

LECTURE XVI.*

Gen. 1. 27.

So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him.

WE have discoursed to you, more generally, concerning the creation. We now come, (as we are more especially concerned,) to consider the creation of man. It is true, that there is a nobler order of creatures, that were before him in dignity and excellency (at least) in the creation. But because that, of their creation we have not so particular an account; and because our concernment lies less there, I shall immediately fall upon the consideration of what this text puts under our notice, to wit, our own creation, the creation of that creature, called man.

The connexed particle here, that refers these words to what goes before. "So God created man," invites us to call back our eye a little. It is said in the 26 verse, "And God said, Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." And then, the text tells us, "So God created man in his own image." This connexion shews us, that (as you have heard at large,) God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will. So

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he did particularly this great work according to forelaid counsels. "Let us do so; let us make man, and make him such a one, even like God." And so accordingly he did. This may be understood as an allusion to human methods; that is, that men, intending this or that work, they do use somewhat of self-excitation; in order thereunto, they do *accingere se*, they do apply themselves to the action which they intend, and, as it were, recollect their strength, that is now to be exerted and put forth. So is God introduced speaking—"Come now let us go to work afresh, and make that creature man, even the resemblance of ourselves."

And it may also be understood to carry with it, an intimation of that great mysterious doctrine of the Trinity. "Let us make man;" that conjunction of the pronoun of the plural number, with a verb singular, (as we have formerly noted to you,) being probably enough to give some intimation of the glorious subsistencies of the Deity: and who (as you have formerly had noted to you) are to be considered jointly under the notion of Creator.

And it speaks the perfect spontaneity of this work, or (if that may import any thing higher) the perfect intellective liberty wherewith it was done. "Let us make man;" there being no foreign inducement before the creation, there could be nothing *extra Deum*, nothing without God himself, but *proprio motu*, from the inward propension of his own mind, and that vast and boundless abyss of goodness, the fulness whereof was in him, now flowing forth, by free choice and consent, into a creation; and into the creation of such a creature as this. "Let us now make man; it is our mere pleasure to do so:" according to that in Rev. 4. 11. "For his pleasure all things are and were created." He only pleased himself and took a delight in such an effusion of his own glorious power and goodness, breaking forth into such a creation.

In the words themselves, we have two things distinctly to be considered,—the work itself, of God's making man—"God made man;" and—the *norma* or the pattern according to which he made him—"he made him after his own image," made him the designed representation of himself: we shall consider these severally.

I. Consider the work itself, or the making of man—"God made man." And therein, we are yet more distinctly to consider—the product—man; and—the productive act—God made him.

1. For the former of these, the creature now made, and signified by that name of "Man," that we are to consider and con-

template awhile; that is, that we are to turn our eyes inward, and contemplate ourselves, and consider what sort of creatures we are. We hear it often, that man is a microcosm, this whole world in little, an epitome of the universe; the two great classes of being meeting in him; viz. mind and matter, the invisible world, and the visible, touching one another, and having (as it were) a *nexus* with one another in his nature. He hath a mind belonging to the invisible world; and a matter belonging to the visible, in his composition and frame. And so is set a middle creature between the angels and brutes, having the intelligent nature with the one, and the sensitive and inferior nature with the other.

We need to be put in mind of what is so obvious to us; for of all things in the world that we are so prone to overlook and forget, we are most of all apt to forget ourselves: though it were a precept of so high and great importance, and so obvious to a reasonable mind, that it did proceed from the mouth of a Pagan: *Nosce teipsum, first know thyself*, yet it was reckoned too great and important a thing, to be primarily attributed to such a one. And therefore, it was said of it, *e caelo descendit*; surely *it came down from heaven*: no mortal could assume to himself the honour to be the author of so great a saying as this. But though it be a matter of so great an importance, and the obligation thereunto, men perpetual lie, and do lie under; and though it be so obvious to a reasonable mind, yet, generally, look upon all the world, and you may say, “Men are the least part or study to themselves, they least of all consider themselves, to know their own natures, and what sort of creatures they are.”

But that we may a little more distinctly consider this subject, plain it is, that man is a twofold creature; he hath a double nature in him; he is a man and a man: or there belongs to his constitution and frame, an inner and an outward man: as the apostle elegantly enough distinguishes them, in 2 Cor. 4. 16. “An outward man,” that is a perishable and perishing thing; and “an inward man,” which, while that outward man is perishing, is yet capable of being “renewed day by day,” as he there speaks.

Indeed, while we turn our eyes upon ourselves, we are least of all apt to consider what is most considerable in our own frame. A people related to God of old, and even the strictest sort, or sect of them, (the pharisees themselves) our Saviour justly upbraids them with this stupidity, this piece of inconsideration: he speaks to them as a company of besotted fools: “Ye fools, hath not he that made the outward, made the inward

too," in that Luke 11. 40. "He that made that which is without, did not he make that which is within also?" But both of these parts of man, or each of this twofold man, we are distinctly and severally to consider, for both have that in them which claim and challenge the deepest intention of our thoughts. There is the outward man which the Scripture speaks of, but under the notion of a tabernacle, the outward case or frame of man, (as I may so speak,) a thing whereof he is capable of being divested, and which may be laid aside. "I must shortly put off this tabernacle," saith the apostle 2 Peter 1. 14. He speaks of a going forth, an exodus, as out of his house, out of his dwelling—"the earthly house of this tabernacle." So it is called 2 Cor. 5. 1. "For we know that if the earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens:" therefore, called a tabernacle, because it is designed but for a temporary and very short abode and residence that we are to have in it; in comparison whereof, the future residence of holy and good souls, is spoken of under the name of a "mansion," in John 14. and in Luke 16. "everlasting habitations;" these are but very temporary ones. But though they are so, yet their present frame and structure doth challenge a very serious, and reverend, and adoring contemplation; whether we look upon the grosser, or more bulky part of this structure or frame; or whether we consider that which is more latent, less obvious unto common notice. If we consider the grosser part of this structure, or tabernacle, either in the whole of it, or by parts, how admirable a thing is the composition of a man, even of the outward man, this exterior part of man! Such, as claims to have such things said of it, as we find, Job 10. 10, 11. "Hast thou not poured me out like milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh, and hast fenced me with bones and sinews. Thou hast granted me life and favour, and thy visitation hath preserved my spirit." All being prefaced with this, "Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me together round about, yet thou dost destroy me;" he then seeming, as if he were all of a sudden about to ruin, and throw back into dust again, his own excellent and so curious work: and of how great excellency is it, according to the account that these words give us, and according to that too which we have Psalm 139. 13, 14. "Thou hast possessed my reins; and covered me in my mother's womb. I will praise thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made: marvellous are thy works; and that my soul knoweth right well. My substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in

the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect, when all lay yet in a rough creation ; and in thy book were all my members written, (or in the idea of the Divine Mind) which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them." They were all fixedly formed in the mind of God, while as yet there was nothing brought forth into actual being, so that, this was the effect of the wisdom of a God, this exterior frame of man, so contrived with so exquisite order, every thing belonging to it, in so apt subserviency to the several uses and purposes for which it was originally designed. Here is that which a pagan calls *ars Dei*, a *divine art*, the art of God himself, in this structure or frame, a fabric composed and made up all of miracles ; if we consider the elegance and curiosity of the whole, and if we consider how the several parts were equally made to serve, both for use and comeliness : so that of all the wonders in the world, I know no greater wonder than this, that man himself, a creature so capable of consideration and thought, should ever have thought it possible, any of them, that there should be such a production as this without design ; as if it were a casual, an unintended thing, that there should be so many severals in this composition and frame of man, but never intended for the uses and purposes for which they so manifestly and peculiarly serve. How stupid a creature is man become, that he is willing to admit even the greatest absurdity, rather than to admit God into his thoughts.

If we look into this frame ; (though I can but touch upon things, and it is hard to know where to touch upon so great a multitude of things both observable and admirable at once,) if we should consider the aptness of the several parts that are in common use for the several offices and functions which they perform ; if we consider what is external ; if we consider what is internal ; if we consider what is ornamental in our frame ; how full of the highest and clearest judications of the greatest wisdom that can be conceived ! There are, belonging to this frame of ours, the organs of the several senses, which do give so many advantages to such a creature as man is : every sense, or sort of sense, it hath its censorium inlaid in this frame ; the things that are necessary unto feeling, and necessary unto touch, and necessary unto smell, and necessary unto hearing, and necessary unto sight. All these organs do belong to the outward man ; though the sentient be somewhat diverse and distinct, from this outward and external frame : for it is not the eye itself that sees, but the soul in the eye ; nor the ear itself that hears, but the same soul in the ear ; and so as to all the rest of the senses too ; which we all know, if that soul were

dislodged, and retired, and gone, could no more see, or hear, or touch or taste, than a stone : but the aptness of these several organs for their several uses and purposes, such a curious contrivance as that of the eye for the sight, and that of the ear for the hearing, it would require volumes to unfold and open these to you.

And then, if we consider that which is more latent, even in the outward man itself, not obvious to the notice of any of our senses, and that is the more spirituous part, in this frame of man, or the several sorts of spirits. I do not now speak of his purposes, and without which it were impossible that any of these operations could be performed, which do belong to the nature of man in this present state. There are the elementary spirits that are to be found in it, and that are common to it, with the inanimate part of the world. As there is no sort of body conceivable, in which we may not also conceive somewhat or other of that which they call elementary spirit. And then, there is a higher sort of spirit, which serves for vegetation ; and a higher than that, which serves for sensation ; and all these, no doubt, some way or other distinguished, though we are not capable of assigning their differences, otherwise than from their effects ; but all meeting in the frame of a living man : one sort of these spirits finer than another ; another, again, finer than that ; but undistinguishable by us by any other way, than only by such indications as the things effected do speak and hold forth to us. All these things we use continually ; and we could do nothing without them ; nor be what we are without them, in this present state. But seldom or rarely doth it occur to any thought, what they are, or that there are such things belonging to us, when without them there could be no motion : they are not things that are self-moving, (as no matter can,) yet they are things by which that which hath the power of motion in itself, doth perform such and such kinds of motions as are necessary in this frame of ours.

If we should consider the several things which are thus used : as all the muscles in the body of a man, reckoned to be about four hundred and thirty, without which, and without the spirits that do move them, the man were a mere trunk, a dead trunk ; so many several sorts of muscles to turn that one member of ours, the eye, this way and that way, and the several agitations of spirits that must be the continual spring of all these motions. How quickly do we turn our eye this way, that way, upward, downward, and never consider what turns it about us, without which no such motion could be performed.

If we think of all this, what cause have we to break out often

into those same raptures, that we find the Psalmist, herein, in that last-mentioned place: "How fearfully and wonderfully am I made: Thy works are marvellous, and that my soul knoweth right well." And it is a mighty emphasis that these words carry in them: "and that my soul knoweth right well:" that is, it signifies this to have been with him a wonted study, that his mind used to be fixed on the contemplation of it—"my soul knows it right well;" these are with me beaten tracks, they are not uncouth or unusual thoughts; these are things that I think of, over and over again, from day to day." Indeed, when any one comes to consider the works of God, and particularly, this work of composing this fabric of our outward man, they are wondrous; and we must consider them so. If we do but glance but one single thought upon this work of God, we cannot but say, "they are wondrous." But how few of us can say, "and this my soul knoweth right well:" that it is a thing to which my thoughts are used, and which is my continual work; I do, from day to day, employ them and keep them in exercise upon such a thing and subject as this.

But time, and my own design of speaking as succinctly as is possible unto the several heads which I am to discourse of, allow me not further to insist on this same outward man.

We are to look yet further: and when we have taken some view of the habitation, to consider the inhabitant, that thing in man called mind and spirit; spirit in a higher and nobler sense than we used that application before. According to the exterior part of man, that you have heard of, he is called Adam, a composition of earth, of red earth, as that word signifies, or out of the dust of the ground; that earth pulverized, reduced to the finest particles, according as more or less, so they were capable of being wrought into that curious contexture which their great Maker did design: hereupon man is said to be thus made. He hath the denomination there, first from his outward, more visible and observable part; this is the creature which appeared first to come under notice and view, upon this stage of this lower world. There was nothing perceivable of him, but this exterior frame that was called man: he hath that denomination *Quoad apparentiam*, in respect to what he did appear, and was obvious to common notice, or that might be in such creatures obvious to the notice of one another, the first notice. It could only, in that respect, be said, that God made man of the clay or dust of the ground; that is, what of man was capable of being made out of matter, was made out of such, or out of that matter.

But you have afterwards, a further account of this creature,

in the 2nd chap. of Genesis and at the 7th verse; that "God did breathe into him the breath of life, and he became a living soul." The outward man carried the name of man before; but now we are given to understand there was a nobler thing belonging to this frame and composition of man, which admits that he should be called "a living soul," from that breath of life, which it is said God breathed into him, that breath of life. It is as significant an expression as we could have in words, or that words could furnish us with, of vital spirit, a living spirit, that is the principal thing in man. And so, now, he hath the denomination, *Quoad rem* as he had it *Quoad apparentiam* before. Before, he was denominated according to his appearance: so man was said to be made of the dust of the ground: now he hath his denomination according to what he is in reality; a living soul being breathed into him, as vital breath, from God himself, most immediately.

And here we are to stay our thoughts a little, and consider what this is. It is to be known, (as all essences are,) but by certain properties that do speak themselves in such and such peculiar effects, and so tell us what the cause must be from whence such effects do proceed. It is plain, that this same soul of man must be a substantial being; otherwise, it were never capable of such actions and effects as we manifestly find do belong to us, and are wrought by us. Now if we do consider them severally,

1. That which is fundamental of all other, is, that it manifestly appears to be a vital thing; the spirit of man is distinguished by vitality, by being essentially vital. It is very true, indeed, that these bodies of ours, as long as the soul inhabits them, live too, have life in them: but I pray consider, what is so very obvious, the difference of that life, from what we must understand and conceive to be the life of our spirits. We know the body of man so lives, as that it doth not constantly live, it doth not always live; and so life doth not belong to it essentially; life is separable from it. The body of man, it can be killed; it is capable of losing its life, and so its life is but a derived and a borrowed thing from somewhat else. Spirit hath life radically in itself. For we must conceive the spirit of a man, this breath of life (as the learned languages, hebrew, greek, and latin, have no word for spirit but that which signifies breath,) I say this spirit, or breath of life, is, in itself, vital, so as that unto it, to be, and to live, is all one. The body may be, and not live; (as I told you) life is separable from it; but the spirit, the soul, while it is, it always lives, its being and its life are not capable of being parted from one another, as it is in the

life of the body. And so it is from that life, that the life which is in the outward man is derived, and transmitted in all the several parts of that body that do partake of life. And then,

2. Next to life, (which is fundamental and indeed of larger extent, and not so distinguishing,) there is intellect; there is a power of understanding that belongs to the spirit of a man, by which his spirit is a thing capable of thought, or doth consist in a thinking power, a continual source or spring of thoughts; so that if we never so continually attend ourselves, we cannot find ourselves not thinking: there is a perpetual forge of thoughts, from whence they fly and spring up, as sparks from this or that fiery substance, and never cease to do so. And within that compass of intellect, lies not only power of forming thoughts, but of connecting thoughts; of affirming one thing that we think, of another thing that we think; and the power of deducing thoughts from other thoughts, of inferring some thoughts from former thoughts; that is, that because I think so and so, therefore, I consequently think so and so too; some thoughts having a dependance upon other foregoing thoughts: and a power of ranging thoughts, of methodizing thoughts, of putting thoughts into a frame and order, according to that relation which they mutually bear to one another.

And this, shews this same thing called spirit or mind in man to be, not only a substance, but a substance quite of another kind from this outward man of ours, that is made up of matter, though there be things belonging to this frame, never so fine, and did require never so high purity of matter; yet plain it is, that the spirit, that is in man, must be somewhat of a quite different nature; inasmuch as there is nothing of matter, whether gross or never so fine, that is capable of a thinking power: for you can no more discern a tendency of a power of thinking in a flame of fire, than you do in a piece of clay; a flame of fire is nothing more rational, nothing more capable of understanding, than a log or a stone; and therefore, whatsoever hath the power of thought belonging to it, must be a being of quite another nature and kind, from any thing of matter, be it never so fine, never so pure; there being no property at all belonging to matter, that hath any possibility of contributing to such a thing as thought—neither figure, nor the size, nor the motion, nor the connexion of parts one to another. It is altogether an unimaginable thing, that a piece of matter, be it never so small, should be more capable of thought for being of such a figure, or less capable of thought for being of such a one: that if it be square it cannot think; if it be round, then, it cannot think.

if it be of a less particle, then, it can think ; if it be a greater, then it cannot think : if such and such particles be separated one from another, then they cannot think ; if they be put together they can. No reasonable understanding can imagine any contribution in these things unto the act of thinking. And the motion of so many parts can contribute as little and no more than so. A heap of sand lying still, can be capable of no thought ; and if it be agitated, never so much, it will be as little capable : therefore, nothing is plainer than, that this property of the mind or spirit of man ; that is, intellect or the power of thought, or thinking, doth speak this spirit, or mind of man, to be quite a diverse thing from all the matter that belongs to the outward man ; even from every thing of the outward man ; that the inward and the outward man must be quite diverse or different things. And then,

3. There is the power of will or choice, belonging to this inward man, the mind and spirit within us, by which we are capable of determining concerning our own actions ; of choosing or refusing, of resolving to do so and so ; of resolving not to do so ; or resolving to do the contrary : a strange power, and of vast extent, that doth distinguish and belong to the spirit of man, and through which this soul and spirit of man come to have that double capacity, to wit, of duty and felicity. I were capable of neither of these, if it were not for that elective power, and consequently upon the intellective, by which I am capable of choosing my own actions, and the objects upon which they are to be employed. I speak now of the original capacity belonging to the spirit and mind of man, not considering, at present, the impairment or diminution thereof, by the apostasy : of which there may be occasion to speak in the proper place, and season, when it may come in our way. But it is the same faculty or property of the mind or spirit of man, to wit, the power of election and choice, that makes him the subject both of duty and felicity. He were never capable of duty, if it were not for this ; nor capable of felicity, otherwise than by this ; as he is a creature obliged by the law of duty, and capable of being rewarded and remunerated by felicity. This is the thing inferred by the power and faculty in man, the power of volition, depending upon that understanding or cogitative power, which you have heard of before ; though some take that term of cogitation to extend so far as to take this in too. But we are not considering of words now. And then,

4. There is the executive power, by which we reduce into act, these purposes and intendments of ours ; a strange sort of

power; that is, being directly under the dominion and government of that former power, the power of choosing; that is, because we will do so and so; and so choose we to go to such a place; or we stay and move not: we move this and that member, or we restrain that motion. If we will, we can move our whole frame with very great facility; or else if we will not, it is very difficult to move it. That I can by the notice, by the command of my will, make my whole bodily frame so easily move to this or that place, which without that empire or commanding act of my will, it would give so much difficulty and trouble to others to do. And I move it myself *nullo conatu, nullo negotio*, upon the matter, I make nothing of it, I do it with ease. This is a power that we continually use; but we very seldom reflect upon it, that we have such an ability belonging to our natures, and even to the very nature of our spirits, the soul within, by which to move to and fro, these members of our body, as from time to time we do. And,

5. There is belonging, as very peculiar, (and some think it is most of all peculiar,) to the mind and spirit of man, the capacity of religion, of which the brute creature is altogether incapable: some think this more differencing of man than reason itself. It is a very dubitable and disputable matter, whether there be not that very thing in many creatures, that are reckoned brutes only, that we call reason. But concerning this, religion, the matter is out of all question and doubt, that it belongs, most peculiarly, to the mind and spirit of man; that is, the capacity of acknowledging a Divine Being, the Author of our being, and of reverencing and adoring that Being accordingly; that power by which I do *susplicere numen*, by which I consider a Being above me, the Author of my being, and of all beings, and of any disposition in me to pay a reverence and adoration to that sovereign and supreme Being thereupon. And,

6. Lastly, there is belonging to this spirit of man, (as peculiar and distinguishing too,) the power of governing the inferior faculties; the power of governing sensitive appetites and passions; and even, in very great part, the acts of the exterior senses: I say, in very great part—there will be some involuntary actions; but how far the natural power of man did herein originally extend, we are not in this state of our apostasy capable of knowing now. But undoubtedly, when man was himself in his innocent and instituted state, and where the inferior nature was held in direct subordination to the superior, as there were then no undue thoughts, so neither were there any undue motions of an inferior nature itself, but what were certainly

commandable and kept within due limits. And this empire did belong to the mind and spirit of man, to govern and conduct all the inferior appetitions and affections, and all the external actions, so as they should move or not move, be done or not be done, as to that governing wisdom seated on the throne, in the mind of man, did seem meet.

Of this there will be more occasion to speak when we come to the latter particular in the text; to wit, "that in the image of God made he man:" when we come to treat of the *norma* and pattern of this great divine work. But upon what hath been said, thus far, concerning the product, the thing produced, man: surely our thoughts cannot but reproach us that they are so seldom employed upon so important a subject, and that lies so very near us: for what can be so near us as ourselves? That we can have our eyes round about us, like the eyes of the fool in the end of the earth, and so seldom find time and room for any such thing as self-contemplation,

LECTURE XVII.*

Whereas, in the former discourse, we told you, that it is impossible that the spirit of a man, this inward man, can have been made of matter, so neither can it be made of spirit, for spirit is not a partible thing. If any should suppose it to be made of created spirit, it is as good to suppose it made immediately out of nothing, as any former created spirit; for the necessity will recur of referring this production, at length, to that special kind; to wit, of making a thing out of nothing. But for its being made of the uncreated spirit, God himself, that would be to make the Divine Essence a divisible thing, a partible thing, as if there were parts capable of being severed from parts belonging to the same essence of God. And therefore, though among some of your heathens, (your stoics particularly) there have been those high hyperbolical expressions of men's being parts and members of the Godhead, *Des partes sumus et membra*, as Seneca's expression is: and that celebrated stoic speaks softly enough indeed of the soul's being *divine particula auræ*, the soul should be a *particle of divine breath*; these are expressions allowable enough as high rhetorical strains, but not as expressions of rigid truth, by any means. If, therefore, the spirit of man were neither made of matter, nor of spirit, it must have been made out of nothing. And so

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in reference to this part of the product, the effect, the thing produced, man, that must needs be by most immediate creation in the strictest and most proper sense.

As for the question, "Whether that these souls were made at once, or whether made successively just then, when put into a state of union with these bodies?" is a thing altogether unfit for us to concern ourselves about; it being, indeed, such a thing as divine Revelation hath given no determination to; and such a thing as no human investigation can ever be able to make a determination of, one way or other; we must be content to be ignorant where God hath drawn a veil over things, and not brought them into any kind of light that we can discern them by.

And then, for the completing of this production or productive act, we are to consider, (as comprehended in it) the union that is brought about between these two parts, the outward man and the inward man, without which there could not be one product considerable in the case: for when we speak of God's making man, (as this text doth,) the meaning cannot be barely, that he made a body for him out of the earth, and that he made a soul for him out of nothing; the production of these two parts will not amount to the making of a man, unless these two parts be united and brought together, so that of both to compass and make one thing: a man is not created till then, not made till then. And most plain it is, that this union, it was made, at first, by God himself immediately, without the co-operation of any second cause. But it is in the after productions, brought about in a settled way and course of nature, in which, yet, we cannot say that man's being produced, doth consist in the making of his body, or the making of his soul; but in the union of the one with the other. There is not a man produced till then; till these two parts, being produced, are brought together. But they are not brought together in union in the same way as they were at first: for at first it was by God's own immediate operation; but he hath now settled the course of nature wherein all following productions are brought about. But yet, still it is his work; otherwise, man which was God's creature at first, would cease to be God's creature, if he were not still the Maker. Now concerning this union we have this to say:

1. That it doth not confound the parts united, one with another; for the body is a body still, and not a spirit: and the spirit is a spirit still, and not a body. These parts do remain distinct in the union: there is no confusion of them in the case, nor identification; as if the nature of the one were

lost and swallowed up, in the nature of the other. But the body continues to have all the properties of a body; and the spirit continues to have all the properties of a spirit; the properties of the one are not communicated to the other. It is not the body that thinks, nor the spirit that grows; or the like, but these particular distinguishing actions proceed, that are proper to the one and the other, they remain unto each. But,

2. We have further to say, concerning this union, that, though under it the parts remain distinct, and are not confounded one with another, yet they are most intimately united; though it does not identify them, nor confound them, yet is this union a most close union, a most inward union, so as not to be ordinarily separable by any means that shall not discompose the recipient herein, that it shall be no longer naturally capable of being; so the soul cannot but stay there: and when it ceaseth to be capable of being the apt recipient of the soul, the soul can no longer stay; it is, therefore, a most intimate union; and a most marvellous one; and one of the greatest mysteries in all the creation of God; considering the vast difference that there is between these two natures, a piece of clay, and a mind; that these two should be so united together, that so long as the one remains naturally susceptible of the other, they can by no means be parted, they cannot be separated, while the crasis of the body remains entire. It is one of the greatest miracles in all the great creation of God; that is, that when this mind of mine, this spirit, is loose from all matter besides, I can move myself from this place, or that, as I will; I cannot yet, by any means, from this body of mine: to this piece of matter I am tied and fixed: and though this soul of mine be an elective and voluntary agent, and I do things electively, and at choice, I cannot at my own choice take myself out of this body of mine, to separate it from my soul; but whither ever I have a mind to go, it follows me, and goes with me, and cleaves with me; I cannot shake it off while the crasis lasts. This is a thing whereon the wisdom of the Creator hath infinitely outwitted us, and gone beyond us. We know not what hath tied this knot, this knot of man, made of these two parts, that are so little of kin, as dust and spirit are to one another, yet so to adhere to one another, as that they cannot be severed by any art, or any power, as long as the crasis, or whole constitution lasts, so as this mind or spirit can go out and come in at pleasure. Let it be considered, for it is one of the deepest mysteries of divine wisdom in all the creation of God. A great wonder it is in itself; and really, it is not a less wonder

that it should be so little considered, that man, that hath such a thing as this belonging to his nature, a union of two such, so disagreeable parts, should so seldom reflect upon it, so seldom allow himself to contemplate and look into the mystery of his own composition.

But now, to go on to the *Use* of this former part—God made man : here are but a few words. But it is a vast improvement that they are capable of, if we would give our thoughts scope ; and if it might please the Divine Spirit to concur and fall in with his own word. Here lies before us the foundation, laid bare and open to view, of the whole law of nature : that which we call the law of nature herein, it hath its foundation even in this—God made man. It results but from the nature of God, and the nature of man compared together, or with one another ; the nature of the Creator and the nature of the creature, this creature, such a creature. Inferior creatures are not governable by a law ; it is an intelligent, voluntary subject that alone is capable of being so governed. And inasmuch as God is the most perfect intellectual Being, and our Creator, and we are intellectual beings too, and his creatures, hence results upon us the obligation of that law which is called “the law of nature ;” and may justly be so called, or which otherwise may be called “the law of our creation.” Take that in the general. But to be here a little more particular, there are these several things to be learned even from hence—that God made man.
As,

1. Is God indeed our Maker ? Then certainly there ought to be in us a most thirsty, longing desire to know him, as far as our minds are capable of knowing him. For what ! Can I be content to be ignorant who it is that made me ? Indeed, there cannot be a higher and more notorious violation of the law of our nature, or creation, to be willingly ignorant of that God that made me, and gave me being. But how dismal a thing is it, that we should so generally need to be taught how to answer the very first question that we are wont to ask our children : “Who made you ?” I hope you are wont to do it ; God knows how it is ; but I hope it is your wont and use to ask your children, “Who made you ?” But pray let us consider, Do we not need to be taught ourselves, what we pretend to teach our children, “who made us ?” When you would teach your children so much, do you mean that they should repeat the words and no more ? Is it not your meaning, that you would have them understand who made them ? Is it not your meaning that they should have some notion in their minds of him that made them ? If we had so, and a true, right, correspondent notion, O ! how mightily

impressive would that very thought be upon our souls; how would it strike through all our powers, for ourselves to answer that question, "Who made us?" He that is infinitely beyond all thought, beyond all conception, declare his name, or his Son's name, if thou canst tell: as it is said unto Ithiel and Ucal, Prov. 30. 4. Into what an amazement should it put us to consider, what answer we should put to this question, "Who made us?" Into how profound thinking should it cast our minds? Into how deep thoughts? Out of how vast and immense a fulness and plenitude of life, and being, and power, we did spring? That vast plenitude, that abyss of being, that answers the question, "Who made me?" He made me, that is the infinite fulness of all being, and of all life, and of all excellency, and of all perfection: and shall not I covet to know him? At the same time that I acknowledge him incomprehensible, I must look upon the knowledge of him as most desirable, the most desirable of all knowledge.

And therefore, it speaks a most horrid degeneracy (as there will be occasion more directly to take notice of hereafter) of this thinking part of man, his mind and spirit, that it can think of so many thousands of things, and covet to know them, affect to know them, but not affect to know the Author of its own being, of its own life, and of all those great powers and faculties that he hath furnished the reasonable, intelligent nature with; "They liked not to retain God in their knowledge." Rom. 1. 28. They did not approve of it: that is the import of the word: a strange thing that this matter being proposed to God's own creature, and a creature capable of thought and understanding. Hast thou a mind to know God, to understand him that gave thee being? No, I do not approve of it. They approved not to retain God in their knowledge; there was a secret dislike and disaffection; "an alienation from the life of God," as it is expressed, Ephes. 4. 18. "and this they are willingly ignorant of," (saith the apostle Peter 2 epis. 3. 5.) "that the world was made at first by the word of God, the earth standing out of the waters and in the waters. Of this they were willingly ignorant." This matter, it lay hid from them, being very willing that it should: that is the import of the expression the Spirit of God makes use of there. It lies hid from them, being willing of it. What lies hid? That this world had a creation; of this they are willing to be ignorant; and so, consequently, that they had a creation. They desire not the knowledge of it; they say to God, "Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thee." Job 21. 14. Here is divine light and glory shining every where through this world; but

we choose rather to dwell in the dark as to this thing. "The light shineth in darkness, but the darkness comprehendeth it not;" receives it not, would exclude and shut out that light: a voluntary darkness; as if that darkness should entertain thoughts and communings with itself; as if there should be an agreement among the several clouds of that darkness; "Come, let us collect and gather together thick about such and such minds, to fence them against the beams of such light;" this mind is self-collecting, and gathering these clouds, drawing them in, inwrapping itself in them; "O! let us not know God, though he made us; God made me and yet I will not know him." O! unnatural thing; most monstrously unnatural.

Even so it is with men in their distresses, when nature itself would dictate to them, "O cry to him to give thee help who hath given thee being." Do but observe that, Job 35. 10. "They cry by reason of oppression of the mighty; but none saith, Where is God my Maker." An amazing thing that men in their distress will many times cry to rocks and stones but not say, "Where is God my Maker?" Cry to rocks and mountains, (as they will at last) but lift up no cry to heaven, "Lord I would fain know thee, manifest thyself to me in this my distress." No, men will perish under their burdens rather than do it: such is the disaffected temper of men's minds towards God. Indeed, for ease and relief they will cry, but not for God, or say, "I want to know God;" that is none of their sense. "My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God, when shall I come and appear before God?" Nothing more remote from the minds and hearts of men than this sense. And yet, it is not understood, what they are incurring of guilt and misery, by this neglect of getting their minds furnished and enriched with the knowledge of him that made them. It is not considered what lies upon it. "It is eternal life to know thee the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." And if these two be necessary (as we find in that John 17. 3.) If both these, I say, be necessary, how fearful a case is it, if we cannot get men over the first, or to the first, which is more natural. But the knowledge of the true God, that lies within the compass of the sphere of nature, that belongs to natural religion. And a compliance with the divine pleasure in this, to wit, seeking to know him, belongs to the law of nature, by the first and primary obligation of that law upon us. At what a distance are their souls then, from blessedness and eternal life, that when it is "eternal life to know the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent," we cannot get man to the first. No,

they are content to be all their days ignorant of God; yea, though he be a Father to them.

O! strange prodigy of unnaturalness! So you would account it, if that were the temper of any child, that he did disaffect to converse with, or take any knowledge of, his own father. But this is the peculiar relation between God and men. He is a Father to them, a Father upon a natural account; as he hath been the immediate Creator of their spirits. And therefore, when Christ's line is run up to the highest, you find it run up to Adam—"Who was the Son of Adam:" and then by Adam it is run up to God—"Who was the Son of God," Luke 3. 38. and upon that account it is that we are said to be "his offspring," in that Acts 17. 28. An expression that the apostle borrows from a celebrated poet of their own, a certain astronomical poet, who was highly in vogue with that people, or with the philosophers of that place; that university at that time. One of your own poets tells us "we are his offspring." Man is the creature of God: but with very great peculiarity. He hath many creatures besides. All the inferior universe are his creatures too: but among all, man only is the son; that is, there is none below him to whom that title is ever given of being his son. "And shall we not be subject to the Father of spirits and live?"

Besides this supernatural ground of this relation of Father and Son between God and the spirits of men: I say, besides the supernatural ground of it in regeneration, it hath its natural ground. And you will see more of it when we come to consider the Second Part—Man's being created after God's image: for if we speak of human productions, a man makes many things himself, yet what things he makes they are of a different nature from himself; but whatsoever he begets is of the same nature, of a like nature with his own. Human nature can make many things, make houses, make garments, but they have nothing of a similitude or agreement of nature with the maker. But it is this peculiar sort of production that gives foundation to the relation of father and son, even that which makes the product to be of the same nature and kind, or of an agreeable nature to the productive cause. If man be the son of God, then he must be an intelligent being, as He is. And this is the state of things between God and men; and yet they do not know it, and choose not to know it, are willingly ignorant of it. The matter is upon account plain, that their ignorance of God is voluntary; for that it is evident, it is not necessary; that is, they do not live ignorant of God because he cannot be known: for his glory shines every where. There is

not the meanest creature but proclaims Deity to every one who will attend: there is not the most despicable pile of grass, or grain of sand, or any such thing, that will not make an argument to us of Deity, that cannot fail but be most cogent and unanswerable. For take but one single pile of grass, one single grain of sand, and here is a real something; that is plain. But is it a thing that came into being of itself? Is this pile of grass, or grain of sand, a self-subsisting thing? No, by no means; no reasonable thought can imagine that, that it can be a self-subsisting thing: for then it would have more perfection in it than all the world hath besides, that did not make itself, or come into being of itself: then it owes itself to a maker, and so we are unavoidably led to God. If you but so much as set yourself to contemplate a grain of sand, or a pile of grass, follow the train of your own thoughts but a little way and you are led to God, whether you will or no: this is either something or nothing; I find it to be a real something: well, but what is it? a thing that subsisted of itself? No, by no means; for then it would have all the perfections, all the excellencies of the universe in it; and infinitely more; this grain of sand, and pile of grass, would have more excellency in it than all the world: for it is plain, that this world did not make itself; why then we must refer it to the Maker; and so you are led to God; whether you will or no, by so mean a thing.

Therefore, I say, men's ignorance of God is not necessary; because they cannot know him: it must, therefore, be voluntary, because they are willingly ignorant of him. And the more plainly so, because, whereas they have a sufficient demonstration of the being of a God, even in the meanest creature, they have a more abundant demonstration in themselves, and from themselves. If a grain of sand, or pile of grass, will prove a creature and a Deity to me, how much more must I myself who know I did not make myself. I know I came into being so many years ago: so that this work of giving an answer to this question "Who made you?" doth not lie remote: I do not need to fly up into heaven, or go down into the depth of the earth, or to cross the seas, for an answer to it; but only look into myself. The word is nigh me, in my mind, and in my mouth; if I will allow that to speak my mind: I have in me these powers, these faculties, that nature, that most expressly represent God to me. *I find myself a creature that can use thoughts; I find I have a power in me of laying designs of forming projects, of foreseeing things, of comparing thought with thought, of inferring and deducing one thought from ano-

ther. How manifestly doth all this lead me to God, the perfectly intellectual Being!

Therefore, it is the most amazing thing, that our thoughts can reflect upon, that there should be such an indisposition and averseness in us to know him that made us. God made man; but man will not know God, though he be not a Creator, at large, only to him, but a Father; and man, in respect of his soul and spirit, his very offspring, he being the Father of spirits: upon the account whereof, pagans themselves have been wont to speak of God, as the paternal Mind, Father of all minds, and of all spirits, as some of them by the light that shone, even to them, could not avoid to see and say.

There is but one thing that leads to many more parts of the law of nature, and our condition which results in all the several parts of it, from the collation and putting together these two things—God and man: man being considered as the thing made, and God as his Maker; God made man. Sure, I say, in the first place, nothing can be more reasonable, and suitable to this state of the case, than that man should have a mighty thirst to know God, to know him that made him. One would think it should be an uneasy state of the spirit of man, to be in any such ignorance of God as should proceed from neglect: to be ignorant of God by neglect, by not caring to know him, by not concerning one's self to have that knowledge, that should be the uneasiest thing in all the world to the spirit, to be capable to have that said to him, "So many years thou hast lived in the world, lived in the flesh, a tabernacle that thy Creator and Maker hath framed for thee, and put thee into it, and all this while thou hast not cared to know him, nor concerned thyself to get any acquaintance with him." It very much becomes and concerns us to covet to know him. It is a very unnatural thing to be content to be ignorant of him that made us; but not to be willing to know him, that is much worse. But now,

LECTURE XVIII.*

2. We may hence collect, that our constant, grateful adoration of God, is a most reasonable duty ineumbent upon all of us. Nothing is more deeply fundamental in the law of our creation, than the law of worship. "Let us come and bow down, and kneel before the Lord our Maker." It is a joyful homage

* Preached January 13, 1694,

that is claimed unto him on this account, the most complacential adoration. "Let us come before him with thanksgiving: it is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves." Indeed, nothing can be more reasonable hereupon, than those two great parts of natural worship, to wit, supplication and thanksgiving. Supplication; Should not a people seek unto their God? Did he make us? did he give us being? from whom else are we to expect all the good we need? He that hath given us being; all the accessories of being are to be looked for only from him. And thanksgiving; these two parts of natural worship, are complicated in one another; in the institution of them, as they are in the reason of them, and root of them. "Let your requests and supplications be always made to him, with thanksgiving," as in divers texts of Scripture, which I might refer you to, and even upon that account, that he hath given us our very being itself, which is the fundamental unto all other good that we are any way capable of, that he hath given us being of such a kind. So God made man.

We should consider what is involved in the nature of man, and so bethink ourselves what we have to bless God for: that is, the primitive nature which God gave man at first, or wherewith he made him, every thing that he made was good, and so was that more excellently good. It is storied concerning Plato, a heathen, that dying, he gave God solemn thanks for three things: "That he made him a man, and not a brute; that he had made him a Grecian and not a barbarian, (there being much more light among them in his time, than with the rest of the world, to wit, the light of philosophy and cultivated reason;) and the third was, because he had ordered it so that he should live in Socrates' days, who was reckoned so great a luminary in that part of the world among them, while yet they were overspread with paganism." O! how awfully should we adore God that he hath given us a being; that he hath given us rational, intelligent natures, capable of knowing and enjoying so great things! that he hath assigned us our station in such a part of the world, and where we have opportunity to know a greater One than Socrates was! that he hath ordered our creation in such circumstances as he hath done, in such a time and such a part of the world! Nothing is a more equal law that can be upon us, than that we should have an habitual, adoring gratitude, possessing our souls upon such accounts.

And, upon the whole, Adoration! how correspondent a thing is it to creation; adoration on our part, unto creation on his part? How convictive a saying was that celebrated one of Austen? "If I (saith he) were capable of making a reason-

able creature to stand forth out of nothing, endowed with the power of reason and understanding, the first thing sure that I should expect from him would be, that he should fall down and worship me." In what an unnatural state, then, is this world upon this account, that being inhabited by so many reasonable creatures, it is inhabited by so few worshippers !
Again,

3. Another practical deduction from hence, is, that we ought to live in a continual dependance on him that made us. So God made man. Hath he made us, and will not we depend upon him? trust in him? This is most essential homage due to our Maker, to place upon him, and exercise toward him, a continual, vital trust. This is a glory which he will not impart, but concerning which he is jealous. And, indeed, as to purely internal worship, this is the first, and most radical of it, trust in God : and so very natural to an intelligent creature, that I remember Philo Indæus hath this expression concerning it : "That he is not fit to be called a man, that hath not in him hope towards God." He seems to mean it of what is most natural to man, that he is not to be reckoned a man, that doth not trust in God, and doth not place a hope in him.

Natural dependance is reckoned, consequentially, essential to a creature ; and it is so. A creature is naturally a depending thing ; an explicit dependance, that doth as properly belong to an intelligent creature, as natural dependance doth to all other creatures. A creature, as such, taken at large, is a mere dependant upon him that made it. This whole creation is nothing else but a thing dependant upon God, upon divine power and upon divine pleasure ; according to which it was determinable, whether it should be, or not be ; and according to which, it is continually determinable, whether it should continue to be another moment, yea or no. And so suitable as natural dependance is to a creature, as a creature, so suitable is intellectual dependance to a reasonable creature, as such : that is, that it should consider its dependant state, and often recount with itself, How came I to be what I am from moment to moment, when I cannot promise myself a moment's breath or being? This is so appropriate a glory to the Deity, that when trust is supremely placed any where else, there is a curse pronounced upon it ; "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man ;" Jer. 17. 5. for this is to rob God of his peculiarity ; to place a homiage on the creature, that is most appropriate and peculiar to the Creator.

But it may be said, In our state of apostasy from God, what room or place is there left for trust in him?

To that I answer, very certain it is, men are in an apostasy from God. But are they, therefore, always to continue so? especially when he is so intent upon a design for their recovery and reducement; and he insists still upon the right that he hath in his own creature. Because his creature is revolted and apostatized, and run away from him, hath he, therefore, lost his right in it? If there be an obligation upon an apostate creature to return, (and if it were a wicked thing to apostatize at first, it must needs be an increase of the wickedness, to continue in that state of apostasy and not to return,) then, wherein stood our revolt, therein must stand our return. The revolt of a creature from God in his apostasy, lay in departing from him through "an evil heart of unbelief;" that it could not trust in him, did not trust in him; trusted the tempter and destroyer of souls, against him, and in opposition to him. And to come out of a state of apostasy must be by trust, if the going into the state of apostasy was by distrust. But this must be in God's own prescribed and appointed way and method. When once it hath pleased him to signify the way in which he is pleased to admit of sinners' return unto him, wherein he hath made the constitution of a Redeemer known, there must be a return in and through him, and trust in God through him: "Ye believe in God, believe also in me." John 14. 1. Where this way of returning to God, so as to make him the supreme Object of our trust, is not known, there the state of a sinner is less capable of remedy. But where it is known, it admits of so much the greater and deeper guilt, if yet there be no thoughts of returning, and returning in this very act, by placing again our supreme and vital trust upon him who was the first great and commanding Object of it; that did most rightfully command it, and challenge it, for himself; Shall I have a creature that shall not trust in me? not make me its all in all? Therefore, to have our interest in God restored by Jesus Christ, that must be our great business, who live under the gospel of Christ.

And then, we are to trust in God under that very notion of the Author of our being, knowing, that because we are apostate creatures, therefore, that he will never, for our sakes, but he will, for Christ's sake, do the part of a kind, benign Creator to us. Our interest in him as Creator being now renewed; not lost and swallowed up, but renewed and restored: and therefore, is the charge laid upon christians (1 Peter 4 19.) to "commit themselves to him in well-doing, as unto a faithful Creator." His interest in us, as our Creator, was never lost; our interest in him, as such, was; but being now restored, upon this restitution, we are continually to trust in him, and commit

ourselves unto him under the same notion of Creator, still. To commit ourselves unto him as a faithful Creator, that is, he did put himself, at first, under obligation (implicitly at least) to his reasonable creatures: "Obey and thou shalt live," shalt be happy, he freely putting himself under this obligation. But the creature, upon his revolt, forfeited all his interest in him, and all right to that promised felicity, which, as an obedient creature, he might have expected: by Christ this right is restored; and so God is to be considered now, by such as through Christ have returned to him, not merely according to the benignity of a Creator, but according to his fidelity also: "commit yourselves to him as a faithful Creator," he having resumed the obligation upon himself to treat such kindly: and he doth it, not merely from unobliged goodness, but obliged, which the notion of faithfulness doth imply. He will be to you a faithful Creator, if you commit yourselves to him accordingly as such. And again,

4. Another piece of practice that we may induce, and should learn, hence, is a constant and most profound humility. What! am I a creature? So God made man: there had never been any such a thing as man if God had not freely made him. O! then how deep an impression of humility should this fix upon our souls! What am I? A creature depending upon will and pleasure; it was lately in the power of another, whether I should be, or not be. A proud creature is a monster in the creation of God; the most horrid monster in the creation. What have I to be proud of, who am of myself nothing, and should never have been any thing, but by vouchsafement, by the good-will of another? It is to that only that I owe it, that I am any thing.

If one creature have more, or do think he hath more, of real excellency than another, that, with the whole of his being is all but a made thing. Thy whole being, whatsoever excellencies belong to it, either as common to that sort of creatures to which thou art annumerated, or more special and peculiar to itself; if it be any thing, (if it be not merely a concealed thing,) it is a made thing, as thou art: thou wast made, and it was made, and it was made to be thine; but all depending upon will and pleasure, therefore is pride a most monstrous thing in the creation of God. The continual sense of all creatures, of any intellectual sense, should be this, "We are all nothing but what it pleased our Creator we should be. We have nothing but by his pleasure; our being is a borrowed being: and the additions, and all the ornaments that have occurred to it, are all made things, all borrowed things." Should any one be

proud of that which he hath borrowed? To wear ornaments that every one knows were borrowed, and to be proud of them, what a madness is that? Our very being is a borrowed thing, and all that belongs to it.

When God would humble a creature down into nothing, thereby to make it the capable receptacle of a Deity, a cohabiting Deity, that with such a one he might dwell, how doth he magnify himself the higher; "Heaven is my throne, and earth is my footstool. Isa. 66. 1. All these things have I made, they are all the works of my own hands. Now, if I can find a creature sensible of this, to such a one will I look, that is of a poor and contrite spirit, that humbles himself into the dust before so mighty and glorious a Creator; with such a one will I dwell; he shall be my temple the habitation of a Deity;" for the Deity will suffer no diminution in uniting with such a one; because that will still be looked upon as the All in all, while he still looks upon himself as nothing. And,

5. We further learn, hence, the great equity of the law of self-denial; it is a most deeply natural law; and when it is made fundamental in Christianity, that is but the revival and reinforcement of a natural law: "Except a man deny himself he cannot be Christ's disciple." Why so, why cannot he be Christ's disciple? Pray consider what was Christ's business, when he was to collect to himself disciples. His business, as a Redeemer, was to recover apostates back again to God; and their discipleship to him, was only to put themselves under his conduct; that under the direction thereof, and through his mediation, they might return to God and be accepted. The very design for which a mediator was appointed, shews the necessity of his insisting upon this law as fundamental to the whole frame of Christianity. As if he had said, "My business as a Redeemer, as Mediator, is to recover and bring back apostate souls to their God again. Wherein were they apostates? In that they did set up themselves apart from God, and in opposition unto God. None can come to me and own me for their Head, and for their Lord, and Intercessor, and Mediator with God, but it must be under this notion; that is, that they look upon me as the only One by whom they are to be restored, and brought back into their primitive state, reduced to God, the great Author, and consequently the end of all things. And therefore, did Christ, in dying, "redeem us to God by his blood." Rev. 5. 9.

We are not to think, that we were, ourselves, the principal end of Christ's redemption: that would be an injurious and absurd imagination; to think that the creature was Christ's chief

end, it were a horrid conception. God must be the chief end of all things; therefore, the design of Christ's dying was to redeem us to God; to restore back such and such creatures to God, that the end for which they were made, might be served upon them. Our interest in him is a secondary thing; but his interest and right in us was the primary thing. Therefore, it was impossible to be otherwise, but that Christ's designing the redemption and reduction of sinners to God back again, must lay this law as fundamental, at the bottom of all that religion he was to set up in the world; that is, self-denial. "You have lived in a separate state apart from God. If you are weary of that life, and will come off from yourselves, then you are for me; then you come under my conduct; I will make your peace; I will buy it out for you, (and he hath bought it out,) and procure your acceptance with God, upon your return." But this can never be, if you have a mind to live separate still, to stand upon your own bottom, and make self your first and last. No, God must be your first and last; and he really is the first and the last. And therefore, "unless any one be willing to deny himself, he cannot be my disciple," saith Christ; he cannot be a christian under any other notion than as one that is now willing that God in all his authority, and greatness, and excellency, and glory, shall entirely fill up that room which, before, self had usurped. And therefore,

6. We further learn, hence, how reasonable and necessary a thing it is to man, as he is a creature, a created thing, to seek an interest in, and union with, God, as his highest and best good; for of himself he is nothing. That he is any thing (as hath been said) did depend upon divine pleasure. Such a one, if he do recollect and use thoughts, must needs state his case thus: "Not only am I incapable of doing any thing towards my own felicity, but I cannot preserve myself in being one moment. What good have I then, but what I must expect from him that made me? I have been severed from God, cut off from God, the great Author of my life and being; I have not, in this my separate state, my good in my own hand; I have not enough in me to make me a happy creature; a creature I am; but I still need to be a happy creature. And when my very being is not my own, what shall I be able to command for myself, or procure for myself, or raise up to myself, within me, that shall be able to be a felicity or satisfaction to me?" He that is nothing of himself, it is the most reasonable and necessary thing to such a one to seek a union with him who is All, I am in myself nothing; there ought, therefore, to be in me a propension towards him who is my All. My soul ought to in-

cline towards him, to adhere to him, as its supreme and best good; "Whom have I in heaven but thee? who can I desire on earth in comparison of thee?" And,

7. A life of the most absolute devotedness to God, is the only righteous way of living; no man lives a righteous life that doth not live a devoted life. And what are we to deny ourselves for, as neither being able to procure a felicitating good to ourselves, nor as being allowed to design a supply for ourselves by any interest of our own? And why are we to deny ourselves in these respects, but that what we take off from ourselves, may be immediately placed upon God who is our All? As we are to seek a union with God for our real, present support, and for our final satisfaction, so are we to devote and addict ourselves to him in order to this service. When we adhere to him, (according to what was expressed in the foregoing head,) that refers to our support and satisfaction; when we devote ourselves to him, that refers to his service; that we may serve and glorify him: for that we are to devote ourselves to him.

And that hath its reason in this too, that we are his creatures, he hath made us: and what did he make us for? Did he ever make a creature to be its own end? He hath made all things for himself: "Of him, and to him, and through him, are all things, that he alone might have the glory. Therefore, is our own created being, (as it is such) our very being itself, a perpetual, standing testimony against us as long as it lasts: if we live not devoted lives; if he who hath been the Author of our being, be not the end of it, this very being of mine is a testimony against me; for what sort of being is it? Not a self-sprung being, but a created being: So God made man. I am a made being; therefore, is my being a testimony against me, (the kind and nature of it being considered.) I am a continual testimony against myself, as I stand a created thing, depending upon will and pleasure, if I live not a devoted life, so as my own heart can bear me record, in the sight of God, that I do live to God. Being to ask myself the question, (and it is a shame to us if we do not often ask ourselves the question,) "What do I live for?" what is my business here in this world? If I cannot answer it with a sincere conscience, "Lord, thou that knowest all things, thou knowest that I principally design to live to thee, and that I reckon my life, and my being, a vain and a lost thing, otherwise than as it is sacred unto thee: I continually testify against myself; I should think it living in vain, to please myself, and to serve an interest of mine own, when I have not a moment to command, but depend upon the

pleasure of another for every moment's sustentation in the being that I have." Who can answer it to himself, to live that sacrilegious and ungodly life? that is, not to live devoted to him by whom we live?

8. We may again learn, hence, what reason there is why we should love God more than ourselves: you cannot but know, this is a thing most strictly charged upon us, and wherein we are upon no terms to be dispensed with; namely, that we are to love him above all. We owe unspeakably more to him than we can do to ourselves. We do not owe to ourselves that we are any thing. "He made us, and not we ourselves." If there be any thing of real goodness in the being that we have, there is infinitely more in the Author of that being: and if goodness, as such, be the object of love, the greatest goodness must be the object of the greatest love, and the highest goodness, of the highest love. And therefore, do not think that we are hardly imposed upon, when the law of our creation doth require and claim this from us, that we love God more than ourselves. And therefore, when our Lord Jesus Christ takes upon him the great business of our redemption, and reconciliation unto God, (which it was impossible for him ever to have effected, if he had not been God as well as man, upon the account of the Deity that was united in the same person with his humanity,) he claims so much for himself from us, that is, he doth tell us, that, if any man do love father, or mother, or wife, or child, or his own life, more than him, he cannot be his disciple. We are to consider that there is Deity in his person, the fulness of the Godhead; and so that he is, as such, the supreme Object of our love, to wit, the Deity which is in him, common to the Father and Spirit, must be the supreme Object of our love. It is as if he should have said, "I come, in kindness, to redeem and save you as lost creatures: you are not to think in doing so, I have laid aside my Deity; for then I could not have been a Redeemer and a Saviour to you: and therefore, having that Godhead united with my humanity, in my own person, I require this of you, that is, that you love me more than your very being: and you cannot be my disciples upon any other terms." He was Creator, in conjunction with the Father, and the Spirit; for "by him were all things made, visible and invisible; and without him, nothing was made that was made." And therefore, we are not to think it a hard or an unreasonable imposition upon us, that we are to love God, and to love Christ, more than ourselves; more than this natural life or being of ours, so as that all must be a sacrifice to his pleasure, if he once say the word, or signify his will to that purpose.

And that is the way, having lost ourselves, to find ourselves again, by loving him above ourselves. "If any man love his life," (that is, supremely,) "he shall lose it; but if he will lose his life for my sake, he shall find it." We find life, and all, in God through Christ, when we are lovers so as to make him the supreme Object of our love, as in that, John 12. 25. No man can really be a loser by so abandoning himself, as to place that love which he unjustly placed upon himself before, (that is, his supreme love,) now upon God, and upon Christ. No man can be a loser, but he finds himself again in this case. He had lost himself before; but now he is restored to himself and to his God both at once. Then,

9. We may further learn, hence, how reasonable a thing it is, that man should be under government: Is he a creature? then he ought to be a governed thing. The most reasonable thing in all the world it is, that he that hath given us being, should give us law. Hath he been the Author of being to us? and shall he not rule his own creature? Shall that be allowed to have a will against his will? To have been raised up out of the dust, but the other day, out of nothing, and now to dispute whose will shall be superior, mine or his that made me, what an insolvency is it! We may again learn,

10. How foolish a thing is self-designing, when men lay their designs apart from God; forming their projects, as the apostle James speaks, chap. 4. 15, 16. "I will go to such a city, and buy and sell and get gain. And I will reside there for such a time." This all proceeds from our forgetting that we are creatures, made things. God hath made us; so that our breath is in his hands. How great an absurdity is it, as well as an injury, that I should talk of forming projects, and laying designs, when I am but a made thing, and there is an arbitrary hand underneath me, which sustains me; but that may let me drop and sink, in the next moment, if it be withdrawn. We ought to say, "If God will, we will do so and so." If your being depend upon his will, certainly your actions and affairs depend upon his will too. But for men to design so and so, without consulting God, or referring themselves to God, is to take upon them as if they were not creatures. And,

11. We may hence learn, further, (as that which is fundamental to all the rest,) how indispensable an obligation there lies upon us to preserve a continual, awful remembrance of God upon our minds and hearts, from time to time, all the day long. "Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth." I pray, let us but use our own understanding in considering this. When it is said, "Remember thy Creator in the days of thy

youth." (Eccles. 12. 1.) Is the meaning of it, that we are only when we are young to remember him, and forget him all our days afterwards? No, the meaning is, that those days of our youth are not to be exempted, we are not at liberty to forget him even then, but that he claims an early and first interest in our time and thoughts, and in the truth and vigour of our spirits, and that we are to begin then, when we are young, as we are to continue all our days afterwards. And how is he to be remembered? Why under the very notion of Creator: that suggests to us the very reason why we are to remember him; because he is our Creator, and our breath is continually in his hands. What! do we think a man can subsist without God, any better when he is grown up, or when he is grown old, than he could when he was young? No, the reason upon which the obligation rests, is still the same upon us all our days; that, therefore, it is a most monstrous thing, to consider how men come to dispense with themselves in this fundamental duty, that virtually comprehends all the rest. All is lost and gone, if we do not so much as remember God. How can we dispense with ourselves to rise up in the morning, without a serious thought of God, and run after our common affairs all the day long, and still forget him? And lie down at night (it may be) without any serious remembrance of him? and yet lie down with the apprehension that we are innocent in all this; we have passed over this day well if we have succeeded in our business, if there hath been no disaster that hath befallen us, all hath been well; though there hath been no serious thought of God; no minding of God at all; that is to live in a downright rebellion against God, through a whole day; and also from day to day, through a whole life's time hitherto: for it must be entire and universal rebellion, inasmuch as all duty towards him depends upon remembering him: we can do nothing besides if we do not do that. Therefore, is that given us as the character and diagnostic of wicked men, of men that are designed for hell, and allotted to hell for their final and eternal inheritance and residence. "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the people that forget God." Psalm 9. 17. And they, accordingly, are characterised as such, who more peculiarly belong to God, and as those whom he owns for his own, and counts his jewels; "In the day that I make up my jewels, saith God, they shall be mine:" Who? why "They that feared the Lord, and thought upon his name." Mal. 3. 16, 17. "And the desire of our soul is to thy name, and to the remembrance of thee." This is the profession of his holy ones. Isa. 26. 8. And, again we may add,

12. Since God made man, you see how easy it is for him to prevent all the evil designs of ill men, if he see good: for they are all his creatures: and hath he made a creature that he cannot govern? If then we see wicked men, at any time, bring their wicked devices to pass, it is not because God cannot rule them; but because he hath deeper designs that they understand not, and we understand not. And therefore, their insolency, and good men's despondency, upon that account, are equally unreasonable. They triumph; and good men are dejected; their hearts sink, and they hang down their heads; and why? because wicked men prevail, and prosper in their way, many times, ages together; and, it may be, in many parts of the world. But,

(1.) Their confidence, on the one hand, is so unreasonable as to be even ridiculous. "He that sitteth in the heavens, laughs, the Most High hath them in derision." "A company of bubbles of being, that I can let drop into nothing in a moment, if I please: and yet they please themselves in the hopes and imaginations of succeeding in such and such designs as they have laid." "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh" at them. He knows how soon he can let such bubbles drop into nothing; and he sees that their day is coming. And,

(2.) Good men's despondency is, upon this account, equally unreasonable. "Hast thou not known, hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary? There is no searching of his understanding." Isai. 40. 28. Thou dost not know the counsels of God, what that all-comprehending mind and understanding of his doth design, in letting creatures awhile run such a course. But we are to be assured, he hath his own creatures in his own hand and power, both men and devils, and can govern them as he pleaseth. He hath a hook in their nostrils, that they themselves are unapprehensible of. He knows their coming in, and their going out, (as he said of that proud Assyrian,) and even all the rage which they have against him. But, I say, he hath a hook in their nostrils, and can turn them as he pleaseth, and when he will: we shall have done a great thing towards the whole business of our religion if we can but get this truth impressed upon, and deeply wrought into our souls; *So God made man*; if we will but learn to look upon ourselves as made things, and look upon all men as made things, continually in the hands, and at the command of their great Creator.

LECTURE XIX.

Gen. 1. 27.

So God created Man in his own Image.

WE have treated of the first thing, to wit, this creation itself. So God made, or created man. And now,

II. We come to speak of the *norma* or pattern of this work of his; or the estate wherein man was created; in his own image; which is mentioned with a reduplication; “in the image of God created he him;” and this we shall speak to briefly, by way of explication and application.

I. In the explication, our great business must be, to inquire, and shew, wherein stood this image of God, wherein man was created. Theirs was a strange and absurd dream, (that of the anthropomophites,) that is, they who did ascribe to God a corporeal shape, and supposed man to be made like to God in that respect. We know, indeed, that in tract of time, our Lord Jesus Christ did assume a human body; but that gives no pretence at all to this imagination: for therein he was made like unto us, man being the pre-existent pattern, and not we like to him, man being made long before. And to ascribe to Deity itself a corporeal shape, must needs speak very mean and base thoughts of God, founded in gross ignorance, and rising up into a mental blasphemy; and indeed, very vile thoughts even of

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ourselves, as if we were but to imitate God in somewhat corporeal.

Some of the more refined pagans have disclaimed, and disclaimed against such gross thoughts of God, warning us to take heed of ascribing any thing corporeal to him; as one, inquiring how we are to conceive of God, according to the doctrine of Plato, (I mean Maximus Tyrius,) he tells us, "we must be very shy, and it ought to be most remote from us, to ascribe any thing at all corporeal to him, neither shape, nor colour, nor magnitude, nor any kind of figure whatsoever: but somewhat of that high excellency as neither to be seen with eyes, nor felt with hands, nor expressed by any words." In some such things we are to understand the excellency of the Divine Nature and Being to consist. And accordingly, the apostle, discoursing to those Athenian philosophers, (Acts 17.) supposeth them very capable of understanding so much as this; he quotes one of their own poets for it, that "we are God's offspring." "And forasmuch," saith he, "as we are the offspring of God, we cannot conceive the Godhead to be like any corporeal thing of never so great excellency;" as silver or gold, of which some corporeal shape or resemblance may be made, or stands never so curiously graven by the art or device of man: we must understand our resemblance to him, as we are his offspring, to lie in some higher, more noble, and more excellent thing, of which there can be no figure; as, who can tell how to give the figure or image of a thought, or the mind or thinking power? This image therefore, must principally lie in some mental thing, and is to be only mentally understood: that is, it must have its seat and subject in the soul and spirit of man itself: and so we must know this image of God in man, wherein he was made, to be twofold; natural and moral.

(1.) Natural, standing in such things as wherein the very nature and essence of man's soul and spirit doth consist and lie. As,

[1.] In spirituality: the soul of man is a spirit, as God himself is a spirit. He, the paternal Spirit, (as a heathen very aptly speaks of,) the fatherly Mind; and agreeably to that, we are his offspring, he being the Father of spirits.

[2.] And in life; essential life. We have bodies that live a borrowed life. Our spirits are, themselves, living things in their own nature and essence; so that life is inseparable from them, as it is not inseparable from our bodies; for our bodies can die; but our souls cannot. If it be, it lives: being and life are the self-same thing. As the blessed God is so frequently spoken of in Scripture, "the living God," the original well-spring of

life; so making a creature like himself, and in his own image, he makes him to be such as to whom life should be essential, though it be dependant upon him, (as all being must be,) yet life being made so much of the essence of man's soul that it can never be severed from it; therein its life is like the divine life; that is, it is an immortal life. It is true, "he only hath immortality;" that is, he only hath an original, independent immortality. But the souls of men, and all created spirits, have a dependant immortality, together with their dependant being, and not separable from it. And,

[3.] In the power of understanding; therein doth the soul of man bear the image of God naturally, as it is an intelligent thing, a thing that hath a power to understand and know the impress of God is upon the spirit of man in this. "He that teacheth men knowledge, shall not he know?" Psalm 94. 10. And he that declareth unto man his thoughts, (as having given him the thinking and the knowing power,) are we not to suppose, he should know his own work? And,

[4.] In liberty, or the power of willing this or that; of acting or suspending its own acts, and of acting this way or that, accordingly as it shall chuse; a dominion it hath over its own act, a self-determining power, or self-dominion; but subordinate to the divine dominion; for he never made a creature that he was not to govern. These are things that I now mention, but which being included in the nature and essence of man, when I gave you an account of this creature man, which God is said to have made.

I shall only add two things more generally concerning this natural image of God in man.

First. That it is permanent and lasts always, as long as man lasts, as it cannot but do, it being essential to him, or his very nature: for his very nature did resemble the divine, "the image and glory of God," as he is called 1 Cor. 11. 7. It must, therefore, be permanent, and can never be severed from man; this is an image that could not be lost. Man could not lose this image; his soul must be a spirit still; a living thing still; and an understanding thing still; a spontaneous, free thing still, subject only to the divine government. And therefore, considering man, even in his estate of apostasy, we find this image of God, still remaining, as the perpetual reason of that law of preserving the life of man in this body, as in the 9. Gen. 6. "Whosoever sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man." If the reason of the law were lost, the law were lost, and would cease: but plain it is, the law was made with reference to man, already

fallen: fallen man, apostate man, still bears, in that respect, the image of God; therefore, he will not have his life to be touched. He is a Godlike creature, and he that strikes at the life of man, strikes at the image of God! A very awful thought, to consider that man, even as he is man, while he was in innocency, or in apostasy, is still the image of God, and therefore, must be inviolable, not to be touched beyond his rules, who reserves to himself still, the dominion over lives, as being the God of our lives, so as to kill or to make alive, either immediately, or mediately, by his own authority in men, but not otherwise. And,

Secondly. There is this to be said in general, too, concerning the natural image of God in man; as it is permanent, so it is fundamental unto the other image, and the contraries thereunto; that is, if man had not the natural image of God upon him, he were never capable of having a moral image, could never be a holy creature, nor unholy, if he were not naturally such a creature. And he could never be happy or miserable, if he were not such a creature: that is, if he had not a soul that were a spirit, and that were a living thing, and that were intelligent, and that were capable of acting voluntarily and by choice. And therefore, this image must still be presupposed unto the other.

(2.) Which other we now go on to speak of, that is, the moral image of God in man, founded on the former. And so man doth bear, and did originally bear, the image of God, in the moral sense, in these two respects—first, in purity—secondly, in felicity. He did at first resemble God as a holy, and as a happy Being. In reference to both these, the natural image of God was fundamental to the moral; this was the very foundation in him of all duty, and of all felicity; and of the contraries thereunto, that is, of sins and of misery; as contraries must always have the same subject in which they take place, successively, or in a remiss degree.

[1.] This image of God in man, which we call *moral*, super-added to his natural image, stood in this, to wit, in the sanctity and holiness of this creature in his original state; the rectitude of his natural powers and faculties with reference to his rule and end. But this is to be understood with *caution*. We are to take heed of asserting either too much, or too little, concerning the holiness of man's original state. We must take heed of asserting too much concerning it, to wit, so much as would not consist with the possibility of his falling; or too little, to wit, what would not consist with the possibility of his standing. But, in general, this sanctity or holiness wherewith man was made, and wherein he did originally resemble God, it stood in these two things;

First. In innocency; that is, that he was made perfectly innocent, and it was impossible that it should not be so: for it could not consist with the holiness, and the other perfections of the Divine Being, to make him a sinner. He could not come out of the hand of God at first, an impure and unholy thing. Wherein stood the image of God, but in that he was originally holy, as God is holy? to wit, in some similitude to the holiness of God: he was created in this, as part of the image of him that created him, as that Col. 3. 10. and Ephes, 4. 24. do plainly imply: for the image of God restored and renewed must be the image that was lost. It could not be a specifically different thing: therefore, when the soul is renewed after this image, it is plain, that he was created in it; that is, was created an innocent and sinless creature: not barely in the negative sense; for so is a stone or a brute innocent. I say, not in that sense only; but as being free from all taint and impurity, when he was a capable subject of being both pure and impure; which a stone or other unintelligent creature was not. And then,

Secondly. This holiness, wherein man was created, as it did include innocency, freedom from any taint of sin; so it did include a possibility of continuing so; that is, that there was no depraved inclination in his nature, as it was made or created by God, to determine him unto sin; unto any sinful thought, or to any sinful act. It is true, he was not made impeccable, or with an impossibility of sinning, yet he was made with a possibility of not sinning; that is, with an intrinsical possibility thereof: for we must distinguish here, between possibility and futurity. It is true, that his fall was future; but his standing, for all that, was possible; we mean only by it, a simple possibility, not compounded with any consideration of God's foreknowledge. It is true, God did foreknow what would become of man; but that did not infer a necessity upon his nature; that could have no influence to make him fall; that is, that God foresaw, that being left to himself he would fall; but he saw at the same time, that though he would fall, yet that he had done that for him by which it was possible for him to have stood, if he had followed the law of his own nature. And therefore, though we call this image moral, in contradistinction to natural, yet we are not to think that it was in no sense natural; for it was con-natural. It was not natural, as that signifies essential; for then it could not have been lost: but as it signifies somewhat agreeable to the nature of man; and nothing could be more agreeable to his nature, than to have continued still an obedient creature to God, and consequently happy in him: so that it was not at all to be ascribed to man's nature that he fell; for that were to

resolve the cause of his fall into the Author of his nature; and so, to cast all upon God at length; whereas, man's destruction is only of himself, he is the fountain of whatsoever is evil, and God the only fountain of all good.

But then, we are to consider the holiness wherewith man was created, more particularly. And so, it stood in the confirmation, or the conforming of the faculties of his soul unto the rule and order wherein God did at first set them; that is, as for the mind and understanding, it did agree with the Divine Mind; and for his will, it did agree with the Divine Will; and so, the faculties of the human soul, those two great leading faculties, the mind and the will, did each of them bear the stamp and impress of God upon them. And therefore, whereas, we find God spoken of under that twofold notion in Scripture, and by one and the same penman of the holy Scripture, the evangelist John, in his 1st epistle, that "God is light," and that "God is love;" the one in the 1st chap. verse 5, and the other in the 4th chap. the 8th and 16th verses. Such a creature was man in his mind, and in his will, conformed to the Divine Mind and Will.

i. "God is light," saith the apostle, "and with him is no darkness at all; and he that walks in darkness, and saith, he hath fellowship with God, lies:" there can be no fellowship between light and darkness. We are not to understand light, there, to mean merely speculative knowledge: but we are to understand it as signifying practical principles, lodged in the mind, and which are most con-natural to holiness in the will and heart. They are the ideas contained in the one, which are exemplified in the other. So, "God is light," essential light itself; and so was the spirit of man, "the inspiration of the Almighty having given it understanding;" that is, that it was,

(i.) A knowing thing; not only had a power to know, but did actually know all that concerned him to know, or that it was his duty to know. And as such, this part of the divine image is referred to morality; for there are some things which it is our duty to know; and to be ignorant of them is a sin. But we are not to suppose man to be destitute of any knowledge, that he ought to have had, in the state of his primitive innocency; though it must be far from us to think that he had universal knowledge, that he knew all things: for that would still be proper to God as an incommunicable attribute of the Divine Nature. And therefore, his knowledge must have been a growing thing in that state wherein he was made. But he did know all that did belong to him to know, for the state wherein he was.

And so are we to conceive of that knowledge, as the moral additament to the faculty or power of knowing, which is natural. And then,

ii. Besides his actual knowledge, we must understand, in his mind, a docility, or an aptitude to learn, or know more; and still more, according as the Creator should vouchsafe to reveal more to him, or as he should give him opportunity (as he had given him a natural ability) to reason himself from the knowledge of some things into the knowledge of more.

(ii.) For his will, that must have been the seat too, of the holiness wherein the image of God stood, and wherein he did resemble God; and there is the seat of God's law impressed: for we must know, that man was made at first with the law of God written in his heart. Besides the positive precept which he transgressed, there was the whole frame of that whole law in him, which was to be the permanent rule of his practice and obedience: for the apostle, speaking of man in his fallen state, (Rom. 2. 15.) tells us, "that even pagans themselves," (where there are the greatest ruins of the human nature to be seen,) "even they have the law written on their hearts." And if it be so with fallen man, what an entire impression must there have been of the divine law upon the mind of man yet in his integrity. A law written in his heart, of which some pagans speak, calling it the *non scripta, sed nata Lex*, not a law written, (that is, in any external scripture,) but an engraven law, an innate law, that was impressed on man on his creation, or that he was made with.

And so, as this law which, is in itself, of universal and everlasting obligation, is all summed up in *love*, which is the fulfilling of the law; why, therein we must understand this creature to have at first resembled God; that is, as God is said to be "light," so he was in respect of his mind: and as God is said to be "love," so he was in respect of his will or heart: a creature made up of love, which sums up all duty; for "love is the fulfilling of the law." And therefore, when men are renewed and brought back to God, and his image restored in them, they are created after God in this respect, so as to be capable of dwelling in *love*, as in a proper element and region con-natural to them. This was the great principle that did conform men to both parts of the law; that part which was to respect God himself; and that part which was to respect men towards one another: for these were the two great natural and moral precepts; "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might; and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." O! what an excel-

lent state was this! when the impression of this law, whereof this was the summary, was entire and perfect; not the least inclination to violate it in any part, or in any point, either towards God, or towards a fellow creature.

And we may yet further, and more distinctly, consider this rectitude of the faculties of man's soul to stand in this—first, that the superior faculties of his mind and will, were more directly and exactly conformed to the divine mind and will—and secondly, that the inferior faculties were subject to the superior; this being the law of man's nature at first; that is, that though he had inferior faculties, as well as superior, suitable to his compounded nature, (being made up of an inward man, and of an outward man, or of an intellectual, and of a sensitive nature,) yet, these inferior faculties belonging to the sensitive nature, they were made so as to be obedient and subject to the superior; that is, to an enlightened mind, and to a holy will: so as to have no appetitions that were irregular or disorderly, of an inferior kind, or belonging to the sphere of sense, but what reason, governing the will, could prescribe to: no violent passions or appetitions in one kind or other, so as to love or desire, or fear, or hope, or joy, or sorrow, or be angry inordinately, but according as a right mind should dictate, and as a right mind should command. And then,

[2] As this moral image, superadded to the natural, and founded thereon, stood in holiness, (which we have thus far explained,) so it stood in happiness too, in sanctity and felicity; that is, as God is the blessed God for ever, so did this creature imitate him in his blessedness; bear the image of that upon him too. We must understand that he had a present inchoate blessedness; a present blessedness begun in a satisfaction to all his faculties, in having what was proportionable and accommodate to all the powers of his nature.

First. As to his superior faculties: herein stood the blessedness of this creature, that he had a mind capable of knowing God, and a will capable of enjoying him; and which did know God, and which did actually enjoy him: and it could not but be so; for here was no culpable darkness or eloud upon this mind; there was no corrupt or depraved inclination in this will: and God was pleased to exhibit himself, and manifest himself, to make himself known, and to offer himself to be his portion and God, according to the tenour of that covenant, that law of works, and that law of his creation, under which he was made. Therefore, there was nothing to hinder his present happiness: there was no aversion from God, no disinclination to him; but, a steady propension towards him. There was no guilt upon him,

to make him afraid of approaching God; as it was with him soon after he fell, when he ran and hid himself. Vain creature! thinking there would be some darkness wherein he could hide himself from the Divine Majesty. But while he remained yet in his integrity, as there was no faulty darkness in his mind, so there was no depraved inclination in his will: but knowing God to be the best and highest Good, most absolutely perfect, all-comprehending and every way suitable to him, his will could not but be a propense towards him accordingly, so as then it must have been his sense in perfection, (though not unalterably,) which comes to be the sense again of the renewed soul: “Whom have I in heaven but thee, and whom can I desire on earth besides thee? When he had the beauties of a new-made creation all in view, a heaven that was then new, and an earth that was then new; yet, “Whom have I in heaven but thee, and what is there upon earth that I desire besides thee?”

As to his inferior faculties, there was what was most grateful to them too. Man was created in a paradise, full of pleasantness, and of pleasant good things, which it was then lawful for him to enjoy without restraint, except that one forbidden tree. And he not only had the perception of all, all grateful, sensible good, but an interest in, and a power over, all. And you see, that God estates him in a dominion, sets him over all the works of his hands, in this inferior, lower world, and doth so, immediately upon his having created him. “God blessed them, and said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every thing that moveth upon the earth.”

What a glorious prince was man then! and into how great a principality did God put him as soon as he made him! Whatsoever was most suitable, and most delectable, for his enjoyment, in that kind of inferior and sensible good, was all put into his power; so as what innocent, well-tempered nature would choose, as most grateful to it, that he might choose, one thing excepted; which very exception, (as all exceptions do *firmare regulas,*) was but a confirmation of his dominion over all the rest; and did but more fully speak his right and title to enjoy what he would beside. All this as to his inchoate happiness. But,

Secondly. Besides this, we must understand him to have had a title to continuing and increasing and, at length, perfect felicity. We are not to suppose him made in that state, which, if it had stood, should have been eternal, without change or alteration. But most rational it was, that God having newly cre-

ated an intelligent creature, should create him in a state of probation, upon which was to follow a state of retribution; as it is most natural, that duty go before felicity: that there must be obedience before recompence. His full and final recompence was yet to come.

And the reason of the thing plainly speaks it. We cannot suppose, that God made man in a better condition than he made the angels: (a superior sort of creatures:) but it is plain, that he created them in a state of probation; otherwise it had been impossible that some of them should have fallen, and left their first station, forsaken it, and thereupon, to be "bound in chains of darkness, and reserved to the judgment of the great day." And it is plain, further, upon this account too; as to this earth, supposing man to have stood, (though God foresaw that he would not; that he would fall,) yet we must suppose his constitution to be such, as agree with the supposition of his standing too. It had been altogether impossible that, in the succession of many ages, this world would have contained all the men, if they had been innocent; and so, consequently, all immortal. But we must necessarily suppose, though not death, (for that was only introduced by sin,) yet some such kind of translation unto higher and more glorious regions; as from perfect arbitrary, good pleasure, Enoch and Elijah found at the hand of God.

And so, besides the actual felicity he had, there was a title to future felicity, supposing he had stood. For when the divine constitution runs in this tenour, "Cursed is he that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them," do but consider what the reverse of that must be: "Blessed is he that continueth in all things written in the book of the law to do them." If not continuing in all things written in God's law, to do them, must infer a curse, then to have continued must infer a blessing: and as that curse did put him into a worse estate, that blessing must have put him into a better estate; otherwise, it had not been a state of retribution suitable to a foregoing state of probation.

Thus far, you have now the explication of this state, wherein God is said at first to have made man; that is, made him in his own image, the image that was natural and essential to man; and that image that was moral and superadded. And can we look upon this as a useless doctrine? Of what importance is it to us to look back, and consider the original of this creature! what it was; and what it is! What man was in that perfect rectitude, of which we have had some account; and what he is in that forlorn and abject state into which he is now sunk and

fallen. It is this that must make redeeming mercy, and our recovery by a mediator grateful. It was a noble expression of a heathen; *Nemo improbe conatur unde descenderat ascendere*: (speaking to this very case, the depraved condition of man as he now generally is, and what his state before was, of which they had hallucinations, though not distinct conceptions;) *no man blameably endeavours to ascend from whence he did descend. Capax est noster animus dei, atque eo fertur, nisi vitia deprimant*: we have minds capable of God; and towards him they would be carried if vice did not depress and sink them. But nobody doth unwarrantably aim to ascend thither, whence he did descend; if he did descend, sink from so excellent a state, there must be some aim upwards, some aspiring to get up to that state again, or to somewhat agreeable thereto, by which the natural appetite in man to blessedness and felicity should be excited and stirred and put into action, and kept in action, even by the very law of his own nature.

LECTURE XX.*

The more distinct *Use* and *application* of this subject, and such as may most aptly and properly be made, we shall now proceed to. And it will afford us a very various, and a very copious use, if we seriously apply our minds to consider it. God created man in his own Image. Why there are,

1. Sundry inferences of truth that we may collect and deduce. As, that man was, at first, a creature of great excellency, (whatsoever he is now become,) a noble and a glorious creature; the image of God being intire could not, sure, but be a very glorious thing. As it is blurred and defaced in a great measure, yet in respect of that remainder, or that mere ground of it, man is now said to be “the image and glory of God.” 1 Cor. 11. 7. The image and glory of God, he is still, notwithstanding he hath diminished and disguised himself, as an intelligent being, a living thing: he hath a soul that is essentially life, or to which life is essential; that cannot cease to live; that hath a self-determining power belonging to its nature; that acts not under the laws of a fatal necessity, but according to reason and liberty, in the common affairs and actions of life.

Take man as he was at first, when those powers that belonged

to his nature were unvitiated and pure, what a glorious creature was this creature ! Dei-formed, made after the likeness of God. The world replenished with such creatures, what a delectable habitation had it been ! to have so many Godlike creatures inhabiting this world of ours, all representing God to one another, so many visible representations of divine knowledge, and divine light, and divine love and divine purity ! O ! what an excellent creature was man in his original state !

(2.) We may further be informed, hence, of the more peculiar excellency of our souls : for we must consider them as the primary seat of the divine image : “So God made man after his own image.” Wherein stood that ? Where lay this image, or where was it seated ? What ! in our bodily frame and structure ? (as the anthropomorphites did formerly dream.) Was it a piece of clay that was made so like God in us ? And therefore, if man be to be looked upon as an excellent sort of creature, we must understand wherein his true value lies, and whereupon men are to value themselves.

A great many are apt to value themselves because they have laden themselves with a great deal of thick clay ; because they have a sort of propriety in much of this earth. Some highly value themselves upon an airy title : “I am such and such a dignified thing, among those with whom I dwell.” Some are more vain to value themselves upon gay apparel, or because they have so and so trimmed and adorned those carcasses : but it is in respect of our mind and spirit, that we are the offspring of God, and bear the image of God : and if ever we have any thing truly valuable, or excellent about us, there it must lie ; a mind and spirit must be the seat and subject of it. Again,

(3.) We may learn, hence, that there is much of God to be understood by ourselves ; for we were made after God’s own image ; and we may discern much of another thing by that which is really like it. Indeed, to direct the intention of our minds immediately towards God, is that which we are not so well capable of in this present state. The intuition of his glory, our weak minds cannot admit of : “No man can see my face and live,” saith God to Moses. But we can see our own faces ; that is, the face of our own souls : we can take a view of them, and consider what naturally, and in themselves, they are : that is, according to what there remains of true primitive nature in us ; and so may discern and understand much of God, as his glory is reflected on ourselves.

Though we know not how to face the sun when it shines in its strength and glory, yet we can sustain it to behold its image

in the water, and look upon it there. So we cannot bear it, to behold the immediate radiations of divine glory directly shining forth, but reflected; and as it hath produced its image in ourselves, so we may be capable of beholding it. And by what we see in ourselves, when we understand that we are made after God's image, that there is a thing called mind in ourselves, then God must be a mind; there is a spirit in man, and we are his offspring: then he, sure, must be a spirit too; but an infinite, purer, and more perfect Spirit. If we find such a thing as love in our own natures, we may be sure that it is infinitely higher, and greater, and larger, and more perfect, every way, in God. But again,

(4.) We may further learn hence, that upon the account of our being made after God's image, we have much the less reason to hesitate at the receiving of that most mysterious doctrine of the Trinity in the Godhead: for if we seriously consider, we may discern the image and impress thereof in ourselves: and we find that we are made after God's image. There is none that doth so seriously contemplate himself, his own soul, but he may and must discern and acknowledge a trinity there; those primary principles which, considered in their conjunction, do carry a most manifest and express representation of God in this respect; to wit, active power, intellect, and love, those three great primalities in God, his word (who best knows his own nature) doth, upon all occasions, repeatedly express and inculcate to us. And the very like hereof we find in ourselves, considering these things in ourselves; not severed but conjunct: that is, a power to act, and to act according to understanding; and so act towards things that we love; and towards which there is a propension from a suitableness in ourselves to the things that we act towards.

Any one that will make himself his own study, must discern and acknowledge such things in himself as do make a real trinity; one and the same soul having active power belonging to it, understanding belonging to it, and love belonging to it, which, though all meet and unite in one and the same soul, are yet diverse and distinct from one another; for my power is not my understanding, and my understanding is not love; but all these do meet together in one and the same soul. So that considering man made after the image of God, the doctrine of the Trinity claims to be received with so much the more facility and agreeableness; we finding, so manifestly, the impress thereof upon our own souls. And so we may upon many things in the created universe besides; yea, and we may find

running through all things; but most manifestly and discernably in ourselves, concerning whom it is most eminently said, that "we were made after God's image." Again,

(5.) We may further learn, hence, that since man was made after the image of God, (so excellent and noble a creature as this image impressed upon him, must speak him and make him,) then sure, God did, in making this creature, design him for higher and greater things than can be compassed within this temporary state. He never did design, in making such a creature as man, to confine him to time and to this lower world. For as he is a creature made after the image of God, he is made with capacities of far higher and greater things than this world can contain, or than time can measure.

If we look upon the present inhabitants of this world, so many minds and spirits inhabiting flesh, and cast about our eyes this way and that way, how thick is this same material world? how thick is it set with minds, with spirits, as so many diamonds sparkling in mud? Any one would say, "This is not their proper place: here are so many diamonds scattered here and there in dirt; surely they are not always to be there! Spiritual and immortal minds inhabiting flesh, and only casting their present rays upon low and sensible things; surely it will not always be thus." Did God make such creatures, did he make man, after his own likeness, for so mean and so low ends and purposes, as they are every where intent upon in this their present state? Did he make man after his own image, only to support and animate a little portion of breathing clay? Did he make him only to take this flesh to keep it awhile from turning into a putrid, stinking carcass. Was this all that a spiritual, immortal mind was made for?

Men should understand, by reflecting upon their original state, what the capacity of their nature was; and that they must be made for some other state, and for higher and greater things, than they commonly apply themselves to mind while they are here. You have so many minds dwelling in flesh; and many, but for a very little while. But suppose it, as long as men do more ordinarily live upon earth, why to have a mind, a spirit, created and put into flesh to inhabit that, suppose twenty, or thirty, or forty, or fifty, or sixty years, or to the utmost pitch that the lives of men do commonly reach to; and then that creature disappears and is gone. That flesh which that mind inhabiteth, turns to dust; the soul is fled and gone; here is no more appearance of this creature, this particular creature, upon this particular stage: what are we to conclude upon this then?

But that sure these have their parts to act in another state, upon an eternal stage, that shall never be taken down. Here are so many Godlike creatures brought into this world, and put in flesh, only to abide here such a certain number of years, and there is an end of them. This can never be thought, that God did make so many creatures after his own image, for so mean and ungodlike ends and purposes. And again,

(6.) We may further learn, hence, that an abode in the flesh, is not inconsistent with a very excellent state of life; for God did at first make man after his own image, of whose creation, as to the outward man, (of which I spake to you distinctly,) we are told, he was only made (as his name Adam doth import) out of the earth; but God breathed into him the breath of life, that intellectual vital life: he placed that spirit in him, by the inspiration whereof he came to be an understanding creature; and therein to resemble him that made him. Though this mind and spirit was to dwell in flesh, yet a very excellent state of life might be transacted here in this state: for admit that a mind and spirit be united with such flesh as we now inhabit and dwell in, yet here it hath the image of God entire and undepraved in it: not only a capacity of understanding, and of willing, and of acting, this way and that, but of doing all these aright, with a due rectitude adhering to each faculty; not remotely, not inseparably, as the sad events have shewn; but really and truly, so as that they might have remained in the state wherein they were made. O! then, how excellent a life might have been lived here, on these terms, in this world.

Though our likeness to God did not consist in this fleshly part of ours, or had not that for its seat and subject, yet it might very well consist with our having such a fleshly part about us, when there was pure and incorrupt integrity in all the powers and faculties of the soul of man: to have his soul replenished with the knowledge of God; possessed with a holy and adoring disposition, in a continual aptitude to look to, and a continual inclination to delight in, God, and in his converse; together with a universal love to one another, under that notion of being made after the image of God, as they should behold God's resemblance in one another. And O! what a happy world were this, and how pleasantly, and with what delight, might time have been transacted here: a very pleasant, happy, excellent state of life might consist with dwelling in flesh.

Such, in whom the image of God, to wit, his moral image, hath been (though less perfectly) restored, yet how pleasantly have they lived here in this world, amidst all the abounding

wickedness of it : such a man as Noah ; such a one as Enoch, who walked with God so many hundred years in this world. This is not to live an unhappy life, to walk with God every day, to live in his fear, and live in his communion. Is this to live unhappily ?

Men are apt to transfer all the causes of their complaint to other things, and set them at a remote distance from themselves. Some, when they do evil, or evil befall them, accuse their stars or external circumstances. But we have nothing to accuse but our own ill inclinations. If we live evil lives, bad and sinful lives, or miserable lives, in this world, it is our own fault : for mere dwelling in flesh imposeth no necessity upon us, of being either sinful or miserable creatures. And that we might be convinced of this, we have the exemplification of such a life in our blessed Lord living in flesh (after all flesh had corrupted their ways) without taint. Therefore, being in flesh, as such, doth necessitate none, either to live wicked or miserable lives in this world : the mind and spirit of man being stamped with the image of God.

(7.) If man were at first made after God's own image, he must now, sure, be a very degenerate creature ; the degeneracy of man must needs be exceeding great : how ungodlike a creature is he become ! How unlike to God do men generally live and act, here in this world. This ought to be considered with deep and bitter regret. It is true that the natural likeness still remains, as it cannot but do, because it is natural, because it is the very nature of man himself. As his mind and spirit (being the immediate seal of the divine image) is a living thing, an understanding thing, a voluntary, active thing, this way and that, the natural image cannot but remain as long as man is man. But the degeneracy is with reference to the moral, superadded image ; for that was at first superadded ; and is *still due* ; a thing concerning which we must say, it is a *Debitum esse* ; and which, in reference to the natural image, is as the more curious lines of a picture are to the first rude draught. It is true, that first rude draught, consisting of maimed strokes, doth shew the true symmetry and proportion of the parts, in such a picture, to one another ; but while every thing is yet wanting that tends to make up the comeliness and beauty, it is a very ungrateful spectacle that a man hath before his eyes in looking upon such a thing.

The natural powers that do belong to the soul of a man, shew his original capacity, what he was capable of ; then all these capacities are to be filled up, as the rude draught of a

picture should be, with what would add beauty, and the appearance of comeliness and vigour to it, as far as the pencil can express that. Here is a capacity in the very nature of man, of knowing much; but look upon that understanding power divested and destitute of all true knowledge. Here is a will capable of choosing, and of enjoying with highest complacency, the best and most delectable good; but totally divested of any such propension and inclination. And, here is a soul that is a spiritually active being; but it is active now any way but towards God, by whom it was made. Why in these very ruins of human nature, you may discern what originally it was.

Take the walls of some noble palace, yet standing: we will suppose all rooms to remain distinct from one another as they were, but it is totally unfurnished. It was inhabited, it may be, by some excellent person; but he is gone and hath left it: there was an honourable family that lived in splendor there; but they are removed, and now there is nothing to be beheld but bare walls: there be the rooms, the several apartments, as they were; but inhabited by nothing but owls and vultures: a habitation of dragons and serpents. And such is the soul of man, destitute of the divine, moral image, and of that holy rectitude which was the furniture and ornament of each several faculty and power.

We may here see what man was in his original state; and hence see and collect how great his present degeneracy is. O! how art thou fallen! what art thou fallen to, thou Lucifer, son of the morning! A Godlike creature, one made after God's image, a little lower than the angels, that did so perfectly resemble him; and now sunk into so low a degree of darkness, and impurity, and misery, and death: of which also we were not capable, if the natural image did not remain, if he had not an understanding still, and a will still, and an active power still. And then,

(8.) You may further learn, hence, what the work of regeneration is to perform in the souls of men; and of how absolute necessity such a work is to be effected and brought about there. So God made man after his own image. That plainly tells us what regeneration hath to do; that is, to restore that image wherein it was defective and lost. That must be the business of regeneration, considering together what the original state of man was, made after God's image: and considering what his present state is, his degenerate state, it is easy to collect what his regenerate state must be; a renovation, a state of renovation after the same image that man was impressed with at first,

consisting of knowledge, (not only in a capacity to know, but in knowledge,) and in righteousness and true holiness. Not only in having the faculties that are capable of these, but in having these things themselves impressed into these faculties: this, regeneration must do: or the restoring us to ourselves, or repairing the image of God that was lost; that must be the business of regeneration. As man was made after the image of God at first, in his first creation; in his second creation, when he is made a new creature, he must be created again after God. The new man must be put on, "which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." And this image is renewed in knowledge, as those two texts speak, Ephes. 4. 24. and Col. 3. 10. compared. Thus, is this part of the doctrine of the text improvable to the learning of several truths that do depend upon it, and that lie in connexion with it. Again,

2. It may be improved too, and very largely, in representing, and reprehending, several sinful evils that this wretched world abounds with; by which it appears how much men, by sin, have fallen short of the glory of God; such characters of his glory having been impressed at first upon them. Why, to consider such things as these that too evidently, and too commonly appear in the temper of men's minds, and in the course of their practice, here in this world: For instance,

To consider how low designs men do generally drive. What! Is this Godlike? Is this becoming a Godlike sort of creatures, such as man was at first, when they wear out their days here in this world, and make it their business to serve divers lusts and pleasures? What a base kind of servitude is this? Is this the creature made after God's image? Men to spend their days in the pursuit of shadows and trifles? Is there any resemblance of God in this? Is this like a creature that had in his own original and primitive state, a representation of divine in it, which was to conduct his whole course? And again, consider not only what men do pursue, that their minds and hearts are set upon; but (which carries more of horror in it) what they decline, and what their minds and hearts are set against. Men made after the image of God, and yet transacting their course in continual ungodliness. What! Thou made after the image of God, and yet an ungodly creature, and yet live an ungodly life in this world, when thou hast a soul about thee that can know God, that hath a capacity of knowing God, and of choosing him, and of loving him, and of delighting in him! That there should be in such a creature, stamped at first with the divine image and likeness,

a disaffection to God; not only no inclination, but disinclination. What! disinclination to thine own true Pattern? disaffection to thine own Original? Thou wast made like God; why dost thou shun him? Why dost thou fly from him? Thou carriest the natural characters of his image upon thee whithersoever thou goest. And what! art thou running away from God with his image on thee, in the remainders of it? The remainders of it thou hast upon thy soul: a mind that can understand, a spirit that can and must live; and thou art running away from God with his own image upon thee. What a monstrous thing is that! And again,

3. It might, in the third place, instruct us in several duties that are also very congruous and con-natural to this part of the doctrine of this text. As,

(1.) More frequently to look back to our original estate. Such a truth as this made known, published to us, standing upon record in the sacred volumes, doth continually and repeatedly call upon us to look back, to consider and bethink ourselves what we were in our original state, made after God's own image, a God-like sort of creatures.

(2.) It will be our duty, hence, to be now ashamed of ourselves in our present degenerate state. It is no shame to a mean creature that was always so, to be now so; no shame to a worm that it is a worm; to a toad that it is a toad. But that man should become an impure, and a poisonous worm, part of the serpent's seed, this is a most shameful thing, and ought to be considered with the most confounding shame. We should even be startled at ourselves to think what, from such a conformity to God, we are now come to. And,

(3.) It should put us upon inquiring and listening after any means or ways of recovery. It would become a thinking creature, (as man naturally is,) apprehending as even the pagans, (the more refined of them generally have,) that men are not now what they were at first. And it would put such upon considering, "Is there no way of recovery?" And it hath put even pagans themselves (destitute of all revealed light) upon many considerations of that kind, insomuch as that we find several of them to have written treatises concerning the purgative and ornative virtues. It shews us to have a great deal more of stupidity among us, than was among pagans themselves, if we have no thoughts about restitution, about being restored, about being recovered out of so low a state as we find ourselves lapsed into, compared with that which we know was original to us. It should make our minds full of thoughts from day to

day. "Is there no way to become again what once we were?" to have minds, and wills, and inclinations, and affections, so rectified as we find, and must apprehend to have been, in our first state? Is there no way to get into that conformity to God, and acquaintance with him, as to be able to lead my life with God, which was the thing most agreeable to my first state? And one that would use the understanding of a man, when he hears of a better state, that was original to him, would certainly be upon his inquiries—"Is there no way of recovering, no way of getting back into such an estate again?" And again,

(4.) It should render the gospel very dear to us, that doth so expressly reveal to us such a way, wherein the image of God is recoverable: and thereupon, converse with him, and a continual intercourse with him, are become possible to us. At present, where there is no likeness, there can be no converse, no disposition, no agreeableness or suitableness. How dear then should that gospel be, that is not only God's revelation, but his way and method to bring this about. To this end he hath revealed his Christ to us, his first Image, his primary Image. He that is said to be "the Image of the invisible God, the first-born before all the creation;" in whom his glory shines as "the glory of the only begotten of the Father;" the arthetypal Image, according to which, the Image is to be renewed again in us. That gospel that reveals this to us, and which is designed to be God's instrument for the making of the impression afresh on our souls, how precious should it be to us! For his glory shines through it, as through a glass; that, "beholding this glory of the Lord, we may be changed into the same image, from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord:" since this, I say, is the design of that very gospel under which we live, O! how dear should that gospel be to us! By this, the image of God may be restored, which hath, in so great a measure, been defaced and lost out of our souls. And it again shews it to be our duty,

(5.) To aspire to the highest pitch of that perfection, in conformity to God, that these souls of ours are any way capable of; especially, that we should be continually aspiring unto the perfection of that state from whence we are fallen. Take the forementioned instruction of a pagan to that purpose. Whereas some might be apt to imagine, and their thoughts might suggest to them, "It is a presumptuous thing for me to think of being made like God, to be holy as God is holy, and to be blessed as God is blessed," and the like; we should consider what we are, that as that heathen said; "It is no fault,

no blameable thing in any one to endeavour to ascend to that state or pitch, from which he did descend; we have a mind capable of God; and it would be carried towards him if vice did not depress and sink it. It is therefore matter of duty, from the consideration that we are to aim and aspire after such a state. I do not aim to be what I was, and what I ought to be, in duty towards him that made me, as well as consulting any interest of my own, in the first place: for I am first his, before I can consider myself as my own: and therefore, in duty towards him, the Author of my being, I ought to be aspiring and aiming at this, to have his image renewed in me, and to be restored in this respect, to what I was.
