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W ORKS
PRESIDENT EDWARDS,
IN EIGHT VOLUMES.
VOLUME V
CONTAINING
I, INQUIRY INTO THE MOD-
ERN PREVAILING NOTIONS
OF FREEDOM OF WILL.
II. MISCELLANEOUS OBSER*
VATIONS CONCERNING THK
DIVINE DECREES IN GEN-
ERAL AND ELECTION IN
PARTICULAR.
III. CONCERNING EFFICA^
CIOUS GRACE.
FIRST AMERICAN EDITION.
PUBLISHED AT WORCESTER,
By ISA-IAH THOMAS, Jun
ISAAC SfURfEVAX'T., PRINTSR
1803,
A
CAREFUL AND STRICT
INQUIRY
INTO THE
MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS,
OF THAT
FREEDOM OF WILL,
WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL
TO
MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD
AND PUNISHMENT, PRAISE AND BLAME.
JVIAjVY find much fault with the calling professing
Christians, that differ one from another in some matters of opin-
ion, by distinct names ; especially calling them by the names of
particular men, who have distinguished themselves as maintainers
and promoters of those opinions ; as the calling some professing
Christians Arminians,,/?" '" Arminius ; others Arians, ./'row Ari-
as ; others Socinians,./rcwz Socinus, and the like. They think it
unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose and suggest, that the per-
sons marked out by these names, received those doctrines which
they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on, those men after
whom they are named ; as though they made them their rule ;
in the same manner, as the followers of Christ are called Christ-
ians ; after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as
their great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and
groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned
denominations. Thus (say they) there is not the least ground to
suppose that the chief Divines, who embrace the scheme of doc-
trine which is, by many, called Arminianism, believe it the more,
■because Arminius believed it ; and that there is no reason to
think any other, than that they sincerely and impartially study
the holy Scriptures, and inquire after the mind of Christ, with
as much judgment and sincerity, as any of those that call them b:j
these names ; that they seek after truth, and are not careful
whether they think exactly as Arminius did ; yea, that, in some
things, they actually differ from him. This practice is also es-
teemed actuclly injurious on this account, that it is supposed nat-
urally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between
persons thus named and others, to be greater than it is ; yea, as
though it were so great, that they must be, as it were, another
species of beings. And they object against it as arising from an
uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit ; which, they say, com-
monly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves,
and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between
themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them,
with odious names. They say, moreover, that the keeping up
such a distinction of names has a direct tendency to ufihold dis-
tance and disaffection, and keefi alive mutual hat rid among
Christians, who ought all to be united in friendship and charity,
. • - -ver they cannot, in nil things, think alike.
vi PREFACE.
/ confess these things are very plausible. And I will not ae-
ny, that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction
of names, and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often
make an ill improvement of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, these
objections are carried far beyond reaso?i. The generality of
mankind are disposed enough, and a great deal too much, to un-
charitableness, and to be censorious and bitter towards those that
differ from them in religious opinions : Which evil temper of
■mind -will take occasion to exert itself from many things in them-
selves j innocent, useful and necessary. But yet there is ?io ne-
cessity to suppose, that the thus distinguishing persons of differ-
ent o/iinions by different names, arises mainly from an uncharit-
able sfiirit. It may arise from the disposition there is in man-
kind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclina-
tion for speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the prop-
er use and design of names, gix>en to things which they have of-
ten occasion to speak of, or signify their minds about ; which is
to enable them to express their ideas with ease and cxfiedition,
without being encumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlo-
cution. And the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions
in religious matters may not imply nor infer , any more than that
there is a difference, and that the difference is such as we find we
have often occasion to take notice of, and make mention of. Thai
which we have frequent occasion to speak of (whatever it be, that
gives the occasion) this wants a name ; and it is always a defect
v; language, in such cases, to be obliged to make use of a descrip-
tion, instead of a name. Thus we have often occasion to speak
of those who are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants
of France, who were subjects or heads of the government of that
land, and spake the language peculiar to it ; in distinction from
the descendants of the inhabitants of Spaiti, who belonged to tliat
community, and spake the language of that country. And there-
fore we find the great need of distinct na?nes to signify these dif-
ferent sorts of people, and the great convenience oj those distin-
guishing words, French and Spaniards ; by wJiich the significa-
tion of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered
from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions,
iT.th which it must otherwise be embarrassed.
That the difference of the opinions of those who, in their gen-
eral scheme of divinity, agree with these two noted men, Calvin
and Arminius, is a thing there is often occasion to speak of is
what the practice of the latter itself confesses ; who are often, in
their discourses and writings, taking notice of the supposed ab-
surd and pernicious opinions of the former sort. And therefore
the making use of different ?iumes in this case cannot reasonably
',.. objected against^ or condemned, as it thing which must come
PREFACE. vii
'from so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted;
for, without supposing it to arise from any other source, than the
existence and natural tendency of the state of things ; consider'
ing the faculty and disposition God has given to mankind, to ex-
press things which they have frequent occasion to mention, by
certain distinguishing names. It is an effect that is simidar to
what we see arise, in innumerable cases which are parallel, where
(he cause is not at all blameworthy.
Nevertheless, at first, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding
the use of the ap/iellation, Arminian, in this treatise : But I soon,
found I should be put to great difficulty by it ; and that my dis-
course would be so encumbered with an often repeated circumlo-
cution, instead of a name, which would express the thing intend-
ed as well and better, that I altered my purpose. And therefore
I must ask the excuse of such as are apt to be offended with
things of this nature, that I have so freely used the term Armin-
ian in the following discourse. I profess it to be witho7it any
design , to stigmatize persons of any sort with a name of reproach*
or at all to make them appear more odious. If when I had oc-
casion to speak of those Divines who are commonly called by this
name, I had, instead of styling them Arminians, called then
these men, as Dr. Whitby does Calvinistic Divines ; it proba-
bly would not have been taken any better, or thought to shew a
better temper., or more good ?na?mers. I have done as I would
be done by, in this matter. However the term Caivhiistic is, in
these days, among most, a term of greater reproach than the
term Arminian ; yet I should not take it at all amiss to be call-
ed a Calvinist, for distinction's sake : Though I utterly disclaim
a dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold*
because he believed and taught them ; and cannot justly be charg-
ed with believing in every thing just as he taught.
But, lest I should really be an occasion of injury to some per-
sons, I would here give notice, that though I generally speak of
that doctrine, concerning Free Will and moral Agency, which I
oppose, as an Arminian doctrine ; yet I would not be understood*
as asserting that every Divine or Author, whom I have occasion
to mention, as maintaining that doctrine, was properly an Armin-
ian, or one of that sort which is commoidy called by that name.
Some of them went far beyond t-fie Arminians ; and I would 6n
no means charge Arminians in general with all the corrupt doc-
trine, which these mainlcdned. Thus, for instance, it would be
very jjijuriovs, if I should rank Arminian Divines, in general,
with such Authors as Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many of theni
have some of his doctrines in abhorrence ; though he agrees, for
the most part, with Arminians, in his notion of the Freedom of the
Will. Andpon the other hand, though I suppose this notion to bt
viii PREFACE.
a leading article in the Arminian scheme, that which, if pursued
in its consequences, will truly infer, or naturally lead to all the
rest ; yet I do not charge all that have held this doctrine, with
being Arminiaris. For whatever may be the consequences of
the doctrine really, yet some that hold this doctrine, may not own
nor see these consequences ; and it would be unjust, in many in-
stances, to charge every Author with believing and maintaining
all the real consequences of his avowed doctrines. And I desire it
may be particularly noted, that though I have occasion, in the fol-
lowing discourse, often to mention the Author of the book, entitled,
An Essay on the Freedom of the Y\ ill, in God and the Crea-
ture, as holding that notion of Freedom of I Till, which I ofifiose ;
yet I do not mean to call him an Arminian : However, in that
doctrine he agrees with Arminians, and departs from the cur-
rent and general opinion of Calvinists. If the Author of that
Fssay be the same as it is commonly ascribed to, he, doubtless^
was not one that ought to bear that name. But however good a
divine he was in many respects, yet that particular Arminian
doctrine which he maintained, is never the better for being held
by such an one; nor is there less need of opposing it on that ac-
count ; but rather is there the more need of it ; as it will be like-
ly to have the more pernicious influence, for being taught by a
divine of his name and character ; supposing the doctrine to be
wrong, and in itself to be of an ill tendency.
I have nothing further to say by way of preface ; but only
to bespeak the Reader's candor, and calm attention to what I
have written. The subject, is of such importance, as to demand
attention, and the most thorough consideration. Of all kinds of
knowledge that we can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and
the knowledge of ourselves, are the most important. As relig-
ionis the great busincss,for which we are created, and on which
our happiness depends ; and as religion consists in an inter-
course between ourselves and our Maker ; and so has its found-
ation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and
we stand in to each other ; therefore a true knowledge of both
must be needful, in order to true religion. But the knowledge
of ourselves consists chief y in right apprehensions concerning
those two chi'f fueulties of our nature, the Understanding and
Will. Both are very important : Yet the science of the latter
must be confessed to be of greatest moment ; inasmuch as all
virtue and religion have their seat more .immediately in the
Will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this
faculty.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
PART I.
Wherein are explained and stated various Terms
and Things belonging to the Subject of the ensu-
ing Discourse.
SECTION I.
Concerning the Nature of the Will.
IT may possibly be thought, that there is no great
need of going about to define or describe the Will ; this word
being generally as well understood as any other words we can:
use to explain it : And so perhaps it would be, had not phi-
losophers, metaphysicians and polemic divines brought the
matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it. But
since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to
the greater clearness in the following discourse, to say a few
things concerning it.
And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any met-
aphysical refining) is plainly, That by which the mind choos-
es any thing. The faculty of the Will is that faculty or pow-
er or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing :
An act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.
If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to
say, that it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses ;
I am content with it : Though I think that it is enough to
say, it is that by which the soul chooses : For in every act of
Will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than
another ; it chooses something rather than the contrary, of
Vol. V. B
10 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
rather than the want or nonexistence of that thing. So in
every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the
thing refused ; the positive and the negative are set before the
mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative ; and the
mind's making its choice in that case is properly the act of the
Will ; the Will's determining between the two is a voluntary
determining ; but that is the same thing as making a choice.
So that whatever names we call the act of the Will by, choos-
ing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, em-
bracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, for-
bidding, declining or being averse, a being pleased or displeas-
ed Avith ; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the
soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively.
Mr. Locke* says, " The Will signifies nothing but a pow-
er or ability to prefer or choose." And in the foregoing page
says, " The word preferring seems best to express the act of
volition ;" but adds, that " it does it not precisely ; for (says
he) though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who
can say he ever wills it ?" But the instance he mentions does
not prove that there is any thing else in willing, but merely
preferring : For it should be considered what is the next and
immediate object of the Will, with respect to a man's walk-
ing, or any other external action ; which is not being remov-
ed from one place to another ; on the earth, or through the
air ; these are remoter objects of preference ; but such or
such an immediate exertion of himself. The thing nextly
chosen or preferred when a man wills to walk, is not his be-
ing removed to such a place where he would be, but such an
exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it.
And his willing such an alteration in his body in the present
moment, is nothing else but his choosing or preferring such
an alteration in his body at such a moment, or his liking it
better than the forbearance of it. And God has so made and
established the human nature, the soul being united to a body
in proper state, that the soul preferring or choosing such an
".mmediatc exertion or alteration of the body, such an altera-
• Human Understanding, Edit. 7. vol. i.^. 19:.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 11
tion instantaneously follows. There is nothing else in the
actions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but
only my preferring or choosing, through successive moments,
that there should be such alterations of my external sensa-
tions and motions ; together with a concurring habitual ex-
pectation that it will be so ; having ever found by experience,
that on such an immediate preference, such sensations and
motions do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise.
But it is not so in the case of flying : Though a man may be
said remotely to choose or prefer flying ; yet he does not
choose or prefer, incline to or desire, under circumstances in
view, any immediate exertion of the members of his body in
order to it ; because he has no expeciation that he should
obtain the desired end by any such exertion ; and he does
not prefer or incline to any bodily exertion or effort under
this apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain.
So that if we carefully distinguish the proper objects of the
several acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such
like instances, that there is any difference between volition
and preference ; or that a man's choosing, liking best, or be-
ing best pleased with a thing, are not the same with his will-
ing that thing ; as they seem to be according to those general
and more natural notions of men, according to which language
is formed. Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed
by its pleasing a man to do thus or thus ; and a man's doing
as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the same thing in
common speech.
Mr. Locke* says, " The Will is perfectly distinguished
from Desire ; which in the very same action may have a
quite contrary tendency from that which our Wills set us up-
on. A man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me
to use persuasions to another, which, at the same lime I am
speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case
it is plain the Will and Desire run counter." I do not sup-
pose, that Will and Desire are words of precisely the same
signification : Will seems to be a word of a more genera!
* Human Undemanding, vol. i, p. 203, 204.
12 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
signification, extending to things present and absent. Desire
respects something absent. I may prefer my present situa-
tion and posture, suppose, sitting still, or having my eyes
open, and so may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so
entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run
counter. A man never, in any instance, wills any thing con-
trary to his desires, or desires any thing contrary to his Will.
The forementioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces,
does not prove that he ever does. He may, on some consid-
eration or other, will to utter speeches which have a tendency
to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not
persuade him : But yet his Will and Desire do not run coun-
ter. The thing which he wills, the very same he de-
sires ; and he does not will a thing, and desire the contrary
in any particular. In this instance, it is not carefully observ-
ed, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired : If
it were, it would be found that Will and Desire do not clash
in the least. The thing willed on some consideration, is to
utter such words ; and certainly, the same consideration, so
influences him, that he does not desire the contrary : All
things considered, he chooses to utter such words, and does
not desire not to utter them. And so as to the thing which
Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz. That the words, though
they tend to persuade, should not be effectual to that end, his
Will is not contrary to this ; he does not will that they should
be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he de-
sires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run
counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to
the other in the same thing, or with respect to the very same
object of Will or Desire : But here the objects are two ; and
in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree.
And it is no wonder that they should not agree in different
thingSj however little distinguished they arc in their nature.
The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Desire agree
with Desire, in different things. As'in this very instance
•which Mr. Locke mentions, a person may, on some considera-
tion, desire to use persuasions, and at the same time may de-
iire they may not prevail ; but yet nobody will say, that De^
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 1$
sire runs counter to Desire ; or that this proves that Desire
is perfectly a distinct thing from Desire. ...The like might be
observed of the other instance" Mr. Locke produces, of a
man's desiring to be eased of pain, See.
But not to dwell any longer on this, whether Desire aud
Will, and whether Preference and Volition be precisely the
same things or no ; yet, I trust it will be allowed by all,
that in every act of Will there is an act of choice ; that in
every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclina-
tion of the soul, whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of a
state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct ob-
ject of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of
the Will, there is some preponderation of the mind or incli-
nation, one way rather than another ; and the soul had rather
have or do one thing than another, or than not have or do that
thing ; and that there, where there is absolutely no prefer-
ring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there
£s no volition.
SECTION II.
Concerning the Determination of the Will.
BY determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any
meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the Will
or choice should be thus, and not otherwise : And the Will
is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some ac-
tion or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a
particular object. As when we speak of the determination
of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be
such a way, or in such a direction, rather than another.
To talk of the determination of the Will, supposes an ef-
fect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined,
there is a determiner. This must be supposed to be intend-
ed even by them that say, the Will determines itself. If it
be so, the Will is both determiner and determined ; it is a
14 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.-
cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the
object of its own influence and action.
With respect to that granc? enquiry, What determines the
Will, it would be very tedious and unnecessary at present to
enumerate and examine all the various opinions which have
been advanced concerning this matter ; nor is it needful that
I should enter into a particular disquisition of all points de-
bated in disputes on that question, whether the Will always
follows the last dictate of the understanding. It is sufficient
to my present purpose to say, it is that motive, which, as it
stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that deter-
mines the Will. But it may be necessary that I should a lit-
tle explain my meaning in this.
By motive-, I mean the whole of that which ;noves, excites
or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing
singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things
may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind ;
and, when it is so, all together are as it were one complex
motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have
respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce
to a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of
one thing alone, or of many together.
Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something
that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understand-
ing, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the
mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceiv-
ed, or is some way or other in the mind's view ; for what is
wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view,
cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing
is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any oth-
erwise than as it is perceived or thought of.
And I think it must also be allowed by ail, that every
tiling that is properly called a motive, excitemenfor induce-
ment to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree
of tendency or advantage to move or excite the Will, previous
to the effect, or to the act of the Will excited. This previous
tendency of the motive is what I call the strength of the mo-
tive. That motive which has a less degree of previous ad'
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. l&
Vantage or tendency to move the Will, or that appeavs less
inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a
weaker motive. On the contrary, that which appears most in-
viting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the under-
standing or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous
tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the
strongest motive. And in this sense, I suppose the Will is
always determined by the strongest motive.
Things that exist in the view of the mind have their
strength, tendency or advantage to move or excite its Will,
from many things appertaining to the nature and circum-
stances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of
the mind that views, and the degree and manner of its view ;
of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enume-
ration. But so much I think may be determined in general,
without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or
apprehended by an intelligent and, voluntary agent, which has
the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is
considered or viewed as good ; nor has it any tendency to
invite or engage the election of the soul in any further degree
than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say,
that things that appear have a tendency by the appearance they
make, to engage the mind to elect them, some other way
than by their appearing eligible to it ; which is absurd.
And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the Will
always is as the greatest apparent good is. For the right un-
derstanding of this, two things must be well and distinctly
observed.
1. It must be observed in what sense I use the lerm good ;
namely, as of the same import with agreeable. To appear
good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to ap-
pear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. Certainly noth-
ing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to
engage its inclination and choice, considered as evil or disa-
greeable ; nor, indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable
nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination, and
move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which
suits the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest
16 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the
mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it most ; and in that
sense, is the greatest apparent good : To say otherwise, is
little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction.
The word good, in this sense, includes in its signification,
the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreea-
ble and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing to avoid what
is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have uneasiness re-
moved. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes
determines the Will. For when he speaks of uneasiness as
determining the Will, he must be understood as, supposing
that the end or aim which governs in the volition or act of
preference, is the avoiding or removal of that uneasiness ;
and that is the same thing as choosing-and seeking what is
more easy and agreeable.
2. When I say, the Will is as the greatest apparent good
is, or, (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its
object the thing which appears most agreeable ; it must be
carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection,
that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of
volition ; and not some object that the act of Will has not an
immediate, but only an indirect and remote respect to. Many
acts of volition have some remote relation to an object, that is
different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen.
Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he
has to choose whether to drink it or no ; the proper and im-
mediate objects, about which his present volition is conver-
sant, and between which his choice now decides, are his own
acts, in drinking the liquor, or letting it alone ; and this will
certainly be done according to what, in the present view of
his mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agreeable to him.
If he chooses or wills to drink it, and not to let it alone ;
then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind, with all
that belongs to its appearance there, is. more agreeable and
pleasing than letting it alone.
But the objects to which this act of volition may relate
more remotely, and between which h,is choice may determine
more indirectly, are the present pleasure the man expects by
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 17
drinking, and the future misery which he judges will be the
Consequence of it : He may judge that this future misery
when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant,
than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two
things are not the proper objects that the act of volition
spoken of is nextly conversant about. For the act of Will
spoken of is concerning present drinking or forbearing to
drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper ob-
ject of the act of his Will ; and drinking, on some account or
ether, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him
best. If lie chooses to refrain, then refraining is the imme-
diate object of his Will, and is most pleasing to him. If in
the choice he makes in the case, he prefers a present pleas-
ure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater
when it comes ; then a lesser present pleasure appears more
agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance. If,
on the contrary, a future advantage is preferred, then that ap-
pears most agreeable, and suits him best. And so still the
present volition is as the greatest apparent good at present is«
I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the
Will always is as the greatest apparent good, or, as what ap-
pears most agreeable, is, than to say that the Will is deter-
mined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most
agreeable ; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing
to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing, seem
hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct. If strict propri-
ety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said,
that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence
and fruit of the mind's volition or choice, is determined by
that which appears most agreeable, than that the preference
or ehtiice itself is ; but that the act of volition itself is al-
ways determined by that in or about the mind's view of the
object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say, in
or aoout the mind's view of the object, because what has in-
fluence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what
appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the
view, and the state and circumstances of the mind that views.
Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mindV
Vol. V. C
IS FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their
appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no
small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is
not necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only
mention some things in general.
I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice
agreeable, is the apparent nature and circumstances of the
object. And there are various things of this sort, that have
an hand in rendering the object more or less agreeable ; as,
1. That which appears in the object, which renders it
beautiful and pleasant, or deformed and irksome to the mind ;
viewing it as it is in itself.
2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending
the object, or the consequence of it. Such concomitants and
consequents being viewed as circumstances of the object, are
to be considered as belonging to it, and as it were parts of it ;
as it stands in the mind's view, as a proposed object of choice.
3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that ap-
pears, with respect to distance of time ; being either nearer
or farther off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind,
to have pleasure speedily ; and disagreeable to have it de-
layed ; so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in
the mind's view, and all other things are equal, but only one
is beheld as near, and the other far off ; the nearer will ap-
pear most agreeable, and so will be chosen. Because though
the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed
in themselves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances ; one
of them having the additional agreeableness of the circum-
stance of nearness.
II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness
of an object of choice, as it stands in the mind's view, is the
manner of the view. If the object be something which ap-
pears connected with future pleasure, not only will the degree
of apparent pleasure have influence, but also the manner of
t!ic view, especially in two respects.
1. With respect to the degree of judgment, or firmness
of assent, with which the mind judges the pleasure to be fu-
ture. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain happi-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 19
ness, than an uncertain one ; and a pleasure viewed as more
probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to
the mind, than that which is viewed as less probable.
2. With respect to the degree of the idea of the future
pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject of
our thoughts, either past, present, or future, we have much
more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others;
that is, our idea is much more clear, lively and strong. Thus
the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate sensation,
are usually much more lively than those we have by mere
imagination, or by contemplation of them when absent. My
idea of the sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid than when
I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious
fruit, is usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only
imagine it. And sometimes the ideas we have of things by
contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other
times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea
of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of
food that he loves, than at another. Now the degree, of
strength of the idea or sense that men have of future good
or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds
to excite choice or volition. When of two kinds of future
pleasure, which the mind considers of, and are presented for
choice, both are supposed ej;actly equal by the judgment,
and both equally certain, and all other things are equal,
but only one of them is what the mind has a far more lively
sense of, than of the other ; this has the greatest advantage
by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the Will. It
is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleasure it has
a strong and lively sense of, than that which it has only a
faint idea of. The view of the former is attended with the
strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the
want of it ; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasi-
ness removed, and its appetite gratified. And if several fu-
ture enjoyments are presented together, as competitors for
the choice of the mind, some of them judged lo.be greater,
and others less ; the mind also having a greater sense and
more lively idea of the good of some of them, and of others a
23 PREEDOM OF THE WILL.
less ; and some are viewed as of greater certainty or proba-
bility than others ; and those enjoyments that appear most
agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in others :
In this case, all other things being equal, the agre^ableness
of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way
compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judg-
ment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that
good, and the degree of the view or sense, or liveliness of the
idea the mind has of that good ; because all together concur
to constitute the degree in which the object appears at pres-
ent agreeable ; and accordingly volition will be determined.
I might further observe, the state of the mind chat views
a proposed object of choice, is another thing that contribute?
to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object ; the
particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has
been introduced and established by education, example, cus-
tom, or some other means ; cr the frame or state that the
Tnind is in on a particular occasion. That object which ap-
pears agreeable to one, does not so to another. And the
same object does not always appear alike agreeable, to the
same person, at different times. It is most agreeable to
some men, to follow their reason; and to others, to follow their
appetites : To some men it is more agreeable to deny a vicious
inclination, than to gratify it ; others it suits best to gratify
the vilest appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men
than others, to counteract a former resolution. In these re-
spects, and many others which might be mentioned, different
things will be most agreeable to different persons ; and not
only so, but to the same persons at different times.
But possibly it is needless and improper, to mention the
frame and state of the mind, as a distinct ground of the agree-
ableness of objects from the other two mentioned before, viz.
The apparent nature and circumstances of the objects viewed,
and the manner of the view ; perhaps. if we strictly consider
the matter, the dim-rent temper and state of the mind makes
no alteration as to the arvccablcness of objects, any other
way than as it makes the objects themselves appear different-
ly beautiful or deformed, having apparent plea&ure or pain
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. si
attending them ; and as it occasions the manner of the view
to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleas-
ure or uneasiness to be more or less lively.
However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no \
one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the
greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been ex-
plained. The choice of the mind never departs from that
which at that time, and with respect to the direct and imme-
diate objects of that decision of the mind, appears most agree-
able and pleasing, all things considered. If the immediate
objects of the Will are a man's own actions, then those ac-
tions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be
now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk,
then he wil!s to w Ik. If it be- now, upon the whole of
what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then
he chooacs to speak : If it suits him best to keep silence, then
he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and
more universal dictate of the sense and experience of man-
kind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they
please, then they do what suits them best, or wh.it is most
agreeable to them. To say, that they do what they please,
or what pleases them, but yet do not do what is agreeable to
them, is the same thing as to 'say, they do what they please,
but do not act their pleasure ; and that is to suy, that they do
what they please, and yet do not do what they please.
It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will
always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But
then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as in-
cluding the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and
not merely what is called reason or judgment. If by the dic-
tate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be
best or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole
of his duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the
last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is
quite a different matter from things appearing now most
agreeable ; all things being put together which pertain to the
mind's present perceptions, apprehensions or ideas, in any re-
spect. Although that dictate of reason, when it takes place,
12 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
is one thing- that is put into the scales, and is to be consider-
ed as a thing that has concern in the compound influence
which moves and induces the Will ; and is one thing- that is
to be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance
of good which the Will always follows ; either as having its
influence added to other things, cr subducted from them.
When it concurs with other things, then its weight is added
to them, as put into the same scult; ; but when it is against
them, it is as a Weight in the opposite scale, where it resists
the influence of other things : Yet its resistance is often over-
come by their greater weight, and so the act of the Will is
determined in opposition to it.
The things which I have said, may, I hope, serve in some
measure^ to illustrate and confirm the position I laid down in
the beginning of this section, viz. That the Will is always
determined by the strongest motive, or by that view of the
mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to
excite volition. But whether i have been so happy as right-
ly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of mo-
tives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the po-
sition itself; which carries much of its own evidence with it ;
and is the thing of chief importance to the purpose of the
ensuing discourse : And the truth of it, I hope, will appear
•with great clearness, before I h^ve finished what I have to say
on the subject of human liberty.
SECTION III.
Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Necessity,
Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence.
THE words necessary, impossible, Sec are abundantly
used in controversies about Free Will and moral agency ;
and therefore the sense in which they are used, should be.
clearlv understood.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 23-
Here I might say, that"a thing* is then said to be necessa-
vy, when it must be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would
not properly be a definition of Necessity, or an explanation of
the word, any more than if I explained the word ?nust, by
there being a necessity. The words must, can, and cannot,
need explication as much as the words necessary and impossi-
ble ; excepting that the former are words that children com-
monly use, and know something of the meaning of earlier
than the latter.
The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a rela-
tive term ; and relates to some supposed opposition made to
the existence of the thing spoken of, which is overcome, or
proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is necessary, in the
origina* •uk! proper sense of the word, which is, or will be,
notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say, that a
thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is im-
possible it should not be : But the word impossible is mani-
festly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power
exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for the
effect ; as the word unable is relative, and has relation to abil-
ity or endeavor which is insufficient ; and as the word irresisti-
ble is relative, and has always reference to resistance which is
made, or rifay be made to some force or power tending to an
effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power or hinder the
effect. The common notion of necessity and impossibility
implies something that frustrates endeavor or desire.
Here several things are to be noted.
1. Things are said to be necessary in general, which are
or will be notwithstanding any supposable opposition from us
or others, or from whatever quarter. But things are said to
be necessary to us, which are or will be notwithstanding all
opposition supposable in the case from us. The same may
be observed of the word impossible, and other such like terms.
2. Ti'ese terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, Sec. do
especially belong to the controversy about liberty and moral
agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now mention-
ed, viz. as necessary or impossible to us, and with relation t»
any supposable opposition or endeavour of ours.
H FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
3. As the word Necessity in its vulgar and common use, is
relative, and has always reference to some supposable insuffi-
cient opposition ; so when we speak of any thing as necessa-
ry to us, it is with relation to some supposable opposition of
our Wills, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the
contrary : For we do not properly make opposition to an
event, any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things
are said to be what must be, or necessarily are, as to us, when
they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavor the con-
trary, or try to prevent or remove their existence : But such
opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies, oppo-
sition of our Wills.
It Is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vul-
garly used, are used and accepted in this manner. A thing
is said to be necessary, When we cannot help it, let us do what
we will. So any thing is said to be impossible to us, when we
would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavor
it ; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it ; but all
our desires and endeavors are, cr Avould be vain. And that
is said to be irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition,
resistance, and endeavors to the contrary. And we are said
to be unable to do a thing, when our supposable desires and en-
deavors to do it are insufficient.
We are accustomed, in the common use of language, to
apply and understand these phrases in this sense : We grow
up with such a habit ; which by the daily use of these terms,
in such a sense, from our childhood, becomes fixed and set-
tled ; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire
and endeavor of ours, is strongly connected with these terms,
and naturally excited in our minds, whenever we hear the
words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so united and
associated, that they unavoidably go together ; one suggests
the other, and carries the other with it, and never can be sop?
aratcd as long as we live. And if we use the words, as terms
of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceeding circum-
spect and wary, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use
of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent man-
ner : This habitual connexion of ideas will deceive and con-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 25
found us in our reasonings and discourses, wherein we pre-
tend to use these terms in that manner, as terms of art.
4. It follows from what has been observed, that when
these terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, Sec. are
used in cases wherein no opposition, or insufficient will or en-
deavor, is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very nature
of the supposed case itself excludes and denies any such oppo-
sition, will or endeavor, these terms are then not used in their
proper signification, but quite beside their use in common
speech. The reason is manifest ; namely, that in such cases
we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable op-
position, will or endeavor. And therefore if any man uses
these terms in such cases, he either u?es them nonsensically,
or in some new sense, diverse from their original and proper
meaning. As for instance ; if a man should affirm after this
manner, that it is necessary for a man, and what must be,
that a man should choose virtue rather than vice, during the
time that he prefers virtue to vice ; and that it is a thing im-
possible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that
he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues ;
such a man would use the terms must, irresistible, &c. with
perfect insignificance and nonsense ; or in some new sense,
diverse from their common use ; which is with reference, as
has been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness
and resistance ; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes
and denies any such thing : For the case supposed is that of
being willing and choosing.
5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms
necessary, impossible, 8cc. are often used by philosophers and
metaphysicians in a sense cpiite diverse from their common
vise and original signification : For they apply them to many
cases in which no opposition is supposed or supposable. Thus
they use them with respect to God's existence before the crea-
tion of the world, when there was no other being but He : So
with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of the Divine
Beings, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness,
hating sin, &c. So they apply these terms to many cases of
the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings, angels*
Vol. V. D
26 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
and men ; wherein all opposition of the Will is shut out and
denied, in the very supposition of the case.
Metaphysical or Philosophical Necessity is nothing differ-
ent from their certainty. I speak not now of the certainty of
knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves,
which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of
them; or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of
the proposition which affirms them.
What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophic-
al Necessity, namely, That by which a thing cannot but be,
or whereby it cannot be otherwise, fails of being a proper ex-
planation of it, on two accounts : First, the words can, or can-
not, need explanation as much as the word Necessity ; and
the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the lat-
ter by the fof mer. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean,
when we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain our-
selves by saying, Ave mean, it must necessarily be so ; as well
as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a thing
cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is liable to the
fore mentioned great inconvenience : The words cannot, or
unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power ex-
erted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken
of; to which, as I have now observed, the word Necessity, as
used by philosophers, has no reference.
Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the
full and fixed connexion between the things signified by the
subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms some-
thing to be true. When there is such a connexion, then the
thing affirmed in^the proposition is necessary, in a philosophi-
cal sense ; whether any opposition, or contrary effort be sup-
posed, or supposable in the case, or no. When the subject
and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence
of any thing, either substance, quality, act or circumstance,
have a full and certain connexion, then the existence or being
of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense.
And in this sense I use the word Necessity, in the following
discourse, when I endeavor to prove that Necessity is not in-
consistent with liberty.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 27.
The subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirm
existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain
connexion several ways.
(1.) They may have a full and perfect connexion in and
of themselves ; because it may imply a contradiction, or gross
absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things
are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence
of being generally considered, is necessary in itself : Because
it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the exist-
ence of being in general, or to say there was absolute and uni-
versal nothing ; and is as it were the sum of all contradic-
tions ; as might be shewn, if this were a proper place for it.
So God's infinity, and other attributes are necessary. So it
is necessary in its own nature, that two and two should be
four ; and it is necessary, that all right lines drawn from the
centre of a circle to the circumference should be equal. It is
necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do to others, as
they would that they should do to them. So innumerable
metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in them-
selves ; the subject and predicate of the proposition which af-
firms them, are perfectly connected of themselves.
(2.) The connexion of the subject and predicate of a prop-
osition, which affirms the existence of something, may be fix-
ed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is
already come to pass ; and either now is, or has been ; and
so has as it were made sure of existence. And therefore, the
proposition which affirms present and past existence of it,
may by this means be made certain, and necessarily and un-
alterably true. The past event has fixed and decided the mat-
ter, as to its existence ; and has made it impossible but that
existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the exist-
ence ©f whatever is already come to pass, is now become
necessary ; it is become impossible it should be otherwise
than true, that such a thing has been.
(3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition which af-
firms something to be, may have a real and certain connex-
ion consequentially ; and so the existence of the thing may be
consequentially necessary ; as it may be surely and firmly con-
2S FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
nected with something else, that is necessary in one of the
former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly con-
nected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own na-
ture, or with something: which has already received and made
sure of existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explain-
ed by the„ connexion of two or more propositions one with
another. Things -which are perfectly connected with other
things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a Ne-
cessity of consequence.
And here it may be observed, that all things which are
future, or which will hereatter begin to be, which can be said
to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way. Their
existence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always would
have existed. Nor is their existence become nesessary by be-
ing made sure, by being already come to pass. Therefore,
the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter,
is or can be necessary, is by a connexion with something
that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already
is, or has been ; so that the one being supposed, the other
certainly follows. And this also is the only way that all things
past, excepting those which were from eternity, could.be
necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass
necessarily ; and therefore the only way in which any effect
or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had, or will
have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will
hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Neces-
sity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts
of the Will.
It may be of some use in these controversies, further to
observe concerning metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeable
to the distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly
understood) things that exist may be said to be necessary,
either with a general or particular Necessity. The existence
of a thing may be said to be necessary with a general Neces-
sity, when all things whatsoever being considered, there is a
foundation for certainty of its existence ; or when in the
most general and universal view of things, the subject and
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 29
predicate of the proposition, which affirms its existence, would
appear with an infallible connexion.
An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be
necessary with a particular necessity, or with regard to a par-
ticular person, thing, or time, when nothing that can be taken
into consideration, in or about that person, thing, or time, al-
ters the case at all, as to the certainty of that event, or the
existence of that thing ; or can be of any account at all, in
determining the infallibility of the connexion of the subject
and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence
of the thing ; so that it is all one, as to that person, or thing,
at least at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a
Necessity that is most universal and absolute. Thus there
are many things that happen to particular persons, which
they have no hand in, and in the existence of which no will
of theirs has any concern, at least at that time ; which, wheth-
er they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general,
yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of
theirs at that time ; as they prevent all acts of the will about
the affair. I shall have occasion to apply this observation to
particular instances in the following discourse. Whether
the same things that are necessary with a particular Necessi-
ty, be not also necessary Avith a general Necessity, may be a
matter of future consideration. Let that be as it will, it alters
not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of
Necessity.
These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the
terms necessary and necessity, as terms of art, and as often
used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity,
in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than their orig-
inal meaning in common language, which was before ex-
plained.
What has been said to shew the meaning of the terms
necessary and necessity, may be sufficient for the explaining
of the opposite terms impossible and impossibility. For there
is no difference, but only the latter are negative, and the
former positive. Impossibility is the same as negative Ne-
cessity, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is
CO FREEDOM OF THE WILL
used as a term of art in a like diversity from the original and
vulgar meaning with Necessity.
The same may be observed concerning the words unable
and inability. It has been observed, that these terms, in their
original and common use, have relation to will and endeavor,
as supposable in the pase, and as insufficient for the bringing
to pass the thing willed and endeavored. But as these terms
are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers
on controversies about free will, they are used in a quite dif-
ferent, and far -more extensive sense, and are applied to many
cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the
thing to pass, is or can be supposed, but is actually denied
and excluded in the nature of the case.
As the words necessary, im/wssiblr, unable^ Sec. arc used by
polemic writers, in a sense diverse from their common sig-
nification, the like has happened to the term contingent.
Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by
chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words,
when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according
to the established course of things, is not discerned ; and so
is what we have no means of the foresight of. And especial-
ly is any thing said to be contingent or accidental with regard
to us, when any thing comes to pass that we are concerned
in, as occasions or subjects, without our foreknowledge, and
beside our design and scope.
But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very dif-
ferent sense ; not for that whose connexion with the series
of things we cannot discern, so as to foresee the event, but
for something which has absolutely no previous ground or
reason, with which its existence lias any fixed and certain
connexion.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. SI
SECTION IV.
Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Necessity,
and Inability.
THAT Necessity which has been explained, consisting
in an infallible connexion of the things signified by the sub-
ject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are
the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural Ne-
cessity.
I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction
be a proper and perfect distinction ; but shall only explain how
these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are
sometimes used, and as they are used in the following dis-
course.
The phrase, moral Necessity, is used variously ; some-
times it is used for a Necessity of moral obligation. So we
say, a man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of
duty and conscience, which he cannot be discharged from.
So the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in
point of interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant
that apparent connexion of things, which is the ground of
moral evidence ; and so is distinguished from absolute Ne-
cessity, or that sure connexion of things, that is a foundation
for infallible certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signi-
fies much the same as that high degree of probability, which
is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy, and be relied upon by man-
kind, in their conduct and behavior in the world, as they
would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others
properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral
Necessity is meant that Necessity of connexion and conse-
quence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength
of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which there is in
many cases between these, and such certain volitions and ac-
tions. And it is in this sense, that I use the phrase, moral
Necessity, in the following discourse.
32 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
By natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such
Necessity as men are under through the force of natural caus-
es ; as distinguished from what are called moral causes,
such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral mo-
tives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain cir-
cumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by Ne-
cessity ; they feel pain when their bodies are wounded ; they
see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when
their eyes are opened ; so they assent to the truth of certain
propositions, as soon as the terms are understood ; as that
two and two make four, that black is not white, that two par-
allel lines can never cross one another ; so by a natural Ne-
cessity men's bodies move downwards, when there is nothing
to support them.
But here several tilings may be noted concerning these
two kinds of Necessity.
1. Moral Necessity may be as absolute, as natural Ne-
cessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected
with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its
natural cause. Whether the Will in every case is necessari-
ly determined by the strongest motive, or whether the Will
ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever op-
pose the strongest present inclination, or not ; if that matter
should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but
that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the
motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the
Will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith.
When motives or previous biasses are very strong, all will
allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And
if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still great-
er. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength,
to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great,
that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it ; for this
plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed
to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite ;
and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can sur-
mount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty de-
grees of strength, because the degrees of strength arc beyond
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. SS
the degrees of difficulty ; yet if the difficulty be increased to
thirty, or an hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength
not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to
. surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed,
that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect
connexion between moral causes and effects ; so this only is
what I call by the name of moral Necessity.
2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural Ne-
cessity, I would not be understood to suppose, that if any
thing comes to pass by the former kind of Necessity, the
nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter.
I do not mean to determine, that when a moral habit or mo-
tive is so strong, that the act of the Will infallibly follows,
this is not owing to the nature of things. But these are the
names that these two kinds of Necessity have usually been
called by ; and they must be distinguished by some names
or other ; for there is a distinction or difference between
them, that is very important in its consequences. Which
difference does not lie so much in the nature of the connex-
ion, as in the two terms connected. The cause with which
the effect is connected, is of a particular kind, viz. that which
is of moral nature ; either some previous habitual disposition,
or some motive exhibited to the understanding. And the
effect is also of a particular kind ; being likewise of a moral
nature ; consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul
or voluntary action.
I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural, in dis-
tinction from moral necessity, is so called, because mere na~
ture, as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any
thing of choice. The word nature is often used in opposition
to choice ; not because nature has indeed never any hand in
our choice ; but this probably comes to pass by means that
we first get our notion of nature from that discernible and ob-
vious course of events, which we observe in many things that
our choice has no concern in ; and especially in the material
world ; which, in very many parts of it, we cusiiy perceive
to be in a settled course ; the stated order and manner of suc-
cession being very apparent. But where wc do not readily
Vol. V. E
U FREEDOM OF THE WILL.*
discern the rule and connexion, (though there be a connexion;,
according to an established law, truly taking place) we signify
the manner of event by some other name. Even in many
things which are seen in the material and inanimate world,
which do not discernibly and obviously come to pass accord-
ing to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the
event by the name of nature, but by such names as accident,
chance, contingenoe, &cc. So men make a distinction between
nature and choice ; as though they were completely and uni-
versally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but
that choice, in many cases, arises from nature, as truly as oth-
er events. But the dependence and connexion between acts
of volition or choice, and their causes, according to established
laws, is not so sensible and obvious. And we observe that
choice is as it were a new principle of motion and action,
different from that established law and order of things which
is most obvious, that is seen especially in corporeal and sensi-
ble things ; and also the choice often interposes, interrupts
and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and
causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let
alone, and left to go on according to the laws of motion
among themselves. Hence it is spoken of as if it were a
principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and prop-
erly set in opposition to it. Names being commonly given
to tilings, according to what is most obvious, and is suggested
by what appears to the senses without reflection and research.
3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained,
as signified by the name of moral Necessity, the word Neces-
sity is not used according to the original design and meaning
of the word ; for as was observed before, such terms, rieces-
nary, impossible, irresistible, Sec. in common speech, and their
most proper sense, are always relative ; having reference to
some supposablc voluntary opposition or endeavor, that is in-
sufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and en-
deavor, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity ; which
is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which docs
not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it.
For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 35
itself, in its present act ; or the present choice to be opposite
to, and resisting present choice ; as absurd as it is to talk of
two contrary motions, in the same moving body, at the same
time. And therefore the very case supposed never admits
of any trial whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome
this Necessity.
What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may
serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inabiir
ity. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when
we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly call-
ed nature does not allow of it, or because of some impeding
defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the facul-
ty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects.
Moral Inability consists not in any of these things ; but either
in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inctir
nation, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce
and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent mo-
tives to the contrary. Or both these may be re-jolyed into
one ; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability
consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a
person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a de-
fect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the
same thing as his being unable through the want of an incli-
nation, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such
circumstances, and under the influence of such views.
To give some instances of this moral Inability. ...A woman
of great honor and chastity may have a moral Inability to
prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and du-
ty to his parents, may be unable to be willing to kill his father.
Avery lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and
temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints,
may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard,
under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear
taking of strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable
to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his pros-
perity ; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile dis-
position, that they may be unable to love those who are most
worthy of their esteem and affection. A strong habit of vir.=
3fi FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
tue, and a great degree of holiness may cause a moral Inabil"
ity to love wickedness in general, may render a man unable
to take complacence in wicked persons or things ; or to
choose a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life. And on
the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may
lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness ;
and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy being,
or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good.
Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral
Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that
Which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual
moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exer-
cises or acts of will of that nature or kind, through a fixed and
habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want
of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very ill natured man
may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as another,
who is full of good nature, commonly exerts ; and a man,
Whose heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to
exert such and such grateful acts, through that stated defect
of a grateful inclination. By particular and occasional moral
Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particu-
lar act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or
of inducements presented to the view of the understanding,
on this occasion. If it be so, that the will is always deter-
mined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an
Inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does ;
it not being possible, in any case, that the will should, at pres-
ent, go against the motive which has now, all things consid-
ered, the greatest strength and advantage to excite and induce
it. The former of these kinds of moral Inability, consisting
in that which is stated, habitual and general, is most common-
ly called by the name of Inability, because the word Inabili-
ty, in its most proper and original signification, has respect
to some- stated defect.
And this especially obtains the name of Inability also up-
on another account : I before observed, that the word Ina-
bility in its original and most common use, is a relative term ;
and has respect to will and endeavor, as supposable in the
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. ST
case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and
endeavored. Now there may be more of an appearance and
shadow of this, with respect to the acts which arise from a
fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from tran-
sient occasions and causes. Indeed Will and endeavor against,
or diverse from present acts of the will, are in no case sup-
posable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual ; for that
would be to suppose the will, at present, to be otherwise
than, at present, it is. But 3'et there may be will and endeav-
or against future acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to
take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction to
suppose that the acts of the will at one time, may be against
the acts of the will at another time ; and there may be desires
and endeavors to prevent or excite future acts of the will ; but
such desires and endeavors are, in many cases, rendered in-
sufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit : When the oc-
casion returns, the strength of habit overcomes, and baffles
all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in mis-
erable slavery and bondage to a strong habit. But it may be
comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to such
future acts as are only occasional and transient ; because the
occasion or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be
prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral Inability
that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of Ina-
bility. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly re-
sist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits ; so
reason may resist present acts of the will, and its resistance
be insufficient; and this is more commonly the case also,
when the acts arise from strong habit.
But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in
each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very
diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a
natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to
such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the
thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is
supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordina-
ry use of language, that a malicious man, let him be ever so
malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is
38 • FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
not able to shew his neighbor kindness ; or that a drunkard,
let his appetite be ever so strong, cannot keep the cup from,
his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a
thing in h4s power, if he has it in his choice, or at his elec-
tion : And a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a
thing, when he can do it if he will. It Is improperly said,
that a person cannot perform those external actions which
are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be ea-
sily performed, if the act of the will were present. And if it
be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external
voluntary actions, which depend on the will, it is in some re-
spect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the
acts of the will themselves ; because it is more evidently false,
with respect to these, that he cannot if he will : For to say so,
is a downright contradiction : It is to say, he cannot will, if he
docs will. And in this case, not only is il true, that it is easy
for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the
doing ; when once he has willed, the thing is performed ;
and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these
things to ascribe a nonperformance to the want of power or
ability, is not just ; because the thing wanting is not a being
able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and
capacity of nature, and every thing else sufficient, but a dis-
position : Nothing is wanting but a will.
SECTION V
Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Mora!
Agency.
THE plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom
and Liberty, in common speech, is poiver> opportunity or ad-
vantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other
words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 3?
way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills.*
And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by,
is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will?
or being necessitated to do otherwise.
If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the
word Liberty, in the ordinary use of language ; as I trust that
none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will
deny ; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neith-
er Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any
being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power or
property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of
no such thing as will, cannot have any power or opportunity
of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act con-
trary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it.
And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belong-
ing to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense ; if we
judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper sig-
nification of words. For the will itself h not an Agent that
has a will : The power of choosing itself, has not a power of
choosing. That which has the power of volition or choice is
the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And
he that has the Liberty of doing according to his will, is the
Agent or doer who is possessed of the will ; and not the will
which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird
let loose has power and Liberty to fly ; but not that the bird's
power of flying has a power and Liberty of flying. To be free
is the property of an Agent, who is possessed of powers and
faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zeal-
ous. But these qualities are the properties of men or per-
sons ; and not the properties of properties.
There are two things that are contrary to this which is
called Liberty in common speech. One is constraint ; the
same is otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction ;
which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary
* I say not only doing, but conducting ; because a voluntary forbearing
to do, sitting still, keeping silence, &c. are instances of persons' conduct,
about which Libeity is exercised; though they, are not so propcily called
Aoin*.
4e FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
to his will. The other is restraint ; which is his being hin*
dered, and not having power to do according to his will. But
that which has no will, cannot be the subject of these things....
I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke having set the
same thing forth, with sc great clearness, in his Essay on the
Human Understanding,
But one thing more I would observe concerning what is
vulgarly called Liberty ; namely, that power and opportunity
for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice,
is all that is meant by it ; without taking into the meaning of
the word any tilling of the cause or original of that choice ; or
at all considering how the perr.on came to have such a voli-
tion ; whether it was caused by some external motive or in-
ternal habitual bias ; whether it was determined by some in-
ternal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a
cause ; whether it was necessarily connected with something
foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his
volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is
nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his
will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the
primary and common notion of freedom.
What has been said may be sufficient to shew what is
meant by Liberty, according to the common notions of man-
kind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word :
But the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians and others,
who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different significa-
tion. ...These several things belong to their notion of Liberty.
1. That it consists in a selldetermining power in the will, or a
certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts,
whereby it determines its own volitions ; so as not to be de-
pendent in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor
determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indiffer-
ence belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind,
previous to the act of volition be, in equiiibrio. S.Contin-
gence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it ; not
in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been al-
ready explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed
and certain connexion with some previous ground or reason
FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so
much to consist in these things, that unless the will of man
be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much so-
ever he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.
A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions
that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denom-
inated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, com-
mendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral fac-
ulty, or sense of moral good and evil, ov of such a thing as
desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punish-
ment; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenc-
ed in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited
to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a con-
duct agreeable to the moral faculty.
The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and
influence on the earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring
forth its fruits ; but it is not a moral Agent. Its action,
though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks
out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischiev-
ous in its operation ; but is not a moral Agent. What it does
is not faulty cr sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The
brute creatures are not moral Agents. The actions of some
of them are very profitable and pleasant ; others are very
hurtful ; yet, seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of
desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding,
or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from
instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral in-
ducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous ;
nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treat-
ment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults
or good deeds.
Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial dif-
ference between the moral Agency of a ruler and a subject.
I call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference
of moral inducements they are capable of being influenced by,
arising from the difference of circumstances. A ruler, act-
ing, in that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced
by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and promi-
Vol. V. F .
42 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ses, rewards and punishments, as the subject is ; though both
may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil.
And therefore the moral agency of the Supreme Being, who
acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures, and
never as a subject, differs in that respect from the moral Agen-
cy of created intelligent beings. God's actions, and particu-
larly those which are to be attributed to him as moral gov-
ernor, are morally good in the highest degree. They are
most perfectly holy and righteous ; and we must conceive of
Him as influenced in the highest degree, by that which,
above all others, is properly a moral inducement, viz. the
moral good which He sees in such and such things : And
therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral Agent, the
source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule
of all virtue and moral good ; though by reason of his being
supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under the
influence of law or command, promises or threatenings, re-
wards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential
qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possi-
ble perfection ; such as understanding, to perceive the differ-
ence between moral good and evil ; a capacity of discerning
that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are
praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment ;
and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by under-
standing, and a power of acting according to his choice or
pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are
in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much
consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which wc
read of Gen. i. 26, 27, and chapter ix. 6.) by which God dis-
tinguishes man from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and
principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency.
Herein very much consists the natural image of God ; as his
spiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at first,
consisted in that moral excellency, that he was endowed with.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 4S
PART II.
Wherein it is considered whether there is or can be
any such Sort of Freedom of Will, as that where-
in Arminians place the Essence of the Liberty of
all moral Agents ; and whether any such Thing
&uer was or can be conceived of,
SECTION I.
Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminiati
Notion 0/^ Liberty of Will, consisting in the WilPs
Selfdetermining Power.
HAVING taken notice of those things which may be
necessary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the prin-
cipal terms and phrases made use of in controversies, concern-
ing human Liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is,
according to the common language and general apprehen-
sion of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained
by Arminians ; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion
of the Freedom of the Will, and the supposed necessity of it
in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable
of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or
counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards
or punishments ; or whether that which has been described,
as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not suffi-
cient, and the only Liberty which makes or can make any
one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of the<;e things.
In this Part, I shall consider whether any such thing be pas-
sible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Armin-
ians insist on ; and shall inquire, whether any such sort of
Liberty be necessary to moral agency, Sec. in the next Pari
44 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a selfdeter-
mining Power in the will : Wherein, according to the Ar-
minians, does most essentially consist the Will's Freedom ;
and shall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly absurd,
and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that the will itself
determines all the free acts of the Will.
Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such
phraser and ways of speaking as the Will's determining it-
self ; because actions are to be ascribed to agents, and not
properly to the powers of agents ; which improper way of
speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr.
Locke observes. But I shall suppose that the Arminians,
when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the
Will mean the soul willing. I shall take it for granted, that
when they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean
the soul in the exercise of a power of willing, or acting vol-
untarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning, because
nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and plainest
absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the powers or prin-
ciples of acting, as doing such things, we mean that the
agents which have thc: ; e Powers of acting, do them in the
exercise of those Powers. So when we say, valor fights
courageously, we mean, the man who is under the influence
of Vaicr fights courageously, When we say, love seeks the
object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that object.
When we say, the understanding discerns, we mean the soul
in the exercise of that faculty. So when it is said, the will
decides or determines, the meaning must be, that the person
in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing, or the
soul acting voluntarily, determines.
Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts,
the soul determines all the free acts of the Will in the exer-
cise of a Power of willing and choosing ; or which is the
same thing, it determines them of choice ; it determines its
own acts by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines
the Will, then choice orders and determines the choice ; and
acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the con-
duct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will deter-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 4a
mines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is
determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act.
And if that preceding act of the Will or choice be also a free
act, then by these principles, in this act too, the Will is self-
determined ; that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the
soul voluntarily chooses ; or, which is the same thing, it is
an act determined still by a preceding act of the Will, choos-
ing that. And the like may .again be observed of the last
mentioned act, which brings us directly to a contradiction ;
for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in
the whole train, directing and determining the rest ; or a
free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or
else we must come at last to an act of the Will, determining
the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not selfdetermined,
and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom ; but if the
first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not
free, none of them all can be free ; as is manifest at first view,
but shall be demonstrated presently.
If the Will, which we find governs the members of the
body and determines and commands their motions and ac-
tions, does also govern itself, and determine its own mo-
tions and actions, it doubtless determines them the same
way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines
which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of volition
or choice ; and there is no other way of the Will's determin-
ing, directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever
the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will.
And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself
in its own actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it
determines other things which are under its command. So
that if the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has it-
self and its own actions under its command and direction, and
its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that
every free volition arises from another antecedent volition,
directing and commanding that ; and if that directing volition
be also free, in that also the Will is determined ; that is to
say, that directing volition is determined by another going be-
fore that, and so on, until we come to the first volition in the
45 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
whole series ; and if that first volition be free, and the Wilt
selfdetermined in it, then that is determined by another voli-
tion preceding that, which is a contradiction ; because by the
supposition, it can have none before it to direct or determine
it, being tiie first in the train. But if that first volition is not
determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is
not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the Arminian
notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's selfdeter-
mination. And if that first act of the V/iil, which determines
and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the follow-
ing acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we
suppose there are five acts in the train, the fiiih and last de-
termined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the
third by the second, and the second by the first ; if the first
is not determined by the Will, and so not free, then none of
them are truly determined by the Will ; that is, that each
of them is as it is, and not otherwise, is not first ow-
ing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in
the series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that
which the Will has no hand in the determination of. And
this being that which decides what the iest shall be, and de-
termines their existence ; therefore the first determination of
their existence is not from the X, ill. The case is just the
same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should
suppose a succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand.
If the first act be not free, being determined by something
out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable
to itself, and that the next, and so on ; they are none of them
free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by
some cause out of the Will ; and so all freedom in the case
is excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to
this notion of freedom. If we should suppose along chain
of ten thousand links, so connected, that if the first link moves,
it will move the next, and that the next, and so the whole
chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of
its motion, by the motion of the first link, and that is moved
by something else. In this case, though all the links but
. • . are moved by other parts of the same chain ; yet it ap-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 4Y
pears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its mo-
tion, is from any selfmoving or selfdetermining power in
the chain, any more than if every link were immediately
moved by something that did not belong to the chain. If
the Will be not free in the first act, which causes the next,
then neither is it free in the next, which is "caused by that
first act ; for though indeed the Will caused it, yet it did not
cause it freely, because the preceding act, by which it was
caused, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in
the second act, so neither can it be in the third, which is
caused by that ; because in like manner, that third was
determined by an act of the Will that was not free. And
so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next ;
and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one. If
the first on which the whole chain depends, and which deter-
mines all the rest, be not a free act, the Will is not free in
causing or determining any one of those acts, because the act
by which it determines them all, is not a free act, and there-
fore the Will is no more free in determining them, than if it
did not cause them at all. Thus, this Arminian notion of
Liberty of the Will, consisting in the Will's selfdeiermrnatlon^
is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world.
SECTION II.
Several supposed ways 0/* Evading the foregoing Rea-
sonings considered.
IF to evade the force of what has been observed, it should
be said, that when the Arminians speak of the Will's deter-
mining its own acts, they^lo not mean that the Will deter-
mines its acts by any preceding act, or that one act of the
Will determines another ; but only that the faculty or power
of Will, or the soul in the use of that power, determines its
•wn volitions ; and that it does it without any act going be-
48. FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
fore the act determined ; such an evasion would be full of
gross absurdity... .1 confess, it is an evasion of my own invent-
ing, and I do not know but I should wrong the drmimans, in
supposing that any of them would make use of it. But it be-
ing as good an one as I can invent, I would observe upon it
a few things.
First. If the faculty or power of the Will determines
an act of volition, or the soul in the use or exercise of that
power, determines it, that is the same thing as for the soul
to determine volition by an act of Will. For an exercise of
the power of "Will, and an act of that power, are the same
thing. Therefore to say, that the power of Will, or the soul
in the use or exercise of that power, determines volition,
without an act of Will preceding the volition determined, is
a contradiction.
Secondly. If a power of Will determines the act of the
will, then a power of choosing determines it. For, as was
before observed, in every act of Will, there is choice, and a
power of willing is a power of choosing. But if a power of
choosing determines the act of volition, it determines it by
choosing it. For it is most absurd to say, that a power of
choosing determines one thing rather than another, without
choosing any thing. But if a power of choosing determines
volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition deter-
mined by an antecedent choice, choosing that volition.
Thirdly. To say, the faculty, or the soul, determines
its own volitions, but not by any act, is a contradiction. Be-
cause, for the soul to direct, decide, or determine any thing,
is to act ; and this is supposed ; for the soul is here spoken
of as being a cause in this affair, bringing something to pass,
or doing something ; or which is the same thing, exerting
itself in order to an effect, which effect is the determination
of volition, or the particular kind and manner of an act of
Will. But certainly this exertion or action is not the same
with the effect, in order to the production of which it is ex-
erted, but must be something prior to it.
Again. The advocates for this notion of the freedom of
the Will, speak of a certain sovereignty in the Will, where-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 49
ay it has power to determine its own volitions. And there-
fore the determination of volition must itself be an act of the
Will ; for other. vise it can be no exercise of that supposed
power and sovereignty.
Again. If the Will determine itself, then either the
Will is active in determining its volitions, or it is not. If it
be active, in it, then the determination is an act of the Will ;
and so there is one act of the Will determining another.
But if the Will is not active in the determination, then how
does it exercise any liberty in it ? These gentlemen suppose
that the thing wherein the Will exercises liberty, is in its de-
termining its own acts. But how can this be, if it be not ac-
tive in determining ? Certainly the Will, or the soul, cannot
exercise any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or where-
in it doth not exercise itself. So that if either part of this
dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in self-
determining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the
Will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of
the Will is determined by another ; and so we have the ab-
surdity of every free act, even the very first, determined by a
foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise of the
Will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised
in determining them. From whence it follows, that no liber-
ty consists in the Will's power to determine its own acts ; or,
which is the same thing, that there is no such thing as liberty
consisting in a selfdetcrmining power of the Will.
If it should be said, that although it be true, if the soul
determines its own volitions, it must be active in so doing,
and the determination itself must be an act ; yet there is no
need of supposing this act to be prior to the volition deter-
mined ;- but the Will or soul determines the act of the Will
in willing ; it determines its own volition, in the very act of
volition ; it directs and limits the act of the Will, causing it
to be so and not otherwise, in exerting the act, without any
preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this
manner, they must mean one of these three things : Either,
1. That the determining act, though it be before the act de-
termined in the order of nature, yet is not before ?t in order
Vol. V. C,
S© FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
of time. Or, 2. That the determining act is not before the
act determined, either in the order of time or nature, nor is
truly distinct from it ; but that the soul's determining the
act of volition is the same thing with its exerting the act of
volition ; the mind's exerting such a particular act, is its
causing and determining the act. Or, 3. That volition has
no cause, and is no effect ; but comes into existence, with
such a particular determination, without any ground or reason
of its existence and determination. I shall consider these
distinctly.
1. If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is
not before the act determined in order of time, it will not help
the case at all, though it should be allowed. If it be before
the determined act in the order of nature, being the cause or
ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct
from it, and independent of it, as if it were before in the or-
der of time. As the cause of the particular motion of a nat-
ural body in a certain direction, may have no distance as to
time, yet cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but
must be as distinct from it as any other cause that is before its
effect in the order of time ; as the architect is distinct from
the house which he builds, or the father distinct from the
son which he begets. And if the act of the Will determining
be distinct from the act determined, and before it in the or-
der of nature, then we can go back from one to another, till
we come to the first in the series, which has no act of the
Will before it in the order of nature, determining it; and
consequently is an act not determined by the Will, and so
not a free act, in this notion of freedom. And this being
the act which determines all the rest, none of them are free
acts. As when there is a chain of many links, the first of
which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand ; all the rest
may folloAv and be moved at the same instant, without OT, »-
distance of time ; but yet the motion of one link is before
that of another in the order of nature'; the last is moved by
the next, and so till we come to the first ; which not being
moved by any other, but by something distinct from the
whole chain, this as much proves that no part is moved by
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 51
any selfmoving power in the chain, as if the motion of on*
link followed that of another in the order of time.
2. If any should say, that the determining act is not be-
fore the determined act, either in order of time, or of nature,
nor is distinct from it ; but that the exertion of the act is the
determination of the act ; that for the soul to exert a particu-
lar volition, is for it to cause and determine that act of voli-
tion ; I would on this observe, that the thing in question
seems to be forgotten or kept out of sight, in darkness and
unintelligibleness of speech ; unless such an objector would
mean to contradict himself. The very act of volition itself
is doubtless a determination of mind ; i. e. it is the mind's
drawing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice between two
things or more, proposed to it. But determining among ex-
ternal objects of choice, is not the same with determining the
act of choice itself, among various possible acts of choice.
The question is, what influences, directs, or determines the
mind or Will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it
does ? Or what is the cause, ground or reason, why it con-
cludes thus, and not otherwise ? Now it must be answered,
according to the Arminian notion of freedom, that the Will
influences, orders and determines itself thus to act. And if it
does, I say, it must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is
caused, influenced and determined by something, and yet not
determined by any thing antecedent, either in order of time
or of nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by
a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is some
way the cause or reason of the thing, with respect to which
it is said to be prior.
If the particular act or exertion of Will, which comes in-
to existence, be any thing properly determined at all, then
it has some cause of its existing, and of its existing in
such a particular determinate manner, and not another ;
some cause, whose influence decides the matter ; which cause
is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that
the Will or mind orders, influences and determines itself to
exert such an act as it does, by the very exertion itself, is
to make the exertion both cause and effect ; or the exerting
such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of such an act. For
53 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
the question is, What is the cause and reason of the soul's cs>
erling such an act ? To which the answer is, the seul ex-
erts such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this,
the exertion must be prior in the order cincture to itself, and
distinct from itself.
3. If the meaning be, that the soul's exertion of such a
particular act of Will, is a thing that comes to pass of itself,
■without any cause ; and that there is absolutely no ground
or reason of the soul's being determined to exert such a voli-
tion, and make such a choice rather than another, I say, if
this be the meaning of Arminians, when they contend so ear-
nestly for the Will's determining its own acts, and for liberty
of Will consisting in selfdetermining power ; they do noth-
ing but confound themselves and others with words without
meaning. In the question, What determines the Will ? And
in their answer, that the Will determines itseli, and in all
the dispute about it, it seems to be taken for granted, that
something determines the Will ; and the controversy on this
head is not, whether any thing at all determines it, or v.hcth-
er its determination has any cause or foundation at all ; but
where the foundation of it is, whether in the Will itself, or
somewhere else. But if the thing intended be what is above-
mentioned, then all comes to this, that nothing at all deter-
mines the Will ; volition having absolutely no cause or foun-
dation of its existence, cither within or without. There
is a great noise made about selfdetermining power, as
the source cf all free acts of the Will ; but when the matter
comes to.be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all
is the source of these acts, neither selfdetermining power,
nor any other, but they arise from nothing ; no cause, no
power, no influence being at all concerned in the matter.
However, this very thing, even that the- free acts of the
Will are events which come to pass without a cause, is cer-
tainly implied in the Arminian notion of liberty of Will ;
though it be very inconsistent with -many other things in
their scheme, and repugnant to some things implied in their
notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the particu-
lar determination of volition is without any cause ; because
•they hold the free acts of the Will to be contingent events ;
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 5S
and contingence is essential to freedom in their notion of it.
But certainly, those things which have a prior ground and
reason of their particular existence, a cause which antecedent-
ly determines them to be, and determines them to be just as
they are, do not happen contingently. If something forego-
ing, by a causal influence and connexion, determines and fix-
es precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then
it does not remain a contingent thing whether they shall come
to pass or no.
And because it is a question, in many respects, very im-
portant in this controversy about the freedom of Will, whether
the free acts of the Will are events wnich come to pass with-
out a cause, I shall be particular in examining this point in
the two following sections.
SECTION III.
Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in
particular, can come to pass without a Cause of
its existence.
BEFORE I enter on any argument on this subject, I
would explain how I would be understood, when i use the
word Cause in this discourse : Since, for want of a better
word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more
extensive, than that in which it is sometimes used. The
word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only
that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a
thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which
have no such positive productive influence ; which yet are
Causes in that respect, that they have truly the nature of a
ground or reason why some things are, rather than others ;
or why they are as they are, rather then otherwise. Thus
the absence of the sun in the night, is not the Cause of the
falling of the dew at that time, in the s-.rne manner as its
54 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
beams are the Cause of the ascending of the vapors in the
day time ; and its withdrawment in the winter, is not in the
same manner the Cause of the freezing of the waters, as its
approach in the spring is the Cause of their thawing. But
yet the withdrawment or absence of the sun is an antecedent,
■with which these effects in the night and winter are connect-
ed, and on which they depend ; and is one thing that belongs
to the ground and reason why they come to pass at that time,
rather than at other times ; though the absence of the sun is
nothing positive, nor has any positive influence.
It may be further observed, that when I speak of connex-
ion of Causes and Effects, I have respect to moral Causes, as
■well as those that are called natural in distinction from them.
Moral Causes may be Causes in as proper a sense, as any
causes whatsoever ; may have as real an influence, and may
as truly be the ground and reason of an Event's coming to
pass.
Therefore I sometimes use the word Cause, in this inqui-
ry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive
or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner
and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground
and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than
not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise ; or, in other
words, any antecedent with which a consequent Event is so
connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the propo-
sition which affirms that Event, is true ; whether it has any
positive influence or not. And in an agreeableness to this, I
sometimes use the word effect for the consequence of anoth-
er thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than a Cause,
most properly speaking.
I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I
may cut off occasion, from any that might seek occasion to
cavil and object against some things which I may say con-
cerning the dependence of all things which come to pass, on
some Cause, and their connexion with their Cause.
Having thus explained what I mean by Cause, I assert that
nothing ever comes to pass without a Cause. What is self-
existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable j
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. .«■
but as to all things that begin to be, they are not selfexistent,
and therefore must have some foundation of their existence
without themselves.— —That whatsoever begins to be, which
before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to ex-
ist, seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural
sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind,
and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the ex-
istence of things, past, present, or to come.
And this dictate of common sense equally respects sub-
stances and modes, or things and the manner and circum-
stances of things. Thus, if we see a body which has hither-
to been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to move,
we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some
Cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the ex-
istence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And
so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction,
should suddenly change the direction of its motion ; or if it
should put off its old figure, and take a new one ; or change
its color : The beginning of these new modes is a new Event,
and the mind of mankind necessarily supposes that there is
some Cause or reason of them.
If this grand principle of common sense be taken away,
all arguing from effects to Causes ceaseth, and so all knowl-
edge of any existence, besides what we have by the most di-
rect and immediate intuition. Particularly all our proof of
the being of God ceases : We argue His being from our own
being, and the being of other things, which we are sensible
once were not, but have begun to be ; and from the being of
the world, with all its constituent parts, and the manner of
their existence ; all which we see plainly are not necessary
in their own nature, and so not selfexistent, and therefore must
have a Cause. But if things, not in themselves necessary,
may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.
Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things
no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God with-
out any evidence of it from His works. I do suppose there
is a great absurdity in the nature of things simply considered,
in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying Be-
S6 FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
ing in general, and supposing an eternal, absolute, universal
nothing ; and therefore that here would be foundation of in-
tuitive evidence that it cannot be ; and that eternal, infinite,
most perfect Being must be ; if we had strength and com-
prehension of mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general
and universal Being, or, which is the same thing, of the infi-
nite, eternal, most perfect Divine Nature and Essence. But
then we should net properly come to the knowledge of the
Being of God by arguing ; but our evidence would be intui-
tive : We should see it, as we see other things that are nec-
essary in themselves, the contraries of which are in their own
nature absurd and contradictory ; as we see that twice two is
four; and as we see that a circle hastio angles. If we had
as clear an idea of universal infinite entity, as we have of these
other things, I suppose we should most intuitively see the
absurdity of supposing such Being not to be ; should immedi-
ately see there is no room for the question, whether it is pos-
sible that Being, in the most general abstracted notion of it,
should not be. But we have not that strength and extent of
mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive independent man-
ner ; but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of
the Being of God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom.
i. 20. " Tlie invisible things of Him, from the creation of the
world, are clearly seen ; being understood by the things that
are made ; even his eternal power and Godhead." We first
ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from effects, that there
must be an eternal Cause ; and then secondly, prove by ar-
gumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be necessari-
ly existent ; and then thirdly, from the proved necessity of
his existence, we may descend, and prove many of his perfec-
tions a priori.'*
* To the inquirer after tru'.h it may here be recommended, as a matter of
some consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference between an argu-
ment a priori and one a posteriori, a distinction of considerable use, as well as
of long standing, among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An
argument from cither of these, when legitimately applied, may amount to a de-
monstration, when used, for instance, rc'ativcly to the being and perfections of
God ; but the one should be confined to the existence of Deity, while the other
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 57
JSut if once this grand principle of common sense be giv-
en up, that what is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause ;
and we begin to maintain, that things may come into exist-
ence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of
themselves without any Cause ; all our means of ascending
in our arguing from the creature to the Creator, and all our
vidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this
case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the
Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the man-
ner of their being, their order, beauty and use. For if things
may come into existence without^tny Cause at all, then they
doubtless may without any Cause answerable to the effect.
Our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both
these things ; namely, that what begins to be has a Canse,
and also thnt it has a Cause proportionable and agreeable to
the effect. The same principle which leads us to determine,
that there cannot be any thing coming to pass without a Cause,
leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect
than in the Cause.
Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to
pass without a Cause, we should not only have no proof of
the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the
existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own immediately
present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to
h applicable to his perfections. By the argument a posteriori we rise from the
effect to the cause, from the stream to the fountain, from what is posterior to
»what is prior; in other words, from what is contingent to what is absolute,
from number to unity ; that is, from the manifestation of God to his existence.
By the argument a priori we descend from the cause to the effect, from the foun-
tain to the stream, from what is prior to what is posterior ; that is, from the
necessary existence of God we lately infer certain properties and perfections.
To attempt a demonstration of the existence of a first cause, or the Being of
God, a priori, would be most absurd ; for it would be an attempt to prove a
prior ground or cause of existence of a first cause ; or, that there is some cause
before the very first. The argument a priori, therefore, is not applicable to prove
the divine existence. For this end, the argument a posteriori alone is legitimate ;
and its conclusiveness rests on the axiom, that " there can be no effect without a
cause." The absurdity of denying this axiom is abundantly demonstrated by-
cur author. W,
Vol. V. H
SB FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to causes :
From the ideas now immediately in view ; we argue other
things not immediately in view : From sensations now excit-
ed in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the
Causes of these sensations ; and from the existence of these
things, we argue other things, which they depend on, as ef-
fects on Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves,
or any thing else, by memory ; only as we argue, that the
ideas, which are now in our minds, are the consequences of
past ideas and sensations.... We immediately perceive nothing
else but the ideas which afe this moment extant in our minds.
We perceive or know other things only by means of these,
as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them.
But if things may be without Causes, all this necessary con-
nexion and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our
knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity nor difficulty
in supposing one thing to start out of nonexistence into being,
of itself without a Cause ; then there is no absurdity nor dif-
ficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. For
nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no diffi-
culty, nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.
And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing,
of the acts of the Will coming to pass without a Cause, it is
the case in fact, that millions of millions of Events are con-
tinually coming into existence contingently, without any
Cause or reason why they do so, all over the world, every day
and hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant succession,
in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient noth-
ing, this effectual No Cause, is always ready at hand, to pro-
duce this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as
often as he has occasion.
If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz. acts of the
Will, seemed to come to pass of themselves ; but those of
this sort in general came into being thus ; and it were an
event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wher-
ever were capable subjects of such events ; this very thing
would demonstrate that there was some Cause of them, which
made such a difference between this Event and others, and
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 59
ghat they did not really happen contingently. For contin-
gence is blind, and does not pick and choose for a particular
sort of events. Nothing has no choice. This No Cause,
which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which
comes to pass, to be of one particular sort only, distinguished
from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops
out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes so often,
so constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages,
shows that there is some Cause or reason of the falling of wat-
er out of the heavens ; and that something besides mere con-
tingence has a hand in the matter.
If we should suppose nonentity to be about to bring forth ;
and things were coming into existence, without any Cause or
antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or manner of ex-
istence depends ; or which could at all determine whether
the tilings should be stones, or stars, or beasts, or angels, or
human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion or figure in
natural bodies, or some new sensations in animals, or new
ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions in the
Will ; or any thing else of all the infinite number of possi-
bles ; then certainly it would not be expected, although ma-
ny millions of millions of things are coming into existence
in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they should
all be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus
in all ages, and that this sort of existences should never fail to
come to pass where there is room for them, or a subject ca-
pable of them, and that constantly, whenever there is occa-
sion for them.
If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of
Event that renders it possible fojr it to come into existence
without a Cause, and should say, that the free acts of the Will
are existences of an exceeding different nature from other
things ; by reason of which they may come into existence
without any previous ground or l-eason of it, though other
things cannot ; if they make this objection in good earnest,
it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting them-
selves ; for they would be giving an account of some ground
of the existence of a thing, when at the same time they would
6« FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
maintain there is no ground of its existence. Therefore X
would observe, that the particular nature of existence, be it
ever so diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that
thing's coming into existence without a Cause ; because to
suppose this, would be to suppose the particular nature of ex-
istence to be a thing prior to the existence ; and so a thing
which makes way for existence, with such a circumstance,
namely, without a cause or reason of existence. But that
which in any respect makes way for a thing's coming into be-
ing, or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence,
must be prior to the existence. The distinguished nature of
the effect, which is something belonging to the effect, cannot
have influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar
nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can have
no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for
its influence ; for then the thing has made sure of existence
already, without its help.
So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that
an act of the Will should come into existence without a
Cause, a? to suppose the human so\d, or an angel, or the
globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into
existence without a Cause. And il once we allow, that such
a sort of effect as a Volition may come to pass without a
Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects
may do so too ? It is not the particular kind of effect that
makes the absurdity of supposing it has being without a Cause,
but something which is common to all things that ever begin
to be, viz. That they are not selfexistent, or necessary in the
nature of things.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Ql
SECTION IV.
Whether Volition can arise without a Cause through
the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.
THE author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God
and the Creatures, in answer to that objection against his doc-
trine of a selfdetermining power in the will, (p. 68, 69.) « That
nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why
it is, and -why it is in this manner rather than another, allows
that it is thus in corporeal things, which are, properly and
philosophically speaking, passive beings ; but denies that it
is thus in spirits, which are beings of an active nature, who
have the spring of action within themselves, and can deter-
mine themselves. By which it is plainly supposed, that such
an event as an act of the Will, may come to pass in a spirit,
without a sufficient reason why it comes to pass, or why it is
after this manner, rather than another ; by reason of the ac-
tivity of the nature of a spirit. ...But certainly this author, in
this matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,
1. The objection or difficulty proposed by this author,
seems to be forgotten in his answer or solution. The very-
difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this : How an event
can come to pass without a sufficient reason why it is, or why
it is in this manner rather than another ? Instead of solving
this difficulty, or answering this question with regard to Voli-
tion, as he proposes, he forgets himself, and answers another
question quite diverse, and wholly inconsistent with this, viz.
What is a sufficient reason, why it is, and why it is in this
manner rather than another ? And he assigns the active be-
ing's own determination as the Cause, and a Cause sufficient
for the effect ; and leaves all the difficulty unresolved, and
the question unanswered, which yet returns, even, how the
soul's own determination, which he speaks of, came to exist,
and to be what it was without a Cause i The activity of the soul
may enable it to be the Cause of effects, but it does not at all ena-
ble or help it to be the subject of effects which have no Cause,
(52 FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
■which is the thing this author supposes concerning acts of the
Will. Activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce
effects, and determine the manner of their existence, within
itself, without a Cause, than out of itself, in some other being.
But if an active being should, through its activity* produce
and determine an effect in some external object, how absurd
would it be to say, that the effect was produced without a Cause 1
£. The question is not so much, how a spirit endowed
with activity comes to act, as why it exerts such an act,
and not another ; or why it acts with such a particular deter-
mination : If activity of nature be the Cause why a spirit
(the soul of man for instance) acts, and does not lie still ; yet
that alone is not the Cause why its action is thus and thus
limited, directed and determined. Active nature is a gener*
al thing ; it is an ability or tendency of nature to action, gen-
erally taken ; which may be a Cause why the soul acts as oc-
casion or reason is given ; but this alone cannot be a sufficient
Cause why the soul exerts such a particular act, at such a
time, rather than others. In order to this, there must be
something besides a general tendency to action ; there must
also be a particular tendency to that individual action. If it
should be asked, why the soul of man uses its activity in such
a manner as it does, and it should be answered, that the soul
uses its activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it has ac-
tivity, would such an answer satisfy a rational man ? Would
it not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one ?
3. An active being can bring no effects to pass by his ac-
tivity, but what are consequent upon his acting. He produces
nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise of
his activity, and so nothing but the fruits of its exercise ; he
brings nothing to pass by a dormant activity. But the exer-
cise of his activity is action ; and so his action, or exercise of
his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If
an active being produces an effect in another being, about
which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of
his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted,
and the effect of it must follow. So it must be, with
equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his ac-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 63
tivity is conversant about himself, to produce and determine
some effect in himself; still the exercise of his activity must
go before the effect, which he brings to pass and deter-
mines by it. And therefore his activity cannot be the Cause
of the determination of the first action, or exercise of activity
itself, whence the effects of activity arise, for that would im-
ply a contradiction ; it would be to say, the first exercise of
activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the Cause
of it.
4. That the soul, though an active substance, cannot di-
versify its own acts, but by first acting ; or be a determining
Cause of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes of
one kind, and sometimes of another, any other way than in
consequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this ; that
if so, then the same Cause, the same causal power, force or
influence, without variation in any respect, would produce dif-
ferent effects at different times. For the same substance of
the soul before it acts, and the same active nature of the soul
before it is exerted, i. e. before in the order of nature, would
be the Cause of different effects, viz. different Volitions at differ-
ent times. But the substance of the soul before it acts, and its
active nature before it is exerted, are the same without varia-
tion. For it is some act that makes the first variation in the
Cause, as to any causal exertion, force, or influence. But if
it be so, that the soul has no different causality, or diverse causal
force or influence, in producing these diverse effects ; then it
is evident, that the soul has no influence, no hand in the diver-
sity of the effect ; and that the difference of the effect cannot
be owing to any thing in the soul ; or, which is the same
thing, the soul does not determine the diversity of the effect ;
which is contrary to the supposition. It is true, the substance
of the soul before it acts, and before there is any difference in
that respect, may be in a different state and circumstance ;
but those whom I oppose, will not allow the different circum-
stances of the soul to be the determining Causes of the acts
of the Will, as being contrary to their notion ofselfdcter-
mination and selfmotion.
64 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
5. Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no
acts of the soul, strictly speaking, but free Volitions ; then it
-will follow, that the soul is an active being in nothing fui'ther
than it is a voluntary or elective being ; and whenever it pro-
duces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and
electively. But to produce effects thus, is the same thing as
to produce effects in consequence of, and according to its own
choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not by its activ-
ity produce all its own acts of Will or choice themselves ;
for this, by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts of
choice voluntarily and electively, or in consequence of its own
free acts of choice, which brings the matter directly to the
ferementioned contradiction, of a free act of choice before the
first free act of choice. According to these gentlemen's own
notion of action, if there arises in the mind a Volition with-
out a free act of the Will or choice to determine and produce
it, the mind is net the active, voluntary Cause of that Volition,
because it does not arise from, nor is regulated by choice or
design. And therefore it cannot be, that the mind should
be the active, voluntary, determining Cause of the first and
leading Volition that relates to the affair. The mind's being
a designing Cause, only enables it to produce effects in con-
sequence of its design ; it will not enable it to be the design-
ing Cause of all its own designs. The mind's being an elec-
tive Cause, will only enable it to produce effects in conse-
quence of its elections, and according to them ; but cannot
enable it to be the elective Cause of ail its own elections ;
because that supposes an election before the first election.
So the mind's being an active Cause enables it to produce ef-
fects in consequence of its own acts, but cannot enable it to be
the determining Cause of all its own acts ; for that is still in
the same manner a contradiction ; as it supposes a determin-
ing act conversant: about the first act, and prior to it. having
a causal influence on its existence, and manner of existence.
I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the
soul's having power to cause and determine its own Volitions,
as a being to whom God has given a power of action, but
this ; that Cod has given power to the soul, sometimes
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. SS
at least, to excite Volitions at its pleasure, or according
as it chooses. And this certainly supposes, in all such
cases, a choice preceding all Volitions which are thus caus-
ed, even the first of them ; which runs into the foremen-
tioned great absurdity.
Therefore the activity of the nature of the soul affords no
relief from the difficulties which the notion of a selfdetermin-
ing power in the Will is attended with, nor will it help, in the
least, its absurdities and inconsistencies.
SECTION V.
Skewing, that if the things asserted in these Eva-
sions should be supposed to be true, they are alto-
gether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of
Arminian liberty ; and how (this being the state
of the case J Arminian writers are obliged to talk
inconsistently.
WHAT was last observed in the preceding section may
shew, not only that the active nature of the soul cannot be a
reason why an act of the Will is, or why it is in this manner,
rather than another ; but also that if it could be so, and it
could be proved that Volitions are contingent events, in that
sense, that their being and manner of being is not fixed or
determined by any cause, or any thing antecedent ; it would
not at all serve the purpose of the Arminians, to establish the
freedom of the Will, according to their notion of its freedom
as consisting in the Will's determination of itself ; which sup-
poses every free act of the Will to be determined by some
act of the Will going before to determine it ; inasmuch as
For the Will to determine a thing, is the same as f. r the s>oul
to determine a thing by Willing ; and there is no way that the
Will can determine an act of the Will, but by willing that
Vol. V. I
66 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
act of the Will ; or, which is the same thing, choosing it. So
that here must be two acts of the Will in the case, one going
before another, one conversant about the other, and the latter
the object of the former, and chosen by the former. If the
Will does not cause and determine the act by choice, it does
not cause or determine it at all ; for that which is not deter-
mined by choice, is not determined voluntarily or willingly :
And to say, that the Will determines something which the
soul does not determine willingly, is as much as to say, that
something is done by the Will, which the soul doth not with
its Will.
So that if Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's
determining its own acts, be maintained, the old absurdity
and contradiction must be maintained, that every free act of
Will is caused and determined by a foregoing free act of
Will ; which doth not consist with the free acts arising with-
out any cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed by
any thing foregoing. So that this evasion must be given up,
as not at all relieving, and as that which, instead of support-
ing this sort of liberty, directly destroys it.
And if it should be supposed, that the soul determines its
own acts of Will some other way, than by a foregoing act of
Will ; still it will not help the cause of their liberty of Will.
If it determines them by an act of the understanding, or some
other power, then the Will does not determine itself ; and so
the selfdetermining power of the Will is given up. And what
liberty is there exercised according to their own opinion of
liberty, by the soul's being determined by something besides
its own choice ? The acts of the Will, it is true, may be di-
rected, and effectually determined and fixed ; but it is not done
by the soul's own will and pleasure : There is no exercise at
all of choice or will in producing the effect : And if Will and
choice are not exercised in it, how is the liberty of the Will
exercised in it ?
So that let Arminians turn which way they please with their
notion oflibcrty, consisting in the Will's determining its own
acts, their notion destroys itself. If they hold every free act
of Will to be determined by the soul's own free choice, or
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 6T
foregoing free act of Will ; foregoing, either in the order of
time, or nature ; it implies that gross contradiction, that the
first free act belonging to the affair, is determined by a free
act which is before it. Or if they say that the free acts of the
Will are determined by some other act of the soul, and not
an act of Will or choice ; this also destroys their notion of
liberty, consisting in the acts of the Will being determined by
the Will itself; or if they hold that the acts of the Will are
determined by nothing at all that is prior to them, but that
they are contingent in that sense, that they are determined
and fixed by no cause at all ; this also destroys their notion
of liberty, consisting in the Will's determining its own acts.
This being the true state of the Arminian notion of liberty,
it hence comes to pass, that the writers that defend it are
forced into gross inconsistencies, in what they say upon this
subject. To instance in Dr. Whitby ; he, in his discourse on
the freedom of the Will,* opposes the opinion of the Calvin-
ists, who place man's liberty only in a power of doing what he
will, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes.
And yet he himself mentions the very same notion of liberty,
as the dictate of the sense and common reason of mankind, and a
rule laid down by the light of nature, viz. that liberty is a power
of acting from ourselves, or doing wha? we will.\ This is
indeed, as he says, a thing agreeable to the sense and common
reason of mankind ; and therefore it is not so much to be won-
dered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against himself :
For if liberty does not consist in this, what else can be devised
that it should consist in ? If it be said, as Dr. Whitby else-
where insists, that it does not only consist in liberty of doing
what we will, but also a liberty of willing without necessity ;
still the question returns, what does that liberty of willing
without necessity consist in, but in a power of willing as we
please, without being impeded by a contrary necessity ? Or in
other words, a liberty for the soul in its willing to act accord-
ing to its own choice ? Yea, this very thing the same author
* In his Book, on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 350, 351, 3,52,
+ Ibid. p. 325, 326.
€8 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
seems to allow, and suppose again and again, in the use he
makes of sayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his
vouchers. Thus he cites the words of Origen, which he pro-
duces as a testimony on his side :* The soul acts by her own
choice, and it is free for her to incline to whatever part she
will. And those words of Justin Martyr; f The doctrine of
the Christians is this, that nothing is done or suffered according
to fate, but that every man doth good or evil according Vo his
own free choice. And from Eusebius these words : \Iffate
be established, philosophy and fiiety are overthrown. All these
things depending upon the necessity introduced by the stars, and
•not upon meditation and exercise proceeding from our own
free choice. And again, the words of Maccarius : §God, to
preserve the liberty of man's Will, suffered their bodies to die,
that it might be in -Their choice to turn to good or evil. They
ivho are acted by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any neces-
sity, but have liberty to turn themselves, and do what They
WILL in this life.
Thus, the doctor in effect comes into that very notion of
liberty, which the Calvinists have ; which he at the same
time condemns, as agreeing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes,
namely, the soul 's acting by its own choice, men's doing good or
evil according to their own free choice, their being in that exer~
cise which proceeds from their own free choice, having it in their
choice to turn to good or evil, and doing what they will. So
that if men exercise this liberty in the acts of the Will them-
selves, it must be in exerting acts of Will as they will, or ac-
cording to their own free choice ; or exerting acts of Will
that proceed from their choice. And if it be so, then let every
one judge whether this does not suppose a free choice going
before the free act of Will, or whether an act of choice does
not go before that act of the Will which proceeds from it....
And if it be thus with all free acts of the Will, then let
every one judge, whether it will not follow that there is a free
choice or Will going before the first free act of the Will cx-
* In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 342. + Ibid. p. 360.
% Ibid. p. 363. § Ibid. p. 369, 370.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 69
erted in the case. And then let every one judge, whether
this be not a contradiction. And finally, let every one judge
whether in the scheme of these writers there be any possi-
bility of avoiding these absurdities.
If liberty consists, as Dr. Whitby himself says, in a man's
doing what he will ; and a man exercises this liberty, not only
in external actions, but in the acts of the Will themselves ;
then so far as liberty is exercised in the latter, it consists in
willing what he wills : And if any say so, one of these two
things must be meant, either, I. That a man has power to
Will, as he does Will ; because what he Wills, he Wills ;
and therefore has power to Will what he has power to Will.
If this be their meaning, then this mighty controversy
about freedom of the Will and selfdetermining power, comes
wholly to nothing ; all that is contended for being no more
than this, that the mind of man does what it does, and is the
subject of what it is the subject of, or that what is, is ; where-
in none has any controversy wiih them. Or, 2. The mean-
ing must be, that a man has power to Will as he pleases or
chooses to Will ; that is, he has power by one act of choice,
to choose another ; by an antecedent act of Will to choose a
consequent act ; and therein to execute his own choice. And
if this be their meaning, it is nothing but shuffling with those
they dispute with, and baffling their own reason. For still
the question returns, wherein lies man's liberty in that ante-
cedent act of Will which chose the consequent act. The an-
swer, according to the same principles, must be, that his lib-
erty in this also lies in his willing as he would, or as he chose,
or agreeably to another act of choice preceding that. And so
the question returns in infinitum and the like answer must be
made in infinitum : In order to support their opinion, there
must be no beginning, but free acts of Will must have been
chosen by foregoing free acts of Will in the soul of every
man, without beginning ; and so before he had a being, from
all eternity.
7» FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
SECTION VI.
Concerning the WiWs determining in Things which
are perfectly indifferent in the View of the Mind.
A GREAT argument for selfdetermining power, is the
supposed experience we universally have of an ability to de-
termine our Wills, in cases wherein no prevailing motive is
presented : The Will (as is supposed) has its choice to make
between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the
view of the mind ; and the Will is apparently altogether in-
different ; and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a choice ;
the Will can instantly determine itself to one, by a sovereign
power which it has over itself, without being moved by any
preponderating inducement.
Tnus the forementioned author of an Essay on the Free-
dom of the Will, Sec. p. 25, 26, 27, supposes, " That there are
many instances, wherein the Will is determined neither by
present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent good, nor by
the last dictate of the understanding, nor by any thing else,
but merely by itself as a sovereign, selfdetermining power of
the soul ; and that the soul does not will this or that action,
in some cases, by any other influence but because it will.
Thus (says he) I can turn my face to the South, or the North ;
I can point with my finger upward, or downward. And thus,
in some cases, the Will determines itself in a very sovereign
manner, because it will, without a reason borrowed from the
understanding ; and hereby it discovers its own perfect pow-
er of choice, rising from within itself, and free from all influ-
ence or restraint of any kind." And in pages 66, 70, and 73,,
74, this author very expressly supposes the Will in many
cases to be determined by no motive at all, but to act altogeth-
er without motive, or ground of preference Here I would
observe,
1. The very supposition which is here made, directly con-
tradicts and overthrows itself. For the thing supposed, where-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 71
in this grand argument consists, is, that among several things
the Will actually chooses one before another, at the same
time that it is perfectly indifferent ; which is the very same
thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at the same time
that it has no preference. What is meant cannot be, that the
mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until
it has a preference ; or, which is the same thing, that the
mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent : For
certainly this author did not think he had a controversy with
any person in supposing this. And then it is nothing to his
purpose, that the mind which chooses, was indifferent once ;
unless it chooses, remaining indifferent ; for otherwise, it
does not choose at all in that case of indifference, concerning
which is all the question. Besides, it appears in fact, that the
thing which this author supposes, is not that the Will choos-
es one thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent
before it chooses ; but also is indifferent when it chooses ;
and that its being otherwise than indifferent is not until after-
wards, in consequence of its choice ; that the chosen thing's
appearing preferable and more agreeable than another, arises
from its choice already made. His words are, (p. 30.)
« Where the objects which are proposed, appear equally fit
or good, the Will is left without a guide or director ; and
therefore must take its own choice by its own determination ;
it being properly a selfdetermining power. And in such cas-
es the Will does as it were make a good to itself by its own
choice, i. e. creates its own pleasure or delight in this self-
chosen good. Even as a man by seizing upon a spot of un-
occupied land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his own
possession and property, and as such rejoices in it. Where
things were indifferent before, the Will finds nothing to make
them more agreeable, considered merely in themselves ; but
the pleasure it feels arising from its own choice, and its
perseverance therein. We love many things we have chos-
en, AND PURELY BECAUSE WE CHOSE THEM."
This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer
many things, now ceasing any longer to be indifferent with
respect to them, purely because we have preferred and chos-
72 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
en them before. These things must needs be spoken incon-
siderately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be
before itself in the same instance, either in the order of time
or nature : It cannot be the foundation of itself, or the fruit
or consequence of itself. The very act of choosing one thing
rather than another, is preferring that thing, and that is set-
ting a higher value on that thing. But that the mind sets an
higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the first
place, the fruit of its setting a higher value on that thing.
This author says, p. 36, " The Will may be perfectly in-
different, and yet the Will may determine itself to choose one
or the other." And again, in the same page, " I am entire-
ly indifferent to either ; and yet my Will may determine it-
self to choose." And again, " Which I shall choose must be
determined by the mere act of my Will." If the choice is
determined by a mere act of Will, then the choice is deter-
mined by a mere act of choice. And concerning this matter,
viz. That the act of the Will itself is determined by an act of
choice, this writer is express, in page 72. Speaking of the
case, where there is no superior fitness in objects presented,
he has these words : « There it must act by its own choice,
and determine itself as it pleases." Where it is supposed
that the very determination, which is the ground and spring
of the Will's act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein
one act is more agreeable and the mind better pleased in it
than another ; and this preference and superior pleascdness
is the ground of all it does in the case. And if so, the mind
is not indifferent when it determines itself, but had rather do
one thing than another, had rather determine itself one way
than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all in
indifference ; not so much as in the first step it takes, or the
first rise and bet-inning of its acting. If it be possible for the
understanding to act in indifference, yet to be sure the Will
never does ; because the Will's beginning to act is the very
same thing as its beginning to choose or prefer. And if in
the very first act of the Will, the mind prefers something,
then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that time prepon-
derate, or prevail in the mind ; or, which is the same thing,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 73
the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the Will. So that
this wholly destroys the thing supposed, viz. That the mind
can, by a sovereign power, choose one of two or more things,
which in the view of the mind are, in every respect, perfectly
equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any
prevailing influence on the mind above another.
So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability
of the Will to choose one of two or more things, concerning
which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same time, in ef-
fect, deny the thing he supposes, and allows and asserts the
point he endeavors to overthrow ; even that the Will, in
choosing, is subject to no prevailing influence of the idea, or
view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to of-
fer this argument without overthrowing it ; the thing suppos-
ed in it being inconsistent with itself, and that which denies
itself. To suppose the Will to act at all in a state of perfect
indifference, either to determine itself, or to do any thing else,
is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing. To say
that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that
it can follow its pleasure when it has no pleasure to follow.
And therefore if there be any difficulty in the instances of two
cakes, two eggs, Sec. which are exactly alike, one as good as
another ; concerning which this author supposes the mind in
fact has a choice, and so in effect supposes that it has a pref-
erence ; it as much concerned himself to solve the difficulty,
as it does those whom he opposes. For if these instances
prove any thing to his purpose, they prove that a man choos-
es without choice. And yet this is not to his purpose ; be-
cause if this is what he asserts, his own words are as much
against him, and do as much contradict him, as the words of
those he disputes against can do.
2. There is no great difficulty in shewing, in such instan-
ces as are alleged, not only that it must needs be so, that the
mind must be influenced in its choice, by something that has
a preponderating influence upon it, but also how it is so. A
little attention to our own experience, and a distinct consider-
ation of the acts of our own minds, in such cases, will be suf-
ficient to clear up the matter.
Vol. V. K
74- FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Thus, supposing I have a chessboard before me ; and be"
cause I am required by a superior, or desired by a friend, of
to make some experiment concerning my own ability and lib-
erty, or on some other consideration, I am determined to
touch some one of the spots or squares on the board with my
finger ; not being limited or directed in the first proposal, or
my own first purpose, which is general, to any one in partic-
ular ; and there being nothing in the squares, in themselves
considered, that recommends any one of all the sixtyfour,
more than another : In this case, my mind determines to
give itself up to what is vulgarly called accident^* by deter-
mining to touch that square which happens to be most in view,
which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or which
happens to be then most in my mind, or which I shall be di-
rected to by some other such like accident. ...Here are sever-
al steps of the mind's proceeding (though all may be done as
it were in a moment) the first step is its general determina-
tion that it will touch one of the squares. The next step is
another general determination to give itself up to accident, in
some certain way ; as to touch that which shall be most in the
eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident.
The third and last step is a particular determination to touch
a certain individual spot, even that square, which, by that
sort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has actually of-
fered itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none
of these several steps does the mind proceed in absolute in-
difference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponder-
ating inducement. So it is in the first step ; the mind's gen-
eral determination to touch one of the sixtyfour spots : The
mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no ; it
is induced to it. for the sake of making some experiment, or
by the desire of a friend, or some ether motive that prevails.
So it is in the second step, the mind's determining to give it-
* I have elsewhere observed what that is wh ; ch is vulgarly called accident;
that it is nothing akin to the Arminian metaphysical notion of contingence, some-
thing not connected with anything foiegoing; but that it is something that
comes to pass in the course of things, in some affair that men are concerned
in, unforeseen, and not owing to their design.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 75
self up to accident, by touching that which shall be most in
the eye, or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the
mind, Sec. The mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it
proceeds by this rule or no ; but chooses it because it appears
at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to
fulfil the general purpose aforesaid. And so it is in the third
and last step, it is determining to touch that individual spot
which actually does prevail in the mind's view. The mind is
not indifferent concerning this ; but is influenced by a pre-
vailing inducement and reason ; which is, that this is a prose-
cution of the preceding determination, which appeared req-
uisite, and was fixed before in the second step.
Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering him a
moment, in such a case. It will always be so among a num-
ber of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea
beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear
sunshine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumera-
ble images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light ;
but the attention of the mind is not equal to several of them
at once ; or if it be, it does not continue so for any time. And
so it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general : Sev-
eral ideas are not in equal strength in the mind's view and
notice at once ; or at least, does not remain so for any sensi-
ble continuance. There is nothing in the world more con-
stantly varying, than the ideas of the mind : They do not re-
main precisely in the same state for the least perceivable
space of time ; as is evident by this, that all perceivable time
is judged and perceived by the mind only by the succession
or the successive changes of its own ideas : Therefore while
the views or perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the
same state, there is no perceivable space or length of time, be-
cause no sensible succession.
As the acts of the Will, in each step of the foremention-
ed proceedure, do not come to pass without a particular cause,
every act is owing to a prevailing inducement ; so the acci-
dent, as I have called it, or that which happens in the un-
searchable course of things, to which the mind yields itself,
and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pass
76 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
without a cause ; and the mind, in determining to be guided
by it, is not determined by something that has no cause ; any
more than if it determined to be guided by a lot, or the cast-
ing of a die. For though the die's falling in such a manner
be accidental to him that casts it, yet none will suppose that
there is no cause why it falls as it does. The involuntary
changes in the succession of our ideas, though the causes may
not be observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable mo-
tions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual infi-
nitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on the
surface of the water.
There are two things especially, which are probably the
occasions of confusion in the minds of those who insist upon
it, that the Will acts in a proper indifference, and without be-
ing moved by any inducement, in its determination in such
cases as have been mentioned.
1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least
not to keep it distinctly in view. The question they dispute
about, is, Whether the mind be indifferent about the objects
presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c.
as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas
the question to be considered, is, Whether the person be in-
different with respect to his own actions ; whether he does
not, on some consideration or other, prefer one act with res-
pect to these objects before another. The mind in its deter-
mination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately
and directly conversant about the objects presented ; but the
acts to be done concerning these objects. The objects may
appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any
choice between them : But the next act of the Will being
about the external actions to be performed, taking, touching,
Sec. these may not appear equal, and one action may properly
be chosen before another. In each step of the mind's prog-
ress, the determination is not about the objects, unless indi-
rectly and improperly, but about the actions, which it choos-
es for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and
for reasons not taken at all from the objects.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 77
There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ev-
er properly choose one of the objects before another ; either
before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man chooses
to take or touch one rather than another ; but not because it
chooses the thing taken, or touched ; but from foreign con-
siderations. The case may be so, that of two things offered)
a man may, for certain reasons, choose and prefer the taking
of that which he undervalues, and choose to neglect to take
that which his mind prefers. In such a case, choosing the
thing taken, and choosing to take, are diverse ; and so they
are in a case where the things presented are equal in the
mind's esteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact
makes evident, is, that the mind chooses one action rather
than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring,
in order to be to their purpose, ought to be to prove that the
mind chooses the action in perfect indifference, with respect
to that action ; and not to prove that the mind chooses the ac-
tion in perfect indifference with respect to the object ; which
is very possible, and yet the Will not act without prevalent in-
ducement, and proper preponderation.
2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this mat-
ter, seems to be, notdistingoishing between a general indiffer-
ence, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in
a more distant and general view of it, and a particular indiffer-
ence, or an indifference with respect to the next immediate
act, viewed with its particular and present circumstances.
A man may be perfectly indifferent with respect to his own
actions, in the former respect ; and yet not in the latter.
Thus, in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares
of a chessboard ; when it is first proposed that I should touch
one of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch ;
because as yet I view the matter I'emolely and generally, be-
ing but in the first step of the mind's progress in the affair.
But yet, when I am actually come to the last step, and the
very next thing to be determined is which is to be touched,
having already determined that I will touch that which hap-
pens to be most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now
V& FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that, considered
thus immediately, and in these particular present circumstan-
ces, is not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about.
SECTION VII.
Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting
in Indifference.
WHAT has been said in the foregoing section, has a ten-
dency in some measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion
of such as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibri-
um whereby the Will is without all antecedent determination
or bias, and left hitherto free from any prepossessing inclina-
tion to one side or the other ; that so the determination of the
Will to either side may be entirely from itself, and that it may
be owing only to its own power, and that sovereignty which
it has over itself, that it goes this way rather than that.*
* Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a distinction of different
kinds of freedom ; one of God, and perfect spirits above ; another of persons
in a state of trial. Tne former Dr. Whitby allows to consist with necessity ;
the latter he holds to be without necessity : And this latter he supposes to be
requisite to cur being the subjects of praise or dispraise, rewards or punish-
ments, precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats, exhortations and de-
hortations, and a covenant treaty. And to this freedom he supposes Indiffer-
ence to be requisite In his Discourse on the five points, p. 299, 300, he
says, " It is a freedom (speaking of a freedom not only fiom coaction, but
from necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of trial or pro-
bation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and our per-
sons of rewards or punishments." And in the next page, speaking of the
same matter, he says, "Excellent to this purpose, are the words of Mr.
Thorndike : We say not that Indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the free-
dom of a man alone in this state of travail and prof cience : The ground of which is
God's tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen man, to-
gether with those precepts and piohibit ions, those promises and threats, those exk»r-
tations and dekortxtions, it is enforced with,"
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 79
But in as much as this has been of such long standing, and
has been so generally received, and so much insisted on by
Pelagians, Semi/ielagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians and oth-
ers, it may deserve a more full consideration. And therefore
I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough inquiry
into this notion.
Now, lest some should suppose that I do not understand
those that place Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me
with misrepresenting their opinion, I would signify, that I
am sensible, there are some, who, when they talk of the Lib-
erty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express them-
selves as though they would not be understood of the Indiffer-
ence of the inclination or tendency of the Will, but of, I know
net what, Indifference of the soul's power of willing ; or that
the Will, with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indif-
ferent, can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand
or left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other.
However this seems to be a refining only of some particular
writers, and newly invented, and which will by no means consist
with the manner of expression used by the defenders of Liber-
ty of Indifference in general. And I wish such refiners would
thoroughly consider, whether they distinctly know their own
meaning, when they make a distinction between Indifference
of the soul as to its power or ability of willing or choosing, and
the soul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itself ;
and whether they do not deceive themselves in imagining that
they have any distinct meaning. The Indifference of the
soul as to its ability or power to Will, must be the same thing
as the Indifference of the state of the power or faculty of the
Will, or the indifference of the state which the soul itself,
•which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the
exercise of that power, in the choice it shall by and by make.
But not to insist any longer on the abstruseness and inex-
plicableness of this distinction ; let what will be supposed
concerning the meaning of those that make use of it, thus
much must at least be intended by Arminians when they talk
of Indifference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend
any thing, in any respect to their purpose, -viz. That it is such
89 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
an Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already ;
but free from, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that
there may be room for the exercise of the selfdetermimng
flower of the Will ; and that the Will's freedom consists in,
or depends upon this vacancy and opportunity that is left for
the Will itself to be the determiner of the act that is to be the
free act.
And here I would observe in the first place, that to make
out this scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect
and absolute ; there must be a perfect freedom from all ante-
cedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the Will be
already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on
itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself : If
when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice, the
proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of Indiffer-
ence, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere selfde-
termirtation....The least degree of antecedent bias must be in-
consistent with their notion of Liberty. For so long as prior
inclination possesses the? Will, and is not removed, it binds the
Will, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act
otherwise than agreeably to it. Surely the Will cannot act
or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of
the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same thing as
to suppose, that the Will is inclined contrary to its present
prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to.
That which the Will chooses and prefers, that all things con-
sidered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impos-
sible for the Will to choose contrary to its own remaining and
present preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer contrary
to its own present preference, or choose contrary to its own
present choice. The Will, therefore, so long as it is under
the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not at
Liberty for a new free act, or any act that shall now be an act
of selfdetermination. The act which is a selfdetermined free
act, must be an act which the Will determines in the pos-
session and use of such a Liberty, as consists in a freedom
from every thing, which, if it were there, would make it iin-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 81
possible that the Will, at that time, should be otherwise thari
that way to which it tends.
If any one should say, there is no need that the Indiffer-
ence should be perfect ; but although a former inclination
and preference still remain, yet, if it be not very strong and
Tiolent, possibly the strength of the Will may oppose and
overcome it ......This is grossly absurd ; for the strength of
the Will, let it he ever so great, does not enable it to act on©
■way, and not the contrary way, both at the same time. It
gives i no such sovereignty and command, as to cause itself
to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose con-
trary to its own present choice.
Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent pre-
ponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before
the Will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary
way. And if the Will determines itself the same way, it is
not a free determination, because the Will is not wholly at
Liberty in so doing : Its determination is not altogether from
itself, but it was partly determined before, in its prior inclina-
tion ; and all the freedom the Will exercises in the case, is
in an increase of inclination, which it gives itself, over and
above what it h \d by the foregoing bias ; so much is from it-
self, and so much is from perfect Indifference. For though
the Will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that ad-
ditional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore
the previous tendency is of no consideration, with respect to
the act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the
same thing which was said at first, that as to the act of the
Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect Indiffer-
ence, or equilibrium.
To illustrate this ; if we should suppose a sovereign, self-
ntioving power in a natural body, but that the body is in mo-
tion already, by an antecedent bias ; for instance, gravitation
towards the centre of the earth ; and has one degree of mo-
tion already, by virtue of that previous tendency ; but by its
selfmoving power it adds one degree more to its motion, and
moves so much more swiftly towards the centre of the earth
than it would do by its gravity only : It is evident, that all that
Vol. V. L
82 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
is owing to a selfmoving power in this case, is the additional
degree of motion ; and that the other degree of motion which
it had from gravity, is of no consideration in the case, does
not help the effect of the free selfmoving power in the least ;
the effect is just the same, as if the body had received from
itself one degree of mction from a state of perfect rest. So
if we should suppose a selfmoving power given to the scale
of a balance, which has a weight of one degree beyond the op-
posite scale ; and we ascribe to it an ability to add to itself
another degree of force the same way, by its selfmoving pow-
er ; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it a power to
give itself one degree of preponderation from a perfect equili-
brium ; and so much power as the scale has to give itself an
overbalance from a perfect equipoise, so much selfmoving
selfpreponderaling power it has, and no more. So that its
free power this way is always to be measured from perfect
equilibrium.
I need say lio more to prove, that if Indifference be essen-
tial to Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference ; and that so far
as the Will is destitute of ibis, so far it is destitute of that free-
dom by which it is its own master, and in a capacity of being
its own determiner, without being in the least passive, or sub-
ject to the power and sway of something else, in its motions
and determinations.
Having observed ihese things, let us now try whether this
notion of the Liberty of Will consisting in indifference and
equilibrium, and the Will's selfdetermT-iation in such a state
be not absurd and inconsistent.
And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted
truth ; that every free act is done in a slate of freedom, and
not after such a state. If an act of the Will be an act
wherein the suul is free, it must be exerted in a state of free-
dom, and in the /,'.';:r rf freedom. It will not suffice, that the
act immediately follows a state of Liberty ; but Liberty must
yet continue, and coexist with the act ; the soul remaining in
possession of Liberty. Because that is the notion of a free act
of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises
Liberty. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act, in
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. S3
the possession of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use
of it.
Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts
forth an act of Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty,
in that notion of a state of Liberty, viz. as implying a state of
Indifference, or whether the soul ever exerts an act of choice
or preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect
equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The
very putting of the question is sufficient to shew the absurdi-
ty of the affirmative answer ; for how ridiculous would it be
for any body to insist, that the soul chooses one thing before
another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indiffer-
ent with respect to each ! This is the same thing as to say,
the soul prefers one thing to another, at the very same time
that it has no preference. Choice and preference can no more
be in a state of Indifference, than motion can be in a state of
rest, or than ihe preponderation of the scale of a balance can
be in a state of equilibrium. Motion may be the next mo-
ment after rest ; but cannot coexist with it, in any, even the
least part of it. So choice may be immediately after a state
of Indifference, but has no coexistence with it ; even the very
beginning of it is not in a state of Indifference. And there-
fore if this be Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is
ever performed in a state of Liberty, or in the time of Liber-
ty. Volition and Liberty are so far from agreeing together,
and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one
to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much
as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and death. So
that the Will does not so much as begin to act in the time of
such Liberty ; freedom is perfectly at an end, and has ceased
to be, at the first moment of action; and therefore Liberty
cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a de-
nomination, or any part of it, any more than if it had ceased to
be twenty years before the action began. The moment that
Liberty ceases to be, it ceases to be a qualification of any
thing. If light and darkness succeed one another instantane-
ously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make any
thing lightsome or bright, any more at the first moment of
84 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
perfect darkness, than months or years after. Life denomi T
nates nothing vital at the first moment of perfect death. So
freedom, if it consists in, or implies Indifference, can denomi-
nate nothing free, at the first moment of preference or pre-
ponderation. Therefore it is manifest, that no Liberty of
which the soul is possessed, or ever uses, in any of its acts of
volition, consists in Indifference ; and that the opinion of such
as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very essence of
Liberty is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory.
If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is
nothing but trick and delusion ; and to evade the reasoning,
should say, that the thing wherein the Will exercises its Lib-
erty, is not in the act of choice or preponderation xtself, but
in determining itself to a certain choice or preference ; that
the act of the Will wherein it is free, and uses its own sover-
eignty, consists in its causing or determining the change or
transition from a state of Indifference to a certain preference,
or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which
has hitherto been even ; and that this act the Will exerts in a
state of Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in equilibri-
um, and perfect master of itself... I say, if any one chooses to
express his notion of Liberty after this, or some such manner,
let us see if he can make out his matters any better than be-
fore.
What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains
in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines to
change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain
choice or preference. Now let us see whether this does
not come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so,
that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, deter-
mines to put itself out of that state, and give itself a certain pre-
ponderation ; then I would inquire, whether the soul does not
determine this of choice ; or whether the Will's coining to a
determination to do so, be not the same thing as the soul's
comine; to a choice to do so. If the soul does not determine this
of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not deter-
mineit voluntarily. And if the soul does not determine itvolun-
tarily, or of its own Will, then in what sense does its Will de
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 85
termine it ? And if the Will does not determine it, then how
is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the determination ?
What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those deter-
minations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not
Voluntary, and wherein the Will is not concerned ?....But if it
be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice, and it
be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of
perfect Indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and
to turn itself one way ; then the soul is already come to a
choice, and chooses that way. And so we have the very same
absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a state of
choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the same time :
The soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state
of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more
than the other And indeed this manner of talking, though
it may a little hide the absurdity in the obscurity of expression,
is more nonsensical, and increases the inconsistence. To say,
the free act of the Will, or the act which the Will exerts in a
stale of freedom and Indi Terence, does not imply preference in
it, but is what the Will does in order to causing or producing
a preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to
will and to choose are the same thing) without choice, and
prefers without preference, in order to cause or produce the
beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is,
that the first choice is exerted without choice, in order to pro-
duce itself.
If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of
Liberty, and a state of Indifference are not the same, and that
the former may be without the latter ; but should say, that
Indifference is still essential to the freedom of an act of Will,
in some sort, namely, as it is necessary to go immediately be-
fore it ; it being essential to the freedom of an act of Will
that it should directly and immediateiy arise out of a state of
Indifference : Still this will not help the cause of Arminian
Liberty, or make it consistent with itself. For if the act
springs immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it
does not arise from antecedent choice or preference. But if
the act arises directly out of a state of Indifference, without
86 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
any intervening choice to choose and determine it, then the
act. not being determined by choice, is not determined by the
Will ; the mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and
free choice and free Will have no hand in the determination
of the act. Which is entirely inconsistent with their notion
of the freedom of Volition.
If any should suppose, that these difficulties and absurdi-
ties may be avoided, by saying that the Liberty of the mind
consists in a power to suspend the act of the Will, and so to
keep it in a state of Indifference, until there has been oppor-
tunity for consideration j and so shall say that, however In-
difference is not essential to Liberty in such a manner, that
the mind must make its choice in a state of Indifference,
which is an inconsistency, or that the act of Will must spring
immediately out of Indifference ; yet indifference may be es<
sential to the liberty of acts of the Will in this respect, viz.
That Liberty consists in a Power of the mind to forbear or
suspend the act of Volition, and keep the mind in a state of
Indifference for the present, until there has been opportunity
for proper deliberation : I say, if any one imagines that this
helps the matter, it is a great mistake : It reconciles no in-
consistency, and relieves no difficulty with which the affair is
attended For here the following things must be observed :
1. That this suspending of Volition, if there be properly
any such thing, is itself an act of Volition. If the mind deter-
mines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily ; it
chooses, on some consideration, to suspend it. And this
choice or determination, is an act of the Will : And indeed it
is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis ; for it is supposed
that the Liberty of the Will consists in its Power to do this,
and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the Will exer-
cises its Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty
in it, if it be not an act of the Will? The Liberty of the
Will is not exercised in any thing but what the Will does.
2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an act
of the Will, but it is supposed to be the only free act of the
Will ; because it is said, that this is the thing wherein the
Liberty of the Will consists. ...Now if this be so, then this is all
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. S?
the act of will that we have to consider in this controversy,
about the Liberty of Will} and in our inquiries, wherein the
Liberty of man consists. And now the fore mentioned diffi-
culties remain : The former question returns upon us, viz.
Wherein consists the freedom of the Will in these acts
wherein it is free ? And if this act of determining a suspen-
sion be the only aet in which the Will is free, then wherein
consists the Will's freedom with respect to this act of suspen-
sion ? And how is Indifference essential to this act ? The an-
swer must be, according to what is supposed in the evasion
under consideration, that the Liberty of the Will in this act
of suspension, consists in a Power to suspend even this act,
until there has been opportunity for thoion.<h deliberation
But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest non-
sense : For it is the act of suspension itself that we are speak-
ing of; and there is no room for a space of deliberation and
suspension in order to determine whether we will suspend or
no. For that supposes, that even suspension itself may be de-
ferred : Which is absurd ; for the very deferring the deter-
mination of suspension to consider whether we will suspend
or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of
suspension, to consider, whether to suspend, the act is i/iso
facto suspended. There is no medium between suspending
to act, and immediately acting ; and therefore no pessibiiity
of avoiding either the one or the other one moment.
And besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity
another way : For now it is come to that, that Liberty con-
sists wholly in the mind's having Power to suspend its deter-
mination whether to suspend or no ; that there may be time
for consideration, whether it be best to suspend. And if Lib-
erty consists in this only, then this is the Liberty under con-
sideration : W T e have to inquire now, how Liberty with re-
spect to this act of suspending a determination of suspension,
consists in Indifference, or how Indifference is essential to it.
The answer, according to the hypothesis we are upon, must
be, that it consists in a Power of suspending even this last
mentioned act, to have time to consider whether to suspend
that. And tiu a the same difficulties and inquiries return
m FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
over again with respect to that ; and so on for ever. Which
if it would shew any thing-, would shew only that there is no'
such thing; as a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom
back in infinitum ; and that is to drive it out of the world.
And besides all this, there is a delusion, and a latent gross
contradiction in the affair another way ; in as much as in ex-
plaining how, or in what respect the Will is free with regard
to a particular act of Volition, it is said that its Liberty con-
sists in a Power to determine to suspend that act, which plac-
es Liberty not in that act of Volition which the inquiry is
about, but altogether in another antecedent act. Which con-
tradicts the thing supposed in both the question and answer.
The question is, wherein consists the mind's Liberty in any-
particular act of Volition ? And the answer, in pretending to
shew wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that act, in effect
says, it does not lie in that act, but in another, viz. a Volition
to suspend that act. And therefore the answer is both con-
tradictory, and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose.
For it does not shew wherein the Liberty of the Will consists
in the act in question ; instead of that, it supposes it does not
consist in that act, but in another distinct from it, even a Vo-
lition to suspend that act, and take time to consider it. And
no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free
with respect to that act, wherein this answer supposes the
Liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz. the act of suspension,
or of determining the suspension.
On the whole, it is exceedingly manifest, that the Liberty
of the mind does not consist in Indifference, and that Indiffer-
ence is not essential or necessary to it, or belonging to it, as
the Arminians suppose ; that opinion being full of absurdity
and selfcontradiction
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. £9
SECTION VIII.
Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as op-
posite to all Necessity.
IT is a thing chiefly insisted on by Jrminians, in this con-
troversy, as a thing most important and essential in human
Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the Will, are contingent
events ; understanding contingence as opposite, not only to
constraint, but to all necessity. Therefore I would particu-
larly consider this matter. And
1. I would inquire, whether there is, or can be any such
thing, as a volition which is contingent in such a sense, as not
only to come to pass without any Necessity of constraint or
coaction, but also without a Necessity of consequence, or an in-
fallible connexion with any thing foregoing.
2. Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause
of Liberty.
I. I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever
does, or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that it has been already
shewn, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or
reason why it exis's in this manner rather than another ; and
the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the acts
of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow,
that the acts of the Will are never contingent, or without ne-
cessity in the sense spoken of ; in as much as those things
Which have a cause, or reason of their existence, must be con-
nected with their cause. This appears by the following con-
siderations.
1 , For an event to have a cause and ground of its exist-
ence, and yet not to be connected with its cause, is an incon-
sistence. For if the event be not connected with the cause}
it is not dependent on the cause ; its existence is as it were
loose from its influence, and may attend it or may not ; it be-
ing a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influ-
Vol. V. M
•o FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
cnce of the cause, or not : And that is the same thing as not
to be dependent on it. And to say the event is not dependent
on its cause is absurd : It is, the same thing as to say, it is
not its cause, nor the event the effect of it : For dependence
on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect. If
there be no such relation between one thing and another, con-
sisting in the connexion and dependence of one thing on the
influence of another, then it is certain there is no such rela-
tion between them as is signified by the terms cause and ef-
fect. So far as an event is dependent on a cause and connect-
ed with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no
more. The cause does, or brings to pass no more in any
event, than it is dependent on it. If we say the connexion
and dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect,
though it has some connexion and dependence, yet it is not en-
tirely dependent on it ; that is the same thing as to say, that
not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause, but that
only a part of it arises from thence, and part some other way.
2. If there are some events which are not necessarily con-
nected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are
some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary
to the supposition. For if there be any event which was not
necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under
such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would at-
tend or follow the influence of the cause, or no ; it might have
followed, and it might not, when the cause was the same, its
influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And
if so, why did it follow rather than not follow ? There is no
cause or reason of this. Therefore here is something with-
out any cause or reason why it is, viz. the following of the ef-
fect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not ne-
cessarily connected. If there be not a necessary connexion
of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may sup-
pose that sometimes the event will follow the cause, and
sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every
respect in the same state of circumstances. And what can be
the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon, even this
diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in an-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 91
other not ? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly
without any cause or ground. Here is something in the pres-
ent manner of the existence of things, and state of the world
that is absolutely without a cause ; which is contrary to the
supposition, and contrary to what has been before demon-
strated.
3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and
ground of their existence,that yet are not necessarily connect-
ed with their cause, which is to suppose that they have a cause
which is not their cause. Thus if the effect be not necessarily
connected with the cause, with its influence and influential cir-
cumstances ; then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and
supposable, that the cause may sometimes exert the same in-
fluence, under the same circumstances, and yet the effect not
follow. And if this actually happens in any instance, this in-
stance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not
sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient,
it would have done it. And yet, by the supposition, in an-
other instance, the same cause, with perfectly the same influ-
ence, and when all circumstances which have any influence,
were the same, it ivasfollowecl with the effect. By which it is
manifest,that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the
influence of the cause, but must come to pass some other way.
For it was proved before, that the influence of the cause was
not sufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not suffi-
cient to produce it, then the production of it could not be ow-
ing to that influence, but must be owing to something else, or
owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing to the in-
fluence of the cause, then it is not the cause ; which brings
us to the contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is
the ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the
same time is not the ground and reason of its existence, nor is
sufficient to be so.
If the matter be not already so plain as to render any fur-
ther reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that that
which seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no
cause ; its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved
insufficient to produce such an effect : And if it be not sufficient
■92 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
to produce it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise*
is to say, there is power to do that which there is not power
to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power exerted, and in
circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect
be actually produced at one time ; these things all concurring,
"will produce the effect at all limes. And so we may turn it
the other way ; that which proves not sufficient at one time,
cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely the same in-
fluential circumstances. And therefore if the effect follows,
it is not owing to that cause ; unless the different time be a
circumstance which has influence : But that is contrary to the
supposition ; for it is supposed that all circumstances that
have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to
suppose the time to be the cause ; which is contrary to the
supposition of the other thing's being the cause. But if merely
diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident that it is
as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to pro-
duce the effect at one time, and not at another ; as to say, that
it is sufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet
not sufficient to produce the same effect at the same time.
On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has
a necessary connexion with its cause, or with that which is
the true ground and reason of its existence. And therefore
if there be no event without a cause, as was proved before,
then no event whatsoever is contingent in the manner, that Ar~
minians suppose the free acts of the Will to be contigent.
SECTION IX.
Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the
Dictates of the Understanding.
IT is manifest, that the acts of the Will are none of them
contingent in such a sense as to be without all necessity, or so
as not to be necessary with a necessity of consequence and
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 93
Connexion ; because every act of the Will is some way con-
nected with the Understanding-, and is as the greatest appa-
rent good is, in the manner which has already been explained ;
namely, that the soul always wills or chooses that which, in
the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that
view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Be-
cause, as was observed before, nothing is more evident than
that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then
they do what appears most agreeable to them , and to say
otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not
choose what appears to suit them best, or what seems most
pleasing to them ; or that they do not choose what they pre-
fer. Which brings the matter to a contradiction.
As it is very evident in itself, that the acts of the Will have
some Connexion with the dictates or views of the Understand-
ing, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the Arminian
writers ; particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark.
Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the doctrine of neces-
sity, allows the same thing. In his Christian Philosophy, (p.
196) he with much approbation cites another philosopher, as
of the same mind, in these words ; " No man, (says an excel-
lent philosopher) sets himself about any thing, but upon some
view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he
does ; and whatsoever faculties he employs, the Understand-
ing, with such light as it has, well or ill formed, constantly
leads ; and by that light, true or false, all her operative pow-
ers are directed. The Will itself, how absolute and incon-
trolable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience
to the dictates of the Understanding. Temples have their
sacred images ; and we see what influence they have always
had over a great part of mankind ; but in truth, the ideas and
images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constant-
ly govern them ; and to these they all pay universally a ready
submission."
But whether this be in a just consistence with themselves,
and their own notions of liberty, I desire may now be impar-
tially considered.
94 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Dr. Whitby plainly supposes, that the acts and determina*
tions of the Will always follow the Understanding's appre-
hension or view of the greatest good to be obtained, or evil to
be avoided ; or, in other words, that the determinations of the
Will constantly and infallibly follow these two things in the
Understanding: 1. The degree of good to be obtained, and
evil to be avoided, proposed to the Understanding, and appre-
hended, viewed, and taken notice of by it. 2. The degree of
the Understanding's view, notice or appehension of that good
or evil ; which is increased by attention and consideration
That this is an opinion he is exceeding peremptory in (as he
is in every opinion which he maintains in his controversy
with the Calvinists) with disdain of the contrary opinion as
absurd and selfcontradictory, will appear by the following
words of his, in his Discourse on the Five Points.*
" Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Under*
standing to perceive, is evidence proposed, and apprehended,
considered or adverted to : For nothing else can be requisite
to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what
makes the Will choose, is something approved by the Under-
standing ; and consequently appearing to the soul as good
And whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the
Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as evil. Whence
all that God requires of us is and can be only this ; to refuse
the evil, and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evi-
dence proposed, apprehended and considered, is not sufficient
to make the Understanding approve ; or that the greatest
good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when equally be-
lieved and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will to
choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, that
which alone doth move the Will to choose or to refuse, is not
sufficient to engage it so to do ; which being contradictory to
itself, must of necessity be false. Be it then so, that we natur-
ally have an aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gos-
pel ; that only can make us indisposed to attend to them, but
cannot hinder our conviction, when we do apprehend them..
* Second Edit, p. an, 212,21}.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. *5
and attend to them. Be it, that there is also a renitency to
the good we are to choose ; that only can indispose us to be-
lieve it is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be it, that
we are prone to the evil that we should decline ; that only can
render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of
evils. But yet, what we do really believe to be Our chiefest
good, will still be chosen ; and what we apprehend to be the
worst of evils, will, whilst we do continue under that convic-
tion, be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in
order to these ends, that the Good Spirit should so illuminate
our Understandings, that we, attending to, and considering
what lies before us, should apprehend, and be convinced of
our duty ; and that the blessings of the Gospel should be so
propounded to us, as that we may discern them to be our
chiefest good ; and the miseries it threateneth, so as we may
be convinced that they are the worst of evils ; that we may
choose the one, and refuse the other."
■ Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is
asserted, that the greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil
threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is suffi-
cient to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse the
evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to choose or
to refuse ; and that it is contradictory to itself, to suppose
otherwise ; and therefore must of necessity be false ; and then
what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still be
chosen, and what we appi'ehend to be the worst of evils, will,
whilst we continue under that conviction, be refused by us
Nothing could have been said more to the purpose, fully to
signify and declare, that the determinations of the Will must
evermore follow the illumination, conviction and notice of the
Understanding, with regard to the greatest good and evil pro-
posed, reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood,
jmd the degree of Understanding, notice and conviction of
that proposed good and evil ; and that it is thus necessarily,
and can be otherwise in no instance : Because it is asserted,
that it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be other-
wise.
96 FREEDOM OF THE WILL."
I am sensible the Doctor's aim in these assertions h
against the Calvinists ; to shew, in opposition to them, that
there is no need of any physical operation of the Spirit of
God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good
choice, but that God's operation and assistance is only moral,
suggesting ideas to the Understanding ; which he supposes to
be enough, if those ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain
the end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more di-
rectly and fully prove, that every determination of the Will,
in choosing and refusing, is necessary ; directly contrary to
his own notion of the liberty of the Will. For if the deter-
mination of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows the
light, conviction and view of the Understanding, concerning
the greatest good and evil, and this be that alone which moves
the Will, and it be a contradiction to suppose otherwise ; then-
it is necessarily so, the Will necessarily follows this light or
view of the Understanding, and not only in some of its acts,
but in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will
does not determine itself in any one of its own acts ; but all its
acts, every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is neces-
sarily connected with some antecedent cause ; which cause is
not the Will itself, nor any act of its own, nor any thing per-
taining to that faculty, but something belonging to another
faculty, whose acts go before the Will, in all its acts, and
govern and determine them.
Here if it should be replied, that although it be true, that ac-
cording to the Doctor, the final determination of the Will al-
ways depends upon, and is infallibly connected with the Un-
derstanding's conviction, and notice of the greatest good ; yet
the acts of the Will are not necessary ; because that convic-
tion and notice of the Understanding is first dependent on a
preceding act of the Will, in determining to attend to, and
take notice of the evidence exhibited ; by which means the
mind obtains that degree of conviction, which is sufficient and
effectual to determine the consequent and ultimate choice of
the Will ; and that the Will, with regard to that preceding
act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not ne-
cessary ; and that in this, the liberty of the Will consists, that
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 9?
when God holds forth sufficient objective light, the Will is at
liberty whether to command the attention of the mind to it.
Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a
reply as this. For that preceding act of the Will, in deter-
mining to attend and consider, still is an act of the Will (it is so
to be sure, if the liberty of the Will consists in it, as is suppos-
ed) and if it be an act of the Will, it is an act of choice or refus-
al. And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is
determined by some antecedent light in the Understanding
concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For he as-
serts, it is that light which alone doth move the Will to choose
«r refuse. And therefore the Will must be moved by that in
choosing to attend to the objective light offered in order to an-
other consequent act of choice ; so that this act is no less ne-
cessary than the other. And if we suppose another act of
the Will, still preceding both these mentioned, to deter-
mine both, still that also must be an act of the Will, and
an act of choice ; and so must, by the same principles, be
infallibly determined by some certain degree of light in the
Understanding concerning the greatest good. And let us
suppose as many acts of the Will, one preceding another, as
we please, yet they are every one of them necessarily deter-
mined by a certain degree of light in the Understanding, con-
cerning the greatest and most eligible good in that case ; and
so, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of
freedom. ...And if it be said, the reason why men do not at-
tend to light held forth, is because of ill habits contracted by
evil acts committed before, whereby their minds are indispos-
ed to attend to, and consider the truth held forth to them
by God, the difficulty is not at all avoided : Still the question
returns, What determined the Will in those preceding evil
acts ? It must, by Dr. Whitby's principles, still be the view
of the Understanding concerning the greatest good and evil.
If this view of the Understanding be that alone which doth move
the Will to choose or refuse, as the Doctor asserts, then every
act of choice or refusal, from a man's first existence, is moved
and determined by this view ; and this view of the Under-
standing, exciting and governing the act, must be before the
Vol. V. N
58 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
act : And therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in
every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause
beside the Will, and a cause that does not proceed from, or
depend on any act of the Will at all. Which at once utterly
abolishes the Doctor's whole scheme of liberty of Will ; and!
he at one stroke, has cut the sinews of all his arguments
from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness and sincerity
of God in his commands, promises, threatenings, calls, invi-
tations, expostulations ; which he makes use of, under the
heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient
and effectual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man ;
and has enervated and made vain all those exclamations a-
gainst the doctrine, of the Calvinists, as charging God with
manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrisy, falla-
ciousness, and cruelty ; which he has over, and over, and
over again, numberless times in his book.
Dr. Samuel Clark in his Demonstration of the Being and
Attributes of God,* to evade the argument to prove the neces-
sity of volition, from its necessary Connexion with the last dic-
tate of the Understanding, supposes the latter not to be di-
verse from the act of the Will itself. But if it be so, it will
not alter the case as to the evidence of the necessity of the act
of the Will. If the dictate of the Understanding be the very
same with the determination of the Will or choice, as Dr.
Clark supposes, then this determination is no finds or
effect of choice : And if so, no liberty of choice has any
hand in it ; as to volition or choice, it is necessary ; that
is, choice cannot prevent it. If the last dictate of the Under-
standing be the same with the determination of volition itself,
then the existence of that determination must be necessary as
to volition ; in as much as volition can have no opportunity
to determine whether it shall exist or no, it having existence
already before volition has opportunity to determine any
thing. It is itself the very rise and existence of volition. But
a thing after it exists, has no opportunity to determine as to
its own existence ; it is too late for that,
would observe, that if it be so, and the Arminian notion of lib-
erty consists in a sclfdelermining power in the Understand-
• Edition. VI. p. 93.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 99
If liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz.
in the Will's determining its own, acts, having free opportu-
nity, and being without necessity ; this is the same as to say,
that liberty consists in the soul's having power and opportu-
nity to have what determinations of the Will it pleases or
chooses. And if the determinations of the Will, and the last
dictates of the Understanding be the same thing, then liberty
consists in the mind's having power to have what dictates of
the Understanding it pleases, having opportunity to choose
its own dictates of Understanding. But this is absurd ; for it
is to make the determination of choice prior to the dictate of
Understanding, and the ground of it ; which cannot consist
with the dictate of Understanding's being the determination
of choice itself.
Here is no way to do in this case, but only to recur to the
old absurdity of one determination before another, and the
cause of it ; and another before that, determining that ; and
so on in infinitum. If the last dictate of the Understanding be
the determination of the Will itself, and the soul be free with
regard to that dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom ;
then the soul before that dictate of its understanding exists,
voluntarily and according to its own choice determines in ev-
ery case, what that dictate of the Understanding shall be ;
otherwise that dictate, as to the Will, is necessary ; and the
acts determined by it must also be necessary. So that here
is a determination of the mind prior to that dictate of the
Understanding, an act of choice going before it, choosing
and determining what that dictate of the Understanding shall
be : And this preceding act of choice, being a free act of
Will, must also be the same with another last dictate of the
Understanding ; .and if the mind also be free in that dictate
of Understanding, that must be determined still by another ;
and so on forever.
Besides, if the dictate of the Understanding, and deter-
mination of the Will be the same, this confounds the Under-
standing and Will, and makes them the same. Whether
they be the same or no, I will not now dispute ; but only
ing, free of all necessity ; being independent, undetermin?
ioo FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
cd by any thing prior to its own acts and determinations j
and the more the Understanding is thus independent and sovc*
reign over its own determinations the more free ; then
of course the freedom of the soul, as a moral agent, must
consist in the independence of the Understanding on any evi-
dence or appearance of things, or any thing whatsoever, that
stands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the Understand-
ing's determination. And what a sort of liberty is this ! Con-
sisting in an ability, freedom and easiness of judging, either
according to evidence, or against it ; having a sovereign com-
mand over itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or dis-
agreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own view. Cer-
tainly it is no liberty that renders persons the proper subjects
of persuasive reasoning, arguments, expostulations, and such
like moral means and inducements. The use of which with
mankind is a main argument of the Arminians, to defend
their notion of liberty without all necessity. For according to
this, the more free men are, the less they are under the gov-
ernment of such means, less subject to the power of evi-
dence and reason, and more independent of their influence, in
their determinations.
However whether the Understanding and Will are the same
or no, as Dr. Clark seems to suppose, yet in order to main-
tain the Arminian notion of liberty without necessity, the free
Will must not be determined by the Understanding, nor neces-
sarily connected with the Understanding ; and the further from
such Connexion, the greater the freedom. And when the
liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the Will
must have no Connexion at all with the dictates of the Under-
standing. And if so, in vain are all applications to the Under-
standing, in order to induce to any free virtuous act ; and
in vain are all instructions, counsels,invitations, expostulations,
?.nd all arguments and persuasives whatsoever : For these
are but applications to the Understanding.and a clear and lively
exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view. But
if, after all, the Will must be selfdetermined, and independent
of the Understanding, to what purpose are things thus repre-
sented to the Understanding, in order to determine the choice ?
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 101
SECTION X.
Volition necessarily connected with the Influence of
Motives ; with particular Observations on the
great Inconsistence oj Mr. Cubb's Assertions a?id
reasonings, about the Freedom of the Will,
THAT every act of the Will has some cause, and conse-
quently (by "what has been already proved) has a necessary
connexion with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of
connexion and consequence is evident by this that every act
of the Will whatsoever is excited by some Motive : Which
is manifest, because, if the Will or mind, in willing and choos-
ing after the manner that it does, is excited so to do by no
motive or inducement, then it has no end which it proposes
to itself, or pursues in so doing ; it aims at nothing, and seeks
nothing. And if it seek nothing, then it does not go after
any thing or exert any inclination or preference towards any
thing : Which brings the matter to a contradiction ; because
for the mind to Will something, and for it to go after some-
thing by an act of preference and inclination, are the same
thing.
But if every act of the Will is excited by a Motive, then
that Motive is the cause of the act of the Will. If the acts
of the Will are excited by motives, then Motives are the
causes of their being excited ; or, which is the same thing,
the cause of their being put forth into act and existence. And
if so, the existence of the acts of the Will is properly the
effect of their motives. Motives do nothing as Motives or
inducements, but by their influence ; and so much as is
done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is
the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by
the influence of another thing.
And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives,
ihen they are necessarily connected with their Motives
i02 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.'
Every effect and event being, as proved before, necessarily
connected with that, which is the proper ground and reason of
its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is necessary,
and is not from any selfdetermining power in the Will : The
volition, which is caused by previous Motive and inducement,
is not caused by the Will exercising a sovereign power over
Itself, to determine, cause and excite volitions in itself. This
is not consistent with the Will's acting in a state of indiffer-
ence and equilibrium, to determine itself to a preference ; for
the way in which Motives operate, is by biasing the Will, and
giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way.
Here it may be proper to observe, that Mr. Chubb, in his
Collection of Tracts on various subjects, has advanced a
scheme of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and
thoroughly subversive of itself; and that many ways.
I. He is abundant in asserting, that the Will, in all its acts,
is influenced by Motive and excitement ; and that this is the
previous ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never
otherwise in any instance. He says, (p. 262) " No action
can take place without some motive to excite it." And in
page 263, " Volition cannot take place without some pre-
vious reason or motive to induce it." And in page 310,
" Action would not take place without some reason or Motive
to induce it ; it being absurd to suppose, that the active facul-
ty would be exerted without some previous reason to dispose
the mind to action." So also page 257. And he speaks of
these things, as what we may be absolutely certain of, and
which are the foundation, the only foundation we have of a
certainty of the moral perfections of God. Pages 252, 253,
254, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264.
And yet at the same time, by his scheme, the influence of
Motives upon us to excite to action, and to be actually a ground
of volition, is consequent on the volition or choice of the
mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free ac-
tions, before the mind is the subject of those volitions, which
Motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it
will comply with the Motive, which presents itself in view,
or not ; and when various Motives are presented, it chooses
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 163
tvhich it will yield to, and which it will reject. So page 256,
* Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting agree-
ably with, or contrary to* any Motive that presents." Page
257, « Every man is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting
agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these Motives,
considered singly, would excite him to. Man has power, and
is as much at liberty to reject the Motive that does prevail, as
he has power, and is at liberty to reject those Motives that do
not." And so, page 310, 311, " In order to constitute a
moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act,
or to refrain from acting, upon such moral Motives as he
pleases." And to the like purpose in many other places
According to these things, the Will acts first, and chooses or
refuses to comply with the Motive, that is presented, before
it falls under its prevailing influence : And it is first deter-
mined by the mind's pleasure or choice, what Motives it will
be induced by, before it is induced by them.
Now, how can these things hang together ? How can the
mind first act, and by its act of volition and choice, determine
what Motive shall be the ground and reason of its volition and
choice ? For this supposes the choice is already made, before
the Motive has its effect ; and that the volition is already ex-
erted, before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the
ground of the volition ; and makes the prevailing of the Mo-
tive, the consequence of the volition, which yet it is the
ground of. If the mind has already chosen to comply Avith a
Motive, and to yield to its excitement, it does not need to
yield to it after this : For the thing is effected already, that
the Motive would excite to, and the Will is beforehand with
the excitement ; and the excitement comes in too late, and is
needless and in vain afterwards. If the mind has already
chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to a thing, that im-
plies, and in fact is a choosing the thing invited to ; and the
very act of choice is before the influence of the Motive which
induces, and is the ground of the choice ; the son is before-
hand with the father that begets him : The choice is suppos-
ed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive, which
"cry influence is supposed to be # the ground of the choice....
104 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
And so vice versa, the choice is supposed to be the const-
quence of the influence of the Motive, which influence of the
Motive is the consequence of that very choice.
And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive be-
fore it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the Mo-
tive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and
consequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive a
previous ground and reason of the act and choice, so that in the
nature of the thing, volition cannot take place without some
previous reason and motive to induce it ; and that this act is
consequent upon, and follows the Motive ? Which things
Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth....
So that the very same motive is both previous and conse-
quent, both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the
very same thing !
II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of
the Will's first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether
it will comply with it, in order to its becoming a ground of
the Will's acting, before any act of volition can take place,
Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and excitements to the
action of the Will, the passive ground or reason of that ac-
tion : Which is a remarkable phrase ; than which I presume
there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and con-
sistent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thom-
as Aquinas. When he represents the Motive to action or vo-
lition as passive, he must mean. ...passive in that affair, or pas-
sive with respect to that action which he speaks of; other-
wise it is nothing to his purpose, or relating to the design of
his argument : He must mean, (if that can be called a mean-
ing) that the Motive to volition, is first acted upon or to-
wards by the volition, choosing to yield to it, making it a
ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence from
thence; and so to make it a previous ground of its own exci-
tation and existence. Which is the same absurdity as if one
should say, that the soul of man, or any other thing, should,
previous to its existence, choose what cause it would come
into existence by, and should act upon its cause, to fetch influ-
ence from thence, to bring it into being ; and so its cause
should be a passive ground of its existence !
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Hi
Mr. Chubb does very plainly suppose Motive or excite-
ment to be the ground of the being of volition. He speaks
of it as the ground or reason of the exertion of an act of the
Will, p. 391, and 392, and expressly says, that volition cannot
•Take place without some previous ground or Motive to in-
duce to it, p. 363. And he speaks of the act as from the Mo*
Vive, and from the influence of the motive, p. 352, and
from the influence that the Motive has on the man, for the Pro-
duction of an action, p. SI 7. Certainly there is no need of
multiplying words about this ; it is easily judged, whether
Motive can be the ground of volition's being exerted and tak-
ing place, so that the very production of it is from the influ-
ence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes
the ground of the volition, is passive, or acted upon by the vo-
lition. But this I will say, that a man, who insists so much on
clearness of meaning in others, and is so much in blaming
their confusion and inconsistence, ought, if he was able, to
have explained his meaning in this phrase of passive ground
of action, so as to shew it not to be confused and inconsistent.
If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb, when he speaks
of Motive as a passive ground of action, does not mean pas-
sive with regard to that volition which it is the ground of, but
some other antecedent volition, (though his purpose and ar-
gument? and whole discourse, will by no means al'Jbw of such
a supposition) yet it would not help the matter in the least.
For, (1.) If we suppose thereto be an act of volition or
choice, by which the soul chooses to yield to the invitation of
a Motive to another volition, by which the soul chooses
something else ; both these supposed volitions are in effect
the very same. A volition, or choosing to yield to the force
of a Motive inviting to choose something, comes to just the
same thing as choosing the thing, which the Motive invites to,
as I observed before. So that here can be no room to help the
matter, by a distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive
be passive with respect, not to the same volition that the Mo-
tive excites to, but one truly distinct and prior ; yet, by Mr.
Chubb, that prior volition cannot take place, without a Mo-
tive or excitement, as a previous ground of its existence-,
Vol. V. O
206 FREEDOM OF THE WILl.
For he insists, that it is absurd to suppose any volition should
take place without some previous Motive to induce it. So
that at last it comes to just the same absurdity : For if every
volition must have a previous Motive, then the very first in the
whole series must be excited by a previous Motive ; and yet
the Motive to that first volition is passive ; but cannot be pas-
sive with regard to another antecedent volition, because by
the supposition, it is the very first : Therefore if it be passive
with respect to any volition, it must be so with regard to that
very volition that it is the ground of, and that is excited by it.
III. Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above, that every
volition has some Motive, and that in the nature of the
thing, no volition can take place without some Motive to in-
duce it ; yet he asserts, that volition does not always follow
the strongest Motive ; or, in other words, is not governed by
any superior strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond
Motives to the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His
own words, p. 258, are as follow : " Though with regard to
physical causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet
it is otherwise with regard to moral causes. Of these, some-
times the stronger, sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the
ground of this difference is evident, namely, that what we call
moral causes, strictly speaking, are no causes at all, but bare-
ly passive reasons of, or excitements to the action, or to the re-
fraining from acting: Which excitements we have power, or are
at liberty to comply with or reject,as I have shewed above." And
so throughout the paragraph, he, in a variety of phrases, insists,
that the Will is not always determined by the strongest Mo-
tive, unless by strongest we preposterously mean actually
prevailing in the event ; which is not in the Motive, but in
the Will ; so that the Will is not always determined by the
Motive, which is strongest, by any strength previous to the
volition itself. And he elsewhere does abundantly assert, that
the Will is determined by no superior strength or advantage t
that Motives have, from any constitution or state of things, or
any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual deter-
mination of the Will. And indeed his whole discourse on
human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is founded upon it.
FREEDOM GF THE WILL. 107
-But these things cannot stand together... .There is such a
thing as a diversity of strength in Motives to choice previous
to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they
do previously invite, induce, excite and dispose the mind to action.
This implies, that they have something in themselves that is
inviting, some tendency to induce and dispose to volition pre-
vious to volition itself. And if they have in themselves this
nature and tendency, doubtless they have it in certain limited
degrees, which are capable of diversity ; and some have it in
greater degrees, others in less ; and they that have most of
this tendency, considered with all their nature, and circum-
stances, previous to volition, are the strongest motives ; and
those that have least, are the weakest Motives.
Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive
which is strongest, or has most previous tendency or advan-
tage, all things considered, to induce or excite it, but follows
the weakest, or that which as it stands previously in the
mind's view, has least tendency to induce it ; herein the
Will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any pre-
vious reason to dispose the mind to it, contrary to what the
same author supposes. The act, wherein the Will must pro-
ceed without a previous Motive to induce it, is the act of pre-
ferring the weakest Motive. For how absurd is it to say, the
mind sees previous reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive
before the other ; and at the same time to supppose, that
there is nothing in the Motive, in its nature, state, or any
circumstances of it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous
view of the mind, that gives it any preference ; but on the
contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition with it,
in all these respects, has most belonging to it, that is inviting
and moving, and has most of a tendency to choice and pref-
erence. This is certainly as much as to say, there is pre-
vious ground and reason in the Motive, for the act of prefer-
ence, and yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition,
as to all that is in the two rival Motives, which tends to pref-
erence, previous to the act of preference, it is not in that
which is preferred, but wholly in the other : Because appear-
ing superior strength, and all appearing preferableness is in
l,OS FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
that; and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the act of preference u
from previous ground and reason in the Motive which is pre-
ferred. But are these things consistent ? Can there be pre-
vious ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no
previous tendency in it to that event ? If one thing- follow an-
other, without any previous tendency to its following, then I
should think it very plain, that it follows it without any man-
ner of previous reason, why it should follow.
Yea, in this, case, Mr. Chubb supposes, that the event
follows an antecedent or a previous thing, as the ground of its
existence, not only that has no tendency to it, but a contrary
tendency. The event js the preference, which the mind
gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the pre-
vious view of the mind ; the immediate antecedent is the
view the mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly ; in
which previous view of the miiij, all the preferableness, or
previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the
other side, or in the contrary Motive ; and all the unworthi-
ness of preference, and so previous tendency to comparative
neglect, rejection or undervaluing, is on that side which is
preferred: And yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be
the previous ground, or reason of this act of preference, excit-
ing it, and disposing the mind to it. Which, I leave the reader
to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it be not, then it is
not absurd to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent
to a consequent, is the ground and reason why that conse-
quent does not follow ; and the want of a previous ten-
dency to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the
true ground and reason why that event does follow.
An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, where-
in the mind acts with reference to two or more things that
are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's view.
If the mind in this comparative act, prefers that which ap-
pears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts
absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation
v/hatsoevcr. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two
forts of food, both which he finds an appetite to, but has a
stronger appetite to one than the other ; and there be n*
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. lot
*iircumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to in-
duce him to take either the one or the other, bat merely his,
appetite : If in the choice he makes between them, he choos-
es that, which he has the least appetite to, and refuses that, to
which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made ab-
solutely without previous Motive, excitement, reason or temp-
tation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to
either : Because his volition in this case is a comparative act,
attending and following a comparative view of the food, which
he chooses, viewing it as related to, and compared with the
other sort of food, in which view his preference has absolute-
ly no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and
Motive. And if there be any principle in man, from whence
an act of choice may arise after this manner, from the same
principle, volition may arise wholly without Motive on either
side. If the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive
then it can go without Motive : For when it is beyond the
Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits
of its influence, and so without Motive. If volition goes beyond
the strength and tendency of Motive, and especially if it goes
against its tendency, this demonstrates the independence of
volition or Motive. And if so, no reason can be given for
what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that in the nature of
things -volition cannot take place without a Motive to induce it.
If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or ac-
tivity of nature, in such a manner, that when unequal weights
are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that
scale to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise
the greater weight ; this would clearly demonstrate, that the
motion of the balance does not depend on weights in the
scales, at least as much as if the balance should move itself,
when there is no weight in either scale. And the activity of
the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the great-
er weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it
when there is no weight at all.
Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot stir at all with-
out some Motive ; and also supposes, that if there be a Mo-
tive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will inialli-
I io FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
bly follow that Motive This is virtually to suppose an en-
tire dependence of the Will on Motives : If it were not
wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little
without them, or help itself a little against a Motive, without
help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And
yet his supposing that the Will, when it has before it various
opposite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its
own influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and follow
the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on Motives.
It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's supposition, that voli-
tion must be without any previous ground in any Motive,
thus : If it be, as he supposes, that the Will is not determined
by any previous superior strength of the Motive, but de-
termines and chooses its own Motive, then when the rival
Motives are exactly equal in strength and tendency to induce,
in all respects, it may follow either ; and may in such a case,
sometimes follow one, sometimes the other And if so,
this diversity which appears between the acts of the Will,
is plainly without previous ground in either of the Motives ;
for all that is previously in the Motives, is supposed precise-
ly and perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever.
Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antece-
dent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the con-
sequent. Perfect identity in the ground cannot be the reason
why it is not followed with the same consequence. And
therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be
sought for elsewhere.
And lastly, it may be observed, that however Mr. Chubb
does much insist that no volition can take place without some
Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it ;
vet, as he also insists that the mind, without reference to any
previous superior strength of Motives, picks and chooses for its
Motive to follow ; he himself herein plainly supposes, that with
regard to the mind's preference of one Motive before another
it is not the Motive that disposes the Will, but the Will dis-
poses itself to follow the Motive.
IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsist-
ent with agency ; and that to suppose a being to be an agent
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 111
in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction. P. 311,
and throughout his discourses on the subject of liberty, he
supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or free-
dom ; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make liberty and
necessity, action and passion, the same thing. And so he
seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking,
but volition ; and that as to the effects of volition in body or
mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are
said to be free, only as they are the effects of an act that is not
necessary.
And yet, according to him, volition itself is the effect of vo-
lition ; yea, every act of free volition : And therefore every
act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from
him be necessary. ...That every act of free voliiion is itself the
effect of volition, is abundantly supposed by him. In p. 341,
he says, " If a man is such a creature as I have proved him
to be, that is, if he has in him a power or liberty of doing
either good or evil, and either of these is the subject of his
own free choice, so that he might, sf he had pleased have
chosen and done the contrary." Here he supposes, all that
is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice ; and so that
his good or evil choice itself, is the effect of his pleasure or
choice, in these words, he might, if he had pleased, have chos-
en the contrary . So in p. 356, "Though it be highly reasonable,
that a man should always choose the greater good. ...yet he
may if he please, choose otherwise." Which is the same
thing as if he had said, he may, if he chooses, choose other-
wise." And then he goes on...." that is, he may, if he pleas-
es, choose what is good for himself," 8cc. And again in the
same page, " The Will is not confined by the under-
standing, to any particular sort of good, whether greater
or less ; but is at liberty to choose what kind of good it
pleases." If there be any meaning in the last words, the
meaning must be this, that the Will is at liberty to choose what
kind of good it chooses to choose ; supposing the act of choice
itself determined by an antecedent choice. The liberty
Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man's having power to
move his body agreeably to an antecedent act of choice, but to
M-2 FREEDOM OF THE WILL'
use, or exert the faculties of his soul. Thus, in p. 379, spsa'lo
ing of the faculties of his mind, he says, " Man has power,
and is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright,
or to abuse them, as he pleases." And that he supposes an
act of choice, or exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from,
and antecedent to those acts thus chosen, directing, com-
manding and producing the chosen acts, and even the acts of
choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283. " He can command
his actions ; and herein consist his liberty ; he can give or de-
ny himself that pleasure as he pleases." And p. 377. If the
actions of men are not the produce of a free choice, or election,
but spring from a necessity of nature, he cannot in reason b^
the object of reward or punishment on their account. Where-
as, if action in man, whether good or evil, is the produce of
Will or free choice ; so that a man in either case, had it in his
power, and was at liberty to have chosen the contrary, he is
the proper object of reward or punishment, according as he
chooses to behave himself." Here, in these last words, he
speaks of liberty of choosing, according as he chooses. So
that the behavior which he speaks of as subject to his choice,
is his choosing itself, as well as his external conduct conse-
quent upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means not
only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when
he speaks of all free actions, as the produce of free choice. And
this is abundantly evident in what he says in p. 372, 373.
Now these things imply a twofold great absurdity and in-
consistence.
1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free
act of choice is commanded by, and is the produce of free choice,
is to suppose the first free act of choice belonging to the case,
yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted, to be
the produce of an antecedent act of choice. But I hope I
need not labor at all to convince my readers, that it is an ab-
surdity to say, ths very first act is the produce of another act
that went before it.
2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb insists,
that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect
of a free act of choice ; yet even then, according to his prin-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 113
ciples, no one act of choice would be free, but every one nec-
essary ; because, every act of choice being the effect of a
foregoing act, every act would be necessarily connected with
that foregoing cause. For Mr. Chubb himself says, p. 389,
" When the selfmoving power is exerted, it becomes the nec-
essary cause of its effects."* So that his notion of a free act,
that is rewardable or punishable, is a heap of contradictions.
It is a free act, and ytt, by his own notion of freedom, is nec-
essary ; and therefore by him it is a contradiction to suppose
it to be free. According to him, every free act is the produce
of a free act; so that there must be an infinite number of
free acts' in succession, without any beginning, in an agent
that has a beginning. And therefore here is an infinite num-
ber of free acts, every one of them free ; and yet not one of
them free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a neces-
sary effect. All the acts are rewardable or punishable, and
yet the agentcannot, in reason, be the object of reward or
punishment, on account of any one of these actions. He is
active in them^all, and passive in none ; yet active in none,
but passive in all, he.
V. Mr. Chubb does most strenuously deny, that Motives
are causes of the acts of the Will; or that the moving prin-
ciple in man is moved, or caused to be exerted by Motives....
His words, pages 388 and 389, are, " If the moving principle
in man is moved, or caused to be exerted, by something
external to man, which all Motives are, then it would not be a
selfmoving principle, seeing it would be moved by a principle
external to itself. And to say, that a selfmoving principle is
moved, or caused to be exerted, by a cause external to
itself, is absurd and a contradiction," Sec. And in the next
page, it is particularly and largely insisted, that Motives are
causes in no case, that they are merely passive in the production
of action, and have no causality in the production of it ; no caus-
ality, to be the cause of the exertion of the Will.
Now I desire it may be considered, how this can possibly
consist with what he says in other places. Let it be noted
here,
Vol. V. W
114 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
1. Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of Motives as excitements
of the acts of the Will ; and says, that Motives do excite voli-
tion, and induce it, and that they are necessary to this end ;
that in the reason and nature of things, volition cannot take filace
without Motives to excite it. But now, if Motives excite the
Will, they move it ; and yet he says, it is absurd to say, the
Will is moved by Motives. And again, (if language is of any
significancy at all) if Motives excite volition, then they are
the cause of its being excited ; and to cause volition to be ex-
cited, is to cause it to be put forth or exerted. Yea, Mr.
Chubb says himself, p. 317, Motive is necessary to the exer-
tion of the active faculty. To excite, is positively to do some-
thing ; and certainly that which does something, is the cause
of the thing done by it. To create, is to cause to be created ;
to make, is to cause to be made ; to kill, is to cause to be
killed ; to quicken, is to cause to be quickened ; and to excite,
is to cause to be excited. To excite, is to be a cause, in the
most proper sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a
ground of existence by positive influence. The notion of ex-
citing, is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or
come forth into existence.
2. Mr. Chubb himself, page 317, speaks of Motives as the
ground and reason of action by influence, and by prevail-
ing influence. Now, what can be meant by a cause, but
something that is the ground and reason of a thing by its in-
fluence, an influence that is prevalent and so effectual.
3. This author not only speaks of Motives as the ground
and reason of action, by prevailing influence ; but expressly
of their influence as prevailing for the production of an
action, in the same page 317 : Which makes the inconsist-
ency still more palpable and notorious. The production of an
effect is certainly the causing of an effect ; and productive in-
fluence is causal influence, if any thing is ; and that which
has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to become the
ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be
any such thing as a cause. This influence, Mr. Chubb says,
Motives have to produce an action ; and yet>he says) it is ab-
surd and a contradiction, to say they are causes.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 115
4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Motives
as disposing the agent to action, by their influence. His
words are these : " As Motive, which takes place in the un-
derstanding, and is the product of intelligence, is necessary
to action, that is, to the exertion of the active faculty, be-
cause that faculty would not be exerted without some pre-
yious reason to dispose the mind to action ; so from hence
it plainly appears, that when a man is said to be disposed to
one action rather than another, this properly signifies the
prevailing influence that one Motive has upon a man
tor the production of an action, or for the being at rest,
before all other Motives, for the production of the contrary....
For as Motive is the ground and reason of any action, so the
Motive that prevails, disposes the agent to the performance
of that action."
Now, if Motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause
the mind to be disposed ; and to cause the mind to be dispos-
ed is to cause it to be willing ; and to cause it to be willing is
to cause it to Will ; and that is the same thing as to be the
cause of an act of the Will. And yet this same Mr. Chubb
holds it to be absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of the
act of the Will.
And if we compare these things together, we have here a-
gain a whole heap of inconsistencies. Motives are the pre-
vious ground and reason of the acts of the Will ; yea, the nec-
essary ground and reason of their exertion, without which they
will not be exerted, and cannot t in the nature of things, take
place ; and they do excite these acts of the Will, and do this by
a prevailing influence ; yea, an influence which prevails for the
production of the act of the Will, and for the disposing of the
mind to it ; and yet it is absurd to suppose Motive to be a cause
of an act of the Will, or that a principle of Will is moved or
caused to be exerted by it, or that it has any causality in the pro-
duction of it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion of
the Will.
A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has
advanced, the- strange inconsistencies which the notion of lib-
erty, consisting in the Will's power of selfdeterminatioH void
ii6 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
of all necessity, united with that dictate of common sense,
that there can be no volition without a Mqjive, drove him into,
may be sufficient to convince us, that it is utterly impossible
ever to make that notion of liberty consistent with the influ-
ence of Motives in volition. And as it is in a manner selfevi-
dent, that there can be no act of Will, choice, or preference of
the mind, without some Motive or inducement, something in
the mind's view, which it aims at, seeks, inclines to, and goes
after ; so it is most manifest, there is no such liberty in the
universe as Arminians insist on ; nor any such thing possible,
or conceivable.
SECTION XI.
\
The Evidence of GOD' 's certain Foreknowledge of
the Volitions of moral Agents.
THAT the acts of the Wills of moral agents are not con-
tingent events, in that sense, as to be without all necessity,
appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events.
In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove,
that God has a certain foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of
moral agents ; and secondly, shew the consequence, or how
it follows from hence, that the volitions of moral agents are
not contingent, so as to be without necessity of connexion and
consequence.
First, I am to prove, that God has an absolute and certain
foreknowledge of the free actions of moral agents.
One would think, it should be wholly needless to enter on
such an argument with any that profess themselves Christ-
ians : But so it is; God's certain foreknowledge of the free
acts of moral agents, is denied by some that pretend to believe
the scriptures to be the word of God ; and especially of late.
1 therefore, shall consider the evidence of such a prescience
in the Most High, as fully as the designed limits of this essay
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 117
will admit of; supposing; myself herein to have to do with
such as own the truth of the Bible.
Arg. I. My first argument shall be taken from God's pre-
diction of such events. Here I would, in the first place, lay
down these two things as axioms.
(1.) If God does not foreknow, he cannot foretell such
events ; that is, he cannot peremptoi'ily and certainly foretell
them. If God has no more than an uncertain guess concern-
ing events of this kind, then he can declare no more than an
uncertain guess. Positively to foretell, is to profess to fore-
know, or to declare positive foreknowledge.
(2.) If God does not certainly foreknow the future volitions
of moral agents, then neither can he certainly foreknow those
events which are consequent and dependent on these volitions.
The existence of the one depending on the existence of the
other ; the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on
the knowledge of the existence of the other ; and the one can-
not be more certain than the other.
Therefore, how many, how great, and how extensive so-
ever the consequences of the volitions of moral agents may
be ; though they should extend to- an alteration of the state of
things through the universe, and should be continued in a se-
ries of successive events to all eternity, and should in the pro-
gress of things branch forth into an infinite number of series,
each of them going on in an endless line or chain of events ;
God must be as ignorant of all these consequences, as he is of
the volitions whence they first take their rise : All these
events, and the whole state of things depending on them,
how important, extensive and vast soever, must be hid from
him.
These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I
now proceed to observe the following things.
1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and
vices, their wickedness and good practice, things rewardable
and punishable, have often been foretold by God. Pharaoh's
mora} conduct, in refusing to obey God's command, in letting
his people go, was foretold. God says to Moses, Exod. iii.
19. "lam sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go."
118 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Here God professes not only to guess at, but to know Pha-
raoh's future disobedience. In chap. vii. 4, God says, but
Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you ; that I may lay mine hand
vfion Egypt, Sec. And chap. ix. 30, Moses says to Pharaoh,
as for thee, and thy servants I kwow that ye will not fear the
Lord. See also chap. xi. 9.. ..The moral conduct of Josiah, by
name, in his zealously exerting himself in opposition to idol-
atry, in particular acts of his, was foretold above three hun-
dred years before he was born and the prophecy sealed by a
miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the words of a second
prophet, as what surely would not fail, 1 Kings xiii. 1....6, 32.
This prophecy was also in effect a prediction of the moral
conduct of the people, in upholding their schismatical and
idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of those
priests of the high places, which it is foretold Josiah should
offer upon that altar of Bethel. ...Micaiah foretold the foolish
and sinful conduct of Ahab, in refusing to hearken to the word
of the Lord by him, and choosing rather to hearken to the
false prophets, in going to Ramoth Gilead to his ruin, 1 Kings
xxi. 20....22. The moral conduct of Hazael was foretold, in
that cruelty he should be guilty of ; on which Hazael says,
What, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this thing ! The
prophet speaks of the event as what he knew, and not what
he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12. I know the evil that thou
vrilt do unto the children of Israel : Thou wilt dash their children,
and riji up. their women with child. The moral conduct of Cyrus
is foretold, long before he had a being, in his mercy to God's
people, and regard to the true God, in turning the captivity of
the Jews, and promoting the building of the Temple, Isaiah
xliv. 28. xlv. IS. Compare 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, 23, and Ezra
i. 1....4. How many instances of the moral conduct of the
Kings of the North and South, particular instances of the wick-
ed behavior of the Kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold in
the xith chapter of Daniel ? Their corruption, violence, rob-
bery, treachery and lies. And particularly, how much is
foretold of the horrid wickedness of Antiochus Epiphanes,
called there a vile person, instead of Epiphanes, or illus-
trious. In that chapter, and also in chap. viii. verses 9.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 119
14, 23, to the end, are foretold his flattery, deceit and lies, his
having his heart set to do mischief, and set against the holy coven-
ant, his destroying and treading underfoot the holy people, in a
marvellous manner, his having indignation against the holy cov-
enant, setting his heart against it, and conspiring against it, his
polluting the sanctuary of strength, treading it underfoot, tak-
ing away the daily sacirifce, and placing the abomination that
maketh desolate ; his great pride, magnifying himself against
God, and uttering marvellous blasphemies against him, until God
in indignation should destroy him. Withal, the moral conduct
of the Jews, on occasion of his persecution, is predicted. It
is foretold, that he should corrupt many by flatteries, chap. xi.
32... .34. But that others should behave with a glorious con-
stancy and fortitude in opposition to him, ver. 32. And that
some good men should fall and repent, ver. 35. Christ fore-
told Peter's sin, in denying his Lord, with its circumstances,
in a peremptory manner. And so that great sin of Judas, in ,
betraying his master, and its dreadful and eternal punishment
in hell, was foretold in the like positive manner, Matth. xxvi.
21. ...25, and parallal places in the other Evangelists.
2. Many events have been foretold by God, which were
consequent and dependent on the moral conduct of particular
persons, and were accomplished, either by their virtuous or
vicious actions Thus, the children of Israel's going clown in-
to Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham, Gen. xv.
which was brought about by the wickedness of Joseph's breth-
ren in selling him, and the wickedness of Joseph's mistress,
and his own signal virtue in resisting her temptation. The
accomplishment of the thing prefigured in Joseph's dream,
depended on the same moral conduct. Jotham's parable and
prophecy, Judges ix. 15. ...20, was accomplished by the wick-
ed conduct of Abimelech, and the men of Shechem. The
prophecies against the house of Eli, 1 Sam. chap. ii. and iii.
were accomplished by the wickedness of Doeg the Edomite,
in accusing the priests ; and the great impiety, and extreme
crueltr foundation than conjecture. For Christ's victory over
Satan consists in men's being saved from sin, and in the vie-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 127
tory of virtue and holiness, over that vice and wickedness,
which Satan, by his temptation has introduced, and wherein
his kingdom consists.
6. If it be so, that God has not a prescience of the future
actions of moral agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of
Scripture in general are without foreknowledge. For scrip-
ture prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally without
any exception, are either predictions of the actings and be-
havior of moral agents, or of events depending on them, or
some way connected with them ; judicial dispensations, judg-
ments on men for their wickedness, or rewards of virtue and
righteousness, remarkable manifestations of favor to the right-
eous or manifestations of sovereign mercy to sinners, forgiving
their iniquities, and magnifying the riches of divine Graces
or dispensations of Providence, in some respect or other, re-
lating to the conduct of the subjects of God's moral govern-
ment, wisely adapted thereto ; either providing for what
should be in a future state of things, through the volitions and
voluntary actions of moral agents, or consequent upon them,
and regulated and ordered according to them. So that all
events that are foretold, are either moral events, or other
events which are connected with, and accommodated to moral
events.
That the predictions of scripture in general must be with-
out knowledge, if God does not foresee the volitions of men,
will further appear, if it be considered, that almost all events
belonging to the future state of the world of mankind, the
changes and revolutions which come to pass in empires, king-
doms and nations, and all societies, depend innumerable ways
on the acts of men's Wills : Yea, on an innumerable multi-
tude of millions of millions of volitions of mankind, huch is
the state and course of things in the world of mankind, that
one single event, which appears in itself exceeding inconsid-
erable, may, in the progress and series of things, occasion a
succession of the greatest and most important and extensive
events ; causing the state of mankind to be vastly different
from what it would otherwise have been, for all succeeding
generations.
12* FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
For instance, the coming into existence of those particular
men, -who have been the great conquerors of the world,
which, under God, have had the main hand in all the conse-
quent state of the world, in all after ages ; such as Nebu-
chadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Caesar, 8cc,
undoubtedly depended on many millions of acts of the Will,
which followed, and were occasioned one by another, in their
parents. And perhaps most of these volitions depended on
millions of volitions of hundreds and thousands of others,
their contemporaries of the same generation ; and most of
these on millions of millions of volitions of others in preced-
ing generations. As we go back, still the number of volitions,
which were some way the occasion of the event, multiply as
the branches of a river, until they come at last, as it were, to
an infinite number. This will not seem strange to any one
who well considers the matter ; if we recollect what philoso-
phers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things
which are, as it were, the firincifiia, or stamina vita, concern-
ed in generation ; the animalcula in senrine ?nascu!o, and the
ova in the womb of the female ; the impregnation, or ani-
mating of one of these in distinction from all the rest, must
depend on things infinitely minute, relating to the time and
circumstances of the act of the parents, the state of their
bodies, Sec. which must depend on innumerable foregoing-
circumstances and occurrences ; which must depend, infinite
ways, on foregoing acts of their Wills ; which are occasioned
by innumerable things that happen in the course of their
lives, in which their own, and their neighbor's behavior, must
have a hand, an infinite number of ways. And as the voli-
tions of others must be so many ways concerned in the con-
ception and birth of such men ; so, no less, in their preserva-
tion, and circumstances of life, their particular determinations
and actions, on which the great revolutions they were the oc-
casions of, depended. As, for instance, when the conspirators
in Persia, against the Magi, were consulting about a succes-
s-ion to the empire, it came into the mind of one of them, to
propose, that he whose horse neighed first, when they came
together the next morning, should be king. Now such a
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 129
thing's coming into his mind, might depend on innumerable
incidents, wherein the volitions of mankind had been concern-
ed. But, in consequence of this accident, Darius, the son cf
Histaspes, was king. And if this had not been, probably his
successor would not have been the same, and all the circum-
stances of the Persian empire might have been far otherwise.
And then perhaps Alexander might never have conquered:
that empire. And then probably the circumstances of the'
world, in all succeeding ages, might have been vastly other-
wise. I might further instance in many other occurrences ;
such as those on which depended Alexander's preservation,
in the many critical junctures of his life, wherein a small
trifle would have turned the scale against him ; and the pres-
ervation and success of the Roman people, in the infancy of
their kingdom and commonwealth, and afterwards ; which all
the succeeding changes in their state, and the mighty revolu-
tions that afterwards came to pass in the habitable world, de-
pended upon. But these hints may be sufficient for every
discerning considerate person, to convince him, that the whole
state of the world of mankind, in all ages, and the very being
of every person who has ever lived in it, in every age, since
the times of the ancient prophets, has depended on more vo-
litions, or acts of the Wills of men, than there are sands or*
the sea shore.
And therefore, unless God does most exactly and perfectly
foresee the future acts of men's Wills, all the predictions
which he ever uttered concerning David, Hezekiah, Josiah,
Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander ; concerning the four
monarchies, and the revolutions in them ; and concerning all
the wars, commotions, victories, prosperities and calamities,
of any of the kingdoms, nations or communities of the world,
have all been without knowledge.
So that, according to this notion of God's not foreseeing th»
volitions and free actions of men, God could foresee nothing
appertaining to the state of the world of mankind in future
ages ; not so much as the being of one person that should live
in it ; and could foreknow no events, but only such as He
-would bring to pass himself by the extraordinary interposition
Vol. V. R
130 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
of his immediate power ; or things -which should come to pass
in the natural material world, by the laws of motion, and
course of nature, -wherein that is independent on the actions
or works of mankind ; that is, as he might, like a very able
mathematician and astronomer, with great exactness calculate
the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the greater wheels
of the machine of the external .creation.
And if we closely consider the matter, there will appear
reason to convince us, that he could not, with any absolute
certainty, foresee even these. As to the first, namely, things
done by the immediate- and extraordinary interposition of
God's power, these cannot be foreseen, unless it can be fore-
seen when there shall be occasion for such extraordinary in-
terposition. And that cannot be foreseen, unless the state of
the moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus
interposes, it is with regard to the state of the moral world,
requiring such divine interposition. Thus God could not
certainly foresee the universal deluge, the calling of Abraham,
the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on
Egypt, and Israel's redemption out of it, the expelling the
seven nations of Canaan, and the bringing Israel into that
land ; for these all are represented as connected with things
belonging to the state of the moral world. Nor can God
foreknow the most proper and convenient time of the day of
judgment and general conflagration ; for that chiefly depends
on the course and state of things in the moral world.
Nor, Secondly, can we on this supposition reasonably think,
that God can certainly foresee what things shall come to pass,
in the course of things, in the natural and material world,
even those which, in an ordinary state of things, might be cal-
culated by a good astronomer. For the moral world is th»
end of the natural world ; and the course of things in the
former, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with re-
spect to the latter. Therefore he has seen cause, from re-
gard to the state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily
to interpose, to interrupt and lay an arrest on the course of
things in the natural world ; and even in the greater wheel*
of its motion ; even so as to stop the sun in its course. And
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 131
unless he can foresee the volitions of men, and so know some-
thing of the future state of the moral world, he cannot know
but that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this
manner, as ever he had ; nor can he foresee how, or when he
shall have occasion thus to interpose.
Corol. 1. It appears from the things which have been ob-
served, that unless God foresees the volitions of moral agents,
that cannot be true which is observed by the Apostle James,
Acts xv. 18. " Known unto God are all his works from the
beginning of the world."
Corol. 2. It appears from what has been observed, that un-
less God foreknows the volitions of moral agents, all the
prophecies of scripture have no better foundation than mere
conjecture ; and that, in most instances, a conjecture which
must have the utmost uncertainty ; depending on an innu-
merable, and, as it were, infinite multitude of volitions, which
are all, even to God, uncertain events : However, these
prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very
many of them in the most positive manner, with assevera-
tions ; and some of them with the most solemn oaths.
Corol. 3. It also follows, from what has been observed, that
if this notion of God's ignorance of future volitions be true, in
vain did Christ say (after uttering many great and important
predictions, concerning God's moral kingdom, and things de-
pending on men's moral actions) Matthew xxiv. 35. " Heav-
en and earth shall pass away ; but my word shall not pass
away."
Corol. 4. From the same notion of God's ignorance, it
would follow, that in vain has God Himself often spoke of the
predictions of his word, as evidences of his foreknowledge ;
and so as evidences of that which is his prerogative as GOD,
and his peculiar glory, greatly distinguishing Him from all
other beings ; as in Isa. xli. 22. ...26, xliii. 9, 10, xliv. 8, xlv.
21, xlvi. 10, and xlviii. 14.
Arg. II. If God does not foreknow the volitions of moral
agents, then he did not foreknow the fall of man, nor of an*
gels, and so could not foreknow the great things which are
consequent on these events j such as his sending his Son in-
i33 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
to the world to die for sinners, and all things pertaining to th»
great work of redemption ; all the things which were done
for four thousand years before Christ came, to prepare the
way for it ; and the incarnation, life, death, resurrection and
ascension of Christ ; and the setting Him at the head of the
universe, as King of heaven and earth, angels and men ; and
the setting up his church and kingdom in this world, and ap-
pointing Him the Judge of the world ; and all that Satan
should do in the world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ :
And the great transactions of the day of judgment, that men
and devils shall be the subjects of, and angels concerned in ;
they are all what God was ignorant of before the fall. And if
so, the following scriptures, and others like them, must be
without any meaning, or contrary to truth. Eph. i. 4. " Ac-
cording as he hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of
the world." 1 Pet. i. 20. « Who verily was foreordained be-
fore the foundation of the world." 2 Tim. i. 9. " Who hath,
saved us, and called us with an holy calling ; not according to
our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which
was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." So,
Eph. iii. 11, (speaking of the wisdom of God in the work of
redemption) " According to the eternal purpose which he
purposed in Christ Jesus." Tit. i. 2. " In hope of eternal
life, which God that cannot lie, promised before the world be-
gan." Rom. viii. 29. " Whom he did foreknow, them he
also did predestinate," Sec. 1 Peter i. 2. " Elect, according
lo the foreknowledge of God the Father."
If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the redemp-
tion by Jesus Christ, nor the volitions of man since the fall ;
then he did not foreknow the saints in any sense ; neither as
particular persons, nor as societies or nations ; either by elec-
tion, or mere foresight of their virtue or good works ; or any
foresight of any thing about them relating to their salvation ;
or any benefit they have by Christ, or any manner of concern
of their's with a Redeemer.
Arc III. On the supposition of God's ignorance of the
future volitions of free agents, it will follow, that God must
in many cases truly repent what he has done, so as properly
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 153
io wish he had done otherwise : By reason that the event of
things, in those affairs which are most important, viz. the af-
fairs of his moral kingdom, being uncertain and contingent,
often happens quite otherwise than he was aware beforehand.
And there Avould be reason to understand, that in the most
literal sense, in Gen. vi. 6, " It repented the Lord, that he had
made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." And
that, 1 Sam. xv. 11, contrary to that, Numb, xxiii. 19, " God
is not the Son of man, that He should repent." And, 1 Sam.
xv. 29, " Also the strength of Israel will not lie, nor repent ;
for He is not a man that He should repent." Yea, from this
notion it would follow, that God is liable to repent and be
grieved at his heart, in a literal sense, continually ; and is al-
ways exposed to an infinite number of real disappointments in
his governing the world ; and to manifold, constant, great
perplexity and vexation ; but this is not very consistent with
his title of God ovzr all, blessed forever more ; which
represents Him as possessed of perfect, constant and un-
interrupted tranquillity and felicity, as God over the uni-
verse, and in his management of the affairs of the world, as
supreme and universal Ruler. See Rom. i. 25. ix. 5. 2 Cor.
xi. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 15.
Ae.g. IV. It will also follow from this notion, that as God
is liable to be continually repenting what he has done ; so he
must be exposed to be constantly changing his mind and in-
tentions, as to his future conduct ; altering his measures, re-
linquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and
projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of
his scheme, namely, such as belong to the state of his moral
kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want
of foresight ; and he must be continually putting his system
to rights, as it gets out of order through the contingence of
the actions of moral agents ; he must be a Being, who, instead
of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the sub-
ject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and
changes of intention, of any being whatsoever ; for this plain
reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an in-
finitely greater number of those things which are to him con-
134 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
tingcnt and uncertain. In such a situation, he must have lit-
tle else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and
be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements ;
in the best manner the case will allow. The Supreme Lord
of all things must needs be under great and miserable disad-
vantages, in governing the world which he has made and has
the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things
of chief importance, which, hereafter shall befal his system ;
which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provis-
ion for. In many cases, there may be very great necessity
that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering
and disposing things, for some great events which are to
happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless conse-
quence to the universe ; which he may see afterwards, when
it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known before-
hand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And
it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices,
purposes and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his meas-
ures, make Him continually to change his mind, subject him
to vexation, and bring him into confusion.
But how do these things consist with reason, or with the
word of God ? Which represents, that all God's works, all
that he has ever to do, the whole scheme and series of his op-
erations, are from the beginning perfectly in his view ; and
declares, that whatever devices and designs "are in the hearts
of men, the counsel of the Lord is that which shall stand, and
the thoughts of his heart to all generations," Prov. xix. 21.
Psal. xxxiii. 10, 11. « And that which the Lord of Hosts hath
purposed, none shall disannul," Isa. xiv. 27. And that he can-
not be frustrated in one design or thought, Job. xlii. 2. « And
that which God doth, it shall be forever, that nothing can be
put to it, or taken from it," Eccl. ill- 14. The stability and
perpetuity of God's counsels are expressly spoken of as con-
nected with the foreknowledge of God, Isaiah xlvi. 10. « De-
claring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times,
the things that are not yet done j saying, My counsel shall
stand, and I will do all my pleasure.".. ..And how are these
things consistent with what the Scripture says of God's in>
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 135
mutability, which represents Him as " without variableness, or
shadow of turning ;" and speaks of Him most particularly as
unchangeable with regard to his purposes, Mai. iii. 6. " I am
the Lord ; I change not ; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not
consumed," Exod. iii. 14. i am that r am, Job. xxiii. 13, 14.
" He is in one mind ; and who can turn Him ? And what his
soul desireth, even that he doth : For he performeth the
thing that is appointed for me."
Arg. V. If this notion of Gods's ignorance of the future
volitions of moral agents be thoroughly considered in its con-
sequences, it will appear to follow from it, that God, after he
had made the world, was liable to be wholly frustrated of his
end in the creation of it ; and so has been, in like manner, li-
able to be frustrated of his end in all the great works he hath
wrought. It is manifest, the moral world is the end of the nat-
ural : The rest of the creation is but an house which God
hath built, with furniture, for moral agents : And the good or
bad state of the moral world depends on the improvement
they make of their natural agency, and so depends on their
volitions. And therefore, if these cannot be foreseen by God,
because they are contingent, and subject to no kind of ne-
cessity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go
wrong, to any assignable degree ; yea, liable to be utterly ru-
ined. As en this scheme, it may well be supposed to be literal-
ly said, when mankind, by the abuse of their moral agency, be-
came very corrupt before the flood, " that the Lord repented
that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at his
heart ;" so, when He made the universe, He did not know
but that he might be so disappointed in it, that it might grievo
Him at his heart that he had made it. It actually proved, that
all mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the an-
gels apostastised : And how could God know beforehand, tha{
all of them would not ? And how could God know but that all
mankind, notwithstanding means used to reclaim them, be-
ing still left to the freedom of their own Will, would contin-
ue in their apostasy, and grow worse and worse, as they of
the old world before the flood did ?
136 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
According to the scheme I am endeavoring to confute,neitli««
er the fall of men ov angels, could be foreseen, and God must
be greatly disappointed in these events ; and so the grand
scheme and contrivance for our redemption, and destroying
the works of the devil, by the Messiah, and all the great things
God has done in the prosecution of these designs, must be
only the fruits of his own disappointment, and contrivances
of his to mend and patch up, as well as he could, his system,
which originally was all very good, and perfectly beautiful ;
but was marred, broken and confounded by the free Will of
angels and men. And still he must be liable to be totally dis-
appointed a second time : He could not know, that He should
have his desired success, in the incarnation, life, death, resur-
rection and exaltation of his only begotten Son, and other
great works accomplished to restore the state of things : He
could not know, after all, whether there would actually be any
tolerable measure of restoration ; for this depended on the free
Will of man. There has been a general great apostasy of al-
most all the Christian world, to that which was worse than
heathenism ; which continued for many ages. And how
could God without foreseeing men's volitions, know whether
ever Christendom would return from this apostasy ? And
which way could He tell beforehand how soon it would begin ?
The apostle says, it began to work in his time; and how
could it be known how far it would proceed in that age ? Yea,
how could it be known that the gospel, which was not effec-
tual for the reformation of the Jews, would ever be effectual
for the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen
apostasy, which they had been confirmed in for so many
ages ?
It is represented often in Scripture,that God, who made the
world forHimsclf, and created it for his pleasure, would infalli-
bly obtain his end in the creation, and in all his works ; that as
all things are of Him, so would all be to Him; and that in the
final issue of things, it would appear that He is the first, and
the last, Rev. xx. 6. « And he said unto me, It is done. I
am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first
and the last." But these things are not consistent with God's
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. m
being so liable to be disappointed in all his works, nor indeed
with his failing of his end in any thing that He has undertak-
en, or done.
SECTION XII.
God's certain Foreknowledge of the future wlitions
of moral agents, inconsistent with such a Contiri-
gence of those volitions, as is without all Neces-
sity.
HAVING proved, that God has a certain and infallible
prescience of the acts of the Will of moral agents, I come
now, in the second place, to shew the consequence ; to shew
how it follows from hence, that these events are neccssary>
with a Necessity of connexion or consequence.
The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had oppor-
tunity to observe, deny this consequence ; and affirm, that if
such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any Ne-
cessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this mat-
ter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I
cannot but think, that on particular and full consideration, it
may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so, or not.
In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would
©bserve the following things.
I. It is very evident, with regard to a thing whose exist-
ence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something
which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of
that thing is necessary. Here may be noted,
1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessi-
ty, that in things which are past, their past existence is now
uecessary : Having already made sure of existence, it is too
late for any possibility of alteration in that respect : It is now
impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that that
thing has existed.
Vol. V. S
138 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge
of the volitions of free agents,that Foreknowledge, by the sup-
position, is a thing which already has, and long ago had exist-
ence ; and so, now its existence is necessary ; it is now ut-
utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this Foreknowl-
edge should be, or should have been.
3. It is also very manifest, that those things which arc
indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary,
are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth
is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is
necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise,
would be a contradiction : It would be in effect to say, that
the connexion was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might
be broken. If that, whose existence is indissolubly connected
with something, whose existence is now necessary, is itself
not necessary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstand-
ing that indissoluble connexion of its existence. Whether
the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.
4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain and
infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the voli-
tions of moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible and
indissoluble connexion between those events and that Fore-
knowledge ; and that therefore, by the preceding observa-
tions, those events arc necessary events ; being infallibly and
indissolubly connected with that, whose existence already is,
and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.
To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and
yet the connexion of the event with that Foreknowledge is not
indissoluble, but dissoluble and fallible is very absurd. To
affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm, that there is
no necessary connexion between a proposition's being infalli-
bly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is
perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowl-
edge of future volitions, the event is necessary ; or, in other
words, that it is impossible but the event should come to pass.
For if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise, then
it is not impossible, but that the proposition which affirms its
future coming to pass,may not now be true. But how absurd
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 130.
as that, on the supposition that there is now an infallible
knowledge (i. e. knowledge which it is impossible should fail)
that it is true. There is this absurdity in it that it is not im-
possible, but that there now should be no truth in that proposi-
tion, which is now infallibly known to be true.
II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose
existence is contingent, and without all Necessity, may be
proved thus : It is impossible for a thing to be certainly
known to any intellect without evidence. To suppose other-
wise, implies a contradiction : Because for a thiug to be cer-
tainly known to any understanding, is for it to be evident to
that understanding ; and for a thing to be evident to any un-
derstanding is the same thing, as for that understanding to see
evidence of it : But no understanding, created or uncreated,
can see evidence where there is none : For that is the same
thing, as to see that to be, which is not. And therefore, if
there be any truth which is absolutely without evidence, that
truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a
contradiction to suppose that it is known.
But if there be any future event, whose existence is con-
tingent, without all Necessity, the future existence of that
event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence
of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either selfevidence, or
proof; for there can be no other sort of evidence, but one of
these two ; an evident thing must be either evident in itself,
or evident in something else ; that is evident by connexion
with something else. But a future thing, whose existence
is without all Necessity, can have neither of these sorts of ev-
idence. It cannot be selfevident : For if it be, it may be now
known, by what is now to be seen in the thing itself; either
its present existence, or the Necessity of its nature : But
both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed,
both that the thing has no present existence to be seen ; and
also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily
existent for the future : So that its future existence is
not selfevident. And, secondly, neither is there any firoof,
or evidence in any thing else, or evidence of connexion
wiih something else that is evident ; for this is also con-
14© FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
trary to the supposition. It is supposed, that there is now
nothing existent with which the future existence of the con-
tingent event is connected. For such a connexion destroys
its contingence, and supposes Necessity. Thus it is demon-
strated, that thore is in the nature of things absolutely no ev-
idence at all of the future existence of that event,\vhich is con-
tingent, without all Necessity (if any such event there be)
neither selfevidence nor proof. And therefore the thing
in reality is Rot evident ; and so cannot be seen to be evident,
or, which is the same thing, cannot be known.
Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five
thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no
other being but the Divine Being ; and then this world, or
some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing
into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form ;
all in absolute contingence, without any concern of God, or any
other cause, in the matter ; without any manner of ground
or reason of its existence ; or any dependence upon, or con-
nexion at all with any thing foregoing : I say, that if this be
supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand.
There was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself ; for,
the thing itself as yet, was not. And there was no evidence
of it to be seen in any thing else ; for evidence in something
else, is connexion with something else : But such connexion
is contrary to the supposition There was no evidence be-
fore, that this thing would hafifien ; for by the supposi-
tion, there was no reason why it should happen, rather than
something else, or rather than nothing, And if so, then all
things be i ore were exactly equal, and the same, with respect
to that and other possible things ; there was no preponder-
ation, no superior weight or value ; and therefore, nothing
that could be of any weight or value ; to determine any un-
derstanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence,
and absolutely unknowable. An increase of understand-
ing, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency,
and makes no advance, to a discerning any signs or ev-
idence of it, let it be increased ever so much ; yea, if it
be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of sight
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Hi
may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which
is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds
and darkness ; but it has no tendency to enable to discern ev-
idence where there is none. If the sight be infinitely strong,
and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable to
see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease ;
yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that
evidence which is not ; but on the contrary, it has a tenden-
cy to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none.
III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to
be necessary events ; or, which is the same thing, events
which it is not impossible but that they may not come to
pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them,
and knows all things ; is to suppose God's knowledge to be
inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and
without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be,
which at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it
may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent
with itself; or that one thing, that he knows, is utterly incon-
sistent with another thing, that he knows. It is the same
thing as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain
infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain
truth. If a future volition is so without all Necessity, that
nothing hinders but that it may not be, then the proposition,
which asserts its future existence, is so uncertain, that nothing
hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God
knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncer-
tain. And that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is in-
falliby true ; and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing
that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views
it so, and judges it to be contingent, if he views things as they
are. If the event be not necessary, then it is possible it may
never be : And if it be possible it may never be, God knows it
may possibly never be ; and that is to know that the proposi-
tion, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true ;
and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain ; which
surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth.
If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all
Ut FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Necessity, then it is no argument of perfection of knowledge
in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be ;
but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake ;
because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to
be certain, which in its own nature, and all things considered
is uncertain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that God
may have ways of knowing contingent events which we can-
not conceive of, is ridiculous ; as much so, as to say, that God
may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know, or
that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time
know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how ;
because he has ways of knowing, which we cannot compre-
hend.
Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that
the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with hu-
man liberty, on account of any Necessity of the event, which
follows from such decrees, than the absolute Foreknowledge
of God. Because the connexion between the event and cer-
tain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as be-
tween the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no
more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree
together, than that the event and absolute Foreknowledge
should disagree. The connexion between the event and
Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition : Be-
cause it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the
knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the cer-
tainty cannot be increased ; and therefore the connexion be-
tween the knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased ;
so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does
not at all increase the connexion, or make it more infallible
or indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of knowledge
might be increased by the addition of a decree; which is
contrary to the supposition, which is, that the knowledge
is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible de-
gree.
There is as much ot an impossibility but that the things
which are infallibly foreknown, should be, or (which is the
same thing) as great a necessity of their future existence, as if
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. i4$
the event were already written down, and was known and read
by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the
most indissoluble and.perfect connexion possible, between the
writing, and the thing written. In such a case, it would be
as impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had ex-
isted already ; and a decree cannot make an event surer or
more necessary than this.
And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it
has been proved there is, then Necessity of connexion and
consequence, is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which
man, or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it may
be inferred, that absolute decrees of God, which do not at all
increase the Necessity, are not at all inconsistent c with the lib-
erty which man enjoys, on any such account, as that they
make the event decreed necessary, and render it utterly im-
possible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if abso-
lute decrees are inconsistent with man's liberty as a moral
agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty what-
soever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any Necessity
which absolute decrees infer.
Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great difference between:
God's Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to Neces~
Bity of future events. In his Discourse on the Five Points, p.
474, &c. he says, "God's prescience has no influence at all
on our actions :... .Should God, (says he) by immediate reve-
lation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man's state
or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence
upon his actions ? Surely none at all. Our knowledge doth
not affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or
more future, than they would be without it. Now, Fore-
knowledge in God is knowledge. As therefore knowledge
has no influence on things that are, so neither has Foreknow-
ledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the Fore-
knowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot
alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God's decree of
election is powerful and active, and comprehends the prepara-
tion and exhibition of such means, as shall unfrustrably pro-
duce the end. Hence God's prescience renders no actions
iU FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
necessary." And to this purpose, p. 473, he cites Origeri,
Avhere he says, God's prescience is not the cause of things future,
but their being future is the cause of God's prescience that they
will be : And Le Blanc, where he says, This is the truest reso-
lution of this difficulty •, that prescience is not the cause that things
are future 3 but their being future is the cause they are foreseen.
In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being
and Attributes of God, p. 95. ...99. And the author of the
Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, speaking to the like
purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents Foreknowledge as having
no more influence on things known, to make them necessary, than
afterknowledge, Or to that purpose.
To all which I would say, that what is said about knowl-
edge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it
necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does it in the least
affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether prescience be the
thing that ?nakes the event necessary or no, it alters not the
case. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Necessity of
the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes the
Necessity. If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this proves
the event known to h? necessary, or proves that it is impossi-
ble but that the event should be, by some means or other,
either by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other
way : Because, as was said before, it is absurd to say, that a
proposition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which
yet may possibly prove not true.
The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this ;
that, inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an
event to be necessary, as a decree does ; therefore it does not
prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no
force in this arguing ; for it is built wholly on this supposition,
that nothing can prove, or be an evidence of a thing's being nec-
essary, but that which has a causal influence to make it so. But
this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of
the future existing of an event, be not the thing, which first
makes ^impossible that it should fail of existence); yet it may,
and certainly does, demonstrate, that it is impossible it should
fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If ForeknowU
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. US
tdgc be not the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it
may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it
were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the
cause, as from the cause to the effect. It is enough, that an
existence, -which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether
that impossibility arise from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to
it. It is as evident, as it is possible any thing should be, that
it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true,
Should prove not to be true : Therefore there is a Necessity
connected with such knowledge ; whether the knowledge be
the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of
the knowledge.
All certain knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or af-
terknowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the thing
knov/n now to be necessary, by some means or other ; or
proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than
true. I freely allow that Foreknowledge does not prove a
thing to be necessary any more than afterknowledge : But
then afterknowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves
that it is now become impossible but that the proposition
known should be true. Certain afterknowledge, proves that
It is now, in the time of the knowledge, by some means or
other, become impossible but that the proposition, which pre-
dicates past existence on the event, should be true. And so
does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the time of
the knowledge, it is by some means or other, become impos-
sible but that the proposition, which predicates future exist-
ence on the event, should be true. The Necessity of the
truth of the propositions, consisting in the present im-
possibility of the nonexistence of the event affirmed, in
both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of
the knowledge ; there ^an be no certainty of knowledge
without it.
There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they
are certainly known, or (which is the same thing) known to be
certain. For certainty of knowledge is nothing else but
knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things
'themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a
Vol. y. T
146 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
certainly in things to be a ground of certainty of knowledge'*
and to render things capable of being known to be certain...,
And this is nothing but the Necessity of the truth known, or
its being impossible but that it should be true ; or, in other
words, the firm and infallible connexion between the subject
and predicate of the proposition that contains that truth. All
certainty of knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of
that connexion. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the fu-
ture existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indis-
soluble connexion of the subject and predicate of the proposi-
tion that affirms its future existence. The subject is that
possible event ; the predicate is its future existing : But if
future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with
that event, then the future existence of that event is necessa-
ry. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event
which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then
He sees a firm connexion between a subject and predicate that
are not firmly connected ; which is a contradiction.
I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, That mere knowl-
edge does not affect the thing known, to make it more certain or
more future. But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the thing
to be already, both future, and certain ; i. e. necessarily future.
Knowledge of futurity, supposes futurity ; and a certain knowl-
edge of futurity, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that
certain knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of
a thing, antecedent to certainty of knowledge, than a prior
impossibility but that the thing should prove true ; or (which
is the same thing) the Necessity of the event.
I would observe one thing further concerning this matter ;
it is this ; that if it be as those forementioned writers sup-
pose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the ef-
fect of the existence of the event foreknown ; this is so far
from shewing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the
Necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather shews
the contrary the more plainly. Because it shews the exist-
ence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had
already been ; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already;
its future existence has already had actual influence, and eff-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 147
eiency, and has produced an effect, viz. Prescience : The effect
exists already ; and as the effect supposes the cause, is con-
nected with the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore
it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed al-
ready. The effect is as firm as possible, it having already the
possession of existence, and made sure of it. But the ef-
fect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground
and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the founda-
tion.
To illustrate this matter, let us suppose the appearances
and images of things in a glass ; for instance, a reflecting tel-
escope to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance,
and out of sight) which they resemble : If it be so, then as
these images in the telescope have had a past actual exist-
ence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should
be otherwise than that they have existed ; so they, being the
true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves
the existing of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible,
firm and necessary, as the existing of these effects ; the one
being connected with, and wholly depending on the other.
Now let us suppose future existences some way or other to
have influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and cause
exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a thousand
years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages ; but yet
that these images are real effects of these future existences,
perfectly dependent on, and connected with them as their
cause ; these effects and images, having already had actual
existence, rendering that matter of their existing perfectly
firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise ; this
proves in like manner, as in the other instance, that the exist-
ence of the things, which are their causes, is also equally sure,
firm and necessary ; and that it is alike impossible but that
they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects
have. And if, instead of images in a glass, we suppose the
antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine
Mind, which have existed there from all eternity, which ara
as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with thejp
cause, the case is not altered.
{48 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Another thing which has been said by some Arviinians> t«
take oft' the force of what is urged from God's Prescience*
against the contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is to
this purpose ; " That when we talk of Foreknowledge in God,
there is no strict propriety in our so speaking ; and that al-
though it be true, that there is in God the most perfect
knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is
no such thing as before and after jn God, but he sees all things
by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession."....
To this I answer,
1. It has been already shewn, that all certain knowledge
proves the Necessity of the truth known ; whether it be before,
after, or at the same time... .Though it be true, that there is no
succession in God's knowledge, and the manner of his knowl-
edge, is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know concern-
ing it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come, that
God is ever uncertain of : He never is, never was, and never
will be without infallible knowledge of it : He always sees the
existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always
sees things just as they arc in truth ; hence there never is in
reality any thing contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it
may happen never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no
Foreknowledge in God, it is because those things, which are
future to us, are as present to God, as if they already had ex-
istence : And that is as much as to sajj that future events
arc always in God's view as evident, clear, sure and necessary,
as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein
the existence of the event is not present with God, then
there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for
it to fail of existence, as if its existence v. ere present, and
were already come to pass.
God's viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably as
that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment decs not
hinder but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a
certain and perfect knowledge of moral actions of men, which
to us are an hundred years hence : Yea the objection suppos-
es this ; and therefore It oertssnly docs net hinder but thai, by
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 14,9
the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral ac-
tions should not come to pass.
We know, that God knows the future voluntary actions
of men in such a sense beforehand, as that he is able particu-
larly to declare, and foretell them, and write them, or cause
them to be written down in a book, as He often has done ; and
that therefore the necessary connexion which there is between
God's knowledge and the event known, does as much prove
the event to be necessary beforehand, as if the Divine Knowl-
edge were in the same sense before the event, as the predic-
tion or writing is. If the knowledge be infallible, then the
expression of it in the written prediction is infallible ; that is,
there is an infallible connexion between that written predic-
tion and the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should
ever be otherwise, than that that prediction and the event
should agree : And this is the same thing as to say, it is im-
possible but that the event should come to pass : And this is
the same as to say that its coming to pass is necessary So
that it is manifest, that there being no proper succession in
God's mind, makes no alteration as to the Necessity of the
existence of the events which God knows. Yea,
2. This is so far from weakening the proof, which has
been given of the impossibility of the not coming to pass of
future events known, as that it establishes that, wherein the
strength of the foregoing arguments consists, and shews the
clearness of the evidence. For,
(1.) The very reason why God's knowledge is without
succession, is because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest
possible degree of clearness and certainty : All things, wheth-
er past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evi-
dence and fulness ; future things being seen with as much
clearness, as if they were present ; the view is always in abso-
lute perfection ; and absolute constant perfection admits of no
alteration, and so no succession; the actual existence of the
thing known, does not at all increase, or add to the clearness or
certainty of the thing known : God calls the things that are not
as though they were ; they are all one to him as as if they
had already existed. But herein consists the strength of the
J50 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
demonstration before given, of the impossibility of the not ex.
isting of those things, whose existence God knows ; that it is
as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they existed
already. This objection, instead of weakening this argument,
sets it in the clearest and strongest light ; for it supposes it
to be so indeed, that the existence of future events is in God's
view so much as if it already had been, that when they come
actually to exist, it makes not the least alteration or variation
in his view or knowledge of them.
(2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God's
knowledge : For it is the immutability of knowledge which
makes his knowledge to be without succession. But this
most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I insist on,
•viz. that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail
of existence. For if that were possible, then it would be pos-
sible for there to be a change in God's knowledge and view
of things. For if the known event should fail of existence,
and not come into being, as God expected, then God would
see it, and so would change his mind, and sec his former mis?
take ; and thus there would be change and succession in his
knowledge. But as God is immutable, and so it is utterly-
impossible that his view should be changed ; so it is, for the
same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event
should not exist: And that is to be impossible in the highest
degree : And therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing
is more impossible than that the immutable God should be
changed, by the succession of time ; who comprehends all
things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and
unalterable view ; so that his whole eternal duration isviite in-
terminabilis, tota, eimtil, et perfecta Jiossessio.
On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geo-
metrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of
strict demonstration, than that God's certain prescience of the
volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a contin-
gence of these events, as is without all Necessity ; and so is
inconsistent with the Arminian notion of liberty.
Carol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calviniata, concernt
ing '.he absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, m
fatality in things, than will demonstrably follow from the'
doctrine of most Arminian divines, who acknowledge God's
omniscience, and universal prescience. Therefore all objec-
tions they make against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as inr*
plying Hobbes doctrine of Necessity, or the stoical doctrine of
fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists, than their
own doctrine : And therefore it doth not become those di-
vines, to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this
account.
Corol. 3. Hence all arguing from Necessity, against the
doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the
conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring
spiritual duties, and against the Calvinistic doctrine of effica-
cious grace ; I say, all arguings of Arminians (such of them
as own God's omniscience) against these things, on this
ground, that these doctrines, though they do not suppose men
to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose them un-
der Necessity, with respect to their moral actions, and those
things which are required of them in order to their accept-
ance with God ; and their arguing against the Necessity of
men's volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God's com-
mands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity
of his counsels and invitations ; and all objections against
any doctrines of the Calvinists as being inconsistent with
human liberty, because they infer Necessity ; I say, all
these arguments and objections must fall to the ground, and
be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them ;
being maintained in an inconsistence with themselves, and in
like manner levelled against their own doctrine, as against the
doctrine of the Cahhtisti.
JSS FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
SECTION XIII.
Whether w suppose the volitions of moral agents io
be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet
they must be necessary in such a sense as to over*
th ro Arminian Liberty.
EVERY act of the Will has a cause, or it has not. If i*
has a cause, then, according to what has already been demon-
strated, it is not contingent, but necessary ; the effect being
necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause ; and that
let the cause be what it will. If the cause is the Will itself,
by antecedent acts choosing and determining ; still the deter-
mined and caused act must be a necessary effect. The act,
that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its
cause, cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause ; but must be
"wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as
the motions of the hands and feet. The consequent command-
ed acts of the Will are as passive and as necessary, with res-
pect to the antecedent determining acts as the parts of the
body arc to the volitions which determine and command them-
And therefore, if all the free acts of the Will are thus, if
they are all determined effects, determined by the Will itself,
that is, determined by antecedent choice, then they are all ne-
cessary ; they are all subject to, and decisively fixed by the
foregoing act, which is their cause : Yea, even the deter-
mining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by
another act, preceding that, if it be a free and voluntary act ;
and so must be necessary. So that by this ail the free acts of
the Will are necessary, and cannot be free unless they are
necessary : Because they cannot be free, according to the Ar-
minian notion of freedom, unless they are determined by the
Will ; which is to be determined by antecedent choice ;
which being their cause, proves them necessary. And yet
they say, Necessity is utterly inconsistent with Liberty. So
that, by their scheme, the acts of the Will cannot be free,
unless they arc necessary, and yet cannot be free if they be
necessary !
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 153
But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be
affirmed that the free acts of the Will have no cause, and are
connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before them and
determines them, in order to maintain their proper and abso-
lute contingence, and this should be allowed to be possible ;
still it will not serve their turn. For if the volition come to
pass by perfect contingence, and without any cause at all,
then it is certain, no act of the Will, no prior act of the soul
was the cause, no determination or choice of the soul, had any
hand in it. The Will, or the soul, was indeed the subject of
what happened to it accidentally, but was not the cause. The
Will is not active in causing or determining, but purely the
passive subject ; at least, according to their notion of action,
and passion. In this case, contingence does as much prevent
the determination of the Will, as a proper cause ; and as to
the Will, it was necessary, and could be no otherwise. For
to suppose that it could have been otherwise, if the Will or
soul had pleased, is to suppose that the act is dependent on
some prior act of choice or pleasure ; contrary to what is
now supposed : It is to suppose that it might have been other-
wise, if its cause had made it or ordered it otherwise. But this
does not agree to its having no cause or ordeter at all. That
must be necessary as to the soul ; which is dependent on no
free act of the soul : But that which is without a cause, is de-
pendent on no free act of the soul : Because, by the supposi-
tion, it is dependent on nothing, and is connected with noth-
ing. In such a case, the soul is necessarily subjected to what
accident brings to pass, from time to time, as much as the
earth, that is inactive, is necessarily subjected to what falls
upon it. But this does not consist with the Arminian notion
of Liberty, which is the Will's power of determining itself in
its own acts, and being wholly active in it, without passiveness,
and without being subject to Necessity Thus Contingence,
belongs to the Arminian notion of Liberty, and yet is inconsist-
ent with it.
I would here observe, that the author of the Essay on the
Freedom of Will., in God and the Creature, page 76, 77, says as
follows : « The word Chance always means something don^
Vol. V. U
154 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
■without design. Chance and design stand in direct opposition
to each other : And chance can never be properly applied to
acts of the Will, which is the spring of all design, and which
designs to choose whatsoever it doth choose, whether there
be any superior fitness in the thing which it chooses, or no ;
and it designs to determine itself to one thing, where two
things, perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because it will."
But herein appears a very great inadvertence in this author.
For if the Will be the spring of all design, as he says, then cer-
tainly it is not always the effect of design ; and the acts of the
Will themselves must sometimes come to pass, when they
do not spring from design ; and consequently come to pass
by chance, according to his own definition of chance. And if
the Will designs to choose whatsoever it does choose, and designs
to determine itself as he says, then it designs to determine all
its designs. Which carries us back from one design to a
foregoing design determining that, and to another determin-
ing that ; and soon in infinitum. The very first design must be
the effect of foregoing design, or else it must be by chance,
in his notion of it.
Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to the
connexion of the acts of the Will with something foregoing
that is their cause, not much unlike to the other ; which is
this ; either human liberty is such, that it may well stand
with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of
the understanding, and so is consistent with Necessity ; or
it is inconsistent with, and contrary to, such a connexion and
Necessity. The former is directly subversive of the Armin-
ian notion of liberty, consisting in freedom from all Necessity.
And if the latter be chosen and it be said, that liberty is in-
consistent with any such necessary connexion of volition with
foregoing views of the understanding, it consisting in free-
dom from any such Necessity of the Will as that would im-
ply ; then the liberty of the soul consists (in part at least) in
freedom from restraint, limitation and government, in its
actings, by the understanding, and in liberty and liableness to
act contrary to the understanding's views and dictates : And
consequently the more the soul has of this disengagedness, in
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 155
jts acting, the more liberty. Now let it be considered what
this brings the noble principle of human liberty to, particu-
larly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection, viz. a
full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at
random, without the least connexion with, or restraint or gov-
ernment by, any dictate of reason, or any thing whatsoever
apprehended, considered or viewed by the understanding ;
as being inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of
the Will over its own determinations. The notion mankind
have conceived of liberty, is some dignity or privilege, some-
thing worth claiming. But what dignity or privilege is there,
in being given up to such a wikl contingence, as this, to be
perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently and un-
reasonably, and as much without the guidance of understand-
ing, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception, a 1 *
the smoke that is driven by the wind I
56 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
PART III.
Wherein is inquired, 'whether any such liberty of Will
as Arminians hold, be necessary to Moral Agen-
cy, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Dis-
praise, fcfc.
SECTION I.
GOD's Moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous
and praiseworthy.
HAVING considered the first thing that was proposed
to be inquired into, relating to that freedom of Will which
Arminians maintain ; namely, Whether any such thing does,
ever did, or ever can exist, or be conceived of ; I come now
to the second thing proposed to be the subject of inquiry, viz.
Whether any such kind of liberty be rcqusite to moral
•agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punish-
ment, Sec.
I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and
agency of the Supreme moral agent, and fountain of all agen-
cy and virtue.
Dr. Whitby, in his discourses on the five Points p. 14, says,
" If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be
empty names ; we being capable of nothing that is blamewor-
thy, or deservcth praise ; for who can blame a person for do-
ing only what he could not help, or judge that he descrveth
praise only for what he could not avoid V To the like pur-
pose he speaks in places innumerable ; especially in his dis-
course on the Freedom of the Will; constantly maintaining,
that a freedom not only from coaction, but necessity, is absolute-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. U7
iy requisite, in order to actions being either worthy of blame,
or deserving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well known,
the current doctrine of Arminian writers, who, in general,
hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment,
nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom.
And yet Dr. Whitby, p. 300, allows, that God is without this
freedom ; and Arminians, so far as I have had opportunity to
observe, generally acknowledge that God is necessarily holy,
and his Will necessarily determined to that which is good.
So that putting these things together, the infinitely holy
God, who used always to be esteemed by God's people not only
virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, and every
virtue in the most absolute purity and perfection, and in infi-
nitely greater brightness and amiableness than in any creature ;
the most perfect pattern of virtue, and the fountain from whom
all others virtue is as beams from the sun ; and who has been
supposed to be, on the account of his virtue and holiness, infi-
nitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honored, admired,
commended, extolled and praised, than any creature : And
He, who is thus every where represented in Scripture ; I
say, this being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and
other Armi?iia?is, has no virtue at all : Virtue, when ascribed
to him, is but an em/ity name ; and he is deserving of no com-
mendation or praise : Because he is under necessity. He
cannot avoid being holy and good as he is ; therefore no
thanks to him for it. It seems, the holiness, justice, faithful-
ness, ike. of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of
the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They
will not deny, that these things in God are good ; but then
we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous, or
of the nature of any thing commendable, than the good that is
in any other being that is not a moral agent ; as the bright-
ness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but not
virtuous, because these properties are necessary to these bod-
ies, and not the fruit of selfdetermining power.
There needs no other confutation of this notion of God's
not being virtuous or praiseworthy, to christians acquainted
with the Bible, but only stating and particularly representing
153 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is represented
as in every respect, in the highest manner virtuous, and su-
premely praiseworthy, would be endless, and is altogether
needless to such as have been brought up in the light of the
gospel.
It were to be wished, that Dr. Whitby, and other divines
of the same sort, had explained themselves, when they have
asserted, that that which is necessary, is not deserving of
praise ; at the same time that they have owned God's perfec-
tion to be necessary, and so in effect representing God as not
deserving praise. Certainly, if their words have any mean-
ing at all, by praise, they must mean the exercise or testimo-
ny of some sort of esteem, respect and honorable regard. And
will they then say, that men are worthy of that esteem, res-
pect and honor for their virtue, small and imperfect as it is,
which yet God is not worthy of, for his infinite righteousness,
holiness and goodness? If so,it must be,because of some sort of
peculiar excellency in the virtuous man, which is his preroga-
tive, wherein he really has the preference ; some dignity, that
is entirely distinguished from any excellency, amiableness, or
honorableness in God : Not in imperfection and dependence,
but in preeminence : Which therefore he does not receive
from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of it ; nor can
God, in that respect, stand in competition with him, as the ob-
ject of honor and regard ; but man may claim a pecu-
liar esteem, commendation and glory, that God can have no
pretension to. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his neces-
sary holiness, to intermeddle with that grateful respect and
praise due to the virtuous man, who chooses virtue, in the ex-
ercise of a freedom ad utrumque ; any more than a precious
stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.
And if it be so, let it be explained what that peculiar respect
is, that is due to the virtuous man, which differs in nature and
kind, in some way of preeminence from all that is due to God.
What is the name or description of that peculiar affection ?
Is it esteem, love, admiration, honor, praise or gratitude ? The
Scripture every where represents God as the highest object
of all these : There we read of the soul's magnifying the Lord)
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 159
b/" loving Him ivith all the heart, with all the soul, with all the
mind, and with all the strength ; admiring Him, and his right'
eous acts,or greatly regarding them, as marvellous and wonder-
ful ; honoring, glorifying, exalting, extolling, blessing, thanking
and praising Him ; giving unto Him all the glory of the good
which is done or received, rather than unto men ; that no
flesh should glory in his presence ; but that He should be re-
garded as the Being to whom all glory is due. What then is
that respect ? What passion, affection or exercise is it, that
Arminians call praise, diverse from all these things, which men
are worthy of for their virtue, and which God is not worthy of,
in any degree ?
If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and
actions, be as inconsistent with a being worthy of praise as a
necessity of coaction ; as is plainly implied in, or inferred
from Dr. Whitby's discourse ; then why should we thank
God for his goodness, any more than if he were forced to be
good, or any more than we should thank one of our fellow-
creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or
from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or
extrinsical necessity ? Arminians suppose, that God is neces-
sarily a good and gracious Being : For this they make the
ground of some of their main arguments against many doc-
trines maintained by Calvinists ; they say, these are certainly
false, and it is impossible they should be true, because they are
not consistent with the goodness of God. This supposes, that
it is impossible but that God should be good : For if it be possi-
ble that he should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the
truth of these doctrines ceases, according to their own argu-
ment.
That virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, reward-
able, is not for want of merit in his moral perfections and ac-
tions, sufficient to deserve rewards from his creatures ; but be-
cause he is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any re-
ward or benefit from the creature : He is already infinitely
and unchangeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto
him. But still he is worthy of our supreme benevolence for
his virtue ; and would be worthy of o«r beneF.ccnce, which is
260 FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodness
could extend to him. If God deserves to be thanked anfi
praised for his goodness, he would, for the same reason, de-
serve that we should also requite his kindness, if that were
possible. What shall I render to the Lord for all his benefits ?
is the natural language of thankfulness ; and so far as in us
lies, it is our duty to recompense God's goodness, and render
again according to benefits received. And that we might have
opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude to
God, as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely a-
bove our reach : He has appointed others to be his receivers,
and to stand in his stead, as the objects of our beneficence ;
such arc especially our indigent brethren.
SECTION II.
The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of Jesu<;
Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous?
praiseworthy, rewardable, &C.
I HAVE already considered how Dr. Whitby insists
upon it, that a freedom, not only from coaction, but necessity,
is requisite either to virtue or vice, praise or dispraise, reward
or punishment . He also insists on the same freedom as abso-
lutely requisite to a person's being the subject of a law, of
precepts or prohibitions ; in the book beforementioned, (p. 301,
214,328,339,340,341, 342, 347,361, 373, 410.) And of
promises and threatenings, (p. 298, 301,305,311,339, 340,
363.) And as requisite to a state of trial, (p. 297, Sec.)
Now therefore, with an eye to these things, I would inquire
into the moral conduct and practice of our Lord Jesus Christ,
which he exhibited in his human nature here, in his state of
humiliation. And first, I would shew, that his holy behavior
was necessary ; or that it was impossible it should be otherwise,
than that he should behave himself holily, and that he should
E££EDOM OF THE WILL. 161
perfectly holy in each individual act of his life. And second*
ly, that his holy behavior was properly of the nature of virtue
and was worthy of praise ; and that he was the subject of lau>j
precepts ox commands, fttond&es and rewards ; and that he was
c'n a state of trial.
I. It was impossible, that the acts of the Will of the human
soul of Christ should, in any instance, degree or circumstance,
be otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and will.
The following things make this evident.
1. God had promised so effectually to preserve and uphold
Him by his Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could
not fail of reaching the end for which he came into the
world ; which he would have failed of, had he fallen into sin.
We have such a promise, Isa. xlii. 1,2, 3, 4. " Behold my
Servant, whom I uphold ; mine Elect, in whom my soul de-
lighteth : I have put my Spirit upon him : He shall bring
forth judgment to the Gentiles : He shall not cry, nor lift up,
iior cause his voice to be heard in the street. He shall bring
forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail nor be discour-
aged, till He have set judgment in the earth ; and the isles
shall wait for his law." This promise of Christ's having
God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up
his voice, See. relates to the time of Christ's appearance on
earth ; as is manifest from the nature of the promise, and also
the application of it in the New Testament, Matthew xii. 18.
And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by
God's Spirit, that he should be preserved from sin ; particu-
larly from pride and vain glory, and from being overcome by
any of the temptations, he should be under to affect the glory
of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause
and praise of men : And that he should be so upheld, that he
should by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming
into the world, of bringing forth judgment unto victory, and
establishing his kingdom of grace in the earth. And in the
following verses, this promise is confirmed, with the greatest
imaginable solemnity. « Thus saith the eop.d, he that creat-
ed the heavens, and stretched them out : He that spread forth
Vol. V. W
162 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
the earth, and that which cometh out of it : He that giveth
breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk
therein : I theLord have called Thee in righteousness, and will
hold thine hand ; and will keep thee, and give thee for a cove-
nant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles, to open the blind
eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that
sit in darkness out of the prison house. I am jehovah, that
is my name," &c.
Very parallel with these promises is that, Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9 r
which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's hu-
miliation on earth. " Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of
Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him
whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers ; kings shall
see and arise, princes also shall worship ; because of the Lord
that is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose
Thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time have I
heard Thee ; in a day of salvation have I helped Thee ; and I
will preserve Thee, and give Thee for a covenant of the peo-
ple, to establish the earth," 8cc.
And in Isa. 1. 5. ...9, we have the Messiah expressing his
assurance, that God would help Him, by so opening his ear,
or inclining his heart to God's commandments that He should
not be rebellious, but should persevere, and not apostatize, or
turn his back ; that through God's help, He should be im-
movable, in a way of obedience, under the great trials of re-
proach and suffering he should meet with ; setting his face
like a Hint : So that he knew, he should not be ashamed, or
frustrated in his design, and finally should be approved and
justified, as having done his work faithfully. " The Lord
hath opened mine ear ; so that I was not rebellious, neither
turned away my back : I gave my back to the smiters, and
my cheeks to them that plucked oft' the hair ; I hid not my
face from shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help
me ; therefore shall I not be confounded ; therefore have I
set my face as a flint, and I know that I shall not be ashamed.
He is near that justilieth me : Who will contend with me ?
Let us stand together. Who is mine adversary ? Let him
come near to me : Behold the Lord God will help me : Who
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 16S
is he that shall condemn me ? Lo, they shall all wax old as a
garment, the moth shall eat them up."
2. The same thing is evident from all the promises which
God made to the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom and
success, in his office and character of a Mediator : Which
glory could not have been obtained, if his holiness had failed,
and he had been guilty of sin. God's absolute promise of
any thing, makes the things promised necessary, and their
failing to take place absolutely impossible : And, in like man-
ner, it makes those things necessary, on which the things
promised depend, and without which they cannot take effect.
Therefore it appears, that it was utterly impossible that
Christ's holiness should fail, from such absolute promises as
those, Psal. ex. 4. " The Lord hath sworn, and will not re-
pent, Thou art a Priest forever, after the order of Melchize-
deck." And from every other promise in that psalm, con-
tained in each verse of it. And Psal. ii. 7, 8. « I will declare
the decree : The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son,
this day have I begotten Thee : Ask of me, and I will give
Thee the Heathen for thine inheritance, &c." Psal. xlv. 3,
4, Sec. " Gird thy sword on thy thigh, O most Mighty, with
thy Glory and thy Majesty ; and in thy Majesty ride prosper-
ously." And so every thing that is said from thence to the
end of the Psalm. And those promises,' Isa. Hi, 13, 14, 15,
and liii. 10, 11, 12. And all those promises which God
makes to the Messiah, of success, dominion and glory in the
character of Redeemer, in Isa. chap. xlix.
3. It was often promised to the Church of God of old, for
their comfort, that God would give them a righteous, sinless
Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5, 6. " Behold, the days come, saith the
Lord, that I will raise up unto David a righteous Branch ;
and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judg-
ment and justice in the earth. In his days shall Judah be
saved, and Israel shall dwell safely. And this is the name
whereby He shall be called, The Lord our Righteousness."
So, Jer. xxxiii. 15. "I will cause the Branch of Righteous-
ness to grow up unto David ; and he shall execute judgment
and righteousness in the land." Isa. ix. 6, 7. « For unto us
164 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
a Child is born ; upon the throne of David and upon his king-
dom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and justice,
from henceforth, even for ever: The zeal of the Lord of
Hosts will do this." Chap. xi. at the beginning, " There shall
come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall
grow out of his roots ; and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest
upon him. ...the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the
Lord :....With righteousness shall He judge the poor, and re-
prove with equity :.. ..Righteousness shall be the girdle of his
loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." Chap. Hi. 13.
« My Servant shall deal prudently." Chap. liii. 9. « Be-
cause He had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his
mouth." If it be impossible that these promises should fail,
and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for
one jot or tittle of these promises of God to pass away, then
it w.tS impossible that Christ should commit any sin. Christ
himself signified, that it was impossible but that the things
which were spoken concerning Him, should be fulfilled.
Luke xxiv. 44. " That all things must be fulfilled, which
were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in
the Psalms concerning Me." Malth. xxvi. 54. " But how
then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be ?"
Mark xiv. 49. «• But the Scriptures must be fulfilled." And
so the apostle, Acts i. 16. « This Scripture must needs have
been fulfilled"
4. All the promises, which were made to the Church of
old, of the Messiah as a future Saviour, from that made to
our first parents in paradise, to that which was delivered by
the prophet Malachi, shew it to be impossible that Christ
should not have persevered in perfect holiness. The ancient
predictions given to God's church of the Messiah as a Sav-
iour, were of the nature of promises ; as is evident by the pre-
dictions themselves, and the manner of delivering them. But
they are expressly, and very often called promises in the New
Testament; as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Acts xiii. 32, S3.
"Horn. i. 1,2, 3, and chap. xv. 8. Heb. vi. 13, Sec. These
promises were often made with great solemnity, and confirm-
ed with an oath ; as in Gen. xxii. 16, 17, 13. " By myself have
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 165
I sworn, saith the Lord, that in blessing, I will bless thee, and
in multiplying, I will multiply thy seed, as the stars of heav-
en, and as the sar.d which is upon the sea shore And in
thy seed sh:J. all the nations of the earth be blessed." Com-
pare Luke i. 72, 73, and Gal. Hi. 8, 15, 16. The apostle in
Heb. vi. 17, 18, speaking of this promise to Abraham, says,
" Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew to the heirs
of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an
oath ; that by two immutable things, in which it was impos-
sible for God to lie, he might have strong consolation.".. ..In
which words, the necessity of the accomplishment, or (which
is the same thing) the impossibility of the contrary, is fully de-
clared. So God confirmed the promise of the great salvation
of the Messiah, made to David, by an oath ; Psal. Ixxxix. 3,
4. " I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn
unto David my servant ; thy seed will I establish forever, and
build up thy throne to all generations." There is nothing
that is so abundantly set forth in Scripture, as sure and ir-
refragable, as this promise and oath to David. See Psalm.
Ixxxix. 34, 35, 36. 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. Isa. lv. 3. Acts ii. 29,
30, and xiii. 34. The Scripture expressly speaks of it as ut-
terly impossible that this promise and oath to David, concern-
ing the everlasting dominion of the Messiah of his seed,
should fail. Jer. xxxiii. 15, &c. « In those days, and at that
time, I will cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up
unto David.. ..For thus saith the Lord, David shall never want
a Man to sit upon the throne of the House of Israel." Ver.
2©, 21. " If you can break my covenant of the day, and my
covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and
night in their season ; then may also my covenant be broken
with David my servant, that he should not have a son to reign
upon his throne" So in verse 25, 26. ...Thus abundant is the
Scripture in representing how impossible it was, that the prom-
ises made of old concerning the great salvation and kingdom
of the Messiah should fail ; which implies, that it was impos-
sible that this Messiah, the second Adam, the promised seed
of Abraham, and of David, should fidl from his integrity, as
the first Adam did.
165 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
5. All the promises that were made to the church of God
under the Old Testament, of the great enlargement of the
church, and advancement cfher glory, in the days of the gos»
pel, after the corning of the Messiah ; the increase of her
light, liberty, holiness, joy, triumph over her enemies, £cc.
of which so great a part of the Old Testament consists ; which
are repeated so often, are so variously exhibited, so frequent-
ly introduced with great pomp and solemnity, and are so a-
bundantly sealed with typical and symbolical representations :
I say, all these promises imply, that the Messiah should per-
fect the work of redemption ; and this implies, that he should
persevere in the work, which the Father had appointed him ;
being in all things conformed to his Will. These promises
were often confirmed by an oath. (See lsa. liv. 9, with the
context ; chap. lxii. 8.) And it is represented as utterly im-
possible that these promises should fail. (lsa. xlix. 15, with
the context ; chap. liv. 10, with the context ; chap. li. 4 8 ;
chap. xl. 8, with the context.) And therefore it was impossi-
lle that the Messiah should fail, or commit sin.
6. It was impossible that the Messiah should fail of perse-
vering in integrity and holiness, as the first Adam did, be-
cause this would have been inconsistent with the promises,
which God made to the blessed Virgin, his mother, and to her
husband ; implying, that He should save his people from their
fins, that God would give him the throne of his Father David,
that He should reign over the house of Jacob forever ; and that
rfhis kingdom there should be no end. These promises were
sure, and it was impossible they should fail.. ..And therefore
the Virgin Mary, in trusting fully to them, acted reas-
onably, having an immoveable foundation of her faith ; as
Elisabeth observes, Luke i. 45. « And blessed is she that be-
lieveth ; for there shall be a performance of those things,
which were told her from the Lord."
7. That it should have been possible that Christ should
sin, and so fail in the work of our redemption, does not con-
sist with the eternal purpose and decree of God, revealed in
the scriptures, that lie would provide salvation for fallen man
in and by Jesus Christ, and that salvation should be offered to
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. m
sinners through the preaching of the gospel. Such an abso*
lute decree as this, Arminians do not deny Thus much at
-least (out of all controversy) is implied in such Scriptures, as
1 Cor. ii. 7. Eph. i. 4, 5, and chap. iii. 9, 10, 1 1 . 1 Pet. i. 19, 20.
Such an absolute decree as this, Arminians allow to be signi-
fied in these texts. And the Arminians, election of nations
and societies, and general election of the Christian Church,
and conditional election of particular persons, imply this.
God could not decree before the foundation of the world, to
save all that should believe in, and obey Christ, unless he had
absolutely decreed, that salvation should be provided, and ef-
fectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as the Armin-
ians themselves strenuously maintain) a decree of God infers
necessity ; hence it became necessary, that Christ should per-
severe, and actually work out salvation for us, and that he
should not fail by the commission of sin.
8. That it should have been possible for Christ's holi-
ness to fail, is not consistent with what God promised to his
Son, before all ages. For, that salvation should be offered to
men through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful followers,
is what is at leastimplied in that certain and infallible promise
spoken of by the apostle, Tit. i. 2. « In hope of eternal life ;
which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began."
This does not seem to be controverted by Arminians.*
9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing
his Father's Will, is inconsitent with the promise made to the
Father by the Son, by the Logos that was with the Father
from the beginning, before he took the human nature : As
may be seen in Psal. xl. 6, 7, 8, (compared with the Apos-
tle's interpretation, Ffeb. x. 5 9.) " Sacrifice and offering
thou didst not desire : Mine ears hast thou opened, (or
bored ;) burnt offering and sin offering Thou hast not re-
quired. Then said I, Lo, I come : In the volume of the book
it is written of me, I delight to do thy Will, O my God, and
thy law is within my heart." Where is a manifest allusion
to the covenant, which the willing servant, who loved his mas-
*Sce Dr. Whitby on the five Points, p. 48, 4.9, 50.
!6S FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ter's service, made with his master, to be his servant forever,
on the day wherein he had his ear bored ; which covenant
was probably inserted in the public records, called the Vol-
ume of the Book, by the judges, who were called to take cog-
nizance of the transaction ; Exod. xxi. If the Logos, who
was with the Father, before the world, and who made the
world, thus engaged in covenant to do the Will of the Father
in the human nature, and the promise was as it were record-
ed, that it might be made sure, doubtless it was impossible
that it should fail ; and so it was impossible that Christ should
fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human nature.
10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing
the W T ill of his Father, and so to have failed of effectually
working out redemption for sinners, then the salvation ef all
the saints, who were saved from the beginning of the world,
to the death of Christ, was not built on a firm foundation. The
Messiah, and the redemption which he was to work out by his
obedience unto death, was the foundation of the salvation of
all the posterity of fallen man, that ever were saved. There-
fore, if when the Old Testament saints had the pardon of their
sins, and the favor of God promised them, and salvation be-
stowed upon them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when
he came, might commit sin, then ail this was on a foundation
that was not firm and stable, but liable to fail ; something which
it was possible might never be. God did as it were trust to what
his Son had engaged and promised to do in future time ; and de-
pended so much upon it, that He proceeded actually to save men
on the account of it, as though it had been already done. But
this trust and dependence of God, on the supposition of Christ's
being liable to fail of doing his Will, was leaning on a staff
that was weak, and might possibly break The saints of old
trusted in the promises of a future redemption to be wrought
out and completed by the Messiah, and built their comfort
upon it : Abraham saw Christ's day and rejoiced ; and he and
the other Patriarchs died in the faiih of the promise of it....
(Heb. xi. 13.) liut on this supposition, their faith and their
comfort, and their salvation, was built on u moveable, fallible
foundation ; Christ was not to them a tried stone, a sure found-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. leg-
ation : As in Isa. xxviii. 16. David entirely rested on the
covenant of God with him, concerning the future glorious do-
minion and salvation of the Messiah, of his seed ; and says it
was all his salvation, and all his desire : And comforts himself
that this covenant was an " everlasting covenant, ordered in
all things and sure,", 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. But if Christ's virtue
might fail, he was mistaken : His great comfort was not built
so sure as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the de-
terminations of the Free Will of Christ's human Soul ; which
was subject to no necessity, and might be determined either
one way or the other. Also the dependence of those, who
looked for redemption in Jerusalem, and waited for the con-
solation of Israel, (Luke ii. 25, and 38) and the confidence of
the disciples of Jesus, who forsook all and followed Him, that
they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom, were
built on a sandy foundation.
11. The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his
course of obedience, and while in the midst of temptations
and trials, was abundant in positively predicting his own fu-
ture glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church,
the salvation of the Gentiles through him, Ecc. and in prom-
ises of blessings he would bestow on his true disciples in his
future kingdom ; on which promises he required the full de-
pendence of his disciples, (John xiv.) But the disciples
would have had no ground for such dependence, if Christ had
been liable to fail in his work : And Christ Himself would
have been guilty of presumption, in so abounding Jin peremp-
tory promises of great things, which depended on a mere
contingence, viz. the determinations of his Free Will, con-
sisting in a freedom ad utrumque, to either sin or holiness,
standing in indifference, and incident, in thousands of future
instances, to go either one way or the other.
Thus it is evident, that it was imfiossible that the Acts of
the Will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than
holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father ; or, in other
words, they were necessarily so conformed.
I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it being
a thing denied by some of the greatest Arminiaiis, by Episeo-*
Vol. V. X
170 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
pius in particular ; and because I look upon it as a point
clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between
Calvinists and Arminians, concerning the necessity of such a
freedom of Will as is insisted on by the latter, in order to
moral agency, virtue, command or prohibition, promise or
threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise, merit
or demerit. I now therefore proceed,
II. To consider whether Christ, in his holy behavior on
earth, was not thus a moral agent, subject to commands, prom-
ises, &c.
Dr. Whitby very often speaks of what he calls a freedom
ad utrumlibet, without necessity, as requisite to law and com-
?nands ; and speaks of necessity as entirely inconsistent with
injunctions and prohibitions. But yet we read of Christ's be-
ing the subject of the commands of his Father, Job x. 18, and
xv. 10. And Christ tells us, that every thing he said, or did,
was in compliance with commandments he had received of the
Father ; John xii. 49, 50, and xiv. 31. And we often read of
Christ's obedience to his Father's commands, Rom. v. 19.
Phil. ii. 8. Hcb. v. 8.
The forementioned writer represents promises offered as
motives to persons to do their duty, or a being moved and in-
duced by promises, as utterly inconsistent with a state wherein
persons have not a liberty ad utrumlibet but are necessarily de-
termined to one. (See particularly, p. 298, 311.) But the
thing which this writer asserts, is demonstrably false, if the
Christian religion be true. If there be any truth in Christian-
ity or the holy Scriptures, the man Christ Jesus had his Will
infalliblv, unalterably and unfrustraoly determined to good,
and that alone ; but yet he had promises of glorious rewards
made to Him, on condition of his persevering in, and perfect-
ing the work which God had appointed Him ; Isa. liii. 10, 11,
12, Psal. ii. and ex. Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9. In Luke xxii. 28,
29, Christ says to his disciples, " Ye are they which have
continued with me in my temptations ; and I appoint unto
you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me."
The word most properly signifies to appoint by covenant or
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 171
promise. The plain meaning of Christ's words is this : " As
you have partook of my temptations and trials, and have been
stedfast, and have overcome, I promise to make you partakers
of my rewaid, and to give you a kingdom ; as the Father has
promised me a kingdom for continuing stedfast, and over-
coming in those trials." And the words are well explained
by those in Rev. iii. 21. " To him that overcometh, will I
grant to sit with me in my throne ; even as I also overcame,
and am set down with my Father in his throne." And Christ
had not only promises of glorious success and rewards made
to his obedience and sufferings, but the Scriptures plainly
represent him as using these promises for motives and induce-
ments to obey and suffer ; and particularly that- promise of a
kingdom which the Father had appoii ted Hhn, or sitting with
the Father in his throne ; as in Heb. xii. 1,2. u Let us lay
aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us,
and let us run with patience the race that is set before us,
looking unto Jesus, the Author and finisher of our faith ;
who, for the joy that was set before Him, endured the cross,
despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the
throne of God."
And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert,
that the holy and excellent temper and behavior of Jesus
Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such
great trials, was not -virtuous or praiseworthy ; because his
Will was not free ad utrwnque, to either holiness or sin, but
was unalterably determined to one ; that upon this account,
there is no virtue at all, in all Christ's humility, meekness,
patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the
world, heavenly mindedness, submission to the will of God,
perfect obedience to his commands, (though he was obedient
unto death, even the death of the cross) his great compassion
to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his faithful-
ness to God and man, under such great trials ; his praying
for his enemies, even when nailing him to the cross ; that
•virtue, when applied to these things, is but an empty name ;
that there was no merit in any of these things ; that is, that
Christ was worthy of nothing at all on account of them, wor-
172 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
thy of no reward, no praise, no honor or respect from God or
man ; because his Will was not indifferent, and free, either
to these things, or the contrary ; but under such a strong in-
clination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it
impossible that he should choose the contrary ; that upon this
account (to use Dr. Whitby's language) it would be sensibly
unreasonable that the human nature should be rewarded for
any of these things.
According to this doctrine, that creature who is evidently
set forth in scripture as theirs* born of every creature, as hav-
ing in all things the preeminence, and as the highest of all crea-
tures in virtue, honor, and worthiness of esteem, praise and
glory, on the account of his virtue, is less worthy of reward or
praise, than the very least of saints ; yea, no more worthy
than a clock or mere machine, that is purely passive, and
moved by natural necessity.
If we judge by scriptural representations of things, we have
reason to suppose, lhat Christ took upon him our nature, and
dwelt with us in this world, in a suffering state, not only to
satisfy for our sins, but that He, being in our nature and cir-
cumstances, and under our trials, might be our most fit and
proper example, leader and captain, in the exercise of glori-
ous and victorious virtue, and might lie a visible instance of
the glorious end and reward of it ; that we might see in Him
the beauty, amiableness, and true honor and glory, and ex-
ceeding benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us hu-
man beings to practise ; and might thereby learn, and be ani-
mated, to seek the like glory and honor, and to obtain the
like glorious reward. See Heb. ii. 9.... 14, with v. 8, 9, and
xii. 1,2, 3. John xv. 10. Rom. \iii. 17. 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12.
1 Pet. ii. 19, 20, and iv. 13. But if there was nothing of any
virtue or merit, or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise or
commendation at all, in all that he did, because it was all nec-
essary, and he could not help it ; then how is here any thing
so proper to animate and excite us, free creatures, by patient
continuance in welldoing, to seek for honor, glory, and im
inortality ?
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 173
God speaks of Himself as peculiarly -well pleased with the
righteousness of this servant of his. Isa. xlii. 21. " The
Lord is well pleased for his righteousness sake." The sacrifi-
ces of old are spoken of as a sweet savour to God, but the obe-
dience of Christ as far more acceptable than they. Psal. xl.
6, 7. » Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not desire : Mine
ear hast Thou opened," [as thy servant performing willing
obedience ;] " burnt offering and sin offering hast thou not
required : Then said I, Lo, I come," [as a servant that cheer-
fully answers the calls of his master :] " I delight to do thy
will, O my God, yea, thy law is within mine heart." Matth.
xvii. 5. « This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleas-
ed." And Christ tells us expressly, that the Father loves
him for that wonderful instance of his obedience, his volun-
tary yielding himself to death, in compliance with the Father's
command. John x. 17, 18. " Therefore doth my Father love
me, because I lay down my life : No man taketh it from me ;
but I lay it down of myself.. ..This commandment received I
my Father.
And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death,
if it was not worthy of praise, and of the most glorious re-
wards, the heavenly hosts were exceedingly mistaken, by the
account that is given of them, in Rev. v. 8.... 12. « The four
beasts and the four and twenty elders fell down before the
Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full
of odors ; and they sung a new song, saying, Thou art wor-
thy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou
wast slain. ...And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many an-
gels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders,
and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thous-
and, and thousands of thousands, saying with a loud voice,
worthy is the lamb that was slain, to receive power and
riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and
blessing.
Christ speaks of the eternal life which he was to receive,
as the reward of his obedience to the Father's command-
ments. John xii. 49,50. « I have not spoken of myself;
3>ut the Father which sent me, He gave me a commandment
174 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
what I should say, ar.d what I should speak ; and I know that
his commandment is life everlasting : Whatsoever I speak
therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak." God
promises to divide him a portion with the great, &c. for his
being his righteous servant, for his glorious virtue under such
great trials and sufferings. Isa. liii. 11, 12. « He shall see
the travail of his soul and be satisfied : By his knowledge
shall my righteous servant justify many ; for he shall bear
their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with
the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, be-
cause be hath poured out his soul unto death." The scrip-
tures represent God as rewarding him far above all his other
servants. Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9. " He took on him the form of a
servant, and was made in the likeness of men : And being
found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became
obedient unto death, even the death of the cross ; wherefore
God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name
above every name." Psal. xlv. 7. " Thou lovest righteous-
ness, and hatest wickedness ; therefore God, thy God, hath
anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.
There is no room to pretend, that the glorious benefits
bestowed in consequence of Christ's obedience, arc not proper-
ly of the nature of a reward. What is a reward, in the most
proper sense, but a benefit bestowed in consequence of some-
thing morally excellent in quality or behavior, in testimony
of well pleascdness in that moral excellency, and respect and
favor on that account ? If we consider the nature of a reward
most strie'ly, and make the utmost of it, and add to the things
contained in this description, proper merit or worthiness, and
the bes.owment of the benefit in consequence of a promise;
still it will be found, there is nothing belonging to it, but that
the scripture is most express as to its belonging to the glory
bestowed on Christ, after his sufferings ; as appears from what
has been already observed : There was a gloiious benefit be-
stowed in consequence of something morally excellent, being
called / '•' ousness and Ohrdicncc ; there was great favor,
love and well pleusedncs, for this righteousness and obedi-
ence, in the bcsiower ; there was proper merit, or worthiness
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. IT'S
of the benefit, in the ohedience ; it was bestowed in fulfilment
of promises made to that obedience ; and was bestowed there-
fore, or because he had performed that obedience.
I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while
here in the flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last
Adam, as Christ is called, Rom. v. 14. 1 Cor. xv. 45, tak-
ing on Him the human nature, and so the form of a servant,
and being under the law, to stand and act for us, was put into
a state of trial, as the first Adam was. ...Dr. Whitby mentions
these three things as evidences of persons being in a state of
trial (on the five Points, p. 298, 299) namely, their afflictions
being spoken of as their trials or temptations, their being the
subjects of promises, and their being exposed to Satan's
temptations. But Christ was apparently the subject of each
of these. Concerning promises made to him, I have spoken
already. The difficulties and afflictions he met with in the
course of his obedience, are called his temptations or trials."
Luke xxii. 28. " Ye are they which have continued with me
in my temptations or trials" Heb. ii. 18. "For in that he
himse' n hath suffered, being tempted, [or tried'] He is able to
succor them that are tempted." And chap. iv. 15. "We
have not an high priest, which cannot be touched with the
feeling of our infirmities ; but was in all points templed like
as we are, yet without sin." And as to his being tempted by
Satan it is what none will dispute-
176 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
SECTION III.
77z<? Case of such as are given up of God to Sin*
and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Ne-
cessity and Inability to be consistent with blame-
worthiness.
DR. WHITBY asserts freedom, riot only from coaction,
but Necessity, to be essential to any thing deserving the name
of Sin, and to an action's being culpable ; in these words
(Discourse on the five Points, edit. iii. p. 348 P ) " If they be
thus necessitated, then neither their sins of omission or com-
mission could deserve that name ; it being essential to the na-
ture of Sin, according to St. Austin's definition, that it be an
action a quo liberum est abstinere. Three things seem plain-
ly necessary to make an action or omission culpable. 1. That
it be in our power to perform or forbear it ; for, as Origcn,
and all the Fathers say, no man is blameworthy for not doing
what he could not do." And elsewhere the Doctor insists,
that " when any do evil of Necessity, what they do is no vice,
that they are guilty of no fault,* are worthy of no blame, dis-
praise,! or dishonor^ but are unblamable.§"
If these things are true, in Dr. Whitby's sense of Neces-
sity, they will prove all such to be blameless, who are given
up of God to sin, in what they commit after they are thus giv-
en up. That there is such a thing as men's being judicially
given up to sin is certain, if the scripture rightly informs us ;
such a thing being often there spoken of ; as in Psal. lxxxi.
12. " So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust, and they
walked in their cvvn counsels." Acts vii. 42. " Then God
turned, and gave them up to worship the host of heaven."
Rom. i. 24. " Wherefore God also gave them up to unclean-
ness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonor their
* Discourse on the Five Points, p. 347, 360, 361, 377. + 303, 326,
339, and many other places, $ 371. § 304, 361,
REEDOM OF THE WILL. 177
own bodies between themselves." Ver. 26. « For this cause
God gave them up to vile affections." Ver. 28. " And evert
as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God
gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that
are not convenient.
It is needless to stand particularly to inquire, what God's
giving men nfi to their own hearts' lusts signifies : It is sufficient
to observe, that hereby is certainly meant God's so ordering
or disposing things, in some respect or other, either by doing
or forbearing to do, as that the consequence should be men's
continuing in their sins. So much as men are given up to, so
much is the consequence of their being given up, whether
that be less or more. If God does not order things so, by ac-
tion or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then the
event proves that they are not given up to that consequence.
If good be the consequence, instead of evil, then God's mer-
cy is to be acknowledged in that good ; which mercy must
be contrary to God's judgment in giving up to evil. If the
event must prove, that "they are given up to evil as the conse-
quence, then the persons, who are the subjects of this judg-
ment, must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event
is necessary.
If not only coaclion, but all Necessity, will prove men
blameless, then Judas was blameless, after Christ had given
him over, and had already declared his certain damnation,
and that he should -uerihj betray him. He was guilty of no
sin in betraying his master, on this supposition ; though his
so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin,
more heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him. And
the Jews in Egypt, in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no sin,
in their not worshipping the true God, after God had sworn by
his great name, that his name should be no more named in the
mouth of any man of Jtidah, in all the land of Egy/it Jer.
sliv. 26.
Dr. Whitby (Discourse on Five Points, p. 302, 303) de-
nies, that men, in this world, are ever so given up by God to
sin, that their Wills should be necessarily determined to
evil ; though he owns, that hereby it may become exceeding
Vol. V. Y
ira FREEDOM OF THE WILE;
difficult for men to do good, having a strong bent, and power-
ful inclination, to what is evil. ...But if we should allow the case
to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin
will no better agree with his notions of that liberty, which is
essential to praise or blame^ than if we should suppose it to
render the avoiding of Sin impossible. For if an impossibility
of avoiding Sin wholly excuses a man ; then, for the same
reason, its Icing difficult to avoid it, excuses him in part ;
and this just in proportion to the degree of difficulty. ...If the
influence of moral impossibility or inability be the same, to
excuse persons in not doing, or not avoiding any thing, as
that of natural inability, (which is suppossed) then undoubted-
ly, in like manner, moral difficulty has the same influence to
excuse with natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural im-
possibility wholly excuses, and also that natural difficulty ex-
cuses in part, and makes the act or omission less blumeable in
proportion to the difficulty. All natural difficulty according to
the plainest dictates of the light of nature, excuses in some de-
gree, sc that the neglect is notsoblameable, as if there had been
no difficulty in the case : And so the greater the difficulty
is, still the more excuscable, in proportion to the increase
of the difficulty. And as natural impossibility wholly ex-
cuses and excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficul-
ty approaches to impossibility, still the nearer a person is to
blamclessncss in proportion to that approach. And if the
case of moral impossibility or necessity, be just the same
with natural necessity or coaction, as to influence to excuse a
neglect, then also, for the same reason, the case of natural dif-
ficulty, does not differ in influence, to excuse a neglect,
from moral difficulty, arising from a strong bias or bent to evil,
such as Dr. Whitby owns in the case of those that are given
up to their own hearts' lusts. So that the fault of such per-
sons must be lessened, in proportion to the difficulty, and ap-
proach to impossibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty
make the action quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then
if there be nine degrees of difficulty, the person is in great
part excused, and is nine degrees in ten, less blameworthy,
than if there had been no difficulty at all ; and he has but one
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 179
degree of blameworthiness. The reason is plain on Armin-
ian principles, viz. because as difficulty by antecedent bent and
bias on the Will, is increased, liberty of indifference, and self-
determination in the Will, is diminished ; so much hinderance
and impediment is there, in the way of the Will's acting free-
ly, by mere selfdetermination. And if ten degrees of such
hinderance take away all such liberty, then nine degrees take
away nine parts in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty.
And therefore there is but one degree of b!ameableness,ctf.?<??7,s'
Jiaribus, in the neglect ; the man beisg no further blameable
in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that af-
fair : For blame or praise (say they) arises wholly from a
good use or abuse of liberty.
From all which it follows, that a strung bent and bias one
way, and difficuly of going the contrary, never causes a per-
son to be at all more exposed to sin, or any thing blameable :
Because, as the difficulty is increased, so much the less is re-
quired and expected. Though in one respect, exposedness
to sin or is fault increased, viz. by an increase of exposedness
to the evil action or omission ; yet it is diminished in another
respect, to balance it ; namely, as the sinfulness or blamea-
bleness of the action or omission is diminished in the same
proportion. So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposed-
ness to guilt or blame, is left just as it was.
To illustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to
be intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a selfmov-
ing power, by virtue of which it could act and produce effects
to a certain degree, ex. gr. to move itself up or down with a
force equal to a weight of ten pounds ; and that it might
therefore be required of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move
itself down with that force ; for which it has power and full
liberty, and therefore woidd be blameworthy if it failed of it.
But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in
the opposite scale, which in force entirely counterbalances
its selfmoving power, and so readers it impossible for it to
move down at all ; this therefore wholly excuses it from any
such motion. But if we suppose there to be only nine
pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not im»
ISO FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
possible, but yet more difficult : So that it can now only
move down with the force o f one pound : But however this is
all that is required of it under these cirumslances ; it is whol-
ly excused from nine parts of Us motion : And if the scale,
under these circumstances, neelecis to move, and remains
at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglect of
that one tenth pari of its motion ; which it had as much lib-
erty and advantage for as in usual circumstances, it has for
the greater melon, which in such a case would be required.
So that this ne.v difficulty, does not at all increase its ex-
posedness to any thing blameworthy.
And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a
man's duty, or proclivity to sin, through a being given up to
hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatsoever,
is an inconsistence, according to Dr. Whitby's notions of
liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding sin
and blame, and the doing what is virtuous and praiseworthy,
must be always equally easy.
D'\ Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, sin,
Sec. led him into another great inconsistence. He abundantly
insists, that necessity is inconsistent with the nature of sin or
fault He says, in the forementioned treatise, p. 14. " Who
can blame a person for doing what he could not help?" And
p. 15. " It being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for do-
ing that which was never in his power to avoid." And in p.
341, to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, say-
ing. » Why doth God command, if man hath not free Will
and power to obey ?" And again in the same and the next
page, "Who will not cry out, that it is folly to command
him, that hath not liberty to do what is commanded ; and
that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power
to do what is required ?" And in p. 373, he cites another
saying. " A law is given to him that can turn to both parts,
i. e. obey or transgress it : But no law can be against him who
is bound by nature."
And yet the same Dr. Whitby asserts, that fallen man is
not able to perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has
these words : « The nature of Adam had power to continue
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 181
innocent, and without sin ; whereas it is certain our nature
never had so.".... But if we have not power to continue inno-
cent and without sin, then sin is consistent with Necessity,
and we may be sinful in that which we have not power to
avoid ; and those things cannot be true which he asserts else-
where, namely, " That if we be necessitated, neither sins of
omission nor commission, would deserve that name," (p. 348.)
If we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have
it not in our power to be blameless: And if so, we are under a
necessity of being blameworthy And how does this con-
sist with what he so often asserts, that necessity is inconsist-
ent with blame or praise ? If we have it not in our power to
perform perfect obedience, to all the commands of God, then
we are under a necessity of breaking some commands, in
some degree j having no power to perform so much as is
commanded. And if so, why does he cry out of the unrea-
sonableness and folly of commanding beyond what men have
power to do ?
And Arryrinians in general are very inconsistent with them-
selves in what they say of the inability of fallen Man in this
respect. They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust
in God, to require any thing of us beyond our present power
and ability to perform ; and also hold, that we are now una-
ble to perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to sat-
isfy for the i?nfierfections of our obedience, and has made way,
that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of
perfect : Wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves
into the grossest inconsistence. For, (as I have observed else-
where) " they hold, that God, in mercy to mankind, has abol-
ished that rigorous constitution or law, that they were under
originally ; and instead of it, has introduced a more mild
constitution, and put us under a new law, which requires no
more than imperfect sincere obedience, in compliance with
our poor, infirm, impotent circumstances since the fall."
Now, how can these things be made consistent ? I would
ask, what law these imperfections of our obedience are a
breach of? If they are a breach of no law that we were ever
Hnder, then they are not sins. And if they be not sins, what
1S2 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
need of Christ's dying to satisfy for them ? But if they are
sins, and the breach of some law, what law is it ? They cannot
be a breach of their new Law ; for thai requires no other than
imperfect obedience* .or obedience with imperfections: And
therefore to have obedience attended with imperii; c 'ions, is no
breach of it ; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot
be a breach of their old law ; for that, they say, is entirely
abolished ; and we neve;- were under it. They say, it would
not be just in God to require of us perfect obedience, because
it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or
to punish us for failing of it. And therefore, by their own
scheme, the imperfections of cm- obedience do not deserve to
be punished. What need therefore of Christ's dying, to sat-
isfy for them I What need of bis ajjfferiag to satisfy for that
which is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no suffering?
What need of Christ's dying, to purchase, that our imperfect
obedience should be accepted, when, according to their
scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other obedience,
than imperfect should be required ? What need of Christ's dy-
ing to make way for God's accepting such an obedience, as it
would be unjust in him not to accept ? Is there any need of
Christ's dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteously ? If
it be said, that Christ died to satisfy that old law for us, that
so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for
our being under a more mild law ; still I would inquire, what
need of Christ's dying, that wo might not be under a law,
which (by their principles) it would be in itself unjust that we
should be under, whether Christ had died or no, because, in
our present state, we arc not able to keep it ?
So the Arminians are inconsistent with themselves, not only
in what they ssy of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone
for these imperfections, which we cannot avoid, but also in
what they say of the grace of God, granted to enable men to
.incere obedience of the new law. '• I grant,
I indeed, that by reason of original sin,
we are utterly disabled for the performance of the condition,
* Treatise of the Op pirit, second edition, page 412, 113,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 135
•without new grace from God. But I say then, that he gives
such grace to all of us, by which the performance of the
condition la truly possible : And upon this ground he may,
and doth most righteously require it." If Dr. Stebbing in-
tends to speak properly, by grace he must mean, that assist-
ance which is of grace, or of free favor and kindness. But
yet in the sarh-e 1 plac« lie speaks of it as very unreasonable, un-
just and craedi for God to require that, as the condition of par-
don, that is become impossible by original Sin. Ifitbeso,
what grace is there in giving assistance and ability to perform
the condition of pardon ? Of why is that called by the name
of grace, that is an absolute debt, which God is bound to be-
stow, and which it would be unjust and cruel in Him to with-
hold, seeing he requires that, as the condition cf/iardon, which
we cannot perform without it.
SECTION IV.
Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent
ivit/i moral Inability to obey.
IT being so much insisted on by Arminian writers, that
necessity is inconsistent with Law or Command, and particu-
larly, that it is absurd to suppose God by his command
should require that of men which they are unable to do ; not
allowing in this case for any difference that there is be-
tween natural and moral Inability ; I would therefore now
particularly consider this master.
And, for the greater clearness, I would distinctly lay down
the following things.
"I. The Will itself, and not only those actions which are
the effects of the Will, is the proper object of precept or
Command. That is, such or such a state or acts of men's
134 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Wills, is in many cases, properly required of them by Com-
mand ; and not those alterations in the state of their bodies
or minds only that are the consequences of volition. This is-,
most manifest ; for it is the soul only that is properly and di-
rectly the subject of precepts or commands ; that only being
capable of receiving or perceiving commands. The motions
or state of the body are matter of command, only as they
are subject to the soul, and connected with its acts. But now
the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most di-
rect and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any
command, but the faculty of the Will ; and it is by this faculty
only, that the soul can directly disobey, or refuse compliance ;
for the very notions of consenting, yielding, accepting, comply-
ing, refusing, rejecting, Ifc. are, according to the meaning of
the terms, nothing but certain acts of the Will. Obedience,
in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of
the Will of one to the Will of another. Disobedience is the
not consenting, not complying of the Will of the command-
ed to the manifested Will of the commander. Other acts
that are not the acts of the Will, as certain motions of the
body and alterations in the soul, are obedience or disobedi-
ence only indirectly as they are connected with the state or acts
of the Will, according to an established law of nature. So that
it is manifest, the Will itself may be required, and the being
of a good Will is the most proper, direct and immediate sub-
ject of command ; and if this cannot be prescribed or requir-
ed by command or precept, nothing can ; for other things
can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and
are the fruits of a good Will.
Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the Will, or a series
of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another,
the first and determining act is properly the subject of com-
mand, and not the consequent acts only, which are dependent
upon it. Yea, it is this more especially, which is that, which
command or precept has a proper respect to ; because it is
this act that determines the whole affair : In this act the obe-
dience or disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner ; the con-
sequent acts being all s-ubject to it, and governed and deter-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 185
mined by it. This determining, governing act must be the
proper subject of precept, or none.
Corol. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed,
that if there be any sort of act, or exertion of the soul, prior
to all free acts of the Will or acts of choice in the case direct-
ing and determining what the acts of the Will shall be ; that
act or exertion of the soul cannot properly be subject to
command or precept, in any respect whatsoever, either di-
rectly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts can-
not be subject to commands directly, because they are no acts
of the Will ; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the
Will, determining and giving rise to all its acts : They
not being acts of. the Will, there can be in them no
consent to, or compliance with, any command. Neither can
they be subject to command, or precept indirectly or remote-
ly i for they are not so much as the effects or consequences of
the Will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any
obedience in that original act of the soul, determining all vo-
litions, it is an act of obedience wherein the Will has no con-
cern at all ; it preceding every act of Will. And therefore,
if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly in-
voluntarily ; there is no willing obedience or rebellion, no com-
pliance or opposition of the Will in the affair : And what
sort of obedience or rebellion is this ?
And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the Will
consisting in the soul's determining its own acts of Will, in-
stead of being essential to moral agency, and to men's being
the subjects of moral government is utterly inconsistent with
it. For if the soul determines all its acts of Will, it is there-
in subject to no command or moral government, as has been
now observed ; because its original determining act is no act
of Will or choice, it being prior, by the supposition, to every
act of Will. And the soul cannot be the subject of com-
mand in the act of the Will itself which depends on the fore-
going determining act, and is determined by it ; inasmuch
as this is necessary, being the necessary consequence and ef-
fect of that prior determining act, which is not voluntary. Nor
can the man be a' subject of command or government in hi?
Vol. V. Z
1*6 I-REEDOM OF THE WILL."
external actions ; because these arc all necessary, being the
necessary effects of the acts of the Will themselves. So
that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects of com-
mand or moral government in nothing ; and all their
moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room for virtue or
vice in the world.
So that it is the Arminian scheme, and not the scheme of
the Calvinists, that is utterly inconsistent with moral govern-
ment, and with the use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, prom-
ises or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatsoever to
make their principles consist with these things. For if it be
said, that there is no prior determining act of the soul, preced-
ing the acts of the Will, but that volitions tfre events that
come to pass by pure accident, without any determining cause,
this is most palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and pre-
cepts ; for nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no
use to direct and regulate perfect accident : Which, by the
supposition of its being pure accident, is in no case regulated
by any thing preceding; but happens,this way or that, perfectly
by chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect useless-
ness of laws and precepts also follows from the Arminian no-
tion of indifference, as essential to that liberty, which is re-
quisite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to bind to one
aide ; and the end of commands is to turn the Will one way;
and therefore they are of no use, unless they turn or bias the
Will that way. But if liberty consists in indifference, then
their biassing the Will one way only, destroys liberty ; as it
puts the Will out of equilibrium. So that the Will, hav-
ing a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon it,
is not wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it
will, without influence from without.
II. Having shewn that the Will itself, especially in those
acts, which are original, leading and determining in any case,
is the proper subject of precept and command, and not only
those alterations in the body, &c. which are the effects of the
Will ; I now proceed, in the second place, to observe that
the very opposition or defect of the Will itself, in that
act, which "is its original and determining act in the case;
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 187
% say, the Will's opposition in this act to a thing proposed or
commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral Ina-
bility to that thing : Or, in other words, whenever a com-
mand requires a certain state or act of the Will, and the per-
son commanded, notwithstanding the command and the cir-
cumstances under which it is exhibitad, still finds his Will
opposite or wanting, in that, belonging to its state or acts, which
is original and determining in the affair, that man is morally
unable to obey that command.
This is manifest from what was observed in the first part,
concerning the nature of moral Inability, as distinguished from
natural ; where it was observed, that a man may then
be said to be morally unable to do a thing., when he is un-
der the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination,
or has a want of inclination, under such circumstances and
views. It is also evident, from what has been before proved,
that the Will is always, and in every individual act, necessarily
determined by the strongest motive ; and so is always unable
to go against the motive, which, all things considered, has now
the greatest strength and advantage to move the Will.. ..But
not further to insist on these things, the truth of the position
now laid down, viz. that when the Will is opposite to, or,
failing of a compliance with a thing in its original, determining
inclination or act, it is not able to comply, appears by Jhe con-
sideration of these two things.
1 . The Will in the time of that diwerse or opposite lead-
ing act or inclination, and when actually under the influence
of it, is not able to exert itself to the contrary, to npakc an al-
teration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable
to change itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is una-
ble to incline to change itself. Present choice cannot at pres-
ent choose to be otherwise: For that would be at firesent to
choose some thing diverse from what is at firesent chosen. If
the Will, all things now considered, inclines or chooses to go
that way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to
go the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the
Other way. To suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined
to change itself to a different inclination, is to suppose the
188 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.'
mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined.
The Will may oppose some future remote act that it is ex-
posed to, but not its own present act.
2. As it is impossible that the Will should comply with
the thing commanded, with respect to its leading act, by any
act of its own, in the time of that diverse or opposite leading
and original act, or after it has actually come under the influ-
ence of that determining choice or inclination ; so it is impossi-
ble it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing
act ; for, by the very supposition, there is no foregoing act ;
the opposite or noncomplying act being that act which is orig-
inal and determining in the case. Therefore it must be so,
that if this first determining act be found noncomplying, on
the proposal of the command, the mind is morally unable to
obey. For to suppose it to be able to obey, is to suppose it to
be able to determine and cause its first determining act to be
otherwise, and that it has power better to govern and regulate
lis first governing and regulating act, which is absurd ; for it is
to suppose a prior act of the Will, determining its first deter-
mining act ; that is, an act prior to the first, and leading and
governing the original and governing act of all ; which is a
contradiction.
Here if it should be said, that although the mind has not
any ability to Will contrary to what it does Will, in the orig-
inal and leading act of the Will, because there is supposed to
be no prior act to determine and order it otherwise, and the
Will cannot immediately change itself, because it cannot at
present incline to a change ; yet the mind has an ability for
the present to forbear to proceed to action, and to take time
for deliberation ; which may be an occasion of the change of
the inclination,
/ answer, (1.) In this objection that seems to be forgot-
ten which was observed before, viz. that the determining to
take the matter into consideration, is itself an act of the Will;
and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises ability
and freedom, then this, by the supposition, must be all that
can be commanded or required by precept. And if this act
be the commSVuted act, then all that has been observed con-
cerning the commanded act of the Will remains true, that
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 189
the very want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, Sec. (2.)
We are speaking concerning the first and leading act of the
Will in the case, or about the affair ; and if a determining to
deliberate, or on the contrary, to proceed immediately with-
out deliberating, be the first and leading act ; or whether it
be or no, if there be another act before it, which determines
that ; or whatever be th e original and leading act ; still the
foregoing proof stands good, that the noncompliance of the
leading act implies moral Inability to comply.
If it should be objected, that these things make all moral
Inability equal, and suppose men morally unable to Will oth-
erwise than they actually do Will, in all cases, and equally so
in every instance.
In answer to this objection, I desire two things may be
observed. First, That if by being equally unable, be meant
as really unable ; then, so far as the Inability is merely mor-
al, it is true, the Will, in every instance, acts by moral neces-
sity and is morally unable* to act otherwise, as truly and prop-
erly in one case as another ; as I humbly conceive has been
perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said
in the preceding part of this Essay. But yet, in some res-
pect, the Inability may be said to be greater in some instances
than others ; though the man may be truly unable, (if moral
Inability can truly be called Inability) yet he may be further
from being able to do some things than others. As it is in
things, which men are naturally unable to do.. ..A person,
whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of
one hundred pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one
hundred and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds ; but yet he
is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the
former ; and so, according to common use of speech, has a
greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man
is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present incli-
nation, which in the least degree prevails ; or, contrary to
that motive, which, all things considered, has strength and ad-
vantage now to move the Will, in the least degree, superior
to all other motives in view ; but yet he is further from abili-
ty to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply root-
ISO FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ed inclination, or a motive vastly exceeding all others ia
strength. And again, the Inability may, in some respects, be
called greater in some instances than others, as it may be more
general and extensive to all acts of that kind. So men may
be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further from
moral ability! who have that moral Inability which is general
and habitual, than they who have only that Inability which is
occasional ;\nd Jmrticular* Thus in cases of natural Inability ;
he that is born blind may be said to be unable to see, in a dif-
ferent manner, and is, in some respects, further from being
able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient
cloud or mist.
And besides, that which was observed in the first part of
this discourse, concerning the Inability which attends a strong
and settled habit, should be here remembered, viz. that fixed
habit i? attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which
it is distinguished from occasional volition, namely, that en-
deavors to avoid future volitions of that kind, which are agree-
able to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly
prove vain and insuflicient. For though it is impossible there
should be any true, sincere desires and endeavors against a
present volition or choice, yet there may be against volitions
of that kind, when viewed at a distance. A person may de-
sire and use means to prevent future exercises of a certain
inclination ; and, in order to it, may wish the habit might be
removed ; but his desires and endeavors may be ineffectual.
The man may be said in some sense to be unable ;" yea, even
as the word unable \s a relative term, and has relation to inef-
fectual endeavors ; yet not with regard to present, but remote
endeavors.
Secondly, It mv.sibc borne in mind, according to what was
observed before, that indeed no Inability whatsoever, which is
merely moral, is properly called lay the name of Inability ; and
that in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may be said
to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his election ; and
lie cannot be said to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if
* See this distinction of moral Inability explained in Part I. Sect. IV.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 191
he now pleases, or whenever he has a proper, direct and im-
mediate desire for it. As to those desires and endeavors, that
may he against the exercises of a strong hahit, with regard to
which men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises,
they are remote desires and endeavors in two respects. First y
as to time ; they are never a'gainst present volitions, but only
against volitions of such a kind, when- viewed at a distance.
Secondly, as to their nature ; these opposite desires are not
directly and properly against the habit and inclination itself,
or the volitions in which it is exercised ; for these, in them-
selves considered, are agreeable ; but against something else,
that attends them, or is their consequence ; the opposition of
the mind is levelled entirely against this ; the inclination or
volitions themselves are not at all opposed directly, and for
their own sake ; but only indirectly and remotely on the ac-
count of something alien and foreign.
III. Though the opposition of the Will itself, or the very
want of Will to a thing commanded, implies a moral Inabili-
ty to that thing ; yet, if it be, as has been already shewn, that
the being of a good state or act of Will, is a tiling most prop-
erly required by command ; then, in some cases, such a state
or act of Will may properly be required, which at present is
not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded.
And therefore those things may properly be commanded,
which men have a moral Inability for.
Such a state, or act of the Will, may be required by com-
mand, as does not already exist. For if that volition only may-
be commanded to be which already is, there could be no use
of precept ; commands in all cases would be perfectly vein
and impertinent. And not only may such a Will be required.
as is wanting before the command is given, but also such as
may possibly be wanting afterwards ; such as the exhibition
of the command may not be effectual to produce or excite..,.
Otherwise, no such things as disobedience to a proper and
rightful command is possible in any case ; and there is no
case supposable or possible, wherein there can be an inexcus-
able or faulty disobedience ; which Arminiuns cannot affirm
consistently with their principles : Vox this makes obedtenee
192 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
to just and proper commands always necessary, and Disobe-
dience impossible. And so the Arminian would overthrow
himself, yielding the very point we are upon, which he so
strenuously denies, viz. that law and command are consistent
with necessity.
If merely that Inability will excuse disobedience, which is
implied in the opposition or defect of inclination, remaining
after the command is exhibited, then wickedness always car-
ries that in it which excuses it. It is evermore so, that by
how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by
so much is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much.
the more, therefore, has he of moral Inability to the good re-
quired. His moral Inability, consisting in the strength of his
evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness con-
sists ; and yet, according to Arminian principles, it must be a
thing inconsistent with wickedness ; and by how much the
more he has of it, by so much is he the further from wicked-
ness.
Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Inability
alone (which consists in disinclination, never renders any
thing improperly the subject matter of precept or command,
and never can excuse any person in disobedience, or want of
conformity to a command.
Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capacity,
or external hindcrance, (which alone is properly called Ina-
bility) without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing im-
properly the matter of command. If men are excused from
doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be commanded,
it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the
Will itself, but extrinsic to it; either in the capacity of un-
derstanding, or body, or outward circumstances.
Here two or three things may be observed,
1. As to spiritual duties or acts, or any good thing in the
state or immanent acts of the Will itself, or of the affections,
(which are only certain modes of the exercise of the Will) if
persons are justly excused, it must be through want of capaci-
ty in the natural faculty of understanding. Thus the same
spiritual duties, or holy affections and exercises of heart, can-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, tgti
i>ot be required of men, as may be of angels ; the capacity of
understanding being so much inferior. So men cannot be re-
quired to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no
opportunity to see, or hear of, or come to the knowledge of,'
in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the
human understanding. But the insufficiency of motives will
not excuse ; unless their being insufficient arises not from the
moral state of the Will or inclination itself, but from the state
of the natural understanding. The great kindness and gene-
rosity of another may be a motive insufficient to excite grati-
tude in the person, that receives the kindness, through his vile
and ungrateful temper : In this case, the insufficiency of the
motive arises from the state of the Will or inclination of
heart, and does not at all excuse. But if this generosity is
not sufficient to excite gratitude, being unknown, there being
no means of information adequate to the state and measure of
the person's faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a nat-
ural Inability which entirely excuses.
2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations
of mind, which do not consist in the immanent acts or state of
the Will itself, but are supposed to be required as effects of
the Will ; I say, in such supposed effects of the Will, in
cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understand-
ing ; that Inability, and that only excuses, which consists in
want of connexion between them and the Will. If the Will
fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, accord-
ing to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition,
the man is perfectly excused ; he has a natural Inability to
the thing required. For the Will itself, as has been observ-
ed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by
Command ; and other things only indirectly, as connected*
with the Will. If, therefore, there be a full compliance of
Will, the person has done his duty ; and if other things do
not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not owing
to him.
3. Both these kinds of natural Inability that have been
mentioned, and so all Inability that excuses, may be resolved
into one thing, namely, want of natural capacity or strength ;
Vol. V. 2 A
194 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
either capacity of understanding, or external strength. For
when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be
no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations
of understanding and strength.
Carol. If things for which men have a moral Inability, may
properly be the matter of precept or command, then they
may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invita-
tions come very much to the same thing ; the difference is
only circumstantial : Commands are as much a manifestation
of the Will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much
testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference
between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand.
The main difference between command and invitation con-
sists in the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or
invites. In the latter it is his kindness, the goodness which
his Will arises from : In the former it is his authority. But
whatever be the ground of the Will of him that speaks, or the
enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither his Will nor
expectation is any more testified in the one case than the oth-
er ; therefore a person's being known to be morally unable to
do the thing to which he is directed by Invitation, is no more
an evidence of insincerity in him that directs in manifesting
either a Will, or expectation which he has not, than his be-
ing known to be morally unable to do what he is directed to
by command. So that all this grand objection of Arminiani
against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in Christ, or
to perform other spiritual gospel duties, from the sincerity of
God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 195
SECTION V.
That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which is
supposed to excuse in the Nonperformance of
Things in themsehes good, particularly considered.
IT is what is much insisted on by many, that some men,
though they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as
repentance of sin, love of God, a cordial acceptance of Christ
as exhibited and offered in the gospel, Sec. yet they may sin-
cerely desire and endeavor these things ; and therefore must
be excused ; it being unreasonable to blame them for the
omission of those things, which they sincerely desire and en-
deavor to do, but cannot do.
Concerning this matter, the following things may be ob-
served.
1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake and gross ab-
surdity ; even that men may sincerely choose and desire
those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, Sec.
consisting in the exercise of the Will itself, or in the disposi-
tion and inclination of the heart ; and yet not be able to per-
form or exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to
suppose that a man should directly, properly and sincerely in-
cline to have an inclination, which at the same time is contra-
ry to his inclination : For that is to suppose him not to be in-
clined to that, to which he is inclined. If a man, in the state
and acts of his Will and inclination, does properly and directly
fall in with those duties, he therein performs them : For the
duties themselves, consist in that very thing ; they consist in
the state and acts of the Will being so formed and directed.
If the soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain pro-
posed act of Will or choice, the soul therein makes that
choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a
proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to
move in that direction.
196 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
2. That which is called a desire and willingness for thos&
inward duties, in such as do not perform them, has repect to
these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly
represented as a willingness for them ; not only because (as
was observed before) it respects those good volitions only in &
distant view, and with respect to future time ; but also be-
cause evermore, not these things themselves, but something
else, that is alien and foreign, is the object that terminates
these volitions and desires.
A drunkard, who continues in his drunkenness, being un-
der the power of a love, and violent appetite to strong drink,
and without any love to virtue ; but being also extremely
covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved at
the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in
a sort desire the virtue of temperance ; and though his pres-
ent Will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may
wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperence, and
forsake his excesses, through an unwillingness to part with
his money : But still he goes on with his drunkenness ; his
wishes and endeavors are insufficient and ineffectual : Such a
man has no proper, direct, sincere willingness to forsake this
vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it : For he acts
voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess : His desire is
very improperly called a willingness to be temperate ; it is
no true desire of that virtue ; for it is not that virtue, that
terminates his wishes ; nor have they any direct respect
to it. It is only the saving his money, and avoiding poverty,
that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his desire.
The virtue of temperance is regarded only very indirectly
and improperly, even as a necessary means of gratifying the
vice of covetousness.
So a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked heart, who
has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the contrary, be-
ing very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest dis-
taste of the things of religion, and enmity against them ; yet
being of a family, that from one generation to another, have
most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption ;
and so having little hope of living long ; and having been in-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 197
structed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and gra-
titude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation
from eternal misery ; if under these circumstances he should,
through fear of eternal torments, wish he had such a disposi-
tion : But his profane and carnal heart remaining, he contin-
ues still in his habitual distaste of and enmity to God and re-
ligion, and wholly without any exercise of that love and grati-
tude, (as doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstand-
ing all the devilishness of their temper, would wish for a holy
heart, if by that means they could get out of hell :) In this
case, there is no sincere willingness to love Christ and choose
him as his chief good : These holy dispositions and exercis-
es are not at all the direct object of the Will : they truly
share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul ; but all
is terminated on deliverence from torment : And these graces
and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are
looked upon as undesirable ; as when a sick man desires a
dose he greatly abhors, to save his life From these things it
appears,
3. That this indirect willingness -which has been spoken
of, is not that exercise of the Will which the command re-
quires ; but is entirely a different one ; being a volition of a
different nature, and terminated altogether on different ob-
jects ; wholly falling short of that virtue of Will, which the
command has respect to.
4. This other volition, which has only some indirect con-
cern with the duty required, cannot excuse for the want of that
good will itself, which is commanded ; being not the thing
which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly des-
titute of the virtue which the command seeks.
Further to illustrate this matter If a child has a most
excellent father, that has ever treated him with fatherly kind-
ness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest de-
gree merited his love and dutiful regaid, being withal very
wealthy ; but the son is of so vile a disposition, that he in-
veterately hates his father ; and yet, apprehending that his
hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him final-
ly to poverty and abject circumstances, through his father'-s
198 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
disinheriting him, or otherwise ; which is exceeding cross to
his avarice and ambition ; he therefore, wishes it were oth-
erwise : But yet, remaining tinder the invincible power of hie
vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his settled
hatred of his father. Now, if such a son's indirect willing-
ness to have love and honor towards his father, at ail acquits
or excuses before God, for his failing of actually- exercising
these dispositions towards him, which God requires, it must
be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either that it answers and
fulfils the command. But this it does not by the supposition ;
because the thing commanded is love and honor to his wor-
thy parent. If the command be proper and just, as is sup-
posed, then it obliges to the thing commanded ; and so noth-
ing else but that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must
be at least, because there is that virtue or goodness in his
indirect willingness, that is equivalent to the virtue required;
and so balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want of
it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The willing-
ness the son has merely from regard to money and honor, has
no goodness in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial
respect required.
Sincerity and reality, in that indirect willingness, which
has been spoken of does not make it the better. That which
is real and hearty is often called sincere ; whether it be iu
virtue or vice. Some persons are sincerely bad ; others are
sincerely good; and others may be sincere and hearty in
Ihings, which are in their own nature indifferent ; as a man
may be sincerely desirous of eating when he is hungry. But
3 being sincere, hearty and in good earnest, is no virtue, un-
less it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere
and hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers.
When the devils cried out, and besought Christ not to tor-
ment them, it was no mere pretence ; they were very hearty
in their desires not to be tormented ; but this did not make
their Will or desires virtuous. ...And if men have sincere de-
sires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be
no excuse for the want of any required virtue.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 199
And as a man's being sincere in such an indirect desire or
willingness to do his duty, as has been mentioned, cannot ex-
cuse for the want of performance ; so it is with endeavorb
arising from such a willingness. The endeavors can have no
more goodness in therh, than the Will which they are the efc
feet and expression of. And, therefore, however sincere and
real, and however great a person's endeavors are ; yea, though
they should be to the utmost of his ability ; unless the Will
which they proceed from be truly good and virtuous,
they can be of no avail, influence or weight to any purpose
whatsoever, in a moral sense or respect. That which is not
truly virtuous, in God's sight, is looked upon, by him, as good
for nothing ; and so can be of no value, weight or influence
in his account, to recommend, satisfy, excuse or make up for
any moral defect. For nothing can counterbalance evil, but
good. If evil be in one scale, and we put a great deal into the
other, sincere and earnest desires, and many and great en-
deavors ; yet, if there be no real goodness in all, there is no
weight in it ; and so it does nothing towards balancing the
real weight, which is in the opposite scale. It is only like the
subtracting a thousand noughts from before a real number
which leaves the sum just as it was.
Indeed such endeavors may have a negatively good infiu=
ence. Those things, which have no positive virtue have no
positive moral influence ; yet they may oe an occasion of per-
sons avoiding some positive evils. As if a man were in the
Water with a neighbor, that he had ill will to, who could no:
swim, holding him by his hand ; which neighbor was much
in debt to him ; and should be tempted to let him sink and
drown ; but should refuse to comply with the temptation ,
not from love to his neighbor, but from the love of money,
and because by his drowning he should lose his debt ; that
which he does in preserving his neighbor from drowning, h
nothing good in the sight of God ; yet hereby he avoids the
greater guilt that would have been contracted, if he had de-
signedly let his neighbor sink and perish. But when Armin-
ians, in their disputes with Calvinists, insist so much on sin-
cere desires and endeavors, as what must excuse men. fotisi
300 FREEDOM OF THE WILL,"
be accepted of God, Sec. it is manifest they have respect to'
some positive moral weight or influence of those desires and
endeavors. Accepting, justifying or excusing on the account
of sincere honest endeavors (as they are called) and men's do-
ing what they can, Sec. has relation to some moral value, some-
thing that is accepted as good, and as such, countervailing
some defect.
But there is a great and unknown deceit arising from the
ambiguity of the phrase, sincere endeavors. Indeed there is a
vast indistinctness and unfixedness in most, or at least very
many of the terms used to express things pertaining to moral
and spiritual matters. Whence arise innumerable mistakes,
strong prejudices, inextricable confusion, and endless con-
troversy.
The word sincere, is most commonly used to signify some-
thing that is good : Men are habituated to understand by it
the same as honest and upright ; which terms excite an idea
of something good in the strictest and highest sense ; good
in the sight of him, who sees not only the outward appearance,
but the heart. And, therefore, men think that if a person be
sincere, he will Certainly be accepted. If it be said that any
one is sincere in his endeavors, this suggests to men's minds
as much, as that his heart and Will is good, that there is no
defect of duty, as to virtuous inclination ; he honestly and ufi~
rightly desires and endeavors to do as he is required ; and
this leads them to suppose, that it would be very hard and un-
reasonable to punish him, only because he is unsuccessful in
his endeavors, the thing endeavored being beyond his power....
Whereas it ought to be observed, that the word sincere has
these different significations :
1. Sincerity, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no
more than reality of Will and endeavor, with resptct to any
thing that is professed or pretended ; without any considera-
tion of the nature of the principle or aim, whence this real
Will and true endeavor arises. If a man has some real desire
to obtain a thing, cither direct or indirect, or does really En-
deavor after a thing, he is said sincerely to desire or endeavor
k ; without anv consideration of the goodness or virtuousness
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 201
©f the principle he acts from, or any excellency or worthiness
of the end he acts for. Thus a man who is kind to his neigh-
bor's wife, who is sick and languishing, and very helpful in
her case, makes a shew of desiring and endeavoring her res-
toration to health and vigor; and not only makes such a shew,
but there is a reality in his pretence, he does heartily and earn-
estly desire to have her health restored, and uses his true
and utmost endeavors for it ; he is said sincerely to desire and
endeavor it ; because he does so truly or really ; though per-
haps the principle he acts from, is no other than a vile and
scandalous passion ; having lived iu adultery with her, he ear-
nestly desires to have her health and vigor restored, that he
may return to his criminal pleasures with her. Or,
2. By sincerity is meant, not merely a reality of Will and
endeavor of some sort or other, and from some consideration
or other, but a virtuous sincerity. That is, that in the per-
formance of those particular acts, that arc the matter of virtue
or duty, there be not only the matter, but the form and es-
sence of virtue, consisting in the aim that governs the act, and
the principle exercised in it. There is not only the reality of
the act, that is as it were the body of the duty ; but also the
soul, which should properly belong to such a body. In this
sense, a man is said to be sincere, when he acts with a pure
intention ; not from sinister views, or bye ends : He not only
in reality desires and seeks the thing to be done, or qualifica-
tion to be obtained, for some end or other ; but he wills the
thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed ; the
•virtue of the thing is properly the object of the Will.
In the former sense, a man is said to be sincere, in oppo-
sition to a mere pretence, and shew of the particular thing to be
done or exhibited, without any real desire or endeavor' at all.
In the latter sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition
to that shew of virtue there is in merely doing Che 7na?t:r of 'duty r ,
without the reality of the virtue itself in the soul, and the es-
sence of it, which there is a shew of. A man may be sincere
in the former sense, and yet in the latter be in the sight of Godj
who searches the heart, a vile hypocrite.
Vol. V. 2B
26* FREEDOM OF THE WtLV.
In the latter kind of sincerity only, is there any thing tru-
ly valuable or acceptable in the sight of God. And this is
the thing, which in scripture is called sincerity, uprightness,
integrity, truth in the inivard parts, and a being of a perfect
heart. And if there be such a sincerity, and such a degree of
it as there ought to be, and there be any thing further that the
man is not able to perform, or which does not prove to be con-
nected with his sincere desires and endeavors, the man is
wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God ; his Will
shall surely be accepted for his deed ; and such a sincere Will
and endeavor is all that in strictness is required of him, by
•ny command of God. But as to the other kind of sincerity
of desires and endeavors, it having no virtue in it, (as was ob-
served before) can be of no avail before God, in any case, to
recommend, satisfy, or excuse, and has no positive moral
weight or influence whatsoever.
Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in the
reason and nature of things appears, from the consideration of
any moral weight of that former kind of sincerity, which has
been spoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or leading us to
suppose, that God has made any positive promises of salvation,
or grace, or any saving assistance, or any spiritual benefit
whatsoever, to any desires, prayers, endeavors, striving, or obe~
dience of those, who hitherto have no true virtue or holiness
in their hearts ; though we should suppose all the sincerity,
and the utmost degree of endeavor, that is possible to be in a
person without holiness.
Some object against God's requiring, as the condition of
salvation, those holy exercises, which are the result of a su-
pernatural renovation : Such as a supreme respect to Christ,
love to God, loving holiness for its own sake, &c. that these
inward dispositions and exercises are above men's power, as
they are by nature ; and therefore that we may conclude, that
when men are brought to be sincere in their endeavors, and
do as well as they can, they are accepted ; and that this must
1je all that God requires, in order to men's being received as
the objects of his favor, and must be what God has appointed
as the condition of salvation. Concerning which, I would oh-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 20S
serve, that in such a manner of speaking of men's being ac-
cepted, because they are sincere, and do as well as they can,
there is evidently a supposition of some virtue, some degree
of that which is truly good ; though it does not go so far as
were to be wished. For if men do what they can, unless their
so doing be from some good principle, disposition, or exer-
cise of heart, some virtuous inclination or act of the Will ;
their so doing what they can, is in some respects not a whit
better than if they did nothing. In such a case, there is
no more positive moral goodness in a man's doing what he
can, than in a windmill's doing what it can ; because the ac-
tion does no more proceed from virtue ; and there is nothing
in such sincerity of endeavor, or doing what we can, that should
render it any more a proper or fit recommendation to positive
favor and acceptance, or the condition of any reward or actual
benefit, than doing nothing ; for both the one and the other
are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight or value.
Coroi. 2. Hence also it follows, that there is nothing that
appears in the reason and nature of things, which can justly
lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the necessa-
ry means of salvation, or some way or other bestow true holi-
ness and eternal life on those Heathen, who are sincere (in the
sense above explained) in their endeavors to find out the Will
of the Deity, and to please him, according to their light, that
they may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain
happiness in the future state, through his favor.
2<M FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
SECTION VI.
Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary t*
Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it ; and all,
either virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations,
inconsistent with Arminian Notions of Liberty and
moral Agency.
TO suppose such a freedom of Will, as Arminians talk of,
to be requisite to virtue and vice, is many ways contrary to
common stnse.
If indifference belongs to liberty of Will, as Arminians
sunpose, and it be essential to a virtuous action, that it be per-
formed in a state of liberty, as they also suppose ; it will fol-
low, that it is essential to a virtuous notion, that it be perform-
ed in a st.ile of indifference ; and if it be performed in a state
of indifference, then doubtless it must be performed in the
lime of indifference. And so it will follow, that in order to
the virtuousness of an act, the heart must be indifferent in the
time of the performance of that act and the more indifferent
and cold the heart is with relation to the act which is per-
formed, so much the better ; because the act is performed
with so much the greater liberty. Hut is this agreeable to
the light of nature ? Is it agreeable to the notions, which
mankind, in all ages, have of virtue, that it lies in that, which
is contrary to indifference, even in the tendency and inclina-
tion of the heart to virtuous action ; and that the stronger the
inclination, and so the further from indifference, the more vir-
tuous the heart* and so much more praiseworthy the act which
proceeds from it ?
If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before de-
monstrated) that there may be an act of Will in a state of in-
difference ; for instance, this act, viz. The Will's determining
to put itself out of a state of indifference, and give itself a
preponderation one way, then it would follow, on Arminian
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 20*
principles, that this act or determination of the Will is that
alone wherein virtue consists, because this only is performed,
while the mind remains in a state of indifference, and so in a
state of liberty : For when once the mind is put out of its
equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state ; and therefore all
the acts, which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can
have the nature neither of virtue nor vice. Or if the thing,
which the Will can do, while yet in a state of indifference,
and so of liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to
take the matter into consideration, then this determination is
that alone wherein virtue consists, and not proceeding to ac-
tion after the scale is turned by consideration. So that it will
follow, from these principles, that all that is done after the
mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium and al-
ready possessed by an inclination, and arising from that in-
clination, has nothing of the nature of virtue or vice, and is
"worthy of neither blame nor praise. But how plainly contra-
ry is tins to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion
they have of sincerely virtuous actions ? Which is, that they
are actions, which proceed from a heart ivell disposed and in-
clined ; and the stro?iger, and the more fixed and determined
the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of
virtue, and so the more of the truth and reality of it. But if
there be any acts, which are done in a state of equilibrium, or
spring immediately from perfect indifference and coldness of
heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposi-
tion in the heart ; and, consequently, according to common
sense, have no sincere goodness in them, having no virtue of
heart in them. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart
that favors virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly
cold and indifferent about it.
And besides, the actions that are done in a state of indiffer-
ence, or that arise immediately out of such a state, cannot be
virtuous, because, by the supposition, they are not determined
by any preceding choice. For if there be preceding choice,
then choice intervenes between the act and the state of indif-
ference ; which is contrary to the supposition of the act's
arising immediately out of indifference. But those acts.
206 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
which arc not determined by preceding choice, cannot be vir-
tuous or vicious by Arminian principles, because they are not
determined by the Will. So that neither one way, nor the
other, can any actions be virtuous or vicious, according to Ar-
viinian principles. If the action be determined by a preceding
act of choice, it cannot be virtuous ; because the action is not
done in a state of indifference, nor does immediately arise
from such a state ; and so is not done in a state of liberty. If
the action be not determined by a preceding act of choice, then
it cannot be virtuous ; because then the Will is not selfdeter-
roined in it. So that it is made certain, that neither virtue
nor vice can ever find any place in the universe.
Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action, that it
be performed in a state of indifference, under a notion of that
being a state of liberty, is contrary to common sense ; as it is
a dictate of common sense, that indifference itself, in many
cases, is vicious, and so to a high degree. As if when I see
my neighbor or near friend, and one who has in the ijighest
degree merited of me, in extreme distress, and ready to per-
ish, I find an indifference in my heart with respect to any
thing proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his re-
lief. So if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God, or
kill my father, or do numberless other things, which might
be mentioned, the being indifferent, for a moment, would
be highly vicious and vile.
And it may be further observed, that to suppose this liberty
of indifference is essential to virtue and vice, destroys the
great difference of degrees of the guilt of different crimes,
and takes away the heinousness of the most flagitious, horrid
iniquities ; such as adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury,
blasphemy, Sec. For, according to these principles, there is
no harm at all in having the mind in a state of perfect indiffer-
ence with respect to these crimes : Nay, it is absolutely nec-
essary in order to any virtue in avoiding them, or vice in
doing them. But for the mind to be in a state of indifference
with respect to them, is to be next door to doing them : It is
then infinitely near to choosing, and so committing the fact :
For equilibrium is the next step to a degree of prepondera-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 2or
tion ; and one, even the least degree of preponderation, (all
things considered) is choice. And not only so, but for the
Will to be in a state of perfect equilibrium with respect to
such crimes, is for the mind to be in such a state, as to be full
as likely to choose them as to refuse them, to do them as tc*
omit them. And if our minds must be in such a state,
wherein it is as near to choosing as refusing, and wherein it
must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as
likely to commit them, as to refrain from them ; where is the
exceeding heinousness of choosing and committing them ? If
there be no harm in often being in such a state, wherein the
probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there
being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one than
the other ; then, according to the nature and laws of such a
contingence, it may be expected, as an inevitable consequence
of such a disposition of things, that we should choose them as
often as reject them : That it should generally so fall out is
necessary, as equality in the effect is the natural consequence
of the equal tendency of the cause, or of the antecedent state
of things from which the effect arises. Why then should we
be so exceedingly to blame, if it does so fall out ?
It is many ways apparent, that the Arminian scheme of lib-
erty is utterly inconsistent with the being of any such thing?
as either virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions. If liberty
of indifference be essential to moral agency, then there can be
no virtue in any habitual inclinations of the heart ; which are
contrary to indifference, and imply in their nature the very
destruction and exclusion of it. They suppose nothing can
be virtuous, in which no liberty is exercised ; but how absurd
is it to talk cf exercising indifference under bias and prepon-
deration !
And if self deter mining flower in the Will be necessary te<
moral agency, praise, blame, &c. then nothing done by the
Will can be any further praise or blameworthy, than so far as
the Will is moved, swayed and determined by itself, and the
scales turned by the sovereign power the Will has over itself.
And therefore the Will must not be put out of its balance al-
ready, the preponderation must not be determined and effect-
303 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
eel beforehand ; and so the selfdetermining act anticipated.
Thus it appears another way, that habitual bias is inconsisent
with that liberty, which Arminians suppose to be necessary
to virtue or vice ; and so it follows, that habitual bias itself
cannot be either virtuous or vicious.
The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning
the inconsistence of necessity with liberty, praise, dispraise,
&c. None will deny, that bias and inclination may be so
strong as to be invincible, and leave no possibility of the Will's
determining contrary to it ; and so be attended with necessity.
This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Will of God, Angels,
and glorified Saints, with respect to good ; and the Will of
Devils with respect to evil. Therefore if necessity be incon-
sistent with liberty ; then, when fixed inclination is to sucli a
degree of strength, it utterly excludes all virtue, vice, praise
or blame. And if so, then the nearer habits are to this
strength, the more do they impede liberty, and so diminish
praise and blame. If very strong habits destroy liberty, the
less ones proportionably hinder it, according to their degree
of strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is the act
most virtuous or vicious, when performed without any in-
clination or habitual bias at all ; because it is then perform-
ed with most liberty.
Every prepossessing, fixed bias on the mind, brings a
degree of moral inability for the contrary ; because so far as
the mind is biassed and prepossessed, so much hinderancc is
there of the contrary. And therefore if moral inability be
inconsistent with moral agency, or the nature of virtue and
vice, then, so far r.s there is any such thing as evil disposi-
tion of heart, or habitual depravity of inclination ; whether
covctousness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else ; so
much the more excusable persons are ; so much the less
have their evil acts of this kind the nature of vice. And on
the contrary, whatever excellent dispositions and inclinations
they have, so much are they the less virtuous.
It is evident, that no habitual disposition of heart, whether
it be to a greater or less degree, can be in any degree virtu-
ous or vicious ; or the actions which proceed from them at
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 209
all praise ov blameworthy Because, though we should sup-
pose the habit not to be of such strength, as wholly to take
away all moral ability and selfdetermining power ; or hinder
but that, although the act be partly from bias, yet it may be
in part from sclfdetermination ; yet in this case, all that is
from antecedent bias must be set aside, as of no considera-
tion ; and in estimating the degree of virtue or vice, no more
must be considered than what arises from selfdetermining
power, without any influence of that bias, because liberty is
exercised in no more ; so that all that is the exercise of ha-
bitual inclination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the
morality of the action. By which it appears, that no exercise
of these habits, let them be stronger or weaker, can ever
have any thing of the nature of either virtue or vice.
Here if any one should say, that notwithstanding all these
things, there may be the nature of virtue and vice in hab-
its of the mind; because these habits may be the effects of
those acts, wherein the mind exercised liberty ; that howev-
er the forementioned reasons will prove that no habits, which
are natural, or that are born or created with us can be either
virtuous or vicious ; yet they will not prove this of habits^
which have been acquired and established by repeated free
acts.
To such an objector I would say, that this evasion will
not at all help the matter. For if freedom of Will be essen-
tial to the very nature of virtue and vice, then there is no vir-
tue or vice, but only in that very thing, wherein this liberty is
exercised. If a man in one or more things, that he does,
exercises liberty, and then by those acts is brought into such
circumstances, that his Liberty ceases, and there follows a
long series of acts or events that come to pass necessarily ;
those consequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable
or punishable ; but only the free acts that established this ne-
cessity ; for in them alone was the man free. The following
effects, that are necessary, have no more of the nature of vir-
tue or vice, than health or sickness of body have properly the
nature of virtue or vice, being the effects of a course of free
acts of temperance or intemperance ; or than the good quail-
Vol, V. 2 C
210 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
lies of a clock are of the nature of virtue, which are the effects
of free acts of the artificer ; or the goodness and sweetness
of the fruits of a garden are moral virtues, being the effects of
the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If liberty be abso-
lutely requisite to the morality of actions and necessity whol-
ly inconsitent with it, as Arminians greatly insist ; then no
necessary effects whatsoever, let the cause be ever so good or
bad, can be virtuous or vicious ; but the virtue or vice must be
only in the free cause. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby sup-
poses, the necessity that attends the good and evil habits of
the saints in heaven, and damned in hell, which are the con-
sequence of their free acts in their state of probation, are not
rewardable or punishable.
On the whole, it appears, that if the notions of Arminians
concerning liberty and moral agency be true, it will follow,
that there is no virtue in any such habits or qualities as humil-
ity, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heav-
enly mindedness ; nothing at all praiseworthy in loving Christ
above father and mother, wife and children, or our own lives ;
or in delight in holiness, hungering and thirsting after right-
eousness, love to enemies, universal benevolence to mankind :
And on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or wor-
thy of dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly, malignant, dev-
ilish dispositions ; in being ungrateful, profane, habitually
hating God, and things sacred and holy ; or in being most
treacherous, envious, and cruel towards men. For all these
things are dis/iositions and inclinations of the heart. And in
short, there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious quality
of mind ; no such thing as inherent virtue and holiness, or
vice and sin : And the stronger those habits or dispositions
are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further
they are from being so indeed ; the more violent men's lusts
are, the more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude and mali-
ciousness, still the further are they from being blameworthy.
If there be a man that by his own repeated acts, or by any
other means, is come to be of the most hellish disposition,
desperately, inclined to treat his neighbors with injurious-
ness, contempt and malignity ; ihc further they should be
FREEDOM OF THE WILL: 2ii
from any disposition to be angry with him, or in the least to
blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a person, who
is of a most excellent spirit, strongly inclining him to the
most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c. so
much is he further from any thing rewardable or commenda-
ble. On which principles, the man Jesus Christ was very
far from being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness and
kindness, which he performed, these propensities being
strong in his heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and
gracious God is infinitely remote from any thing commenda-
ble, his good inclinations being infinitely strong, and He,
therefore, at the utmost possible distance from being at liber-
ty. And in all cases, the stronger the inclinations of any are
to virtue, and the more they love it, the less virtuous they
are ; and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious....
Whether these things are agreeable to scripture, let every
Christian, and every man who has read the Bible, judge :
And whether they are agreeable to common sense, let every
one judge, that has human understanding in exercise.
And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that vir-
tue and vice are wholly excluded out of the world ; and that
there never was, nor ever can be any such thing as one or the
other ; either in God, angels, or men. No propensity, dispo-
sition or habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been shewn ;
because they, so far as they take place, destroy the freedom
of the Will, the foundation of all moral agency, and exclude
all capacity of either virtue or vice. ...And if habits and dispo-
sitions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the
exercise of these dispositions be so ; for the exercise of bias is
not the exercise of free selfdetermining JViU, and so there is
no exercise of liberty in it. Consequently, no man is virtu-
ous or vicious, either in being well or ill disposed, nor in act-
ing from a good or bad disposition. And whether this bias
or disposition, be habitual or not, if it exists but a moment
before the act of Will, which is the effect of it, it alters not
the case, as to the necessity of the effect. Or if there be
no previous disposition at all, either habitual or occasional,
that determines the act, then it is not choice that determines
212 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
it: It is therefore a contingence, that happens to the man,
arising from nothing in him ; and is necessary, as to any in-
clination or choice of his ; and, therefore, cannot make him
either the better or worse, any more than a tree is better than
other trees, because it oftener happens to be lit upon by a
swan or nightingale ; or a rock more vicious than other rocks,
because rattlesnakes have happened oftener to crawl over it.
So that there is no virtue nor vice in good or bad dispositions,
either fixed or transient ; nor any virtue or vice in acting
from any good or bad previous inclination ; nor yet any virtue
or vice, in acting wholly without any previous inclination.
Where then shall we find room for virtue or vice ?
SECTION VII-
Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconsistent ivith
all influence of Motive and Inducement, in either
virtuous or vicious Jettons.
AS Arminian notions of that liberty, which is essential to
virtue or vice, are inconsistent with common sense, in their
being inconsistent with all virtuous and vicious hah : ' and dis-
positions ; so they are no less so in their inconsistency with
all influence of motives in moral actions.
It is equally against those notions of liberty of Will,
whether there be, previous to the act of choice, a preponder-
ancy of the inclination, or a preponderancy of those circum-
stances, which have a tendency to move the inclination. And,
indeed, it comes to just the same thing ; to say, the circum-
stances of the mind are such as tend to sway and turn its in-
clination one way, is the same thing as to say, the inclination
of the mind , as under such circumstances, tends that way.
Or if any think it most proper to say, that motives do al-
ter the inclination, and give a new bias to the miud, it will not
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 213
alter the case, as to the present argument. For if motives
operate by giving the mind an inclination, then they operate
by destroying the mind's indifference, and laying it under a
bias. But to do this, is to destroy the Arminian freedom : It
is not to leave the Will to its own selfdetermination, but to
bring it into subjection to the power of something extrinsic,
which operates upon it, sways and determines it, previous to
its own determination. So that what is done from motive,
cannot be either virtuous or vicious. And besides, if the acts
of the Will are excited by motives, those motives are the
causes of those acts of the Will ; which makes the acts of the
Will necessary ; as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of
the cause. And if the influence and power of the motive
causes the volition, then the influence of the motive deter-
mines volition, and volition does not determine itself; and so
is not free, in the sense of Arminians, (as has been largely
shewn already) and consequently can be neither virtuous nor
vicious.
The supposition, which has already been taken notice of
as an insufficient evasion in other cases, would be, in like man-
ner, impertinently alleged in this case ; namely, the suppo-
sition that liberty consists in a power of suspending action for
the present, in order to deliberation. If it should be said,
though it be true, that the Will is under a necessity of finally
following the strongest motive ; yet it may, for the present,
forbear to act upon the motive presented, till there has been
opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and compare its real
weight with the merit of other motives. I answer as follows :
Here again, it must be remembered, that if determining
thus to suspend and consider, be that act of the Will, where-
in alone liberty is exercised, then in this all virtue and vice
must consist ; and the acts that follow this consideration, and
are the effects of it, being necessary, are no more virtuous or
vicious than some good or bad events, which happen when
men are fast asleep, and are the consequences of what they
did when they were awake. Therefore, I would here ob-
serve two things :
214 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
1. To suppose, that all virtue and vice, in every case, con-
sists in determining, whether to take time for consideration
or not, is not agreeable to common sense. For, according to
such a supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder,
sodomy, blasphemy, &C. do not at all consist in the horrid na-
ture of the things themselves, but only in the neglect of
thorough consideration before they were perpetrated, which
brings their viciousness to a small matter, and makes all
jcrimes equal. If it be said, that neglect of consideration,
when such heinous evils arc proposed to choice, is worse than
in other cases : I answer, this is inconsistent, as it supposes
the very thing to be, which, at the same time, is supposed
not to be ;. it supposes all moral evil, all viciousness and
beinousness, does not consist merely in the want of consider-
ation. It supposes some crimes in themselves, in their own
nature, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to consid-
eration or inconsideralion, which lays the person under a
previous obligation to consider in some cases more than
others.
2. If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case,
consisted only in the act of the Will, whereby it determines
whether to consider or no, it would not alter the case in thg
least, as to the present argument. For still in this act of the
Will on this determination, it is induced by some motive, and
necessarily follows the strongest motive ; and so is necessary,
even in that act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.
One thing more I would observe, concerning the incon-
sistence of Arminian notions of moral agency with the influ-
ence of motives I suppose none will deny, that it is possi-
ble for motives to be set before the mind so powerful, and
exhibited in so strong a light, and under so advantageous cir-
cumstances, as to be invincible ; and such as the mind can-
not but yield to. In this case, Arminians will doubtless say,
liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if motives are exhibited
with half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion
to their strength, and go halfway towards destroying it. If a
thousand degrees of motive abolish all liberty, then five hun-
ched take it half away. If one degree of the influence of mo-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 21 $
live does not at all infringe or diminish liberty, then no more
do two degrees ; for nothing doubled, is still nothing. And if
two degrees do not diminish the Will's liberty, no more do
four, eight, sixteen, or six thousand. For nothing multiplied
ever so much, comes to but nothing. If there be nothing in
the nature of motive or moral suasion, that is at all opposite
to liberty, then the greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty.
But if there be any thing in the nature of the thing, that is
against liberty, then the least degree of it hurls it in some
degree ; and consequently hurts and diminishes virtue. If
invincible motives, to that action which is good, take away all
the freedom of the act, and so all the virtue of it ; then the
more forcible the motives are, so much the worse, so much
the less virtue; and the weaker the motives are, the better
for the cause of virtue ; and none is best of all.
Now let it be considered, whether these things are agree-
able to common sense. If it should be allowed, that there
are some instances wherein the soul chooses without any mo-
tive, what virtue can there be in such a choice ? I am sure,
there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made
for no good end ; for it is for no end at all. If it were for any
end, the view of the end would be the motive exciting to the
act ; and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good
aim, then there is no good intention in it ; and, therefore, ac-
cording to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in
it than in the motion of the smoke, which is driven to and fro
by the wind without any aim or end in the thing moved,
and which knows not whither, nor why and wherefore, it is
moved.
Carol. 1. By these things it appears, that the argument
against the Calvi?iists, taken from the use of counsels, exhort-
ations, invitations, expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by
Armimans, is truly against themselves. For these things can
operate no other way to any good effect, than as in them is ex-
hibited motive and inducement, tending to excite and deter-
mine the acts of the Will. But it follows, on their principles.
that the acts of Will excited by such causes, cannot be virtu-
ous ; because so far as thev are from these, they ars not from
216 FREEDOiVhOF THE WILL.
the Will's selfdetermining power. Hence it will follow, that
it is not worth the while to offer any arguments to persuade
men to any virtuous volition or voluntary action ; it is in vain
to set before them the wisdom and amiableness of ways of
virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice. This no-
tion of liberty and moral agency frustrates all endeavors to
draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion, precept or
example : For though these things may induce men to what
is materially virtuous, yet at the same time they take away the
form of virtue, because they destroy liberty ; as they, by their
own power, put the Will out of its equilibrium, determine
and turn the scale, and take the work of selfdetermining pow-
er out of its hands. And the clearer the instructions are that
are given, the more powerful the arguments that are used,
and the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more
likely they are to frustrate their own design ; because they
have so much the greater tendency to put the Will out of its
balance, to hinder its freedom of selfdeterminalion ; and so to
exclude the very form of virtue, and the essence of whatso-
ever is praiseworthy.
So it clearly follows, from these principles, that God has no
hand in any man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by
a physical or moral influence ; that none of the moral methods
He uses with men to promote virtue in the world, have ten-
dency to the attainment of that end ; that all the instructions,
which he has given to men, from the beginning of the world
to this day, by prophets, apostles, or by his Son Jesus Christ ;
that all his counsels, invitations, promises, threatenings, warn-
ings and expostulations ; that all means he has used with
men, in ordinances, or providences ; yea, all influences of his
Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency to
excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any-
thing morally good or commendable, in any respect. For
there is no way that these or any other means can promote
virtue, but one of these three. Either (1.) By a physical
operation on the heart. But all effects that are wrought in
men this] way, have no virtue in them, by the concurring
voice of all Arminians. Or, (2.) morally, by exhibiting mo-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 2ir
fives to the understanding, to excite good acts in the Will.
But it has been demonstrated, that volitions, which are excited
by motives, are necessary, and not excited by a selfmoving
power ; and therefore, by their principles, there is no virtue
in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving the Will an opportuni-
ty to determine itself concerning the objects proposed, either
to choose or reject, by its own uncaused, unmoved, uninfluen-
ced selfdetermination. And if this be all, then all those means
do no more to promote virtue than vice : For they do noth-
ing but give the Will opportunity to determine itself either
ivay, either to good or bad, without laying it under any bias
to either : And so there is really as much of an opportunity
given to determine in favor of evil, as of good.
Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will certainly
follow from the Arfninian doctrine, which they charge on
others ; namely, that God acts an inconsistent part in using so
many counsels, warnings, invitations, intreaties, &c. with sin-
ners, to induce them to forsake sin, and turn to the ways of
virtue ; and that all are insincere and fallacious. It will fol-
low, from their doctrine, that God does these things when he
knows, at the same time that they have no manner of tenden-
cy to promote the effect he seems to aim at ; yea, knows that
if they have any influence, this very influence will be incon-
sistent with such an effect, and will prevent it. But what an
imputation of insincerity would this fix on Him, who is infi-
nitely holy and true !....So that their's is the doctrine, which,
if pursued in its consequences, does horribly reflect on the
Most High, and fix on Him the charge of hypocrisy ; and
not the doctrine of the Calvinists ; according to their frequent,
and vehement exclamations and invectives.
Carol. 2. From what has been observed in this section, it
again appears, that Arminian principles and notions, when fair-
ly examined and pursued in their demonstrable consequences,
do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and make it im-
possible that there should ever be any such thing, in any case ;
or that any such thing should ever be conceived of. For, by
these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies ab-
surdity and contradiction..., .For it is absurd in itself, and con-
Vol. V. 2D
213 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
trary to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind
without any good intention or aim ; and, by their principles,
it is absurd to suppose a virtuous act with a good intention or
aim ; for to act for an end, is to act from a motive. So that
if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous act
with a good design and end ; and it is selfevident, there
can be none without : Consequently there can be no virtuous
act at all.
Corol. 3. It is manifest, that Arminian notions of moral
agency, and the being of a faculty of Will, cannot consist to-
gether ; and that if there be any such thing as either a vir-
tuous or vicious act it cannot be an act of the Will ; no Will
can be at all concerned in it. For that act which is performed
without inclination, without motive, without end, must be
performed without any concern of the Will. To suppose an
act of the Will without these, implies a contradiction. If the
soul in its act has no motive or end ; then, in that act (as was
observed before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts
no inclination to any thing ; and this implies, that in that act
it desires nothing, and chooses nothing ; so that there is no
act of choice in the case : And that is as much as to say, there
is no act of Will in the case. Which very effectually shuts
all vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe ; in as much
as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act
wherein the Will is concerned ; and according to the plainest
dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the princi-
ples of Arminicms themselves, there can be no virtuous or vi-
cious act wherein the Will is not concerned. And therefore
there is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts at all.
Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings
are influenced by either previous inclination or motive, anoth-
er strange thing will follow ; and this is, that God not only
cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his crea-
tures, but he can make no conjecture, can give no probable
guess concerning them. For all conjecture in things of this,
nature, must depend on some discerning or apprehension of
these two things, Jireviou.s disftonition and motive, which, as has
been observed, Jnninicn notions of moral agency, in their re-
al consequence, altogether exclude.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 219
PART IV.
Wherein the chief grounds of the reasonings of Ar-
minians, in support and defence of the foremention-
ed notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c. and
against the opposite doctrine, are considered.
section r.
The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of Dispositions
of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, lies not in
their Cause, but their Nature.
ONE main foundation of the reasons which are broughj
to establish the forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, vice,
&c. is a supposition, that the virtuousness of the dispositions,
or acts of the Will, consists, not in the nature of these disposi-
tions or acts, but wholly in the origin or cause of them : So
that if the disposition of the mind, or act of the Will, be ever
so good, yet if the cause of the disposition or act be not our
virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it ; and,
on the contrary, if the Will, in its inclination or acts, be ever
so bad, yet, unless it arises from something that is our vice or
fault, there is nothing vicious or blameworthy in it. Hence
their grand objection and pretended demonstration, or self-
evidence, against any virtue and commend:iblcness, or vice
and blameworthiness, of those habits or acts of the Will,
which are not from some virtuous or vicious determination of
the Will itself.
Now if this matter be well considered, it will appear to be
altogether a mistake, yea,a gross absurdity ; and that it is most
220 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
certain, lhat if there be any such things as a virtuous or yi<
ious disposition, or volition of mind, the virtuousness or vic=
iousness of them consists, not in the origin or cause of these
things, but in the nature of them.
If the essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and
of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature of the dispo-
sitions or acts of mind, which are said to be our virtue or our
fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at
all. Thus for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of Will lies
not in the nature of the act, but the cause ; so that its being
of a bad nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises
from some faulty determination of our's, as its cause, or
something in us that is our fault : Then, for the same reason
neither can the viciousness of that cause lie in the nature of
the thing itself, but in its cause : That evil determination of
our's is not our fault, merely because it is of a bad nature, un-
less it arises from some cause in us that is our fault. And
when we are come to this higher cause, still the reason of the
thing holds good ; though this cause be of a bad nature, yet
we are not at all to blame on that account, unless it arises
from something faulty in us. Nor yet can blameworthiness
He in the nature of this cause, but in the. cause of that. And
thus we must drive faultiness back from step to step, from a
lower cause to a higher, in infinitum : And that is thoroughly
to banish it from the world, and to allow it no possibility of ex-
istence any where in the universality of things. On these
principles, vice, or moral evil, cannot consist in any thing that
is an effect ; because fault does not consist in the nature of
things, but in their cause ; as well as because effects are ne-
cessary, being unavoidably connected with their cause :
Therefore the cause only is to blame. And so it follows, that
faultiness can lie only in that cause, which is a cause only, and
no effect of any thing. Nor yet can it lie in this ; for then it
must lie in the nature of the thing itself; not in its being
from any determination of our's, nor any thing faulty in us
which is the cause, nor indeed from any cause at all ; for, by
the supposition, it is no effect, and has ?io cause And thus, he
that will maintain, it is not the nature of habits or acts; of
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 221
Will that make them virtuous or faulty, but the cause, must
immediately run himself out of his own assertion ; and in
maintaining it, will insensibly contradict and deny it.
This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not
from their nature, or from any thing inherent in them, but
because they are from a bad cause, it must be on account of
the badness of the cause and so on account of the nature of
the cause : A bad effect in the Will must be bad, because the
cause is bad, or of an evil nature or has badness as a quality in-
herent in it : And a good effect in the Will must be good, by
reason of the goodness of the cause, or its being of a good kind
and nature. And if this be what is meant, the very supposi-
tion of fault and praise lying not in the nature of the thing,
but the cause, contradicts itself, and does at least resolve the
essence of virtue and vice into the nature of things, and sup-
posses it originally to consist in that And if a caviller has a
mind to rus from the absurdity, by saying, " No, the fault of
the thing, which is the cause, lies not in this, that the cause
itself is of an evil nature, but that the cause is evil in that
sense, that it is from another bad cause :" Still the absurdity
■will follow him ; for, if so, then the cause before charged is
at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to the higher
cause, and must consist in that's being evil or of an evil nature.
So now, we are come again to lay the blame of the thing
blameworthy, to the nature of the thing, and not to the cause.
And if any is so foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from
step to step, till he is come to that, which is the first cause
concerned in the whole affair, and will say, all the blame lies
in that ; then, at last, he must be forced to own, that the faul-
tiness of the thing, which he supposes alone blameworthy, lies
wholly in the nature of the thing, and not in the original or
cause of it ; for the supposition is that it has no original, it is
determined by no act of our's, is caused by nothing faulty in
us, being absolutely without any cause. And so the race is at
an end, but the evader is taken in his flight.
It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that mor-
al evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its
other ill deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the na*
FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ture of certain dispositions of the heart, and acts of the Will j
and not in the deformity of something else, diverse from the
very thing itself, which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be
the cause of it. Which would be absurd, because that would
be to suppose a thing, that is innocent and not evil, is truly
evil and faulty, because another thing is evil. It implies a
contradiction ; for it would be to suppose the very thing,
which is morally evil and blameworthy, is innocent and not
blameworthy ; but that something else, which is its cause, is
only to blame. To soy, that vice does not consist in the thing
which is vicious, but in its cause, is the same as to say, that
vice does not consist in vice, but in that which produces it.
It is true, a cause may be to blame, for being the cause of
vice : It may be wickedness in the cause, that it produces
wickedness. But it would imply a contradiction, to suppose
that these two are the same individual wickedness. The wick-
ed act of the cause in producing wickedness, is one wicked-
ness ; and the wickedness produced, if there be any produc-
ed, is another. And therefore, the wickedness of the latter
does not lie in the former, but is distinct from it ; and the
wickedness of both lies in the evil nature of the things, which
are wicked.
The thing, which makes sin hateful, is that by which it
deserves punishment; which is but the expression of hatred.
And that, which renders virtue lovely, is the same with that,
on the account of which, it is fit to receive praise and reward ;
which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But tha$
which makes vice hateful, is its hateful nature ; and that
which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable nature. It is a cer-
tain beauty or deformity that is inherent in that good or evil
Will, which is the soul of virtue and vice (and not in the oc-
casion of it) which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteenij
praise or dispraise, according to the common sense of man-
kind. 1 f the cause or occasion of the rise of an hateful disposi-
tion or act of Will,be also hateful ; suppose another antecedent
evil Will; that is entirely another sin, and deserves punish-
ment by itself, under a distinct consideration. There is worthi-
ness of dispraise in the nature of an evil volition, and not wholly
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 223
in some Foregoing act, which is its cause ; otherwise the evil
volition, which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than
sickness, or some other natural calamity, which arises from a
cause morally evil.
Thus, for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dis-
praise, according to common sense ; not because something as
bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the cause that produced it ;
but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent deform-
ity. So the love of virtue is amiable, and worthy of praise,
not merely because something else went before this love of
virtue in our minds, which caused it to take place there ; for
instance, our own choice ; we chose to love virtue, and, by
some method or other, wrought ourselves into the love of it ;
but because of the amiableness and condecency of such a
disposition and inclination of heart. If that was the case, that
we did choose to love virtue, and so produced that love in our-
selves, this choice itself could be no otherwise amiable or
praiseworthy, than as love to virtue, or some other amiable
inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If that choice
was amiable at all, it must be so on account of some amiable
quality in the nature of the choice. If we chose to love
virtue, not in love to virtue, or any thing that was good,
and exercised no sort of good disposition in the choice,
the choice itself was not virtuous, nor worthy of any praise,
according to common sense, because the choice was net of a
good nature.
It may not be improper here to take notice of something
said by an author, that has lately made a mighty noise in
America. w A necessary holiness (says he*) is no holiness.
Adam could not be originally created in righteousness and
true holiness, because he must choose to be righteous, bejbre
he could be righteous. And therefore he must exist, he must
be created, yea, must exercise thought and reflection, before
he was righteous." There is much more to the same effect in
that place, and also in p. 437, 438, 439, 440. If these things
are so, it will certainly follow, that the first choosing to be
* Sciip. Doc. of Original Sin, p. t8o. 3d Edit.
224 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
righteous is no righteous choice ; there is no righteousness d*
holiness in it ; because no choosing to be righteous goes be-
fore it. For he plainly speaks of choosing to be righteous, as
what must go before righteousness : And that which follows the
choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot be righteousness
or holiness : For an effect is a thing necessary, and cannot
prevent the influence or efficacy of its cause ; and therefore is
unavoidably dependent upon the cause : And he says, a neces-
sary holiness is no holiness. So that neither can a choice of
righteousness be righteousness or holiness, nor can any thing
that is consequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be
righteousness or holiness ; nor can any thing that is without
choice, be righteousness or holiness. So that by his scheme,
all righteousness and holiness is at once shut out of the world,
and no door left open, by which it can ever possibly enter into
the world.
I suppose, the way that men came to entertain this absurd,
inconsistent notion, with respect to internal inclinations and vo-
litions themselves, (or notions that imply it) viz. that the es-
sence of their moral good or evil "lies not in their nature, but
their cause ; was, that it is indeed ;'. very plain dictate of com-
mon sense, that it is so with respect to all outward actions,
and sensible motions of the body ; that the moral good or evil
of them does not lie at all in the motions themselves ; which,
taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature ; and the
essence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them, lies
in those internal dispositions and volitions, which are the cause
of them. Now, being always used to determine this, without
hesitation or dispute, concerning external actions ; which are
the things, that in the common use of language are signified
by such phrases as men's actions, or their doings ; hence, when
they came to speak of volitions, and internal exercises of their
inclinations, under the same denomination of their actions, or
what they do, they unwarily determined the case must also be
the same with these, as with external actions ; not considering
the vast difference in the nature of the case.
If any shall still object and say, why is it not necessary that
the cause should be considered, in order to determine wheth-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 1 235
fer any thing be worthy of blame or praise ? Is it agreeable to
reason and common sense, that a man is to be praised or
blamed for that, which he is not the cause or author of, and
has no hand in ?
I answer, such phrases as being the cause, being the author,
having a hand, and the like, are ambiguous. They are most
vulgarly understood for being the designing, voluntary cause,
or cause by antecedent choice ; and it is most certain that
men are not, in this sense, the causes or authors of the first act
of their Will's, in any case ; as certain as any thing is, or ev-
er can be ; for nothing can be more certain, than that a thing
is not before it is, nor a thing of the same kind before the first
thing of that kind ; and so no choice before the first choice.
As the phrase, being the author, may be understood, not of be-
ing the producer by an antecedent act of Will ; but as a per-
son may be said to be the author of the act of Will itself, by
his being the immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or
in exercise in that act ; if the phrase of being the author, ia
used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires
men's being the authors of their own acts of Will, in order to
their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise, on account
of them. And common sense teaches, that they must be the
authors of external actions, in the former sense, namely, their
being the causes of them by an act of Will or choice, in order
to their being justly blamed or praised ; but it teaches no such
thing Avith respect to the acts of the Will themselves. But
this may appear more manifest by the things which will be
observed in the following section,
SE
226 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
SECTION II.
The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical
Notion of Action and Agency, which seems to be
generally entertained by the Defenders oj the Ar~
minian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agen-
cy, &c.
ONE thing that is made very much a ground of argument
and supposed demonstration by jirminians, in defence of the
forementioned principles, concerning moral agency, virtue,
vice, 8cc. is their metaphysical notion of agency and action.
They say, unless the soul has a selfdetermining power, it has
ho power of action; if its volitions be not caused by itself.
but are excited and determined by some extrinsic cause, they
cannot be the soul's own acts ; and that the soul cannot be ac-
tive, but must be wholly passive, in those effects which it is
the subject of necessarily, and not from its own free determi-
nation.
Mr. Chubb lays the foundation of his scheme of liberty,
and of his arguments to support it, very much in this position,
that man is an agent, and capable of action. Which doubt-
less is true ; but selfdetermination belongs to his notion of ac-
tion, and is the very essence of it. Whence he infers, that it
is impossible for a man to act and be acted upon, in the same
thing, at the same time ; and that nothing, that is an action,
can be the effect of the action of another ; and he insists, that
a necessary agent, or an agent that is necessarily determined
to act, is a plain contradiction.
But those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which
men build on the meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a word;
especially when that meaning is abstruse, inconsistent, and
entirely diverse from the original sense of the word in com-
mon speech.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 227
That the meaning of the word action, as Mr. Chubb and
many others use it, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent,
is manifest, because it belongs to their notion of an action, that
it is something wherein is no passion or passiveness ; that is
(according to their sense of passiveness) it is under the pow-
er, influence or action of no cause. And this implies, that ac-
tion has no cause, and is no effect ; for to be an effect implies
passiveness, or the being subject to the power and action of
its cause. And yet they hold, that the mind's action is the ef-
fect of its own determination, yea, the mind's free and volun-
tary determination ; which is the same with free choice. So
that action is the effect of something preceding, even a pre-
ceding act of choice ; and consequently, in this effect the mind
is passive, subject to the power and action of the preceding
cause, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be
active. So that here we have this contradiction, that action
is always the effect of foregoing choice ; and therefore can-
not be action ; because it is passive to the power of that pre-
ceding causal choice ; and the mind cannot be active and pas-
sive in the same thing, at the same time. Again, they say,
necessity is utterly inconsistent with action, and a necessary
action is a contradiction ; and so their notion of action implies
contingence, and excludes all necessity. And therefore,
their notion of action implies, that it has no necessary depend-
ence or connexion with any thing foregoing ; for such a de-
pendence or connexion excludes contingence, and implies
necessity. And yet their notion of action implies necessity,
and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot be contingent.
For they suppose, that whatever is properly called action,
must be determined by the Will and free choice ; and this is
as much as to say, that it must be necessary, being dependent
upon, and determined by something foregoing ; namely, a
foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of
action, of that which is a proper and mere act, that it is the
beginning of motion, or of exertion of power; but yet it is
implied in their notion of action, that it is not the beginning
of motion or exertion of power, but is consequent and depend-
ent on a preceding exertion of power, viz. the power of Will
228 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
and choice ; for they say there is no proper action but what
is freely chosen ; or, which is the same thing, determined by
a foregoing act of free choice. But if any of them shall see
cause to deny this, and say they hold no such thing as that
every action is chosen or determined by a foregoing choice ;
but that the very first exertion of Will only, undetermined by
any preceding act, is properly called action ; then I say, such
a man's notion of action implies necessity ; for what the mind
is the subject of, without the determination of its own previ-
ous choice, it is the subject of necessarily, as to any hand,
that free choice has in the affair, and, without any ability, the
mind has to prevent it, by any Will or election of its own ;
because by the supposition it precludes nil previous acts of the
Will or choice in the case, which might prevent it. So that
it is again, in this other way, implied in their notion of act,
that it is both necessary and not necessary. Again, it belongs
to their notion of an act, that it is no effect of a predetermin-
ing bias or preponderation, but springs immediately out of in-
difference ; and this implies, that it cannot be from foregoing
choice, which is foregoing prcponderation : If it be not ha-
bitual, but occasional, yet if it causes the act, it is truly previ-
ous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at the same time,
it is essential to their notion of an act, that it is what the agent
is the author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by previ-
ous choice and design.
So that, according to their notion of an act, considered with
regard to its consequences, these following things are all es-
sential to it, viz. that it should be necessary, and not necessa-
ry ; that it should be from a cause, and no cause ; that it
should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit of
choice and dcv.gn ; that it should be the beginning of motion
or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion ; that it
should be before it is ; that it should spring immediately out
of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of prc-
ponderation ; that it should be selforiginated, and also have its
original from somcthil . < 1 •. ; that it is what the mind causes
itself, of its own Will, and car, produce or prevent, according
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 259
to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power
to prevent, it precluding all previous choice in the affair.
So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of
it, is something of which there is no idea : It is nothing hut a
confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct
meaning, and is an absolute nonentity ; and that in two res-
pects : (1.) There is nothing in the world that ever was, is,
or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its de-
scription, according to what they suppose to be essential to it.
And (2.) There neither is, no*' ever was, nor can be, any no-
tion or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it.
For if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways
destroy itself. But it is impossible any idea or notion should
subsist in the mind, whose very nature, and essence, which
constitutes it, destroys it. If some learned philosopher, who
had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observa-
tions he had made in his travels, should say, " He had been
in Terra del Fuego, and there had seen an animal, which he
calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself, and
yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself ; that it had an ap-
petite, and was hungry before it had a being ; that his master,
who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always
governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased ; that
when he moved, he always took a step before the first step ;
that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail fore-
most ; and this, though he had neither head nor tail :" It
would be no impudence at all, to tell such a traveller, though
a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of such
an animal, as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever
would have.
As the forementioned notion of action is very inconsistent,
so it is wholly diverse from the original meaning of the word.
The more usual signification of it, in vulgar speech, seems
to be some motion, or exertion of power, that is voluntary, or
that is the effect of the Will ; and is used in the same sense
as doing ; and most commonly it is used to signify outward
actions. So thinking is often distinguished from acting ; and
desiring and willing, from doing.
530 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Besides this more usual and proper signification of the
word action, there are other ways in which the word is used,
that are less proper, which yet have place in common speech.
Oftentimes it is used to signify some motion or alteration in
inanimate things, with relation to some object and effect. So
the spring of a watch is said to act upon the chain and wheels ;
the sun beams, to act upon plants and trees ; and the fire, to
act upon wood. Sometimes the word is used to signify mo-
tions, alterations, and exertions of power, which are seen in
corporeal things, considered absolutely ; especially when these
motions seem to arise from some internal cause which is hid-
den ; so that they have a greater resemblance of those mo-
tions of our bodies, which are the effects of internal volition,
or invisible exertions of Will. So the fermentation of liquor,
the operations of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are
called the action of these things. And sometimes the word
action is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of Will
and inclination : So meditating, loving, hating, inclining, dis-
inclining, choosing and refusing, may be sometimes called
acting ; though more rarely (unless it be by philosophers and
metaphysicians) than in any of the other senses.
But the word is never used in vulgar speech in that sense
which Arminian divines use it in, namely, for the selfdeler-
minate exercise of the Will, or an exertion of the soul that
arises without any necessary connexion, with any thing fore-
going. If a man does something voluntarily, or as the effect
of his choice, then in the most proper sense, and as. the word
is most originally and commonly used, he is said to act : But
whether that choice or volition be sclfdetermined, or no,
whether it be connected with foregoing habitual bias, wheth-
er it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some
extrinsic cause, never comes into consideration in the mean-
ing of the word.
And if the word Action is arbitrarily used by some men
otherwise, to suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality,
no argument can reasonably be founded on such a use of this
term, to prove any thing but their own pleasure. For divines
and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 23*
though they were sufficient to support and demonstrate a
whole scheme of moral philosophy and divinity, is certainly
to erect a mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on a shadow.
And though it may now perhaps, through custom, have be-
come natural for them to use the word in this sense (if that
may be called a sense or meaning, which is inconsistent with
itself) yet this does not prove, that it is agreeable to the natur-
al notions men have of things, or that there can be any thing
in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And
though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men
are so far from experiencing any such thing, that it is impos-
sible for them to have any conception of it.
If it should be objected, that action and passion are doubt-
less words of a contrary signification ; but to suppose that the
agent, in its action, is under the power and influence of some-
thing extrinsic, is to confound action and passion, and make
them the same thing.
I answer, that action and passion are doubtless, as they
are sometimes used, words of opposite signification ; but not
as signifying opposite existences, but only opposite relations.
The words cause and effect, are terms of opposite significa-
tion ; but, nevertheless, if I assert, that the same thing may,
at the same time, in different respects and relations, be both
cause and effect, this will not prove that I confound the terms.
The soul may be both active and passive in the same thing in
different respects ; active with relation to one thing, and pas-
sive with relation to another. The word passion, when set in.
opposition to action, or rather activeness, is merely a relative
term ; it signifies no effect or cause, nor any proper exist-
ence ; but is the same with passiveness, or a being passive, or
a being acted upon by some thing. Which is a mere rela-
tion of a thing to some power or force exerted by some cause,
producing some effect in it, or upon it. And action, when set
properly in opposition to passion, or passiveness, is no real ex-
istence ; it is not the same with an action, but is a mere rela-
tion : It is the activeness of something on another thing, be-
ing the opposite relation to the other, viz. a relation of pow-
er, or force, exerted by some cause towards another thing,
232 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
which is the subject of the effect of that power. Indeed, tha
■word action, is frequently used to signify something not mere-
ly relative, but more absolute, and a real existence ; as when
we say an action ; when the word is not used transitively, but
absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or mind, with-
out any relation to any object or effect : And as used thus,
it is not properly the opposite of passion ; which ordinarily
signifies nothing absolute, but merely the relation of being act-
ed upon. And therefore, if the word action be used in the like
relative sense, then action and passion are only two contrary
relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose,'that contrary re-
lations may belong to the same thing, at the same time, with
respect to different things. So to suppose, that there are acts
of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves, and acts upon
objects, and produces effects, which yet themselves are
effects of something else, and wherein the soul itself is
the object of something acting upon, and influencing that,
does not confound action and passion. The words may
nevertheless be properly of opposite signification : There
may be as (rue and real a difference between acting and
being caused to act, though we should suppose the soul
to be both in the same volition, as there is between living
and being quickened or made to live. It is no more a contra-
diction to suppose that action may be the effect of some other
cause, besides the agent, or being that acts, than to suppose,
that life may be the effect of some other cause, besides the be-
ing that lives, in whom life is caused to be.
The thing which has led men into this inconsistent notion
of action, when applied to volition, as though it were essential
to this internal action, that the agent should be selfdetermin-
ed in it, and that the Will should be the cause of it, was
probably this ; that according to the sense of mankind, and
the common use of language, it is so with respect to men's
external actions ; which are originally, and according to the
vulgar use and most proper sense of the word, called actions.
Men in these are selfdirccted, selfdctermined and their Wills
are the cause of the motions of their bodies, and the external
things that are done ; so that unless men do them volunta-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 233
vily 3 and of choice, and the action be determined by their
antecedent volition, it is no action or doing of theirs.
Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but
absurdly, to suppose the same concerning volition itself, that
that also must be determined by the Will ; which is to be
determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the
body is ; not considering the contradiction it implies.
But it is very evident, that in the metaphysical distinction
between action and passion, (though long since become com-
mon and the general vogue) due care has not been taken to
conform language to the nature of things, or to any distinct,
clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other philosophical, meta-
physical terms, used in these disputes ; which has occasion-
ed inexpressible difficulty, contention, error and confusion.
And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity-
was inconsistent with action, as these terms are applied to vo-
lition. First, these terms action and necessity, are changed
from their original meaning, as signifying external, voluntary
action and constraint, (in which meaning they are evidently
inconsistent) to signify quite other things, viz. volition itself,
and certainty of existence. And when the change of signifi-
cation is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances
and abatements for the difference of sense ; but still the same
things are unv/arily attributed to action and necessity, in the
new meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to them
in their first sense ; and on this ground, maxims are estab-
lished without any real foundation, as though they were the
most certain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.
But however strenuously it is maintained, that what is nec-
essary cannot be properly called action, and that a necessary
action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few Armin-
ian divines, who, if thoroughly tried, would stand to these
principles. They will allow that God is, in the highest sense,
an active being, and the highest fountain of life and action ;
and they would not probably deny, that those, that are called
God's acts of righteousness, holiness and faithfulness, are
truly and properly God's acts, and God is really a holy agent
Vol. V, 2 F
234 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
in them ; and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God neces*
sarily acts justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for
Him to act unrighteously and unholily.
SECTION 111.
The Reasons why some think it contrary to commoi*
Sense, to suppose those Things which are Recessa-
ry, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.
IT is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers,
that it is contrary to common sense, and the natural notions
and apprehensions of mankind, to suppose otherwise than
that necessity (making no distinction between natural and mo-
ral necessity) is inconsistent with virtue and vice, praise and
blame, reward and punishment. And their arguments from
hence have been greatly triumphed in ; and have been not a
little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the
truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures ; it has seem-
ed to Them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines
with the notions men commonly have of justice and equity.
And the true reasons of it seem to be these that follow.
I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that
natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with just praise or
blame. If men do things which in themselves are very-
good, fit to be brought to pass, and very happy effects, prop-
erly against their Wills, and cannot help it ; or do them
from a necessity that is without their Wills, or with which
their Wills have no concern or connexion ; then it is a plain
dictate of common sense, that it is none of their virtue, nor
any moral good in them ; and that they are not worthy to be
rewarded or praised, esteemed or loved on that account. And f
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 235
■on the other hand, that if, from like necessity, they do those
things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious,
and do them because they cannot help it ; the necessity is
such, that it is all one whether they will them or no ; and the
reason why they are done, is from necessity only, and not
from their Wills ; it is a very plain dictate of common sense,
that they are not at all to blame ; there is no vice, fault, or mo-
ral evil at all in the effect done ; nor are they, who are thus
necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in
the least disrespected, on that account.
In like manner, if things, in themselves good and desira-
ble, are absolutely impossible, with a natural impossibility,
the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and
perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them.
And it is also a plain dictate of common sense, that if the
doing things, in themselves good, or avoiding things, in them-
selves evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural
impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural difficulty ; that
is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all consisting in Will and
inclination itself, and which would remain the same, let the
inclination be what it will ; then a person's neglect or omis-
sion is excused in some measure, though not wholly ; his
sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be done were easy.
And if, instead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contra-
ry natural propensity in the state of things, to the thing to
be done, or the effect to be brought to pais, abstracted
from any consideration of the inclination of the heart ;
though the propensity be not so great as to amount to
a natural necessity ; yet being some approach to it, so that
the doing the good thing be very much from this natural
tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good in-
clination ; then it is a dictate of common sense, that there is
so much the less virtue in what is done ; and so it is less
praise worthy and rewardable. The reason is easy, viz. be-
cause such a natural propensity or tendency is an approach
to natural necessity ; and the greater the piopensity, still so
much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And, there-
fore, as natural necessity takes away or shuts out all virtue* so
236 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
this propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue ; that is^
it diminishes it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty,
in the state of things, is an approach to natural impossibility.
And as the latter, when it is complete and absolute, wholly
takes away blame ; so such difficulty takes away some blame,
or diminishes blame ; and makes the thing done to be less
worthy of punishment.
II . Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, must)
can't, can't help it, can't avoid it, necessary, unable, impossible,
unavoidable, irresistible, &c. use them to signify a necessity of
constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or impossibility ;
or some necessity that the Will has nothing to do in ; which
may be whether men will or no ; and which may be supposed
to be just the same, let men's inclinations and desires be
what they will. Such terms in their original use, I sup-
pose, among all nations, are relative ; carrying in their
signification (as was before observed) a reference or respect
to some contrary Will, desire or endeavor, which, it is sup-
posed, is, or may be, in the case. All men find, and begin to
find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things
that cannot be done, which they desire to do ; and innumera-
ble things which they are averse to, that must be, they cannot
avoid them, they will be, whether they choose them or no.
It is to express this necessity, which men so soon and so oft-
en find, and which so greatly and so early affects them in in-
numerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first form-
ed ; and. it is to signify such a necessity, that they are first
used, and 'hat they are most constantly used, in the common
affairs of life ; and not to signify any such metaphysical,
speculative and abstract notion, as that connexion in the na-
ture or course of things, which is between the subject and
predicate of a proposition, and which is the foundation of the
certain truth of that proposition, to signify which, they, who em-
ploy themselves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin
and metaphysical relations and dependencies of things, have
borrowed these terms, for want of others. But we grow up from
cur cradles in a use of such terms and phrases entirely dif-
ferent from this, and carrying a sense exceeding diverse from
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 23f
that, in "which they are commonly used in the controversy be-
tween Arminians and Calvinists. And it being, as was said
before, a dictate of the universal sense of mankind, evident to
us as soon as we begin to think, that the necessity signified
by these terms, in the sense in which we first learn them,
does excuse persons and free them from all fault or blame ;
hence our idea of excusableness or faultiness is tied to these
terms and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun in child-
hood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up with us, and
is strengthened by constant use and custom, the connexion
growing stronger and stronger.
The habitual connexion, which is in men's minds between
blamele'sness and those forementioned terms, must, cannot,
v,nabl», necessary^ impossible, unavoidable, isfc. becomes very
strong ; because, as soon as ever men begin to use reason
and speech, they have occasion to excuse themselves, from
the natural necessity signified by these terms, in numerous in-
stances.. ..I ca?i't do it, ...I could not help, 2/. ...And all mankind
have" constant and daily occasion to use such phrases in this
sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the con-
cerns of life, with respect to disappointments, and things that
happen, which concern and affect ourselves and others, that
are hurtful, or disagreeable to us or them, or things desira-
ble, that we or others fail of.
That a being accustomed to an union of different ideis,
from early childhood, makes the habitual connexion exceed-
ing strong, as though such connexion were owing to nature,
is manifest in innumerable instances. It is altogether by such
an habituaI*connexion of ideas, that men judge of the bigness
©r distance of the objects of sight, from their appearance.
Thus it is owing to such a connexion early established, and
growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain, which
he sees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nose, of
further off than the end of it. Having been used so long to
join ^a considerable distance and magnitude with such an ap-
pearance, men imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense ?
Whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his
eyes newly opened, who had been horn blind ; he would have
8*6 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
the same visible appearance, bv.t natural sense would dictate
no such thing, concerning the magnitude cr distance of what
appeared.
III. When men, after they have been so habituated to con-
nect ideas of innocency orblamelessness with such terms, that
the union seems to be the effect of mere nature, come to hear
the same terms used, and learn to use them themselves in
the forementioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify quite
another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation
to a contrary supposable Will and endeavor ; the notion of
plain and manifest blamelessness, by this means, is, by a
strong prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case
to which it by no means belongs; the change of the use of
the terms, to a signification which is very diverse, not being
taken notice of, or adverted to. And there are several reas-
ons, why it is not.
1. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very dis-
tinct and clear in their meaning ; few use them in a fixed, de-
termined sense. On the contrary, their meaning is very
vague and confused. Which is what commonly happens to
the words used to signify things intellectual and moral, and to
express what Mr. Locke calls mixt modes. If men had a clear
and distinct understanding of what is intended by these meta-
physical terms, they would be able more easily to compare
them with their original and common sense ; and so would
not be so easily led into delusion by words of tins sort.
2. The change of the signification of the terms is the
jnore insensible, because the things signified, though indeed
very different, yet do in some generals agree. In necessity,
that which is vulgarly so called, there is a strong connexion
between the thing said to be necessary, and something ante-
cedent to it, m the order of nature ; so there is also in philo-
sophical necessity. And though in both kinds of necessity,
the connexion cannot he called by that name, with relation tQ
an opposite Will or endeavor, to which it is sufierior ; which
as the case in vulgar necessity ; yet in both, the connexion is
ftrior to Will and endeavor, and so, in some respect, sufierior.
In both kinds of necessity, there is a foundation for some cer-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL; 23*
tainty of the proposition, that affirms the event. The terms
used being the same, and the things signified agreeing in
these and some other general circumstances, and the expres-
sions, as used by philosophers being not well defined, and so
of obscure and loose signification ; hence persons are not
aware of the great difference ; and the notions of innocence
or faultincss, which were so strongly associated with them>
and were strictly united in their minds, ever since they can
remember, remain united with them still, as if the union were
altogether natural and necessary ; and they that go about to
make a separation, seem to them to do great violence even to-
nature itself.
IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile
it with reason, that men should be blamed for that which is
necessary with a moral necessity (which, as was observed be-
fore, is a species of philosophical necessity) is, that for want
of due consideration, men inwardly entertain that apprehen-
sion, that this necessity may be against men's Wills and sin-
cere endeavors. They go away with that notion, that men
may truly will, and wish, and strive, that it may be otherwise,
but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many
think thus concerning themselves : Some, that are wicked
men, think they wish, that they were good, that they loVed
God and holiness ; but yet do not find that their wishes pro-
duce the effect. ...The reasons why men think thus, are as fol-
low : (1.) They find what may be called an indirect willing-
ness to have a better Will, in the manner before observed.
For it is impossible, and a contradiction to suppose the Will
to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not
consider, that this indirect willingness is entirely a different
thing from properly willing the thing that is the duty and
virtue required ; and that there is no virtue in that sort of
willingness which they have. They do not consider, that the
volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God,
are no acts of the Will at all against the moral evil of not lov-
ing God ; but only some disagreeable consequences. But the
making the requisite distinction requires more care of reflec-
tion and thought, than most men are used to. And men*
340 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.'
through a prejudice in their own favor, are disposed to think
\vcll of their own desires and dispositions, and to account them
good and virtuous, though their respect to virtue he only indi-
rect and remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous that
truly excites or terminates their inclinations. (2.) Another
thing, that insensibly leads and beguiles men into a supposi-
tion that this moral necessity or impossibility is, or may be
against men's Wills and true endeavors, is the derivation and
formation of the terms themselves, that are often used to
express it, which is such as seems directly to p int to, and
holds this forth. Such words, for instance, as unable, un-
avoidable, impossible, irresistible ; which carry a plain refer-
ence to a supposable power exerted, endeavors used, resist-
ance made, in opposition to the necessity ; and the persons
that hear them, not considering nor suspecting but that they
are used in their proper sense ; that sense being therefore un-
derstood, there does naturally, and as it were necessarily,
arise in their minds a supposition, that it may be so indeed,
that true desires and endeavors may take place, but that in-
vincible necessity stands in the way, and renders them vain
and to no effect.
V. Another thing, which makes persons more ready to
suppose it to be contrary to reason, that men should be ex-
posed to the punishments threatened to sin, for doing those
things which are morally necessary, or not doing those things
morally impossible, is, that imagination strengthens the argu-
ment, and adds greatly to the power and influence of the seem-
ing reasons against it, from the greatness of that punishment.
To allow that they may be justly exposed to a small punish-
ment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there were any
good reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason,
that such necessity was inconsistent with fauhiness, or just
punishment, the demonstration would be equally certain with
respect to a small punishment, or any punishment at all, as a
very great one ; but it is not equally easy to the imagination.
They that argue against the justice of damning men for those
things that are thus necessary, seem to make their argument
the stronger, by setting forth the greatness of the punishment
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 241
#» strong expressions.... That a man should be cast into eternal
burnings, that he (should be made to fry in hell to all eternity for
those things which he had no fiotver to avoid, and nvas 'under q.
fetal, unfrustrqble, invincible necessity of doing.
SECTION IV.
It is agreeable to Common Sense, and the Natural
Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity
to be consistent with Praise and Blame^ Reward
and Punishment.
4
WHETHER the reasons that have been given, why it ap-
pears difficult to some persons, to reconcile with common:
sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing, those
things which are morally necessary, are thought satisfactory
or not ; yet it most evidently appears, by the following things,
that if this matter be rightly understood, setting aside all de-
lusion arising from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms,
this js not at all inconsistent with the natural apprehensions
of mankind, and that sense of things which is found every
where in the common people ; who are furthest from having
their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by meta-
physical and philosophical subtilties ; but, on the contrary,
altogether agreeable to, and the very voice and dictate of, this
natural and vulgar sense.
I. This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar notion
of blameworthiness is. The idea which the common people,
through all ages and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to
be plainly this ; a person's being or doing wrong, with his
own will and pleasure ; containing these two things: 1. His
doing wrong when he does as he pleases. 2. His pleasure's
being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly
Vol, V. 2 G
242 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
expressing their notion ; a person's having his heart wrong^
and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the sum total
of the matter.
The common people do not ascend up in their reflections
and abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations and de-
pendencies of things, in order to form their notion of faulti-
ness or blameworthiness. They do not wait till they have de-
cided by their refinings, what first determines the Will ;
whether it be determined by something extrinsic, or intrinsic ;
whether volition determines volition, or whether the under-
standing determines the Will ; whether there be any such
thing as metaphysicians mean by contingence (if they have
any meaning ,) whether there be a sort of a strange, unac-
countable sovereignty in the Will, in the exercise of which,
by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all its own sover-
eign acts. They do not take any part of their notion of fault
or blame from the resolution of any such questions. If this
were the case, there are multitudes, yea, the far greater part
of mankind, nine hundred and ninetynine out of a thousand,
would live and die, without having any such notion, as that of
Tault, ever entering into their heads, or without so much as
once having any conception that any body was to be either
blamed or commended for any thing. To be sure, it would
be a long time before men came to have such notions. Where-
as it is manifest, they are some of the first notions that ap-
pear in children ; who discover, as soon as they can think, or
speak, or act at all as rational creatures, a sense of desert.
And, certainly, in forming their notion of it, they make no use
of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon, consists in
these two things; experience, and a natural sensation of a
certain fitness or agreeableness, which there is in uniting
such moral evil as is above described, viz. a being or doing
wrong with the Will, and resentment in others, and pain in-
flicted on the person in whom this moral evil is. Which na-
tural sense is what we call by the name of conscience.
It is true, the common people and children, in their no-
tion of a faulty act or deed, of any person, do suppose that it
is the person's own act and deed. But this is all that belongs
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 243
to what they understand by a thing's being a person's own
deed or action j even that it is something done by him of
choice. That some exercise or motion should begin of itself,
does not belong to their notion of an action, or doing. If so,
it would belong to their notion of it, that it is something, which
is the cause of its own beginning ; and that is as much as to
say, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their notion of an
action some motion or exercise, that begins accidentally,
without any cause or reason ; for that is contrary to one of
the prime dictates of common sense, namely, that every thing
that begins to be, has some cause or reason why it is.
The common people, in their notion of a faulty or praise-
worthy deed or work done by any one, do suppose, that the
man does it in the exercise of liberty. But then their notion
of liberty is only a person's having opportunity of doing as he
pleases. They have no notion of liberty consisting in the
Will's first acting, and so causing its own acts ; and deter-
mining, and so causing its own determinations ; or choosing,
and so causing its own choice. Such a notion of liberty is
what none have, but those that have darkened their own
minds with confused, metaphysical speculation, and abstruse
and ambiguous terms. If a man is not restrained from acting
as his Will determines, or constrained to act otherwise ; then
he has liberty, according to common notions of liberty, with-
out taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the
determinations of a man's free Will being the effects of the
determinations of his free Will. Nor have men commonly
any notion of freedom consisting in indifference. For if so,
then it would be agreeable to their notion, that the greater
indifference men act with, the more freedom they act with j
whereas, the reverse is true. He that in acting, proceeds
with the fullest inclination, does what he does with the great-
est freedom, according to common sense. And so far is it
from being agreeable to common sense, that such liberty as
consists in indifference is requisite to praise or biame, that on
the contrary, the dictate of every man's natural sense through
the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in
his acting good or evil, and the more he docs either with or
244 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
without full and strong inclination, the more is he to be es»
teemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.
II. If it were inconsistent with the common sense of man-
kind, that men should be either to be blamed or commended
in any volitions, they have, or fail of, in case of moral neces-
sity or impossibility ; then it would surely also be agreeable
to the same sense and reason of mankind, that the nearer the
case approaches to such a moral necessity or impossibility,
either through a strong antecedent moral propensity, on the
one hand,* or a great antecedent opposition and difficulty on
the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither
blameable nor commendable ; so that acts exerted with such
preceding propensity, would be worthy of proportionably less
praise ; and when omitted, the act being attended with such
difficulty, the omission would be worthy of the less blame.
It is so, as was observed before, with natural necessity and
impossibility, propensity and difficulty ; as it is a plain dictate
of the sense of all mankind, that natural necessity and impos-
sibility take away all blame and praise ; and therefore, that
the nearer the approach is to these, through previous propen-
sity or difficulty, so praise and blame are proportionably di-
minished. And if it were as much a dictate of common sense,
that moral necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding,
takes away all praise and blame, as that natural necessity or
impossibility does this ; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it
would be as much the dictate of common sense, that an ap-
proach to moral necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoid-
ing, diminishes praise and blame, as that an approach to nat-
ural necessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the
voice of common sense, that persons are excusable in part, in
neglecting things difficult against their Wills, as that they are
excusable wholly in neglecting things impossible against their
Wills. And if it made no difference whether the impossi-
bility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the
Will, with regard to excusableness ; so neither would it make
* It is here argued, on supposition uVt not all propensity implies ruosA
aecesMty, but only some very high degree; winch none will deny.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 94*
any difference, whether the difficulty, or approach to necessif
ty be natural agninst the Will, or moral, lying in the propen-
sity of the Will.
But it is apparent, that the reverse of these things is true.
If there be an approach to a moral necessity in a man's exer-
tion of good acts of Will, they being the exercise of a strong
propensity to good, and a very powerful love to virtue ; it is
so far from being the dictate of common sense, that he is less
virtuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved and praised ;
that it is agreeable to the natural notions of all mankind, that
he is so much the better man, worthy of greater respect, and
higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination is,
and the nearer it approaches to necessity in that respect ; or
to impossibility of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a
vicious one, still the more virtuous, and worthy of higher com-
mendation. And, on the other hand, if a man exerts evil acts
of mind ; as, for instance, acts of pride or malice from a root-
ed and strong habit, or principle of haughtiness and malicious-
ness, and a violent propensity of heart to such acts ; accord-
ing to the natural sense of all men, he is so far from being the
less hateful and blameable on that account, that he is so much
the more worthy to be detested and condemned, by all that
observe him.
Moreover, it is manifest thai it is no part of the notion,
which mankind commonly have of a blameable or praisewor-
thy act of the Will, that it is an act which is not determined
by an antecedent bias or motive, but by the sovereign power
of the Will itself ; because, if so, the greater hand such
causes have in determining any acts of the Will, so much the
less virtuous or vicious would they be accounted ; and the
less hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the re-
verse is true : Men do not think a good act to be the less
praiseworthy, for the agent's being much determined in it by
a good inclination or a good motive, but the more. And if
good inclination or motive, has but little influence in deter-
mining the agent, they do not think his act so much the
more virtuous, but the less. And so concerning evil acts,
which are determined bv evil motives or inclinations,
246 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are
implanted in the hearts of men, by nature itself, (which, it is
certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases) yet it is
not commonly supposed, that men are worthy of no praise or
dispraise for such dispositions ; although what is natural, is
undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the
Will whatsoever. Thus, for instance, if a man appears to be
of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is supposed to
be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate
of the common sense and apprehension of men, that such
dispositions are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons
are not worthy of disesteem, odium and dishonor ; or that
the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dis-
positions, are worthy of no resentment. Yea, such vile natur-
al dispositions, and the strength of them, will commonly
be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked acts,
that come from such a fountain, than an extenuation of them.
Its being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by
men in the height of their indignation : They will say, " It
is his very nature : He is of a vile natural temper : It is as
natural to him to act so as it is to breathe ; he cannot help
serving the devil," &c. But it is not thus with regard to
hurtful, mischievous things, that any are the subjects or occa-
sions of, by a natural necessity, against their inclinations. In
such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of mankind,
will be spoken of as a full excuse. Thus it is very plain, that
common sense makes a vast difference between these two
kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influ-
ence on the moral quality and desert of men's actions.
And these dictates of men's minds are so natural and nec-
essary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Armin-
ians themselves have ever got rid of them ; yea, their great-
est doctors, that have gone furthest in defence of their met-
aphysical notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments
to their greatest strength, and, as they suppose, to a demon-
stration, against the consistence of virtue and vice with any
necessity ; it is to be questioned, whether there is so much
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 24?
as one of them, but that, if he suffered very much from the
injurious acts of a man, under the power of an invincible
haughtiness and malignancy of temper, would not, from the
forementioned natural sense of mind, resent it far otherwise,
than if as great sufferings came upon him from the wind that
blows, and fire that burns by natural necessity ; and other*
"wise than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct
of a man perfectly delirious ; yea, though he first brought
his distraction upon him some way by his own fault.
Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make be-
tween natural and moral necessity, as though it were altogeth-
er impertinent in this controversy : " That which is necessa-
ry, say they, is necessary ; it is that which must be, and can-
not be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossi-
ble, and cannot be done ; and therefore, none can be to blame
for not doing it." And such comparisons are made use of,
as the commanding of a man to walk, who has lost his legs,
and condemning and punishing him for not obeying ; invit-
ing and calling upon a man, who is shut up in a strong prison,
to come forth, &c. But, in these things, Arminians are very
unreasonable. Let common sense determine whether there
be not a great difference between those two cases ; the one,
that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into
prison ; and after he has lain there a while, the king comes
to him, calls him to come forth to him, and tells him, that if
he will do so, and will fall down before him, and humbly beg
his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at liberty, and also be
greatly enriched and advanced to honor : The prisoner
heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence
against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himself,
and accept of the king's offer ; but is confined by strong
walls, with gates of brass, and bars of iron. The other case is,
that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a haugh-
ty, ungrateful, wilful disposition, and, moreover, has been
brought up in traitorous principles, and has his heart possess-
ed with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful sover-
eign ; and for his rebellion is cast into prison, and lies long
?here, loaden with heavv chains, and in miserable circumstan-
S48 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ccs. At length the compassionate prince comes to the pri**
on, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison doors
to be set wide open ; calls to him, and tells him, if he will
come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge
that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness ;
he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great
dignity and profit in his court. But he is so stout and stomach-
ful, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be willing
to accept the offer : His rooted, strong pride and malice
have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by
binding his heart : The opposition of his heart has the mas-
tery over him, having an influence on his mind far superior
to the king's grace and condescension, and to all his kind offers
and promises. Now, is it agreeable to common sense to assert
and stand to it, that there is no difference between these two
cases, as to any worthiness of blame in the prisoners ; be-
cause, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and the required
act in each case is impossible ? It is true, a man's evil dispo-
sitions may be as strong and immoveable as the bars of a
castle. But who cannot see, that when a man, in the latter
case, is said to be unable to obey the command, the expression
is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally and
in common speech ? And that it may properly be said to be
in the rebel's power to come out of prison, seeing he can ea-
sily do it if he pleases ; though by reason of his vile temper
of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it
should please him ?
Upon the whole, I presume there is no person of good
■understanding, who impartially considers the things which
have been observed, but will allow, that it is not evident, from
the dictates of the common sense, or natural notions of man-
kind, that moral necessity is inconsistent with praise and
blame. And therefore, if the Arminians would prove any
such inconsistency, it must be by some philosophical and
metaphysical arguments, and not common sense.
There is a grand illusion in the pretended demonstration
of Arminians from common sense. The main strength of
all these demonstrations lies in that prejudice, that arises
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 245
through the insensible change of the use and meaning of such
terms as liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable,
invincible, action, &c. from their original and vulgar sense, to
a metaphysical sense, entirely diverse, and the strong connex-
ion of the ideas of blamelessness, &c. with some of these
terms, by an habit contracted and established, while these
terms were used in their first meaning. This prejudice and
delusion is the foundation of all those positions, they lay
down as maxims, by which most of the scriptures, which they
allege in this controversy, are interpreted, and on which all
their pompous demonstrations from scripture and reason de-
pend. From this secret delusion and prejudice they have
almost all their advantages ; it is the strength of their bul-
warks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main
ground of all the right they have to treat their neighbors in
so assuming a manner, and to insult others, perhaps as wise
and good as themselves, as weak bigots, men that dwell in the
dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting
their eyes, against the noonday light, enemies to common sense,
maintaining the first born of absurdities, Sec. See. But perhaps
an impartial consideration of the things, which have been ob-
served in the preceding parts of this inquiry, may enable the
lovers of truth better to judge, whose doctrine is indeed ab-
surd, abstruse, self contradictory, and inconsistent with com-
mon sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dic-
tates of the reason of mankind.
Corol. From things which have been observed, it will
follow, that it is agreeable to common sense to suppose, that
the glorified saints have not their freedom at all diminished,
in any respect ; and that God himself has the highest possi-
ble freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of
the term ; and that he is, in the highest possible respect, an
agent, and active in the exercise of his infinite holiness;
though he acts therein, in the highest degree, necessarily ;
and his actions of this kind are in the highest, most absolutely
perfect manner, virtuous and praiseworthy ; and are so, for
that very reason, because they are most perfectly necessary.
Vot. V. 2 H
250 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
SECTION V.
Concerning those Objections, that this Scheme of
Necessity renders all Means and Endeavors for
the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue and,
Holiness, vain and to no purpose ; and that itt
makes Men no more than mere Machines in Af-
fairs of Morality and Religion.
ARMINIANS say, if it be so, that sin and virtue come
to pass by a necessity consisting in a sure connexion of caus-
es and effects, antecedents and consequents, it can never be
worth the while to use any means or endeavors to obtain the
one, and avoid the other ; seeing no endeavors can^alter the
futurity of the event, which is become necessary by a connex-
ion already established.
But I desire, that this matter may be fully considered ;
and that it may be examined with a thorough strictness,
whether it will follow that endeavors and means, in order to
avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on
the supposition of such a connexion of antecedents and. con-
sequents, than if the contrary be supposed.
For endeavors to be in vain, is for them not to ba
successful ; that is to say, for them not eventually to be.
the means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be, but in one
of these two ways; either, first, That although the means
are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow ; or, secondly,
If the event does follow, it is not because of the means, or
from any connexion or dependence of the event on the means,
the event would have come to pass, as well without the means
as with them. If either of these two things are the case,
then the means are not properly successful, and are truly in
vain. The successfulness or unsuccessfulness of means, in
FOR FULL COMMUNION. 251
©rder to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, con-
sists in those means being connected, or not connected with
the effect, in such a manner as this, viz. That the effect is
with the means, and not without them ; or that the being of
the effect is, on the one hand, connected with the means, and
the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with
the want of the means. If there be such a connexion as this
between means and end, the means are not in vain. The
more there is of such a connexion, the further they are from
being in vain ; and the less of such a connexion, the more
they are in vain.
Now, therefore, the question to be answered, (in order to
determine, whether it follows from this doctrine of the neces-
sary connexion between foregoing things, and consequent
ones, that means used in order to any effect, are more in vain
than they would be otherwise) is, whether it follows from it,
that there is less of the forementioned connexion between
means and effect ; that is, whether, on the supposition of
there being a real and true connexion between antecedent
things and consequent ones, there must be less of a connex-
ion between means and effect, than on the supposition of
there being no fixed connexion between antecedent things
and consequent ones ; and the very stating of this question is
sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one that will
open his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed, without
the grossest absurdity and inconsistence. Means are forego-
ing things, and effects are following things ; and if there
were no connexion between foregoing things and following
ones, there could be no connexion between means and end ;
aid so all means would be wholly vain and fruitless. For it
i8 by virtue of some connexion only, that they become suc-
cessful : It is some connexion observed, or revealed, or oth-
erwise known, between antecedent things and following ones,
that is, what directs in the choice of means. And if there
were no such thing as an established connexion, there could
be no choice, as to means ; one thing would have no more
tendency to an effect, than another ; there would be no such
thing as tendency in the case. All those things which are
252 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
successful means of other things, do therein prove connected
antecedents of them ; and therefore to assert, that a fixed
connexion between antecedents and consequents makes
means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the
connexion between means and end, is just as ridiculous as to
to say, that a connexion between antecedents and consequents
stands in the way to hinder a connexion between antecedents
and consequents.
Nor can any supposed connexion of the succession or train
of antecedents and consequents, from the very beginning of
all things, the connexion being made already sure and neces-
sary, either by established laws of nature, or by these togeth-
er with a decree of sovereign immediate interpositions of di-
vine power, on such and such occasions, or any other way (if
any other there be ;) I say, no such necessary connexion of a
series of antecedents and consequents can in the least tend to
hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the series ;
and so may be some of those antecedents which are connect-
ed with the consequents we aim at, in the established course
of things. Endeavors which we use, are things that exist ;
and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events ; all
the parts of which chain are supposed to be connected ; and
so endeavors are supposed to be connected with some effects,
or some consequent things or other. And certainly this does
not hinder but that the events they are connected with, may
be those which we aim at, and which we choose, because we
judge them most likely to have a connexion with those
events, from ihe established order and course of things which
we observe, or from something in divine revelation.
Let us suppose a real and sure connexion between a man's
having his eyes open in the clear day light, with good organs
of sight, and seeing ; so that seeing is connected with his op-
ening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes ;
and also the like connexion between such a man's attempt-
ing to open his eyes, and his actually doing it. The suppos-
ed established connexion between these antecedents and con-
sequents, let the connexion be ever so sure and necessary, cer-
tfinly docs not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such cir-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 253
eumstances, to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing ;
his aiming at that event, and the use of the means, being the
effect of his Will, does not break the connexion, or hinder the
success.
So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the
doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connexion
and consequence : On the contrary, it is truly forcible against
the Arminian doctrine of contingence and selfdetermination ;
■which is inconsistent with such a connexion. If there be no
connexion between those events, wherein virtue and vice con-
sist, and any thing antecedent ; then there is no connexion
between these events and any means or endeavors used in or-
der to them ; and if so, then those means must be vain. The
less there is of connexion between foregoing things and fol-
lowing ones, so much the less there is between means and
end, endeavors and success ; and in same proportion are
means and endeavors ineffectual and vain.
It will follow from Arminian principles, that there is no
degree of connexion between virtue or vice, and any forego-
ing event or thing ; or, in other words, that the determination
of the existence of virtue or vice does not in the least depend
on the influence of any thing that comes to pass antecedently,
from which the determination of its existence is, as its cause,
means, or ground ; because, so far as it is so, it is not from
selfdetermination ; and, therefore, so far there is nothing of
the nature of virtue or vice. And so it follows, that virtue and
vice are not in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with,
any foregoing event or existence, as its cause, ground, or
means. And if so, then all foregoing means must be totally
vain.
Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any consistence
with the Arminian scheme, be any reasonable ground of so
much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any
means and endeavors, in order to escaping vice or obtaining
virtue, or any choice or preference of means, as having a
greater probability of success by some than others ; either
from any natural connexion or dependence of the end on the
means, or through any divine constitution, or revealed way of
254 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
God's bestowing or bringing- to pass these things, in con&ev
quence of any means, endeavors, prayers or deeds. Conjee
ture, in this latter case, depends on a supposition, that God
himself is the giver, or determining cause of the event!
sought ; but if they depend on selfdetermination, then God is
not the determining or disposing author of them ; and if thes«
things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be made,
from any revelation he has given, concerning any way or meth-
od of his disposal of them.
Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow, that men
cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment o* conjecture,
that their means and endeavors to obtain virtue or avoid vice,
■will be successful, but they may be sure, they will not ; they
may be certain, that they will be vain ; and that if ever the
thing, which they seek, comes to pass, it will not be at all ow-
ing to the means they use. For means and endeavors can
have no effect, in order to obtain the end, but in one of these
two ways ; either, (1.) Through a natural tendency and influ-
ence, to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts,
either by causing the disposition of the heart to be more in
fevor of such acts, or by bringing the mind more into the view
of powerful motives and inducements ; or, (2.) By putting
persons more in the way of God's bestowment of the benefit.
But neither of these can be the case. Not the latter ; for, as
has been just now observed, it does not consist with the Ar-min-*
inn notion of selfdetermination, which they suppose essential
to virtue, that God should be the bestower, or (which is the
sajarie thing) the determining, disposing author of virtue. Not
the former, for natural influence and tendency supposes caus-
ality and connexion ; and that supposes necessity of event,
which is inconsistent with Arminian liberty. A tendency of
means, by biasing the heart in favor of virtue, or by bringing
the Will under the influence and power of motives in its de-
terminations, are both inconsistent with Arminian liberty of
Will, consisting in indifference, and sovereign selfdetermina-
tion, as has been largely demonstrated.
But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the
doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as though
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 355
it tended to encourage a total neglect of all endeavors as vain \
the following things may be considered.
The question is not, whether men may not thus improve
this doctrine : We know that many true and wholesome doc-
trines are abused ; but, whether the doctrine gives any jusc
occasion for such an improvement ; or whether, on the sup-
position of the truth of the doctrine, such a use of it would
not be unreasonable ? If any shall affirm, that it would not,-
but that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives just
occasion for it, it must be on this supposition, namely, that
such an invariable necessity of all things already settled, must
render the interposition of all means, endeavors, conclusions'
or actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end
whatsoever, perfectly insignificant ; because they cannot in*
the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in any
event or circumstance ; all being already fixed unalterably by
necessity ; and that therefore it is folly, for men to use any
means for any end; but their wisdom, to save themselves the'
trouble of endeavors, and take their ease. No person can draw
such an inference from this doctrine, and come to such a con-
clusion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to
the very principles he pretends to act upon ; for he comes to
a conclusion, and takes a course, in order to an end, even his 1
ease, or the saving himself from trouble ; he seeks something
future, and uses means in order to a future thing, even in his*
drawing up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing, and use
no means in order to any thing in future ; he seeks his future
ease, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior ne-
cessity, that determines all things, makes vain all actions or
conclusions of ours, in order to any thing future ; then 1 it ;
makes vain all conclusions and conduct of ours, in order to'
our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the time,
manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-
determining necessity, as much as any thing else. If he says^
within himself) " What future happiness or misery I shall
have, is already, in effect, determined by the necessary course
and connexion of things ; therefore, I will save myself the
trouble of labor and diligence, which cannot add to my deter-
558 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
mined degree of happiness, or diminish my misery ; but wllf'
take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negli-
gence." Such a man contradicts himself ; he says, the meas-
xire of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and
he will not try to diminish the one, nor add to the other ; but
yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this ; for, he takes
up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness, by the ease
and comfort of his negligence ; and to diminish his future
trouble and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using
means and taking pains.
Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this improve-
ment of the doctrine of necessity, that they will go into a vol-
untary negligence of means for their own happiness. For the
principles they must go upon in order to this, are inconsist-
ent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine ;
for to make some improvement of it, is to be influenced by it,
to come to some voluntary conclusion, in regard to their own
conduct, with some view or aim ; but this, as has been shown,
is inconsistent with the principles they pretend to act upon.
In short, the principles arc such as cannot be acted upon, in
any respect, consistently. And, therefore, in every pretence
of acting upon them, or making any improvement of them*
there is a selfcontradiction.
As to that objection against the doctrine, which I have en-
deavored to prove, that it makes men nomore than mere ma-
chines; I would say, that notwithstanding this doctrine, man
is entirely, perfectly and unspeakably different from a mere
machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has a
faculty of Will, and so is capable of volition and choice ; and
in that, his Will is guided by the dictates or views of his un-
derstanding ; and in that his external actions and behavior,
and, in many respects, aiso his thoughts, and the exercises of
his mind, are subject to his Will ; so that he has liberty to
act according to his choice, and do what he pleases ; and by
means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral
acts, such inclinations and actions as, according to the com*
mon sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love and?
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 25?
reward ; or, on the contrary, of disesteenij detestation, indig-
nation and punishment.
In these things is all the difference from mere machines,
as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, digni-
ty or privilege, in any respect ; all the difference that can be
desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that
the pretensions of the Arminians themselves come to, as thdy
are forced often to explain themselves. (Though their expli-
cations overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pre-
tended to be explained) for they are forced to explain a self-
determining power of Will, by a power in the soul, to deter-
mine as it chooses or Wills ; which comes to no more than
this, that a man has a power of choosing, and, in many instan-
ces, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a different thing
from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first
act of choice in the case.
Or, if their scheme makes any other difference than this,
between men and machines, it is for the worse ; it is so far
from supposing men to have a dignity and privilege above
machines, that it makes the manner of their being determin-
ed still more unhappy. Whereas, machines, are guided by
an understanding cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or
owner ; the Will of man is left to the guidance of nothing,
but absolute blind contingency
f
Vol. V. 21
353 FREEDOM OF THE WILE:
SECTION VI.
Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine
"which has been maintained, that it agrees with
the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of
Mr. Hobbcs.
WHEN Calvinists oppose the Arminian notion of the free-
dom of Will, and contingence of volition, and insist that there
are no acts of the Will, nor any other events whatsoever, but
•what are attended with some kind of necessity ; their oppos-
ers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoics in
their doctrine ofja&e, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of
necessity.
It would not be worth while to take notice of so imperti-
nent an objection, had it not been urged by some of the chief
Arminian writers. There were many important truths main-
tained by the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, and es-
pecially the Stoics, that are never the woree for being held by
them. The Stoic philosophers, by the general agreement of
Christian, and even Arminian divines, were the greatest, wis-
est, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers; and,
in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to Christiani-
ty of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of
these philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even
of Arminian divines, produced, not as arguments of the false-
ness of the doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirma-
tion of some of the greatest truths of the Christian religion,
relating to the unity and perfections of the Godhead, a future
state, the duty and happiness of mankind, &c. as observing
how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest and best of
the Heathens, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of
Jesus Christ.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 250
And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that-
Although he alleges the agreement of the Stoics with us,
wherein he supposes they maintained the like doctrine with
us, as an argument against the truth of our doctrine ; yet, this
very Dr. Whitby alleges the agreement of the Stoics with the
Arminians, wherein he supposes they taught the same doc-
trine with them, as an argument for the truth of their doc-
trine.* So that, when the Stoics agree with them, this (it
seems) is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confutation
of ours, as shewing that our opinions are contrary to the nat-
ural sense and common reason of mankind : Nevertheless,
when the Stoics agree with us, it argues no such thing in our
favor ; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us,
and shews our doctrine to be heathenish.
It is observed by some Cafoinistic writers, that the Armin-
ians symbolize with the Stoics, in some of those doctrines
wherein they are opposed by the Calvinists ; particularly in
their denying an original, innate, total corruption and deprav-
ity of heart ; and in what they held of man's ability to make
himself truly virtuous and conformed to God ; and in some
other doctrines.
It may be further observed, it is certainly no better objec-
tion against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects,
with the doctrine of the ancient Stoic philosophers, than it is
against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in
some respects, with the opinion of the very worst of the
heathen philosophers, the followers of Epicurus, that father
of atheism and licentiousness, and with the doctrine of the
Sadducees and Jesuits.
I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the an-
cient Stoic philosophers held concerning fate, in order to de-
termine what is truth ; as though it were a sure way to be in
the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems,
that they differed among themselves ; and probably the doc-
trine of fate as maintained by most of them, was, in some res-
pects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of
* Whitby on the Five Points, Edit. III. p. 325, 326, 327.
260 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consist-
ing in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a fate. If
they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common
and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity,
moral agency, virtue and vice, I disclaim any such thing, and
think I have demonstrated that the scheme I maintain is no
such scheme. If the Stoics, by fate, meant any thing of such
a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of the advan-
tage and benefit of the use of means and endeavors, or makes
it less worth the while for men to desire, and seek after any
thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists ; I hold no
doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any
more than any other scheme whatsoever ; and by no means
so much as the Armmian scheme of contingence ; as has
been shewn. If they held any such doctrine of universal fa-
tality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can
be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing
desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or in-
deed with any liberty that is possible or conceivable ; I em-
brace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of
fate, as is inconsistent with the world's being in all things sub-
ject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides,
not as the soul of the world, but as the Sovereign Lord of the
Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice and de-
sign, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable,
without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under
the power or influence of any thing before, above or without
himself, I wholly renounce any such doctrine.
As to Mr. Hobbes' maintaining the same doctrine concern-
ing necessity, I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes.
Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth
which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it
was once held by some bad man. This great truth, that Jesut
is the Son of God, was not spoiled because it was once and
again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is
so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by
ihe pen of some ill minded mischievous man, that it must nev-
er be received, we shall never know, when we hold any of the
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 261
most precious and evident truths by a sure tenure. And if
Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be la-
mented ; but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejec-
tion on that account. It is common for the corruptions of
the hearts of evil men to abuse the best things to vile pur-
poses.
I might also take notice of its having been observed, that
the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes in many more things
than the Calvinists.* As, in what he is said to hold concern-
ing original sin, in denying the necessity of supernatural il-
lumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doctrine
©f justification by faith alone, and other things.
SECTION VII.
Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.
SOME may possibly object against what has been sup-
posed of the absurdity and inconsistence of a selfdetermining
power in the Will, and the impossibility of its being other-
wise, than that the Will should be determined in every case
by some motive, and by a motive, which, (as it stands in the
view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any ap-
pearing on the other side ; that if these things are true, it
will follow, that not only the Will of created minds, but the
Will of God himself is necessary in all its determinations.
Concerning which, says the author of the Essay on the Free-
dom of the Will in God and in the Creature, page 85, 86,
« What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of
the dominion of God ? Does it not destroy the glory of his
liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Gover-
nor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and sovereign
Agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom ? Does it not
* Dr. Gill, in his Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. III. p. 183, &c.
#S2 FREEDOM Or THE WILL.
■seem to make him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, and
introduce Mr. Hobbes' doctrine of fatality and necessity, into
all things that God hath to do with ? Does i: not seem to
represent the blessed God, as a Being of vast understanding)
as well as power and efficiency, but still to leave him without a
Will to choose among all the objects within his view ? In
short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort of Almighty-
Minister of Fate, under its universal and supreme influence ;
as it was the professed sentiment of some of the ancients,
that fate was above the gods."
This is declaiming, rather than arguing ; and an applica-
tion to men's imaginations and prejudices, rather than to
mere reason. But I would calmly endeavor to consider,
•whether there be any reason in this frightful representation.
But before I enter upon a particular consideration of the mat-
ter, I would observe this ; that it is reasonable to suppose, it
should be much more' difficult to express or conceive things
according to exact metaphysical truth, relating to the nature
and manner of the existence of things in the Divine Under-
standing and Will, and the operation of these faculties (if I
may so call them) of the Divine Mind, than in the human
mind ; which is infinitely more within our view, and near-
er to a proportion to the measure of our comprehension,
and more commensurate to the use and import of human
speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in regard of
terms, to express precise truth concerning our own minds,
and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed
ro express external things ; and those that are applied to ex-
press things internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed,
and used in a sort of figurative sense. Whence they are,
most of them, attended with a great deal of ambiguity and
tmfixedness in their signification, occasioning innumerable
doubts, difficulties and confusions, in* inquiries and controver-
sies, about things of this nature. But language is much less
adapted to express tilings in the mind of the incomprehensi-
ble Deity, precisely as they are.
We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of
the nature of our own souls. A.'^l notwithstanding all ihe
FREEDOM OF THE WILE: ccc
progress which has been made, in past and present ages, in
this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphysics, as it re-
lates to these things, is brought to greater perfection than
once it was ; yet, here is still work enough left for future in-
quiries and researches, and room for progress still to be
made, for many ages and generations. But we had need to
be infinitely able metaphysicians, to conceive with clearness,
according to strict, proper and perfect truth, concerning the
nature of the Divine Essence, and the modes of the action and
operation of the powers of the Divine Mind.
And it may be noted particularly, that though we sr&
obliged to conceive of some things in God as consequent and
dependent on others., and of some things pertaining to the
Divine Nature and Will as the foundation of others, and so
before others in the order of nature ; as, we must conceive
of the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of
nature, to his happiness ; the perfection of his understanding,
as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees ; the holi-
ness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy deter-
minations. And yet, when we speak of cause and effect, an-
tecedent and consequent, fundamental and dependent, deter-
mining and determined, in the first Being, who is selfexis?*
ent, independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and im-
mutability, and the first cause of all things ; doubtless
there must be less propriety in such representations, thaa
when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are com-
pounded, and liable to perpetual mutation and succession.
Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning
the forementioned author's exclamation, about the necessary
determination of God's Will, in all things, by what he sees to
be fittest and best.
That all the seeming force of such objections and excla-
mations must aiise from an imagination, that there is some
sort of privilege or dignity in being without such a moral
necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than al-
ways choose what is wisest and best ; as though there wers
some disadvantage, meanness and subjection, in such a neces-
sity ; a thing by which the Will was confined, kept under,
264, FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
and held in servitude by something, which, as it were, main-
tained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by-
bonds that held God fast, and that he could, by no means, de-
liver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere imagi-
nation and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonor to a
being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy
manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature.
This argues no imperfection, inferiority or dependence, nor
any want of dignity, privilege or ascendency.* It is not in-
* " It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Su-
preme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is
best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's purpose ;
for this is a necessity, not of nature and of fate, but of fitness and wis-
dom ; a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom, and most perfect
choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rec-
titude of Will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise
Being to act foolishly." Clark's Demonstration oj the Being and Attributes of
God. Edit. 6, p. 64,
" Though God is a most perfect free agent, yet he cannot but do what is
best and wisest on the whole. The reason is evident ; because peifect wisdom
and goodness arc as steady and certain principles of action, as necessity itself ;
and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most perfect liberty,
can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a
necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity by which it is acted ; it being
as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to
choose to act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as
it would be in nature, for absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary
effect. There was, indeed, no necessity in nature, that God should at first
create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all, because he is, in
Himself, infinitely happy and allsufficient. There was also, no necessity in,
nature, that he should preserve and continue things in being, after they were
created; because he would be selfsufficient without their continuance, as he
was before their creation. But it was fit, and wise, and good, that Infinite
Wisdom should manifest, and Infinite Goodness communicate itself; and
therefore it was necessary, in the sense of necessity I am now speaking ol, that
things should be made at such a time, and continued so long, and indeed
with various perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wifdom and Goodness
saw it best and wisest that they should." Ibid p. 112, 113.
«' 'Tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act,
according to the last result of a fair examination. This is so far from being
a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and ben-
efit of it. 'Tis not an abridgement, 'tis the end and ufe of our liberty ; and
Freedom of the wilt. ass
Consistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of
God. The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to
do whatever pleases him ; whereby He doth according to hit
Will in the armies of Heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the
earth-, and none can stay his hand) or say unto him, what dost
the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are tc*
misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by-
its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice,
would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual
D3ture, that it wculd be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency
to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection
on the other side. 'Tis as much a perfection, that desire, or the power o£
preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting
should be determined by the Will ; and the more certain such determina ion
is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the
last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we
were not free. The very end of our freedom being that we might attain the
good we choose ; and, therefore, every man is brought under a necessity by
his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his
own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do ; else he would be
under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liber-
ty. And to deny that a man's Will, in every determination, follows his own
judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not
have, at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his
present thoughts, before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and
would have it before any other, unless he can have, and not have it, will, and
Aot will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted.
If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness,
we! shall have Teason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in
their choice of good lhan we; and yet we have no reason to think they are
less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite
freatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdbm and Goodness could
do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good.
The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is
best. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let m«= ask,
Would any one be a changeling because he is less determined by wise deter-
mination, than a wise man ? Is it worth ihe name of freedom, to be at liberty
to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self ? If to
break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examina-
tion and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be lib-
erty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men. Yet I think, oo-
Vol. V. 2 K
266 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
thou .?.... The following things belong to the sovereignly of
God, viz. 1. Supreme, universal, and infinite Power., where-
by he is able to do what he pleases, without control, with-
out any confinement of that power, without any sub-
jection, in the least measure, to any other power ; and
so without any hinderance or restraint, that it should be
either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish
his Will ; and without any dependence of his power on
any other power, from whence it should be derived, or
which it should stand in any need of : So far from this,
that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely
dependent on him. 2. That He has supreme authority, ab-
solute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without
body would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is
mad already." Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit. 7, p. 215, 216.
"This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always,
and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is,
must will all things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting
free of this consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. T»
be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood.
And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contra-
dicts that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite knowledge must direct the
Will without error. Here then, is the origin of moral necessity; and that is
really, of freedom. Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is deter-
mined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as ne-
cessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were poffiblc.
But it is unskilfulness, to suppose this an objection. The great principle is
once established, viz. That the Divine Will is determined by the eternal rea-
son and aptitudes of things, inftead of being physically impelled ; and after
that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect
the Deity must be allowed to be. It is this that makes him an amiable and
adorable Being, whose Will and power are constantly, immutably, detei mined,
by the consideration of what is wisest and best ; instead of a surd Being, with
power, but without discerning and reason. It is th^ beauty of this ne-
cessity, that it is strong as fate itself, wiih all the advantage of reason and
goodness. It is strange, to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, be-
cause he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a man is
allowed ftill the perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is
determined by reason and truth." Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul^
Edit. 3, vol. II. p. 403, 4O4.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 2*1
subjection to any superior authority, or any derivation of au-
thority from any other, or limitation by any distinct indepen-
dent authority, either supei'ior, equal, or inferior ; he being
the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority ; and
also without restraint by any obligation, implying either sub-
jection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation. 3.
That his Will is supreme, underived, and independent on
any thing without Himself; being in every thing determined
by his own counsel, having no other rule but his own wis-
dom ; his Will not being subject to, or restrained by the
Will of any other, and other Wills being perfectly subject to
his. 4. That his Wisdom, which determines his Will, is su-
preme, perfect, underived, selfsufficient and independent i
so that it may be said, as in Isa. xl. 14. With whom took He
counsel ? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the path
of judgment, and taught Him knowledge, and shewed Him the
way of understanding ?.., .There is no other Divine Sovereign-
ty but this, and this is properly absolute sovereignty ; no other
is desirable, nor would any other be honorable, or happy, and
indeed, there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the
glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereignty, that God's Will
is determined by his own infinite allsufhcient wisdom in ev-
ery thing ; and in nothing is either directed by any inferior
wisdom, or by no wisdom ; whereby it would become sense-
less arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, de-
sign or end.
If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every
thing by supreme wisdom, then it is in every thing necessari-
ly determined to that which is most wise. And, certainly, it
would be a disadvantage and indignity to be otherwise. For
if the Divine Will was not necessarily determined to that,
which in every case is wisest and best, it must be subject to
some degree of undesigning contingence ; and so in the same
degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine Will liable to
be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain
wind of blind contingence, which is guided by no wisdom, no
motive, no intelligent dictate whatsoever, (if any such thing
were possible) would certainly argue a great degree of im»
468 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
perfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity.
If it be a disadvantage for the Divine Will to be attended with
this moral necessity, then the more free from it, and the
more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage.
And, consequently to be perfectly free from the direction of
understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless,
unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely a? random, would
be the supreme glory.
It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, that his
supremely wise volition is necessary, than it argues a depen-
dence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be
something too low, for the Supreme Being to have his Will
determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every
case, to will in the highest degree holily and happily ; then
why is it not also something too low, for him to have his ex-
istence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infi-
nite happiness determined by necessity ? It is no more to
God's dishonor, to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily
holy. And if neither of them be to his dishonor, then it is
not to his dishonor necessarily to act holily and wisely. And
if it be not dishonorable to be necessarily holy and wise, in the
highest possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonorable,
necessarily to act holily and wisely in the highest possible de-
gree ; or, which is the same thing, to do that, in every case,
which, above all other things, is wisest and best.
The reason, why it is not dishonorable to be necessarily
most holy, is, because holiness in itself is an excellent and
honorable thing. For the same reason, it is no dishonor to
be necessarily most wise, and, in every case, to act most wise-
ly, or do the thing which is the wisest of all ; for wisdom is
also in itself excellent and honorable.
The forementioned author of the Unsay on the Freedom of
Will, &c. as has been observed, represents that doctrine of
the Divine Will's being in every thing necessarily determin-
ed by superior fitness, as making the blessed God a kind of
Almighty Minister and mechanical medium of fate ; and he
insists, page 93, 94, tjttet this moral necessity and impossibili-
ty is, in effect, the s?.i7\c thing with physical and natural Bfe
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 26*
eessity and impossibility : And in p. 54, 55, he says, « The
scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by
the understanding, and the understanding by the appearance
of things, seems to take away the true nature of vice and vir-
tue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest of vices,
seem rather to be matters of fate and necessity, flowing natur-
ally and necessarily from the existence, the circumstances,
and present situation of persons and things ; for this exist-
ence and situation necessarily makes such an appearance to
the mind ; from this appearance flows a necessary perception
and judgment, concerning these things ; this judgment, nec-
essarily determines the Will ; and thus, by this chain of nec-
essary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and be-
come natural ideas, and necessary things, instead of moral
and free actions."
And yet this same author allows, p. 30, 31, That a per-
fectly wise being will constantly and certainly choose what is
most fit ; and says, p. 102, 103, « I grant, and always have
granted, that wheresoever there is such antecedent superior
fitness of things, God acts according to it, so as never to con-
tradict it ; and, particularly in all his judicial proceedings as
a Governor, and distributer of rewards and punishments."
Yea, he says expressly, p. 42, « That it is not possible for
God to act otherwise, than according to this fitness and good-
ness in things."
So that according to this author, putting these several pas-
sages of his Essay together, there is no virtue, nor any thing
of a moral nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts and
exercises of God's holiness, justice, and faithfulness ; and he
never does any thing which is in itself supremely worthy, and,
above all other things, fit and excellent, but only as a kind of
mechanical medium of fate ; and in what he does as the Judge
and moral Governor of the world, he exercises no moral ex-
cellency ; exercising no freedom in these things, because he
acts by moral necessity, which is, in effect, the same with
physical or natural necessity ; and, therefore, he only acts by an
Hobistical fatality ; as a Being indeed of vast understanding, as
Weil as fiower and efficiency (as he said before) but without a
2T€> FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Will to choosey being a kind of Almighty Minister of fate, acting
under its supreme influence. For he allows, that in all these
things, God's Will is determined constantly and certainly by
a superior fitness, and that it is not possible for him to act
otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory or praise
belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most
fit, holy, wise and excellent course, in any one instance ?
Whereas, according to the scriptures, and also the common
sense of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the
honor of any being, that through the moral perfection of his
nature, he necessarily acts with supreme wisdom and holi-
ness ; but on the contrary, his praise is the greater ; herein
consists the height of his glory.
The same author, p. 5 6, supposes, that herein appears the
excellent character of a ivise and good man, that though he can
choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet he does not ; but suf-
fers himself to be directed by fitness ; and that, in this conduct,
he imitates the blessed God. And yet, he supposes it is con-
trariwise with the blessed God ; not that he suffers himself to
be directed by fitness, when he can choose contrary to the fit-
ness of things, but that he cannot choose contrary to the fitness
of things ; as he says, p. 42.... 7W it is not possible for God to
cct otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any
Jilness or goodness in things : Yea, he supposes, p. 31, That if
a man were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise
than be constantly and certainly determined by the fitness of
things.
One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this
section ; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the glo-
jy of God, to be necessarily determined by superior fitness in
some things, then neither docs it to be thus determined in all
things ; from any thing in the nature of such necessity, as at
all detracting from God's freedom, independence, absolute
supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state or
manner of acting ; or as implying any infirmity, restraint, or
subjection. And if the thing be such as well consists with
God's glory, and has nothing tending to detract from it ; then
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 27 S
we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many
things, lest thereby we should detract from God's glory to©
much.
SECTION VIII.
Some further Objections against the moral Necessity
of God's Volitions considered.
THE author last cited, as has been observed, owns that
God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose
what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and
goodness in things ; and that it is not possible for him to do
otherwise. So that it is in effect confessed, that in those
things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dishon-
or, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act
from necessity ; notwithstanding all that can be objected from
the agreement of such a necessity, with the fate of the Stoics s
and the necessity, maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which
it will follow, that if it were so, that in ail the different things,
among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior
fitness, or preferableness en one side, then it would be no
dishonor, or any thing, in any respect, unworthy, or unbecom-
ing of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in eve-
ry thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely
the argument, from the unsuitableness of such a necessity to
the liberty, supremacy, independence and glory of the Divine
Being ; and a resting the whole weight of the affair on the
decision of another point wholly diverse ; viz. Whether it be
so indeed, that in all the various possible things, which are in
God's view, and may be considered as capable objects of his
choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one thing
above another. This is denied by this author ; who supposes?
that in many instances, between two or more possible things*
27* FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
which come within the view of the divine mind, there is st
perfect indifference and equality, as to fitness or tendency to
attain any good end which God can have in view, or to an-
swer any of his designs. Now, therefore, I would consider
whether this be evident.
The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds.
(1.) It is urged, that in many instances, we must suppose there
is absolutely no difference between various possible objects of
choice, which God has in view : And (2.) that the difference
between many things is so inconsiderable, or of such a na-
ture, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any
consequence ; or to suppose that any of God's wise designs
would not be answered in one way as well as the other.
Therefore,
I. The first thing to be considered is whether there are
any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness, and abso-
lutely no difference, between different objects of choice, that
are proposed to the Divine Understanding ?
And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be con-
sidered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the i
question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there
is an inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is enquired,
whether different objects of choice may not be absolutely
without difference ? If they are absolutely without difference,
then how are they different objects of choice ? If there be ab-
solutely no difference, in any respect, then there is no variety
or distinction ; for distinction is only by some difference.
And if there be no variety among proposed objects of choice,
then there is no opportunity for variety of choice, or differ-
ence of determination. For that determination of a thing,
which is not different in any respect, is not a different deter-
mination, but the same. That this is no quibble, may appear
more fully anon.
The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some in-
stances, chooses to do one thing rather than another, where
the things themselves are perfectly without difference,
are two.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 273
1. That the various parts of infinite time and space, abso-
lutely considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all
one from another ; and that therefore, when God determin-
ed to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and
space, rather than others, he determined and preferred,
among various objects, between which there was no prefera-
bleness, and absolutely no difference.
Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time
before the world was created, distinguished by successive parts,
properly and truly so ; or a succession of limited and unraea?-
urable periods of time, following one another, in an infinitely-
long series ; which must needs be a groundless imagination.
The eternal duration which was before the world, being only
the eternity of God's existence ; which is nothing else but
his immediate, perfect and invariable possession of the whole
of his unlimited life, together and at once : Vita interminabilis,
tota, simul et ficrfecta fwssessio. Which is so generally allow-
ed, that I need not stand to demonstrate it.*
* " If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation
or succession, of one thing to another, would appear to be also removed.
Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that suc-
ceeds ? One minute to another, perhaps, vclut unda supervenit undam. But
when we imagine this, we fancy that the minutes are things separately exist-
ing. This is the common notion ; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time
is nothing but the existence of created successive beings, and eternity the nec-
essary existence of the Deity. Therefore, if this necessary being hath no
change or succession in his nature, his existence must of course be unsucces-
sive. We seem to commit a double oversight in this case ; first, we find suc-
cession in the necessary nature and existence of the Deity himself ; which is
wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this suc-
cession to eternity, considered abstractedly from the Eternal Being ; and sup-
pose it, one knows not what, a thing subsisting by itself, and flowing one
minute after another. This is the work of pure imagination, and contrary to
the reality of things. Hence the common metaphorical expressions: Time
runs apace, let us lay hold on the present minute, and the lite. The philosophers)
themselves mislead us by their illustrations. They compare eternity to the mo-
tion of a point running on forever, and making a tfaceless infinite line. Here
the point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing the present min-
ute ; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it ; that is, they ascribe
motion to a mere nonentity, t© illustrate to us a successive eternity, made up
Vol. V. 2 L
274 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the
limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth and depth,
truly and properly distinguished into different measurable
parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an in-
finite series. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is
doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute
and infinite duration. It is as improper to imagine that the
immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by a se-
ries of miles and leagues, one beyond another ; as that the
infinite duration of God is distinguished by months and years,
one after another. A diversity and order of distinct parts,
limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as natur-
ally obtrude itself on our imagination, in one case as the oth-
er ; and there is equal reason in each case, to suppose that
our imagination deceives us. It is equally improper to talk ,
of months and years of the Divine Existence, and milesquares
of Deity ; and we equally deceive ourselves, when we talk of
the world's being differently fixed with respect to either of
these sorts of measures. I think, we know not what we mean,,
if we say, the world might have been differently placed from
what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity ; or, that it might
have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity ; and
all arguments and objections, which arc built on the imagina-
tions we are apt to have of infinite extension or duration, are
buildings founded on shadows, or castles in the air.
2. The second argument, to prove that the Most High
wills one thing rather than another, without any superior fit-
ness or preferableness in the thing preferred, is God's actual-
ly placing in different parts of the world, particles, or atoms
of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The foremen-
tioned author says, p. 78, &c. « If one would descend to the
of finite successive parts. If once we allow an all perfect mind, which hath
an eternal, immutable and infinite comprehension of all things, always (and
allow it we must) the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to
such a mind. ...In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or
existence of the Deity will appear to be Vita intcrminabilit, tota,simul et ptrjec-
tapoisessio ; how much soever this may have been a paradox hitherto." En-
quiry into tht Naturt of the Human Soul, Vol. II. p. 409, 410, 411. Edit, III-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 275
minute specific particles, of which different bodies are com-
posed, we should see abundant reason to believe, that there are
thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which
are perfectly equal and alike, and coald give no distinct deter-
mination to the Will of God, where to place them." He there
instances in particles of water, of which there are such im-
mense numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans of this
world ; and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery
particles, which compose the body of the sun ; so many, that
it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them
should be exactly equal and alike.
Answ. (1.) To this I answer : That as we must suppose
matter to be infinitely divisible, it is very unlikely, that any
two, of all these particles, are exactly equal and alike ; so un-
likely, that it is a thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to
one, but it is otherwise ; and that although we should allow a
great similarity between the different particles of water and
fire, as to their general nature and figure ; and however small
we suppose those particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely, that
any two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and
quantity of matter. If we should suppose a great many
globes of the same nature with the globe of the earth, it would
be very strange, if there were any two of them that had ex-
actly the same number of particles of dust and water in them.
But infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light
should have just the same quantity of matter. For a particle
of light, according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of
matter, is composed of infinitely more assignable parts, than
there are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth.
And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles
should be equal ; so it is, that they should be alike in other
respects ; to instance in the configuration of their surfaces.
If there were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it
would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the
same number of particles of dust, water and stone, in their
surfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with respect to
another, without any difference, in any part discernible eith-
er by the naked eye or microscope ; but infinitely less strange,
276 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
than that two particles of light should be perfectly of the same
figure. For there are infinitely more assignable real parts
on the surface of a particle of light than there are particles of
dust, water and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial globe.
Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two parti-
cles, or atoms of matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God
lias placed in different parts of the creation ; as I will not de-
ny it to be possible for God to make two bodies pefectly alike,
and put them in different places ; yet it will not follow, that
two different or distinct acts or effects of the Divine Power
have exactly the same fitness for the tame ends. For these
two different bodies are not different or distinct, in any other
respects than those wherein they differ : They are two in no
other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If
they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they
can be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those things which
are called circumstances ; as place, time, vest, motion, or
some other present or past circumstances or relations. For it
is difference only that constitutes distinction. If God makes
two bodies, in themselves every way equal and alike, and
agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances and relations,
but only their place ; then in this only is there any distinction
or duplicity. The figure is the same, the measure is the
same, the solidity and resistance are the same, and every thing
the same, but only the place. Therefore what the Will of
God determines, is this, namely, that there should be the same
figure, the same extension, the same resistance, 8cc. in two
different places. And for this determination he has some rea-
son. There is some end, for which such a determination and
act has a peculiar fitness, above all other acts. Here is no
one thing determined without an end, and no one thing with-
out a fitness for that end, superior to any thing else. If it be
the pleasure of God to cause the same resistance, and the
same figure, to be in two difi'erent places and situations, we
can no more justly argue from it, that here must be some de-
termination or act of God's Will, that is wholly without mo-
tive or end, than we can argue, that whenever, in any case it
is a man's Will to speak the same words, or make the hame
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 277
sounds at two different times ; there must be some determi-
nation or act of his Will, without any motive or end. The
difference of place, in the former case, proves no more than
the difference of time does in the other. If any one should
say, with regard to the former case, that there must be some-
thing determined without an end, viz. that of those two simi-
lar bodies, this in particular should be made in this place,
and the other in the other, and should inquire, why the Crea-
tor did not make them in a transposition, when both are alike,
and each would equally have suited either place ? The in-
quiry supposes something that is not true, namely, that the
two bodies differ and are distinct in other respects besides
• their place. So that with this distinction inherent in them,
they might, in their first creation, have been transposed, and
each might have begun its existence in the place of the
other.
Let us, for clearness sake, suppose, that God had, at the
beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both
perfect spheres, and perfectly solid, without pores, and per-
fectly alike in every respect, and placed them near one to
another, one towards the right hand, and the other towards
the left, without any difference as to time, motion or rest,
past or present, or any circumstance, but only their place ;
and the question should be asked, why Gad in their creation
placed them so : Why that which is made on the right hand,
was not made on the left, and vice versa ? Let it be well
considered, whether there be any sense in such a question ;
and whether the inquiry does not suppose something false
and absurd. Let it be considered, what the Creator must
have done otherwise than he did, what different act of Will
or power he must have exerted, in order to the thing propos-
ed. All that could have been done, would have been to have
made two spheres, perfectly alike, in the same places where
he has made them, without any difference of the things made,
either in themselves or in any circumstance ; so that the
whole effect would have been without any difference, and
therefore, just the same. By the supposition, the two spheres
are different in no other respect but thtir place ; and there-
3T8 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
fore in other respects they are the same. Each has the same
roundness ; it is not a distinct rotundity, in any other respect
but its situation. There are also the tame dimensions, dif*
fering in nothing but their place. And so of their resistance,
and every thing else that belongs to them.
Here, if any chooses to say, « that there is a difference in
another respect, viz. that they are not NUMERICALLY the
same ; that it is thus with all the qualities that belong to them ;
that it is confessed they are, in some respects, the same ;
that is, they are both exactly alike ; but yet numerically they
differ. Thus the roundness of one is not the same numeri-
cal individual roundness with that of the other." Let this be
supposed ; then the question about the determination of the
Divine Will in the affair, is, why did God will, that this indi-
vidual roundness should be at the right hand, and the other
individual roundness at the left ? Why did he not make them
in a contrary position ? Let any rational person consider,
whether such questions be not words without a meaning, as*
much as if God should see fit for some ends, to cause the
same sounds to be repeated, or made at two different times ;
the sounds being perfectly the same in every other respect,
but only one was a minute after the other ; and it should be
asked upon it, why did God cause these sounds, numerically
different, to succeed one the other in such a manner ? Why
did he not make that individual sound, which was in the first
minute, to be in the second ? And the individual sound of
the last minute to be in the first ? These inquiries would be
even ridiculous ; as, I think, every person must see, at once,
in the case proposed of two sounds, being only the same re-
peated, absolutely without any difference, but that one cir-
cumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer
gome good end, that the same sound should be made by light-
ning at two distinct times, and therefore wills that it should
be so, must it needs therefore be, that herein there is some
act of God's Will without any motive or end ? God saw fit
often, at distinct times, and on different occasions, to say the
very same words to Moses, namely, those, / am Jehovah.
And would it not be unreasonable to infer, as a certain consc-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 2F9
quence, from this, that here must be some act or acts of the
Divine Will, in determining and disposing these words ex-
actly alike, at different times, wholly without aim or induce-
ment ? But it would be no more unreasonable than to say*
that there must be an act of God's without any inducement,
if he sees it best, and, for some reasons, determines that there
shall be the same resistance, the same dimensions, and the
same figure, in several distinct places.
If, in the instance of the two spheres, perfectly alike, it be
supposed possible that God might have made them in a con-
trary position ; that which is made at the right hand, being
made at the left ; then I ask, Whether it is not evidently
equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that
in the place of the right hand globe, that he might have made
that numerically different from what it is, and numerically
different from what he did make it, though perfectly alike,
and in the same place ; and at the same time, and in every
respect, in the same circumstances and relations ? Namely,
Whether he might not have made it numerically the same
with that which he has now made at the left hand, and so
have left that which is now created at the right hand, in a
state of nonexistence ? And, if so, whether it would not
have been possible to have made one in that place, perfectly
like these, and yet numerically differing from both ? And
let it be considered, whether, from this notion of a numerical
difference in bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which numeri-
cal difference is something inherent in the bodies themselves,
and diverse from the difference of place or time, or any cir-
cumstance whatsoever ; it will not follow, that there is an in-
finite number of numerieqjly different possible bodies, per-
fectly alike, among which God chooses, by a selfdetermining
power, when he goes about to create bodies.
Therefore let us put the case thus : Supposing that God,
in the beginning, had created but one perfectly solid sphere,
in a certain place ; and it should be inquired, Why God cre-
ated that individual sphere, in that place, at that time ? And
why he did not create another sphere, perfectly like it, but
numerically different, in the same place, at the same time ?
230 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Or why he chose to bring into being there, that very body,
rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies, per-
fectly like it ; either of which he could have made there as
■well, and would have answered his end as well ? Why he
caused to exist, at that place and time, that individual round-
ness, rather than any other of the infinite number of individu-
al rotundities just like it ? Why that individual resistance,
rather than any other of the infinite number of possible resist-
ances just like it ? And it might as reasonably be asked,
Why, when God first caused it to thunder, he caused that in-
dividual sound then to be made, and not another just like it ?
Why did he make choice of this very sound, and reject all
the infinite number of other possible sounds just like it, but
numerically differing from it, and all differing one from an-
other ? I think, every body must be sensible of the absurdi-
ty and nonsense of what is supposed in such inquiries. And,
if we calmly attend to the matter, we shall be convinced, that
all such kind of objections as I am answering, are founded on
nothing but the imperfection of our manner of conceiving
things, and the obscureness of language, and great want of
clearness and precision in the signification of terms.
If any shall find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a
great length in metaphysical niceties and subtilties ; I answer,
The objection which they are in reply to, is a metaphysical
subtilty, and must be treated according to the nature of it.*
II. Another thing alleged is, that innumerable things
which are determined by the Divine Will, and chosen and
done by God rather than others, differ from those that are
not chosen in so inconsiderable a manner, that it would be
unreasonable to suppose the difference to be of any conse-
quence, or that there is any superior fitness or goodness,
that God can have respect to in the determination.
* " For rren to have recourse to subtilties, in raising difficulties, and then
complain, that thsy should be taken off by minutely examining these subtil-
ties, is a strange kind of procedure." Nature of the Human Soul, Vol, 2, pags
33»-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 281
To -which I answer ; it is impossible for us to determine,
with any certainty or evidence, that because the difference is
very small, and appears to us of no consideration, therefore
there is absolutely no superior goodness, and no valuable
end, which can be proposed by the Creator and Governor of
the world, in ordering such a difference. The foremention-
ed author mentions many instances. One is, there being one
atom in the whole universe more or less. But I think, it
would be unreasonable to suppose, that God made one atom,
in vain, or without any end or motive. He made not one
atom, but what was a work of his Almighty power, as much
as the whple globe of the earth, and requires as much of a
constant exertion of Almighty power to uphold it ; and was
made and is upheld understandingly, and on design, as much
as if no other had been made but that. And it would be as
unreasonable to suppose, that he made it without any thing
really aimed at in so doing, as much as to suppose, that he
made the planet Jupiter without aim or design.
It is possible, that the most minute effects of the Creator's
power, the smallest assignable difference between the things
which God has made, may be attended, in the whole series
of events, and the whole compass and extent of their influence,
with very great and important consequences. If the laws of
motion and gravitation, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, hold
universally, there is not one atom, nor the least assignable
part of an atom, but what has influence, every moment,
throughout the whole material universe, to cause every part
to be otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that partic-
ular corporeal existence. And however the effect is insensi-
ble for the present, yet it may, in length of time, become
great and important.
To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the
same way, in straight lines, perfectly parallel one to another J
but to be diverted from this parallel course, and drawn one
from another, as much as might be by the attraction of an
atom, at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed stars
from the earth ; these bodies being turned out of the lines of
Vol. V. 2 M
282 FREEDOM OF THE WILL."
their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get further and fur*
ther distant, one from the other ; and though the distance
may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may
become very great. So the revolution of a planet round the
sun being retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolu-
tion made greater or less, and more or less eliptical, and so
its periodical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by
the influence of the least atom, might, in length of time, per-
form a whole revolution sooner or later than otherwise it
would have done ; which might make a vast alteration with
regard to millions of important events. So the influence of
the least particle may, for aught we know, have such effect
on something in the constitution of some human body, as to
cause another thought to arise in the mind at a certain time,
than otherwise would have been ; which, in length of time,
(yea, and that not very great) might occasion a vast alteration
through the whole world of mankind. And so innumerable
other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least assignable
alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences.
Another argument, which the forementioned author brings
against a necessary determination of the Divine Will, by a
superior fitness, is, that such doctrine derogates from the
freeness of God's grace and goodness, in choosing the objects
of his favor and bounty, and from the obligation upon men
to thankfulness for special benefits. Page 89, &c.
In answer to this objection, I would observe,
1. That it derogates no more from the goodness of God,
to suppose the exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be
determined by wisdom, than to suppose it determined by
chance, and that his favors are bestowed altogether at random,
his Will being determined by nothing but perfect accident,
without any end or design whatsoever ; which must be the
case, as has been demonstrated, if volition be not determined
by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect con-
tingence, wherein neither previous inducement, nor antece-
dent choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodness or
benevolence, than that which is owing to the influence of a
wise end.
THEEDOM OF THE WILL. 285
2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that determines
the Will of God, in the choice of the objects of his favors,
be any moral quality in the object, recommending that object
to his benevolence above others, his choosing that object is
not so great a manifestation of the freeness and sovereignty
of his grace, as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessi-
ty of supposing this, in order to our supposing that he has
some wise end in view, in determining to bestow his favors
on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish
between the merit of the object of God's favor, or a moral
qualification of the object attracting that favor and recom-
mending to it, and the natural fitness of such a determination
of the act of God's goodness, to answer some wise designs of
his own, some end in the view of God's omniscience. It is
God's own act, that is the proper and immediate object of
his volition.
3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some in-
stances, God acts from wise designs in determining the par-
ticular subjects of his favors. None will say, I presume,
that when God distinguishes, by his bounty, particular socie-
ties or persons, He never, in any instance, exercises any
wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence.
And, if it be not denied to be so in some instances, then I
would inquire, whether; in these instances, God's goodness is
less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end
at all ? And whether the subjects have less cause of thank-
fulness ? And if so, who shall be thankful for the bestow-
ment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circum-
stance of the distinction's being made without an end ? How
shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim,
and when not ? It is very manifest, with respect to the Apos-
tle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a
Christian and an Apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c.
The Apostle himself mentions one end. 1 Tim. i. 15, 16.
Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, qfivhom I am
chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me
first, Jesus Christ might shew forth all long suffering, for a fiat?
tern to them who should hereafter believe on Him to life everlast-
284 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ing. But yet the Apostle never looked on it as a diminution
of the freedom and riches of Divine Grace in his election,
which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me
to observe,
4. Our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of
God's Will, as has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily
derogating from the riches of God's grace to such as are the
chosen objects of his favor, that, in many instances, this mor-
al necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great de-
gree of it. God may choose this object rather than another,
as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs and
inclinations of his goodness ; being more sinful, and so more
miserable and necessitous than others ; the inclinations of
Infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and
the gracious design of God's sending his Son into the world,
may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy
towards such an object, rather than another.
One thing more I would observe, before I finish,' what I
have to say on the head of the necessity of the acts of God's
Will ; and that is, that something much more like a servile
subjection of the Divine Being to fatal necessity, will follow
from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which
they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with
respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depend-
ing on the volitions of moral agents, which arc ^he most im-
portant events of the universe, to which all others are subor-
dinate ; I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God
has a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any pur-
poses or decrees of his, about them. And if so, they have a
fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or volitions of his,
and independent on them, and to which his volitions must be
subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this
fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So
that here, instead of a moral necessity of God's Will, arising
from, or consisting in, the infinite perfection and blessedness
of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable state of things,
properly distinct from the perfect nature of the Divine Mind,
and the state of the Divine Will and Design, and entirely in-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 2*5
dependent on these things, and which they have no hand in,
because they are prior to them ; and which God's Will is
truly subject to, he being obliged to conform or acccommodate
himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in every
thing he does in his disposals and government of the world ;
the moral world being the end of the natural ; so that all is in
vain, that is not accommodated to that state of the moral
world which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and stale
of the wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from
eternity. Such a subjection to necessity as this, would truly
argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy the
Supreme Being ; and is much more agreeable to the notion
which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods,
than that moral necessity of fitness and wisdom which has
been spoken of •, and is truly repugnant to the absolute sover-
eignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his
Will ; and really subjects the Will of the Most High, to the
Will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon
them.
SECTION IX.
Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which
has been maintained, that it makes God the Au-
thor of Sin.
IT is urged by Arminians, that the doctrine of the necessi-
ty of men's volitions, or their necessary connexion with ante-
cedent events and circumstances, makes the first cause, and
supreme orderer of all things, the author of sin ; in that he
has so constituted the state and course of things that sinful
volitions become necessary, in consequence of his disposal.
286 FREEDOM OF THE WILE.
Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will,*
cites one of the ancients, as on his side, declaring that this
opinion of the necessity of the Will " absolves sinners, as do-
ing nothing of their own accord which was evil, and would cast
all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world,
upon God, and upon his Providence, if that were admitted by
the assertors of this fate ; whether he himself did necessitate
them to do these things, or ordered matters so, that they
should be constrained to do them by some other cause." And
the doctor says, in another place,f " In the nature of the thing,
and in the opinion cf philosophers, causa deficient, in rebus
necessariis, ad causani per se tfficientem reducenda est. In things
necessary, the deficient cause must be reduced to the efficient.
And in this case the reason is evident ; because the not doing
•what is required, or not avoiding what is forbidden, being a
defect, must follow from the position of the necessary cause
of that deficiency."
Concerning this, I would observe the following things.
I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing pe-
culiar to this scheme ; it is no difficulty or disadvantage,
wherein it is distinguished from the scheme of Arminians ;
and, therefore, not reasonably objected by them.
Dr. Whitby supposes, that if sin necessarily follows from
God's withholding assistance, or if that assistance be not giv-
en, which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil ;
then, in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly the
author of that evil, as if he Avere the efficient cause of it. From
whence, according to what he himself says of the devils and
damned spirits, God must be the proper author of their per-
fect unrestrained wickedness : He must be the efficient cause
of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfect malignity
against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of the
insatiable cruelly of their disposition. For he allows, that
God has so forsaken them, and does so withhold his assist-
ance from them, that they arc incapacitated for doing good,
and determined only to evil.| Our doctrine, in its conse-'
* On the Five Points, p. 361. f Ibid, p, 486. \ Ibid, p. 302, 305.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 28/
<mence, makes God the author of men's sin in this world, no
more, and in no other sense, than his doctrine, in its conse-
quence, makes God the author of the hellish pride and mal-
ice of the devils. And doubtless the latter is as odious an ef-
fect as the former.
Again, if it will follow at all, that God is the author of sin,
from what has been supposed of a sure and infallible connex-
ion between antecedents and consequents, it will follow be-
cause of this, viz. that for God to be the author or orderer of
those things which, he knows beforehand, will infallibly be at-
tended with such a consequence, is the same thing, in effect,
as for him to be the author of that consequence. But, if this
be so, this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of
Anninians themselves ; at least, of those of them who allow
God's certain foreknowledge of all events. For, on the sup-
position of such a foreknowledge, this is the case with res-
pect to every sin that is committed : God knew, that if he or-
dered and brought to pass such and such events, such sins
would infallibly follow. As for instance, God certainly fore-
knew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered things
so, that there should be such a man born, at such a time, and
at such a place, and that his life should be preserved, and that
he should, in Divine Providence, be led into acquaintance
with Jesus ; and that his heart should be so influenced by
God's Spirit or Providence, as to be inclined to be a follower
of Christ; and that he should be one of those twelve, which
should be chosen constantly to attend him as his family ; and
that his health should be preserved, so that he should go up
to Jerusalem, at the last passover in Christ's life ; and if it
should be so ordered, that Judas should see Christ's kind treat-
ment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have
that reproof from Christ, which he had at that time, and see
and hear other things, which excited his enmity against his
master, and that if other circumstances should be ordered, as
they were ordered ; it would be what would most certainly and
infallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would
soon after hang himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to
hell, for his horrid wickedness.
2SS FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
Therefore, this supposed difficulty ought not to be brough?
as an objection against the scheme which has been maintain-
ed, as disagreeing with the Arminian scheme, seeing it is no
difficulty owing to such disagreement ; but a difficulty where-
in the Arminians share with us. That must be unreasonably
made an objection against our differing from them, which we
should not escape or avoid at all by agreeing with them.
And therefore I would observe,
II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the au-
thor of sin, ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that
phrase, The author of sin. I know the phrase, a3 it is com-
monly used, signifies sometbing very ill. If by the author of
sin, be meant the sinner, the agent, or actor of sin, or the doef
of a wicked thing ; so it would be a reproach and blaspbemy,
to suppose God to be the author of sin. In this sense, I ut-
terly deny God to be the author of sin ; rejecting such an im-
putation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhor-
red ; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what
I have laid down. But if, by the author of sin, is meant the
permitter, or not a hinderer of sin ; and, at the same time, a
disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise,
holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be
permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly
follow : I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the author
of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin (though I
dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and cus-
tom is apt to carry another sense) it is no reproach for the Most
High to be thus the author of sin. This is not to be the actor
of sin, but, on the contrary, of holiness. What God doth here-
in, is holy ; and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency
of his nature. And, I do not deny, that God's being thus the
author of sin, follows from what I have laid down ; and, I as-
sert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is main-
tained by most of the Arminian divines.
That it is most certainly so, that God is in such a manner
the disposer and ordcrer of sin, is evident, if any credit is to be
given to the scripture ; as well as because it is impossible, in
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 38$
the nature of thines, to be otherwise. In such a manner God
ordered the obstinacy of Pharaoh, in his refusing to obey God's
commands, to let the people go. Exod. iv. 21. "I will hard-
en his heart, that he shall not let the people go." Chap. viu
2....5. " Aaron thy brother shall speak unto Pharaoh, that he
send the children of Israel out of his land. And I will harden
Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in
the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you ;
that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt, by great judgments,"
Sec. Chap. ix. 12. « And the Lord hardened the heart of
Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had
spoken unto Moses." Chap. x. 1,2. " And the Lord sakl
unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh ; for I have hardened his
heart and the heart of his servants, that I might shew these
my signs before him, and that thou mayest tell it in the ears of
thy son, and thy son's son, what things I have wrought in
Egypt, and my signs which I have done amongst them, that
ye may know that I am the Lord." Chap. xiv. 4. « And I
will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after them :
And I will be honored upon Pharaoh, and upon all nis Host."
Verse 8. " And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh
King of Egypt, and he pursued after the Children of Israel."
And it is certain, that in such a manner, God, for wise and
good ends, ordered that event, Joseph's being sold into Egypt,
by his brethren. Gen. xlv. 5. "Now, therefore, be not
grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither ;
for God did send me before you to preserve life." Verse 7,
8. " God sent me before you to preserve you a posterity in
the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance : So
now it was not you, that sent me hither, but God." Psal. cv.
17. « He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was
sold for a servant." It is certain, that thus God ordered the
sin and folly of Sihon King of the Amorites, in refusing to let
the people of Israel pass by him peaceably. Dcut. ii. 30.
« But Sihon King of Heshbon would not let us pass by him ;
for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart
obstinate, that he might deliver him into thine hand." It is
certain, that Gcd thus ordered the sjn and folly of the Kings
Vol. V. 2 N
290 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
of Canaan, that they attempted not to make peace with Israel,
but with a stupid boldness and obstinacy, set themselves vio-
lently to oppose them and their God. Josh. xi. 20. « For it
•was of the Lord, to harden their hearts, that they should come
against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly,
and that they might have no favor ; but that he might destroy
them, as the Lord commanded Moses." It is evident, that
thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of Zedekiah
against the King of Babylon. Jer. Hi. 3. » For through the
anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem, and Judah,
until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah.
rebelled against the King of Babylon." So 2 Kings xxiv. 20.
And it is exceeding manifest, that God thus ordered the rap-
ine and unrighteous ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in spoiling
and running the nations round about. Jer. xxv. 9. " Behold,
I will send and take all the families of the north, saith the
Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar, my servant, and will bring them
against this land, and against all the nations round about ; and
will utterly destroy them, and make them an astonishment,
and an hissing, ?nd perpetual desolations." Chap, xliii. 10, 11.
" I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon,
my servant ; and I will set his throne upon these stones that
I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavilion over them.
And when lie cometh, he shall smite the land of Egypt, and
deliver such as are for death to death, and such as are for cap-
tivity to captivity, and such as are for the sword to the sword."
Thus God represents himself as sending for Nebuchadnezzar,
and taking of him and his armies, and bringing him against
the nations, which were to be destroyed by him, to that ver)*
end, that he might utterly destroy them, and make them des-
olate ; and as appointing the work that he should do, so par-
ticularly, that the very persons were designed that he should
kill with the sword, and those that should be killed with fam-
ine and pestilence, and those that should be carried into cap-
tivity ; and that in doing all these things, he should act as his
servant ; by which, less cannot be intended, than that he
should serve his purposes and designs. And in Jer. xxvii. 4."
5, 6. God declares, how he would cause him thus to serve
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 291
his designs, viz. by bringing this to pass in his sovereign dis-
posal, as the great Possessor and Governor of the universe,
that disposes all things just as pleases him. " Thus saith the
Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel ; I have made the earth, the
man and the beast, that are upon the ground, by my great
power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it unto
whom it seemed meet unto me ; and now I have given all
these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, my servant,
and the beasts of the field have I given also to serve him."
And Nebuchadnezzar is spoken of as doing these things, by
having his arms strengthened by God, and having God's sword
put into his hands, for this end. Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 26. Yea,
God speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and
cruelly destroying all sorts, without distinction of sex or age,
as the weapon in God's hand, and the instrument of his indig-
nation, which God makes use of to fulfil his own purposes,
and execute his own vengeance. Jer. li. 20, Sec. « Thou art
my battle axe, and weapons of war: For with thee will I
break in pieces the nations, and with thee will I destroy king-
doms, and with thee will I break in pieces the horse and his
lider, and with thee will I break in pieces the chariot and his
rider ; with thee also will I break in pieces man and woman,
and with thee will I break in pieces old and young, and with
thee will I break in pieces the young man and the maid," Sec.
It is represented, that the designs of Nebuchadnezzar, and
those that destroyed Jerusalem, never could have been ac-
complished, had not God determined them, as well as they.
Lam. iii. 37". « Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass,
and the Lord commandeth it not ?" And yet the king of Bab-
ylon's thus destroying the nations, and especially the Jews, is
spoken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally des-
troyed him. Isa. xiv. 4, 5, 6, 12. Hab. ii. 5. ...12, and Jer.
chap. 1. and li. It is most manifest, that God, to serve his
own designs, providentially ordered Shimei's cursing David.
2 Sam. xvi. 10,11. « The Lord hath said unto him, curse
David... .Let him curse, for the Lord hath bidden him.
It is certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious
and glorious ends ordered the fact which they committed, who
293 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
were concerned in Christ's death ; and that therein they did
hut fulfil God's designs. As, I trust, no Christian will deny
it was the design of God that Christ should be crucified^ and
that for this end, he came into the world. It is very manifest
by many scriptures, that the whole affair of Christ's crucifix-
ion, with its circumstances, and the treachery of Judas, that
made way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in pur-
suance of his purpose ; notwithstanding- the violence that is
used with those plain scriptures, to obscure and pervert the
sense of them. Acts it. 23. " Him being delivered, by the
determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God,* ye have ta-
ken, and with wicked hands, have crucified and slain." Luke
21, 22.f « But behold the hand of him that betrayeth me, is
with me on the table ; and truly the Son of man goeth, as it
was determined " Acts iv. 27, 28. " For of a truth; against thy
holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and
Pontius Piiate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel,
were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy
counsel determined before to be done. Acts Hi. 17, 18. " And
now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did
also your rulers ; but these things, which God before had
shewed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should
suffer, he hath so fulfilled." So that what these murderers of
Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to pass or order-
ed, and that by which he fulfilled his own word.
* " Grotius, as well as Bcza. observes, prognosis must here signify decree;
and Eisner has shewn that it has that signification, in approved Greek writers.
And it is certain Ekdotos signifies one given up into the hands of an enemy."
Doid. in Loc .
r «• As this passage is not liable to the ambiguities, which some have ap-
prehended in Acts ii. 23, and iv. 28, (which yet seem on the whole to be par-
allel to it, in their most natural construction) I look upon it as an evident
proof, "hat these things are. in the language of scripture, said to be determin-
ed or decreed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God as the word
Orizo most naturally signifies) which he, sees in fact will^happen, in conse-
quence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency ; as well as those
events, of which re is properly the Author." Dodd, in ift ,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL-
In Rev. xvii. 17, the agreeing of the kings of the earth
to give their kingdom to the beast, though it was a very
wicked thing in them, is spoken of as a fulfilling of God's Will,
and what God had put into their hearts to do. It is manifest
that God sometimes permits sin to be committed, and at the
same time orders things so, that if he permits the fact, it will
come to pass, because, on some accounts, he sees it needful
and of importance, that it should come to pass. Matth. xviii.
7. " It must needs be, that offences come ; but woe to that
man by whom the offence cometh." With 1 Cor. xi. 19.
« For there must also be heresies among you, that they
which are approved may be made manifest among you."
Thus it is certain and demonstrable from the Holy Scrip-
tures, as well as the nature of things, and the principles of
Arminians, that God permits sin, and at the same time, so
orders things, in his Providence, that it certainly and infallibly
will come to pass, in consequence of his permission.
I proceed to observe in the next place,
III. That there is a great difference between God's be-
ing concerned thus, by his permission, in an event and act,
which, in the inherent subject and agent of it, is sin, (though
the event will certainly follow on his permission) and his be-
ing concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of
sin ; or between his being the Orderer of its certain exist-
ence, by not hindering it, under certain circumstances, and
his being the proper Actor or Author of it, by a positive agen-
cy or efficiency. And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby
offers about a saying of philosophers, that cau.ia de/iczens, hi
rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientatf reducenda est.
As there is a vast difference between the sun's being the
cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and
brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive
influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost,
in the night, by its motion, whereby it descends below the
horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the lat-
ter kind of events ; but it is not the proper cause, efficient or
producer of them ; though they are necessarily consequent
&94 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
•jn tiiut motion under such circumstances ; no more is any ac-
tion of the Divine Being the cause of the evil of men's Wills*
If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it
would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of
light and heat ; and then something might be argued from
the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in
the sun ; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is
dark and cold, and that its beams are black and frosty. But
from its being the cause no otherwise than by its departure,
no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary ; it may just-
ly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold
and darkness are found to be the consequences of its with-
drawment ; and the more constantly and necessarily these
effects are connected with, and confined to its absence, the
more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light
and heat. So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive
agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the contrary,
arises from the witholding of his action and energy, and, un-
der certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of
his influence ; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his op-
eration evil, or has any thing of the nature of evil, but, on the
contrary, that He and his agency are altogether good and holy,
and that He is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange
arguing, indeed, because men never commit sin, but only
when God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin,
when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from them-
selves but from God ; and so, that God must be a sinful Be-
ing ; as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always
dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is
present, that therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that
his disk and beams must needs be black.
IV. It properly belongs to the Supreme and Absolute
Governor of the universe, to order all important events with-
in his dominion, by his wisdom ; but the events in the moral
world are of the most important kind, such as the moral ac-
tons of intelligent creatures, and their consequences.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 2?f
These events will be ordered by something. They will ei-
ther be disposed by wisdom, or they will be disposed by
chance ; that is, they will be disposed by blind and undesign-
ing causes, if that were possible, and could be called a dispos-
al. Is it not better, that the good and evil which happsns in
God's world, should be ordered, regulated, bounded and de-
termined by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise Being,
who perfectly comprehends within his understanding and
constant view, the universality of things, in all their extent
and duration, and sees all the influence of every event, with
respect to every individual thing and circumstance, through-
out the grand system, and the whole of the eternal series of
consequences ; than to leave these things to fall out by
chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no
understanding or aim ? Doubtless, in these important events*
there is a better and a worse, as to the time, subject, place,
manner and circumstances of their coming to pasG, with re-
gard to their influence on the state and course of things,
And if there be, it is certainly best that they should be deter-
mined to that time, place, &c. which is best. And therefore
it is in its own nature fit, that wisdom, and not chance, should
order these things. So that it belongs to the Being, who is
the possessor of Infinite Wisdom, and is the Creator and
Owner of the whole system of created existences, and has
the care of all ; I say, it belongs to him to take care of this
matter ; and he would not do what is proper for him, if he
should neglect it. And it is so far from being unholy in him
to undertake this affair, that it would rather have been unholy
to neglect it, as it would have been a neglecting what fitly ap-
pertains to him ; and so it would have been a very unfit and
unsuitable neglect.
Therefore the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to
this matter ; especially considering, that if it should be sup-
posed to be otherwise, and God should leave men's volitions,
and all moral events, to the determination and disposition of
blind and unmeaning causes, or they should be left to happen
perfectly without a cause ; this would be no more consistent
with liberty, in any notion of it, and particularly net in the Ar-
296 FREEDOM 01 THE WILL.
minian notion of it, than if these events were subject to the
disposal of Divine Providence, and the Will of man were de-
termined by circumstances which are ordered and disposed
by Divine W 7 isdoin ; as appears by what has been already
observed. But it is evident, that such a providential dispos-
ing and determining men's moral actions, though it infers a
moral necessity of those actions, yet it does not in the least
infringe the real liberty of mankind ; the only liberty that
common sense teaches to be necessary to moral agency,
which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with
such necessity.
On the whole, it is manifest, that God may be, in the
manner which has been described, the Orderer and Disposer
of that event, which, in the inherent subject and agent, is
moral evil ; and yet His so doing may be no moral evil. He
may will the disposal of such an event, and its coming to pass
for good ends, and his Will not be an immoral or sinful Will,
but a perfectly holy Will. And he may actually, in his Prov-
idence, so dispose and permit things, that the event may be
certainly and infallibly connected with such disposal and per-
mission, and his act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but
a perfectly holy act. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet that
there should be such a disposal and permission, as that it
should come to pass, may be a good thing. This is no con-
tradiction or inconsistence. Joseph's brethren selling him
into Egypt, consider it only as it was acted by them, and with
respect to their views and aims which were evil, was a very
bad thing ; but it was a good thing, as it was an event of
God's ordering, and considered with respect to his views and
aims which were good. Gen. 1. 20. " As for you, ye thought
evil against me ; but God meant it unto good. So the cruci-
fixion of Christ, if we consider only those things which belong
to the event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are com-
prehended within the compass of the affair considered as their
act, their principles, dispositions, views and aims ; so it was
one of the most heinous things that ever was done, in many
respects the most horri'l of all acts : Rut consider it, as it was
FREEDOM OF THE WILL, 29?
ivHled and ordered of God, in the extent of his designs and views,
it was the most admirable and glorious of all events, and God's
willing the event, was the most holy volition of God that ever
was made known to men ; and God's act in ordering it was a
divine act, which, above all others, manifests the moral excel-
lency of the Divine Being.
The consideration of these things may help us to a sufficient
answer to the cavils of Armenians, concerning what has been,
supposed by many Calvinists, of a distinction between a secret
and revealed will of God, and their diversity one from the
other, supposing that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent
Wills to the Most High ; which is without any foundation.
God's secret and revealed Will, or in other words, his dis-
posing and preceptive Will may be diverse, and exercised in,
dissimilar acts, the one in disapproving and opposing, the
other in willing and determining, without any inconsistence.
Because, although these dissimilar exercises of the Divine
Will may, in some respects, relate to the same things, yet,
in strictness, they have different and contrary objects, the one
evil, and the other good. Thus, for instance, the crucifixion
of Christ was a thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive
Will of God, because, as it was viewed and done by his ma-
lignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely contrary to the
holy nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy
inclination of his heart revealed in his law. Yet this does
not at all hinder but that the crucifixion of Christ, considered
with all those glorious consequences, which were within the
view of the Divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and there-
fore might appear to God to be, a glorious event, asd conse-
quently be agreeable to his Will, though this Will may be
secret, i. e. not revealed in God's law. And thus considered,
the crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret
exercises of God's Will were of a kind that is dissimilar, and
contrary to his revealed Will, respecting the same, or like
objects ; if the objects of both were good, or both evil; then,
indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds of volition or r ii'ation to
God, respecting these objects, would be to ascribe an incon*
Vol- V. 2 O
298 FREEDOM OF THE WILL;
sistent Will to God ; but to ascribe to him different and op-
posite exercises of heart, respecting different objects, and
objects contrary one to another, is so far from supposing
God's Will to be inconsistent with itself, that it cannot be
supposed consistent with itself any other way. For any being
to have a Will of choice respecting good, and at the same
time a Will of rejection and refusal respecting evil, is to be
very consistent ; but the contrary, viz. to have the same Will
towards these contrary objects, and to choose and love both
good and evil, at the same time, is to be very inconsistent.
There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may
hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil,
and yet that it may be his Will it should come to pass, con*
sidering all consequences. I believe, there is no person of
good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain
that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole
compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the
endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as
moral evil in the world.* And if so, it will certainly follow,
* Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted writer,
of our nation, that nobody who is acquainted with him, will suspect
to be very favorable to Calvinism. " It is difficult, (says he,) to
handle the necessity of evil in such a manner, as not to stumble such
as are not above being alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon
sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will
find, that consistently with the unlimited power of the Supreme Cause, it may
be said, that in the best ordered system, evils must have place." Turnbull's
Principks of Moral PhiloiOphy, p. 327, 328. He is there speaking of moral
evils, as may be seen.
Again the same author, in his second vol. entitled Christian Philosophy, p.
35, has these words : " If the Author and Governor of all things be infinite-
ly perfect, then whatever is, is right; of all possible systems he hath chosen
the best ; and consequently, there is no absolute evil in the universe. This^
being the case, all the seeming imperfections or evils in it are such only in a
partial view ; and with respect to the whole system, they are goods.**
Ibid, p 37. " Whence then comes evil ? Is the question that hath, in all
ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in philosophy. And indeed, if we own
the existence of evil in the woild in an absolute sense, we diametrically con-
tradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any evil
in the jystcm that is not good in respect to the whole, then is the whole
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 29&
that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is
best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And,
if so, then such a choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy
choice. And if so, then that Providence which is agreeable
to such a choice, is a wise and holy Providence. Men do
will sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it : They
love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does not
will sin as sin, or for the sake of any thing evil ; though it
be his pleasure so to order things, that He permitting, sin
will come to pass, for the sake of the great good that by his
disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order
things so that evil should come to pass, for the sake of the
contrary good, is no argument that He does not hate evil, as
«vil ; and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasona-
bly forbid evil, as evil, and punish it as such.
The Arminians themselves must be obliged, whether they
will or no, to allow a distinction of God*s Will, amounting to
just the same thing that Calvinists intend by their distinction
of a secret and revealed Will. They must allow a distinction
of those things which God thinks best should be, considering
not good, but evil, or at best, very imperfect ; and an author must be as his
workmanship is : As is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of
this difficulty is at hand : That there is no evil in the universe. What !
Are there no pains, no imperfections ? Is there no misery, no vice in the
world ? Or are not these evils ? Evils indeed they are ; that is, those of
one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful and abom-
inable; but they are not evil or mischievous with respect to the whole."
Ibid. p. 42. " But He is at the same time, said to create evil, darkness,
confusion, and yet to do no evil, but to be the Author of good only. He
is called " the Father of lights, the Author of every perfect and good gift,
with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning," who " tempt-
eth no man, but giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not " And yet
by the prophet Isaias, He is introduced saying of Himself, " I form light,
and create darkness ; I make peace, and create evil : I the Lord, do all these
things." What is the meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the
Lord delighteth in goodness, and, as the Scripture speaks, evil is his Strang-;
work ? He intends and pursues the universal good of his creation ; and the
evil which happens, is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleas-
ure in evil, but because it is requisite to the greater good pursued."
306 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
all circumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to
his disposing Will, and those things which he loves, and are
agreeable to his nature, in themselves considered. Who is
there that will dare to say, that the hellish pride, malice and
cruelty of devils are agreeable to God, and what He likes and
approves ? And yet, I trust, there is no Christian divine but
what will allow, that it is agreeable to God's Will so to order
and dispose things concerning them, so to leave them to
themselves, and give them up to their own wickedness,
that this perfect wickedness should be a necessary conse-
quence. Besure Dr. Whitby's words do plainly suppose and
allow it.*
The following things may be laid down as maxims of
plain truth, and indisputable evidence.
1. That God is a perfectly happy Being, in the most
absolute and highest sense possible.
2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from
every thing that is contrary to happiness, and so, that in strict
propriety of speech, there is no such thing as any pain, grief,
or trouble in God.
3. When any intelligent being is really crossed and dis-
appointed, and things are contrary to what he truly desires,
lie is the less pleased or has less pleasure, his pleasure and
happiness is diminished, and he suffers what is disagreeable
to him, or is the subject of something that is of a nature
contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief, t
From this last axiom, it follows, that if no distinction is
to be admitted between God's hatred of sin, and his Will
with respect to the event and the existence of "in, as the all-
wise Determiner of all events, under the view of all consequen-
• Whitby on the Five Points, Edit. 2, p. 300, 305, 309.
t Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable, to talk, or God's Will
and desire's being truly and properly crossed, without his suffering any uneas-
iness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is to talk of something
that may be called a revealed Will, which may, in some respect, be different
from a secret purpose ; which purpose may be fulfilled, when the other is
opposed,
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 301
ces through the whole compass and series of things ; I say,
then it certainly follows, that the coming to pass of every in-
dividual act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary to
his Will, and that his Will is really crossed in it ; and this in
proportion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is in-
finite, bv reason of the infinite contrariety of his holy nature
to sin ; so his Will is infinitely crossed, in every act of sin that
happens. Which is as much as to say, He endures that which
is infinitely disagreeable to him, by means of every act of sin
that He sees committed. And, therefore, as appears by the
preceding positions, He endures truly and really, infinite
grief or pain from every sin. And so He must be infinitely
crossed, and suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of mil-
lions of instances : He must continually be the subject of an
immense number of real, and truly infinitely great crosses
and vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the
most miserable of all beings.
If any objector should say ; all that these things amount
to, is, that God may do evil that good may come ; which is just-
ly esteemed immoral and sinful in men ; and therefore may
be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral prerfections of
God : I answer, that for God to dispose and permit evil, in
the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that
good may come ; for it is not to do evil at all....In order to a
thing's being morally evil, there must be one of these things
belonging to it : Either it must be a thing unfit and unsuita-
ble in its own nature ; or it must have a bad tendency ; or it
must proceed from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil
end. But neither of these things can be attributed to God's
ordering and permitting such events, as the immoral acts of
creatures, for good ends. (1.) It is not unfit in its own nature,
that He should do so. For it is in its own nature fit, that in-
finite wisdom, and not blind chance, should dispose moral
good and evil in the world. And it is fit, that the Being
who has infinite wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner and Su-
preme Governor of the world, should take care of that matter.
And, therefore, there is no unfitness, or unsuitableness in his
doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other be-
S02 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ings to go about to order this affair ; because they are not
possessed of a wisdom, that in any manner fits them for it ;
and, in other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this
affair ; nor does it belong to them, they not being the owners
and lords of the universe.
We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good
man knew with absolute certainty, it would be best, all things
considered, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in
the world, it would not be contrary to his wisdom and good-
ness, for him to choose that it should be so. It is no evil de-
sire, to desire good, and to desire that which, all things con-
sidered, is best. And it is no unwise choice, to choose that
that should be, which it is best should be ; and to choose the
existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz.
that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be
rnost worthy to be chosen. On the contrary, it would be a
plain defect in wisdom and goodness, for him not to choose it.
And the reason why he might not order it, if he were able,
would not be because he might not desire it, but only the or-
dering of that matter docs not belong to him. But it is no
harm for Him who is, by right, and in the greatest propriety,
the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every thing in
such a manner, as it would be a point of wisdom in Him to
choose that they should be ordered. If it would be a plain
defect of wisdom and goodness in a Being, not to choose that
that should be, which He certainly knows it would, all things
considered, be best should be (as was but now observed) then
it must be impossible for a Being who has no defect of wis-
dom and goodness, to do otherwise than choose it should be ;
and that, for this very reason, because He is perfectly wise
and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and good-
ness for him to choose that it should be, and the ordering of
all things supremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be
agreeable to infinite wisdom and goodness, to order that it
should be. If the choice is good, the ordering and disposing
things according to that choice must also be good. It can be
110 harm in one to whom it belongs to do his Will in the armies
of heaven, and amongst the inhabita?its of the earthy to execute
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 303
a good volition. If his Will be good, and the object of hie
Will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choos-
ing or willing it, is not willing evil that good may come. And
if so, then his ordering, according to that Will, is not doing
evil, that good may come.
2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus
to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it is best
should come to pass. For that it is of good tendency, is the
very thing supposed in the point now in question. Christ's
crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that perpetrat-
ed it, was of most glorious tendency as permitted and ordered
of God.
3. Nor is there any need of supposing it proceeds from
any evil disposition or aim ; for by the supposition, what is
aimed at is good, and good is the actual issue, in the final re-
sult of things.
SECTION X.
Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.
THE things, which have already been offered, may serve
to obviate or clear many of the objections which might be
raised concerning sin's first coming into the world ; as though
it would follow from the doctrine maintained, that God mirs*
be the author of the first sin, through his so disposing things,
that it should necessarily follow from his permission, that the
sinful act should be committed, Sec. I need not, therefore,
stand to repeat what has been said already, about such a ne-
cessity's not proving God to be the author of sin, in any ill
sense, or in any such sense as to infringe any liberty of man,
concerned in his moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt and
punishment.
304 FREEDOM OF THE WILL."
But, if it should nevertheless be said, supposing the case-
so, that God, when he had made man, might so order his cir-
cumstances, that from these circumstances, together with his
withholding further assistance and divine influence, his sin
would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have first
made man with a fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart ?
I answer,
I. It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appeal
in the world, it should arise from the imperfection which
properly belongs to a creature, as such, and should appear so
to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efficient
or fountain. But this could not have been, if man had been
made at first with sin in his heart ; nor unless the abiding
principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act
of the creature. If sin had not arisen from the imperfection
of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that it did
notarise from God, as the positive cause, and real source of
it. ...But it would require room that cannot be here allowed,
fully to consider all the difficulties which have been started,
concerning the first entrance of sin into the world.
And therefore,
II. I would observe, that objections against the doctrine
that has been laid down, in opposition to the Armiman notion
of liberty, from these difficulties, are altogether impertinent ;
because no additional difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a
scheme in this manner differing from theirs, and none would
be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining
theirs. Nothing that the Arminians say, about the contingence,
or sclfdetermining power of man's will, can serve to explain,
with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition of mankind
could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame
of it. To say, the Will was selfdetcrmincd, or determined
by free choice, in that sinful volition ; which is to say, that
the first sinful volition was determined by a foregoing sinful
volition ; is no solution of the difficulty. It is an odd way of
solving difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To say<
FREEDOM OF THE WILL; 305
two and two make nine ; or, that a child begat his father,
solves no difficulty : No more does it, to say, the first sinful
act of choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and chose
and determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it any bet-
ter solution, to say, the first sinful volition chose, determined
and produced itself; which is to say, it was before it was.
Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the diffi-
culty to say, the first sinful volition arose accidentally, without
any cause at all ; any more than it will solve that difficult
question, How the world could be made out of nothing ? To say,
it came into being out of nothing, without any cause ; as has
been already observed. And if we should allow that that
could be, that the first evil volition should arise by perfect ac-
cident, without any cause ; it would relieve no difficulty, about
God's laying the blame of it to man. For how was man to
blame for perfect accident, which had no cause, and which
therefore, he (to be sure) was not the cause of, any more than
if it came by some external cause ?.. ..Such solutions are no
better, than if some person, going about to solve some of the
strange mathematical paradoxes, about infinitely great ancj
small quantities ; as, that some infinitely great quantities are
infinitely greater than some other infinitely great quantities ;
and also that some infinitely small quantities, are infinitely
less than others, which yet are infinitely little ; in order to a
solution, should say, that mankind have been under a mistake,
in supposing a greater quantity to exceed a smaller ; and that
a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes but a single unit.
Vol. V. 3P
3Ctt FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
SECTION XI.
Of a supposed Inconsistence of these Principles with
God's moral Character.
THE things which have been already observed, may be
sufficient to answer most of the objections, and silence the
great exclamations of Arminiam against the Calvinists, from
the supposed inconsistence of Calvinistic principles with the
moral perfections of God, as exercised in his government of
mankind. The consistence of such a doctrine of necessity as
has been maintained, with the fitness and reasonableness of
God's commands, promises and threatenings, rewards and
punishments, has been particularly considered ; the cavils of
our opponents, as though our doctrine of necessity made God
the author of sin, have been answered ; and also their objec-
tion against these principles, as inconsistent with God's sin-
cerity, in his counsels, invitations and persuasions, has been
already obviated, in what has been observed respecting the
consistence of what Calvinists suppose, concerning the secret
and revealed Will of God ; by that it appears, there is no re-
pugnance in supposing it may be the secret Will of God, that
his ordination and permission of events should be such, that it
shall be a certain consequence, that a thing never will come t»
pass ; which yet it is man's duty to do, and so God's precep-
tive Will that he should do ; and this is the same thing as
to say, God may sincerely command and require him to do
it. And if he may be sincere in commanding him, he may,
for the same reason, be sincere in counselling, inviting and
using persuasions with him to do it. Counsels and invitations
are manifestations of God's preceptive Will, or of what God
loves and what is in itself, and as man's act, agreeable to his
heart ; and not of his disposing Will, and what he chooses as
a part of his own infinite scheme of things. It has been par-
ticularly shewn, Part III. Sect. IV. that such a necessity a*
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 3.07
l*as been maintained, is not inconsistent with the propriety
■and fitness of divine commands ; and for the same reason, not
inconsistent with the sincerity of invitations and counsels, in
the Corollary at the end of the Section. Yea, it hath been
shewn, Part III. Sect. VII. Corol. 1, that this objection of
Arminians, concerning the sincerity and use of divine exhor-
tations, invitations and counsels, is demonstrably against them-
selves.
Notwithstanding, I would further observe, that the difficul-
ty of reconciling the sincerity of counsels, invitations and per-
suasions with such an antecedent known fixedness of all
events, as has been supposed, is not peculiar to this scheme,
as distinguished from that of the generality of Arminiansy
which acknowledges the absolute foreknowledge of God ; and
therefore, it would be unreasonably brought as an objection
against my differing from them. The main, seeming diffi-
culty in the case is this ; that God, in counselling, inviting
and persuading, makes a shew of aiming at, seeking and us-
ing endeavors for the thing exhorted and persuaded to ; where-
as, it is impossible for any intelligent being truly to seek, or
use endeavors for a thing, which he at the same time knows,
most perfectly, will not come to pass ; and that it is absurd to
suppose, he makes the obtaining of a thing his end, in his
calls and counsels, which he, at the same time, infallibly
knows will not be obtained by these means. Now, if God
knows this, in the utmost certainty and perfection, the way by
which he comes by this knowledge makes no difference. If
he knows it is by the necessity which he sees in things, or by
some other means ; it alters not the case. But it is in effect
allowed by Arminians themselves, that God's inviting and per-
suading men to do things, which he at the same time, certain-
ly knows will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity ; be-
cause they allow, that God has a certain foreknowledge of all
men's sinful actions and omissions. And as this is thus im-
plicitly allowed by most Arminians, so all that pretend to own
the scriptures to be the word of God, must be constrained to
allow it. ...God commanded and counselled Pharaoh to let his
people go, and used arguments and persuasions to induce him
308 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
to it ; he laid before him arguments taken from his infinite
greatness and almighty power, (Exod vii. 16,) and forewarned
him of the fatal consequences of his refusal, from time to
time. (Chap. viii. 1, 2, 20, 21. Chap. ix. 1....5, 13... IT, and
x. 3, 6.) He commanded Moses, and the ciders of Israel, to
go and beseech Pharaoh to let the people go ; and at the same
time told them, he knew surely that he would not comply
with it. Exod. iii. 18, 19. « And thou shalt come, thou and
the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and you shall say
unto him ; the Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us ;
and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days journey into
the wilderness, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God ;
and, I am sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go."
So our blessed Saviour, the evening wherein he was betrayed,
knew that Peter would shamefully deny him, before the morn-
ing ; for he declares it to him with asseverations, to shew the
certainty of it ; and tells the disciples, that all of them should
be offended because of him that night ; Matth. xxvi. SI. ...35.
Luke xxii. 31. ...34. John xiii. 38. John xvi. 32. And yet
it was their duty to avoid these things : They were very sin-
ful things, which God had forbidden, and which it was their
duty to watch and pray against ; and they were obliged to do
so from the counsels and persuasions Christ used with them,
at that very lime, so to do ; Matth. xxvi. 41. " Watch and
pray, that ye enter not into temptation. So that whatever
difficulty there can be in this matter, it can be no objection
against any principles which have been maintained in opposi-
tion to the principles of Armivdav.s ; nor does it any more con-
cern me to remove the difficulty, than it does them, or indeed
all, that call themselves Christians, and acknowledge the di-
vine authority of the scriptures. ...Nevertheless, this matter
may possibly (God allowing) be more particularly and largely
considered, in some future discourse, on the doctrine of pre-
destination.
But I would here observe, that however the defenders of
that notion of liberty of Will, which I have opposed, exclaim
against the doctrine of Calvinists, as tending to bring men
into doubts concerning the moral perfections of God ; it is
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 309
their scheme, and not the scheme of Calvinists, that indeed is
justly chargeable with this. For it is one of the most funda-
mental points of their scheme of things, that u freedom of
Will, consisting in selfdetermination, without all necessity,
is essential to moral agency. This is the same thing as to
say, that such a determination of the will, without all necessity,
must be in all intelligent beings, in those things, wherein
they are moral agents, or in their moral acts ; and from this
It will follow, that God's Will is not necessarily determined,
in any thing he does, as a moral agent, or in any of his acts
that are of a moral nature. So that in all things, wherein he
acts holily, justly and truly, he does not act necessarily ; or
his Will is not necessarily determined, to act holily and just-
ly ; because, if it were necessarily determined, he would not
be a moral agent in thus acting. His Will would be attend-
ed with necessity, which, they say, is inconsistent with moral
agency. " He can act no otherwise : He is at no liberty in
the affair : He is determined by unavoidable, invincible ne-
cessity ; therefore such agency is no moral agency, yea, no
agency at all, properly speaking. A necessary agent is no
agent ; he being passive, and subject to necessity, what ho
does is no act of his, but an effect of a necessity prior to any
act of his."
This is agreeable to their manner of arguing. Now then
what is become of all our proof of the moral perfections of
God ? How can we prove, that God certainly will, in any
one instance, do that which is just and holy ; seeing his Will
is determined in the matter by no necessity ? We have no
other way of proving that any thing certainly will be, but only
by the necessity of the event. Where we can see no neces-
sity but that the thing may be, or may not be, there we arc
unavoidably left at a loss. We have no other way propcrlv
and truly to demonstrate the moral perfections of God, but.
the way that Mr. Chubb proves them in p. 252,261,262,263,
of his Tracts, viz. that God must necessarily perfectly know,
what is most worthy and valuable in itself, which, in the na-
ture of things, is best and fittest to be done. And as this is
most eligible in itself, He, being omniscient, must see it to be
310 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
so ; and being both omniscient and selfsufficient, cannot have
any temptation to reject it, and so must necessarily will that
■which is best. And thus, by this necessity of the determina-
tion of God's Will to what is good and best, we demonstrably
establish God's moral character.
Corol. From things which have been observed, it ap-
pears that most of the arguments from Scripture which Ar-
minians make use of to support their scheme, are no other
than begging the question. For in these arguments, they
determine in the first place, that wi'hout such a freedom of
Will as they hold, men cannot be proper moral agents, nor
the subjects of command, counsel, persuasion, invitation,
promises, threatenings, expostulations, rewards and punish-
ments ; and that without such freedom it is to no purpose
for men to take any care, or use any diligence, endeavors or
means, in order to their avoiding sin, or becoming holy, es-
caping punishment or obtaining happiness ; and having sup-
posed these things, which are grand things in question in the
debate, then they heap up Scriptures, containing commands,
counsels, calls, warnings, persuasions, expostulations, prom-
ises and threatenings ; (as doubtless they may find enough
such; the Bible is confessedly full of them, from the begin-
ning to the end) and then they glory, how full the Scripture
is on their side, how many more texts there are that evident-
ly favor their scheme, than such as seem to favor the contra-
ry. But let them first make manifest the things in question,
which they suppose and take for gfanted, and shew them to
he consistent with themselves, and produce clear evidence of
their truth, and they have gained their point, as all will con-
fess, without bringing one Scripture. For none denies, that
there are commands, counsels, promises, threatenings, Sec.
in the Bible. But unless they do these things, their multi-
plving such texts of Scripture is insignificant and vain.
It may further be observed, that such Scriptures as they
bring are really against them, and not for them. As it has
been demonstrated, that it is their scheme, and not ours, that
is inconsistent with the use of motives and persuasives, or
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 311
any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice
of virtue, or abstaining from wickedness : Their principles,
and not ours, are repugnant to moral agency, and inconsist-
ent with moral government, with law or precept, with the
nature of virtue or vice, reward or punishment, and with ev-
ery thing whatsoever of a moral nature, either on the part of
the moral governor, or in the state, actions or conduct of the
subject.
SECTION XII.
Of a supposed Tendency of these Principles to A the
ism and Licentiousness.
IF any object against what has been maintained, that it
tends to Atheism, I know not on what grounds such an objec-
tion can be raised, unless it be that some Atheists have held
a doctrine of necessity which they suppose to be like this.
But if it be so, I am persuaded the Arminians would not look
upon it just, that their notion of freedom and contingence
should be charged with a tendency to all the errors that ever
any embraced, who have held such opinions. The Stoic
philosophers, whom the Calvinists are charged with agreeing
with, were no Atheists, but the greatest Theists and nearest
akin to Christians in their opinions concerning the unity and
the perfections of the Godhead, of all the heathen philoso-
phers. And Epicurus, that chief father of Atheism, main-
tained no such doctrine of necessity, but was the greatest
maintainer ofcontinger.ee.
The doctrine of necessity, which supposes a necessary-
connexion of all events, on some antecedent ground and rea-
son of their existence, is the only medium we have to prove
the being of God. And the contrary doctrine of contingence..
3:2 FREEDOM OF THE WILLI
even as maintained by Arminians, (which certainly implies o;
infers, that events may come into existence, or begin to be,
without dependence on any thing foregoing, as their cause,
ground or reason) takes away all proof of the being of God ;
which proof is summarily expressed by the apostle, in Rom.
i. 20. And this is a tendency to Atheism with a witness. So
that, indeed, it is the doctrine of Arminians, and not of the
Calvinists, that is justly charged with a tendency to Atheism ;
it being built on a foundation that is the utter subversion of
every demonstrative argument for the proof of a Deity, as
has been shown, Part II. Sec. 3.
And whereas it has often been said, that the Calvinistic
doctiine of necessity saps the foundations of all religion and
virtue, and tends to the greatest licentiousness of practice :
This objection is built on the pretence, that our doctrine ren-
ders vain all means and endeavors, in order to be virtuous
and religious. Which pretence has been already particularly
considered in the 5th Section of this Part ; where it has been
demonstrated, that this doctrine has no such tendency ; but
that such a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary
doctrine ; inasmuch as the notion of contingence, which their
doctrine implies, in its certain consequences, overthrows all
connexion in every degree, between endeavor and event,
means and end.
And besides, if many other things which have been ob-
served to belong to the Arminian doctrine, or to be plain con-
sequences of it, be considered, there will appear just reason
to suppose that it is that which must rather tend to licentious-
ness. Their doctrine excuses all evil inclinations, which
men find to be natural ; because in such inclinations, they
are not selfdetermined, as such inclinations are not owing to
any choice or determination of their own Wills. Which
leads men v.holly to justify themselves in all their wicked
actions, so far as natural inclination has a hand in determining
their Wills, to the commission of them. Yea, these notions,
which suppose moral necessity and inability to be inconsist-
ent with blame or moral obligation, will directly lead men to
justify the vilest acts and practices, from the strength of their
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 313
wicked inclinations of all sorts ; strong inclinations inducing
a moral necessity ; yea, to excuse every degree of evil in-
clination, so far as this has evidently prevailed, and been the
thing which has determined their Wills ; because, so far as
antecedent inclination determined the Will, so far the Will
was without liberty of indifference and selfdetermination.
Which, at last, will come to this, that men will justify them-
selves in all the wickedness they commit. It has been ob-
served already, that this scheme of things does exceedingly
diminish the guilt of sin, and the difference between the
greatest and smallest offences ;* and if it be pursued in its
consequences, it leaves room for no such thing,as either virtue
or vice, blame or praise in the world.f And then again, how
naturally does this notion of the sovereign, selfdetermiuing
power of the Will, in all things, virtuous or vicious, and what-
soever deserves either reward or punishment, tend to encour-
age men to put off the work of religion and virtue, and turn-
ing from sin to God ; it being that which they have a sover-
eign power to determine themselves to, just when they please j
or if not, they are wholly excusable in going on in sin, be-
cause of their inability to do any other.
If it should be said, that the tendency of this doctrine of
necessity to licentiousness, appears by the improvement many
at this day actually make of it, to justify themselves in their
dissolute courses ; I will not deny that some men do unrea-
sonably abuse this doctrine, as they do many other things
which are true and excellent in their own nature ; but I deny
that this proves the doctrine itself has any tendency to licen-
tiousness. I think the tendency of doctrines, by what now
appears in the world, and in our nation in particular, may
much more justly be argued from the general effect which
has been seen to attend the prevailing of the principles of
Armenians, and the contrary principles ; as both have had
their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it be in-
* Part III. Sect. 6. + Part III. Sect. 6. Ibid. Sect. 7. Part IV. Sect.
1. Part III. Sect. 3. Corol. 1, after the first Head.
Vol. V. 2 Q
314 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
deed, as is pretended, that Calvinistic doctrines undermine
the very foundation of all religion and morality, and enervate
and disannul all rational motives to holy and virtuous practice ;
and that the contrary doci rinks give the inducements to vir-
tue and goodness their proper force, and exhibit religion in a
rational light, tending to recommend it to the reason of man-
kind, and enforce it in a manner that is agreeable to their
natural notions of things : I say, if it be thus, it is remark-
able that virtue and religious practice should prevail most,
when the former doctiines, so inconsistent with it, prevailed
almost universally ; and that ever since the latter doctrines,
so happily agreeing with it, and of so proper and excellent a
tendency to promote it, have been gradually prevailing, vice,
prophaneness, luxury and -wickedness of all sorts, and con-
tempt of all religion, and of every kind of seriousness and
strictness of conversation, should proportionably prevail ; and
that these things should thus accompany one another, and
rise and prevail one with another, now for a whole age togeth-
er. It is remarkable that this happy remedy (discovered by
the free inquiries and superior sense and wisdom of this age)
against the pernicious effects of Calvinism, so inconsistent
with religion, and tending so much to banish all virtue from
the earth, should, on so long a trial, be attended with no good
effect, but that the consequence should be the reverse of
amendment ; that in proportion as the remedy takes place,
and is thoroughly applied, so the disease should prevail, and
the very same dismal effect take place, to the highest degree,
which Calvinistic doctrines are supposed to have so great a
tendency to, even the banishing of religion and virtue, and the
prevailing of unbounded licentiousness of manners. If these
things are truly so, they are very remarkable, and matter o (
very curious speculation.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. $\s
SECTION XIII.
Concerning that Objection against the reasonings by
which the Cahinistic doctrine is supported^ that it
is metaphysical and abstruse.
IT has often been objected against the defenders of Cal-
vinistic principles, that in their reasonings they run into nice,
scholastic distinctions and abstruse, metaphysical subtilties,
and set these in opposition to common sense. And it is pos-
sible, that after the former manner it may be alleged against
the reasoning by which I have endeavored to confute the Ar-
minian scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very ab-
stracted and metaphysical. Concerning this I would observe
*he following things.
I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing
reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be re-
duced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent
objection ; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute
or controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous
to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what lan-
guage it is delivered in ; and for a man to go about to confute
the arguments of his opponent, by telling him his arguments
are metaphysical, would be as weak as to fell him his argu-
ments could not be substantial, because they were written in
French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said
be metaphysics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, Eng-
lish or Mohawk ? But whether the reasoning be good, and
the arguments truly conclusive ? The foregoing arguments
are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against
the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation ;
alleging it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identi-
S16 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
ty, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time.
It is by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove
that the rational soul is not corporeal ; that lead or sand can-
not think ; that thoughts are not square or round, or do not
weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the be-
ing of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to shew
their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be meta-
physically treated. It is by metaphysics only, that we
can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or
is not mutable ; that he is not ignorant or forgetful ;
that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust, and
that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thous-
ands. And, indeed, we have no strict demonstration of any-
thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics.
We can have no proof that is properly demonstrative, of any
one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his
creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him,
the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls,
or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion,
but what is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments
should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest rea-
son, and that a clear, distinct and determinate meaning of the
terms I use, should be insisted on ; but let not the whole be
rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet,
metaphysical.
II. If the reasoning which has been made use of, be in
some sense metaphysical, it will not follow that therefore it
must needs be abstruse, unintelligible, and akin to the jargon
of the schools. I humbly conceive the foregoing reasoning,
at least as to those things which are most material belonging
to it, depends on no abstruse definitions or distinctions, or
terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and unde-
termined signification, or any points of such abstraction and
subtilly, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in
clouds and darkness. There is no high degree of refine-
ment and abstruse speculation, in determining that a thing is
pot before it is, and so cannot be the cause of itself; or tha*
FREEDOM OF THE WILL,
the first act of free choice, has not another act of free choice
going before that, to excite or direct it, or in determining, that
no choice is made, while the mind remains in a state of abso
lute indifference ; that preference and equilibrium never co
exist ; and that therefore no choice is made in a state of lib*
erty, consisting in indifference ; and that so far as the Will is
determined by motives, exhibited and operating previous to the
act of the Will, so far it is not determined by the act of the
Will itself ; that nothing can begin to be, which before was
not, without a cause, or some antecedent ground or reason,
why it then begins to be ; that effects depend on their causes,
and are connected with them ; that virtue is not the worse,
nor sin the better, for the strength of inclination with which
it is practised, and the difficulty which thence arises of do" g
otherwise ; that when it is already infallibly known, that the
thing witl be, it is not a thing contingent whether it will ever
be or no ; or that it can be truly said, notwithstanding, that it
is not necessary it should be, but it cither may be, or may not
be. And the like might be observed of many other things
which belong to the foregoing reasoning.
If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing reasoning-
is nothing but metaphysical sophistry ; and that it must be
so, that the seeming force of the arguments all depends on
some fallacy, and while that is hid in the obscurity, which al-
ways attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and
refinement ; and shall be ready to say, " Here is indeed some-
thing that tends to confound the mind, but not to satisfy it ;
for, who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men are fitlv
blamed or commended, punished or rewarded for those voli-
tions which are not from themselves, and of whose existence
they are not the causes ? Men may refine as much as they
please, and advance their abstract notions, and make Out a
thousand seeming contradictions, to puzzle our understand-
ings ; yet there can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this ;
the natural sense of the mind of man will always resist it."*
* A certain noted author of the present age says, '.he arguments for necessi-
ty are nothing but quibbling, or logomachy, using wards without a meaning, or beg-
FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
I hambly conceive, that such an objector, if he has capacity
and humility and calmness of spirit, and sufficient impartiality,
thoroughly to examine himself, will find that lie knows not
really what he would be at ; and that indeed, his difficulty is
nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent customary
use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly understood, nor
carefully reflected upon. Let the objector reflect again, if he
has candor and patience enough, and does not scorn to be at
the trouble of close attention in the affair. He would have a
man's volition be from himself. Let it be from himself, most
primarily and originally of any way conceivable ; that is,
from his own choice : How will that help the matter, as to
his being justly blamed or praised, unless that choice itself
be blame or praiseworthy ; And how is the choice itself (an
iil choice, for instance) blameworthy, according to these prin-
ciples, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner ;
gmg the question. I do not know what kind of necessity any authors, he may
have reference to, are advocates for ; or whether they have managed their ar-
guments well, or ill. As to the arguments I have made use of, if they are quit'
bits they may be shewn to be so : Such knots are capable of being untied, and
the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly
done, with respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon, I shall have
just occasion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argu-
mentations. I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined ; and
if there be nothing but tfgging the question, or mere logomachy, or dispute ol
words, let it be made manifest, and shewn how the seeming strength of the
argument depends on my using words without a meaning, or arises from the
amBiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an indeterminate and un-
steady manner ; and that the weight of my reasons rests mainly on such a
foundation ; and then, T shall either be ready to retract what I have urged,
and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for
my obstinacy.
The sa-T>e author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls
v qn4 sophistry, to experience. A person can experience only what
passes in his own mind. But yet, as we may well suppose, that all men have
the same human faculties ; so a man may well argue from his own experience
to that of others, in things that shew the nature of those faculties, and the man-
ner of their op'ration. But then one has as good right to allege his experi-
ence, as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable
things I ran do ns I v.- i 1 1 j ibat the motions of my body, in many respects,
FREEDOM OF THE W LL. S19
'that is, from his own choice ? But the original and first deter-
mining choice in the affair is not from his choice ; his choice
is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself some other
way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help the mat-
ter: If it be not from himself of choice, then it is not from
himself voluntarily ; and if so, he is surely no more to blame,
than if it were not from himself at all. It is a vanity, to pre-
tend it is a sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing
but metaphysical refinement and subtilty, and so attended with
obscurity and uncertainty.
If it be the natural sense of our minds, that what is blame-
worthy in a man must be from himself, then it doubtless is
also, that it must be from something bad in himself, a bad
choice, or bad disposition. But then our natural sense is, that
this bad choice or disposition is evil in itself, and the man
blameworthy for it, on its own account, without taking into
our notion of its blameworthiness, another bad choice, or dis-
position going before this, from whence this arises ; for that
is a ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate con-
instantaneously follow the acts of my Will concerning those motions ; and
that my Will has some command of my thoughts ; and that the acts of my
Will are my own, i. e. that they are acts of my Will, the volitions of my own
mind ; or, in other words, that what I will, I will. Which, I presume, is
the sum of what others experience in this affair. But as to finding by expe-
rience, that my Will is originally determined by itself; or that, my Will first
choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly fol-
lows; and that this is the first rise of the determination of my Will in any af-
fair ; or that any volition rises in my mind contingently ; I declare, I know-
nothing in myself, by experience, of this nature ; and nothing that ever I ex-
perienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any such thing, or gives
me any more reason to suppose or suspect any such thing, than to suppose-
that my volitions existed twenty years before they existed. It is true, I find
myself possessed of my volitions, before I can see the effectual power of any
cause to produce them, (for the power and efficacy of the cause is net seen
but by the effect) and this, for ought I know, may make some imagine, that
volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason
from hence to determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave
myself ray own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a cause,
because 1 first found myself possessed of being, before I had knowledge of a
cause of my being.
320 FREEDOM OF THE WILL:
tradiction, which our natural sense of blameworthiness has
nothing to do with, and never comes into the mind, nor is sup-
posed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair. As
was demonstrated before, natural sense does not place the
moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them,
but the nature of them. An evil thing's being from a man, or
from something antecedent in him, is not essential to the
original notion we have of blameworthiness ; but it is its be-
ing the choice of the heart ; as appears by this, that if a thing
be from us, and not from our choice, it has not the nature of
blameworthiness or ill desert, according to our natural sense.
When a thing is from a man, in that sense, that it is from his
Will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his W T ill is in
it : So far as the Will is in it, blame is in it, and no fur-
ther. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame,
to inquire whether the bad Will be from a bad Will : There
is no consideration of the original of that bad Will ; because,
according to our natural apprehension, blame originally con-
sists in it. Therefore a thing's being from a man, is a sec-
ondary consideration, in the notion of blame or ill desert.
Because those things, in our external actions, are most prop-
erly said to be from us, which are from our choice ; and no
other external actions, but those that are from us in this sense,
have the nature of blame ; and they indeed, not so properly
because they are from us, as because we are in them, i. e. our
Wills are in them ; not so much because they are from some
property of ours, as because they are our properties.
However, all these external actions being truly from us,
as their cause ; and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and
in the common affairs of life, to speak of men's actions and
conduct that we see, and that affect human society, as deserv-
ing ill or well, as worthy of blame or praise ; hence it is come
to pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all iheir
measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the dictates
of common sense, about these overt acts of men ; to the run-
ning of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful
confusion.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 321
And, therefore, I observe,
III. It is so far from being true (whatever may be pre-
tended) that the proof of the doctrine which has been main-
tained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphys •
ical terms and notions ; and that the Arminian scheme, without
needing such clouds and darkness for its defence, is support-
ed by the plain dictates of common sense ; that the very re-
verse is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is
fact, that they, and not we, have confounded things with meta-
physical, unintelligible notions and phrases ; and have drawn
them from the light of plain truth, into the gross darkness of
abstruse, metaphysical propositions, and words without a
meaning. Their pretended demonstrations depend very much
on such unintelligible, metaphysical phrases, as, selfdetermi-
nation, and sovereignty of the Will ; and the metaphysical
sense they put on such terms, as necessity, contingency, action y
agency, isfc. quite diverse from their meaning as used in com-
mon speech ; and which, as they use them, are without any
consistent meaningor any manner of distinct, consistent ideas;
as far from it as any of the abstruse terms and perplexed
phrases of the peripatetic philosophers or the most unintelli-
gible jargon of the schools, or the cant of the wildest fanatics.
Yea, we may be bold to say, these metaphysical terms, on
which they build so much, are What they use without know-
ing what they mean themselves ; they are pure metaphysical
sounds, without any ideas whatsoever in their minds to an=>
swer them ; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there
cannot be any notion in the mind consistent with these expres-
sions, as they pretend to explain them ; because their expla-
nations destroy themselves. No such notions as imply self-
contradiction, and selfaholition, and this a great many ways,
can subsist in the mind ; as there can be no idea of a whole
which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension with-
out dimensions, or of an effect which is before its cause. ...Ar-
minians improve these terms, as terms of art, and in their met-
aphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things
which are contrary to common sense, in a high degree. Thus,
instead of the plain, vulgar notion of liberty, which all man*
Vol. V. 2 R
S22 FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
kind, in every part of the face of the earth, and in all ages-
have ; consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases ; they
have introduced a new, strange liberty, consisting in indiffer-
ence, contingence, and selfdetermination ; by which they in-
volve themselves and others in great obscurity, and manifold
gross inconsistence. So, instead of placing virtue and vice,
as common sense places them very much, in fixed bias and
inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more
established inclination ; these, through their refinings and
abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in indifference,
to be essential to all virtue and vice. So they have reasoned
themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but metaphysic-
al confusion, into many principles about moral agency, blame,
praise, reward and punishment, which are, as has been shewn,
exceeding contrary to the common sense of mankind ; and
perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in commoR
life.
CONCLUSION.
WHETHER the things which have been alleged, are lia-
ble to any tolerable answer in the way of calm, intelligible
and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge ; but I am
sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not un-
likely, that some, who value themselves on the supposed ra-
tional and generous principles of the modern, fashionable di-
vinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the
sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pre-
tended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of be-
ing read, or of so much notice as to say much about it, they
may probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional
vehemence and contempt, about the fate of the heathen, Hob-
bes' necessity, and ynaking men mere machines ; accumulating
the terrible epithets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable, irresisti-
ble, Ifc. and it may be, with the addition o£ hoi-rid and blasphe-
mous; and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things,
which have been said, in colors which shall be shocking to
the imaginations, and moving to the passions of those, who
have either too little capacity, or too much confidence of the
opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to
try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination.*
* A writer, of the present age, whom I have several times had occasion to
mention, speaks once and again of those who hold the doctrine of necessity,
as scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers. ...I do not know, whether he has
respect to any particular notion of necessity, thai some may have maintained ;
and, if so, what doctrine of necessity it is that he means. ..Whe. her I am wor-
thy of the name of a philosopher, or not, would be a question little to the
present purpose. If any, and ever so many, should deny it, I should not think
324 CONCLUSION.
Or difficulties may be started and insisted on, which do not be^
long to the controversy ; because, let them be more or less
real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are owing to
any thing distinguishing of this scheme from that of the Ar-
minians, and would ajot be removed nor diminished by re-
nouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or some
particular things may be picked out, which they may think
will sound harshest in the ears of the generality ; and these
may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and contemptuous
words ; and from thence, the whole treated with triumph and
insult.
It is easy to see, how the decision of most of the points in
controversy, between Calvinists and Arminians, depends on the
determination of this grand article concerning the freedom
of the Will, requisite to moral dgency ; and that by clearing and
establishing the Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the chief ar-
guments are obviated, by which Arminian doctrines in gener-
al are supported, and the contrary doctrines demonstratively
confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest, that God's moral
government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents,
making them the objects of his commands, counsels, calls,
warnings, expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards and
punishments, is not inconsistent with a determining disposal
of all events, of every kind, throughout the universe, in his
providence ; either by positive efficiency, or permission. In-
deed, such an universal, determining Providence infers some
kind of necessity of all events, such a necessity as implies an
infallible, previous fixedness of the futurity of the event ; but
no other necessity of moral events, or volitions of intelligent
agents, is needful in order to this, than moral necessity ; which
it -worth the while to enter into a dispute on that question : Though at the
same time 1 might expect, some better answer should be given to the arguments
brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain ; and I might further reas-
onably desire, that it might be considered, whether it dots not become those,
■who are truly worthy of the name of philosophers, to be sensible, that there is
a difference between argument and contempt ; yea, and a difference between
the contemptibleriess of the person that argues, and the inconclusivciiess of the
arguments he offers.
CONCLUSION. 32i>
4oes as much ascertain the futurity of the event, as any other
necessity. But, as has been demonstrated, such a necessity
is not at all repugnant to moral agency, and a reasonable use
of commands, calls, rewards, punishments, &c. Yea, not on-
ly are objections of this kind against the doctrine of an uni-
versal determining Providence, removed by what has been
said, but the truth of such a doctrine is demonstrated.
As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future
events is established by previous necessity, either natural or
moral ; so it is manifest that that the Sovereign Creator and
Disposer of the world has ordered this necessity, by ordering
his own conduct, either in designedly acting or forbearing to
act. For, as the being of the world is from God, so the cir-
cumstances in which it had its being at first, both negative
and positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways ;
and all the necessary consequences of these circumstances,
must be ordered by him. And God's active and positive in-
terpositions, after the world was created, and the consequen-
ces of these interpositions ; also every instance of his
forbearing to interpose, and the sure consequences of
this forbearance, must all be determined according to his
pleasure. And therefore every event, which is the con-
sequence of any thing whatsoever, or that is connected with
any foregoing thing or circumstance, either positive or nega-
tive, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be order-
ed of God ; either by a designed efficiency and interposition,
or a designed forbearing to operate or interpose. But, as has
been proved, all events whatsoever are necessarily connected
with something foregoing, either positive or negative, which
is the ground of their existence : It follows, therefore, that
the whole series of events is thus connected with something
in the state of things, either positive or negative, which is o-
riginal in the series ; i. e. something which is connected
■with nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate con-
duct, either his acting or forbearing to act. From whence it
follows, that as God designedly orders his own conduct, and
its connected consequences, it must necessarily be, that he
designedly orders all things.
32G CONCLUSION.
The things which have been said, obviate some of the
chief objections of Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine
of the total depravity and corruption of marCs nature, where-
by his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is utter-
ly unable, without the interposition of sovereign grace, sav-
ingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do any thing that is
truly good and acceptable in God's sight.- For the main ob-
jection against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with the
freedom of man's Will, consisting in indifference and selfde-
termining power ; because it supposes man to be under a ne-
cessity of sinning, and that God requires things of him in or-
der to his avoiding eternal damnation, which he is unable to
do ; and that this doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the
sincerity of counsels, invitations, Sec. Now, this doctrine
supposes no other necessity of sinning, than a moral necessi-
ty ; which, as has been shewn, does not at all excuse sin ;
and supposes no other inability to obey any command, or
perform any duty, even the most spiritual and exalted, but a
moral inability, which, as has been proved, does not excuse
persons in the nonperformance of any good thing, or make
them not to be the proper objects of commands, counsels and
invitations. And moreover, it has been shewn that there is
not, and never can be, either in existence, or so much as in
idea, any such freedom of Will, consisting in indifference and
selfdetermination, for the sake of which, this doctrine of orig-
inal sin is cast out ; and that no such freedom is necessary,
in order to the nature of sin, and a just desert of punishment.
The things which have been observed, do also take off the
main objections of Arminians against the doctrine of effica-
cious grace ; and at the same time prove the grace of God in
a sinner's conversion (if there be any grace or divine influ-
ence in the affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irresistible too, if
by irresistible is meant that which is attended with a moral
necessity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by
any resistance. The main objection of Arminians against
this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their selfdetermin-
ing freedom of Will ; and that it is repugnant to the nature
of virtue, that it should be wrought in the heart by the deter-
CONCLUSION. S27
mining efficacy and power of another, instead of its being
owing to a selfmoving power ; that in that case, the good
which is wrought, would not be our virtue, but rather God's
virtue ; because it is not the person in whom it is wrought,
that is the determining author of it, but God that wrought it
in him. But the things, which are the foundation of these
objections, have been considered ; and it has been demon-
strated that the liherty of moral agents does not consist in self-
• determining power, and that there is no need of any such liber-
ty in order to the nature of virtue- nor does it at all hinder but
that the state or act of the Will may be the virtue of the sub-
ject, though it be not from selfdetermination, but the deter-
mination of an extrinsic cause ; even so as to cause the event
to be morally necessary to the subject of it. And as it has
been proved, that nothing in the state or acts of the Will of
man is contingent ; but that, on the contrary, every event of
this kind is necessary, by a moral necessity ; awd as it has
also been now demonstrated, that the doctrine of an universal
determining Providence, follows from that doctrine of neces-
sity which was proved before ; and so that God does deci-
sively, in his Providence, order all the volitions of moral a-
gents, either by positive influence or permission ; and it be-
ing allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair of
man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or less, is by
some positive influence, and not by mere permission, as in
the affair of a sinful volition ; if we put these things togeth-
er, it will follow, that God's assistance or influence, must be
determining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral
necessity of the event ; and so, that God gives virtue, holi-
ness and conversion to sinners, by an influence which deter-
mines the effect, in such a manner, that the effect will infalli-
bly follow by a moral necessity ; which is what Calvinists
mean by efficacious and irresistible grace.
The things which have been said, do likewise answer the
chief objections against the doctrine of God's universal and
absolute decree, and afford infallible proof of this doctrine ;
and of the doctrine of absolute, eternal, personal election in par-
ticular. The main objections against these doctrines arc, that
328 CONCLUSION.
they infer a necessity of the volitions of moral agents, and of
the future, moral state and acts of men, and so are not consist-
ent with those eternal rewards and punishments, which are
connected with conversion and impenitence ; nor can be
made to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the
precepts, calls, counsels, warnings and expostulations of the
word of God ; or with the various methods and means of
grace, which God uses with sinners, to bring them to repent-
ance ; and the whole of that moral government, which God
exercises towards mankind ; and that they infer an inconsist-
ence between the secret and revealed Will of God, and make
God the author of sin. But all these things have been obvi-
ated in the preceding discourse. And the certain truth of
these doctrines, concerning God's eternal purposes, will fol-
low from what was just now observed concerning God's uni-
versal Providence ; how it infallibly follows from what has
been proved, that God orders all events ; and the volitions of
moral agents amongst others by such a decisive disposal, that
the events are infallibly connected with his disposal. For if
God disposes all events, so that the infallible existence of the
events is decided by his Providence, then he, doubtless, thus
orders and decides things kno*uri?igly, and on design. God
does not do what he does, nor order what he orders, accident-
ally or unawares ; either without or beside his intention. And
if there be a foregoing design, of doing and ordering as he
does, this is the same with a purpose or decree. And ;s it
has been shewn that nothing is new to God, in any respect,
but all things are perfectly and equally in his view from eter-
nity ; hence it will follow, that his designs or purposes are
net things formed anew, founded on any new views or ap-
pearances, bu> are all eternal purposes. And as il has been
now shewn, how the doctrine of determining, efficacious grace
certainly follows from things proved in the foregoing dis-
course ; hence will necessarily follow the doctrine of particu-
lar, eternal, absolute election. For if men are made true saints,
no otherwise than as God makes them so, and distinguishes
them horn others, by an efficacious power and influence of
his, that decides and fixes the event ; and God thus makes
CONCLUSION. 329
some saints, and not others, or design or purpose, and (a5 haa
been now observed) no designs of God are new ; it follows,
that God thus distinguished from others, all that ever become
true saints, by his eternal design or decree. I might also
shew how God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an ab-
solute decree, and how such a decree can be proved to a de-
monstration from it, but that this discourse may not be length-
ened out too much, that must be omitted for the present.
From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ
in some sense may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visi-
ble Christians, yea, the whole world by his death ; yet there
must be something particular in the design of his death, with
respect to such as he intended should actually be saved there-
by. As appears by what has been now shewn, God has the
actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in his
proper, absolute design, and of a certain number only ; and
therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in any thing
God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a
proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to
die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other,
most strictly speaking ; for it is impossible that God should
prosecute any other design than only such as he has ; he
certainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of
speech, pursue a design that he has not. And, indeed, such
a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly
follow, from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, as from
that of the decree. For it is as impossible, in strictness
of speech, that God should prosecute a design, or aim at a
thing, which He at the same time most perfectly knows will
not be accomplished, as that he should use endeavors for that
which is beside his decree.
By the things which have been proved, are obviated some
of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible
and necessary perseverance of saints, and some of the main
foundations of this doctrine are established. The main prej-
udices of Arminians agidr.st this doctrine seem to be these.
They suppose such a necessary, infallible perseverance to be
Vol. V. 2 S
330 CONCLUSION.
repugnant to the freedom of the Will : That it must be ow
ing to man's own selfdetcrmining power, that hejirst becomes
virtuous and holy ; and so, in like manner, it must be left a
thing contingent, to be determined by the same freedom of
Will, •whether he will persevere in virtue and holiness ; and
that otherwise his continuing stedfast in faith and obedience
would not be his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and rewardable,
nor could his perseverance be properly the matter of divine
commands, counsels and promises, nor his apostacy be proper-
ly threatened, and men warned against it. Whereas we find all
these things in Scripture : There we find stedfastness and
perseverance in true Christianity, represented as the virtue
of the saints, spoken of as praiseworthy in them, and glorious
rewards promised to it ; and also find that God makes it the
subject of his commands, counsels and promises ; and the
contrary, of threatenings and warnings. But the foundation
of these objections has been removed, in its being shewn that
moral necessity and infallible certainty of events is not incon-
sistent with these things ; and that as to freedom of Will, ly-
ing in the power of the Will to determine itself, there neither
is any such thing, nor any need of it, in order to virtue, re-
ward, commands, counsels, &c.
And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute e-
lection do certainly follow from things which have been prov-
ed in the preceding discourse ; so some of the main founda-
tions of the doctrine of perseverance, are thereby established.
If the beginning of tiue faith and holiness, and a man's be-
coming a true saint at first, does not depend on the selfde-
terminip.g power of the Will, but on the determining, effica-
cious grace of God ; it may well be argued, that it is so
also with respect to men's being continued saints, or perse-
vering in faith and holiness. The conversion of a sinner be-
ing not owing to a man's selfdetermination, but to God's de-
termination and eternal election, which is absolute and de-
pending on the sovereign Will of God, and not on the free
Will of man ; as is evident from what has been said ; and
it being very evident from the Scriptures, that the eternal e-
lection which there is of saints to faith and holiness, is also
CONCLUSION. §SI
an election of them to eternal salvation. Hence their ap-
pointment to salvation must also be absolute, and not depend-
ing on their contingent, selfdetermining Will. From all
which it follows, that it is absolutely fixed in God's decree,
that all true saints shall persevere to actual eternal sal-
vation.
But I must leave all these things to the consideration of
*he fair and impartial reader ; and when he has maturely-
weighed them, I would propose it to his consideration, wheth-
er many of the first reformers, and others that succeeded
them, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his
church, and greatest instruments of their deliverance from
error and darkness, and of the support of the cause of piety
among them, have not been injured in the contempt with
which they have been treated by many late writers, for their
teaching and maintaining such doctrines as are commonly
called Calvinistic. Indeed, some of these new writers, at
the same time that they have represented the doctrines of
these ancient and eminent divines as in the highest degree ri-
diculous, and contrary to common sense, in an ostentation of
a very generous charity, have allowed that they were honest,
wellmeaning men ; yea, it maybe some of them, as though
it were in great condescension and compassion to them, have
allowed that they did pretty well for the day in which they
lived, and considering the great disadvantages they labored
under ; when at the same time, their manner of speaking
has naturally and plainly suggested to the minds of their
readers, that they were persons, who, through the lowness
of their genius, and greatness of the bigotry with which their
minds were shackled and thoughts confined, living in the
gloomy caves of superstition, fondly embraced, and demure-
ly and zealously taught the most absurd, silly, and monstrous
opinions, worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen pos-
sessed of that noble and generous freedom of thought, which
happily prevails in this age of light and inquiry. When,
indeed, such is the case, that we might, if so disposed, speak
as big words as they, and on far better grounds. And
really all the Arminians on earth might be challenged with*
332 CONCLUSION.
out arrogance or vanity, to make these principles of theirs,
wherein they mainly differ from their fathers, whom they
so much despise, consistent with common sense ; yea, and
perhaps to produce any doctrine ever embraced by the blind-
er bi^ot of the church of Rome, or the most ignorant Mus-
b'. man or extravagant enthusiast, that might be reduced to
more demonstrable inconsistencies, and repugnancies to com-
mon ^.ense, and to themselves ; though their inconsistencies
indeed may not lie so deep, or be so artfully veiled by a de-
ceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate significa-
tion of phrases. I will not deny, that these gentlemen,
many of them, are men of great abilities, and have been
helped to higher attainments in philosophy, than those an-
cient divines, and have done great service to the church of
God in some respects ; but I humbly conceive that their dif-
fering from their fathers with such magisterial assurance,
in these points in divinity, must be owing to some other cause
than superior wisdom.
It may also be worthy of consideration, whether the
great alteration, which has been made in the state of things
in our nation, and some other parts of the Protestant world,
in this and the past age, by the exploding so generally Cal-
vinistic doctrines, that is so often spoken of as worthy to be
greatly rejoiced in by the friends of truth, learning and virtue,
as an instance of the great increase of light in the Christian
church ; I say, it may be worthy to be considered, whether
this be indeed a happy change, owing to any such cause as an
increase of true knowledge and understanding in things of
relieion ; or whether there is not reason to fear, that it may
be owing to some worse cause.
And I desire it may be considered, whether the boldness
of some writers may not be worthy to be reflected on, who
have not scrupled to say, that if these and those things are
true (which yet appear to be the demonstrable dictates of rea-
son, as well as the certain dictates of the mouth of the Most
High) then God is unjust and cruel,, and guilty of manifest
deceit and double dealing, and the like. Yea, some have
gone so far, as confidently to assertj that if any book which
CONCLUSION. 333
pretends to be scripture, teaches such doctrines, that alone is
sufficient warrant for mankind to reject it, as what cannot be
the word of God. ...Some, who have not gone so far, have said,
that if the scripture seems to teach any such doctrines, so
contrary to reason, we are obliged to find out some other in-
terpretation of those texts, where such doctrines seem to be
exhibited. Others express themselves yet more modestly :
They express a tenderness and religious fear, lest they should
receive and teach any thing that should seem to reflect on
God's moral character, or be a disparagement to his methods
of administration, in his moral government; and therefore
express themselves as not daring to embrace some doctrines,
though they seem to be delivered in scripture, according to
the more obvious and natural construction of the words. But
indeed it would shew a truer modesty and humility, if they
would more entirely rely on God's wisdom and discerning,
who knows infinitely better than we, what is agreeable to his
own perfections, and never intended to leave these matters to
the decision of the wisdom and discerning of men ; but by his
own unerring instruction, to determine for us what the truth
is ; knowing how little our judgment is to be depended on,
and how extremely prone, vain and blind men are, to err in
such matters.
The truth of the case is, that if the scripture plainly taught
the opposite doctrines, to those that are so much stumbled at,
viz. the Armlnian doctrine of free Will, and others depending
thereon, it would be the greatest of all difficulties that attend
the scriptures, incomparably greater than its containing any,
even the most mysterious of those doctrines of the first re-
formers, which our late free thinkers have so superciliously
exploded. ...Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the divinity of
the holy scriptures, that they teach such doctrines, which
in one age and another, through the blindness of men's
minds, and strong prejudices of their hearts, are rejected,
as most absurd and unreasonable, by the wise and greai i
of the world; which yet, when they are most caref
strictly examined, appear to be exactly agreeable to l'
demonstrable, certain and natural dictates of reason.
S3* CONCLUSION.
such things it appears, that the foolishness of God is xt/iser tnaK
men, and God does as is said in 1 Cor. i. 19, 20. " For it \%
written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise ; I will bring
to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the
wise ! Where is the scribe ! Where is the disputer of this
world ! Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world V*
And as it used to be in time past, so it is probable it will be
in time to come, as it is there written, in verse 27, 28, 29.
« But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to con-
found the wise ; and God hath chosen the weak things of the
world, to confound the things that are mighty ; and base
things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God
chosen : Yea, and things which are not, to bring to naught
things that are ; that no flesh should glory in his presence.'*
Amen.
REMARKS
ON THE ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND NAT-
URAL RELIGION, IN A LETTER TO A MINISTER OF THE
CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.
REVEREND SIR,
THE intimations you have given me of the use which
has, by some, been made of what I have written on the Free-
dom of the Will, iJfc. to vindicate what is said on the subject of
liberty and necessity, by the author of the Essays on the Prin-
ciples of Morality and Natural Religion, has occasioned my
reading this author's essay on that subject, with particular
care and attention. And I think it must be evident to every
one, that has read both his Essay and my Inquiry, that our
schemes are exceeding reverse from each other. The wide
difference appears particularly in the following things.
This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place
with respect to all men's actions, as is inconsistent with liber-
ty,* and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting.
Thus in p. 168, after he had been speaking of the necessity
of our determinations, as connected with motives, he con-
eludes with saying, " In short, if motives are not under our
power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can at
bottom have- — no liberty." Whereas, I have abund-
antly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions,
has true liberty ; and that the moral necessity, which univer-
sally takes place, is not in the least inconsistent with any-
thing that is properly called liberty, and with the utmost lib-
erty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be con-
ceived off.
* P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many ether places.
+ Inquiry, p. 38.,.. 43, 186, 18?, 278.... 288, 300, 307, 326.. ..335
33G REMARKS.
I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of mor-
al necessity of men's volitions, which I suppose to be univer-
sal, at least some degree of liberty is denied ; that though it
be true I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain a self-
determining power in the Will, and a liberty of contingencc
and indifference, hold an higher sort of freedom than I do;
but I think this is certainly a great mistake.
Liberty, as I have explained it, in p. 38, and other places,
is the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do
as he pleases, or conducting in any respect, according to his
pleasure; without considering how his pleasure comes to be
as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has been demon-
strated, that no necessity of men's volitions that I maintain,
is inconsistent with this liberty ; and I think it is impossible
for any one to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than
this : If any imagine they desire higher, and that they con-
ceive of a higher and greater liberty than this they are deceiv-
ed, and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words,
instead of ideas. If any one should here say, " Yes, I con-
ceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of
conducting in any respect as he pleases, viz. a liberty of choos-
ing as he pleases." Such an one, if he reflected, would eith-
er blush or laugh at his own instance. For, is not choosing
as he pleases, conducting in some respect, according to his
pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that
pleasure ? If he says, " Yes, I came by that pleasure by my
own choice." If he be a man of common sense, by this time
he will see his own absurdity ; for he must needs see that his
notion or conception, even of this liberty, does not contain
any judgment or conception how he comes by that choice,
which first determines his pleasure, or which originally fixed
his own will respecting the affair. Or if any shall say, " That
a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own
choice, but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any
rhoice, preference, or inclination of his own, but by a deter-
mination arising contingently out of a state of absolute indif-
ference ;" this is not rising higher in his conception of liber-
ty ; as such a determination of the Will would not be a vol-
REMARKS. S3?
itntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a
power of doing something not according to his own choice, or
from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than he that
places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own elec-
tion. If there were a power in the mind to determine itself,
but not by its choice or according to its pleasure, what advan-
tage would it give ? And what liberty, worth contending for,
would be exercised in it ? Therefore no Arminian, Pelagian 9
or Epicurean, can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty,
than the notion of it which I have explained : Which notion
is apparently, perfectly consistent with the whole of that ne-
cessity of men's actions, which I suppose takes place. And,
I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a
higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty ; let
them talk of sovereignty of the Will, self determining poiver 9
selfmotion, selfdirection, arbitrary decision, liberty ad utrumvis,
fiower of choosing differently in given cases, <J?c. iJfc. as long as
they will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous
affirmation, and dispute about these things, aim at they know
not what, fighting for something they have no conception of,
substituting a number of confused, unmeaning words, instead
of things, and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged
clearly to explain what they would have : They never catt.
answer the challenge.
The author of the Essays, through his whole Essay on.
Liberty and Necessity, goes on that supposition, that, in order
to the being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that is
opposed to moral necessity ; and yet he supposes, p. 175, that
" such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting
without and against motives, a power of acting without any
view, purpose or design, and even of acting in contradiction
to our own desires and aversions, and to all our principles of
action ; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a ra-
tional nature. Now, who ever imagined such a liberty as
this, a higher sort or degree of freedom, than a liberty of
following one's own views and purposes, and acting agreeable
to his own inclinations and passions ? Who will ever reasona-
bly suppose that liberty, which is an absurdity altogether io?
Vol. V. 2 T
338 REMARKS.
consistent with a rational nature,, to be a kind of liberty above
that which is consistent with the nature of a rational, intelli-
gent, designing agent ?
The author of the Essays seems to suppose such a neces-
sity to take place, as is inconsistent with some supposable
power of arbitrary choice ;* or that there is some liberty con-
ceivable, whereby men's own actions might be more proper-
ly in their fioioer^ and by which events might be more depend-
ent on ourselves ;\ contrary to what I suppose to be evident in
my Inquiry. ,§ What way can be imagined, of our actions be-
ing more in our power, from ourselves, or de/iendcnt on our-
selves, than their being from our power to fulfil our own
choice, to act from our own inclination, pursue our own views,
and execute our own designs ? Certainly, to be able to act
thus, is as properly having our actions in our power, and de-
pendent on ourselves, as a being liable to be the subjects of
acts and events, contingently and fortuitously, without desire,
■view, purpose or design, or any principle of action within our-
selves ; as we must be acording to this author's own declared
sense, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is
opposed to moral necessity.
This author seems every where to suppose, that necessi-
ty, most properly so called, attends all men's actions ; and
that the terms necessary, unavoidable, vnpossible, &c. are equal-
ly applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In
p. 173, he says, " The idea of necessary and unavoidable,
equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity." And
in p. 184, " All things that fall out in the natural and moral
world are alike necessary." P. 174, "This inclination and
choice is unavoidably caused or occasioned by the prevailing
motive. In this lies the necessity of our actions, that, in such
circumstances, it was impossible we could act otherwise."
He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere, speak-
ing in strong terms of men's actions as unavoidable, what they
cannot forbear, having no power over their own actions, the
* P. 169. + P. 191, 195, 197. 206. % P. 183. S ?• 395. 39>-
REMARKS. S3*
order of them being unalterably fixed and inseparably linked
together, &c*
On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connex-
ion between antecedent things and consequent ones, which
takes place with regard to the acts of men's Wills, which is
called moral necessity, is called by the name of ?:ecessity im-
properly ; and that all such terms as must, cannot, imjiossible,
unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c. when applied
here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are
either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignificance, or
in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper mean-
ing, and their use in common speech ; and, that such a ne-
cessity as attends the acts of men's Wills, is more properly
called certainty, than necessity ; it being no other than the
certain connexion between the subject and predicate of the
proposition which affirms their existence.
Agreeably to what is observed in my Inquiry, I think it is
.evidently owing to a strong prejudice in person's minds, aris-
ing from an insensible, habitual perversion and misapplication
of such like terms as necessary, impossible, unable, unavoidable,
invincible, iJfc. that they are ready to think, that to suppose a
certain connexion of men's volitions, without any foregoing
motives or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence
whatsoever, is truly and properly to suppose such a strong, ir-
refragable chain of causes and effects, as stands in the way of,
and makes utterly vain, opposite desires and endeavors, like
immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass ; and im-
pedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gales of brass, and
bars of iron : Whereas, all such representations suggest ideas
as far from the truth, as the east is from the west; Nothing
that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any
fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and choosing as
they please, with full freedom ; yea with the highest degree
of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly
enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in
vain to endeavor to make some persons believe this, or at least
* P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 399, 205, 206.
34<& REMARKS.
fully and steadily to believe it ; for if it be demonstrated ta
them, still the old prejudice remains, which has been long
fixed by the use of the terms necessary, must, cannot, impossi*
ble, isfc. the association with these terms of certain ideas, in-
consistent with liberty, is not broken ; and the judgment is
powerfully warped by it ; as a thing that has been long bent
and grown stiff, if it be straightened, will return to its former
curvity again and again.
The author of the Essays most manifestly supposes that
if men had the truth concerning the real necessity of all their
actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themselves,
or one another, as at all praiseworthy or culpable, or under
any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions ;* which
supposes, that men are not to be blamed or praised for any of
their actions, and are not under any obligations, nor are truly-
accountable for any thing they do, by reason of this necessity ;
■which is very contrary to what I have endeavored to prove,
throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive
it is there shewn, that this is so far from the truth, that the
moral necessity of men's actions, which truly take place, is
requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praise-
■worthy or culpable : That the liberty of indifference and con-
lingence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity, is
inconsistent with the being of these ; as it would suppose that
men are not determined in what they do, by any virtuous or
-vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions or
aims whatsoever ; or have any end, either good or bad, in act-
ing. And it is not remarkable, that this author should sup-
pose, that, in order to men's actions truly having any desert,
they must be performed without any view, purpose, design, or
desire, or any principle of action, or any thing agreeable to a
rational nature ? As it will appear that he does, if we compare
p. 206, 207, with p. 175.
The Author of the Essays supposes, that God has deeply
Implanted in man's nature, a strong and invincible apprehen-
sion or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty and contingence, of
P. 507, 209, and other p!ar "«
REMARKS. 341
jhis own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly attends
them ; and which in truth does not agree with real fact,* is
not agreeable to strict, philosophic truth, t is contradictory to
the truth of things,} and which truth contradicts,§ not tallying
with the real plan ; || and that therefore such feelings are de-
ceitful,^! are in reality of the delusive kind.** He speaks of
them as a wise delusion,ft as nice, artificial feelings, merely
that conscience may have a commanding power ;|| meaning
plainly, that these feelings are a cunning artifice of the Au-
thor of Nature, to make men believe they are free, when they
are not.§§ He supposes that, by these feelings, the moral
■world has a disguised appearance. |||| And other things of
this kind be says. He supposes that all selfapprobation, and
all remorse of conscience, all commendation or condemnation
of ourselves or others, all sense of desert, and all that is con-
nected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which at pres-
ent are suggested by the words ought, should, arise from this
delusion, and would entirely vanish withoutit.lffl
All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly in-
sisted on and endeavored to demonstrate in my Inquiry, where
I have largely shewn that it is agreeable to the natural sense
of mankind, that the moral necessity or certainty that attends
men's actions, is consistent with praise and blame, reward
and punishment ;*f and that it is agreeable to our natural no-
tions, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhor-
rence, and all its other illdeservings, consists in a certain de-
formity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart,
and not in the evil of something else, diverse from these, sup-
posed to be their cause or occasion. *\
I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in
the world of mankind, who is conscious to a sense or feeling,
naturally and deeply rooted in his mind, that in order to a
* P. 200. + P. 152. X P. 183. $ P. 186. II P. 205- 5 P. 203,
204, 211. ** P. 183. ++ P. 209. Xt p - a "« hS p - 1 53*
UK 214. ^ffl P. 160, 194, 199, 205, 206, 209. *+ Inquiry, Pan IV.
Sect. 4, throughout, *f Idem, Part IV. Sect, 1, throughout, and p. 395
...••397-
342 KEMARKS.
man's performing any action that is praise or blameworthy.,
he must exercise a liberty that implies and signifies a power
of acting without any motive, view, design, desire or principle
of action ? For such a liberty, this author supposes that must
be which is opposed to moral necessity, as I have already ob-
served once and again. Supposing a man should actually do
good, independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle or
end, is it a dictate of invincible, natural sense, that his act is
more meritorious or praiseworthy, than if he had performed
it for some good end, and had been governed in it bv good
firincifilcs and motives ? And so I might ask on the contrary;
with respect to evil actions.*
The author of the Essays supposes that the liberty without
necessity, which we have a natural feeling of. implies contin-
gencc ; and speaking of this contingence, he sometimes calls
it by the name of chance. And it is evident that his notion of
it, or rather what he says about it, implies things happening
loosely, fortuitously, by accident, and without a cause. f Now I
conceive the slightest reflection may be sufficient to satisfy
any one that such a contingence of men's actions, according
to our natural sense, is so far from being essential to the mo-
rality or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it ; and
that, on the contrary, the dependence of our actions on such
causes as inward inclinations, incitements and ends, is essen-
tial to the being of it. Natural sense- teaches men, when
they see any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency,
to inquire what their intention was ; what principles and
views they were moved by, in order to judge how far they
are to be justified or condemned ; and not to determine, that
in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the action
must be performed altogether fortuitously, proceeding from
nothing, arising from no cause. Concerning this matter, I
have fully expressed my mind in the Inquiry.
If the liberty which we have a natural sense of as necessa-
ry to desert, consists in the mind's selfdetermination, without
Sec this matter illustrated in my Inquiry. Part IV. Sect. 4. + P. 156.
177, 178.. 181, 183....185.
REMARKS. 34S
being determined by previous inclination or motive, tben in-
difference is essential to it, yea, absolute indifference, as is
observed in my Inquiry. But men naturally have no notion
of any such liberty as this, as essential to .the morality or de-
merit of their actions ; but, on the contrary, such a liberty,
if it were possible, would be inconsistent with our natural no-
tions of desert, as is largely shewn in the Inquiry. If it be
agreeable to natural sense, that men must be indifferent in de-
termining their own actions, then, according to the same, the
more they are determined by inclination, either good or bad,
the less they have of desert : The more good actions are
performed from good dispositions, the less praiseworthy ; and
the more evil deeds are from evil dispositions, the less culpa-
ble ; and in general, the more men's actions are from their
hearts, the less they are to be commended or condemned ;
which all must know is very contrary to natural sense.
Moral necessity is owing to the power and government of
the inclination of the heart, either habitual or occasional, ex-
cited by motive ; but according to natural and common sense,
the more a man does any thing with full inclination of heart,
the more is it to be charged to his account for his condemna-
tion if it be an ill action, and the more to be ascribed to him
for his praise, if it be good.
If the mind were determined to evil actions by contin-
gence, from a state of indifference, then either there would
be no fault in them, or else the fault would be in being so
perfectly indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to a
bad or good determination. And if this indifference be liber-
ty, then the very essence of the blame or fault would lie in
the liberty itself, or the wickedness would, primarily and sum-
marily, lie in being a free agent. If there were no fault in
being indifferent, then there would be no fault in the deter-
mination's being agreeable to such a state of indifference j
that is, there could no fault be reasonably found with this,
viz, that opposite determinations actually happen to take
place indifferently, sometimes good and sometimes bad, as
contingence governs and decides. And if it be a fault to be
indifferent to good and evil, then such indifference is no indif-
§44 REMARKS.
ference to good and evil, but is a determination to evil, or ttf
a fault ; and such an indifferent disposition would be an evil,
faulty disposition, tendency or determination of mind. So
inconsistent are these notions of liberty, as essential to praise,
or blame.
The author of the Essays supposes men's natural, delusive
sense of a liberty of contingence, to be in truth, the founda-
tion of all the labor, care and industry of mankind ;* and
that if men's practical ideas liadA be en formed on the plan of
universal necessity , the ignava raffo, the inactive doctrine of the
Stoics, would have followed ; and that there would have been
no room for forethought about futurity, or any sort of industry
and care ;\ plainly implying, that in this case men would see
and know that all their industry and care signified, nothing
was in vain and to no purpose, or of no benefit ; events being
fixed in an irrefragable chain, and not at all depending on
their care and endeavor ; as he explains himself, particular-
ly in the instance of men's use of means to prolong life ;%
not only very contrary to what I largely maintain in my In-
quiry, but also very inconsistently with his own scheme, in
what he supposes of the ends for which God has so deeply
implanted this deceitful feeling in man's nature ; in which
he manifestly supposes men's care and industry not to bo
in vain and of no benefit, but of great use, yea, of absolute
necessity, in order to the obtaining the most important
ends and necessary purposes of human life, and to fulfil the
ends of action to the best advantage, as he largely declares.
Now, how shall these things be reconciled ? That if men
had a clear view of real truth, they would see that there
Was no room for their care and industry, because they would
see it to be in vain, and of no benefit ; and yet that God, by
having a clear view of real truth, sees that their being excited
to care and industry, will be of excellent use to mankind,
and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea, absolutely neces-
sary in order to it ; and that therefore the great wisdom and
* P. 184. + P. 189. t P. 184, 185. ^ P. 188.. ,.192, and »r
many other places.
CONCLUSION. 343
goodness of God to men appears, in artfully contriving to put
them on care and industry for their good, which good could
not be obtained without them ; and yet both these things are
maintained at once, and in the same sentences and words by
this author. The very reason he gives, why God has put
this deceitful feeling into men, contradicts and destroys itself.
That God in his great goodness to men gave them such a de-
ceitful feeling, because it was very useful and necessary for
them, and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care
and industry for their own good, which care and industry is
useful and necessary to that end ; and yet the very thing that
this great benefit of care and industry is given as a reason for,
is God's deceiving men in this very point, in making them
think their care and industry to be of great benefit to them,
when indeed it is of none at all; and if they saw the real
truth, they would see all their endeavors to be wholly useless,
that there was ?io room for them, and that the event does not
at all depend upon them.*
And besides, what this author says, plainly implies (as
appears by what has been already observed) that it is necessa-
ry men should be deceived, by being made to believe that fu-
ture events are contingent, and their own future actions free,
with such a freedom, as signifies that their actions are not
the fruit of their own desires or designs, but altogether con-
tingent, fortuitous, and without a cause. But how should a
notion of liberty, consisting in accident or loose chance, en-
courage care and industry ? I should think it would rather
entirely discourage every thing of this nature. For surely,
if our actions do not depend on our desires and designs, then
they do not depend on our endeavors, flowing from our de-
sires and designs. This author himself seems to suppose,
that if men had, indeed, such a liberty of contingence, it
would render all endeavors to determine or move men's fu-
ture volitions vain ; he says, that in this case to exhort, to
■instruct, to promise, or to threaten, would be to no purpose.
Why ? Because, (as he himself gives the reason) then our
* P. 188, 189, &c
Vol, V. 2 U
346 CONCLUSION.
Will would be capricious and arbitrary, and we should be thrown
loose altogether, and our arbitrary power could do us good or ill
only by accident. But if such a loose, fortuitous state would
render vain other endeavors upon us, for the same reason
would it make useless our endeavors on ourselves ; for events
that are truly contingent and accidental, and altogether loose
from, and independent of, all foregoing causes, are independ-
ent on every foregoing cause within ourselves, as well as in
others.
I suppose that it is so far from being true, that our minds
are naturally possessed with a notion of such liberty as this, so
strongly that it is impossible to root it out ; that indeed men
have no such notion of liberty at all, and that it is utterly im-
possible, by any means whatsoever, to implant or introduce
such a notion into the mind. As no such notions as imply
selfcontradiction and selfabolition can subsist in the mind, as
I have shewn in my Inquiry, I think a mature, sensible con-
sideration of the matter, sufficient to satisfy any one, that even
the greatest and most learned advocates themselves for liber-
ty of indifference and selfdetermination, have no such notion ;
and that indeed they mean something wholly inconsistent
with, and directly subversive of, what they strenuously affirm,
and earnestly contend for. By a man's having a power of de-
termining his own Will, they plainly mean a power of deter-
mining his Will, as he pleases, or as he chooses ; which
supposes that the mind has a choice, prior to its going about
to confirm any action or determination to it. And if they
mean that they determine even the original or prime choice,
by their own pleasure or choice, as the thing that causes and
directs it ; I scruple not most boldly to affirm, that they speak
they know not what, and that of which they have no manner
of idea, because no such contradictory notion can come into,
or have a moment's subsistence in the mind of any man living
as an original or first choice being caused, or brought into
being, by choice. After all, they say they have no higher or
other conception of liberty, than that vulgar notion of it, which
I contend for, viz. a man's having power or opportunity to do
as he fhooses ; or if they had a notion that every act of
REMARKS. 3«
choice was determined by choice, yet it would destroy their
notion of the contingence of choice ; for then no one act of
choice would arise contingently, or from a state of indiffer-
ence, but every individual act, in all the series, would arise
from foregoing bias or preference, and from a cause prede-
termining and fixing its existence, which introduces at once
such a chain of causes and effects, each preceding link
decisively fixing the following, as they would by all means
avoid.
And such kind of delusion and selfcontradiction as this,
does not arise in men's minds by nature ; it is not owing to
any natural feeling which God has strongly fixed in the mind
and nature of man ; but to false philosophy, and strong prej-
udice, from a deceitful abuse of words. It is artificial, not in
the sense of the author of the Essays, supposing it to be a de-
ceitful artifice of God ; but artificial as opposed to natural,
and as owing to an artificial, deceitful management of terms,
to darken and confound the mind. Men have no such thing
when they first begin to exercise reason ; but must have a
great deal of time to blind themselves, with metaphysical con-
fusion, before they can embrace, and rest in such definitions
of liberty as are given, and imagine they understand them.
On the whole, I humbly conceive, that whosoever will
give himself the trouble of weighing what I have offered to
consideration in my Inquiry, must be sensible, that such a
moral necessity of men's actions as I maintain, is not at all in-
consistent with any liberty that any creature has, or can have,
as a free, accountable, moral agent, and subject of moral gov-
ernment ; and that this moral necessity is so far from being
inconsistent with praise and blame, and the benefit and use of
men's own care and labor, that, on the contrary, it implies the
very ground and reason, why men's actions are to be ascribed
to them as their own, in that manner as to infer desert, praise
and blame, approbation and remorse of conscience, reward
and punishment ; and that it establishes the moral system of
the universe, and God's moral government, in every respect,
with the proper use of motives, exhortations, commands,
Gounsels, promises, and threatening ; and the use and benefit
348 CONCLUSION.
of endeavors, care and industry ; and that therefore there is
no need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all con-
cealed from men ; no danger in contemplation and profound
discovery in these things. So far from this, that the truth in
this matter is of vast importance, and extremely needful to be
known ; and that the more clearly and perfectly the real fact
is known, and the more constantly it is in view, the better ;
and particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that,
which is the true system of the universe, in these res-
pects, would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the
true Christian scheme of Divine Administration in the city of
God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ, in its most important ar-
ticles ; and that these things never can be well established,
and the opposite errors, so subversive of the whole gospel,
which at this day so greatly and generally prevail, be well
confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained,
answered, till these points are settled. While this is not done,
it is, to me, beyond doubt, that the friends of those great
gospel truths will but poorly maintain their controversy
with the adversaries of those truths. They will be oblig-
ed often to dodge, shuffle, hide, and turn their backs ; and
the latter will have a strong fort, from whence they nev-
er can be driven, and weapons to use, which those whom they
oppose will find no shield to screen themselves from ; and
they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends
of sound doctrine, and glory, and vaunt themselves in their ad-
vantage over them ; and carry their affairs with an high hand,
as they have done already for a long time past.
I conclude, sir, with asking your pardon for troubling you
■with so much said in vindication of myself from the imputa-
tion of advancing a scheme of necessity, of a like nature with
that of the author of the Essays on the Principles of Morality
end Natural Religion. Considering that what I have said is
KOtonly in vindication of myself, but, as I think, of the most
important articles of moral philosophy and religion ; I trust
in what I know of your candor, that you will excuse,
Your obliged friend and brother,
JOHNATHAN EDWARDS
SxocKBRinGEj July, 25, 1757,
MISCELLANEOUS
OBSERVATIONS
CONCERNING THE
DIVINE DECREES IN GENERAL,
ELECTION IN PARTICULAR.
MISCELLANEOUS
OBSERVATIONS.
Concerning the Dfaine Decrees in general, and
Election in particular.
§ 1. WHETHER God has decreed all things that ever
came to pass or not, all that own the being of a God, own that
he knows all things beforehand. Now, it is selfevident, that
if he knows all things beforehand, he either doth approve of
them, or he doth not approve of them ; that is, he either is
willing they should be, or he is not willing they should be.
But to will that they should be, is to decree them.
% 2. The Arminians ridicule the distinction between the
secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed,
the distinction between the decree and law of God ; because
we say he may decree one thing, and command another. And
so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of
his contradicted another. However, if they will call this a
contradiction of wills, we know that 'here is such a thing ; so
that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and
they know it was God's secret will, that Abraham should not
sacrifice his son Isaac ; but yet his command was, that he
should do it. We know that God willed, that Pharaoh's heart
should be hardened ; and yet, that the hardness of his heart
was sin. We know that God willed the Egyptians should
hate God's people : Psal. cv. 25. " He turned their heart to
hate his people, and deal subtilly with his servants." We
know that it was God's will, that Absalom should lie with Da-
352 DECREES AND ELECTION.
vid's wives; 2 Sam. xii. 11. " Thus saith the Lord, I will
raise up this evil against thee, out of thine own house ; and I
will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy
neighbor ; and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this
sun. For thou didst it secretly ; but I will do this thing before
all Israel, and before the sun." We know that God willed
that Jeroboam and the ten tribes should rebel. The same
may be said of the plunder of the Babylonians ; and other in-
stances might be given. The scripture plainly tells us, that
God wills to harden some men, Rom. ix. 18. That he will"
ed that Christ should be killed by men, 8cc.
§ 3. It is most certain, that if there are any things so con-
tingent, that there is an equal possibility of their being or not
being, so tbat they may be, or they may not be ; God fore-
knows from all eternity that they may be, and also that they
may not be. All will grant that we need no revelation to
teach us this. And furthermore, if God knows all things that
are to come to pass, he also foreknows whether those contin-
gent things are to come to pass or no, at the same time that
they are contingent, and that they may or may not come to
pass. But what a contradiction is it to say, that God knows a
thing will come to pass, and yet at the same time knows that
it is contingent whethei it will come to pass or no ; that is,
he certainly knows it will come to pass, and yet certainly
knows it may not come to pass ? What a contradiction
is it to say, that God certainly foreknew that Judas would be-
tray his master, or Peter deny him, and yet certainly knew r
that it might be otherwise, or certainly knew that he might be
deceived i 1 suppose it will be acknowledged by all, that for
God certainly to know a thing will be, and yet certainly to
know that it may not be, is the same thing as certainly to
know that he may be deceived. I suppose it will also be
acknowledged, that certainly to know a thing, and also at the
same time to know that we may be deceived in it, is the same
thing as certainly to know it, and certainly to know that we
are uncertain of it, or that we do not certainly know it ; and
that is the same thing as certainly to know it, and not certain-
DECREES AND ELECTION. 35 3
\y to know it at the same time ; which we leave to be consid-
ered, whether it be not a contradiction.
§ 4. The meaning of the word absolute, when used about
the decrees, wants to be stated. It is commonly said, God
decrees nothing upon a foresight of any thing in the creature ;
as this, they say, argues imperfection in God ; and so it does,
taken in the sense that they commonly intend it. But nobody,
I believe, will deny but that God decrees many things that he
would not have decreed, if he had not foreknown and prede-
termined such and such other tilings. What we mean, we
completely express thu3....That God decrees all things har-
moniously, and in excellent order, one thing harmonizes with
another, and there is such a relation between all the decrees,
as makes the most excellent order. Thus God decrees ram
in drought, because he decrees the earnest prayers of his peo-
ple ; or thus, he decrees the prayers of his people, because he
decrees rain. I acknowledge, to say, God decrees a thing be-
cause, is an improper way of speaking ; but not more improp-
er than all our other ways of speaking about God. God de-
crees the latter event, because of the former, no more, than
he decrees the former, because of the latter. But this is what
we mean.... When God decrees to give the blessing of rain,
he decrees the prayers of his people ; and when he decrees
the prayers of his people for rain, he very commonly decrees
rain ; and thereby there is an harmony between these two de-
crees, of rain, and the prayers of God's people. Thus also,
when he decrees diligence and industry, he decrees riches
and prosperity ; when he decrees prudence, he often decrees
success ; when he decrees striving, then he often decrees the
obtaining the kingdom of heaven ; when he decrees the
preaching of the gospel, then he decrees the bringing home
of souls to Christ ; when he decrees good natural faculties,
diligence and good advantages, then he decrees learning ;
when de decrees summer, then he decrees the growing of
plants ; when he decrees conformity to his Son, then he de-
crees calling ; when he decrees calling, then he decrees justi-
fication ; and when he decrees justification, then he decrees
Vol. V. 3 W
i54 DECREES AND ELECTION'.
everlasting glory. Thus, all the decrees of God are harnio=
nious ; and this is all that can be said for or against absolute
•r conditional decrees. But this I say, it is as improper to
make one decree a condition of another, as to make the oth-
er a condition of that : But there is a harmony between both.
§ 5. It cannot be any injustice in God to determine who is
certainly to sin, and so certainly to be damned. For, if we
suppose this impossibility, that God had not determined any
thing, things would happen as fatally as they do now. For,
as to such an absolute contingency, which they attribute to
■man's will, calling it the sovereignty of the will ; if they mean,
by this sovereignty of will, that a man can will as he wills, it
is perfect nonsense, and the same as if they should spend
abundance of time and pains, and be very hot at proving, that
a man can will when he doth will ; that is, that it is possible
for that to be, which is. But if they mean, that there is a
perfect contingency in the will of man, that is, that it happen*
merely by chance that a man wills such a thing, and not anoth-
er, it is an impossibility and contradiction, that a thing should
be without any cause or reason, and when there was every
way as much cause why it shculd not have been. Where-
fore, seeing things do unavoidably go fatally and necessarily,
what injustice is it in the Supreme Being, seeing it is a con-
tradiction that it should be otherwise, to decree that they
should be as they are ?
§ 6. Contingency, as it is holdcn by some, is at the same
time contradicted by themselves, if they hold foreknowledge.
This is all that follows from an absolute, unconditional, irre-
versible decree, that it is impossible but that the things de-
creed should be. The same exactly follows from foreknowl-
edge, that it is absolutely impossible but that the thing cer-
tainly foreknown should precisely come to pass.
If it will universally hold, that none can have absolutely
perfect and complete happiness, at the same time that any
thing is otherwise than he desires at that time it should be ;
or thus, if it be true, that he has not absolute, perfect, infinite
DECREES AND ELECTION. 355
and all possible happiness now, who has not now all that he
wills to have now : Then God, if any thing is now otherwise
than he wills to have it now, is not now absolutely, perfectly
and infinitely happy. If God is infinitely happy now, then
every thing is now, as God would have it to be now ; if every
thing, then those things that are contrary to his commands.
If so, it is not ridiculous to say, that things which are contrary
to God's commands, are yet in a sense agreeable to his will.
Again, let it be considered, whether it be not certainly true,
that every one that can with infinite ease have a thing done,
and yet will not have it done, wills it not ; that is, whether or
no he that wills not to have a thing clone, properly wi'.ls not to
have a thing done. For example, let the thing be this, that
Judas should be faithful to his Lord ; whether it be not true,
that if God could with infinite ease have it done as he would,
but would not have it done as he could, if he would, it be not
proper to say, that God would not have it be, that Judas should
be faithful to his Lord.
§ 7. They say, to what purpose are praying and striving,
and attending on means, if all was irreversibly determined by
God before ? But, to say that all was determined before these
prayers and strivings, is a very wrong way of speaking, and
begets those ideas in the mind, which correspond with no re-
alities with respect to God. The decrees of our everlasting
state were not before our prayers and strivings ; for ihese are
as much present with God from all eternity, as they are the
moment they are present with us. They are present as part
of his decrees, or rather as the same ; and they did as really
exist in eternity, with respect to God, as they exist in time,
and as much at one time as another. Therefore, we can no
more fairly argue, that these will be in vain, because God has
foredetermined all things, than we can, that they would be in
vain if they existed as soon as the decree, for so they do, in-
asmuch as they are a part of it.
§8. That we should say, that God has decreed every ac-
tion of men, yea, every action that is sinful, and every circum-
356 DECREES AND ELECTION.
stance of those actions ; that he predetermines that they shall
be in erery respect as they afterwards are ; that he deter-
mines that there shall he such actions, and just so sinful as
they are ; and yet that God does not decree the actions that
are sinful, as sin, but decrees them as good, is really consist-
ent. For we do not mean, by decreeing an action as .sinful,
the same as decreeing an action so that it shall he sinful ; but
by decreeing an action as sinful, I mean decreeing it for the
sake of the sinfulness of the action. God decrees that they
shall be sinful, for the sake of the good that he causes to arise
from the sinfulness thereof; whereas man decrees them for
the sake of the evil that is in them.
§ 9. When a distinction is made between God's revealed
will and his secret will, or his will of command and decree,
will is certainly in that distinction taken in two senses. His
will of decree, is not his will in the same sense as his will of
command is. Therefore, it is no difficulty at all to suppose,
that the one may be otherwise than the other : His will in
both senses is his inclination. But when we say he wills vir-
tue, or loves virtue, or the happiness of his creature ; there-
by is intended, that virtue, or the creature's happiness, abso-
lutely and simply considered, is agreeable to the inclination
of his nature. His will of decree, is his inclination to a thing,
not as to that thing absolutely and simply, but with respect to
the universality of things, that have been, are, or shall be.
So God, though he hates a thing as it is simply, may incline
to it with reference to the universality of things. Though
he hates sin in itself, yet he may will to permit it, for the
greater promotion of holiness in this universality, including
all things, and at ail times. So, though he has no inclination
to a creature's misery, considered absolutely, yet he may will
it, for the greater promotion of happiness in this universality.
God inclines to excellency, which is harmony, but yet he may
incline to suffer that which is unharmonious in itself, for the
promotion of universal harmony, or for the promoting of the
harmony that there is in the univeisuiity, and makir;; it shine
'..lighter. And thus it must neeus be, and no hypoiheuc
DECREES AND ELECTION. HI
whatsoever will relieve a man, but that he must own these
two wills of God. For all must own, that God sometimes
wills not to hinder the breach of his own commands, because
he does not in fact hinder it. He wills to permit sin, it is ev-
ident, because he does permit it. None will say that God
himself does what he does not will to do. But you will say,
God wills to permit sin, as he wills the creature should be
left to his freedom ; and if he should hinder it, he would
offer violence to the nature of his own creature. I answer,
this comes nevertheless to the very thing that I say. You
say, God does not will sin absolutely ; but rather than alter
the law of nature and the nature of free agents, he wills it.
He wills what is contrary to excellency in some particulars,
for the sake of a more general excellency and order. So
that this scheme of the Arminians does not help the
matter.
§ 10. It is a proper and excellent thing for infinite glory
to shine forth ; and for the same reason, it is proper that the
shining forth of God's glory should be complete ; that is,
that all parts of his glory should shine forth, that every beau-
ty should be proportionably effulgent, that the beholder may
have a proper notion of God. It is not proper that one glory
should be exceedingly manifested, and another not at all ; for
then the effulgence would not answer the reality. For the
same reason it is not proper that one should be manifested
exceedingly, and another but very little. It is highly proper
that the effulgent glory of God should answer his real excel-
lency ; that the splendor should be answerable to the real
and essential glory, for the same reason that it is proper and
excellent for God to glorify himself at all. Thus it is neces-
sary, that God's awful majesty, his authority and dreadful
greatness, justice and holiness, should be manifested. But
this could not be, unless sin and punishment had been de-
creed ; so that the shining forth of God's glory would be very
imperfect, both because these parts of divine glory would not
shine forth as the others do, and also the glory of his good-
ness, love and holiness would be faint without them ; nay,
•hey could scarcely shine forth at all. If it were not righ-
35S DECREES AND ELECTION.
that God should decree and permit and punish sin, there
could be no manifestation of God's holiness in hatred of sin,
or in shewing any preference, in his providence, of godliness
before it. There would be no manifestation of God's grace
or true goodness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no mis-
ery to be saved from. How much happiness soever he be-
stowed, his goodness would not be so much prized and ad-
mired, and the sense of it not so great, as we have elsewhere
shown. We little consider how much the sense of good is
heightened by the sense of evil, both moral and natural. And
as it is necessary that there should be evil, because the dis-
play of the glory of God could not but be imperfect and incom-
plete without it, so evil is necessary, in order to the highest
happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that com-
munication of God, for which he made the world ; because
the creature's happiness consists in the knowledge of God and
sense of his love. And if the knowledge of him be imper-
fect, the happiness of the creature must be proportionably
imperfect ; and the happiness of the creature would be im-
perfect upon another account also ; for, as we have said, the
sense of good is comparatively dull and flat, without the
knowledge of evil.
§11. It is owned, that God did choose men to eternal
life, upon a foresight of their faith. But then, here is the
question, whether God decreed that faith, and chose them
that they should believe.
§ 12. The sin of crucifying Christ being foreordained of
God in his decree, and ordered in his providence, of which
we have abundant evidence from the nature of the thing, and
from the great ends God had to accomplish by means of
this wicked act of crucifying Christ ; it being, as it were, the
cause of all the decrees, the greatest of all decreed events,
and that on which all other decreed events depend as their
main foundation ; being the main thing in that greatest work
of Cod, the work of redemption, which is the end of all other
works ; and it being so much prophesied of, and so plainly
DECREES AND ELECTION. 35$
Spoken of, as being done according to the determinate counsel
and foreknowledge of God ; I say, seeing we have such evi-
dence that this sin is foreordained in God's decrees, and or-
dered in providence, and it being, as it were, the head sin, and
representative of the sin of men in general ; hence is a clear
argument, that all the sins of men are foreordained and or-
dered by a wise providence.
§ 13. It is objected against the absolute decrees respect-
ing the future actions of men, and especially the unbelief of
sinners, and their rejection of the gospel, that this does not
consist with the sincerity of God's calls and invitations to such
sinners ; as he has willed, in his eternal secret decree, that
they should never accept of those invitations. To which I
answer, that there is that in God, respecting the acceptance
and compliance of sinners, which God knows will never be,
and which he has decreed never to cause to be, in which,
though it be not just the same with our desiring and wishing
for that which will never come to pass, yet there is nothing
wanting but what would imply imperfection in the case.
There is all in God that is good, and perfect, and excellent in
our desires and wishes for the conversion and salvation of
wicked men. As, for instance, there is a love to holiness,
absolutely considered, or an agreeablen^ss of holiness to his
nature and will ; or, in ether words, to his natural inclination.
The holiness and happiness of the creature, absolutely consid-
ered, are things that he loves. These things are infinitely
more agreeable to his nature than to ours. There is all in God
that belongs to our desire of the holiness and happ'utess of
unconverted men and reprobates, excepting what implies im-
perfection. All that is consistent with infinite knowledge,
wisdom, power, selfsufiicience, infinite happiness and immu-
tability. Therefore, there is no reason that his absolute pre-
science, or his wise determination and ordering what is fu-
ture, should hinder his expressing this disposition of his
nature, in like manner as we are wont to express such a
disposition in ourselves, viz. by calls and invitations, and
the like.
360 DECREES AND ELECTION.
The disagreeableness of the wickedness and misery of the
creature, absolutely considered, to the nature of God, is all
that is good in pious and holy men's lamenting the past mis-
ery and wickedness of men. Their lamenting these, is good
no farther than it proceeds from the disagreeableness of those
things to their holy and good nature. This is also all that is
good in wishing for the future holiness and happiness of men.
And there is nothing wanting in God, in order to his having
such desires and such lamentings, but imperfection ; and
nothing is in the way of his having them, but infinite perfec-
tion ; and therefore it properly, naturally and necessarily
came to pass, that when God, in the manner of existence,
came down from his infinite perfection, and accommodated
himself to our nature and manner, by being made man, as he
was, in the person of Jesus Christ, he really desired the con-
version and salvation of reprobates, and lamented their obsti-
nacy and misery ; as when he beheld the city Jerusalem, and
wept over it, saying, " O Jerusalem," Sec. In the like man-
ner, when he comes down from his infinite perfection, though
not in the manner of being, but in the manner of manifesta-
tion, and accommodates himself to our nature and manner, in
the manner of expression, it is equally natural and proper
that he should express himself as though he desired the con-
version and salvation of reprobates, and lamented their obsti-
nacy and misery.
§ 14. Maxim 1. There is no such thing truly as any
pain or grief, or trouble in God.
Maxim 2. Hence it follows that there is no such thing
as any real disappointment in God, or his being really cross-
ed in his will, or tilings going contrary to his Will ; because,
according to the notion of will, to have one's will, is agreeable
and pleasing ; for it is the notion of being pleased or suited,
to have things as we will them to be ; and so, on the other
hand, to have things contrary to one's will, is disagreeable,
troublesome or uncomfortable. Job xxiii. 13. " He is in
one mind, and who c*n turn him I And what his soul de
sireth, that he doth,"
DEGREES AND ELECTION. 361
In the first place, I lay this down, which I suppose none
will deny, that as to God's own actions, God decrees them, or
purposes them beforehand. For none will be so absurd as to
say that God acts without intentions, or without designing to
act, or that he forbears to act, without intending to forbear.
2dly. That whatsoever God intends or purposes, he intends
and purposes from all eternity, and that there are no new pur-
poses or intentions in God. For, if God sometimes begins
to intend what he did not intend before, then two things will
follow.
1. That God is not omniscient. If God sometimes be-
gins to design what he did not design before, it must of
necessity be for Want of knowledge, or for want of knowing
things before as he knows them now, for want of having exact-
ly the same views of things. If God begins to intend what he
did not before intend, it must be because he now sees reasons
to intend it, that he did not see before ; or that he has some-
thing new, objected to his understanding, to influence him.
2. If God begins to intend or purpose things that he did
not intend before, then God is certainly mutable, and then he
must in his own mind and will, be liable to succession and
change ; for wherever there arc new things, there is succes-
sion and change. Therefore, I shall take these two things
for positions granted and supposed in this controversy, viz.
that as to God's own actions and forbearings to act, he de-
crees and purposes them beforehand ; and that whatsoever
God designs or purposes, he purposes from all eternity, and
thus decrees from all eternity all his own actions, and for-
bearings to act.
Coroll. Hence God decrees from all eternity, to per-
mit all the evil that ever he does permit ; because God's per-
mitting is God's forbearing to act or to prevent.
§ 15. It can be made evident by reason, that nothing can
come to pass, but what it is the will and pleasure of God should
come to pass. This may be argued from the infinite happi-
ness of God. For every being had rather things should go
Vol, V. 2 X
362 DECREES AND ELECTION*.
according; to his will, than not ; because, if he had not rathe*,
then it is not his will. It is a contradiction to say, he wills it,
and yet does not choose it, or had not rather it should be so
than not. But, if God had rather things should be according
to his will than not, then, if a thing fall out otherwise than he
hath willed, he meets with a cross ; because, on this suppo-
sition, he had rather it should have been otherwise- and there-
fore he would have been better pleased if the thing had been
otherwise. It is contrary to what he chose, and therefore it
is of necessity that he must be displeased. It is of necessity
that every being should be pleased, when a thing is as he
chooses, or had rather it should be. It is a contradiction to
suppose otherwise. For it is the very notion of being pleas-
ed, to have things agreeable to one's pleasure. For the very
same reason, every being is crossed, or it is unpleasing to
him, when a thing is, that he chose, and had rather should
not have been. For it is the very notion of a thing's being
cross or unpleasing to any, that it is contrary to his
pleasure.
But if God can meet with crosses and things unpleasing to
him, then he is not perfectly and unchangeably happy. For
wherever there is any unpleasedness or unpleasantness, it
must, of necessity, in a degree diminish the happiness of the
subject. Where there is any cross to a being's choice, there
is something contrary to happiness. Wherever there is any
unpleasedness, there is something contrary to pleasure, and
which consequently diminishes pleasure. It is impossible
any thing should be plainer than this.
§ 16. The commands and prohibitions of God arc only
significations of our duty and of his nature. It is acknowl-
edged that .sin is, in itself considered, infinitely contrary to
God's nature ; but it does not follow, but that it may be the
pleasure of God to permit it, for the sake of the good that he
will bring cut of it. God can bring such good out of that,
which in itself is contrary to his nature, and which, in itself
considered, he abhors, as may be very agreeable to his na-
ture, and when sin is spoken of as contrary to the will of
DECREES AND ELECTION. 363
God, it is contrary to his will, considered only as in itself.
As man commits it, it is contrary to. God's will; for men
act in committing; it with a view to that which is evil. But
as God permits it, it is not contrary to God's will ; for God
in permitting it has respect to the great good that he will
make it an occasion of. If God respected sin as man res-
pects it in committing it, it would be exceedingly contrary to
his will ; but considered as God decrees to permit it, it is
»ot contrary to God's will. To give an instance.. ..The cru-
cifying of Christ was a great sin ; and as men committed it,
it was exceedingly hateful and highly provoking to God. Yet
upon many great considerations it was the will of God that it
should be done. Will any body say that it was not the will
of God that Christ should be crucified ? Acts iv. 28. " For
to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before
to be done."
§ 17. Sin is an evil, yet the futurition of sin, or that sin
should be future, is not an evil thing. Evil is an evil thing,
and yet it may be a good thing that evil should be in the
world . There is certainly a difference between the thing it-
self existing, and its being an evil thing that ever it came in-
to existence;. As, for instance, it might be an evil thing to
crucify Christ, but yet it was a good thing that the crucifying
of Christ came to pass. As men's act, it was evil, but as
God ordered it, it was good. Who will deny but that it may
be so that evil's coming to pass may be an occasion of a great-
er good than that is an evil, and so of there being more good
in the whole, than if that evil had not come to pass ? And if
so, then it is a good thing that that evil comes to pass. When
we say the thing is an evil thing in itself, then we mean that
it is evil, considering it only within its own bounds. But
when we say that it is a good thing that ever it came to pass,,
ihen we consider the thing as a thing among events, or as
one thing belonging to the series of events, and as related to
the rest of the series. If a man should say that it was a good
thing that ever it happened that Joseph's brethren sold him into
Egypt, or that it was a good thing that ever it came to pass chat
364 DECREES AND ELECTION.
Pope Leo X. sent out indigencies for the commission of fu-
ture sins, nobody would understand a man thus expressing
himself, as justifying these acts.
It implies no contradiction to suppose that an act may be
an evil act, and yet that it is a good thing that such an act
should come to pass. A man may have been a bad man,
and yet it may be a good thing that there has been such a
man. This implies no contradiction ; because it implies no
contradiction to suppose that there being such a man may be
an occasion of there being more good in the whole, than
there would have been otherwise. So it no more implies a
contradiction to suppose that an action may be a bad action,
and yet that if may be a good thing that there has been such
an action. God's commands, and calls, and counsels, do im-
ply another thing, viz. that it is our duty to do these things ;
and though they may be our duty, yet it may be certain be-
forehand that we shall not do them.
And if there be any difficulty in this, the same difficulty
will attend the scheme of the Arminians ; for they allow
that God permits sin. Therefore, as he permits it, it cannot
be contrary to his will. For if it were contrary to his will as
lie permits it, then it would be contrary to his will to permit,
it ; for that is the same thing. But nobody will say that
God permits sift, when it is against his will to permit it ; for
this would be to make him act involuntarily, or against his
own will.
§ 18. " The wrath of man shall praise thee, and the re-
mainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Psal. lxxvi. 10. If
God restrains sin when he pleases ; and when he permits it,
permits it for the :;ake of some good that it will be an occa-
sion of, and does actually restrain it in all other cases ; it is
evident that when he permits it, it is his will that it should
come to pass for the sake of the good that it will he an occa-
sion ci*. If he permits it for the sake of that p;ood,then he does
not permit it merely because he Mould infringe on the crea-
ture's liberty in restraining it ; as is further evident because
.be docs restrain it when ihtft good is not in view. If it be bi9
DECREES AND ELECTION. 365
will to permit it to come to pass, for the sake of the good that
its coming to pass will be an occasion of; then it is his will
to permit it, that by its coming to pass he may obtain that
good; and 1 here fore, it must necessarily be his will that it
should come to pass, that he may obtain that good. If he per-
mits it, that, by its coming to pass, he may obtain a certain
good, then his proximate end in permitting it, is that it may
come to pass. And if he wills the means for the sake of the
end, he therein wills the end. If God wills to permit a thing
that it may come to pass, then he wills that it should come to
pass. This is selfevident. But if he wills to permit it to
come to pass, that by its coming to pass he may obtain some
end, then he wills to permit it that it should come to pass.
For t© will to permit a thing to come to pass, that by its com-
ing to pass good may be obtained, is exactly the same thing
as to will to permit it to come to pass, that it may come to
pass, and so the end may be attained. To will to permit a
thing to come to pass, that he may obtain some end by its
coming to pass, and yet to be unwilling that it should come
to pass, ceitainly implies a contradiction.
If the foundation of that distinction that there is between
one man and another, whereby one is a good man, and anoth-
er a wicked man, be God's pleasure, and his causation ; then
God has absolutely elected the particular persons that are to
be godly. For, by supposition, it is owing to his determina-
tion. Matth. xi. 25, 26, 27. " At that time, Jesus answered
and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth,
because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent,
and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so
it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me
of my Father ; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father ;
neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to
whomsoever the Son will reveal him."
§ 19. It may be argued, from the infinite power and wis
dom of God, that nothing can come to pass, but that it must
be agreeable to the will and pleasure of God that it should
eixfrm to pass. For, as was observed before, every being had
S6o DECREES ANI> ELECTION.
rather things should he according to his will, t!:an not. 'i'Leti -
ffiws, if things be not according to his will, it roust be for want
of power. It cannot be for want of \vi!!, by supposition. It
must therefore be for want of sufficiency. It must be either
because he cannot have it so, or cannot have it so withoi:t
some difficulty) or some inconvenience ; or all may be express-
ed in a word, viz. that he wants sufficiency to have things as
he wishes,' P.ut this cannot be the ca^e of a being- of infinite
'■: : ;c wisdom. If he has infinite power and wis-
• '.<• order all things to be just as he wills : And he
vvith perfect and infinite ease, or without the least
difficulty ofc inconveniency. Two things lie before him, both
in his power, either to order the matter to be, or
no) to omv-i- [t In be ; and both of them are equally easy to
him. One is as.little trouble to him as the other ; as to easi-
ness or trouble, they are perfectly equal. It is as easy for
him to order it, as not to order it. Therefore, his determine
tion, whether it be ordering it, or not ordering- it, must be a
certain sign of his will in the c:ise. If he does order it to be,
this is a sign that his will is that it should be. And if he does
not order it to be, but suffers it not to be, that is as sure a sign
that he wills that it should not be. So that, however the thing
is, it is a sure sign that it is the will of God that it should be
f.s it is.
To this nothing can be objected, unless that it is not for
want of will, nor want of power in God, that things be not as
he would have them, but because the nature of the subject
will not allow of it. But how can this be to the purpose,
when the nature of the subject itself is of God, and is wholly
within bis power, is altogether the fruit of his mere will ? And
cannot a God of infinite wisdom and infinite power cause the
matures of tilings to be such, and order them so after they are
caused, as to have things as lie chooses, or -without his will's
being crossed, and things so coming to pass that he had rath-
them otherwise ? As, for instance, God foresaw who
would comply with the terms of salvation, and who would
not : And he could have forborne to give being to such as he
would not cornplyj if ; upon some consideration, it was
DECREES AND ELECTION'. 267
not his pleasure that there should be some who should not
comply with the terms of salvation. Objectors may say, God
cannot always prevent men's sins, unless he act contrary to
the free nature of the subject, or without destroying men's
liberty. But will they deny, that an omnipotent and infinitely
wise God could not possibly invent and set before men such
strong motives to obedience, and have kept them before them
in such a manner, as should have influenced all mankind to
continue in their obedience, as the elect angels have done,
without destroying their liberty ? God will order it so, that the
saints and angels in heaven never will sin : And does it there-
fore follow, that their liberty is destroyed, and that ftfey ate nc:
free, but forced in their actions r Does it ibilow, that they are-
turned into blocks, as the Arminians say the'Calvinist doc-
trines turn men ?
§ 20. God decrees all the good that ever comes to pass ;
and therefore there certainly will come to pass no more good,
than he has absolutely decreed to cause ; and there certainly
and infallibly will no more believe, no more be godly, and no
more be saved, than God has decreed that he will cause to be-
lieve, and cause to be godly, and will save.
§21. The foreknowledge of God will necessarily infer a
decree : For God could not foreknow that things would be,
unless he had decreed they should be ; and that because
things would not be future, unless he had decreed they should
be. If God, from all eternity, knew that such and such things
were future, then they were future ; and consequently the
proposition was from all eternity true, that such a thing, at
such a time, would be. And it is as much impossible that
a thing should be future, without some reason of its being fu-
ture, as that it should actually be, without some reason why
it is. It is as perfectly unreasonable to suppose, that this
proposition should be true, viz. such a thing will be, or is to
be, without a reason why it is true ; as it is that this proposi-
tion should be true, such a thing actually is, or has been, with-
out some reason why that is true, or whv that thing exists.
363 DECREES AND ELECTION.
For, as the being of the thing is not in its own nature necessa-
ry, so that proposition that was true before, viz. that it shall
be, is not in its own nature a necessary truth. And therefore
I draw this consequence, that if there must be some reason
of the futurition of the thing, or why the thing is future ; this
can be no other than God's decree, or the truth of the propo-
sition, that such a thing will be, has been determined by God.
For the truth of the proposition is determined by the supposi-
tion. My meaning is, that it does not remain a question ;
but the matter is decided, whether the proposition shall be
true or not. The thing, in its own nature, is not necessary,
but only possible ; and therefore, it is not of itself that it is
future ; it is not of itself in a state of futurition, if I may so
speak, but only in a state of possibility ; and there must be
some cause to bring it out of a state of mere possibility, into
a state of futurition. This must be God only ; for there was
no other being by supposition existing. And though other
things are future, yet it will not be sufficient to say, that the
futurition of other things is the cause of the futurition of this.
And it is owing only to him, that is the first being, and that
exists necessarily, and of himself, that all other things, that
are not in their own nature necessary, or necessarily future,
but merely possible, are brought out of that state of mere pos-
sibility, into a state of futurition, to be certainly future. Here
is an effect already done, viz. the rendering that which in its
own nature is only possible, to be certainly future, so that it
can be certainly known to be future : And there must be
something already existing, that must have caused this effect.
Whatsoever is not of itself or by the necessity of its own na-
ture, is an effect of something else. But that such a thing
should be future by supposition, is not of itself or by necessi-
ty of its own nature. If things that appertain to the creature,
or things that come to pass in time, be not future of them-
selves and of their own nature, then they are future, because
God makes them to be future. This is exceedingly evident ;
for there is nothing else at all beside God and things that
come to pass in time. And therefore, if things that come to
DECREES AND ELECTION. 369
pass in time have not the reason of their own futurition in
themselves, it must be in God.
But if you say, that the ground or reason of their futurition
is in the things themselves, then things are future, prior to any
decree, or their futurition is antecedent in nature of any de-
cree of God. And then, to what purpose is any decree of
God ? For, according to this supposition, God's decreeing
does not make any thing future, or not future ; because it
was future, prior to his decree. His decreeing or appointing
that any thing shall be, or shall not be, does not alter the case.
It is not about to be, or about not to be, any thing the more
for God's decreeing it. According to this supposition, God
has no freedom or choice in decreeing or appointing any
thing. It is not at his choice what shall be future, and what
not ; no not in one thing. For the futurition of things is by
this supposition antecedent in nature to his choice ; so that
his choosing or refusing does not alter the case. The things
in themselves are future, and his decreeing cannot make them
not future ; for they cannot be future and not future at the
same time ; neither can it make them future, because they
are future already ; so that they who thus plead for man's lib-
erty, advance principles which destroy the freedom of God
himself. It is allowed that things are future before they come
to pass ; because God foreknows them. Either things are
future antecedently to God's decree and independently of it,
or they are not. If they are not future antecedently to, and
independently of God's decree, then they are made so by his
decree; there is no medium. But if they are so antecedent-
ly to his decree, then the above mentioned absurdity will fol-
low, viz. that God has no power by his decree to make any
thing future or not future. He has no choice in the case.
And if it be already decided, something must have decided it ;
for, as has been already shown, it is not true without a reason
why it is true. And if something has deiermined or decided
the truth of it, it must be God that has decided it, or some-
thing else. It cannot be chance or mere accident : That is
contrary to every rational supposition. For it is to be sup-
posed, that there is some reason for it, and that something
Vol V 2Y
3T0 DECREES AND ELECTION.
does decide it. If there be any thing that comes to pass by
mere accident, that comes to pass of itself without any reason.
If it be not chance therefore that has decided it, it must be
God or the creature. It cannot be the creature as actually
existing : For, by supposition, it is determined from all eter-
nity before any creature exists. Therefore, if it beany thing
in the creature that decides it in any way, it must be only the
futurition of that thing in the creature. But this brings us
to the absurdity and contradiction, that the same thing is both
the cause and the effect of itself. The very effect, the cause
of which we are seeking, is the futurition of the thing ; and
if this futurition be the cause of that effect, it is the cause of
itself.
§ 22. The first objection of the Arminians is, that the di-
vine decree infringes on the creature's liberty. In answer t«
this objection, we may observe some things to shew what is
the true notion of liberty, and the absurdity of their notion of
liberty. Their notion of liberty is, that there is a sovereign-
ty in the will, and that the will determines itself, so that its
determination to choose or refuse this or that, is primarily
within itself ; which description of liberty implies a selfcon-
tradiction. For it supposes the will, in its first act, choosing
or refusing lobe determined by itself; which implies that
there is an antecedent act of the will to that first act, deter-
mining that act. For, if the will determines its own first act,
then there must be an act of the will before that first act, (for
that determining is acting) which is a contradiction. There
can be no fallacy in this ; for we know that if the will deter-
mines its own act, it does not determine it without acting.
Therefore, here is this contradiction, \iz. that there is an act
of the will before the first act. There is an act of the will de-
termining what it shall choose^ before the first act of choice ;
which is as much as to say, that there is an act of volition be-
fore the first act of volition. For the will's determining what
it will choose, is choosing. The will's determining what it
will will, is willing. So that according to this notion of liber-
ty, the will must choose before it chooses, in order to deter-
DECREES AND ELECTION. 37 1
snine what it will choose. If the will determines itself, it is
certain that one act must determine another. If the will de-
termines its own choice, then it must determine by a forego-
ing act what it will choose. If the will determines its own
act, then an antecedent act determines the consequent ; for
that determining is acting. The will cannot determine with-
out acting. Therefore I inquire what determines that first
act of the will, viz. its determination of its own act ? It must
be answered, according to their scheme, that it is the will by
a foregoing act. Here, again, we have the same contradic-
tion, viz. that the first act of the will is determined by an act
that is before that first act. If the will determines itself, or
determines its own choice, the meaning of it must be, if there
be any meaning belonging to it, that the will determines how-
it will choose ; and that it chooses, according to that, its own
determination how to choose, or is directed in choosing by
that its own determination. But then I would inquire, wheth-
er that first determination, that directs the choice, be not it-
self an act or a volition ; and if so, I would inquire what de-
termines that act. Is it another determination still prior to
that in the order of nature ? Then I would inquire, what de-
termines the first act or determination of all ? If the will, in
its acts of willing or choosing, determines or directs itself how
to choose, then there is something done by the will prior to
its act of choosing that is determined, viz. its determining or
directing itself how to choose. This act determining or di-
recting, must be something besides cr distinct from the
choice determined or directed, and must be prior in order of
nature to it. Here are two acts of the will, one the cause of
the other, viz. the act of the will directing and determining,
and the act or choice directed or determined. Now, I inquire,
what determines that first act of the will determining or di-
recting, to determine and direct as it does ? If it be said, the
will determines itself in that ; then that supposes there is
another act of the will prior to that, directing and determining
that act, which is contrary to the supposition. And if it was
not, still the question would recur, what determines that first
determining act of the will ? If the will determines itself, one
$72 DECREES AND ELECTION.
of these three things must be meant, viz. l.That that very
same act of the will determines itself. But this is as absurd
as to say that something makes itself ; and it supposes it to
be before it is. For the act of determining is as much prior
to the thing determined, as the act making is before the thing
made. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that the will determines
its own act, by some other act that is prior to it in order of
nature ; which implies that the will acts before its first act.
Or, 3. The meaning must be, that the faculty, considered at
the same time as perfectly without act, determines its own
consequent act ; which is to talk without a meaning, and is a
great absurdity. To suppose that the faculty, remaining at
the same time perfectly without act, can determine any thing,
is a plain contradiction ; for determining is acting. And be-
sides, if the will does determine itself, that power of deter-
mining itself does not argue any freedom, unless it be by an.
act of the will, or unless that determination be itself an act of
choice. For what freedom or liberty is there in the will's
determining itself, without an act of choice in determining,
whereby it may choose which way it will determine itself ?
So that those that suppose the will has a power of selfdeter-
mination, must suppose that that very determination is an act
of the will, or an act of choice, or else it does not at all help
them out in what they would, viz. the liberty of the will. But
if that very determination how to act, be itself an act of
choice, then the question returns, what determines this act of
choice.
Also, the foreknowledge of God contradicts their notion
of liberty as much, and in every respect in the same manner
as a decree. For they do not pretend that decree contra-
dicts liberty any otherwise, than as it infers that it is before-
hand certain that the thing will come to pass, and that it is
impossible but that it should be, as the decree makes an in-
dissoluble connexion beforehand between the subject and
predicate of the proposition, that such a thing shall be. A
decree infers no other necessity than that. And God's fore-
knowledge does infer the same to all intents and purposes.
For if from all eternity God foreknew that such a thing would
DECREES AND ELECTION. 373
be, then the event was infallibly certain beforehand, and that
proposition was true from all eternity, that such a thing
would be ; and therefore there was an indissoluble connex-
ion beforehand between the subject and predicate of that
proposition. If the proposition was true beforehand, the sub-
ject and predicate of it were connected beforehand. And
therefore it follows from hence, that it is utterly impossible
that it should not prove true, and that, for this reason, that
it is utterly impossible that a thing should be true, and not
true, at the same time.
§ 23. The same kind of infallible certainty, that the
thing will come to pass, or impossibility but that it should
come to pass, that they object against, must necessarily be
inferred another way, whether wc hold the thing to be any-
way decreed or not. For it has been shown before, and I
suppose none will deny, that God from all eternity decrees
his own actions. Therefore he from all eternity decrees ev-
ery punishment that he ever has inflicted, or will inflict. So
that it is impossible, by their own reasoning, but that the
punishment should come to pass. And if it be impossible
but that the punishment should come to pass, then it is equal-
ly impossible but that the sin should come to pass. For if
it be possible that the sin should not come to pass, and yet
impossible but that the punishment should come to pass, then
it is impossible* but that God should punish that sin which
may never be.
§ 24. For God certainly to know that a thing will be,
that possibly may be, and possibly may not be, implies a con-
tradiction. If possibly it may be otherwise, then how can
God know certainly that it will be ? If it possibly may be
otherwise, then he knows it possibly may be otherwise ; and
that it is inconsistent with his certainly knowing that it will
not be otherwise. If God certainly knows it will be, and yet
it may possibly be otherwise, then it may possibly happen to
be otherwise than God certainly knows it will be. If so, then
it may possibly happen that God may be mistaken in his
374 DECREES AND ELECTION,
judgment, when he certainly knows ; for it is supposed that
it is possible that it should be otherwise than he judges. For
that it should be otherwise than fie judges, and that he should
be mistaken, are the same thing. How unfair therefore is it
in those that hold the foreknowledge of God, to insist upon
this objection from human liberty, against the decrees, when
their scheme is attended with the same difficulty, exactly in
the same manner !
§ 25. Their other objection is, that God's decrees make
God the author of sin. I answer, that there is no more ne-
cessity of supposing God the author of sin, on this scheme,
than on the other. For if we suppose, according to my doc-
trine, that God has determined, from all eternity, the number
and persons of those that shall perform the condition of the
covenant of grace ; in order to support this doctrine, there is
no need of maintaining any more concerning God's decree-
ing sin, than this, viz. that God has decreed that he will per-
mit all the sin that ever comes to pass, and that upon his
permitting it, it will certainly come to pass. And they hold
the same thing ; for they hold that God does determine be-
forehand to permit all the sin that does come to pass ; and
that he certainly knows that if he does permit it, it will come
to pass. I say, they in their scheme allow both these ; they
allow that God docs permit all the sin to come to pass, that
ever docs come to pass ; and those that allow the foreknowl-
edge of God, do also allow the other thing, viz. that he knows
concerning all the sin that ever does really come to pass, that
it will come to pass upon his permitting it. So that if this
be making God the author of sin, they make him so in the
very same way that they charge us with doing it.
§ 26. One objection of their's against God's decreeing
or ordering, in any sense, that sin should come to pass, is,
that .man cannot do this without making himself sinful and in
some measure, guilty of the sin, and that therefore God can-
not. To this I answer, that the same objection lies against
their <. v,n scheme two ways : 1. Because thev own that God
DECREES AND ELECTION. 375
does permit sin, and that he determines to permit it before-
hand, and that he knows, with respect to all sin that ever is
committed, that upon his permitting it, it will come to pass ;
and we hold no other. 2. Their objection is, that what is a
sin in men, is a sin in God ; and therefore, in any sense to de-
cree sin, would be a sin. But if this objection be good, it is
as strong against God's permission of sin, which they allow ;
for it would be a sin in men to permit sin. We ought not to
permit or suffer it where we have opportunity to hinder it ;
and we cannot permit it without making ourselves in some
measure guilty. Yet they allow that God does permit sin ;
and that his permitting it does not make him guilty of it.
Why must the argument from men to God be stronger in
the other case than in this ?
§ 27. They say, that we ought to begin in religion, with
the perfections of God, and make these a rule to interpret
scripture. Ans. 1. If this be the best rule, I ask, why is it
not as good a rule to argue from these perfections of God,
his omniscience, infinite happiness, infinite wisdom and pow-
er, as his other attributes that they argue from ? If it be not
as good a rule to argue from these as those, it must be be-
cause they are not so certain, or because it is not so certain
that he is possessed of these perfections. But this they will
not maintain ; for his moral perfections are proved no other-
wise than by arguing from his natural perfections ; and there-
fore the latter must be equally certain with the former.
What we prove another thing by, must at least be as certain
as it makes the thing proved by it. If an absolute and uni-
versal decree does infer a seeming inconsistence with some
of God's moral perfections, they must confess the contrary
to have a seeming inconsistence with the natural perfections
of God.
Again, 2dly. They lay it down for a rule to embrace no
doctrine which they by their own reason cannot reconcile
with the moral perfections of God. But I would shew the
unreasonableness of this rule. For, 1. If this be a good rule,
then it always was so. Let us then see what will follow. We
376 DECREES AND ELECTION.
shall then, 2dly, have reason to conclude every thing to be
really inconsistent with God's moral perfections, that we can-
not reconcile with his moral perfections ; for if we have not
reason to conclude that it is inconsistent, then we have no
reason to conclude that it is not true. But if this be true that
we have reason to conclude every thing is inconsistent with
God's moral perfections which we cannot reconcile with those
perfections, then David had reason to conclude that some things
that he saw take place, in fact were inconsistent with God's
mora' perfections, for he could not reconcile them with those
perfections, Psalm lxxiii. And Job had cause to come to the
same conclusion concerning some events in his day. 3. If it
be a good rule that Ave must conclude that to be inconsistent
with the divine perfections, that we cannot reconcile with, or,
which is the same thing, that we cannot see how it is consist-
ent with those perfections, then it must be because we have
reason to conclude that it cannot happen that our reason can-
not see how it can be, and then it will follow that we must re-
ject the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of
God, &c.
The scripture itself supp'oses that there are some things
in the scripture that men may not be able to reconcile with
God's moral perfections. See Rom. ix. 19. "Why doth
he yet find fault ? For who hath resisted his will ?" And
the apostle does not answer the objection, by shewing us how
to reconcile it with the moral perfections of God, but by rep-
resenting the arrogancy of quarrelling with revealed doctrines
under such a pretence, and not considering the infinite dis-
tance between God and us. " Nay, but who art thou, O man,
that repliest against God ?" And God answered Job after
the same manner. God rebuked him for darkening counsel
by words without knowledge, and answered him, only by de-
claring and manifesting to him the infinite distance between
God and him ; so letting him know, that it hecame him
humbly to submit to God, and acknowledge his justice even
in those things that were difficult to his reason ; and that
without solving his difficulties any other way than by making
him sensible of the weakness of his own understanding.
DECREES AND ELECTION. 377
§ 28. If there be no election, then it is not God that
makes men to differ, expressly contrary to scripture. No
man ought to praise God for that happiness that he has above
other men, or for that distinction that is between him and
other men, that he is holy and that he is saved ; when they
are not holv and not saved. The saints in heaven, when they
look on the devils in hell, have no occasion to praise God on
account of the difference between them. Some of the ill
consequences of the Arminian doctrines are, that it robs God
of the greater part of the glory of his grace, and takes away a
principal motive to love and praise him, and exalts man to
God's room, and ascribes the glory to self, that belongs to
God alone. Rom. xi. 7. « The election hath obtained, and
the rest were blinded." That by the election here is not
meant the Gentiles, but the elect part of the Jews, is most
apparent by the context. Such Arminians who allow, that
some only are elected, and not all that are saved, but that
none are reprobated, overthrow hereby their own main objec-
tion against reprobation, viz. that God offers salvation to all,
and encourages them to seek it, which say they, would be
inconsistent with God's truth, if he had absolutely determin-
ed not to save them ; for they will not deny that those that
are elected whilst ungodly, are warned of God to beware of
eternal damnation, and to avoid such and such things, lest
they should be damned. But for God to warn men to be-
ware of damnation, though he has absolutely determined that
they shall not be damned, is exactly parallel with his exhort-
ing men to seek salvation, though he has actually determin-
ed that they shall not be saved.
§ 29. That election is not from a foresight of werks, or
conditional, as depending on the condition of man's will, is
evident by 2 Tim. i. 9. « Who hath saved us, and called us
with an holy Galling, not according to our works, but accord-
ing to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in
Christ Jesus before the world began." Philip, ii. 13. « For
it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his
own good pleasure." Rom. ix. 15, 16. "I will have mercy
on whom I will have mercy, and will have compassion od
Vol. V. 2 Z
S7* DECREES AND ELECTION.
whom I will have compassion. So then, it is not of him that
Willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth
mercy." Men's labors and endeavors themselves are from
God. 1 Cor. xv. 10. " But by the grace of God, I am what
I am ; and his grace which was bestowed upon me, was not
in vain ; but I labored more abundantly than they all. Yet
not I, but the grace of God which was with me."
§ 30. God decrees all things, and even all sins. Acts ii.
23. " Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and
foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands
have crucified and slain ;" iv. 28. " For to do whatsoever
thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." If
the thing meant, be only that Cnrist's sufferings should
come to pass by some means or other,; I answer, they could
not come to pass but by sin. For contempt and disgrace was
one thing he was to suffer. Even the free actions of men
are subject to God's disposal. Prov. xxi. 1. "The king's
heart is in the hand of the Lord ; be turneth it as the rivers
of water, whithersoever it pleaselh him." See Jer. Hi. 3.
« For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in
Jerusalem and Judah, till he had cast them out from
his presence, that Zedckiah rebelled against the king of Bab-
ylon." The not complying with the terms of the covenant
of grace is decreed, 1 Pet. ii. 8. " A stone of stumbling and
a rock of offence to them that stumble at the word, being dis-
obedient, whereunto also they were appointed." What man
determines, never comes to pass, unless God determines it,
Lam. iii. 37. " Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass,
and the Lord commandeth it not i" By commanding is here
meant willing ; and God is elsewhere said to speak, and it was
done ; to command, and it stood fast. God determines the
limits of men's lives. This is exceeding evident. Job vii. 1.
" Is there not an appointed time to man upon earth ? Are
not his days also like the days of an hireling ?" Days of an
hireling signify an appointed, certain, limited time ; as Isa.
xvi. 14, and Isa. xxi. 16. If the limits of men's lives are de-
termined, men's free actions must be determined,, and even
DECREES AND ELECTION. 3*9
their sins ; for their lives often depend on such acts. See
also Job xiv. 5.
§31. If God does not know all things, then his knowl-
edge may increase, he may gain, and may grow wiser as he
grows older. He may discover new things, and may draw
consequences from them. And he may be mistaken : If he
does not know, he may guess wrong : If he does not know,
he has no infallible judgment ; for an infallible judgment is
knowledge. And if he may be mistaken, he may order mat-
ters wrong ; he may be frustrated ; his measures may be
broken. For, doubtless, in things that are uncertain, he or-
ders things according to what appears most probable, or else
he fails in prudence. But in so ordering things, his meas-
ures may be broken. And then the greater part of the great
events, viz. events among rational creatures, would be uncer-
tain to him. For the greater part of them depend on men's
free actions. That he does foreknow, is evident by his pre-
dicting and foretelling events, and even the sins of men, as
Judas's sin. If he did not foreknow, he might change his
will as he altered his views. Now, it is especially with res-
pect to God's will and purposes, that he is said in scripture
not to be changeable. Having thus proved the foreknowl-
edge of God, and the greater part of Arminians not denying
it, I shall hereafter take it for granted, and shall argue against
those only that allow it. If he did not foreknow and might be
disappointed, he might repent.
§ 32. They say, as God's power extends only to all
things possible, so God's knowledge only extends to all things
knowable.
Ans. Things impossible, or contradictions, are not things ;
but events that come to pass, are things. God's power does
extend to all things, otherwise it would not be infinite. So
neither is the knowledge of God infinite, unless God knows all
things. To suppose that God cannot do things impossible, does
not suppose that God's power can be increased. But to sup-
pose that God docs not know men's free actions does sun-
S8© DECREES AND ELECTION.
pose that God's knowledge may be increased. To suppose
that God's decrees are conditional, in the sense of the Armin»
ians, or that they depend, as they suppose, on a foresight of
something that shall come to pass in time, is to suppose that
something that first begins to be in time, is the cause of
something that has been from all eternity, which is absurd ;
for nothing can be a cause of that existence, which is before
the existence of that cause. What an absurdity is it, to sup-
pose that that existence which is an effect, is effected by a
cause, when that cause that effects it, is not, or has no being ?
If it be answered, that it is not the actual existence of the
thing, that is the reason or cause of the decree, but the fore-
sight of the existence ; and the foresight of the existence
may be at the same time with the decree, and before it, in
the order of nature, though the existence itself is not ; and
that it is not properly the actual existence of the thing fore-
seen, that is the cause of the decree, but the existence of it
in the divine foreknowledge. I reply, that this does not help
the difficulty at all, but only puts it a step farther off ; for
Still, by their scheme, the foreknowledge depends on the fu-
ture actual existence ; so that the actual existence is the
cause of the divine foreknowledge, which is infinite ages be-
fore it. And it is a great absurdity to suppose this effect to
flow from this cause, before the existence of the cause. And
whatever is said, the absurdity will occur, unless we suppose
that the divine decree is the ground of the futurition of the
event, and also the ground of the foreknowledge of it. Then
the cause is before the effect ; but otherwise the effect is be-
fore the cause.
§ 33. If God absolutely determined that Christ's death
should have success in gathering a church to him, it will fol-
low that there was a number absolutely elected, or that God
had determined some should surely be saved. If God deter-
mined that some should surely be saved, that implies that he
had determined that he would see to it, that some should per-
form the conditions of salvation and be saved ; or, which is
the same thing, that he would cause that they should be
surely saved. But this cannot be, without fixing on the per?
DECREES AND ELECTION. 3Si
sons beforehand. For the cause is before the effect. There
is no such thing as God's resolving absolutely beforehand
that he would save some, and yet not determining who they
should be, before they were actually saved : Or that he should
see to it, that there should be in a number the requisites of
salvation, and yet not determine who, till they actually have
the requisites of salvation. But God had absolutely determin-
ed that some should be saved, yea a great number, after
Christ's death ; and had determined it beforehand. Because
he had absolutely promised it ; Isa. xlix. 6, and liii. 10. See
in Psal. lxxii. and other places in the Psalms, and Tit. ii. 14.
God, having absolutely purposed this before Christ's death,
must either have then determined the persons, or resolved that
he would hereafter determine the persons ; at least, if he saw
there was need of it, and saw that they did not come in of
themselves. But this latter supposition, if we allow it, over-
throws the Arminian scheme. It shows, that such a prede-
termination, or absolute election, is not inconsistent with
God's perfections, or the nature of the gospel constitution, or
God's government of the world, and his promise of reward to
the believing and obedient, and the design of gospel offers and
commands, as the Arminians suppose. If God has absolute-
ly determined to save some certain persons, then, doubtless,
he has in like manner determined concerning all that are to
be saved. God's promising, supposes- not only that the thing
is future, but that God will do it. If it be left to chance, or
man's contingent will, and the event happen right, God is nev-
er the truer. He performs not his promise ; he takes no ef-
fectual care about it ; it is not he that promised, that per-
forms. That thing, or, rather nothing, called fortune, orders
all. ...Concerning the absurdity of supposing that it was not ab-
solutely determined beforehand, what success there should be
of Christ's death ; see PolhiWs S/iec. Theolog. in Christo, p.
165... .171.
It is pretended, that the antecedent certainty of any sin's
oeing committed, seeing that it is attended with necessity,
takes away all liberty, and makes warnings and exhorl i
to avoid sin, a mere illusion. To this I would bring
382 DECREES AND ELECTION.
stance of Peter. Christ told him, that he should surely deny
him thrice that night, before the cock should crow twice.
And yet, after that, Christ exhorted all his disciples to watch
and pray, that they might not fall into temptation ; and di-
rects, ihat he who had no sword, should sell his garment and
buy one.
§ 34. How evident is it, that God sets up that to be sought
after as a reward of virtue, and the fruit of our endeavors,
•which yet he has determined shall never come to pass ? As,
1 Sam. xiii. 13. " And Samuel said unto Saul, Thou hast
done foolishly ; thou hast not kept the commandment of the
Lord thy God, which he commanded thee. For now would
the Lord have established thy kingdom upon Israel for ever."
It is evident that God had long before decreed, that the king-
dom of Israel should be established in the tribe of Judah....
Luke xxii. 22. " The son cf man goeth as it was determin-
ed [Matth. xxvi. 24, and Mark xiv. 21, as it is written of him]
but woe unto that man by whom the son of man is betrayed."
As it nvas determined : As this passage is not liable to the am-
biguities which some have apprehended in Acts ii. 23, and iv.
28, (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it in
their most natural construction) I look upon it as an evident
proof, that those things are in the language of scripture said
to be determined or decreed, (or exactly bounded and mark-
ed out by God, as the word up^u most naturally signifies)
'which he sees will in fact happen in consequence of his voli-
tions, without any necessitating agency, as well as those
events of which he is properly the author ; and, as Beza ex-
presses it, " Qui sequitur dewn emendate sane loquitur, we
need not fear, falling into any impropriety of speech, when we
use the language which God has taught." Doddridge in loc.
§ 35. As to the decrees of election, see Psal. Ixv. 4. « Bless-
ed is the man whom thou choosest, and causest to approach
unto thee, that he may dwell in thy courts : We shall be sat-
isfied with the goodness of thy house, even of thy holy tem-
pU." Isa. :;!i. .-. " Thou whom I have taken from the ends
of the earth, and cr.Hcd thee from the chief men thereof; and
DECREES AND ELECTION.
33.1
said unto thee, Thou art my servant ; I have chosen tlicc,
and not cast thee away." Matth. xx. 16. « So the last shall
be first, and the first last : For many be called, but few chos-
en." Chap. xxii. 14. " For many are called, but few arc chos-
en." Chap. xxiv. 24. " For there shall arise false Christs and
false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders ; in sa
much that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very
elect." John vi. 37.. ..46. " All that the Father giveth me,
shall come to me ; and him that cometh to me, I will in no
wise cast out," &c. Chap. x. 3, 4, and verse 1 1, and 14... .17.
v. 26. ...30. " To him the porter openeth, and the sheep hear
his voice ; and he calleth his own sheep by name, and lead-
eth them out. And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he
goeth before them, and the sheep follow him, for they know
his voice. I am the good Shepherd ; and know my sheep,
and am known of mine. Therefore doth my Father love me ;
because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. But
ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto
you," Sec Chap. xvii. 6. ...20. " I have manifested thv name
unto the men thou gavest me out of the world : Thine they
were, and thou gavest thsm me ; and they have kept thy word,
&c. Neither pray I for these alone ; but for them also which
shall believe on me through their word." Acts xviii. 10.
"For I am with thee, and no man shall set on thee, to hurt
thee : For I have much people in this city." As to reproba-
tion, see Matth. xi. 20. ...27. " Then began he to upbraid the
cities wherein most of his mighty works were clone, because
they repented not, &c. Even so, Father, for so it seemed
good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my
Father ; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father ; neith-
er knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to
whomsoever the Son will reveal him." John vi. 44. ...46.
" No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent
me draw him : And I will raise him up at the last clay, &c.
Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of
God, he hath seen the Father." Chap. viii. 47. « He that is
©f God, heareth God's words : Ye therefore hear them not,
because ye are not of God." Chap. x. 26. " But ye believe
384 DECREES AND ELECTION.
not, because you are not of my sheep, as I said unto you.' 1
Chap. xvii. 9....13. " I pray for them: I pray not for the
world, but for them which thou hast given me ; for they are
thine," Sec. 1 Thes. v. 9. « For God hath not appointed us
to wrath, but to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ."
1 Pet. ii. 8. " And a stone of stumbling-, and a rock of of-
fence, even to them which stumble at the word, being disobe-
dient : Whereunto also they were appointed." Jude i. 4.
« For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were be-
fore of old ordained to this condemnation, turning the grace
of God into lasciviousness." i John iv. 6. « We are of God.
He that knoweth God, heareth us ; he that is not of God,
heareth not us. Hereby know we the spirit of truth, and the
spirit of of error." Rev iii. 8. " I know thy works : Behold,
I have set before thee an open door, and no man can shut it :
For thou hast a little strength, and hast kept my word, and
hast not denied my name." Chap. xx. 12, 15. « And I saw
the dead, small and great, stand before God ; and the books
were opened : And another book was opened, which is the
book of life : And the dead were judged out of those things
which were written in the books, according to their works.
And whosoever was not found written in the book of life, was
cast into the lake of fire." John xii. 37....41. " But though
he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believ-
ed not on him. Because that Esaias said, he hath blinded
their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see
with their eyes, &c. These things said Esaias, when he saw
his glory, and spake of him." Rom. ix. 6, 7, 8. 11.... 14, 16....
19. v. 21. ...24. v. 27, 29, 33. "Not as though the word of
God hath taken none effect For they are not all Israel, which
are of Israel : Neither because they are the seed of Abraham,
are they all children : But, in Isaac shall thy seed be called.
That is, they which are the children of the flesh, these are
not the children of God ; but the children of the promise are
counted for the seed. For the children, being not yet born,
neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of
God, according to election might stand, not of works, but of
him that calleth. it was said, « The elder shall serve the
DECREES AND ELECTION. $8a
younger, Sec. What shall we say then ? Is there unright-
eousness with God ? God forbid. So then, it is not of him
that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth
mercy, &c. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet
find fault ? For who hath resisted his will ? Hath not the pot-
ter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel
unto honor, and another to dishonor ? Sec. Even us whom he
hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles.
Esaias also crieth concerning Israel, Though the number of
the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall
be saved : And as Esaias said before, Except the Lord of
Sabaoth had left us a seed, we had been as Sodoma, and been
made like unto Gomorrha. As it is written, Behold, I lay in
Sion a stumbling stone, and a rock of offence : And whosoev-
er believeth on him shall not be ashamed." And chap. xi.
1,...6. v. 7....11. v. 15,17, 19. ...23. v. 32, 36. " I say then,
Hath God cast away his people ? God forbid. For I also
am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Ben-
jamin, &c. Even so then at this present time also there is a
remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace,
then is it no more of works : Otherwise grace is no more
grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace : Oth-
erwise, work is no more work. What then ? Israel hath not
obtained that which he seeketh for ; but the election hath
©btained it, and the rest were blinded. God hath given them
the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears
that they should not hear, unto this day. Let their table be
made a snare, and a trap, and a stumbling block, and a recom-
pence unto them, &c. And if some of the branches be brok-
en off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted in among
them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the
©live tree ; thou wilt say then, The branches were broken off,
that I might be grafted in, £cc. And they also, if they abide
not in unbelief, shall be grafted in : For God is able to graft
them in again. For God hath concluded them all in unbelief,
mat he might have mercy upon all. For of him, and through
him, and to him, are all things : To whom be glory for ever.
Amen."
Vol. V. 3 A
386 DECREES AND ELECTION:
§ 36. All that is intended when we say that God decrees
all that comes to pass, is, that all events are subject to the dis-
posals of providence, or that God orders all things in his prov-
idence ; and that he intended from eternity to order all things
in providence, and intended to order them as he does. Elec-
tion does not signify only something common to professing
Christians, Matth. xx. 16. " Many are called, but few are
chosen." Matth. xxiv. 31. " He shall send forth his angels,
and gather together his elect."
§ 37. God's foreknowledge appears from this, that God
has foretold that there should be some good men, as the Ar-
minians themselves allow. Stebbing, in his Treatise concern-
ing the Operations of the Holy Spirit, p. 237, second edition,
says as follows : " So long as a man may be certain that those
things will come to pass which God hath foretold, he mav be
certain, that God's grace will prevail in multitudes of men be-
fore the end of all things. For, by divers predictions in holy
writ we are assured, that when Christ shall come to judgment,
there will be some who shall be changed, and put on immor-
tality."
§38. The scriptures, in teaching us this doctrine, are
guilty of no hard imposition on our understanding of a doc-
trine contrary to reason. If they had taught the contrary
doctrine, it would have been much more contrary to reason,
and a . much greater temptation to persons of diligent and
thorough consideration, to doubt of the divinity of the scrip-
ture.
§39. Concerning the decreeing of sin, see Actsiii. 17, 18,
with Actsxiii. 27. " And now, brethren, I wot that through
ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers. But those things
which God before had shewed by the mouth of all his proph-
ets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled."... u For
they that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they
knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which arr
DECREES AND ELECTION. 3S?
read every Sabbath day, they have fulfilled them in condemn*
Ing him.
§ 40. It is objected, that this is a speculative point. So
might they say, Jesus's being the Messiah, is a speculative
point.
§41. If God's inviting or commanding a person to do a
thing, when he, in his decree, has ordained that it shall be
otherwise, argues insincerity in the command or invitation,
the insincerity must be in this, viz. that he commands a thing
to be done, when his end in commanding is not, that the thing
may be done ; which cannot be his end ; because he knows
certainly, at the time that he commands it, that it will not
be. But it is certain, that God's commanding a thing to be
done, which he certainly knows at the time will not be done,
is no evidence of insincerity in God in commanding. For
thus God commanded Pharaoh to let the people go : And yet
he knew he would not obey, as he says at the same time that
he orders the command to be given him, Exod. iii. 18, 19.
" And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the
king of Egypt, and you shall say unto him, The Lord God of
the Hebrews hath met with us ; and now let us go, we be-
seech thee, three days journey into the wilderness, that we
may sacrifice to the Lord our God : And I am sure that the
king of Egypt will not let you go ; no not by a mighty hand."
See also chap. iv. 21, 22, 23, and chap. vii. 1....7 ; see also
chap. ix. 16, compared with Rom. ix. 17.
§ 42. It is impossible for an infinitely wise and good being
to do otherwise, than to choose Ayhat he sees on the whole to
be best. And certainly reason requires us to suppose, that of
all possible events with respect to sin, and the conversion and
salvation of particular persons, it is better that one of those
possible and opposite events should come to pass than anoth-
er ; and therefore, an infinitely wise and good being must /
choose accordingly. What God permits, he decrees to per-
mit. If it is no blemish to God to permit sin, then it is no
388 DECREES AND ELECTION.
blemish to him to purpose or intend to permit it. And if he
be omniscient, and does designedly permit that sin which ac-
tually comes to pass, then he designedly permits that sin,
knowing, if he permits it, it will actually come to pass. And
this is an effectual permission, and all that we plead for.
What, then, do our adversaries quarrel with us for ? And why
do they pretend that we charge God with being the author of
sin ? There is a way of drawing consequences from scrip-
ture, that begs the question. As the Arminians say, there
are many more texts plainly against election, than seem to be
for it, viz. those texts that represent, that general offers of
salvation are made, as though it was left to men's choice,
whether they will be saved or no. But that is begging the
question. For the question very much consists in these
things, whether an absolute decree be inconsistent with man's
liberty, and so with a general offer of salvation, £cc.
§43. Concerning the Anminian notion of election, that
when the apostles speak of election, they only mean that by
which the professing Christians in those days were distin-
guished from others, as the nation of Israel of old was ; this
is unreasonable, according to their own principles. For if
they- were elected, and that was the reason why they so far
embraced the gospel, as to become Christians rather than oth-
ers, then, on Arminian principles, no thanks were due to them
for embracing the gospel ; neither were others, who continu-
ed openly to reject the gospel, to blame ; and it was in vain
to use any means to persuade any to join with the Christian
church ; nor were any to blame for not doing it, or to be
praised for doing it, Sec. Besides, their principles render vain
all endeavors to spread the gospel. For the gospel will cer-
tainly be spread to all nations that are elected ; and all such
shall have the offers of the gospel, whether they take any care
of the matter or no.
§44. Dr. Whitby, to make out his scheme, makes the
.vord election signify two entirely different things ; one. elev-
DECREES AND ELECTION. 389
tion to a common faith of Christianity ; another, a conditional
election to salvation. But every one must be sensible of the
unreasonableness of such shifting and varying, and turning in-
to all shapes, to evade the force of scripture.
§ 45 It is evident the apostle, in Rom. ix. has not only-
respect to God's sovereignty in the election and pretention of
nations, because he illustrates his meaning by the instance of
a particular person, viz. Pharaoh. The exercise of the sov-
ereignty that he speaks of, appears by the express words of
the apostle about vessels of mercy and vessels of wrath, ves-
sels of honor and vessels of dishonor. But .the vessels of
mercy, he speaks of as prepared to glory. They, it is plain,
are those that shall be saved, and the vessels of wrath are
those that perish. He speaks of those that shall be saved, v.
27. « A remnant shall be saved." What is there that God
does decree according to the scheme of the Arminians so as to
make it in any measure consistent with itself ? He does not
decree any of the great events of the world of mankind,
(which are the principal events, and those to which all others
are subordinated) because these depend on men's free will.
He does not absolutely decree any events wherein the wel-
fare of men is concerned ; for if he does, then these things,
according to their scheme, cannot be the subject of prayer.
For according to them, it is absurd to seek or pray for things,
which we do not know but that God has absolutely decreed
and fixed before. We do not know but that he has deter-
mined absolutely and unfrustrably from eternity, that they
shall not be ; and then, by their scheme, we cannot pray in
faith for them. See Whitby, p. 177, 8cc. And if God does
not decree and order those events beforehand, then what be-
comes of the providence of God ; and what room is there for
prayer, if there be no providence ? Prayer is shut out this
way also. According to them, we cannot reasonably pray for
the accomplishment of things that are already fixed, before our
prayers ; for then our prayers alter nothing, and what, say
they, signifies it for us to pray ?
J9V DECREES AND ELECTION.
Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that we cannot pray in Faith for
the salvation of others, if we do not know that Christ died in-
tentionally for their salvation.
§ 46. To Dr. Whitby's observation, that the apostle
speaks of churches, as though they were all elect, I answer,
he speaks from a judgment of charity, as Dr. Whitby him-
self observes, p. 460. God foreknows the elect, as God is
said to know those that are his own sheep from strangers ; as
Christ is said not to know the workers of iniquity, that is, he
owns them not. In the same sense, God is said to know the
elect from all eternity ; that is, he knew them as a man
knows his own things. He acknowledged them from eternity-
He owns them as his children. Reprobates he did not know ;
they were strangers to God from all eternity. If God ever
determined, in the general, that some of mankind should cer-
tainly be saved, and did not leave it altogether undetermined
whether ever so much as one soul of all mankind shouklbe-
lieve in Christ ; it must be that he determined that some par-
ticular persons should certainly believe in him. For it is cer-
tain that if he has left it undetermined concerning this and
that, and the other person, whether ever he should believe or
not, and so of every particular person in the world ; then
there is no necessity at all, that this or that, or any particular
person in the world, should ever be saved by Christ, for the
matter of any determination of God's. So that, though God
sent his Son into the world, yet the matter was left altogether
undetermined by God, whether ever any person should be
saved by him, and there was all this ado about Christ's birth,
death, resurrection, ascension, and sitting at God's right hand,
when it was not as yet determined whether he should ever
save one soul, or have any mediatorial kingdom at all.
§ 47. It is most absurd, to call such a conditional election
as they talk of, by the name of election, seeing there is a ne-
cessary connexion between faith in Jesus Christ and eternal
life. Those that believe in Christ, must lie saved, according
to God's inviolable constitution of things. What nonsense is
DECREES AND ELECTION. 39ta
it, therefore, to talk of choosing such to life from all eternity
out of the rest of mankind ? A predestination of such to life
is altogether useless and needless. By faith in one that has
satisfied for sin, the soul necessarily becomes free from sin.
By faith in one that has bought eternal life for them, they
have, of unavoidable consequence, a right to eternal life.
Now, what sense is it to say, that God from all eternity, of
his free grace, chose out those that he foresaw would have no
guilt of sin, that they should not be punished for their guilt,
as others were, when it is a contradiction to suppose that they
can be punished for their guilt when they have none ? For
who can lay any thing to their charge, when it is Christ that
has died ? And what do they mean by an election of men to
that which is, in its own nature, impossible that it should not
be, whether they are elected to it or no ; or by God's choos-
ing them that had a right to eternal life, that they should pos-
sess it ? What sense is it to say that a creditor chooses out
those among his debtors to be free from debt, that owe him
nothing ? But if they say that election is only God's deter-
mination, in the general, that all that believe shall be saved,
in what sense can this be called election ? They are not per-
sons that are here chosen, but mankind is divided into two
sorts, the one believing, and the other unbelieving, and God
chooses the believing sort. It 19 not election of persons, but
of qualifications. God does from all eternity choose to be-
stow eternal life upon those that have a right to it, rather than
upon those who have a right to damnation. Is this all the e-
lection we have an account of in God's word ? Such a thing
as election may well be allowed ; for that there is such a
thing as sovereign love is certain ; that is, love, not for any
excellency,but merely God's good pleasure. For whether it is
proper to say that God from all eternity loved the elect or no,
it is proper to say that God loved men after the fall, while
sinners and enemies ; for God so loved the world, that he
gave his only begotten Son to die. This was not for any
goodness or excellency, but merely God'?, good pleasure ; for
he would not love the fallen anj
392 DECREES AND ELECTION.
§ 48. Christ is often spoken of in scripture as being, by
way of eminency, the Elect or Chosen of God. Isa. xlii. 1.
« Behold ray Servant whom I uphold, mine Elect in whom
ray soul delighteth." Luke xxiii. 35. " If he be the Christ,
the Chosen of God." 1 Pet. ii. 4. " A living stone, chosen
of God, and precious." Psal. lxxxix. 3. " I have made a cov-
enant with my Chosen :" v. 19. "I have exalted one chosen
out of the people." Hence those persons in the Old Testa-
ment, that were the most remarkable types of Christ, were
the subjects of a very remarkable election of God, by which
they were designed to some peculiar honor of the prophetical,
priestly, or kingly office. So Moses was called God's chosen,
in that wherein he was eminently a type of Christ, viz. as a
prophet and ruler, and mediator for his people ; Psal. cvi. 23.
« Had not Moses, his chosen, stood before him in the breach."
So Aaron was constituted high priest by a remarkable elec-
tion of God, as in Numb. xvi. 5. and xvii. 5. Deut. xxi. 5.
So David the king was the subject of a remarkable election ;
Psal. lxxviii. 67. ...72. « Moreover, he refused the tabernacle
of Joseph, and chose not the tribe of Ephi aim, but chose the
tribe of Judah, the mount Sion, which he loved ; and he built
his sanctuary like high palaces ; like the earth which he hath
established for ever. He chose David also his servant, and
took him from the sheepfolds, from following the ewes great
with young ; he brought him to feed Jacob his people, and
Israel his inheritance." 1 Sam. xvi. 7.... 10. " The Lord
bath not chosen this, neither hath the Lord chosen this ; the
Lord hath not chosen these." Christ is the chosen of God,
both as to his divine and human nature. As to his divine na-
ture, he was chosen of God, though not to any addition to his
essential glory or real happiness, which is infinite, yet to great
declarative glory. As he is man, he is chosen of God to the
highest degree of real glory and happiness of all creatures.
As to both, he is chosen of God to the office and glory of the
mediator between God and men, and the head of all the elect
creation. His election, as it respects his divine nature, was
for his worthiness and excellency and infinite amiableness in
the sight of God, and perfect fitness for that which God chose
DECREES AND ELECTION. 393
Mm to, and his worthiness was the ground of his election.
But his election, as it respects his human nature, was free
and sovereign, not being for any worthiness, but his election
was the foundation of his worthiness. His election, as he is
God, is a manifestation of God's infinite wisdom. The wis-
dom of any being is discovered by the wise choice he makes,
so the infinite wisdom of God is manifest in the wisdom of
his choice when he chose his eternal Son, gne so fit, upon all
accounts, for the office of a mediator, when he only was fit,
and when he was perfectly and infinitely fit ; and yet his fit-
ness was so difficult to be discerned, that none but one of in-
finite wisdom could discover it. His election, as he was man,
was -a manifestation of God's sovereignty and grace. God
had determined to exalt one of the creatures so high, that he
should be one person with God, and should have communion
with God, and should have glory in all respects answerable ;
and so should be the head of all other elect creatures, that
they might be united to God and glorified in him. And his
sovereignty appears in the election of the man Jesus, various
ways. It appears in choosing the species of creatures of
which he should be, viz. the race of mankind, and not the an-
gels, the superior species. God's sovereignty also appears
in choosing this creature of the seed of fallen creatures that
were become enemies and rebels, abominable, miserable crea-
tures. It appears in choosing that he should be of such a
branch of mankind, in selecting the posterity of David, a
mean person originally, and the youngest of the family. And
as he was the seed of the woman, so his sovereignty appears
in his being the seed of such particular women ; as of Leah,
the uncomely wife of Jacob, whom her husband had not
chosen ; and Tamar, a Canaanitess, and a harlot ; and Ra-
hab a harlot ; and Ruth a Moabitess ; and of Bathsheba, one
that had committed adultery, and as he was the seed of many
a mean person. And his sovereignty appears in the choice
of that individual female of whom Christ was born..
It was owing to this election of God, that the man Jesus
was not one of the corrupt race of mankind, so that his free-
dom from sin and damnation is owing to the free, sovereign.
Vol. V. 3 B
394 DECREES AND ELECTION.
electing love of God in him, as well as in the rest of elecc
men. All holiness, all obedience and good works, and per-
severance in him, was owing to the electing love of God, as
well as in his elect members. And so his freedom from e-
ternal damnation was owing to the free, electing love of God
another way, viz. as it was owing to God's electing love to
him and his members, but to him in the first place, that he
did not fail in that great and difficult work that he undertook ;
that he did not fail under his extreme sufferings, and so eter-
nally continue under them. For if he had failed ; if his
courage, resolution and love had been conquered by his suf-
ferings, he never could have been delivered from them ; for
then he would have failed in his obedience to God, and his
love to God failing, and being overcome by sufferings, these
sufferings would have failed of the nature of an acceptable
sacrifice to God, and the infinite value of his sufferings would
have failed, and so must be made up in infinite duration, to a-
tone for his own deficiency. But God having chosen Christ,
he could not fail in this work, and so was delivered from his
sufferings, from the eternity of them, by the electing love of
God. Justification and glorification were fruits of God's
foreknowledge and predestination in him, as well as in his e-
lect members.
So that the man Christ Jesus has the eternal, electing
love of God to him, to contemplate and admire, and to delight
and rejoice his heart, as all his elect members have. He has
it before him as others have, eternally to praise God for his
free and sovereign election of him, and to ascribe the praise of
his freedom from eternal damnation, (which he, with his elect
members, beholds, and has had a sense of, far beyond all the
rest, and so has more cause of joy and praise for his deliver-
ance from it) and the praise of the glory he possesses, to that
election. This election is not for Christ's works or worthi-
ness, for all his works and worthiness arc the fruits of it.
God had power over this seed of the woman, to make it either
a vessel to honor or dishonor, as he had ovor the rest.
Christ is, by way of cminency, called The Elect of
God. For though other elect men are by election distin-
DECREES AND ELECTION. 396
g.uished from the greater part of mankind, yet they, in then'
election, have that which is common to thousands and mil-
lions ; and though the elect angels are distinguished by elec-
tion from the angels that fell, yet they are chosen among
myriads of others ; but this man, by his election, is vastly
distinguished from all other creatures in heaven or earth ;
and Christ, in his election, is the head of election, and the
pattern of all other election. Christ is the head of all elect
creatures ; and both angels and men are chosen in him in
some sense, i. e. chosen to be in him. All elect men are said
to be chosen in Christ, Eph. 1. 4. Election contains two
things, viz. foreknowledge and predestination, which are dis-
tinguished in the 8th chapter of Romans. The one is choos-
ing persons to be God's, which is a foreknowing of them ;
and the other, a destining them to be conformed to the im-
age of his Son, both in holiness and blessedness. The elect
are chosen in him, with respect to those two, in senses some-
what diverse. With respect to foreknowledge or foreknow-
ing, we are chosen in him as God chose us, to be actually his
in this way, viz. by being in Christ, or being members of his
Son. This is the way that God determined we should actu-
ally become his. God chose Christ, and gave his elect peo-
ple to him ; and so, looking on them as his, owned them
for his own. But by predestination, which is consequent on
his foreknowledge, we are elected in Christ, as we are elect-
ed in his election. For God having in foreknowledge given
us to Christ, he thenceforward beheld us as members and
parts of him ; and so ordaining the head to glory, lie therein
ordained the members to glory. In destining Christ to eter-
nal life, he destined all parts of Christ to it also. So that we
are appointed to eternal life in Christ, being in Christ, his
members from eternity. In his being appointed to life, we
are appointed to life. So Christ's election is the foundation
of ours, as much as his justification and glorification are the
foundation of ours. By election in scripture is sometimes
meant this latter part, viz. destination to conformity to Christ
in life and glory, as 2 Thess. ii. 13. « God from the begin-
aing hath chosen you to salvation." And it seems to be
596 DECREES AND ELECTION.
spoken of in this sense chiefly, in Eph. i. 3, 4, 5. " Who
hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places
in Christ, according as he hath chosen us in him before the
foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without
blame before him in love ; having predestinated us to the a-
doption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to
the good pleasure of his will."
§49. 2 Thess. ii. 13. « But we are bound to give thanks
alway to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because
God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through
sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." Concern-
ing this scripture I observe the following things : 1. The
word translated chosen is a word that signifies to choose or
pick out from many others. 2. That this choosing is given
as a reason why those differ from others that believe not the
truth, but have pleasure in unrighteousness, as an instance of
the distinguishing grace of God ; and therefore the apostle
mentions their being chosen, their election as the ground of
their sanctification by the Spirit and belief of the truth. 3.
The apostle speaks of their being chosen to salvation, as a
ground of their perseverance, or the reason why they never
shall fall away, as others spoken of before, whereby they fail-
ed of salvation. See the preceding verses. Compare Heb.
Vi. 9. 4. They are spoken of as thus chosen from the be-
ginning.
That place, Matth. xx. 21. ...23. " Grant that these my
two sons may sit, one on thy right hand, and the other on
thy left, in thy kingdom ;....it shall be given to them for
whom it is prepared of my father," affords an invincible ar-
gument for particular, personal predestination.
It is an evidence that the apostle, in chap. ix. of Romans,
has not respect solely to an election and dereliction of nations
or public societies, that one instance which he produces to
illustrate and confirm what he says, is the dereliction of a par-
ticular person, even Pharaoh, Rom. ix. 17. So it is an in-
stance of Cod's mercy to a particular person, even Moses.
When he says to Moses, « I will have mercv on whom T
DECREES AND ELECTION. 297
will have mercy, and will have compassion on whom I will
have compassion," Sec. the words cited were used by God on
occasion of, and with relation to his mercy to, a particular per-
son, even Moses ; (see Exod. xxxiii. 19.) And the language
in that verse and the next, is suited to particular persons ; as,
verse 16, and 18, and verses 22, 23. And the apostle shews
plainly, verses 27, 29, that it is not an election of nations or
public societies, but a distinction of some particular persons
from others of the same society ; as it was a distinction of
particular persons, in preserving some, when others were des-
troyed by Nebuchadnezzar's armies ; and in returning some
from captivity, and leaving others. This was not a showing
of mercy to one public society in distinction from another.
So in chap. x. 4, 5, where the apostle plainly continues to
speak of the same election, it was not by a national election,
or election of any public society, that God distinguished the
seven thousand that he had reserved, who had not bowed the
knee to Baal.
John vi. 37. " All that the Father hath given me shall
come to me. And this is the Father's will which sent me,
that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but
should raise it up again at the last day."...." What is this be-
ing given to Christ to be raised up again to everlasting life,
but the election of particular persons to salvation ? And since
it is the Father's will, that of all that he has given to Christ,
he should lose nothing ; this election must be so absolute as
to insure their salvation." Green's Friendly Conferences.
It is plainly and abundantly taught in scripture, that elec-
tion is not of works: Rom. ix. 11. " That the purpose of
God according to election might stand, not of works, but of
him that calleth." Verse 11. "Neither of them having
done either good or evil." And Rom. xi. 5, 6. " Even so at
this present time also, there is a remnant according to the
election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works :
Otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works,
then it is no more grace : Otherwise work is no more work."
2 Tim. i. 9. " Who hath saved us, and called us with an ho-
ly calling, not according to our works, but according to his own
59S DECREES AND ELECTION.
purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before
the work) began."
How invincible a proof of the Caivinistical doctrine of
election is that place in Rom. xi. 5. " Even so then at this
present time also, there is a remnant according to the elec-
tion of grace." Dr. Doddridge observes upon it, that some
explain this of having chosen grace, i. e. the gospel. But
that turn is very unnatural, and neither suits the phrase, nor
the connexion with the former clause, or with the next verse,
where the apostle comments on his own words.
§ 50. If God does not some way in his providence, and so
in his predeterminations, order what the volitions of men shall
be, he would be as dependent in governing the world, as a
skilful mariner is in governing his ship, in passing over a
turbulent, tempestuous ocean, where he meets constantly,
and through the whole voyage, with things that agitate the
ship, have great influence on the motions of it, and are so
cross and grievous to him, that he is obliged to accommodate
himself in the best manner that he can. He meets with cross
winds, violent tempests, strong currents, and great opposition
from enemies ; none of which things he has the disposal of,
but is forced to suffer. He only guides the ship, and, by his
skill, turns that hither and thither, and steers it in such a man-
ner as to avoid dangers, as well as the case will allow.
§51. As to that objection against the election which the
apostle speaks of in his epistles, as an election by which
such should be distinguished as should certainly be saved at
last, viz. that many of those whom the apostle calls elect,
chosen in Christ, he. actually turned apostates : What Dr.
Doddridge observes in his note on Eph. i. 4, may be a suffi-
cient answer. " The apostle speaks of whole societies in gen-
eral as consisting of saints and believers, because this was the
predominant character ; and he had reason, in the judgment
of charity, to believe the greater part were such ; (compare
Phil. i. 7.) Nor did he always judge it necessary to make
exceptions in reference to a few hypocrites who had crept in
DECREES AND ELECTION. &&
^mong them, any more than Christ judged it so, to speak of
Judas as excluded, when he mentions the twelve thrones of
judgment on which the apostles should sit." (Matth. xix. 28.)
§ 52. Many have a notion concerning some things in re-
ligion, and, in particular, concerning predestination, that if
they be the truth, yet it is not best that they should be known.
But many reasons may be offered against this notion.
§ 53. What the devil did to afflict Job, was the exercise
and fruit of his devilish disposition, and his acts therein were
devilish. And yet it is most apparent, that those acts and
effects of the devil towards Job, were appointed by infinite
wisdom for holy ends ; but not accomplished by God any oth-
erwise than by permission.
§ 54. There were many absolute promises of old, that sal-
vation should actually be accomplished, and that it should be
of great extent, or extending to great multitudes of mankind ;
as, that « the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's
head." « In thee, and in thy seed, shall all the families of the
earth be blessed." Psalm xxii. 30. " A seed shall serve him,
und it shall be accounted to the Lord for a generation." Isa.
Hii. 10. " He shall see his seed." Psalm ii. 6. " Ask of
me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance,"
ike. Psalm ex. « Sit thou at my right hand, till I make
thine enemies thy footstool." « Thy people shall be willing
in the day of thy power ;" and innumerable others. And if
there were absolute promises of this, then there were absolute
purposes of it ; for that which is sincerely, absolutely prom-
ised, is with an absolute purpose of fulfilling the promise*
But how can it be devised, that there should be an absolute,
determinate, infallible, unchangeable purpose, that Christ
should actually save vast multitudes of mankind ; and yet it
be not absolutely purposed that he should save any one single
person, but that with regard to every individual soul, this was
left undetermined by God, to be determined by man's con-
tingent will, which might determine for salvation, or against
400 DECREES AND ELECTION.
it, there being nothing to render it impossible concerning
any one, that his will would not finally determine against it ?
Observe, these prophecies are not merely predictions, but
are of the nature of promises, and are often so called :....
« Which he hath promised by the mouth of all his holy
prophets since the world began," &c. God takes care to ful-
fil his own promises ; but, according to this scheme, it is not
God that fulfils these promises ; but men, left to themselves,
to their contingent wills, fulfil them. Man's will, which God
does not determine, determines itself in exclusion of God.
All the promises of God are yea and amen, and God him-
self makes them so to be ; he takes care of that matter.
§ 55. Concerning that grand objection, that this doctrine
supposes partiality in God, and is very dishonorable to him,
being quite contrary to God's extensive and universal benev-
olence to his creatures ; it may be shewn that the Arminian
notions and principles in this matter, lead directly to Deism ;
and that on these principles, it is utterly impossible to answer
Tindal's objections against revealed religion, especially in
his 14th chapter. Besides, unjustifiable partiality is not im-
putable to a sovereign distributing his favors, though ever so
unequally, unless it be done unwisely, and so as to infringe
the common good.
§ 56. God has regard to conditions in his decrees, as he
has regard to a wise order and connexion of things. Such is
his wisdom in his decrees, and all his acts and operations, that
if it were not for wise connexion that is regarded, many
things would not be decreed. One part of the wise system
of events would not have been decreed, unless the other parts
had been decreed, &c.
§ 57. God in the decree of election is justly to be con-
sidered as decreeing the creature's eternal happiness, ante-
cedently to any foresight of good works, in § sense wherein
he docs not in reprobation decree the creature's eternal mise-
ry, antecedently to any foresight of sin ; because the being of
DECREES AND ELECTION. 401
sih is supposed in the first place in order to the decree of
reprobation, which is, that God will glorify his vindictive jus-
tice ; and the very notion of revenging justice, simply con-
sidered, supposes a fault to be revenged. But faith and good
works are not supposed in the first place in order to the de-
cree of election. The first things in order in this decree are,
that God will communicate his happiness, and glorify his
grace ; (for these two seem to be coordinate.) But in nei-
ther of these are faith and good works supposed. For when
God decrees, and seeks to communicate his own happiness
in the creature's happiness, the notion of this, simply consid-
ered, supposes or implies nothing of faith or good works ;
Dor does the notion of grace, in itself, suppose any such thing.
It does not necessarily follow from the very nature of grace,
or God's communicativeness of his own happiness, that there
must be faith and good works. This is only a certain way of
the appointment of God's wisdom, wherein he will bring men
lo partake of his grace. But yet God is far from having de-
eveed damnation from a foresight of evil works, in the sense
of the Arminians, as if God in this decree did properly de-
pend on the creature's sinful act, as an event, the coming to
pass of which primarily depends on the creature's determina-
tion ; so that the creature's determination in this decree may
properly be looked upon as antecedent to God's determina-
tion, and on which his determination is consequent and de-
pendent.
§ 58. What divines intend by prior and posterior in the
affair of God's decrees, is not that one is before another in
the order of time, for all are from eternity ; but that we must
conceive the view or consideration of one decree to be before
another, inasmuch as God decrees one thing out of respect
to another decree that he has made ; so that one decree
must be conceived of as in some sort to be the ground of an-
other, or that God decrees one because of another ; or that
he would not have decreed one, had he not decreed that oth-
er. Now there are two ways in which divine decrees may be
said to be in this sense prior one to another. 1 . When one
Vol. V. 3 C
4t2 DECREES AND ELECTION
thing decreed is the end of another, this must in some res-
pect be conceived of as prior to that other. The good to be
obtained is in some respect prior, in the consideration of him
who decrees and disposes, to the means of obtaining it. 2.
When one thing decreed is the ground on which the dispos-
er goes, in seeking such an end by another thing decreed, as
being the foundation of the capableness or fitness that there is
in that other thing decreed, to obtain such an end. Thus
the sinfulness of the reprobate is the ground on which God
goes in determining to glorify his justice in the punishment
of his sinfulness ; because his sinfulness is the foundation of
the possibility of obtaining that end by such means. His hav-
ing sin is the foundation of both the fitness and possibility of
justice being glorified in the punishment of his sin, and there-
fore the consideration of the being of sin in the subject, must
in some respect be prior in the mind of the disposer, to the
determination to glorify his justice in the punishment of sin.
For the disposer must first consider the capableness and apt-
ness of such means for such an end, before he determines
them to such an end.
Thus God must be conceived of, as first considering Ado-
nibezek's cruelty in cutting off the thumbs and great toes of
threescore and ten kings, as that which was to be before he
decreed to glorify his justice in punishing that cruelty by
the cutting off his thumbs and great toes. For God, in this
last decree, has respect to the fitness and aptness of his
thumbs and great toes being cut off to glorify his justice.
But this aptness depends en the nature of that sin that was
punished. Therefore the disposer, in fixing on those means
for this end, must be conceived of as having that sin in view.
Not only must God be conceived of as having some end in
consideration, before he determines the means in order to that
end, but he must also be conceived of as having a considera-
tion of the capableness or aptness of the means to obtain the
end before he fixes on the means. Both these, in different
respects, may be said to be prior to the means decreed to
such an end in the mind of the disposer. Both, in different
respects, are the ground or reason of the appointment of thr
DECREES AND ELECTION. 463
means. The end is the ground or reason of the appoint-
ment of the means ; and also the capacity and fitness of the
means to the end, is the ground or reason of this appointment
to such an end. So both the sin of the reprobate, and also
the glory of divine justice, may properly be said to be before
the decree of damning the reprobate. The decree of damna-
tion may properly be said, in different respects, to be because
of both these ; and that God would not have decreed the
damnation of the sinner, had it not been for the respect he
had both to the one and the other. Boih may properly be
considered as the ground of the decree of damnation. The
■view of the sinfulness of the reprobate must be in some res-
pect prior in the decree, to God's decree to glorify his jus-
tice in punishing their sinfulness. Because sinfulness is neces-
sarily supposed as already existing in the decree of punishing
sinfulness, and the decree of damnation being posterior to the
consideration of the sin of men in this latter respect, clears
God of any injustice in such a decree. That which stands
in the place of the ultimate end in a decree, i. e. that which
is a mere end, and not a means to any thing further or high-
er, viz. the shining forth of God's glory, and the communica-
tion of his goodness, must indeed be considered as prior, in
the consideration of the Supreme Disposer, to every thing
excepting the mere possibility of it. But this must in some
respects be conceived of as prior to that, because possibility
is necessarily supposed in his decree. But if we descend
lower than the highest end ; if we come down to other
events decreed, that be not mere ends, but means to obtain
that end, then we must necessarily bring in more things, as
in some respect prior, in the same manner as mere possi-
bility is in this highest decree. Because more things must
necessarily be supposed or considered as existing in the de-
cree, in order that those things which are decreed may reach
the end for which they are decreed. More things must be
supposed in order to a possibility of these things taking place
as subordinate to their end ; and therefore they stand in the
same place, in these lower decrees, as absolute possibility
does in the decree of the highest end. The vindictive jus-
404 DECREES AND ELECTION.
tice of God is not to be considered as a mere or ultimate end,
but as a means to that end. Indeed, God's glorifying his
justice, or rather his glorifying his holiness and greatness,
has the place of a mere and ultimate end. But his glorify-
ing his justice in punishing sin, (or in exercising vindictive
justice, which is the same) is not to be considered as a mere
end, but a certain way or means of obtaining an end. Vin-
dictive justice is not to be considered as a certain, distinct at-
tribute to be glorified, but as a certain way and means for the
glorifying an attribute. Every distinct way of God's glorify-
ing or exercising an attribute, might as well be called a dis-
tinct attribute as this. It is but giving a distinct name to it,
and so we might multiply attributes without end. The con-
sidering of the glorifying of vindictive justice as a mere end,
has led to great misrepresentations, and undue and unhappy
expressions about the decree of reprobation. Hence the glo-
rifying of God's vindictive justice on such particular persons,
has been considered as altogether prior in the decree to their
sinfulness, yea to their very beings. Whereas it being only
a means to an end, those things that are necessarily presup-
posed, in order to the fitness and possibility of this means of
obtaining the end, must be conceived of as prior to it.
Hence God's decree of the eternal damnation of the rep-
robate is not to be conceived of as prior to the fall, yea, and
to the very being of the persons, as the decree of the eternal
glory of the elect is. For God's glorifying his love, and com-
municating his goodness, stands in the place of a mere or ul-
timate end, and therefore is prior in the mind of the eternal
disposer to the very being of the subject, and to every thing
but mere possibility. The goodness of God gives the being
as well as the happiness of the creature, and does not presup-
pose it. Indeed, the glorifying of God's mercy, as it pre-
supposes the subject to be miserable, and the glorifying his
grace, as it presupposes the subject to be sinful, unworthy
and illdeserving, are not to be conceived of as ultimate ends,
but only as certain ways and means for the glorifying the
exceeding abundance and overflowing fulness of God's good-
ness and love ; therefore these decrees arc not to be consid-
DECREES AND ELECTION. 405
ered as prior to the decree of the being and permission of
the fall of the subject. And the decree of election, as it im-
plies a decree of glorifying God's mercy and grace, considers
men as being cursed and fallen ; because the very notion of
such a decree supposes sin and misery. Hence we may
learn, how much in the decree of predestination is to be con-
sidered as prior to the creation and fall of man, and how
much as posterior ; viz. that God's decree to glorify his love
and communicate his goodness, and to glorify his greatness
and holiness, is to be considered as prior to creation and the
fall of man. And because the glory of God's love, and the
communication of his goodness necessarily imply the happi-
ness of the creature, and give both their being and happiness ;
hence the design to communicate and glorify his goodness
and love eternally to a certain number, is to be considered as
prior, in both those mentioned respects, to their being and
fall. For such a design, in the notion of it, presupposes nei-
ther. But nothing in the decree of reprobation is to be look-
ed upon as antecedent in one of those respects to man's being
and fall ; but only that general decree that God will glorify
his justice, or rather his holiness and greatness, which sup-
poses neither their being nor sinfulness. But whatsoever
there is in this decree of evil to particular subjects, it is to be
considered as consequent on the decree of their creation, and
permission of their fall. And indeed, although all that is in
the decree of election, all that respects good to the subjects 9
be not posterior to the being and fall of men, yet both the de-
cree of election and rejection or reprobation,' as so styled,
must be considered as consequent on the decrees concerning
the creation and fall. For both these decrees have respect
to that distinction or discrimination that is afterwards actually
made amongst men in pursuance of these decrees. Hence
effectual calling, being ihe proper execution of election, is
sometimes in scripture called election ; and the rejection of
men in time is called reprobation. Therefore the decrees of
election and reprobation must be looked upon as beginning
there, where the actual distinction begins, because distinction
is implied in the notion of those decrees. And therefore.
406 DECREES AND ELECTION.
whatsoever is prior to this actual distinction, the foresight of
it, and decree concerning it, or that state that was common,
or wherein they were undistinguished, the foresight of that,
or decree concerning it, must be considered, in some respect,
as prior to the decree concerning the distinction. Because
all that is before is supposed or looked upon as already put in
the decree. For that is the decree, viz. to make such a dis-
tinction between those that were hefore in such a common
state. And this is agreeable to the scripture representations
of those decrees, John xv. 19. « Ye are not of the world, but
I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth
you." See also Ezek. xvi. 1....8.
The decrees of God must be conceived of in the same or-
der, and as antecedent to, and consequent on one another, in
the same manner, as God's acts in the execution of those de-
crees. If this will not hold, with regard to those things that
are the effects of those acts, yet certainly it will hold with res-
pect to the acts themselves. They depend on one another,
and are grounded on one another, in the same manner as the
decrees that these are the execution of, and in no other. For,
on the one hand, the decrees of God are no other than his
eternal doing what is done, acted or executed by him in time.
On the one hand, God's acts themselves, in executing, can be
conceived of no otherwise, than as decrees for a present effect.
They arc acts of Gods will. God brings things to pass only
by acts of his will. He speaks, and it is done. His will says,
let it be, and it is. And this act of his will that now is, can-
not be looked upon as really different from that act of will that
was in him before, and from eternity, in decreeing that this*
thing should be at this time. It differs only relatively. Here
is no new act of the will in God, but only the same acts of
God's will, which before, because the time was not come, res-
pected future time ; and so were called decrees. But now
the time being come, they respect present time, and so are
not called by us decrees, but acts executing decrees. Yet
they are evidently the same acts in God. Therefore those
acts, in executing, must certainly be conceived of in the same
order, and with the same dependence, as the decrees them-
DECREES AND ELECTION. 407
selves. It may be in some measure illustrated by tbis....The
decree of God or the will of God decreeing events, may be
represented as a straight line of infinite length, that runs
through all past eternity, and terminates in the event. The
last point in the line, is the act of God's will in bringing the
event to pass, and does not at all differ from all the other
points throughout the infinite length of the line, in any other
respect but this, that this last point is next to the event. This
line may be represented as in motion, but yet always kept
parallel to itself. The hither end of the line, by its motion,
describes events in the order in which they come to pass ; or
at least represents God's acts in bringing the events to pass,
in their order and mutual dependence, antecedence and con-
sequence. By the motion of all the other points of the line,
before the event or end of the line, in the whole infinite length
of it, are represented the decrees in their order ; which, be-
cause the line in all its motions is kept parallel to itself, is ex-
actly the same with the order of the motions of the last point.
For the motion of every point of the whole line, is in all res-
pects, just like the motion of that last point wherein the line
terminates in the event ; and the different parts of the mo-
tion of every point, are in every respect precisely in the same
order. And the maxim, that what is first in intention, is last
in execution, does not in the least concern this matter. For,
by last in execution, is meant only last in order of time, with-
out any respect to the priority or posteriority that we are
speaking of ; and it does not at all hinder, but that in God's
acts, in executing his decrees, one act is the ground or reason
of another act, in the same manner precisely as the decree
that related to it was the ground or reason of the other de-
cree. The absolute independence of God, no more argues
against some of God's decrees being grounded on decrees of
some other things that should first come to pass, than it does
against some of God's acts in time, being grounded on some
other antecedent acts of his. It is just the same with God's
acts in executing, as has been said already of his decreeing.
In one respect, the end that is afterwards to be accomplished,
is the ground of God's acting ; in another respect, something
408 DECREES AND ELECTION.
that is already accomplished, is the ground of his acting, as k
is the ground of the fitnesss or capableness of the act to obtain
the end. There is nothing but the ultimate end of all things,
viz. God's glory, and the communication of his goodness, that
is prior to all first acts in creating the world, in one respect
and mere possibility in another. But, with respect to after
acts, other ends are prior in one respect, and other preceding
acts are prior in another, just as I have shewn it to be with
respect to God's decrees. Now, this being established, it may
help more clearly to illustrate, and fully to evince, what we
have insisted on concerning the order of the decrees, and that
God's decrees of some things that are accomplished first in
order of time, are also prior in the order, so as to be the prop-
er ground and reason of other decrees. For, let us see how
it is in God's acts in executing his decrees. Will any deny,
that God's act in rewarding righteousness, is grounded on a
foregoing act of his in giving righteousness ? And that he re-
wards righteousness in such a person, because he hath given
righteousness to such a person ; and that because this latter
act necessarily supposes the former act foregoing ? So, in like
manner, God's decree, in determining to reward righteous-
ness, is grounded on an antecedent decree to give righteous-
ness, because the former decree necessarily supposes the lat-
ter decree, and implies it in the very notion of it. So, who
will deny, but that God's act in punishing sin, is grounded on
what God hath antecedently done in permitting sin, or suffer-
ing it to be, because the former necessarily supposes the lat-
ter, and therefore that the actual permission of sin is prior, in
the order of nature, to the punishment of it ? So that whatev-
er foregoing act of God is in any respect a ground and reason
of another succeeding act, so far is both the act, and decree of
the act, prior to both that other act and decree.
It may be objected to this, that if so, the decree of bestow-
ing salvation on an elect soul, is founded on the decree of bes-
towing faith on him ; for God actually bestows salvation ia
some respect, because he has bestowed faith ; and this would
be to make the decree of election succedaneous to the decree
of giving faith, as well as that of reprobation consequent on
DECREES AND ELECTION. 409
the decree of permitting sin. To this I answer, that both
God's act, and also his decree of bestowing salvation on such
a fallen creature, is in some respects, grounded on God's act
and decree of giving faith, but in no wise as the decree or
act of eternal punishing is grounded on sin, because punish-
ment necessarily presupposes sin, so that it could not be
without it. But the decreeing arid giving the happiness of
the elect, is not so founded on faith. The case is very differ-
ent. For with respect to eternal punishment, it may be said
that God would not, yea, could not, have decreed or executed
it, had he not decreed and permitted sin ; but it cannot be
said, either that God could not, or would not, have decreed
or bestowed the eternal happiness of the elect, unless he had
decreed and given faith. Indeed, the salvation of an elect:
soul is, in this respect, grounded on the decree of giving faith
as God's decree of bestowing happiness on the elect in this
particular way, as a fallen creature, and by the righteousness
of Christ made his own, by being heartily received and closed
with, is grounded on the decree of bestowing faith in Christ,
because it presupposes it, as the act that answers to this de-
cree does. But the decree of bestowing happiness in gener-
al, which we conceive of as antecedent to this act, presup-
poses no such thing ; nor does just so much without any
more in execution presuppose faith, or indeed the righteous-
ness of Christ, or any act or suffering of a mediator, or even
the fall of man. And the decree of God's communicating
his goodness to such a subject, does not so much as presup-
pose the being of the subject, because it gives being. But
there is no decree of evil to such a suhject which can be con-
ceive'! of as antecedent to a ciec rtc o' punishment. For the
first decree of evil or suffering, implies that in it. For there
is no evil decreed for any other end, but the glory of God's
justice. Therefore the decree of the permission of sin is
prior to all other things in the decree of reprobation. Due
distinctions seem not to have been observed, in asserting that
till flie decrees of God are unconditional ; which has occasion-
ed difficulties in controversies about the decrees. There are
no conditional decrees in this sense, viz. that decrees should
Vol. V. 3D >
4iw DECREES AND ELECTION
depend on things as conditions of them, which in this decree,
that depends on them as conditions, must be considered, like
themselves, as yet undecreed. But yet decrees may, in
some sort, be conditions of decrees ; so that it may be said,
that God would not have decreed some things, had he not de-
creed others.
§ 59. The objection to the divine decrees will be, that
according to this doctrine, God may do evil, that good may
come of it.
Ans. I do not argue that God may commit evil, that
good may come of it ; but that he may will that evil should
come to pass, and permit that it may come to pass, that good
may come of it. It is in itself absolutely evil, for any being
to commit evil that good may come of it ; but it would be
no evil, but good, even in a creature, to will that evil should
come to pass, if he had wisdom sufficient to see certainly that
good would come of it, or that more good would come to pass
in that way than in any other. And the only reason why it
would not be lawful for a creature to permit evil to come to
pass, and that it would not be wise, or good and virtuous in
him so to do, is, that he has net perfect wisdom and sufficien-
cy, so as to render it fit that such an affair should be trusted
with him. In so doing he goes beyond his line; he goes
out of his province ; he meddles with things too high for
him. It is every one's duty to do things fit for him in his
sphere, and commensurate to his power. God never intrust-
ed this providence in the hands of creatures of finite under-
standings, nor is it proper that he should.
If a prince were of perfect and allcornprehensive wisdom
and foresight, and he should see that an act of treason would
be for the great advancement of the welfare of his kingdom,
it might be wise and virtuous in him to will that such act
of treason should come to pass ; yea, it would be foolish and
wrong if he did not ; and it would be prudent and wise in
him not to restrain the traitor, but to let him alone to go on
in the way he chose. And yet he might hale the treason at
the same time, and he might properly also give forth laws at
DECREES AND ELECTION. 41!
the same time, forbidding it upon pain of death, and might
hold these laws in force against this traitor.
The Arminians themselves allow that God permits sin,
and that if he permits it, it will come to pass. So that the
only difficulty about the act of the will that is in it, is that Gcd
should will evil to be, that good may come of it. But it is
demonstrably true, that if God sees that good will come of it,
and more good than otherwise, so that when the whole series
of events is viewed by God, and all things balanced, the sum
total of good with the evil is more than without it, all being
subtracted that needs be subtracted, and added that is to be
added ; if the sum total of good thus considered, be greatest,
greater than the sum in any other case, then it will follow
that God, if he be a wise and holy being, must will it.
For if this sum total that has evil in it, when what the evil
subtracts is subtracted, has yet the greatest good in it, then
it is the best sum total, better than the other sum total that
has no evil in it. But if, all things considered, it be really the
best, how can it be otherwise than that it should be chosen by
an infinitely wise and good being, whose holiness and good-
ness consists in always choosing what is best ? Which does
it argue most, wisdom or folly, a good disposition or an evil
one, when two things are set before a being, the one better
and the other worse, to choose the ; worse, and refuse the
better ?
§ 60. There is no inconsistency or contrariety between
the decretive and preceptive will of God. It is very consistent to
suppose that God may hate the thing itself, and yet will that
it should come to pass. Yea, I do not fear to assert that the
thing itself may be contrary to God's will, and yet that it
may be agreeable to his will that it should come to pass, be-
cause his will, in the one case, has not the same object with
his will in the other case. To suppose God to have contrary
wills towards the same object, is a contradiction ; but it is
not so, to suppose him to have contrary wills about different
objects. The thing itself, and that the thing should come to
pass, are different, as is evident ; because it is possible that
412 DECREES AND ELECTION.
the one may be good and the other may be evil. The thing
itself may be evil, and yet it may be a good thing that it
should come to pass. It may be a good thing that an evU
thing should come to pass ; and oftentimes it most certainly
and undeniably is so, and proves so.
§ 61. Objectors to the doctrine of election may say, God
cannot always preserve men from sinning, unless he destroy
lhe„ir liberty. But will they deny that an omnipotent, an in-
imitely wise God, could possibly invent and set before men
such strong motives to obedience, and keep them before them
in such a manner as should influence them to continue in
their obedience, as the elect angels have done, without de-
stroying their liberty ? God Avill order it so that the saints
and angels in heaven never will sin, and does it therefore fol-
low that their liberty is destroyed, and that they are not free,
but forced in their actions ? Does it follow that they are turn-
ed into machines and blocks, as the Arminians say the Cal-
vinistic doctrines turn men ?
§ 62. To conclude this discourse ; I wish the reader to
consider the unreasonableness of rejecting plain revelations,
because they are puzzling to our reason. There is no great-
er difficulty attending this doctrine than the contrary, nor so
great. So that though the doctrine of the decrees be myste-
rious, and attended with difficulties, yet the opposite doctrine
is in itself more mysterious, and attended with greater diffi-
culties, and with contradictions to reason more evident, to
one who thoroughly considers things ; so that, even if the
scripture had made no revelation of it, we should have had
reason to believe it. But since the scripture is so abundant
in declaring it, the unreasonableness of rejecting it appears
the more glaring.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE 41:
CONCERNING
EFFICACIOUS GEACE,
§ 1. IT is manifest that the scripture supposes, that if
ever men are turned from sin, God must undertake it, and
he must be the doer of it ; that it is his doing that must de-
termine the matter ; that all that others can do, -will avail
nothing, without his agency. This is manifest by such texts
as these, Jer. xxxi. 18, 19. « Turn thou me, and I shall be
turned ; Thou art the Lord my God. Surely after that I
was turned, I repented ; and after that I was instructed, I
smote upon my thigh," &c. Lam. v. 21. "Turn thou us
unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned."
§ 2. According to Dr. Whitby's notion of the assistance
of the Spirit, the Spirit of God does nothing in the hearts or
minds of men beyond the power of the devil ; nothing but
what the devil can do ; and nothing shewing any greater
power in any respect, than the devil shews and exercises in
his temptations. For he supposes that all that the Spirit of
God does, is to bring moral motives and inducements to mind,
and set them before the understanding, S:c. It is possible
that God may infuse grace, in some instance-:, into the minds
of such persons as are striving to obtain it in the other way,
though they may not observe it, and may not know that it it.
not obtained by gradual acquisition. But if a man has indeed
sought it only in that way, and with as much dependence on
himself, and with as much neglect of God in his endeavors
and prayers, as such a doctrine naturally lead3 to, it is not
very likely that he should obtain saving grace by the effica-
cious, mighty power of God. It is most likely that God
414 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
should bestow this gift in a way of earnest attention to divine
truth, and the use of the means of grace, with reflection on
one's own sinfulness, and in a way of being more and more
convinced of sinfulness, and total corruption and need of tho
divine power to restore the heart, to infuse goodness, and of
becoming more and more sensible of one's own impotence,
and helplessness and inability to obtain goodness by his own
strength. And if a man has obtained no other virtue, than
what seems to have been wholly in that gradual and insensi-
ble way that might be expected from use and custom, in the
exercise of his own strength, he has reason to think, how-
ever bright his attainments may seem to be, that he has no
saving virtue.
§ 3. Great part of the gospel is denied by those who deny
pure efficacious grace. They deny that wherein actual salvation
and the application of redemption mainly consists ; and how
unlikely arc such to be successful in their endeavors after ac^
tual salvation ?
§ 4. TurnbuU's explanation of Philip, ii. 12. 13. " Work
out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God
that workelh in you both to will and to do of his own good
pleasure," is this, (Christian /i/ii/oso/i/iy, p. 96, 97.) " Give all
diligence to work out your salvation ; for it is God the Creator
of all things, who, by giving you, of his good pleasure, the
power of willing and doing, with a sense of right and wrong,
and reason to guide and direct you, hath visibly made it your
end so to do. Your frame shews, that to prepare yourselves
lor great moral happiness, arising from a well cultivated and
improved mind, suitably placed, is your end appointed to you
by your Creator. Consider, therefore, that by neglecting
ibis your duly, this your interest, you contemn and oppose
the good ivill of God towards you, and his design in creating
If we look through all the examples wc have of
conversion in scripture, the conversion of the Apostle Paul,
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 415
and of the Corinthians, (" Such were some of you, hut ye are
■washed," Sec.) and all others that the apostles write to, how
far were they from this gradual way of conversion, hy con-
tracted habits, and hy such culture as Turnbull speaks of I
Turnbnll, in his Christian Philosophy, p. 470, seems to think,
that the sudden conversions that were in the apostles' days,
were instances of their miraculous power, as in these words,
" They appealed to the works they wrought, to the samples
they gave of their power to foretel future events ; their pow-
er to cure instantaneously all diseases of the body ; their
power to cure, in the same extraordinary manner, all diseases
of the mind, or to convert bad into good dispositions ; their
power to bestow gifts and blessings of all sorts, bodily and
spiritual." See again to the like purpose, p. 472.
Now I would inquire, whether those who thus had the
diseases of their minds cured, and their bad converted into
good dispostions, had any virtue ; or whether those good dis-
positions of their's were virtues, or any thing praiseworthy ;
and whether, when they were thus converted, they became
good men, and the heirs of salvation ? As Turnbull himself
allows, all that are not good men, were called the children of
the devil in scripture ; and he asserts that nothing is virtue,
but what is obtained by our own culture ; that no habit is vir-
tuous, but a contracted one, one that is owing to ourselves,
our own diligence, Sec. and also holds, that none are good men
but the virtuous ; none others are the heirs of future happi-
ness.
§ 5. What God wrought for the Apostle Paul and other
primitive Christians, was intended for a pattern to all future
ages, for their instruction and excitement ; Eph. ii. 7. 1 Tim.
i. 16. It is natural to expect, that the first fruits of the
church specially recorded in history, and in that book which
is the steady rule of the church in all things pertaining to sal-
vation, should be a pattern to after ages in those things, those
privileges, which equally concern all. Or if it be said, that
as soon as men take up a strong resolution, they are accepted
416 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
and looked upon by God as penitents and converts ; it may be
inquired, is there a good man without good habits, or princi-
ples ol* virtue and goodness in his heart ?
§6. Turnbull speaks of good men as born again; i. c
changed by culture ; Christian Philosophy, p. 282. Is there a
good man without such principles as love to God and men, or
charity, humility, See ? How comes that resolution to be so
good, if no principle of virtue be exercised in it?
If it be said, Paul was a good man before he was converted,
it may be answered, he did not believe in Christ, and there-
fore was in a state of condemnation. Besides, he speaks of
himself as being then a wicked man.
§ 7. Concerning the supposition advanced by Bishop
Butler, and by Turnbull in his Christian Philosophy, that all
that God does, even miracles themselves, are wrought ac-
cording to general laws, such as are called the laws of nature,
though unknown to us ; and the supposition of Turnbull,
that all may be done by angels acting by general laws, I ob-
serve, this seems to be unreasonable. If angels effect these
works, acting only by general laws, then they must do them
without any immediate, special interposition at all, even with-
out the smallest intimation of the divine mind, what to do, or
upon what occasion God would have any thing to be done.
And what will this doctrine bring inspiration to, which is one
kind of miracle ? According to this, all significations of the
divine mind, even to the prophets and apostles, must be ac-
cording to general laws, without any special interposition at
all of the divine agency.
§ 8. Acts xii. 23. God was so angry with Herod for not
giving him the $;lory of his eloquence, that the angel of the
Lord smote him immediately, and he died a miserable death ;
he was eaten of worms, and gave up the ghost. But if it be
very sinful for a man to take to himself the glory of such a
qnalifica'ion as eloquence, how much more a man's taking to
himself the glory of divine grace, God's own image, and that
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 417
Which is infinitely God's most excellent, precious and glori-
ous gift, and man's highest honor, excellency and happiness,
whereby he is partaker of the divine nature, and becomes a
godlike creature ? If God was so jealous for the glory of so
small a gift, how much more for so high an endowment, this
being that alone, of all other things, by which man becomes
like God ? If man takes the glory of it to himself he there-
by will be in the greatest danger of taking the glo-y to him-
self that is due to God, and of setting up himself as standing
in competition with God, as vying with the Most High, and
making himself a god, and not a man. If not giving God the
glory of that which is least honorable, provokes God's jeal-
ousy ; much more must not giving God the glory of that
which is infinitely the most honorable. It is allowed, the a-
postle insists upon it, that the primitive Christians should be
sensible that the glory of their gifts belonged to God, and that
they made not themselves to differ. But how small a matter
is this, if they make themselves to differ in that, which the
apostle says is so much more excellent than all gifts ?
§ 9. How much more careful has God shewn himself, that
men should not be proud of their virtue, than of any other
gift ? See Deut. ix, 4. Luke xviii. 9, and innumerable other
places. And the apostle plainly teaches us to ascribe to God
the glory, not only of our redemption, but of our wisdom,
righteousness and sanctification ; and that no flesh should
glory in themselves in these things, 1 Cor. i. 29, 30, 31.
Again, the apostle plainly directs, that all that glory in their
virtue, should glory in the Lord, 2 Cor. x. 17. It is glorying
in virtue and virtuous deeds he is there speaking of; and it is
plain, that the apostle uses the expression of glorying in the
Lord, in such a sense, as to imply ascribing the glory of our
virtue to God.
§ 10. The doctrine of men's being the determining causes
of their own virtue, teaches them, not to do so much, as even
the proud Pharisee did, who thanked God for making him to
differ from other men in virtue, Luke xviii.
Vol. V. 3 E
418 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
See Gen. xli. 15, 16. Jobxi. 12. Dan. ii. 25, &c 2 Cor
iii. 5, 6. 2 Cor. iv. 7. 2 Cor. x. 17.
Proverbs xx. 12. " The hearing ear, and the seeing eye,
the Lord hath made, even both of them ;" compared with
many parallel places that speak about God's giving eyes to
see, and ears to hear, and hearts to understand, &c.
§ 11. The Aiminian doctrine, and the doctrine of our new
philosophers, concerning habits of virtue being only by cus-
tom, discipline, and gradual culture, joined with the other
doctrine, that the obtaining of these habits in those that have
time for it, is in every man's power, according to their doc-
trine of the freedom of will, tends exceedingly to cherish pre-
sumption in sinners, while in health and vigor, and tends to
their utter despair, in sensible approaches of death by sick-
ness or old age.
§ 12. Observe that the question with some is, whether the
Spirit of God does any thing at all in these days, since the
scriptures have been completed. With those that allow that
he does any thing, the question cannot be, whether his influ-
ence be immediate ; for, if he does any thing at all, his influ-
ence must be immediate. Nor can the question be, whether
b.is influence, with regard to what he intends to do, be effica-
cious.
The questions relating to efficacious grace, controverted
between us and the Arminians, are two: 1. Whether the
grace of God, in giving us saving virtue, be determining and
decisive. 2. Whether saving virtue be decisively given
by a supernatural and sovereign operation of the Spirit of
God ; or, whether it be only by such a divine influence or as-
sistance, as is imparted in the course of common providence,
either according to established laws of nature, or established
laws of God's universal providence towards mankind ; i. e.
either, 1. Assistance which is given in all natural actions,
wherein men do merely exercise and improve the principles
of nature and laws of nature, and come to such attainments as
are connected with such exercises by the mere laws of nature.
For there is an assistance in all such natural actions ; because
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 419
it is by a divine influence that the laws of nature are upheld ;
and a constant concurrence of divine power is necessary in
order to our living, moving, or having a being. This we
may call a natural assistance. Or, 2. That assistance, which,
though it be something besides the upholding of the laws
of nature, (which take place in all affairs of life) is yet, by a di-
vine, universal constitution in this particular affair of religion,
so connected with those voluntary exercises which result from
this mere natural assistance, that by this constitution it in-
discriminately extends to all mankind, and is certainly con-
nected with such exercises and improvements, as those just
mentioned, by a certain, established, known rule, as much as
any of the laws of nature. This kind of assistance, though
many Arminians call it a supernatural assistance, differs little
or nothing from that natural assistance that is established by
a law of nature. The law so established, is only a particular
law of nature ; as some of the laws of nature are more gen-
eral, others more particular : But this establishment, which
they suppose to be by divine promise, differs nothing at all
from many other particular laws of nature, except only in this
circumstance, of the established constitutions, being revealed
in the word of God, while others are left to be discovered on-
ly by experience.
The Calvinists suppose otherwise ; they suppose that di-
vine influence and operation, by which saving virtue is obtain-
ed, is entirely different from, and above common assistance,
or that which is given in a course of ordinary providence, ac-
cording to universally established laws of nature. They sup-
pose a principal of saving virtue is immediately imparted and
implanted by that operation, which is sovereign and effica-
cious in this respect, that its effect proceeds not from any es-
tablished laws of nature. I mention this as an entirely different
question from the other, viz. AVhether the grace of God, by
which we obtain saving virtue, is determining or decisive.
For that it may be, if it be given wholly in a course of nature,
or by such an operation as is limited and regulated perfectly
according to established, invariable laws. For none will dis-
pute that many things are brought to pass by God in this man-
420 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
ner, that are decisively ordered by him, and are brought to
pass by his determining providence.
The controversy, as it relates to efficacious grace, in this
sense, includes in it these four questions.
1. Whether saving virtue differs from common virtue, or
such virtue as those have that are not in a state of salvation,
in nature and kind, or only in degree and circumstances ?
2. Whether a holy disposition of heart, as an internal, gov-
erning principle of life and practice, be immediately implant-
ed or infused in the soul, or only be contracted by repeated
acts, and obtained by human culture and improvement ?
S. Whether conversion, or the change of a person from
being a vicious or wicked man, to a truly virtuous character,
be instantaneous or gradual ?
4. Whether the divine assistance or influence, by which
men obtain true and saving virtue, be sovereign and arbitrary,
or, whether God, in giving this assistance and its effects, lim-
its himself to certain exact and stated rules, revealed in his
word, and established by his promises ?
§ 13. Eph. i. 19, 20. " What is the exceeding greatness of
his power to usward, according to the working of his mighty
power," or the effectual working, as the word signifies....
These words, according to the effectual working of his paver,
we shall find applied to conversion, to growth in grace, and to
raising us up at last. You have them applied to conversion,
Eph. iii. 7. " Whereof I was made a minister, according to
the gift of the grace of God, given to me, by the effectual work-
ing of his power. "....So likewise to growth in grace, Eph. iv.
10. " The whole body increaseth with the increase of God,
by the effectual working in the measure of every part.".. ..And
to the resurrection to glory at the last day, Philip, iii. 21.
" He will change our vile bodies, according to the effectual
working of his mighty power, whereby he is able to subdue all
things to himself."
And that the power of God in conversion, or in giving
faith and the spiritual blessings that attend it, is here meant,
may be argued from the apos'.ie's change of phrase, that
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 421
whereas in the foregoing verse, he spoke of the riches of the
glory of Christ's inheritance in the saints, he does not go on
to say, " and what is the exceeding greatness of his power
towards them," (i. e. the saints) which surely would have
been most natural, if he still had respect only to the power of
God in bestowing the inheritance of future glory. But, in-
stead of that, we see he changes the phrase ; " and what
is the exceeding greatness of his power to icsward ivho be-
lieve ;" plainly intimating some kind of change of the subject.
or a respect to the subject of salvation with regard to some-
thing diverse ; that whereas before he spoke of saints in their
future state only, now he speaks of something that the saints,
we that dwell in this world that believe, are the subjects of.
And as the apostle includes himself, so it is the more likely
he should have the mighty power of God in conversion in
his thought i his conversion having been so visible and re-
markable an instance of God's marvellous power.
Again, the apostle, in praying that they " knowing the ex-
ceeding greatness of God's power," 8cc. prays for such a
knowledge and conviction of the power of God to bring them
to life and glory, which was a most special remedy against
such doubts as the church in the then present state was most
exposed to, viz. that of their being preserved to glory and
salvation through all their trials, persecutions, and the great
opposition that was made by the enemies of Christ and their
souls. Therefore, after mentioning the glory of their inher-
itance, he, for their comfort and establishment, mentions the
power of God to bring them to the possession of this inherit-
ance, as the apostle Peter does, 1 Peter i. 4, 5. " To an in-
heritance incorruptible... .who are kept by the power of God
through faith unto salvation." He speaks to their hearts, for
here was their difficulty and temptation to doubting. But if
the keeping them in faith shewed such great power, much
more did the first bringing them from heathenism and the
power of sin, darkness, and spiritual death and ruin, into a
state of faith and salvation, quickening them when dead in
trespasses and sins ; as it is a greater instance of divine pow-
er to raise the dead, than to maintain life that is exposed to
422 EFFICACIOUS CRACE.
danger ; a greater work to reconcile us being enemies, than
to keep us friends being reconciled. It was natural for the
apostle to put them in mind of the power of God manifested
in their conversion, as he would strengthen their faith in his
power to raise them at the last day, and glorify them to eter-
nity. Dr. Goodwin says, he finds most of the Greek fath-
ers ran this way in interpreting the place. He mentions
Theophylact and Chrysostom,and cites these words of Chrys-
ostom : " The apostle's scope is to demonstrate by what
already was manifested in them, viz. the power of God in
working faith, and to raise up their hearts to believe what
was not manifested, viz. the raising of them from death to
life. It being (saith he) a far more wonderful work to per-
suade a soul to believe in Christ, than to raise up a dead man,
a far more admirable work of the two." Besides, what the
apostle says in the continuation of his discourse, explains his
meaning, and puts the matter of his intending to include the
power of God manifested in their conversion, out of all doubt,
as, in the very next sentence, " and you hath he quickened,
who were dead in trespasses and sins ;" and every word that
follows, to the end of the second chapter, confirms the same
thing. I shall mention a few of them : Verse 2. " Wherein
in time past ye walked. ...according to the prince of the pow-
er of the air, the spirit that now worketh effectually in the
children of disobedience." This shews the exceeding great-
ness of power in their being delivered from such a state,
wherein they were held by the great power of so strong an
enemy. Verses 5 and 6. " Even when we were dead in sins,
hath quickened us together in Christ, and hath raised us up
together, and made us sit together in heavenly places in
Christ Jesus." These things tend to shew how the power
of God in their conversion, and the happy, honorable, and
glorious change of their state by it, was according to the
power that wrought in Christ when he was quickened, raised
up, and made to sit in heavenly places, as chap. i. 19, 20, 21.
Now, to back this with a parallel place, as here in this place
the apostle speaks of the greatness of God's power in work-
ing faiihj and parallels it with the power that raised upChrJisr
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 423
from the dead ; so we find lie says the very same thing in
Colossians ii. 12, 13. " Ye are buried with him in bap-
tism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the
faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the
dead." In that text in Ephesians the apostle speaks of faith,
the fiower that works in us that believe. So in this text in
Colossians, ye are risen through faith. Again, 2dly, in Ephe-
sians, together with what there follows, chap. ii. he compar-
eth believing to a rising from the dead. So here in Colos-
sians, ye are risen with him through faith. Thirdly, as in E-
phesians the apostle speaks of the work of God in giving
faith, as parallel with his work in raising Christ, so he does
here in Colossians : " Ye are risen with him, through the
faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him, from the
dead." Fourthly, as we in Ephesians are said to believe, ac-
cording to the efficacious working of God, the word evtpyax is
also used here in Colossians. It is called faith of the opera-
tion, or effectual working of God, and as there God is said to
be the author, the same that raised up Christ, and to work
faith in them ; so here it is the faith of the operation of God
who raised Christ from the dead, so that, every way, one
place is parallel with the other.
Some pretend, that in that expression, through the faith of
the operation of God, there is no respect to God's operation
as the efficient cause of faith, but only to the operation of
God that raised Christ as the object of faith, which believes
that power and operation as it was manifested in raising
Christ, and which is believed to be sufficient to raise us up
also. But that the apostle means the operation of God in
giving faith, appears by verse 1 1, which introduces these
words, where the apostle says, " In whom ye are circumcised
with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the
body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ."
This phrase, made without hands, in scripture, always denotes
God's immediate power, above the course of nature, and
above second causes. Thus, when he speaks of heaven, 2
Cor. v. 1, he calls it " an house not made with hands," and
to Ileb. ix, 1 1, the human nature of Christ, which was fram-
424 E 1 1 1CACIOUS GRACE.
ed by so wonderful and supernatural a power of the Holy
Ghost, is said to be a " tabernacle made without hands."
Note. The foregoing remarks concerning the texts in
Eph. i. 19, 20, and in Coloss. ii. 11, 12, 13, are taken chiefly
from Dr. Goodwins's works, vol. 1, p. 298, 8cc.
§ 14. It is a doctrine mightily in vogue, that God has
promised his saving grace to men's sincere endeavors in
praying for it, and using proper means to obtain it ; and so
that it is not God's mere will that determines the matter,
whether we shall have saving grace or not ; but that the
matter is left with us, to be determined by the sincerity of
our endeavors.
But there is vast confusion in all talk of this kind, for want
of its being well explained what is meant by sincerity of en-
deavor, and through men's deceiving themselves by using
words without a meaning. I think the scripture knows of
but one sort of sincerity in religion, and that is a truly pious
or holy sincerity. The Bible suggests no notion of any other
sort of sincere obedience, or any other sincerity of endeavors,
or any doings whatsoever in religion, than doing from love to
God and true love to our duty. As to those that endeavor
and take pains, (let them do ever so much) that yet do noth-
ing freely, or from any true love to, or delight in God, or
free inclination to virtue, but wholly for byends, and from sin-
ister and mercenary views, as being driven and forced against
their inclination, or induced by regard to things foreign ; I say,
respecting such as these, I find nothing in scripture that
should lead us to call them honest and sincere in their en-
deavors. I doubt not but that the scripture promises super-
natural, truly divine and saving blessings, to such a sincerity
of endeavor as arises from true love to our duty. But then,
as I apprehend, this is only to promise more saving grace to
him that seeks it in the exercise of saving grace, agreeably
to that repeated saying of our Saviour, ' k to him that hath
shall be given, and he shall have more abundance." Persons,
in seeking grace with this sincerity, ask in faith ; they seek
these blessings in the exercise of a saving faith, the great
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. m
condition of the covenant of grace. And I suppope, promises
are made to no sincerity, but Avhat implies this. And who-
ever supposes that divine promises are made to any other
sincerity than this, I imagine he never will be able to make
out his scheme, and that for two reasons :
1. On such a supposition, the promises must be suppos-
ed to be made to an undetermined condition. And,
2. Even on the supposition that the promises are made
to some other sincerity than a truly pious sincerity, the sov-
ereign grace and will of God must determine the existence
of the condition of the promises ; and so the whole must still
depend on God's determining grace.
I. On the supposition that the promises of saving grace
are made to some other sincerity of endeavor than that which
implies true and saving piety of heart, they must be made to
an undetermined condition, and so be in effect no promises at
all.
If there be any thing else worthy to be called sincerity in
endeavors after holiness, but a free, pious inclination, or true
regard and love to holiness, nothing better can be mentioned
than this, viz. endeavors after holiness, from a real willing-
ness of heart to put forth those endeavors for the agent's own
sake, yet for s.uch ends as prudence and selflove would pro-
pose ; such as his own eternal interest, salvation from ever-
lasting misery, 8cc.
So that by sincerity here, is not meant any holy freedom
or virtuous disposition or desire ; but it signifies no more
than reality of disposition and will to endeavor for some end,
only provided the end be subservient to selfpreservation. But
the thing that truly in this case denominates the endeavor
sincere, is the reality of the will or disposition of heart to en-
deavor,, and not the goodness of the will or disposition. Now
if this be the sincerity of endeavor which is meant, when men
talk of its being the condition of peremptory and decisive
promises of saving grace, then it never has (as I know of) yet
been told, and I suppose, never will. or can be told, what the
condition of the promise. is.
Vol. V. 3 F
426 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
The thing that needs to be determined, in order to knctf
this condition, is, how great a decree of this sort of sincerity,
or real willingness of heart to endeavor, a man must have, to
be entitled to the promise. For there can be no question,
but that multitudes that live in gross wickedness, and are
jnen of a very debauched, flagitious behavior, have some de-
gree of it ; and there are none, even of those that are the
most strict and painful in their endeavor, but have it in a very
imperfect degree, and, in many things, fail of this sincerity of
endeavor. For it must be kept in mind, that the sincerity
of heart v : e are speaking of, attending religious duties, is only
a reality of willingness to use endeavors. And every man
•whatsoever, that uses any endeavor at all for his salvation, or
ever performs any religious duty, to the end that he may g»
to heaven and not to hell, has this sincerity. For whatever
men do voluntarily for this end, they do from a real willing-
ness and disposition of heart to do it ; for if they were not
willing to do it, they would not do it. There surely are no
voluntary actions performed without men's being willing to
perform them. And is there any man that will assert that
God has absolutely or peremptorily promised his saving grace
to any man that ever stirs hand or foot, or thinks one thought
in order to his salvation ?
And on the other hand, as to those that go farthest is.
their endeavors, still they fail, in numberless instances, of ex-
ercising this kind of sincerity, consisting in reality of will.
For such are guilty of innumerable sins ; and every man
that commits sin, by so doing, instead of being sincerely
willing to do his duty, sincerely wills the contrary. For se
far as any actions of his are his sin, so far his will is in what
he does. No action is imputed to us any farther than it is
voluntary, ar.d involves the real disposition of the heart. The
man, in this painful endeavor, fails continually of his duty, or
(which is the same thing) of perfect obedience. And so far
as he does so, he fails of sincerity of endeavor. No man is
any farther defective in his obedience, than as he is defective
in sincerity ; for there the defect lies, viz. in his will, and
th« disposition of his heart. If men were perfect in these.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 427
that would be the same thing as to be perfect in obedience, or
complete in holiness. Nothing, either of omission or com-
mission, is sin, any farther than it includes the real disposition
and will ; and therefore, no men are any farther sinful, than
as they are sincere in sinning ; and so far as they are sincere
in sinning, so far they are deficient of sincerely endeavoring
their duty. Now, therefore, where are the bounds to which
men must come in order to be entitled to the promise ? Some
have a faint sincerity of endeavor, who none do suppose are
entitled to the promise. And those that have, most sincerity,
of endeavor, do greatly fail of that degree of sincerity that
they ought to have, or fall short of that which God requires.
And there are infinite degrees between these two classes.
And if every degree of strength of endeavor is not sufficient,
and yet some certain degree of it, greatly short of that which
God requires, is sufficient, then let it be determined what tha*
degree is.
Some have determined thus, that if men sincerely en-
deavor to do what they can, God has promised to help them
to do more, Sec. But this question remains to be resolved,
whether the condition of the promise be, that he shall sin-
cerely endeavor to do what he can, constantly, or only some-
times. For there is no man that sincerely endeavors to do
his duty to the utmost constantly, with this sort of sincerity
consisting in reality of will so to do. If he did, he would
perfectly do his duty at all times. For, as was observed be-
fore, nothing else is required but the will ; and men never
fail of their duty, or commit sin, but when their real will is to
sin.
But if the condition of the promise, be sincerely doing
what they can sometimes, then it should be declared how oft-
en, or how great a part of the time of man's life, he must ex-
ercise this sincerity. It is manifest that men fail of their du-
ty every day, yea continually ; and therefore, that there is a
continual defect of sincerity of endeavor in the practice of
duty.
If it should be said that the condition of the promise of
paving grace is, that, take one time with another, and one du'«
428 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
fy with another, the sincerity of their will should be chiefly
in favor of their duty ; or, in other wbrds, that they should be
sincere in endeavors to do more than half their duty, though
they sincerely neglect the rest ; I would inquire, where they
find such promises as these in the Bible ? Besides, I think
it can be demonstrated, that there is not a man on earth, that
ever comes up half way to what the law of God requires of
him ; and consequently, that there is in all more want of sin-
cerity, than any actual possession of it. But whether it be so
or no, how does it appear, that if men are sincere in endeav-
ors with respect to more than half their duty, God has prom-
ised them saving mercy and grace, though, through a defect
of their sincerity, the rest be neglected ?
But if we suppose the sincerity to which divine promises
are made, implies a trtie freedom of the heart in religious
endeavors and performances, consisting in love to God and
holiness, inclining our hearts to our duty for its own sake,
here is something determinate and precise ; as a title to the
benefit promised, does not depend on any particular degree of
sincerity to be found out by difficult and unsearchable rules of
mathematical calculation, but on the nature of it ; this sincer-
ity being a thing of ah entirely distinct nature and kind from
any thing that is to be found in those men who have no inter-
est in the promises. If men know they have this sincerity,
they may know the promises are theirs, though they may
be sensible they have very much of a contrary principle in
their hearts, the operations of which are as real as of this.
This is the only sincerity in religion that the scripture makes
any account of. According to the word of God, then, and
then only, is there a sincere, universal obedience, when per-
sons love all God's commands, and Ioyc all those things
wherein holiness consists, and endeavor after obedience to ev-
ery divine precept, from love and of free choice. Otherwise,
in scripture account, there is nothing but sincere disobedi-
ence and rebellion, without any sincerity oFthe contrary. For
their disobedience is of free choice, from sincere love to sin,
And delight in wickedness. Bui their rcfiaining from Rome
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 429
sins, and performing some external duties, is without the least
degree of free choice or sincere love.
If here it should be said, that men who have no piety of
heart in a saving degree, yet may have some degree of love
to virtue ; and it should be insisted that mankind are born
with a moral sense, which implies a natural approbation of,
and love to virtue ; and therefore, men that have not the prin-
ciple of love to God and virtue established to that degree as
to be truly pious men, and entitled to heaven, yet may have
such degrees of them as to engage them, with a degree of in-
genuous sincerity and free inclination, to seek after farther
degrees of virtue, and so with a sincerity above that which
has been mentioned, viz. a real willingness to use endeavors
from fear and selfinterest....It may be replied, If this be allow-
ed, it will not at all help the matter. For still the same ques-
tion returns, viz- what degree of this sincerity is it that con-
stitutes the precise condition of the promise ? It is supposed
that all mankind have this moral sense ; but yet it is not sup-
posed that all mankind are entitled to the promises of saving
mercy. Therefore the promises depend, as above noticed, on
the degree of sincerity, under the same difficulties, and with
the same intricacies, and all the forementioned unfixedness
and uncertainty. And other things concerning this sincerity,
besides the degree of it, are undetermined, viz. how constant
this degree of sincerity of endeavor must be ; how long it
must be continued ; and how early it must be begun.
Thus, it appears that, on the supposition of God's having
made any promises of saving grace to the sincere endeavors
of ungodly men, it will follow, that such promises are made
to an undetermined condition.
But a supposed promise to an undetermined condition, is
truly no promise at all. It is absurd to talk of positive deter-
minate promises made to something not determined, or to a
condition that is not fixed in the promise. If the condition be
not decided, there is nothing decisive in the affair.
If the master of a family should give forth such a pretend-
ed promise as this to his servants, " 1 promise, that if any of
you will do something, though I tell you not what, that I will
*30 . EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
surely give him an inheritance among my children :" Would
this be truly any promise at ai! ?
I proceed now to observe,
II. On the supposition, that the promises of saving grace
are made to some other sincerity of endeavor, than that which
implies truly pious sincerity, the sovereign grace and will of
God must determine the existence of the condition of the
promises ; and so the whole must still depend on God's deter-
mining grace ; and that, of whatever kind this sincerity, short
of truly pious and saving sincerity, is supposed to be ; wheth-
er it consists only in a reality of will, arising from foreign
motives, for a certain degree of endeavors or use of means ;
or whether it be a certain sincerity or reality of willingness to
use endeavors, arising from a natural love of virtue. For all
suppose the sincerity, to which the promises are made, to be
that in which some are distinguished from others ; none sup-
posing that all mankind, without exception, have this sinceri-
ty which is the condition of the promises. Therefore, this
sincerity must be a distinguishing attainment. And how is
it that some attain to it, and not others ? It must be in one of
these two ways ; either by the sovereign gift of God's will, or
by their endeavors. To say the former, is to give up the
point, and to own that the sovereign grace and will of God de-
termines the existence of the condition of the promises. But
if it be said, that this distinguishing sincerity cf endeavor is
obtained by men's own endeavor, then I ask, what sort of en-
deavor is it attained by ? Sincere endeavor, or insincere ? None
will be so absurd, as to say, that this great condition of saving
promises is attained to by insincere endeavors. For what
tendency, either natural or moral, can the exercise of insin-
cerity have, to produce, or attain to sincerity ? But if it be
said, that distinguishing sincerity of endeavor is attained to
by distinguishing sincere endeavor, this is to run round in a
j idiculous circle ; and still the difficulty remains, and the
question returns, how the distinguishing sincerity that first
of all took place in the affair came to have existence, otherwise
than by the determining grace of God ?
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 431
And if it be said, that there is no need of supposing any
such thing as any previous, habitual sincerity, or any such sin-
cerity going before, as shall be an established principle, but
that it is sufficient that the free will does sincerely determine
itself to endeavor after holiness. ..I answer, whether we sup-
pose the sincerity that first entitles to the promises, to be a
settled habit, or established principle or not, it does not in the
least remove the difficulty, as long as it is something, in which
some men are distinguished from others, that precedes the
distinguishing endeavor which entitles to the promises, and
is the source and spring of those endeavors. This first, dis-
tinguishing sincerity, which is the spring of the whole affair,
must have existence by some means or other ; and it must
proceed either from some previous, sincere endeavor of the
man's own, which is a contradiction ; or from God, which is
the point required ; or it must be the effect of chance, in
other words, of nothing.
If we suppose that distinguishing sincerity of endeavor
by which some men are interested in the promises of saving
grace, and not others, to be some certain decree of love to
virtue, or any thing else in the disposition or exercise of the
heart ; yet it must be owned, that all men either are alike by
nature, as to love to virtue, or they are not. If they are not,
but some have naturally a greater love to virtue than oth-
ers, and this determines some, rather than others, to the
requisite sincerity of endeavor after saving grace ; then
God determines the affair by his sovereign will ; for he,
and not men themselves, determines all distinguishing quali-
fications or advantages that men are born with. Or if there
be no difference naturally, but one man is born with the same
love to virtue as another ; then, how do some men first attain
to more of this love to virtue than others, and so possess that
distinguishing sincerity of endeavor which consists in it ?
To say it arises from a previous, distinguishing sincerity ofen-
deavor, attempt, desire, or will, is a contradiction. Therefore,
it must proceed from the determining grace of God ; which
being allowed, the great pqint in dispute is allowed.
&32 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§ ! 3. Epbesians ii. " By grace are ye saved, through
fahh ; and that not of yourselves : It is the gift of God." Mr.
Beach observes, f l this text does not mean that their faith is
so God's gift, as not to he of themselves, as is most evident
to any who reads the original." This is certainly a great mis-
take. What I suppose he means, is, that the relative thai, be-
ing of the neuter gender, and the word w»r»j of the feminine,
they do not agree together. But if he would translate the
Greek relative that thing, viz. the thing last spoken of, all the
difficulty vanishes. Vid. Beza in Loc. Such scriptures as
these, 1 Cor. xv. 10. « Not I, but the grace of God that was
with me ;" Gal. ii. 20. « Not I, but Christ liveth in me ;"
prove efficacious grace. The virtuous actions of men that
are rewardable, are not left to men's indifference, without di-
vine ordering and efficacy, so as to be possible to fail. They
are often in the scripture the matter of God's promises. How
often does God promise reformations ? How often does God
promise that grt;at revival of religion in the latter days ? Dr.
Whitby seems to deny any physical influence at all of tlie
Spirit of God on the will ; and allows an influence by moral
suasion and moral causes only, p. 344. This is to deny that
the Spirit of God does any thing at all, except inspiring the
prophets, and giving the means of grace, with God's ordina-
tion of this in his providence. If God do any thing physical-
ly, what he does must be efficacious and irresistible.
Such an assistance Dr. Whitby maintains, and, concerning
it, says the following things.. ..p. 221, 222.
1st, " Then I say it must be granted, that in raising an
idea in my brain by the Holy Spirit, and the impression
made upon it there, the action is truly physical. 2d, That in
those actions I am wholly passive ; that is, I myself do noth-
ing formally to produce those ideas ; but the good Spirit,
without my operation, doth produce them in me. 3d, That
these operations must be irresistible in their production, be-
cause they are immediately produced in us without our knowl-
edge of them, and without our will, and so without those fac-
ulties bv which we are enabled to act."
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 433
Though it should be allowed that God assists man with a
physical assistance, and yet by an obliged and promised assist-
ance only ; then God does not do, or effect or give the thing
assisted to, any more than if he operated and assisted men on-
ly according to the established laws of nature ; and men may
as properly be said to do it of themselves, and of their own
power. The doing of the thing, is in the same manner in their
power. The assistance by which God assists a drunkard tha5
goes to the tavern, and there drinks excessively, or by which
he assists an adulterer or pirate in their actions, is,'thathe up-
holds the laws of nature, the laws of the nature of the human
soul,whereby it is able to perform such and such acts in such
order and dependence ; and the laws of the union of soul and
body ; and moves the body in such a stated manner in conse-
quence of such acts of the soul, and upholds the laws of mo-
tion, and causes that there shall be such and such effects in
corporeal things, and also of men's minds in consequence of
such motions. All the difference is, that the assistance which
he grants in the duties of religion, is according to a newer es-
tablishment than the other, according to a method established a
little later : and also, that the method of assistance, in the one
case, is written and revealed by way of promise or covenant,
and hot in the other.
But if it be said, that though God has promised assistance,
yet he has not promised the exact degree, as, not: airland-
ing his promise, he has left himself at liberty to assist some,
much more than others, in consequence of the very same en-
deavor....! answer, that this will prove a giving up of their
whole scheme, and will infallibly bring in the Calvinistical no-
tion of sovereign and arbitrary grace ; whereby some, with
the very same sincerity of endeavor, with the same degree of
endeavor, and the same use of means, nay, although all things
are exactly equal in both cases, both as to their persons and
behavior ; yet one has that success by sovereign grace and
God's arbitrary pleasure, that is denied another. If God has
left himself no liberty of sovereign grace in giving success to
man's endeavors, but his consequent assistance be always tied
to such endeavors precisely, then man's success is just as
Vol. V. $ G
434 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
much in bis own power, and is in the same way the fruit oi
his own doings, as the effect and fulfilment of his endeavors
to commit adultery or murder; and indeed much more. For
his success in those endeavors, is not tied to such endeavors,
but may be providentially disappointed. Although particular
motions follow such and such acts of will, in such a state of
body, exactly according to certain laws of nature ; yet a man's
success in such wickedness, is not at all tied to his endeavors
by any divine establishment, as the Arminians suppose suc-
cess is to man's endeavors after conversion.
For the Spirit of God, by assisting in the alleged manner,
becomes not the efficient cause of those things, as the scrip-
tures do certainly represent him. If God be not the proper
bestower, author, and efficient cause of virtue, then the great-
est benefits flow not from him ; are not owing to his good-
ness ; nor have we him to thank for them.
« Christ upbraids the cities wherein most of his mighty
works were done, that they were worse than Sodom, Sec and
the Jews of that generation, that they were worse than the
men of Nineveh ; and the Pharisees, that the Publicans and
harlots went into the kingdom of God before them. But why
did he do this, if the only reason was, that the one was brought
to repent by effectual grace, and the other not ?" (See Whit-
by, p. 169, 170, 171.) I answer, the unbelief and impenitence
of those cities, of that generation, and of those Pharisees,
when, on the contrary, the Publicans and Nineveh repented,
and the men of Sodom would have repented, was an argument
that they were worse, more perverse and hardhearted than
they. Because, though repentance is owing to special, effica-
cious assistance, yet, in his ordinary methods of proceeding
with men, God is wont much more rarely to bestow it on
those that are more perverse, hardhearted, and rooted in evil,
than others. So much the more as their hearts are harden-
ed, so much the less likely are they to be brought to repent-
ance. And though there be oftentimes exceptions of partic-
ular persons, yet it still holds good as a general rule ; and es-
pecially with regard to societies, nations, cities and ranks of
men : So that Christ might well, from the fact that he men-
EFFICACIOUS GRACE, 435
tions, draw an argument of the greater perverseness and
stubbornness of those societies and ranks of men that he
spoke of.
§ 16. A command and a manifestation of will are not the
same thing. A command does not always imply a true desire
that the thing commanded should be done. So much at least
is manifest by the instance of Abraham commanded to offer
up Isaac. That command was not such an effect of the di-
vine will, as the commands to believe and repent, Sec.
§ 17. Either the stronger the habitual inclination to good
is, the more virtuous ; and the stronger the disposition to evil,
the more vicious ; or, if it be otherwise, then indifference or
want of inclination, is essential to both virtue and vice.
§ 18. Dr. Whitby's inconsistence appears in that one while,
when he is disputing against the decree of election, he main-
tains that the epistles, where the apostle speaks to the elect,
are not written to the converted only ; because then it suits
his turn that the persons addressed should not be converted.
But afterwards, when disputing against efficacious grace, he
maintains that where the apostle says, " God worketh in you
both to will and to do,"&c. Philip, ii. 13, he speaks only to
them that are converted, p. 288. Again, when it suits the
Doctor's turn, when writing about perseverance, then all
-whom the apostles write to are true saints. As particularly
those the apostle Peter writes to, that had precious fait/i,
p. 399. And theGalatians addressed in Paul's epistle, p. 401,
402.
§ 19. When the Psalmist prays, " Make me to go in the
way of thy statutes ;" is it indeed his meaning, that God
would give him the general grace which he gives to all, and
which is sufficient for all if they will but improve it ? And is
this all ?
436 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§20. Arminians argue that God has obliged himself to
bestow a holy and saving disposition, on certain conditions,
and that what is given in regeneration, is given cither for nat-
ural men's asking, or for the diligent improvement of com-
mon grace ; because, otherwise, it would not be our fault that
we are without it, nor our virtue that we have it. But if this
reasoning is just, the holy qualities obtained by the regener-
ate, are only the fruits of virtue, not virtues themselves. All
the virtue lies in asking, and in the diligent improvement of
common grace.
§ 21. Prov. xxi. 1. « The heart of the king is in the hand
of the Lord, as the rivers of water ; he turneth it whitherso-
ever he will." This shews that the Arminian notion of liber-
ty of will, is inconsistent with the scripture notion of God's
providence and government of the world. See also Jer. xxxi.
IS. « Turn me, and I shall be turned." Matth. vii. 18. "A
gcod tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt
tree bring forth good fruit." Let us understand this how we
will, it destroys the Arminian notion of liberty, and virtue and
vice. I'uv, if it means only a great difficulty ; then so much
the less liberty, and therefore so much the less virtue or vice.
And the preceding verse would be false, which says, " every
good tree bringeih forth good fruit," Sec. Rom. viii. 6, 7, 8,
9. '« For to be carnally minded is death ; but to be spiritu-
ally minded is life and peace : Because the carnal mind is en-
mity against God ; for it is not subject to the law of God,
neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh can-
ROt please God. But we are not in the fiesn, but in the Spir-
it, if so be that the Sphit of God dwell in you. Now, if any
}nan have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." The
design of! the apostle in this place, overthrows Arminian no-
tions of liberty, virtue and vice. It appears from scripture,
that Cor! gives such assistance to virtue and virtuous acts, as
to be properly a determining assistance, so as to determine
the effect ; which i:> inconsistent with the Arminian notion of
liberty- The scripture shews that Cod's influence in the case
is such, thai he is the cause of the effect : } Le causes it to b# :
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 437
Which shews that his influence determines the matter,
whether it shall be or not. Otherwise innumerable expres-
sions of scripture are exceedingly improper, and altogether
without a meaning.
§ 22. Dr. Whitby's notion of the assistance of the Spirit,
is of the same sort with inspiration. Whereas that which I
suppose is the true notion, is entirely different. Consequent-
ly their notion is much more enthusiastical, docs much bet-
ter agree with, and much more expose to pernicious enthusi-
asm, than ours. Hence we find that the grossest enthusiasts,
such as Quakers and others, are generally Arminians in the
doctrines of free will, Sec.
§ 23. Scripture expressions are every where contrary to
the Arminian scheme, according to all use of language in the
world in these days. But then they have their refuge here.
They say, the ancient figures of speech are exceedingly di-
verse from ours ; and that we in this distant age cannot judge
at all of the true sense of expression used so long ago, but by
a skill in antiquity, and being versed in ancient history, and
critically skilled in the ancient languages ; not considering,
that the scriptures were written for us in these ages on whom
the ends of the world are come ; yea, were designed chiefly
for the latter age of the world, in which they shall have then-
chief, and comparatively, almost all their effect. They were
written for God's people in those ages, of whom at least
ninetynine in an hundred must be supposed incapable of such
knowledge, by their circumstances and education ; and nine
hundred and ninetynine in a thousand of God's people, that
hitherto have been saved by the scriptures. It is easy, by
certain methods of interpretation, to refine and criticise any
book to a sense most foreign to the mind of the author.
§ 24. If God be truly unwilling that there should be am
moral evil in the world, why does not he cause less moral evil
to exist than really does ? If it be answered, as is usual to
«such kind of objections, that though God is unwilling there
438 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
should be moral evil, yet he will not infringe on man's liber-
ty, or destroy his moral agency to prevent it ; then I ask, if
this be all, why does God cause so much less to exist at some
certain times ; on the contrary, causes virtue gloriously to
prevail ? Other times are spoken of and promised, wherein
it shall prevail yet vastly more. And this is spoken of as of
God's effecting, and is abundantly so spoken of and promised,
as what God would do, and none should hinder, &c.
The Arminian principles, denying the efficacious, deter-
mining grace of God, as the cause of men's virtue and piety>
are wholly inconsistent with the promises and prophecies of
the future flourishing of religion and virtue in the world, and
never can be made consistent therewith. This flourishing of
religion is spoken of as what God will effect ; and is made
the matter of his abundant promise ; is spoken of as his glo-
rious work, the work of his almighty power ; what he will
effect, and none shall hinder ; what he will effect against all
opposition, removing and overcoming the wickedness of
men, 8tc.
§ 25. Dr. Stebbing says, page 104. " So much grace
as is necessary to lead us to that obedience which is indispen-
sably required in order to salvation, God will give to every
one, who humbly and devoutly prays to him for it ; for this
is the condition, and the only condition prescribed by our
Saviour, Luke ii. 9.... 13. « And I say unto you, ask, and it shall
be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, and it shall
be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth ;
and he that seeketh, findeth ; and to him that knocketh, it
shall be opened. If then, ye, being evil, know how to give
good gifts unto your children ; how much more shall your
heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him ?
....where the promise of the Spirit is made." Here humility
and devotion are mentioned as the condition of that obedi-
ence which is indispensably required in order to salvation.
By that obedience which is required in order to salvation
must be meant, cither, 1. That sort of virtue and obe-
dience that is requisite, or. 2. Perseverance in it. If he
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 439
means that sort of virtue which is requisite in order to salva-
tion ; then I would ask, what sort of humility and devotion is
that, to which God has promised the grace which is necessa-
ry to their obtaining that virtue which is the condition of sal-
vation ? Must it not be real, sincere humility and devotion ?
Surely if God has promised so great a gift to any humility
and devotion, it must be to that which is sincere and upright.
Because that which is not sincere, is nothing ; it is hypocrit-
ical ; a mere shew of that which is really wanting. And it
would be very unreasonable to suppose that God promises
such infinite rewards to hypocrisy, which he has often de-
clared to be abominable to him, and which only provokes
him the more. But if it be true, sincere, upright humility
and devotion, it is unreasonable to suppose that God makes
this the condition of that grace which is necessary to his ob-
taining that kind of virtue which is requisite to salvation.
Because he, who has this humility and devoticr,, has that kind
of virtue already. The Scripture every where speaks of up-
rightness and sincerity of heart, as that virtue that is saving
He ihat sincerely asks for grace to obey, has that slnceritv
and uprightness of heart that is exercised in sincere obedi-
ence ; for he that sincerely asks this, is sincerely willing to
obey, or sincerely desirous of obeying. Or, 2. If the Doctor,
by that obedience that is indispensably required in order to
salvation, means perseverance in sincere virtue, and this be
promised to devoutly and sincerely asking.it ; then herebv
must be meant, either devoutly and sincerely asking it once,
or final perseverance in this sincere asking, or a certain lim-
ited continuance in that asking. If a final perseverance in ask-
ing be the condition of grace to lead us to persevere, saving
virtue is, as said before, the condition of itself. For perse-
vering sincerity is the condition of obtaining persevering sin-
cerity. If it be only once asking, or asking a limited numbci
of times, or a limited continuance in asking, this is cont
the Arminian doctrine about perseverance. For it supposes
a person in this life, on a past condition, to be already, before
the end of the day of his probation, so confil edienct
that it is impossible for him to fall tw
440 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§ 26. One danger of these Arminian notions is, that they
strongly tend to prevent conviction of sin.
§ 27. The vast pretences of Arminians to an accurate
and clear view of the scope and design of the sacred penmen,
and a critical knowledge of the original, will prove forever
vain and insufficient to help them against such clear evidence
as the scripture exhibits concerning efficacious grace. I de-
sire it may be shewn, if it can be, that ever any terms, that
are fuller and stronger, are used more frequently, or in great-
er variety, to signify God's being the author, efficient and be-
stower of any kind of benefit, than as to the bestowment of true
virtue or goodness of heart ; whether concerning the deliver-
ance out of Egypt, or the manna that was rained down from
heaven, or the bestowment of the blessings of Canaan, or
saving Noah and his family in the ark ; or the raising any
from the dead, or Christ's giving health to the sick, or sight
to the blind, or bread to the hungry in the wilderness, or any
thing else whatsoever ; or the giving being to mankind in
their creation ; the giving reason to them, with their other
natuial faculties: the giving them life and breath ; the giv-
ing them the beautiful form of their bodies ; the giving them
Jife at the general resurrection ; the giving them their glory
and happiness in heaven ; the giving prophets, and the word
of God by the prophets and others ; the giving the means of
grace and salvation ; the giving Christ, and providing means
of salvation in him. Yea, I know of no one thing in scripture
wherein such significant, strong expressions are used, in so
great variety, or one half so often, as the bestowment of this
benefit of true goodness and piety of heart. But after all, we
must be faced down in it with vast confidence, that the scrip-
tures do not imply any more than only exhibiting means of
instruction, leaving the determining and proper causing of
the effect wholly with man, as the only proper, efficient and
determining cause ; and that the current of scripture is all
against us ; and that it is because we do not understand lan-
guage, and are bigots and fools for imagining any such thing
as that the scriptures say any thing of that nature, and be-
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 44$
cause the divines on our side do not understand Greek, and
do not lay the scripture before them, nor mind the scope of
scripture, nor consider the connexion, &c. 8cc. Perhaps it
will be said, that every one of those scriptures, which are
brought to prove efficacious grace, may have another inter-
pretation, found out by careful and critical examination. But,
alas ! Is that the way of the Most High's instructing man-
kind, to use such a multitude of expressions, indifferent lan-
guages, and various different ages, all which, in their natural
and most common acceptation, in all languages, nationsand ages,
must undoubtedly be understood in a particular sense ; yea,
the whole thread and current of all that God says, according
to the use of speech among mankind, tends to lead to such an
understanding, and so unavoidably leads his people in all ages
into such an understanding ; but yet, that he means no such
thing ; intending only that the true meaning should not be
found out, but by the means of acute criticism, which might
possibly hit upon the strange, unusual, and surprising mean-
ing ?
§ 28. Instead of persons' being the determining and effi-
cient causes of their own virtue and piety, after all the moral
means God uses with man, let us suppose some third person
between God and the subject of this gift of virtue, to be in
the very same manner the sovereignly determining cause
and efficient of virtue ; that he had power to bestow it on us,
or cause us to be the subjects of it, just in the same manner
as the Arminians suppose we ourselves have power to be the
•auses of our being the subjects of virtue ; and that it de-
pended on this third person's free will, just in the same man-
ner as now they suppose our having virtue depends on our
own free will ; and that God used moral means with that
third person to bestow virtue on us- just in the same manner
that he uses moral means to persuade us to cause virtue in
ourselves, and the moral means had the like tendency to ope-
rate on his will as on ours ; but finally, it was left entirely to
his free will to be the sole determining cause whether we
should have virtue, without any such influence on his wiil as
Vol. V. 3 H
m EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
in :hc least :o ensure his sovereignty, and arbitrary disposal,
and perfectly free selfdetermination ; and it should be left
contingent, whether he would bestow it or not ; and, in these
circumstances, this third person should h?ppen to determine
in our favor, and bestow virtue : Now I ask, would it be
proper to ascribe the matter so wholly to God, in such strong;
terms, and in such a great variety ; to ascribe it so entirely
to him as his gift ; to pray to him beforehand for it 5 to give
him thanks, to give him all the glory, &c. ? On the contra-
ry, would not this determining cause, whose arbitrary, selfde-
termined, selfpossessed, sovereign will, decides the matter,
be properly looked upon as the main cause, vastly the most
proper cause, the truest author and bestowcr of the benefit I
Would not he be, as it were, all in the cause ? Would not
the glory properly belong to him, on whose pleasure the de-
termination of the matter properly depended ?
§ 29. By regeneration, being new creatures, raised from
death in sin, in the New Testament, is not meant merely per-
sons' being brought into the state and privileges of professing
Christians, according to Dr. Taylor. When Christ says unto
Nicodemus, John iii. 3. " Verily, verily, I say unto thee,
except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
God ;" he does not mean merely, that unless a man be
brought to a participation of the new state and privileges of
the Christian church, he cannot enter on the possession and
privileges of the Christian church ; for that would be non-
sense, and only to say, unless a man be born again, he cannot
be born again ; or, unless a man enter into the new state of
things, as erected by the Messiah, he cannot enter on the new
state of th : ngs as erected by the Messiah. Nor can he mean,
that unless a man be a professing Christian, he cannot see
the future and eternal privileges of the kingdom of heaven,
for he supposes many heathens will see the kingdom of God
in that sense.
And how unreasonable would it be to suppose that Christ
Mould teach this doctrine of the necessity of being instated ia
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 443
his new modelled church, as such a great* important and
main doctrine of his !
Taylor, to make out his scheme, is forced to suppose,
that by being born of God is meant two things in the New
Testament, (see p. 127, of his Key, and on Original Sin, p.
1 14, &c.) So he is forced to suppose, that by the kingdom
of God is meant two things, (p. 125, marginal note, and other
places) and so he supposes two senses of our being of the
truth, our being of, or in Got!, and knowing God, (see p. 127,
marginal note.) He is forced to suppose that many of the
expressions, signifying antecedent blessings, are to be taken
in a double sense, (see p. 133, No. 243, Sec.) Sec how evi-
dently being born of God signifies something else than a be-
ing brought into the state of professing Christians, 1 John ii.
29. " If ye know that he is righteous, ye know that every
one that doth righteousness is born of him." Chap. iii.
" Whatsoever is born of God, doth not commit sin ; for his
seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born
of God." Chap. iv. S. "Every one that leveth, is born of
God, and knoweth God." Chap. v. 4. " Whatsoever is
born of God, overcometb the world." Verse 18. » We
know that whosoever is born of God, sinneth not ; but he
that is begotten of God, keepeth himself ; and that wicked
one toucheth him not."
So it is exceeding apparent, that knowing God, and being
of God, and in God, having this hope in him, Stc. mean some-
thing beside our Christian profession, and principles, and
privileges. 1 John ii. 3, Sec. " Hereby do we know that we
know him, if we keep his commandments. Whoso keepeth
his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected. Here-
by know we that we are in him." Chap. iii. " Every one
that hath this hope in him, purifieth himself, even as he is
pure." Chap. iii. 14. " We knew that we have passed from
death unto life, because we love the brethren." Chap. iv. 12.
" If we love one another, God dwelleth in us." Taylor sup-
poses that this same apostle, by being born of God, means
being received to the privileges of professing Christians.,
444 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
John i. 12. (p. 49.) 1 John v. 1, Sc v. 18. (p. 48.) 1 John iii.
l.(p.49.)
§ 30. Why does the apostle say, concerning apostates,
« they were not of us : If they had been of us, they would
no doubt have continued with us ; but they went out, that
they might be made manifest that they were not all of us ;"
if it be, as Dr. Taylor supposes, that professing Christians
are indeed of the society of Christians to all intents and pur-
poses, have all their privileges, are truly the children of God,
members of Christ, of the household of God, saints, believers
that have obtained like precious faith, are all one body, have
one spirit, one faith, one inheritance, have their hearts pu-
rified and sanctified, are all the children of light, are all of
the househould of God, fellow citizens with the saints, have
all fellowship with Christ, &c. ?
§31. It is true, the nation of the Jews are in the Old
Testament said to be elected, called, created, made, formed,
redeemed, delivered, saved, bought, purchased, begotten.
But particular Jews are no where so spoken of, at least with
reference to the same thing, viz. their national redemption,
when they were brought out of Egypt, Sec.
David, in the book of Psalms, though he is so abundant
there in giving thanks to God for his mercies, and is also so
frequent in praising God for God's redeeming his people out
of Egypt, and the salvation God wrought for the nation and
church of Israel at that time ; yet he never once blesses God
(having respect to that salvation) that God had chosen him
and redeemed him, bought him, regenerated him ; never
(having reference to that affair) speaks in the language of
the apostle," He loved me, und gave himself for me ;" though
he often speaks of the blessedness of those men God had
chose, and caused to come nigh unto him, agreeably to the
language of the New Testament, and often blesses God for
redeeming and saving him in particular ; but never, in any
of these things, has he respect to those national privileges,
nor indeed any other of the penmen of the Psalms ; which is
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 4<45
very strange, if the privilege of being bought, made, created,
Sec. as applied to the nation of the Jews, be that which the
apostle in the New Testament applies to himself in particu-
lar, and which this and the other apostles applied to many
other particular persons.
§ 32 That professing Christians are said to be sanctified,
washed, 8cc does not argue, that all professing Christians arc
so in fact. For Taylor himself says, " it should be carefully
observed, that it is very common in the sacred writings, to
express not only our Christian privileges, but also the duty
to which they oblige, in the present or preterperfect tense ;
or to speak of that as done, which only ought to be done, and
which, in fact, may possibly never be done : As in Matth. v.
13. " Ye are the salt of the earth," that is, ye ought to be.
Rom. ii. 4. « The goodness of God leadeth thee to repent-
ance ;" that is, ought to lead thee : Chap. vi. 2. Chap. viii.
9. Col. iii. 3. 1 Pet. i. 6. " Wherein ye greatly rejoice ;"
i. e. ought to rejoice. 2 Cor. iii. 18. "We all with open
face (enjoying the means of) beholding, as in a glass, the glo-
ry of the Lord, are (ought to be, enjoy the means of being*
changed into the same image from glory to glory." 1 Cor.
v. " Ye are unleavened," i. e. obliged by the Christian pro-
fession to be. Heb. xiii. 14. " We seek, (i. e. we ought to
seek, or, according to our profession, we seek) a city to come."
1 John ii. 12.... 15. iii. 9. v. 4.... 18, and in other places. See.
Taylor's Key, p. 139. No. 244, and p. 144. No. 246. This
overthrows all his supposed proofs, that those which he calls
antecedent blessings, do really belong to all professing Christ-
ians.
§ 33. The case was quite ot!;cnvise in the Christian
church with regard to election, redemption, creation, &c. from
what it was with, the Jews. With the Jews, election, their
redemption out of Egypt, their creation, was a national thing ;
it began with them as a nation, and descended, as it were, from
the nation, to particular persons. Particular persons were
first of the nation and church of the Jews ; so, by that means.
446 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
hail an interest in their election, redemption, Sec. that Guu
wrought of old. The being of the nation and church of Israel,
was the ground of a participation in these privileges.* But
it is evident, it is contrariwise in Christians. With regard
to them, the election, redemption, creation, regeneration, &c.
are personal things. They begin with particular. persons,
and ascend to public societies. Men are first redeemed,
bought, created, regenerated, and by that means become mem-
bers of the Christian church ; and this is the ground of their
membership. Paul's regeneration, and Christ's loving him,
and giving himself for him, was the foundation of his being
of the Christian church, that holy nation, peculiar people, &c.
whereas, David's being one of the nation of Israel, is the prop-
er ground of his participation in Israel's redemption out of
Egypt, and of that birth and formation of the people that were
at that time. It is apparent the case was thus. It cannot be
otherwise. It is evident that the new creation, regeneration,
calling, and justification, are personal things, because they are
by personal influences ; influences of God's spirit on particu-
lar persons, and personal qualifications.
Their regeneration was a personal thing, and therefore, it
is not called simply an entering into the new creation, or ob-
taining a part in the new world or new Jerusalem, Sec. but a
putting off the old man, and putting On the new man. They
•are first raised from the dead, and by that means come to be-
long to the church of Christ. They are first lively or living
stones, and by that means come to belong to the spiritual
house, and the holy temple ; by being lively stones, they come
to be parts of the living temple, and capable of it. So that
their being alive, is prior to their belonging to the Christian
church. The Christian calling, is represented as being the
ground of their belonging to the church. They are called
into the church, called into the fellowship of Jesus Christ.
* It is much to be doubted whether our author is correct in the material dis-
tinction he here makes between the Jewish and Christian dispensations. The
reader will consider whether privileges andblessings werenot pergonal as much
'mucrthe one as the other.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. U7
Their Spiritual baptism or washing, is prior to their being in
the church. They are by one spirit baptised into one body.
They put on Christ, and so become interested in Christ, and
sharers with those that had a part in him. By such a person-
al work of the Spirit of God, they were first made meet to be
partakers with the saints in light, before they were partakers.
§ 34. It will follow from Taylor's scheme, that Simon the
sorcerer had an interest in all the antecedent blessings. Yet
the apostle tells him he was at that time in the gall of bitter-
ness, and bond of iniquity. If he was really justified, washed,
cleansed, sanctified ; how was he at that time in the bond oi
iniquity ? Justification, forgiveness, &c. is a release from
the bond of iniquity. If the heart be purified by faith, it does
not remain in the gall of bitterness.
§ 35. Saving grace differs from common grace, in nature
and kind. To suppose only a gradual difference, would not
only be to suppose, that some in a state of damnation are,
within an infinitely little as good as some in a state of salva-
tion, (which greatly disagrees with the Arminian notion of
men's being saved by their own virtue and goodness) but this,
taken with the Arminian notion of men's falling from grace,
will naturally lead us to determine, that many that are once
in a state of salvation, may be in such a state, and out of it,
scores of times in a very short space. For though a person
is in a state of salvation, he may be but just in it, and may be
infinitely near the limits between a state of salvation and dam-
nation ; and as the habits of grace are, acccording to that
scheme, only contracted and raised by consideration and ex-
ercise, and the exertion of the strength of the mind, and are
lost when a man falls from grace by the intermission or ces-
sation of these, and by contrary acts and exercises ; and as the
habits and principles of virtue are raised and sunk, brought
into being and abolished by those things, and both the degree
of them and the being of them wholly depend on them; the
consequence will naturally be, that when a man is first raised
to that degree of a virtuous disposition; as to be in a state oi"
448 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
salvation, and the degree of virtue is almost infinitely near the
dividing line, it will naturally be liable to be a little raised or
sunk every hour, according as the thoughts and exercises of
the mind are ; as the mercury in the thermometer or barom-
eter is never perfectly at rest, but is always rising or subsid-
ing, according to the weight of the atmosphere, or the degree
of heat.
§ 36. The dispute about grace's being resistible or irre-
sistible, is perfect nonsense. For the effect of grace is upon
the will ; so that it is nonsense, except it be proper to say
that a man with his will can resist his own will, or except it
be possible for him to desire to resist his own will ; that is,
except it be possible for a man to will a thing and not will it
at the same time, and so far as he does will it. Or if you
speak of enlightening grace, and say this grace is upon the
understanding ; it is nothing but the same nonsense in other
words. For then the sense runs thus, that a man, after he
has seen so plainly that a thing is best for him that he wills it,
yet he can at the same time nill it. If you say he can will
any thing he pleases, this is most certainly true ; for who can
deny, that a man can will any thing he doth already will I
That a man can will any thing that he pleases, is just as cer-
tain, as what is, is. Wherefore it is nonsense to say, that af-
ter a man has seen so plainly a thing to be so much best for
him that he wills it, he could have not willed it if he had pleas-
ed ; that is to say, if he had not willed it, he could have not
willed it. It is certain, that a man never doth any thing but
what he can do. But to say, after a man has willed a thing;,
that he could have not willed it if he had pleased, is to sup-
pose two wills in a man ; the one to will which goes first ;
the oilier to please or choose to will. And so with the same
reason we may say, there is another will to please ; to please
to will ; and so on to a thousand. Wherefore, to say that
the man could have willed otherwise if he had pleased, is just
all one as to say, that if lie had willed otherwise, then we
mitrbt be we he could will ...the. wise.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 449
§ 37. Those that deny infusion of grace by the Holy Spir-
it, must, of necessity, deny the Spirit to do any thing at all.
By the Spirit's infusing, let be meant what it will, those who
say there is no infusion, contradict themselves. For they say
the Spirit doth something in the soul ; that is, he causeth
some motion, or affection, or apprehension to arise in the soul,
that, at the same time, would not be there without him. Now,
God's Spirit doeth what he doeth ; he doth as much as he
doth ; or he causeth in the soul as much as he causeth,
let that be how little soever. So much as is purely the ef-
fect of his immediate motion, that is the effect of his imme-
diate motion, let that be what it will ; and so much is infus-
ed, how little soever that be. This is selfevident. For sup-
pose the Spirit of God only to assist the natural powers, then
there is something done betwixt them. Men's own powers
do something, and God's Spirit doth something ; only they
work together. Now, that part that the Spirit doth, how little
soever it be, is infused. So that they that deny infused hab-
its, own that part of the habit is infused. For they say, the
Holy Spirit assists the man in acquiring the habit*; so that it
is acquired rather sooner than it would be otherwise So that
part oi* the habit is owing to the Spirit ; some of the strength
of the habit was infused, and another part is owing to the nat-
ural powers of the man. Or if you say not so, but that it is
all owing to the natural power assisted ; how do you mean as-
sisted ? To act more lively and vigorously than otherwise ?
Then th^t liveliness and vigorousness must be infused ; which
is a habit, and therefore an infused habit. It is grace, and
therefore infused grace. Grace consists very much in a prin-
ciple that causes vigorousness and activity in action. This is
infusion, even in the sense of the opposite party. So that, if
any operation of he Holy Spirit at all is allowed, the dispute
is only, How much is infused ? The one says, a great deal,
the other says, bin little.
§ 38. 1st. The main thing meant by the word efficacious,
is this, it being decisive This seems to be the main question.
2d. Its being immediate and arbitrary in that sense, as not to
Vol. V. 3 I
450 EFFICACIOUS GRACE."
be limited to the laws of nature. 3d. That the principles of
grace are supernatural in that sense, that they are entirely
different from all that is in the heart before conversion. 4th.
That they are infused, and not contracted by custom and exer-
cise. 5th. That the change is instantaneous, and not gradual.
These four last heads may be subdivisions of a second gen-
eral head : So that the divisions may be thus : 1st. The main
thing meant, is, that it is decisive ; 2d, That it is immediate
and supernatural. The four last of the heads mentioned
above, may be subdivisions of this last.
So that there are two things relating to the doctrine of ef-
ficacious grace, wherein lies the main difference between the
Calvinists and Arminians as to this doctrine. Firsts That the
grace of God is determining and decisive as to the conver-
sion of a sinner, or a man's becoming a good man, and having
those virtuous qualifications that entitle to an interest in Christ
and his salvation. Secondly, That the power and grace and
operation of the Holy Spirit, in, or towards, the conversion of
a sinner, is immediate : That the habit of true virtue or holi-
ness is immediately implanted or infused ; that the operation
goes so far, that a man has habitual holiness given him in-
stantly, wholly by the operation of the Spirit of God, and not
gradually by assistance concurring with our endeavors, so as
gradually to advance virtue into a prevailing habit. And be-
side these, Thirdly, It is held by many, of late, that there is no
immediate interposition of God ; but that all is done by gen-
eral laws.
The former is that which is of greatest importance or con-
sequence in the controversy with Arminians, (though the oth-
ers are also very important) and this, only, is what I shall con-
sider in this place ; perhaps the others may be considered,
God willing, in some other discourse.
§ 39. Concerning what the Arminians say, that these are
speculative points ; all devotion greatly depends on a sense
and acknowledgment of our dependence on God. But this
is one of the very chief things belonging to our dependence
on God : How much stress do the Scriptures lay on our de-
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 4#l
pendence on God ! All assistance of the Spirit of God what-
soever, that is by any present influence or effect of the Spirit ;
any thing at all that a person that is converted from sin to
God, is the subject of, through any immediate influence of
the Spirit of God upon him, or any thing done by the Spirit,
since the completing and confirming the Canon of the Scrip-
tures, must be done by a physical operation, either on the soul
or body.
The Holy Spirit of God does something to promote virtue
in men's hearts, and to make them good, beyond what the
angels can do. But the angels can present motives ; can ex-
cite ideas of the words of promises and threatenings, Sec. and
can persuade in this way by moral means ; as is evident, be-
cause the devils in this way promote vice. ,
§ 40. There is no objection made to God's producing any
effects, or causing any events, by any immediate interposition,
producing effects arbitrarily, or by the immediate efforts of
his will, but what lies equally against his ordering it so, that
any effects should be produced by the immediate interposi-
tion of men's will, to produce effects otherwise than the es.-
tablished laws of nature would have produced without men's
arbitrary interposition.
I beg the reader's attention to the following quotations...,
" That otherwise, the world cannot be the object of inquiry
and science, and far less of imitation by arts : Since imitation
necessarily presupposes a certain, determinate object, or fix^-
ed, ascertainable relations and connexions of things ; and that,
upon the contrary supposition, the world must be absolutely
unintelligible. Nature, in order to be understood by us, must
always speak the same language to us. It must therefore
stedfastly observe the same general laws in its operations, or
work uniformly, and according to stated, invariable methods
and rules. Those terms, order, beauty, general good, Sec.
plainly include, in their meaning, analogy ; and constancy,
uniformity amidst variety ; or, in other words, the regular
observance of general, settled laws, in the make and econo-
my, production, and operations or effects; of any object to
452 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
■which they arc ascribed. Wherever order, fixed connexion.,,
or general laws and unity of design take place, there is cer-
tainty in the nature of such objects, and so knowledge may
be acquired. But where these do not obtain, there can be
nothing but unconnected, independent parts. All must be
disorder and confusion ; and consequently, such a loose, dis-
jointed heap of things, must be an inexplicable chaos. In one
word, science, prudence, government, imitation and art, nec-
essarily suppose the prevalence of general laws throughout
all the objects in nature to which they reach. No being can
know itself, project or pursue any scheme, or lay down any
maxims for its conduct, but so far as its own constitution is
certain, and the connexion of things relative to it are fixed and
constant. For so far only are things ascertainable ; and there-
fore, so far only can rules be drawn from them." Turnbiill's
Mov. Phil. Part I. Introd.
" The exercise of all moral powers, dispositions and af-
fections of mind, as necessarily presuppose an established or-
der of nature, or general laws settled by the author of nature
with respect to them, as the exercise of our bodily senses
abovit qualities and effects of corporeal beings do with regard
to them. We could 'neither acquire knowledge of any kind,
contract habits, or attain to any moral perfection whatsoever,
unless the author of our nature had appointed and fixed cer-
tain laws relating to our moral powers, and their exercises
and acquisitions." Ibid. p. 13, 14. Yet this Turnbull stren-
uously holds a seifdetermining power in the will of man. Such
like arguments, if they are valid against any interposition at
all, will prevail against all interposition of God or man, and
against the interposition of God ever to bring the world to an
end, or amend it ; and prove that all shall be according to
general laws. And they might as well argue, that the mak-
ing of the world too was by general laws. If it be said, that
it is of great importance and absolute necessity, that God
should at last interpose and rectify the course of nature....!
.;, v.cr, this is yielding the point, that, in cases of great im-
portance, it is reasonable to suppose there may be an intcrpo.
itipn that may be arbitrary, and not by general laws.
efficacious Grace. 45s
§ 41. It is not necessary that men should be able, by the
connexions of things, to know all future events ; nor was this
ever in the Creator's designs. If it had been so, he could
have enabled them to know the future volitions of men, and
those events that depend upon them, which are by far the
most important.
§ 42. The nature of virtue being a positive thing, can
proceed from nothing, but God's immediate influence, and
must take its rise from creation or infusion by God. For it
must be either from that, or from our own choice and pro-
duction, either at once or gradually, by diligent culture. But
it cannot begin, or take its rise from the latter, viz. cur
choice, or voluntary diligence. For if there exist nothing
at all of the nature of virtue before, it cannot come from cul-
tivation i for by the supposition there is nothing of the na-
ture of virtue to cultivate, it cannot be by repeated and multi-
plied acts of virtuous choice, till it becomes an habit. For
there can be no one virtuous choice, unless God immediately
gives it. The first virtuous choice, or a disposition to it, must
be immediately given, or it must proceed from a preceding
choice. If the first virtuous act of will or choice be from a
preceding act of will or choice, that preceding act of choice
must be a virtuous act of choice, which is contrary to the
supposition. For then there would be a preceding act of
choice before the first virtuous act of choice. And if it be said
the first virtuous act of choice is from a preceding act of will
■which is not virtuous, this is absurd. For an act of will not:
virtuous, cannot produce another act of will of a nature entire-
ly above itself, having something positive in it which the
cause has nothing of, and more excellent than it is ; any
more than motion can produce thought or understanding ; ov
the collision of two bodies can produce thought ; or stone*
and lead can produce a spirit ; or nothing can produce some-
thing.
§ 43. As to man's inability to convert himself.. ..In them
that are totally corrupt, there can be no tendency towards
454 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
their making their hearts better, till they begin to repent of
the badness of their hearts. For if they do not repent, they
still approve of it ; and that tends to maintain their badness,
and confirm it. But they cannot begin sincerely to repent of
the badness of their hearts, till their hearts begin to be better,
for repentance consists in a change of the mind and heart.
So that it is not men's repentance that first gives rise i ir
having a better heart ; and therefore it cannot be any tenden-
cy in them to make their hearts better, that gives rise to it.
The heart can have no tendency to make i f self better, till it
begins to have a better tendency ; for therein consists its
badness, viz. its having no good tendency or inclination. And
to begin to have a good tendency, or, which is the same
thing, a tendency and inclination to be better, is the same
thing as to begin already to be better. And therefore the
heart's inclination to be good, cannot be the thing that first
gives rise to its being made good. For its inclination to bt?
better, is the same tiling with its becoming better.
§44. Iftherebeany immediate influence or action of
the Spirit of God at all on any created beings, in any part of
the universe, since the days of the apostles, it is physical.
If it be in exciting ideas of motives, or in any respect assist-
ing or promoting any effect, still it is physical ; and every
■whit as much so, as if we suppose the temper and nature of
the heart is immediately changed. And it is as near akin,
to a miracle. If the latter be miraculous, so is the former,
§ 45. "Whoever supposed that the term irresistible was
properly used with respect to that power by which an infant
is brought into being ; meaning, irresistible by the infant ?
Or whoever speaks of a man's waking out of a sound sleep
irresistibly, meaning, that he cannot resist awaking ? Or
who says, that Adam was formed out of the dust of the earth
irresistibly ? See what I have said of the use of such terms as
irresistible, imfrustrable, &c. in my Inquiry about Liberty.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 455
§ 46. The opponents of efficacious grace and physical
operation, may be challenged to show that it is possible that
any creature should become righteous without a physical op-
eration, either a being created with the habit of righteousness,
or its being immediately infused. See what I have written
in my book of Original Sin, in those sections wherein I vindi-
cate the doctrine of original righteousness, and argue, that if
Adam was not created righteous, no way can be invented how
he could ever become righteous.
§ 47. As to that, Matthew vii. 7, « Seek and ye shall
find ;" it is explained by such places as that, Deut. iv. 29.
« But if from thence thou shalt seek the Lord thy God, thou
shalt find him, if thou seek him with all thy heart and with all
thy soul." And by Deut. xxx. 2.... 6. « If thou shalt return
unto the Lord thy God, and shalt obey his voice with all thy
heart and with all thy soul ; the Lord thy God will circum-
cise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord
thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul ;" which is
very parallel with that, " to him that hath shall be given."
§ 48. The Scripture teacheth that holiness, both in prin-
ciple and fruit, is from God. « It is God who worketh in
you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure." And Prov.
xvi. 1. " The preparation of the heart in man, and the an-
swer of the tongue is from the Lord." Comparing this with
other parts of the book of Proverbs, evinces that it is a mora!
preparation, and the answer of the tongue in moral regards.,
that is meant.
§ 49. Reason shows that the first existence r>f a principle
of virtue cannot be from man himself, nor in any created be-
ing whatsoever ; but must be immediately given from God ;
or that otherwise it never can be obtained, whatever this
principle be, whether love to God, or love to men. It must
either be from God, or be an habit contracted by repeated
acts. But it is most absurd to suppose that the first existence
of the principle of holy action, should be preceded by a course
45i> EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
of holy actions. Because there can be no holy action with'
out a principle, of holy inclination. There can be no act
done from love, that shall be the cause of first introducing
the very existence of love.
§ 50. God is said to give true virtue and piety of heart to
vnan ; to work it in him, to create it, to form it, and with re-
gard to it we are said to be his workmanship. Yea, that
there may be no room to understand it in some improper
sense, it is often declared as the peculiar character of God,
that he assumes it as his character to be the author and giver
of true virtue, in his being called the Sanctifier ; he that
sanctificth us. " I am he that sanctifieth you." This is
spoken of as the great prerogative of God, Levit. xx. S, and
other parallel places. He declares expressly that this effect
shall be connected with his act, or with what he shall do in
order to it. " I will sprinkje clean water, and you shall be
clean." Vv hat God does is often spoken of as thoroughly
effectual ; the effect is infallibly consequent. « Turn us,
and we shall be turned." Jesus Christ has the great charac-
ter of a Saviour on this account, that " he save3 his people
from their sins." See Rom. xi. 26, 27. " And so all Israel
shall be saved ; as it is written, there shall come out of Zion
a deliverer, and shall tarn away ungodliness from Jacob. For
this is rav covenant unto them, when I shall take away their
sins." God says, " I will put my law into their hearts ; I
will write my law in their inward parts, and they shall not
depart away from me ; I will take away the heart of stone,
and give them an heart of flesh ; I will give them an heart
to know me ; I will circumcise their hearts to love me ; oh,
that there were such an heart in them 1" And it is spoken
of as his work, to give, to cause, to create such a heart, to
put it in them. God is said to incline their hearts, not only
to give statutes, but to incline their hearts to his statutes.
Moses speaks of the great moral means that God had
used with the children of Israel to enlighten them, and con-
vince and persuade them ; but of their being yet unper-
suaded and unconverted, and gives this as a reason, that Go.l
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. *§f
had not given them an heart to perceive, as Deut. xxix. 4.
" Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and
eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day." The scripture
plainly makes a distinction between exhibiting light, or means
of instruction and persuasion, and giving eyes to see, circum-
cising the heart, &c.
§ 51. Why should Christ teach us to pray in the Lord's
prayer, " Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," if it
is not God's work to bring that effect to pass, and it is left to
man's free will, and cannot be otherwise, because otherwise
it is no virtue, and none of their obedience, or doing of God's
will ; and God does what he can oftentimes consistently with
man's liberty, and those that enjoy the means he uses, do
generally neglect and refuse to do his will ? He does so
much, that he can well say, what could 1 have done more ?
And yet almost all are at the greatest distance from doing
his will. See Colos, i. 9, 10.
§52. If it be as the Arminians suppose, that all men's
virtue is of the determination of their own free will, indepen-
dent on any prior determining, deciding, and disposing of the
event ; that it is no part of the ordering of God, whether
there be many virtuous or few in the world, whether there
shall be much virtue or little, or where it shall be, in what
nation, country, or when, or in what generation or age : or
whether there shall be any at all : Then none of these
things belong to God's disposal, and therefore, sorely it does
not belong to him to promise them. For it does not belong
to him to promise in an affair, concerning which he has not
the disposal.
And how can God promise, as he oftentimes does in his
word, glorious times, when righteousness shall generally pre-
vail, and his will shall generally be done ; and yet that it is
not an effect which belongs to him to determine ; it is not
left to his determination, but to the sovereign, arbitrary de-
termination of others, independently on any determination
of him ; and therefore surely they ought to be the prora-
Vol. V. 3 K
458 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
isers ? For him to promise, who ha3 it not in his hands to
dispose and determine, is a great absurdity ; and yet God
oftentimes in promising, speaks of himself as the sovereign
disposer of the matter, using such expressions as abundantly
imply it. Isaiah lx. 22. « I the Lord do hasten it in its
lime." Surely this is the language of a promiser, and not
merely a predictor. God promises Abraham, that " all the
families of the earth shall be blessed in him." God swears,
" every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess." And it
is said to be given to Christ, that every nation, &c. should
serve and obey him, Dan. vii. After what manner they shall
serve and obey him, is abundantly declared in other prophe-
cies, as in Isaiah xi. and innumerable others. These are
spoken of in the next chapter, as the excellent things that
God does.
§ 53. If God is not the disposing author of virtue, then
he is not the giver of it. The very notion of a giver implies
a disposing cause of the possession of the benefit. 1 John iv.
4. " Ye are of God, little children, and have overcome them,
(i. e. have overcome your spiritual enemies) because greater
is he that is in you, than he that is in the world ;" that is,
plainly, he is stronger, and his strength overcomes. But
how can this be a reason, if God does not put forth any over-
coming, effectual strength in the case, but leaves it to free
will to get the victory, to determine the point in the conflict ?
§ 54. There are no sort of benefits that are so much the
subject of the promises of scripture, as this sort, the bestow-
ment of virtue, or benefits which imply it. How often is the
faith of the Gentiles, or their coming into the Christian
Church promised to Christ in the Old Testament, Isaiah xlix.
6, and many other places ; and he has promised it to his
church, chap. xlix. 18. ...21, and innumerable other places.
See Rom. xv. 12. 13. "What a promise have we, Isaiah lx. 21,
<■<■ Thy people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit
the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my
hand, that I may be glorified,".. ..compared with the next
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 459
chapter, 3d verse, " That they may be called the trees of
righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be
glorified." See also verse 8th of the same chapter. Like-
wise chap. lx. 17, 18. « I will make thy officers peace, and
thy exactors righteousness ; violence shall no more be heard
in trjy land, wasting nor destruction within thy border, but
thou shalt call thy walls salvation, and thy gates praise."
Here it is promised that the rulers shall be righteous ; and
then, in the 21st verse following, it is promised that the peo-
ple shall be so. The change of men to be of a peaceable dis T
position is promised, as in places innumerable, so in Isaiah
xi. 6....11. " The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and
the leopard shall lie down with the kid," Sec. Isaiah lv.
5. " Behold, thou shalt call a nation that thou knowest
not, and nations that knew not thee shall run unto thee,
because of the Lord thy God, and for the Holy One of Israel,
for he hath glorified thee." Jer. iii. 15. "And I will give
you pastors according to mine heart, which shall feed you
with knowledge and understanding." This implies a prom-
ise that there should be such pastors in being, and that they
should be faithful to feed the people with knowledge and un-
derstanding. Jer. x. 23. " The way of man is not in him-
self." Stebbing owns, that on Arminian principles, conver-
sion depending on the determination of free will, it is possi-
ble, in its own nature, that none should ever be converted, (p.
235.) Then all the promises of virtue, of the revival of re-
ligion, Sec. are nothing. Jer. xxxi. 18. » Turn thou me,
and I shall be turned,"... .compared with Jer. xvii. 14. « Heal
me, O Lord, and I shall healed ; save me, and I shall be
saved, for thou art my praise." Which shews the force
and meaning of such a phraseology to be, that God alone can
be the doer of it ; and that if he undertakes it, it will be ef-
fectually done. Jer. xxxi. 32.. ..35. "Not according to the
covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that I
look them by the hand to bring them out of the land of E-
gypt, (which my covenant they brake, although I was an hus-
band unto them, saith the Lord :) But this shall be the cov-
enant that I will make with the house of Israel, after those
466 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts,
and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, and they
shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every
man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know
the Lord ; for they shall all know me, from the least of them,
unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord ; for I will forgive
their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more." The
prophet elsewhere tells what is connected with knowing God,
viz. doing judgment and justice, and shewing mercy, Sec-
Chap, xxii. 16, Jer. xxxii. 39, 4C. " And I will give them
one heart and one way, that they may fear me for ever, for
the good of them and their children after them ; and I will
make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not turn
away from them to do them good. But I will put my fear in
their hearts, and they shall not depart from me." Jer. xxxiii.
2. " Thus saith the Lord, the maker thereof, the maker that
formed it." Verse 8. " And I will cleanse them from all
their iniquity, whereby they have sinned against me." Ezek.
xi. 18. ...20. » And they shall come thither, and they shall
take away all the detestable things thereof, and all the abom-
ination thereof from thence. And I will give them one
heart, and I will put a new spirit within you ; and I will
take the stony heart out of their flesh, and I will give them
an heart of flesh ; that they may walk in my statutes, and
keep mine ordinances, and do them ; and they shall be my
people, and I will he their God."
Zech. xii. 10, to the end. " And I will pour upon the
house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the
spirit of grace and of supplications ; and they shall look upon
me whom they have pierced," Sec.
So in the next chapter at the beginning, " I will cut off
the names of the idols out of the land, and they shall be no
more remembered ;" and also, " I will cause the prophets,
and also the unclean spirits to pass out of the land."
Mai. iii. 3. 4. " And he shall sit as a refiner and purifier
of silver ; and he shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge
them as gold and biiver, that they may offer unto the Lord an
offering in righteousness. 'J hen *-. iiaii the offering of Judah
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 464
and Jerusalem be pleasant unto the Lord, as in the days of
old, and as in the former years."
§ 55. We are told, Job. xxviii. 28, that " the fear of the
Lord is wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding."
The same is also abundantly declared in other places. But
it is equally declared, that God is the author and giver of wis-
dom, and that he is the author wholly and only ; which is de-
nied of other things. It is also abundantly declared in this
28th chapter of Job, that it cannot be obtained of any creature
by any means ; and it is implied in the end of the chapter, that
it is God that gives wisdom, as is asserted, P/ov. ii. 6. « For
the Lord giveth wisdom ; out of his mouth cometh knowledge
and understanding." It is the promise of God the Father,
Psalm ex. 2. " Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy
power." Psalm cxix. 35. " Make me to go in the way of
thy commandments." Verse 36. « Incline my heart unto
£hy testimonies."
§ 56. We are directed earnestly to pray and cry unto God
for wisdom, and the fear of the Lord ; for this reason, that it is
he that giveth wisdom. Prov. ii. at the beginning : Compare
Job. xxviii. with Prov. xxi. 1 . " The king's heart is in the
hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water ; he turneth it whith-
ersoever he will." Here it is represented that the will of God
determines the wills of men, and that when God pleases to in-
terpose, he even directs them according to his pleasure, with-
out failure in any instance. This shews that God has not left
men's hearts so in their own hands, as to be determined by
themselves alone, independently on any antecedent determi-
nation.
Prov. xxviii. 26. " He that trusteth in his own heart is p
fool." Aman is to be commended for making a wise improve-
ment of his outward possessions, for his own comfort ; vet
this is the gift of God. Eccles. ii. 24 26. " There is
nothing better for a man, than that he should eat and drink,
and that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labor.
This also I saw that it was from the hand of God.
462 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
John i. 12, 13. " As many as received him, to them gave
he power to become the sons of God ; which were born, not
of the will of man, but of God." Thus also we read, Luke
iii. 8. k ' God is able of these stones to raise up children un-
to Abraham." John iii. 3. " Except a man be born again,
he cannot see the kingdom of God." Verse 5. " Except
a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into
the kingdom of God." « That which is born of the flesh is
flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." Verse 8.
« The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the
sound thereof, but canst not teil whence it cometh, and whith-
er it goeth ; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." Jam.
i. 18. " Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth,
that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures."
What Christ meant by being born again, we may learn by
the abundant use of the like phrase by the same disciple
that wrote this gospel, in his first epistle, who doubtless learn-
ed his language from his master ; and particularly from those
savings of his concerning the new birth, which he took more
special notice of, and which left the deepest impressions on
his mind, which we may suppose are those he records, when
he writes the history of his life. Matth. iv. 19. " I will
make you fishers of men." So Mark i. 16, 20, together with
Luke v. " From henceforth thou shalt catch men." Com-
pared with the foregoing story of Christ's giving them so
great a draught of fishes, which was wholly his doing, and as-
cribed to him. Matth. vi. 10. " Thy kingdom come ; thy
will be done." Matth. xi. 25 27. « At that time Jesus
answered and said, 1 thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven
and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and
prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Fa-
ther, for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are deliv-
ered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son,
but the Father ; neither knoweth any man the Father, save
the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." So
Luke x. 21, 22. John vi. 37. " All that the Father giveth
me, shall come unto me." Verse 44. " No man can come
unto me, except the Father which hath sent me, draw him."
Efficacious grace. m
John x. 16. " Other sheep I have which are not of this
fold ; them also I must bring ; and there shall be one fold
and one shepherd." Verse 26 29. " But ye believe not,
because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you ; my
sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me ;
and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish,
neither shall any pluck them out of my hands. My Father
which gave them me," 8tc.
Acts xv. 3, 4. "Declaring the conversion of the Gen-
tiles, and they declared all things that God had done with
them." Verse 9. « And put no difference between us and
them, purifying their hearts by faith." Therefore it is not
probable, that the heart is first purified, to fit it for faith. John
xiv. 12. " Greater works than these shall he do, that the Fa-
ther may be glorified in the Son." The meaning of it is con-
firmed from John xii. 23, 24, 28.. ..32, and John xvii. 1, 2, 3.
Isa. xlix. 3, 5, and xxvi. 15, and Isa. xvi. 14. Isa. xvii. 3, 4,
5, and 16, 17, and 22, 21, (especially Isa. Iv. 4, 5.) Jer. xxx.
19. Rom. ix. 16. « It is not of him that willeth, nor of him
that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." By such an
expression in the apostle's phraseology, from time to time, is
meant the use of endeavors, whereby they seek the benefit
they would obtain. So what he here says, is agreeable to
what he says in chap. xi. 4, 5, 6, 7, where he particularly
shows, that it is God that preserves the remnant, and that it is
of the election of his grace and free kindness, and not of their
works ; but in such a way of freedom, as is utterly inconsistent
with its being of their works. And in verse 7, that it is not
determined by their seeking, but by God's election. The
apostle here, as Dr. Taylor says, has respect to bodies of men,
to the posterity of Esau and Jacob, Sec. Yet this he applies
to a distinction made in those days of the gospel, and that dis-
tinction made between those that were in the Christian church,
and those that were not, and particularly some of the Jews
that were in the Christian church, and others of the same na-
tion that were not ; which is made by some believing and
accepting Christ, and others rejecting him ; by that faith
which they professed to exercise with all their hearts; that
464 EFFICACIOUS GRACJt.
faitli which was a mercy and virtue, and the want of which
was a fault ; as appears by the objection the apostle supposes,
verse J 9. "Why doth he yet find fault?" The want of
which faith argued hardness of heart, verse 18, exposed them,
to wrath and destruction, as a punishment of sin, verse 22,
and exposes persons to be like the inhabitants of Sodom and
Gomorrah, verse 29.
Rom. xi. 4, 5, 6, 7. But what saith the answer of God unto
•him ? " I have reserved to myself seven thousand men, who
have not bowed the knee to the image of Baal. E ven so at
this present time, there is a remnant according to the elec-
tion of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works ;
otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then
it is no more grace ; otherwise work is no more work."
2 Tim. ii. 9. Eph. ii. 9. Tit. iii. 5. « What then ? Israel
hath not obtained that which he seeketh for ; but the election
hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded." Rom. xi. 17, 18.
" If some of the branches are broken off, and thou, being a
wild olive tree, wert grafted in amongst them, and with them
partakest of the root and fatness of the olive tree ; boast not
against the branches."
Rom. xi. 25, 26, 27. « Blindness in part is happened to
Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in ; and so
all Israel shall be saved. As it is written, There shall come
out o /lion the deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness
from Jacob. For this is rrly covenant unto them, when I shall
take away their sins." Together with verses 35, 06. « Who
hath first given unto him, and it shall be recompensed to him
again ? For of him, and through him, and to him, are all
things, to whom be glory for ever and ever."
§ 57. That expression, Rom. i. 7, and 1 Cor. i.2,and else-
where, called to be sai>its, implies, that God makes the distinc-
tion. Compare this with what Christ says, John x. 27. "My
-sheep hear my voice." Verse 16. "Other sheep have I
which are not of this fold ; them also must I bring ; and they
shall hear my voice ; and t'aeie shall be one fold and one shep-
herd.': 1 Cor.i. 26, 27, 28, to the end ; « For ye see your call-
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 465
ing, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh,
not many mighty, not many noble, are called : But God hath
chosen the foolish things of, &c. That no flesh should glory
in his presence. But of him are ye in Christ Jesus," Sec.
Rom. xi. latter end. Heb. xiii. 20, 21. 1 Cor. ill. 5, 6, 7, 8,
9. « Who then is Paul, or who is Apollos, but ministers by
whom ye believed, even as the Lord gave to every man. I
have planted, and Apollos watered ; but God gave the in»
crease. So neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he
that watereth ; but God that giveth the increase. ...We are la-
borers together with God ; ye are God's husbandry ; ye are
God's building." According to the Arminian scheme, it
ought to have been ; I have planted, and Apollos watered, and
God hath planted and watered more especially. For we have
done it only as his servants. But you yourselves have given
the increase ; the fruit has been left to your free will : Agree-
ably to what the Arminians from time to time insist on, in
what they say upon the parable of the vineyard which God
planted in a fruitful hill, &c. and looked that it should bring
forth grapes, and says, what could I have done more unto my
vineyard ?
1 Cor. iii. 3. "Ye are manifestly declared to be the epis-
tle of Christ, ministered by us, written not with ink, but
with the Spirit of the living God ; not on tables of stone,
but on the fleshly tables of the heart." They were the epis-
tle of Christ, as the effect of the Spirit of God in their hearts
held forth the light of truth ; of gospel truth with its evi-
dence to the world ; as the church i- compared to a candle-
stick, and called the pillar and ground of the truth. This is
agreeable to those scriptures in the Old Testament, that
speak of writing God's law in their hearts, &c. Add to this,
Chap. iv. 6. « For God, who commanded the light to shine
out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of
the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus
Christ " 2 Cor. v. 14.... 18. « If one died tor all, then were
all dead ; that they which live, should noi henceforth live un-
to themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose
again. Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new crea-
Vol. V. 3 L
466 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
ture : Old things are passed away : Behold, all things are be-
come new ; and all things are of God."
2 Cor. viii. 16, 17.- " Thanks be to God, who put the
same earnest care into the heart of Titus for you. For in-
deed he accepted the exhortation. But being more forward,
of his own accord he went unto you." So the next chapter
speaks of the Corinthians' forwardness and readiness in their
bounty to the poor saints, not as of necessity, but with freedom
and cheerfulness, according to the purpose of their own hearts
or wills ; but yet speaks of their charity as just cause of much
thanksgiving, to God ; and speaks expressly of thanksgiving
to him for such a subjection of them to the gospel, and liber-
al distribution to them.
Gal. i. 15, 16. « But when it pleased God, who separat-
ed me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace^
to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the
Gentiles," compared with 2 Cor. iv. 6, 7, and the account
which he gives himself of his conversion, Acts xxvi. 16. ...18.
Gal. ii. 19, 20. " I through the law am dead to the law,
that I might live unto God. I am crucified with Christ ; nev-
ertheless I live ; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."
Gal. v. 22, 23, 8cc. " The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy,
peace, long suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness,
temperance."
§ 58. The apostle, in Eph. i. 18... .20, speaks of some ex-
ceeding great work of power, by which they th&t believe are
distinguished. But a bodily resurrection is no such distin-
guishing work of power. See the words : « The eyes of
your understanding being enlightened, that ye may know
•what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glo-
ry of his inheritance in the saints, and what is the exceeding
greatness of his power to us ward who believe, according to
the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ
Jesus, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his
own right hand in heavenly places." The apostle repeats
the same thing in substance again in chapter iii. 14, and fol-
lowing verses, and tells us what sort of knowledge he desired,
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 467
gmd so earnestly prayed that they might receive, and what is
the fioiver that he speaks of : "That they may be able to
comprehend with all saints, what is the breadth and length,
and depth and height ; and to know the love of Christ which
passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the full-
ness of God." And tells by what means God would dwell in
their hearts by faith, 8cc verses 16, 17. And he tells us in
verse 20, what is the power of God he speaks of. See Rom.
xv. 13. 1 Pet. i. SV. ..5, and 2 Thess. i. 11, 12. See also what
the apostle speaks of as an effect of God's glorious power,
Col.i. 11.
Eph.i. 18. ...20, is to be taken in connexion with the words
which follow in the beginning of the next chapter ; which is
a continuation of the same discourse, where the apostle abun-
dantly explains himself. In those words, there is an explana-
tion of what had before been more figuratively represented.
He here observes, that those that believe, are the subjects of
a like exceeding greatness of power that Christ was, when he
was raised from the dead, and set at God's own right hand in
heavenly places. And then in the prosecution of this dis-
course he shows how, viz. in our being raised from the deadj
being dead ourselves in trespasses and sins, and raised as
Christ was, and made to sit together with him in heavenly
places ; and this he speaks of, not only as the fruit of the ex-
ceeding greatness of his power, but of the riches of his mer-
cy, and exceeding riches of his grace ; by grace in opposition
to works ; that it is by faith which is the gift of God. The
apostle repeats it over and over, that it is by grace, and then
explains how ; not of works ; and that our faith itself, by
which it is, is not of ourselves, but is God's gift ; and that we
are wholly God's workmanship ; and that all is owing to
God's foreordaining that we should walk in good works. I
know not what the apostle could have said more. See Eph.
ii. 1....10.
§ 59. In Eph. iii. it is spoken of as a glorious mystery of
God's will, contrived of old, and determined from the founda-
tion of the world, and his eternal purpose, &c. that God would
46» EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
bring in the Gentiles as fellow heirs, and of the same body
and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel. Which
confirms the promises of the Old Testament ; shews that
they were not foretold only as foreseen, but Predetermined,
as what God would bring to pass. This is also spoken of
elsewhere, as the fruit of God's eternal purpose, his election,
Sec. as our adversaries acknowledge.
§60. Sincerity itself is spoken of as coming from God.
Phil. i. 10. " That ye may approve the things that are excel-
lent ; that ye may be sincere and without offence in the day
of Christ." And elsewhere God is represented as « creating
a clean heart, renewing a right spirit, giving an heart of flesh,"
&c. The apostle « gives thanks for the faith and love of the
Colossians, their being delivered from the power of darkness,
8cc. and prays that they may be filled with the knowledge of
his will in all wisdom and might, agreeable to their knowl-
edge, being fruitful in every good work ; and for their perse-
verance, and that they might be made meet for the reward of
the saints." Col i. 3, 4, 9. ...13. This argues all to flow from
God as the giver. Their first faith, and their love that their
faith was attended with, and' their knowledge and spiritual
wisdom and prudence, and walking worthy of the Lord, and
universal obedience, and doing every good work, and increas-
ing in grace, and being strengthened in it, and their persever-
ance and cheerfulness in their obedience, and being made
meet for their reward, all are from God. They are from God
as the determining cause ; else, why does the apostle pray
that God would bestow or effect these things, if they be not
at his determination whether they shall have them or not ?
He speaks of God's glorious power as manifested in the be-
stowment of these things.
Col. ii. 13. « And you being dead in your sins and the
uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together
with him."
Col. lii. 10. " Have put on the new man, which is renew-
ed in knowledge after the in age of him that created him.*'
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 469
See how many things the apostle gives thanks to God For
in the Thessalonians, and prays for them. 2 Thess. i. 3, 4,
11, 12, and ii. 17, 18, and iii. 3, 4, 5. 1 Thess. i. verse 2, to
the end, and chap. ii. verses 13, 14, and chap. iii. 9, 10, 12,
13, chap. v. 23, 24. 1 Thess. iii. 12. « The Lord make you
to increase and abound in love," Sec. 1 Thess. iv. 10. " But
as touching brotherly love, ye need not that I should write
unto you ; for ye yourselves are taught of God to love o;;e
another. And indeed ye do it towards all the brethren."
1 Thess. v. 23, 24. " And the very God of peace sanctify
you wholly ; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul and
body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord
Jesus Christ. Faithful' is he that hath called you, who also
will do it."
2 Thess. i. 3, 4. " We are bound to thank God always
for you, because your faith groweth exceedingly, and the
charity of every one of you all toward each other aboundtth ;
so that we glory in you, for your faith and patience in all
your persecutions and tribulations."
The apostle thanks God for his own prayers, and for oth-
ers ; 2 Tim. i. '3. If they are from God, then doubtless also
our prayers for ourselves, our very prayers for the Spirit, are
from him.
The prophet ascribes persons' prayers to their having the
spirit of grace and supplication. True acceptable prayer is
spoken of, Rom. viii. as being the language of the Spirit ;
not that I suppose that the very words are indited, but the
disposition is given. 2 Tim. i. 7. " God hath not given us
the spirit of fear, but of power and of love, and of a sound
mind."
2 Tim. ii. 9. " Who hath saved us and called us with an
holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his
own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus
before the world began."
Hcb. xiii. 20, 21. " Now the Cod of peace, who brought
again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great shepherd of
the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting cove-
nant, make you perfect in every good work, and to do his
470 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
wiii, working- in yen that which is well pleasing- in hir
sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and
ever, Amen." See Eph. i. 19, 20, and 1 Cor. i. fetter end.
Heb. xiii 2. "Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith,"
compared with Philip, i. 5. James i. 5. ...8. " If any man
lack wisdom, let him ask it of God, that givclh to all liber-
ally and upbraicleth not, and it shall be given him. But 1c':
him ask in faith, nothing wavering ; for ho that v, avereth. is
like a wave of the sea, driven of the wind and tossed. For
let not that man think he shall obtain any thing of the Lord.
A doublemindcd man is unbtable in all his ways/' So that,
in order to a man's having any reason to expect to be heard,
he must first have faith, and a sincere, single heart. And
what that is which the apostle calls wisdom, mav be learnt
from chap. iii. 17, i8. " The wisdom that is from above is
first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated,
full of mercy and good fruits, without partiafuy, and without
hypocrisy. And the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace
of them that make peace." In chap. i. 5, &c. above cited,
God is spoken of as the giver of this wisdom ; and in the fol-
lowing part of the chapter, he is spoken of as the giver of
this and every benefit of that kind ; every thing that contains
any thing of the nature of light or wisdom, or moral good ;
and this is represented as the fruit of his mere will and pleas-
ure. Verses 16, IT, 18. "• Do not err, my beloved brethren.
Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, and
cometh down from the Fattier of lights, with whom is no va-
riableness nor shadow of turning. Of his own will begat he
us by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first
fruits of his creatures." Sec John i. 13, and iii. 8.
The scope of the apostle, and connexion of his discourse,
plainly shew that the apostic means to assert that all moral
good is ftom God. In the preceding verses, he was warning-
those he wrote to, not to lay their sins, or pride, or lusts to the
charge of God, and on that occasion he would have them be sen-
sible that every good gift is from God, and no evil ; that God
is the Father of lights and only of light ; and that no dark-
ness is from him, because there is no darkness inhim ; no
Efficacious grace. en
change from light to darkness ; no, not the least shadow,
What he says is plainly parallel to what the Apostle John
says, when he would bignify God's perfect holiness without
any sin ; 1 John i. 5, 6. " This, then, is the message which
we have heard of him, and declare unto you, that God is
light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we
have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and
do not the truth." But if all moral good is from God, com-
cth down from him, and is his gift ; then the very firs'; good
determination of the will, and every good improvement of as^
sistance, is so.
1 Pet. i. 2... 5. " Elect according to the foreknowledge
of God, through sanetification of the Spirit unto obedience.
Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,
who, according to his abundant mercy, hath begotten us again
unto a lively hope," (or a living hope, i. e, from the dead ; to
be begotten from the dead, in the phrase of the New Testa-
ment, is the same as to be raised from the dead. See Coloss.
i. 13, Rev. i. 5 ) " by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the
dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, reserved
in heaven for you, who are kept by the power of God through
faith unto salvation." See Eph. i. 18. ...20, and ii. at the be-
ginning.
Philip, ii. IS. "It is God that worketh in you bom to
will and to do of his good pleasure." The plain meaning of
this text is, that it is God by his operation and efficiency who
gives the will, and also enables us to put that will jri execu-
tion ; or that he by his efficiency gives both the will and the
deed. And this will remain the plain meaning of this text,
after this sort of gentlemen have worked upon it a thousand
years longer, if any of them shall remain on eartn so long.
It will be the indisputable meaning of it, notwithstanding
their criticisms on the word vspymi & c - I question whether any
word can be found, in all the Greek language, more expres-
sive and significant of an effectual operation. Wherever the
words effectual and effectually are used in our translation of
the Bible, this is the word used in the original. See the Eng-
lish Concordance.
472 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§ 61. By the disposing or determining cause of a benefit
I mean, a cause that disposes, orders or determines, whether
we shall be actually possessed of the benefit or not ; and the
same cause may be said to be an efficacious or effectual cause.
That cause only can be said to be an efficacious cause, whose
efficiency determines, reaches, and produces the effect.
A being may be the determiner and disposer of an event,
and not properly an efficient or efficacious cause. Because,
though he determines the futurity of the event, yet there is
no positive efficiency or power of the cause that reaches and
produces the effect ; but merely a withholding or withdraw-
ing of efficiency or power.
Concerning the giver's being a disposer or determiner,
let us consider that objection, that when a man gives to a beg-
gar, he does but offer, and leaves it with the determination of
the beggar's will, whether he will be possessed of the thing of-
fered. In answer to this I observe, that in the instance before
us, the very thing given is the fruit of the bounty of the giver.
The thing given is virtue, and this consists in the determination
of the inclination, and will. Therefore the determination of the
will is the gift of God ; otherwise virtue is not his gift, and
it is an inconsistence to pray to God to give it to us. Why
should we pray to God to give us such a determination of
will, when that proceeds not from him but ourselves ?
§ 62. Every thing in the Christian scheme argues, that
man's title to, and fitness for heaven, depends on some great
divine influence, at once causing a vast change, and not any
such gradual change as is supposed to be brought to pass by
men themselves in the exercise of their own power. The
exceeding diversity of the states of men in another world, ar-
gues it.
§ 63. Arminians make a great ado about the phrase ir-
resistible grace. But the grand point of controversy really is,
what is it that determines, disposes, and decides the matter,
whether there shall be saving virtue in the heart or not ; and
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 473
much more properly, whether the grace of God in the affair
he determining grace, than whelher it be irresistible.
Our case is indeed extremely unhappy, if we have such a
book to be our grand and only rule, our light and directory, that
is so exceeding perplexed, dark, paradoxical and hidden every-
where in the manner of expression, as the scriptures must be,
to make them consistent with Arminian opinions, by whatev-
er means this has come to pass, whether through the distance
of ages, diversity of customs, or by any other cause. It is to
be considered that this is given for the rule of all ages ; and
not only of the most learned, and accurate, and penetrating
critics, and men of vast inquiry and skill in antiquity, but for
all sorts of persons, of every age and nation, learned and un-
learned. If this be true, how unequal and unfit is the provi-
sion that is made ! How improper to answer the end design-
ed ! If men will take subterfuge in pretences of a vast alter-
ation of phrase, through diversity of ages and nations, what
may not men hide themselves from under such a pretence !
No words will hold and secure them. It is not in the nature
of words to do it. At this rate, language in its nature has n»
sufficiency to communicate ideas.
§ 64. In efficacious grace we are not merely passive*
nor yet does God do some, and we do the rest. But God
does all, and we do all. God produces all, and we act all.
For that is what he produces, viz. our own acts. God is the
only proper author and fountain ; we only are the proper act-
ors. We are, in different respects, wholly passive, and
wholly active.
In the scriptures the same things are represented as from
God and from us. God is said to convert, and men are said
to convert and turn. God makes a new heart, and we are
commanded to make us a new heart. God circumcises the
heart, and we arc commanded to circumcise our own hearts;
not merely because we must use the means in order to the
effect, but the effect itself is our act and our duty. These
tilings are agreeable to that text, « God worketh in you both
to will and to do."
Vol. V. 3M
47* EFFICACIOUS GRACE.'
§ 65. Christ says, that no other than those whom « the
Father draws, will come to him ;" and Slebbing suppose*
none but those whom the Father draws in this sense, viz. by
first giving them a teachable spirit, &c. But this was false
in fact in the Apostle Paul and others ; at least he did not
give it in answer to prayer, as their scheme supposes, and
must suppose ; else efficacious grace is established, and the
liberty of the will, in their sense of it, is overthrown.
§ 66. When Christ says, John x. « Other sheep have I
which are not of this fold ;" it is unreasonable to suppose he
meant all in the world, that were then of a teachable disposi-
tion. Many of them would be dead before the gospel could
be spread among the Gentiles ; and many of the Gentiles
were doubtless brought in, that at that time were not of a
teachable disposition. And unless God's decrees and effica-
cious grace made a difference, it is unreasonable to suppose
any other, than that multitudes, in countries where the apos-
tles never preached, were as teachable as in those countries
where they did go, and so they never were brought in ac-
cording to the words of Christ, " Those whom the Father
hath given me, shall come unto me." Christ speaks of the
Father's giving them as a thing past, John x. 29. » My Fath-
er which gave them me."
When Christ speaks of men's being drawn to him, he does
not mean any preparation of dispositiou antecedent to their
having the gospel, but a being converted to Christ by faith in
the gospel, revealing Christ crucified, as appears by John xii.
32. " And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men
unto me." Acts xv. 9. "Purifying their hearts by faith."
Therefore we are not to suppose God first purifies the heart
with the most excellent virtues, to fit it for faith.
The apostle says, " without faith it is impossible to please
God." Therefore it is not possible that persons should have.,
before faith, those virtues that are peculiarly amiable to God,
as Stebbing supposes.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 475
§ 67. The Apostle James tells us, that if we do not pray
in faith, we have no reason to expect to receive any thing,
and particularly not to receive divine wisdom. And there-
fore it is unreasonable to suppose with Stebbing, that persons
first pray, even before they have a spirit of meekness, and
teachableness, and humility, faith or repentance, and that
God has promised to answer these prayers. Christian vir-
tues being every where spoken of as the special effect of
grace, and often called by the name of grace, by reason of its
being the peculiar fruit of grace, does not well consist with
the Arminian notion of assistance, viz. that God is obliged to
give us assistance sufficient for salvation from hell, because,
forsooth, it is not just to damn us for the want of that which
we have not sufficient means to escape ; and then, after God
has given these sufficient means, our improving them well is
wholly from ourselves, our own will, and not from God ; and
the thing wherein Christian virtue consists, is wholly and en-
tirely from ourselves.
§ 68. Efficacious grace is not inconsistent with freedom.
This appears by 2 Cor. viii. 16, 17. « Thanks be to God
which put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for
you ; for indeed he accepted the invitation ; but being more
forward, of his own accord he went unto you." So that his
forwardness being put into his heart by God, and his being
forward of his own accord, are not inconsistent, one with the
other.
§ 69. According to Arminian principles, men have a
good and honest heart, the very thing that is the grand re-
quisite in order to God's acceptance, and so the proper grand
condition of salvation, and which is often spoken of in the
scriptures as such, before they have the proper condition of
salvation.
See Stebbing, page 48 This good and honest, meek and
humble, sincere heart, they suppose they have before they
have faith, repentance or obedience. Yea, they themselves
hold this previous qualification to be the grand and essential
476 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
requisite in order to God's acceptance and salvation by Christ ,
so that they greatly insist that if men have it, they shall be
surely saved, though they live and die in ignorance of the
gospel, and without faith, and repentance, and holiness, which
are necessary in order for salvation, according to them... .
Stebbing)Y>. 13.
§ 70. I would ask, how it is possible for us to come by
virtue at first, according to Arminian principles, or how we
come by our first virtue ? Is it natural ? Is there some vir-
tuous disposition with which we come into the world ? But
how is that virtue ? That which men bring into the world
is necessary, and what men had no opportunity to prevent,
and it is not at all from our free will. How then can there
be any virtue in it according to their principles ? Or is our
first virtue wholly from the influence of the Spirit of God
"without any endeavor or effort of ours, to be partly the cause
of it ? This, to be sure cannot be, by their principles ; for,
according to them, that which is not at all from us, or that
we are not the causes of, is no virtue of ours. Is it wholly
from our endeavors, without any assistance at all of the Spir-
it ? This is contrary to what they pretend to hold ; for they
assert, that without divine assistance there can be no virtue.
Stebbing, pages 27, 28, and pages 20, 2 1, and other places.
If they say it is partly from the influence of the Spirit of
God, and partly from our own endeavors, I would inquire
whether those endeavors that our first virtue partly arises
from, be good endeavors, and at all vi? tuous. If the answer
be in the affirmative, this contradicts the supposition. For I
am now inquiring what the first virtue is. The first virtue
we have, certainly does not arise from virtuous endeavors
preceding that first virtue ; for that is to suppose virtue be-
fore the first virtue. If the answer be, that they are no good
endeavors, they have nothing at all of the nature of the exer-
cise of any good disposition, or any good aim and intention,
or any virtuous sincerity ; i ask, what tendency can such ef-
forts of the mind, as are wholly empty of all goodness, have
to produce true moral goodness in tbe heart ?
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 477
Can an action, that in principles and ends has no decree
of moral good, have a tendency to beget a habit of acting from
good principles and for good ends ? For instance, can a man's
doing something purely to satisfy some sensitive appetite of his
own, or to increase his own worldly profit, have any kind of
tendency to beget a habit of doing something from true, disin-
terested benevolence, or to excite to any act from such a prin-
ciple ? Certainly an act perfectly void of benevolence, has no
more tendency to produce either an habit or act of benevo-
lence, than nothing has a tendency to produce something.
§71. Stebbing supposes the assistance God gives, or the
operation of the Spirit in order to faith, is to give a good and
honest heart, prepared to receive and well improve the word ;
as particularly, meekness, humility, teachableness, 8cc. And
supposes that these effects of the Spirit are to be obtained by
prayer ; but yet allows, that the prayer must be acceptably
made, page ;06, which supposes that some degree of virtue
must be exercised in prayer. For surely they do not suppose
any thing else, beside virtue in prayer, or in any other part of
religion, is acceptable to God. I suppose they will not deny,
that there must be at least some virtuous respect to the divine
being, as well as some virtuous concern for the good of their
own souls, to make any external act of religion in them at all
acceptable to God, who is a spirit, and the searcher of hearts.
And it may be also presumed that they will allow, that there
are multitudes of men, who at present are so wicked, so des-
titue of virtue, that they have not virtue enough for acceptable
prayer to God. They have not now so much respect to God
or their own souls, as to incline them to pray at all. But they
live in a total neglect of that duty. Now, I would inquire,
how these men shall come by viruie, in order to acceptably
praying to God ? Or how is it within their reach by virtue of
God's promises ? Or how can they come by it, save by God's
sovereign, arbitrary grace ? Shall they pray to God for it, and
so obtain it ? But this is contrary to the supposition. For it is
supposed, that they now have not virtue enough to pray ac-
ceptably, and this is the very thing inquired, how they come
by the virtue necessary in order to their making acceptable
478 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
prayer ? Or shall they work the virtue in themselves wholly
without God's assistance ? But this is contrary to what they
pretend, viz. that all virtue is from God, or by the grace and
assistance of God, which they allow to be evident by that
scripture, " without me ye can do nothing." Or, is God oblig-
ed to give it, or to assist them to obtain it, without their pray-
ing for it, or having virtue enough to ask it of him ? That
they do not pretend. For they suppose the condition of our
obtaining the heavenly Spirit is our seeking, Sec. asking, Sec.
and besides, if God gives it without their first seeking it, that
will make God the first determining efficient, yea, the mere
and sole author of it, without their doing any thing toward it,
without their so much as seeking or asking for it ; which
would be entirely to overthrow their whole scheme, and would,
by their principles, make this virtue no virtue at all, because
not at all owing to them, or any endeavors of theirs.
If they reply, they must in the first place consider : They
are capable of consideration ; and if they would consider as
they ought and may, they would doubtless pray to God, and
ask his help ; and every man naturally has some virtue in
him, which proper consideration would put into exercise so
far as to cause him to pray in some measure acceptably,
without any new gift from God....I answer, this is inconsist-
ent with many of their principles. It is so, that men should
naturally have some virtue in them. For what is natural is
necessary ; is not from themselves and their own endeavors
and free acts ; but prevents them all, and therefore cannot be
their virtue. If they say, no ; consideration will not stir up
any virtue that is naturally in them, to cause them to pray
virtuously ; but God has obliged himself to give virtue enough
to enable them to pray and seek acceptably, if they will con-
sider : I answer, this is more than they pretend. They do
not pretend that God has promised any new grace to any man,
on any lower condition than asking, seeking, knowing, Sec.
and if they should think best at last to pretend any promise on
lower terms, they had best produce the promises, and tell us
what, and where they are. If they say, serious consideration
itself is some degree of seeking their own good, and there is
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 479
an implicit prayer in it to the Supreme Being to guide them
into the way to their happiness : I answer, if it be supposed
that there is an implicit prayer in their consideration, still
they allow that prayer must be in some measure acceptable
prayer, in order to its being entitled to an answer ; and con-
sequently must have some degree of virtuous respect to God,
Sec. and if so, then the same question returns with all the
aforementioned difficulties over again, viz. How came the
profane, thoughtless, vain, inconsiderate person by this new
virtue, this new respect to God, that he ever exercises in this
serious consideration and implicit prayer ?
If they say, there is no necessity of supposing any implicit
prayer in the first consideration ; and yet, if the wicked,
profane, careless person, makes a good improvement of what
grace he has, in proper consideration or otherwise, God has
obliged himself to give him more, in that general promise,
" to him that hath shall be given, and he shall have more a-
bundance :" Then I answer, here is new virtue in his mak-
ing a good improvement of what common assistance he has,
which before he neglected, and made no good improvement
of. How came he by this new virtue ? Here, again, all the
aforementioned difficulties return. Was it wholly from him-
self? This is contrary to what they pretend. Or is God
obliged to give new assistance in order to this new virtue by
any promise ? If he be, what is the condition of the promise ?
It is absurd to say, making a good improvement of what as-
sistance they have ; for that is the thing we are inquiring af-
ter, viz. How comes he by that new virtue, making a good
improvement of what he has, when before he had not virtue
enough to make such an improvement ?
Of whatever kind this assistance is, whether it be some
afflictive dispensation of providence, or some other outward
dispensation or inward influtnce, the difficulty is the same.
How becomes God obliged to give this assistance ; and what
is the condition of the promise ?
The answer must be, that this new virtue is without any
new assistance given, and is from God no otherwise than as
the former neglected assistance or grace subserves it. But
480 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
the question is, whence comes the virtue of not neglecting*
but improving that former assistance ? Is it proper to say
that a man is assisted to improve assistance by the assistance
improved? Suppose a number of men were in the water in
danger of drowning, and a friend on shore throws out a cord
amongst them, but all of them for a while neglect it ; at
length one of them takes hold of it, and makes improvement
of it; and any should inquire, how that man came by the
prudence and virtue of improving the cord, when others did
not, and he before had neglected it ; would it be a proper an-
swer to say, that he that threw out the rope, assisted him
wisely to improve the rope, by throwing out the rope to him ?
This would be an absurd answer. The question is not, how
he came by his opportunity, but how he came by the virtue
and disposition of improvement. His friend on shore gave
him the opportunity, and this is all. The man's virtue in
improving it was not at all from him.
Would it not be exceedingly impertinent, in such a cise,
to set forth from time to time, how this man's discretion, and
virtue, and prudence, was the gift of his friend on the shore,
his mere gift, the fruit of his purpose and mere good pleas-
ure, and of his power ; and yet that it was of his own will ?
Man's virtue, according to Arminian principles, must con-
sist wholly and entirely in improving assistance : for in that
only consists the exercise of their free will in the affair, and
not in their having the assistance, although their virtue must
be by their principles entirely from themselves, and God has
no hand in it. From the latter part of the above discourse, it
appears that, according to At minhn principles, men's virtue
is altogether of themselves, and God has no hand at all in it.
§ 72. When I say that the acts and influences of the Spir-
it determine the effects, it is not meant that man has nothing
to do to determine in the affair. The -soul of man undoubted-
ly, in every instance, does voluntarily determine with respect
to his own consequent actions. But this determination of the
will of man, or voluntary determination of the soul of man, is
the effect determined. This determining act of the soul is
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 481
notdenied, but supposed, as it is the effect we are speaking
of, that the influence of God's Spirit determines.
§ 73. The scripture speaks of this as the reason that good
men have virtue, that God hath given it to them ; and the rea-
son why bad men have it not, that God hath not given it to them.
These two together clearly prove that God is the determin-
ing or disposing cause of virtue or goodness in men.
§ 74. Dr. Stebbing insists upon it, that conversion is the
effect of God's word ; and supposes that therefore it is de-
monstratively evident, that it must needs be the effect of
men's free will, and not the necessary effect of the Spirit
of God. But I say, that by their doctrine of selfdeter-
mination, it cannot be the effect of the word of God in any
proper sense at all. That it should be the effect of the word,
is as inconsistent with their scheme, as they suppose it to be
with ours. Selfdeterminati^n is utterly inconsistent with con-
version's being at all the effect of either the word or Spirit.
% 75. They say that commands, threatenings, promises,
invitations, counsels, &c. are to no purpose in our scheme.
But indeed they can have no place in their scheme : For their
scheme excludes all motive.
* § 76. In many particulars their scheme contradicts com-
mon sense. It is contrary to common sense, that a being
should continually meet with millions of millions of real, prop-
er disappointments and crosses to his proper desires, and not
continually lead a distressed and unhappy life. It is contrary
to common sense, that God should know that an event will
certainly come to pass, whose nonexistence he at the same
time know* is not impossible. It is contrary to common
sense that a thing should be the cause of itself; and that a
thing not necessary in its own nature should come to pass
without any cause : That the more indifferent a man is in any
moral action, the more virtuous he is 8cc.
Vol. V. 3N
t*H EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§77. If the grace of God is not disposing and determining,
then a gracious man's differing: in this respect from another,
is not owing 'o the goodness of God. He owes no thanks to
God for it ; and so owes no thanks to God, that he is saved,
and not others.
But how contraryis this to scripture ! Seeing the scripture
speaks of the gift of virtue, and of the possession of it, as a
fruit of God's bounty.
§78. A man's conformity to the rule of duty, is partly
owing to assistance or motive ; if his conformity be to ten de-
grees, and it is in some measure, v. g. to the amount of five
degrees, owing to sovereign assistance ; then only the re-
maining five degrees are to be ascribed to the man himself
and therefore there are but five degrees of virtue.
§79. Dr. Stebbing says, " that a man is indeed both pas-
sive and active in his own conversion," and he represents God
as partly the cause of man's conversion, and man himself as
partly the cause, p. 208.
Again, Stebbbig says, p. 254. « Faith and regeneration
are our works, as well as his gifts, i. e. they arise partly from
God and partly from ourselves." But if so, on this scheme,
they imply virtue so far only as they are our works.
Men's salvation is attributed wholly and entirely to men
in their scheme, and none of the praise of it is due to God,
as will most evidently appear, if the matter be consider-
ed with a little attention. For, 1. They hold that man's sal-
vation is given as a reward of man's virtue ; so is pardon of
sin, deliverance from hell, and eternal life and glory in heav-
en ; all is for man's virtue. 2 Rewardable virtue wholly con-
sists in the exercise of a man's own free will. They hold
that a man's actions are no farther virtuous nor •rewa'-dable,
than as they are from man himself. If they are partly from
some foreign cause, so far they are not rewardable. It being
so, that that virtue which is rewardable in man, is entirely from
man himself; hence it is to himself wholly that he is to as-
cribe his obtaining the reward. If the virtue, which is that
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 483
thing, and that thing only, which obtains the reward, be whol-
ly from man himself, ihen it will surely follow, that his ob?
taining the reward is wholly from himself.
All their arguments suppose, that men's actions are no far*
ther virtuous and rewardable, than as they are from them-
selves, the fruits of their own free will and selfdetermination.
And men's own virtue, they say, is the only condition of sal-
vation, and so must he the only thing by which salvation is
obtained. And this being of themselves only, it surely follows,
th,at their obtaining salvation is of themselves only.
„ They say, their scheme gives almost all the glory to God.
That matter, I suppose, may easily be determined, and it may
be made to appear beyond all contest, how much they do as-
cribe to the man, and how much they do not.
By them, salvation is so far from God, that it is God that
gives opportunity to obtain salvation ; it is God that gives the of-
fqrand makes the promise: Bui the obtainingof thethingprom-
ised is of men. The being of the promise is of God ; but their
interest in it is wholly of themselves, of their own free will.
And furthermore, it is to be observed, that evea God's mak-
ing the offer, and giving the opportunity to obtain salvation,
at least that which consists in salvation from eternal misery,
is not of God, so as to be owing to any proper grace or good-
ness of his. For they suppose he was obliged to make the
offer, and it would have been a reproach to his justice, if he
had not given an opportunity to obtain salvation. For they
hold, it is unjust for God to make men miserable for Adam's
sin ; and that it is unjust to punish them for that sin that they
cannot avoid ; and that, therefore, it is unjust for God not to
preserve or save all men that do what they can, or use their
sincere endeavors to do their duty ; and therefore it certainly
follows, that it is unjust in God not to give all opportunity to
be saved or preserved from misery ; and consequently, it is
no fruit at all of any grace or kindness in him to give such
opportunity, or to make the offer of it. So that, all that is the
fruit of God's kindness in man's salvation, is the positive hap-
piness that belongs to salvation. But neither of these two
things are in any respect whatsoever the fruit of God's kind-
4«4 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
ness, neither his deliverance from sin, nor from misery in his
virtue and holiness ; and when hereafter he shall see the mis-
ery of the damned, he will have it to consider, that it is owing
in no respect to God that he is delivered from that misery.
And that good men differ from others, that shall burn in hell
to all eternity, is wholly owing to themselves. When they,
at the day of judgment, shall behold some set on the left hand
of the Judge, while they are on his right hand, and shall see
how they differ, they may, and, as they would act according
to truth, they ought to take all the glory of it unto themselves ;
and therefore the glory of their salvation belongs to them.
For it is evident that a man's making himself to differ with
regard to any great spiritual benefit, and his not receiving it
from another, but his having it in distinction from others,
being from himself, is ground of a man's boasting and glory-
ing in himself, with respect to that benefit, and of boasting of
it : I say, it is evident by the apostle's words, « Who maketh,
thee to differ ? Why boastest thou, as though thou hadst not
received it ?" 'I hese words plainly imply it.
It is evident, that it is God's design to exclude man's boast-
ing in the affair of his salvation. Now, let us consider what
does give ground for boasting in the apostle's account, and
what it is that in his account excludes boasting, or cuts off oc-
casion for it. It is evident by what the apostle says, 1 Cor.
i. latter end, that the entireness and universality of our de-
pendence on God, is that which cuts off occasion of boasting ;
as, our receiving our wisdom, our holiness, and redemption
through Christ, and not through ourselves ; that Christ is
made to us wisdom, justification, holiness and redemption ;
and not only so, but that it is of God that we have any part in
Christ ; of him are yc in C/vtist Jesus : Nay, further, that it is
from God we receive those benefits of wisdom, holiness, See.
through the Saviour that we a:e interested in.
The import of all these things, if we may trust to Scrip-
lure representations is, that God has contrived to exclude our
glorying ; that we should he wholly and every way depend-
ent on God, for the moral and natural good that belongs to
salvation ; and that we have all from the hand of God, by his
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 485
power and grace. And certainly this is wholly inconsistent
with the idea that our holiness is wholly from ourselves ; and,
that we are interested in the benefits of Christ rather than
others, is wholly of our own decision. And that such an uni-
versal dependence is what takes away occasion of taking glory
to ourselves, and is a proper ground of an ascription of all the
glory of the things belonging to man's salvation to God, is
manifest from Rom. xi. 35, S6. " Or who hath first given
unto him, and it shall be recompensed to him again ? For
of him, and to him, and through him, are all things ; to whom
be glory for ever and ever, Amen."
The words are remarkable, and very significant. If we
look into all the foregoing discourse, from the beginning of
chapter ix. of which this is the conclusion, by not giving to
God, but having all this wholly from, through, and in God, is
intended that these things, these great benefits foremention-
ed, are thus from God, without being from or through our-
selves. That some of the Jews were distinguished from oth-
ers in enjoying the privileges of Christians, was not of them-
selves ; not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but
of God that sheweth mercy. It is of him who has mercy on
whom he will have mercy. It is of God who makes of the
same lump, a vessel of honor and a vessel unto dishonor. It
is not of us, nor our works, but of the calling of God, or of
him that calleth, chap. ix. 1 1, and 23, 24. Not first of our own
choice, but of God's election, chap. ix. 1 1....27, and chap. xi.
5. It is all of the grace of God in such a manner, as not to
be of our works at all ; yea, and so as to be utterly inconsist-
ent with its being of our works ; chap. xi. 5, 6, 7. In such
a manner as not first to be of their seeking ; their seeking
does not determine, but God's election ; chap. xi. 7. It is
of God, and not of man, that some were grafted in, that were
wild olive branches in themselves, and were more unlikely as
to any thing in themselves to be branches, than others, verse
17. Their being grafted in, is owing to God's distinguishing
goodness, while he was pleased to use severity towards oth-
ers, v. 22. Yea, God has so ordered it, on purpose that all
should be shut up in unbelief; be left to be so sinful, that he
486 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
might have mercy on all ; so as more visibly to show the sal-
vatiori of all to be merely dependent on mercy- Then the
apostle filly concludes all this discourse, Rom. xi. 35, 36.
" Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed
to him again ? For of him, and to him, and through him,
are all things ; to whom be glory for ever. Amen."
Again, in the apostle's account, a benefit's being of our
■works, gives occasion for boasting, and therefore God has
contrived that our salvation shall not be of our works, but of
mere grace, Rom. Ill . 27, Eph. ii. 9. And that neither the
salvation, nor the condition of it, shall be of our works, but
that, with regard to all, we are God's workmanship and his
creation antecedently to our works ; and his grace and pow-
er in producing this workmanship, and his determination or
purpose with regard to them, are all prior to our works, and
the cause of them. See also Rom. xi. 4, 5, 6.
And it is evident, that man's having virtue from himself,
and not receiving it from another, and making himself to
differ with regard to great spiritual benefits, does give ground
for boasting, by the words of the apostle in Rom. iii. 27.
And this is allowed by those men in spiritual gifts. And if
so in them, more so in greater things ; more so in that which
in itself is a thousand times more excellent, and often thous-
and times greater importance and benefit.
By the Arminian scheme, that which is infinitely the
most excellent thing, viz. virtue and holiness, which the apos-
tle sets forth as being infinitely the most honorable, and will
bring the subjects of it to infinitely the greatest and highest
honor, that which is infinitely the highest dignity of man's
nature of all things tlint belong to man's salvation ; in com-
parison of which, all things belonging to that salvation are
nothing ; that which does infinitely more than any thing else
constitute the difference between them and others, as more
excellent, more worthy, more honorable and happy ; this is
from themselves. With regard to this, they have not re-
ceived of another. With regard to this great thing, they, and
they only, make themselves to differ from others ; and this
difference proceeds not at all from the power or grace of God.
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 4Sf
Again, in the apo-tle's account, this scheme will give oc-
casion to have a great benefit, that appertains to salvation, not
of grace, but of works.
Virtue is not only the most honorable attainment, but it is
that which men, on the supposition of their being possessed
of it, are more apt to glory in, than in any thing else whatso-
ever. For what are men so apt to glory in as their own sup-
posed excellency, as in their supposed virtue ? And what
sort of glorying is that, which, it is evident in fact, the Scrip-
tures do chiefly guard against ? It is glorying in their own
righteousness, their own holiness, their own good works.
It is manifest, that in the apostle's account, it is a proper
consideration to prevent our boasting, that our dislinction
from others is not of ourselves, not only in being distinguish-
ed in having better gifts and better principles, but in our be-
ing made partakers of the great privileges of Christians, such
as being engrafted into Christ, and partaking of the fatness of
that olive tree. Rom. xi. 17, 18. » And if some of the
branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert
grafted in amongst them, and with them partakest of the root
and fatness of the olive tree, boast not against the branches."
Here it is manifest, it is the distinction that was made be-
tween some and others, that is the thing insisted on ; and the
apostle, verse 22, calls upon them to consider this great dis-
tinction, and to ascribe it to the distinguishing goodness of
God only. " Behold therefore the goodness and severity of
Gcd ; on them which fell, se\erity ; but toward thee, good-
ness." And its being owing, not to them, but to God and
his distinguishing goodness, is the tiling the apostle urges as
a reason why they should not boast, but magnify God's grace
or distinguishing goodness. And if it be a good reason, and
the scheme, of our salvation be every way so contrived (as
the apostle elsewhere signifies) that all occasion of boasting
should be precluded, and all reasons given to ascribe all to
God's grace ; then it is doubtless so ordered, that the greatest
privileges, excellency, honor and happiness of Christians,
should be that wherein they do not distinguish themselves,
but the difference is owing to God's distinguishing goodness
488 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
Stebbing strongly asserts, God is not the author of that
difference that is between some and others, that some are
good, and others bad.
§ 89. The Arminians differ among themselves. Dr.
Whitby supposes what God does, is only proposing moral
motives ; but that in attending, adverting and considering,
we exercise our liberty. But Stebbing supposes, that the
attention and consideration is itself the thing owing to the
Spirit of God ; p. 2 1 7.
§81. Stebbing changes the question, pages 223, 224.
He was considering who has the chief glcy of our conver-
sion, or of our virtue ; and there, answering objections, en-
deavors to prove the affirmative of another question, viz.
whether God is the author of that pardon and salvation, of
which conversion and virtue are the condition.
§ 82. Stebbing supposes that one thing wherein the as-
sistance of the Spirit consists, is the giving of a meek, teach-
able, disinterested temper of mind, to prepare men for faith in
Christ ; pages 217, 259, and that herein consists that drawing
of the Father, John vi. 44, viz. in giving such a temper of
mind.
This he calls the preventing grace of God, that goes be-
fore conversion. He often speaks of a part that we do, and a
part that God does. And he speaks of this as that part which
God does. Therefore this, if it be the part which God does,
in distinction from the part which we do, (for so he speaks of
it) is wholly done by God. And consequently, here is virtue
wholly from God, and not at all from the exercise of our own
freewill ; which is inconsistent with his own, and all other Ar-
minian principles. Stebbing speaksof these preparatory disposi-
tions as virtue, p. 30, 31, 32, yea, as that wherein virtue does
in a peculiar manner consist, p. 31. And he there also, viz.
page 259, talks inconsistently with himself ; for he supposes
that this meek and teachable tamper is given by Ged, by his
preventing grace ; and also supposes, that all that have this f
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 439
Shall surely come to the Father. He says, page 256, « It is
certainly true of the meek, disinterested man, that as he will
hot reject the gospel at first ; so he will not be prevailed on
by any worldly considerations to forsake it afterwards."
" He who is under no evil bias of mind, by which he may
be prejudiced against the truth, (which is the notion of a
meek and disinterested man) such a one, I say, cannot possi-
bly fail of being wrought upon by the preaching of the word,
which carries in it all that evidence of truth, which reason re-
quires," See. and his words, page 259, are, « John vi. 37, 39.
All that the Father giveth me, shall come unto me ;" for to
be given of the Father signifies the same thing with being
drawn of the Father, as has been already shown. And to be
drawn of the Father, signifies to be prepared or fitted for the
reception of the gospel, by the preventing grace of God, as
has also been proved. Now, this preparedness consisting, as
has likewise been shown, in being endued with a meek and
disinterested temper of mind ; those who are given of the
Father, will be the same with Christ's sheep. And the sense
of the place is the same with the preceding, where our Sav-
iour says that his sheep hear his voice and follow him, i. e.
become his obedient disciples. This text, therefore, being
no more than a declaration of what will be certain, and (mor-
ally speaking) the necessary effect of that disposition, upon
the account of which men are said to be given of the Father,
(to wit, that it will lead them to embrace the gospel, when
once proposed to them.") By these things, the preventing
grace of God, the part that God does, in distinction from the
part that we do, and that which prevents or goes before what
we do, thoroughly decides and determines the case as to our
conversion, or our faith and repentance and obedience, not-
withstanding all the hand our free will is supposed to have in
the case ; and which he supposes is what determines man's
conversion ; and insists upon it most strenuously and magis-
terially through his whole book. Stebbing supposes the in-
fluence of the Spirit necessary to prepare men's hearts, pages
15.... 18. He (pages 17, 18) speaks oi this as what the Spirit-
does, and as being his preventing grace ; and speaks of it as
Vol. V. 3 O
490 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
always effectual ; so that all such, and only such as have It,
will believe, bee also pages 28. ...30.
That these dispositions must be effectual ; see pages 46
....48.
This teachable, humble, meek spirit, is what Stebbing
speaks of every where as what the Spirit of God gives ante-
cedent to obedience. He insists upon it, that God's assist-
ance is necessary in order to obedience. In pages 20, 21, he
plainly asserts that it is necessary in order to our obedience,
and declares that our Saviour has asserted it in express terms
in these words, John xv. 5. " Without me ye can do noth-
ing ;" i. e. as he says, no good thing. Hence it follows, that
this teachable, humble, meek disposition, this good and hon-
est heart, is not the fruit of any good thing we do in the ex-
ercise of our free will ; but is merely the fruit of divine op-
eration. Here observe well what Stebbing says concerning
God's giving grace sufficient for obedience, in answer ta
prayer. Pages 103.... 106.
§ 83. No reason in the world can be given, why a meek,
humble spirit, and sense of the importance of Christian
things, should not be as requisite in order to acceptable pray-
er, as in order to acceptable hearing and believing the word.
It is as much so spoken of. A praying without a good spirit
in these and other respects, is represented as no prayer, as
ineffectual, and what we have no reason to expect will be an-
swered.
§84. If that meekness, &c. depends on some antece-
dent, selfdetcrmincd act of theirs, and they be determined by
that ; then their being Christ's, being his sheep, and therein
distinguished from others that are not his sheep, is not prop-
erly owing to the Father's gift, but to their own gift. The
Father's pleasure is not the thing it is to be ascribed to at all ;
for the Father docs nothing in the case decisively ; he acts
not at all freely in the case, but acts on an antecedent, firm
obligation to the persons themselves ; but their own pleas-
ure, undetermined by God, is that which disposes and decides
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 491
in the matter. How impertinent would it be to insist on the
gift of the Father in this case, when the thing he speaks of is
not from thence ?
§ 85. He supposes that the assistance that God gives in
order to obedience is giving this good and honest heart ; see
p. 46, 47, together with p. 40, 45 ; and therefore, this good
and honest heart is not the fruit of our own obedience, but
must be the fruit of assistance that precedes our good works,
as he often calls it the preventing grace of God. And there-
fore, if this grace determines the matter, and will certainly
be followed with faith and obedience, then all Arminianism,
and his own scheme, comes to the ground.
§ 86. Stebbing interprets that passage, Luke xix. 16, 17,
which speaks of our being little children, and receiving the
kingdom of God as little children, of that meekness and hu-
mility, Sec. that is antecedent to conversion, which it is ap-
parent Christ elsewhere speaks of as consequent on conver-
sion, as Matth. xviii.
§ 87. It is manifest the power of God overcomes resist-
ance, and great resistance of some sort ; otherwise there
would be no peculiar greatness of power, as distinguishing it
from the power of creatures, manifested in bringing men to
be willing to be virtuous ; which it is apparent there is, by
Matth. xix. 26. " But Jesus beheld them, and said unto
them, With men this is impossible, but with God all things
are possible."
§ 88. The Arminian scheme naturally, and by necessary
consequence, leads men to take all the glory of all spiritual
good (which is immensely the chief, most important and ex-
cellent thing in the whole creation) to ourselves ; as much as
if we, with regard to those effects, were the supreme, the
first cause, selfexistent, and independent, and absolutely sov-
ereign disposers. We leave the glory of only the meaner
part of creation to God), and take to ourselves all the glory of
492 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
that which is properly the life, beauty and glory of the crea-
tion, and without which i: is all worse than nothing. So that
there is nothing left for the great F^rst and Last; no glory
for either the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, in the affair. This
is not carrying things too fafl but is a consequence truly and
certainly to be ascribed to their scheme of things.
§ 89. He may be said to be the giver of money that of-
fers it to us, without being the proper determiner of our
acceptance of it. But if the acceptance of an offer itself
be the thing which is supposed to be given, he cannot,
in any proper sense whatsoever, be properly said to be
the giver of this, who is not the determiner of it. But it is
the acceptance of offers, and the proper improvement of op-
portunities, wherein consists virtue. He may be said to be
the giver of money or goods that does net determine the
vise choice ; but if the wise and good choice it.idf be said to
be the thing given, it supposes that the giver determines the
existing of such a wise choice. But now, this is the thing
that God is represented as the giver of when he is spoken of
as the giver of virtue, holiness, &c. for virtue and holiness (as
all our opponents in these controversies allow and maintain)
is the thing wherein a wise and good choice consists.
§ 90. It is the common way of the Arminians, in their
discourses and doctrines, which they pretend are so much
more consistent with reason and conmion sense, than the
doctrines of the Calvinists, to give no account at all, and make
no proper answer to the inquiries made ; and thty do as Mr.
Locke says of the Indian philosopher, who, when asked what
the world stood upon, answered, it s'ood upon an elephant ;
and, when asked what the elephant stood upon, he replied,
on a broadbacked tut tie, &c. None of their accounts will
bear to be traced. The first link of the chain, and tnc foun-
tain of the whole stream, must not be inquired after. If it
be, it brings all to a gross absurdity and selfcontradiction.
And yet, when they have done, they look upon others as stu-
pid bigots, and void of common sense, or at least going di-
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 43o
yectly counter to common sense, and worthy of contempt and
Indignation, because they will not agree with them.
§91.1 suppo c e it wiil not be denied by any party of Christ-
ians, that the happiness of the saints in the other world con-
sists much in perfect holiness and the exalted exercises of it ;
that the souls of the saints shall enter upon it at once at
death ; or (if any deny that) at least at the resurrection ; that
the saint is made perfectly holy as soon as ever he enters into
heaven. I suppose none will say, that perfection is obtained
by repeated acts of holiness ; but all will grant, that it is
wrought in the saint immediately by the power of God ; and
yet that it is virtue notwithstanding. And why are not the
beginnings of holiness wrought in the same manner ? Why
should not the beginnings of an holy nature be wrought im-
mediately by God in a soul that is wholly of a contrary nature,
as well as holiness be perfected in a soul that has already a
prevailing holiness ? And if it be so, why is not the begin-
ning, thus wrought, as much virtue as the perfection thus
wrought ?
§92. Saving grace differs, not only in degree, but in na-
ture and kind, from common grace, or any thing that is ever
found in natural men. This seems evident by the following-
things. 1. Because conversion is a work that is done at once,
and not gradually. If saving grace differed only in degree
from what went before, then the making a man a good man
■would be a gradual work ; it would be the increasing of the
grace that he has, till it comes to such a degree as to be sav-
ing, at least it would be frequently so. But that the conver-
sion of the heart is not a work that is thus gradually wrought,
but that it is wrought at once, appears by Christ's converting
the soul being represented by his calling of it ; Rom. viii. 28,
29, 30. " And we know that all things work together for good
to them that love God, to them who are the called according
to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did pre-
destinate to be conformed to the image of his Son ; that he
might be the first born among many brethren. Moreover,
494 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
whom he did predestinate, them he also called ; and whom he
called, them he also justified ; and whom he justified, them
he also glorified." Acts ii. 37. ...39. « Wen and brethren,
what shall we do ? Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and
be baptized everyone of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for
the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy
Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your children,
and to all that are afar of!', even as many as the Lord our God
shall call" Heb. rx. 15. " That they which are called might
receive the promise of eternal inheritance." 1 Thess. v.
23, • 4. « And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly :
And I pray God, your whole spirit, soul and body, be preserv-
ed blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.
Faithful is he that catteth you, who also will do it." Nothing
else can be meant in these places by calling, but what Christ
does in a sinner's saving conversion ; by which it seems evi-
dent, ihat this is done at once, and not gradually. Hereby
Christ shows his great power. He does but speak the pow-
erful word, and it is done. He does but call, and the heart of
the sinner immediately cometh, as was represented by his
calling his disciples, and their immediately following him.
So, when he called Peter and Andrew, James and John, they
were minding other things, and had no thought of following
Christ. But at his call they immediately followed him, Matth,
iv. 18. ...22. Peter and Andrew were casting a net into the sea.
Christ says unto them, as he passed by, Follow me ; and it is
said, they straightway left their nets and followed him. So
James and John were in the ship with Zebedee their father,
mending their nets : And he called them ; and immediately
they left the ship, and their father, and followed him. So
when Matthew was called ; Matth. ix. 9. " And as Jesus
passed forth from thence, he saw a man, named Matthew,
ut the receipt of custom ; and he saith unto him, Fol-
low me : And he arose and followed him." The same cir-
cumstances are observed by other evangelists. Which, doubt-
less, is to represent the manner in which Christ effectually
calls his disciples in all ages. There is something immedi-
ately put into their hearts, at that call, that is new, that there
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 495
was nothing of there before, which makes them so immedi-
ately act in a manner altogether new, and so alien from what
they were before.
That the work of conversion is wrought at once, is further
evident, by its being compared to a work of creation. When
God created the world, he did what he did immediately ; he
spake, and it was done ; he commanded, and it stood fast. He
said, let there be light, and there was light. Also by its being-
compared to a raising from the dead. Raising from the dead
is not a gradual work, but it is done at once. God calls, and
the dead come forth immediately. The change in conver-
sion is in the twinkling of an eye ; as that, 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52.
" We shall be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an
eye, at the last trump. For the trumpet shall sound, and the
dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed."
It appears by the manner in which Christ wrought all
those works that he wrought when on earth, that they were
types of his great work of converting sinners. Thus, when
he healed the leper, he put forth his hand and touched him,
and said, " I will, be thou clean ; and immediately his leprosy
was cleansed." Matth. viii. 3. Mark i. 42. Luke v. 13.
So, in opening the eyes of the blind men, Matth. xx. 30, Ecc.
he touched their eyes, and immediately their eyes received
sight, and tney followed him. And so Mark x. 52. Luke
xviii. 43. So, when he healed the sick, particularly Simon's
wife's mother, he took her by her hand, and lifted her up ;
and immediately the fever left her, and she ministered unto
him. So when the woman that had the issue of blood, touch-
ed the hem of Christ's garment, immediately her issue of
blood stanched ; Luke viii. 44. So the woman that was bow-
ed together with the spirit of infirmity, when Christ laid his
hands on her, immediately she was made straight, and glori-
fied God ; Luke xiii. 12, 13. So the man at the pool of
Bethcsda, when Christ bade him rise and take up his bed and
walk, was immediately made whole ; John v. 3, 9. After the
same manner Christ raised the dead, and cast out devils and
stilled the winds and seas
496 EFFICACIOUS GRACF.
2 There seems to be a specific difference between saving
grace or virtue and all that was in the heart before, by the
things that conversion is represented by in scripture ; partic-
ularly by its being represented as a work of creation. When
God creates, he does not merely establish and perfect the
things that were made before, but makes them wholly and
immediately. The tilings that are seen, are not made of
things that do appear. Saving grace in the heart is said to be
the new man, a new creature ; and corruption the old man.
If that virtue that is in the heart of an holy man, be not differ-
ent in its nature and kind, then the man might possibly have
liad the same seventy years before, and from time to time,
from the beginning of his life, and has it no otherwise now,
but only in a greater degree : And how then is he a new
creature ?
Again, it is evident also from its being compared to a res-
urrection. Natural men are said to be dead : But when they
are converted, they are by God's mighty and effectual pow-
er raised from the dead. Now, there is no medium be-
tween being dead and alive. He that is dead, has no degree
of life. He that has the least degree of life in him, is alive.
When a man is raised from the dead, life is not only in a
greater degree, but it is all new. And this is further evident
by that representation that is made of Christ's converting sin-
ners, in John v. 25. " Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour
is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of
the Son of God ; and they that hear shall live." This shews
conversion to be an immediate and instantaneous work, like
to the change made in Lazarus when Christ called him from
the grave : There went life with the call, and Lazarus was
immediately alive. That immediately before the call they
are dead, and therefore wholly destitute of any life, is evident
by that expression, " the dead shall hear the voice ;" and im-
mediately after the call, they are alive; yea, there goes life
with the voice, as is evident not only because it is said they
shall live, but also because it is said, they shall hear his voice.
It is evident, that the first moment they have any life, is the
moment when Christ calls ; and when Christ calls, or as soon
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 497
&s they are called, they are converted ; as is evident from
what is said in the first argument, wherein it is shewn, that to
be called, and converted, is the same thing.
3. Those that go farthest in religion, that are in a natural
condition, have no charity, as is plainly implied in the begin-
ning of the 1 3th chapter of the first of Corinthians ; by which
we must understand, that they have none of that kind of grace,
or disposition or affection, that is so called. So Christ else-
where reproves the Pharisees, those high pretenders to relig-
ion among the Jews, that they had not the love of God in
them.
4. In conversion, stones are raised up to be children unto
Abraham. While stones, they are wholly destitute of all
those qualities that afterward render them the living children
of • Abraham ; and not possessing them, though in a lesser
degree .
Agreeably to this, conversion is represented by the taking
away the heart of stone, and giving an heart of flesh. The
man, while unconverted, has a heart of stone, which has no
degree of that life or sense in it that the heart of flesh has ;
because it yet remains a stone ; than which, nothing is farther
from life and sense.
5. A wicked man has none of that principle of nature that
a godly man has, as is evident by 1 John iii. 9. » Whosoev-
er is born of God doth not commit sin ; for his seed remain-
eth in him ; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God."
The natural import of the metaphor shows, that by a seed,
is meant a principle of action : It may be small as a grain of
mustard seed. A seed is a small thing ; it may be buried up
and lie hid, as the seed sown in the earth ; it may seem to be
dead, as seeds for a while do, till quickened by the sim and
rain. But any degree of such a principle, or a principle of
such a nature, is what is called the seed ; it need not be to
such a degree, or have such a prevalency, in order to be ceil-
ed a seed. And it is further evident that this seed, or this in-
ward principle of nature, is peculiar to the saints ; for he that
has that seed, cannot sin ; and theieiore he that sins, or is a
wicked man, has it not.
Vol. V. 3 P
498 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
6. Natural men, or those that are not savingly converted
have no degree of that principle from whence all gracious act-
ings flow, viz. the Spirit of God or of Christ ; as is evident,
because it is asserted both ways in scripture, that those who
have not the Spirit of Christ, are not his, Rom. vii. 9, and al-
so, that those who have the Spirit of Christ, are his ; 1 John
iii. 24. « Hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the Spir-
it which he hath given us." And the Spirit of God is called
the earnest of the future inheritance, 2 Cor. i. 22, and v. 5.
Eph. i. 14. Yea, that a natural man has nothing of the Spir-
it in him, no part nor portion in it, is still more evident, be-
cause the having of the Spirit is given as a sure sign of being
in Christ. 1 John iv. 13. " Hereby know we that we dwell
in him, because he hath given us of his Spirit." By which it
is evident, that they have none of that holy principle, that the
godly have. And if they have nothing of the Spirit, they
have nothing of those things that are the fruits of the Spirit,
such as those mentioned in Gal. v. 22. « But the fruit of the
Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness,
faith, meekness, temperance." These fruits are here mention-
ed with the very design, that we may know whether we have
the Spirit or no. In the 18th verse, the apostle tells the Gala-
tians, that if they are ltd by the Spirit, they are not under the
law ; and then directly proceeds, first, to mention what are
the fruits or works of the flesh, and then, nextly, what are the
fruits of the Spirit, that we may judge whether we are led by
the Spirit or no.
7. That natural men, or those that are not born again,
have nothing of that grace that is in godly men, is evident by
John iii. 6, where Christ, speaking of regeneration, says,
« That which is born of the flesh, is flesh ; and that which is
born of the Spirit, is Spirit." By flesh is here meant nature,
and by Spirit is meant grace, as is evident by Gal. v. 16, 17.
Gal. vi. 8. 1 Cor. iii. 1. Rom. viii. 7. That is Christ's very
argument ; by this it is that Christ in those words would show
"Nicodcmus the necessity of regeneration, that by the first birth
we have nothing but nature, and can have nothing else with-
out being born again ; by which it is exceeding evident, that
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 499
iney that are not born again, have nothing else. And that
isatural men have not the Spirit is evident, since by this text
•with the context it is most evident that those who have the
Spirit, have it by regeneration. It is born in them ; it comes
into them no otherwise than by birth, and that birth is in
regeneration, as is most evident by the preceding and fol-
lowing verses. In godly men there are two opposite princi-
ples : The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit
against the flesh ; as Gal. v. 25. But it is not so with natur-
al men. Rebekah, in having Esau and Jacob struggle togeth-
er in her womb, was a type only of the true Church.
8. Natural men have nothing of that nature in them which
true Christians have ; and that appears, because the nature
they have is divine nature. The saints alone have it. Not
only they alone partake of such degrees of it, but they alone
are partakers of it. To be a partaker of the divine nature is
mentioned as peculiar to the saints, in 2 Pet. i. 4. It is evi-
dent it is the true saints the apostle is there speaking of. The
words in this verse and the foregoing, run thus : " According
as his divine power hath given us all things that pertain unto
life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath
called us to glory and virtue ; whereby are given unto us ex-
ceeding great and precious promises, that by these ye might
be partakers of the divine nature ; having escaped the corrup-
tion that is in the world through lust." Divine nature and
lust are evidently here spoken of as two opposite principles in
men. Those that are of the world, or that are the men of the
world, have only the latter principle. But to be partakers of
the divine nature, is spoken of as peculiar to them that are
distinguished and separated from the world, by the free and
sovereign grace of God giving them all things that pertain to
life and godliness ; by giving the knowledge of Christ, and call-
ing them to glory and virtue ; and giving them the exceeding
great and precious promises of the gospel, and enabling them
to escape the corruption of the world of wicked men. It is
spoken of, not only as peculiar to the saints, but as the highest
privilege of saints.
5©9 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
9. A natural man has no degree of that relish and sense
of spiritual things, or things of the Spirit, and of their divine
truth and excellency, which a godly man has ; as is evident
by 1 Cor. ii. 14. « The natural man receiveth not the things
of the Spirit of God ; for they arc foolishness unto him ;
neither can he know them, because they are spiritually dis-
cerned." Here a natural man is represented as perfectly
destitute of any sense, perception, or discerning of those
things. For by the words, he neither does, nor can know
them or discern them. So far from it, that they are foolish-
ness unto him. He is" such a stranger to them, that he knows
not what the talk of such things means ; they are words with-
out a meaning to him ; he knows nothing of the matter, any
more than a blind man of colors. Hence it will follow, that
the sense of things of religion that a natural man has, is not
only not to the same degree, but is not of the same nature with
what a godly man has. Besides, if a natural person has that
fruit of the Spirit, which is of the same kind with what a
spiritual person has, then he experiences within himself the
things of the Spirit of God. How then can he be said to be
such a stranger to them, and have no perception or discerning
of them ? The reason why natural men have no knowledge of
spiritual things, is, that they have nothing of the Spirit of
God dwelling in them. This is evident by the context. For
there we are told it is by the Spirit these things are taught,
verse 10 ...12. Godly persons, in the text we are upon, are
called spiritual, evidently on this account, that they have the
Spirit ; and unregenerate men are called natural men, be-
cause they have nothing but nature. Hereby the 6th argu-
ment is continued- For natural men are in no degree spirit-
ual ; they have only nature, and no Spirit. If they had any
thing of the Spirit, though not in so great a degree as the
godly, yet they would be taught spiritual things, or the things
of the Spirit in proportion ; the Spirit, that searcheth all things,
■would teach them in some measure. There would not be so
great a difference, that the one could perceive nothing of
them, and that they should be foolishness to them, while, to
the other, they appear divinely and unspeakably wise arid ex-
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 50 i
eellent, as they are spoken of in the context, verses 6. ...9, and
as such, the apostle speaks here of discerning them. The
reason why natural men have no knowledge or perception of
spiritual things, is, that they have none of that anointing-
spoken of, 1 John ii. 27. " But the anointing, which ye have
received of him, abideth in you, and ye need not that any
man should teach you ; but as the same anointing teacheth
you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it
hath taught you, ye shall abide in him."
This anointing is evidently here spoken of, as a thing pe-
culiar to true saints. Sinners never had any of that oil pour-
ed upon them ; and because ungodly men have none of it,
therefore they have no discerning of spiritual things. If they
had any degree of it, they would discern in some measure,
Therefore, none of that sense that natural men have of spirit-
xial things, is of the same nature with what the godly have.
And that natural men are wholly destitute of this knowledge.,
is further evident, because conversion is represented in scrip-
ture by opening the eyes of the blind. But this would be
very improperly so represented, if a man might have some
sight, though not so clear and full, time after time, for scores
of years before his conversion.
10. The grace of God's Spirit is not only a precious oil
with which Christ anoints the believer by giving it to him,
but the believer anoints Christ with it, by exercising it to-
wards him ; which seems to be represented by the precious
ointment Mary poured on Christ's head. Herein it seems to
me, that Mary is a type of Christ's church, and of every be-
lieving soul. And if so, doubtless the thing in which she
typifies the Church, has in it something peculiar to the
church. There would not be a type ordered on purpose to
represent the church, that shall represent only something
that is common to the church and others. Therefore unbe-
lievers pour none of that sweet and precious ointment on
Christ.
11. That unbelievers have no degree of that grace thai
the saints have, is evident, because they have no communion
with Christ. If unbelievers partook of any of that Spirit.
502 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
those holy inclinations, affections and actings that the godly
have from the Spirit of Christ, then they would have commu-
nion with Christ. The communion of saints with Christ,
does certainly consist in receiving of his fulness, and partak-
ing of his grace, which is spoken of, John i. 16. "Of his
fulness have we all received, and grace for grace." And
the partaking of that Spirit which God gives not by measure
unto him, the partaking of Christ's holiness and grace, his
nature, inclinations, tendencies, affections, love, desires, must
be a part of communion with him. Yea, a believer's com-
munion with God and Christ, does mainly consist in partaking
of the Holy Spirit, as is evident by 2 Cor. xiu. 14. But that
unbelievers have no communion or fellowship with Christ,
appears, 1st. Because they are not united to Christ, they are
not in Christ. Those that are not in Christ, or are not united
to him, can have no degree of communion with him ; for
union with Christ, or a being in Christ, is the foundation of
all communion with him. The union of the members with
the head, is the foundation of all their communion or partak-
ing- with the head ; and so the union of the branch with the
vine, is the foundation of ail the communion it has with the
vine, of partaking of any degree of its sap or life, or influence.
So the union of the wife to the husband, is the foundation of
her communion in his goods. But no natural man is united
to Christ ; because all that are in Christ shall be saved ; 1
Cor. xv. 22. " As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be
made alive ;" i. e. all that are in Christ ; for this speaks only
of the glorious resurrection and eternal life. Phil. iii. 8, 9.
« Yea, doubtless, I count al! things but loss, for the excel-
lency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord ; for whom
I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but
dung, that I may win Christ, and be found in him, not having
on my own righteousness," &c. 2 Cor. v. 17. "Now, if
any man be in Christ, he is a new creature ; old things are
passed away ; behold, ail things are become new." 1 John
ii. 5. "Hereby know we that we are in him." Chap. iii.
24. " And he that kecpeth his commandments, divelleth in
him, and he in him, and hereby we know that he abtdethin us y "
EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 5QS
Sec and iv. 13. " Hereby know we that we dwell in him, and
he in us."
2d. The Scripture does more directly teach, that it is on-
ly true saints that have communion with Christ ; as, particu-
larly, this is most evidently spoken of as what belongs to the
saints, and to them only, in 1 John i. 3. ...7. " That which
we have seen and heard, declare we unto you, that ye also
may have fellowship with us ; and truly our fellowship is
with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ. If we say
we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie,
and do not the truth. But if we walk in the light, as he is in
the light, we have fellowship one with another ; and the blood
of Jesus Christ, his Son, cleanseth us from all sin." And 1
Cor. i. 3, 9. " Who shall also confirm you unto the end,
that ye may be blameless in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ.
God is faithful, by whom ye were called unto the fellowship
of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord." By this it appears that
those who have fellowship with Christ, are those that cannot
fall away, whom God's faithfulness is bound to confirm to the
end, that they may be blameless in the day of Jesus Christ.
§ 93. Ezekiel's vision of the dry bones is a confirmation,
that however natural men may be the subjects of great and
wonderful influences and operations of God's great power and
Spirit ; yet they do not properly partake at all of the Spirit
before conversion. In all that is wrought in them, in every
respect fitting and preparing them for grace, so that nothing
shall be wanting but divine life ; yet as long as they are
without this, they have nothing of the Spirit. Which con-
firms the distinctions I have elsewhere made, of the Spirit of
God influencing the minds of natural men under common il-
luminations and convictions, and yet not communicating him-
self in his own proper nature to them, before conversion;
and that saving grace differs from common grace, not only in
degree, but also in nature and kind. It is said, Rev. iii. 8, of
the church at Philadelphia, which is commended above all
other churches, Thou hast a little strength... .certainly imply-
ing, that ungodly men have none at all.
504 EFFICACIOUS GRACE.
§ 94. That there is no good work before conversion and
actual union with Christ, is manifest from that, Rom. vii. 4.
« Wherefore', my brethren, ye also are become dead to the
law, by the body of Christ, that ye should be married unto
another, even to him who is raised from the dead ; that we
should bring forth fruit unto God." Hence we may argue,
that there is no lawful child brought forth before that mar-
riage. Seeming virtues and good works before, are not so
indeed. They are a spurious brood, being bastards, and not
children.
§ 95. That those thst prove apostates, never have the
same kind of faith with true saints, is confirmed by what
Christ said of Judas, before his apostasy, John vi. 64. "But
there are some of you, who believe not. For Jesus knew
from the beginning who they were that believed not, and
who should betray him." By this it is evident, that Judas,
who afterwards proved an apostate, (and is doubtless set
forth as an example for all apostates) though he had a kind of
faith in Christ, yet did not believe in Christ with a true faith,
and was at that time, before his apostasy, destitute of that
kind of faith which the true disciples had ; and that he had
all along, even from the beginning, been destitute of that
faith. And by the 70, and 71st verses of the same chapter, it
is evident that he was not only destitute of that degree of
goodness that the rest had, but totally destitute of Christian
piety, and wholly under the dominion of wickedness ; being
in this respect like a devil, notwithstanding all the faith and
temporary regard to Christ that he had. " Jesus answered
them, Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a
devil ? He spake of Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon. For
he it was that should betray him, being one of the twelve."
END OF THE FIFTH VOLUME.
