A

    CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY

        INTO THE

MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS

        OF THAT

  FREEDOM OF WILL

   WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE. AND VICE,
   REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, PRAISE AND BLAME.

   Rom. ix. 16 it is not him that willeth.
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  PREFACE

   Many find much fault with calling professing Christians, that differ
   one from another in some matters of opinion, by distinct names;
   especially calling them by the names of particular men, who have
   distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those
   opinions: as calling some professing Christians Arminians, from
   Arminius; others Arians, from Arius; others Socinians, from Socinus,
   and the like. They think it unjust in itself; as it seems to suppose
   and suggest, that the persons marked out by these names, received those
   doctrines which they entertain, out of regard to, and reliance on,
   those men after whom they are named; as though they made them their
   rule; in the same manner, as the followers of christ are called
   Christians, after his name, whom they regard and depend upon, as their
   great Head and Rule. Whereas, this is an unjust and groundless
   imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations.
   Thus, say they, there is not the least ground to suppose, that the
   chief divines, who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is, by many,
   called Arminianismt believe it the more, because Arminius believed it:
   and that there is no reason to think any other, than that they
   sincerely and impartially study the Holy Scriptures, and inquire after
   the mind of Christ, with as much judgment and sincerity, as any of
   those that call them by these names; that they seek after truth, and
   are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did; yea, that,
   in some things, they actually differ from him. This practice is also
   esteemed actually injurious on this account, that it is supposed
   naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between
   persons thus named, and others, to be greater than it is; so great, as
   if they were another species of beings. And they object against it as
   arising from an uncharitable, narrow, contracted spirit; which, they
   say, commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to
   themselves, and their own party, and to make a wide distinction between
   themselves and others, and stigmatize those that differ from them with
   odious names. They say, moreover, that the keeping up such a
   distinction of names, has a direct tendency to uphold distance and
   disaffection, and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians, who ought
   all to be united in friendship and charity, though they cannot, in all
   things, think alike.

   I confess, these things are very plausible; and I will not deny, that
   there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names, and
   that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill
   improvement of it. But yet, I humbly conceive, these objections are
   carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed
   enough, and a great deal too much, to uncharitableness, and to be
   censorious and bitter towards those that differ from them in religious
   opinions: which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself
   from many things in themselves innocent, useful, and necessary. But yet
   there is no necessity to suppose, that our thus distinguishing persons
   of different opinions by different names, arises mainly from an
   uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition there is in
   mankind (whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for
   speech) to improve the benefit of language, in the proper use and
   design of names, given to things of which they have often occasion to
   speak, which is to enable them to express their ideas with ease and
   expedition, without being encumbered with an obscure and difficult
   circumlocution. And our thus distinguishing persons of different
   opinions in religious matters may not imply any more, than that there
   is a difference; a difference of which we find we have often occasion
   to take notice: and it is always a defect in language, in such cases,
   to be obliged to make use of a description, instead of a name. Thus we
   have often occasion to speak of those who are the descendants of the
   ancient inhabitants of France, in distinction from the descendants of
   the inhabitants of Spain; and find the great convenience of those
   distinguishing words, French and Spaniard; by which the signification
   of our minds is quick and easy, and our speech is delivered from the
   burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions, with which
   it must otherwise be embarrassed.

   That there is occasion to speak often concerning the difference of
   those, who in their general scheme of divinity agree with these two
   noted men, Calvin and Arminius, is what the practice of the latter
   confesses; who are often, in their discourses and writings, taking
   notice of the supposed absurd and pernicious opinions of the former
   sort. And therefore the making use of different names in this case
   cannot reasonably be objected against, as a thing which must come from
   so bad a cause as they assign. It is easy to be accounted for, without
   supposing it to arise from any other source, than the exigence of the
   case, whereby mankind express those things, which they have frequent
   occasion to mention, by certain distinguishing names. It is an effect,
   similar to what we see in cases innumerable, where the cause is not at
   all blameworthy.

   Nevertheless, at first, I had thoughts of carefully avoiding the use of
   the appellation, Arminian, in this Treatise. But I soon found I should
   be put to great difficulty by it; and that my discourse would be too
   much encumbered with circumlocution, instead of a name, which would
   better express the thing intended. And therefore I must ask the excuse
   of such as are apt to be offended with things of this nature, that I
   have so freely used the term Arminian in the following Discourse. I
   profess it to be without any design to stigmatize persons of any sort
   with a name of reproach, or at all to make them appear more odious. If,
   when I had occasion to speak of those divines who are commonly called
   by this name, I had, instead of styling them Arminians, called them "
   these men" as Dr. Whitby does Calvinistic divines, it probably would
   not have been taken any better, or thought to show a better temper, or
   more good manners. I have done as I would be done by, in this matter.
   However the term Calvinistic is, in these days, among most, a term of
   greater reproach than the term Arminian; yet I should not take it at
   all amiss, to be called a Calvinist, for distinction's sake: though I
   utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines
   which I hold, because he believed and taught them; and cannot justly be
   charged with believing in every thing just as he taught.

   But, lest I should really be an occasion of injury to some persons, I
   would here give notice, that though I generally speak of that doctrine,
   concerning free-will and moral agency, which I oppose as an Arminian
   doctrine; yet I would not be understood as asserting, that every divine
   or author, whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that
   doctrine, was properly an Arminian, or one of that sort which is
   commonly called by that name. Some of them went far beyond the
   Arminians; and I would by no means charge Arminians in general with all
   the corrupt doctrine which these maintained. Thus, for instance, it
   would be very injurious, if I should rank Arminian divines, in general,
   with such authors as Mr. Chubb. I doubt not, many of them have some of
   his doctrines in abhorrence; though he agrees, for the most part, with
   Arminians, in his notion of the Freedom of the Will. And, on the other
   hand, though I suppose this notion to be a leading article in the
   Arminian scheme, that which, if pursued in its consequences, will truly
   infer, or naturally lead to all the rest; yet I do not charge all that
   have held this doctrine, with being Arminians. For whatever may be the
   consequences of the doctrine really, yet some that hold this doctrine,
   may not own nor see these consequences; and it would be unjust, in many
   instances, to charge every author with believing and maintaining all
   the real consequences of his avowed doctrines. And I desire it may be
   particularly noted, that though I have occasion, in the following
   Discourse, often to mention the author of the book, entitled An Essay
   on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature, as holding that
   notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppose; yet I do not mean to call
   him an Arminian: however, in that doctrine he agrees with Arminians,
   and departs from the current and general opinion of Calvinists. If the
   author of that Essay be the same as it is commonly ascribed to, he
   doubtless was not one that ought to bear that name. But however good a
   divine he was in many respects, yet that particular Arminian doctrine
   which he maintained, is never the better for being held by such an one:
   nor is there less need of opposing it on that account, but rather more;
   as it will be likely to have the more pernicious influence, for being
   taught by a divine of his name and character; supposing the doctrine to
   be wrong, and in itself to be of an ill tendency.

   I have nothing further to say by way of preface; but only to bespeak
   the reader's candour, and calm attention to what I have written. The
   subject is of such importance, as to demand attention, and the most
   thorough consideration. Of all kinds of knowledge that we can ever
   obtain, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves, are the
   most important. As religion is the great business for which we are
   created, and on which our happiness depends; and as religion consists
   in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker; and so has its
   foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and
   we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be
   needful, in order to true religion. But the knowledge of ourselves
   consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief
   faculties of our nature, the understanding and will. Both are very
   important: yet the science of the latter must be confessed to be of
   greatest moment; inasmuch as all virtue and religion have their seat
   more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts
   and habits of this faculty. And the grand question about the Freedom of
   the Will, is the main point that belongs to the science of the Will.
   Therefore, I say, the importance of the subject greatly demands the
   attention of Christians, and especially of divines. But as to my manner
   of handling the subject, I would be far from presuming to say, that it
   is such as demands the attention of the reader to what I have written.
   I am ready to own, that in this matter I depend on the reader's
   courtesy. But only thus for I may have some colour for putting in a
   claim; that if the reader be disposed to pass his censure on what I
   have written, I may be fully and patiently heard, and well attended to,
   before I am condemned. However, this is what I would humbly ask of my
   readers; together with the prayers of all sincere lovers of truth, that
   I may have much of that Spirit which Christ promised his disciples,
   which guides into all truth; and that the blessed and powerful
   influences of this Spirit would make truth victorious in the world.

        A

  CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY, &C.
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  PART I.

   WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO
   THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE
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      SECT. I.

   Concerning the Nature of the Will.

   It may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about
   to define or describe the Will; this word being generally as well
   understood as any other words we can use to explain it: and so perhaps
   it would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians, and polemic divines,
   brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it.
   But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to
   greater clearness in the following discourse, to say a few things
   concerning it.

   And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical
   refining) is, That by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty of
   the Will, is that power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable
   of choosing: an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or
   choice.

   If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to say, that
   it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses; I am content
   with it: though I think it enough to say, It is that by which the soul
   chooses: for in every act of Will whatsoever, the mind chooses one
   thing rather than another; it chooses something rather than the
   contrary or rather than the want or non-existence of that thing. So in
   every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing
   refused; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its
   choice, and it chooses the negative; and the mind's making its choice
   in that case is properly the act of the Will: the Will's determining
   between the two, is a voluntary determination; but that is the same
   thing as making a choice. So that by whatever names we call the act of
   the Will, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking,
   disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding,
   forbidding, inclining, or being averse, being pleased or displeased
   with; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act
   voluntarily, is evermore to act electively.

   Mr. Locke [105] says, "The Will signifies nothing but a power or
   ability to prefer or choose." And, in the foregoing page, he says, "The
   word preferring seems best to express the act of volition;" but adds,
   that "it does it not precisely; for, though a man would prefer flying
   to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it?" But the instance he
   mentions, does not prove that there is any thing else in willing, but
   merely preferring: for it should be considered what is the immediate
   object of the Will, with respect to a man's walking, or any other
   external action; which is not being removed from one place to another;
   on the earth, or through the air; these are remoter objects of
   preference; but such or such an immediate exertion of himself. The
   thing next chosen, or preferred, when a man wills to walk is not his
   being removed to such a place where he would be, but such an exertion
   and motion of his legs and feet &c, in order to it. And his willing
   such an alteration in his body in the present moment, is nothing else
   but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body at such a
   moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has
   so made and established the human nature, the soul being united to a
   body in proper state that the soul preferring or choosing such an
   immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration
   instantaneously follows. There is nothing else in the actions of my
   mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only my preferring or
   choosing, through successive moments, that there should be such
   alterations of my external sensations and motions; together with a
   concurring habitual expectation that it will be so; having ever found
   by experience, that on such an immediate preference, such sensations
   and motions do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise. But it
   is not so in the case of flying; though a man may be said remotely to
   choose or prefer flying; yet he does not prefer, or desire, under
   circumstances in view, any immediate exertion of the members of his
   body in order to it; because he has no expectation that he should
   obtain the desired end by any such exertion; and he does not prefer, or
   incline to, any bodily exertion, under this apprehended circumstance,
   of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish the
   proper objects of the several acts of the Will, it will not appear by
   this, and such like instances, that there is any difference between
   volition and preference; or that a man's choosing liking best, or being
   pleased with a thing, are not the same with his willing that thing.
   Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to
   do thus or thus; and a man doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases
   are in common speech the same thing.

   Mr. Locke [106] says, "The Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire;
   which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from
   that which our Wills sets us upon. A man, says he, whom I cannot deny,
   may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I
   am speaking, I may wish not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain
   the Will and Desire run counter." I do not suppose, that Will and
   Desire are words of precisely the same signification: Will seems to be
   a word of more general signification, extending to things present and
   absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present
   situation and posture, suppose sitting still, or having my eyes open,
   and so may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely
   distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man
   never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or
   desires any thing contrary to his Will. The forementioned instance,
   which Mr. Locke produces, is no proof that he ever does. He may, on
   some consideration or other will to utter speeches which have a
   tendency to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not
   persuade him; but yet his Will and Desire do not run counter all: the
   thing which he wills, the very same he desires; and he does not will a
   thing, and desire the contrary, in any particular. In this instance, it
   is not carefully observed, what is the thing willed, and what is the
   thing desired: if it were, it would be found, that Will and Desire do
   not clash in the least. The thing willed on some consideration, is to
   utter such words; and certainly, the same consideration so influences
   him, that he does not desire the contrary; all things considered, he
   chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them. And
   so as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz. That the
   words, though they tend to persuade, should not be effectual to that
   end, his Will is not contrary to this; he does not will that they
   should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he
   desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it
   should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same
   thing, or with respect to the very same object of Will or Desire: but
   here the objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will
   and Desire agree. And it is no wonder that they should not agree in
   different things, though but little distinguished in their nature. The
   Will may not agree with the Will, nor Desire agree with Desire, in
   different things. As in this very instance which Mr. Locke mentions, a
   person may, on some consideration, desire to use persuasions, and at
   the same time may desire they may not prevail; but yet nobody will say,
   that Desire runs counter to Desire; or that this proves that Desire is
   perfectly a distinct thing from Desire.--The like might be observed of
   the other instance Mr. Locke produces, of a man's desiring to be eased
   of pain, &c.

   But, not to dwell any longer on this, whether Desire and Will, and
   whether Preference and Volition be precisely the same things, I trust
   it will he allowed by all, that in every act of Will there is an act of
   choice; that in every volition there is a preference , or a prevailing
   inclination of the soul, whereby at that instant, it is out of a state
   of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the
   volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the Will; there is
   some preponderation of the mind, one way rather than another; and the
   soul had rather have or do one thing, than another, or than not to have
   or do that thing; and that where there is absolutely no preferring or
   choosing, but a perfect, continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.
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   [105] Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197

   [106] Hum. Und. vol. i. p203, 204
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      SECT. II.

   Concerning the Determination of the Will.

   By determining the Will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must
   be intended, causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus,
   and not otherwise: and the Will is said to be determined, when, in
   consequence of some action, or influence, its choice is directed to,
   and fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the
   determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be
   in such a direction, rather than another.

   The Determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which must have a
   cause. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This must be
   supposed to be intended even by them that say, The Will determines
   itself. If it be so, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is
   a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object
   of its own influence and action.

   With respect to that grand inquiry, "What determines the Will?'' it
   would be very tedious and unnecessary, at present, to examine all the
   various opinions, which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor
   is it needful that I should enter into a particular discussion of all
   points debated in disputes on that other question, "Whether the Will
   always follows the last dictate of the understanding?" It is sufficient
   to my present purpose to say, It is that motive, which, as it stands in
   view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will. But may
   be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning.

   By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the
   mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things
   conjunctly. Many particular things may concur, and unite their
   strength, to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are as
   one complex motive. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have
   respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a
   particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing
   alone, or of many together.

   Whatever is objectively [107] a motive, in this sense, must, be
   something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the
   understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the
   mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is
   some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived
   and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all. It
   is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes
   any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.

   And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is
   properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement to a perceiving,
   willing agent, has some sort and degree of tendency, or advantage to
   move or excite the Will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the
   Will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the
   strength of the motive. That motive which has a less degree of previous
   advantage, or tendency to move the Will, or which appears less
   inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a weaker
   motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by
   what appears concerning it to the understanding or apprehension, the
   greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice,
   is what I call the strongest motive. And in this sense, I suppose the
   Will is always determined by the strongest motive.

   Things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength,
   tendency, or advantage to move, or excite its Will, from many things
   appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the
   nature and circumstances of the mind that views, and the degree and
   manner of its view; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect
   enumeration. But so much I think may be determined in general, without
   room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an
   intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of
   a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good; nor
   has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further
   degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say,
   that things that appear, have a tendency, by the appearance they make,
   to engage the mind to elect them, some other way than by their
   appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be
   true, in some sense, that the Will always is, as the greatest apparent
   good is. But only, for the right understanding of this, two things must
   be well and distinctly observed.

   1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term "good;" namely, as
   of the same import with "agreeable." To appear good to the mind, as I
   use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to
   the mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind,
   or tending to engage its inclination and choice, considered as evil or
   disagreeable; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor
   disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the inclination, and move the
   Will, it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind. And
   therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage
   it, which as it stands in the mind's view, suits it best, and pleases
   it most; and in that sense, is the greatest apparent good: to say
   otherwise, is little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain
   contradiction.

   The word "good," in this sense, includes in its signification, the
   removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and
   uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing, to avoid what is disagreeable and
   displeasing, and to have uneasiness removed. So that here is included
   what Mr. Locke supposes determines the Will. For when he speaks of
   "uneasiness," as determining the Will, he must be understood as
   supposing that the end or aim which governs in the volition or act of
   preference, is the avoiding or the removal of that uneasiness; and that
   is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and
   agreeable.

   2. When I say, that the Will is as the greatest apparent good, or, (as
   I have explained it,) that volition has always for its object the thing
   which appears most agreeable; it must be carefully observed, to avoid
   confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and
   immediate object of the act of volition; and not some object to which
   the act of Will has only an indirect and remote respect. Many acts of
   volition have some remote relation to an object, that is different from
   the thing most immediately willed and chosen. Thus, when a drunkard has
   his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether to drink it, or no;
   the immediate objects, about which his present volition is conversant,
   and between which his choice now decides, are his own acts, in drinking
   the liquor, or letting it alone; and this will certainly be done
   according to what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole
   of it, is most agreeable to him. If he chooses to drink it, and not to
   let it alone, then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind,
   with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and
   pleasing than letting it alone.

   But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely,
   and between which his choice may determine more indirectly, are the
   present pleasure the man expects by drinking, and the future misery
   which he judges will be the consequence of it: he may judge that this
   future misery, when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant,
   than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things are
   not the proper objects that the act of volition spoken of is next
   conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of, is concerning present
   drinking, or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking
   is the proper object of the act of his Will; and drinking, on some
   account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him
   best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is immediate object of
   his Will, and is most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the
   case, he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage, which he
   judges will be greater when it comes; then a lesser present pleasure
   appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance.
   If on the contrary a future advantage is preferred, then that appears
   most agreeable, and suits him best. And so still, the present volition
   is, as the greatest apparent good at present is.

   I have rather chosen to express myself thus, "that the Will always is
   as the greatest apparent good," or "as what appears most agreeable,"
   than to say "that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent
   good," or " by what seems most agreeable;" because an appearing most
   agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely
   distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more
   properly be said, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate
   consequence of the mind's choice, is determined by that which appears
   most agreeable, than the choice itself; but that volition itself is
   always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object,
   which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say, "in or about the
   mind's view of' the object;" because what has influence to render an
   object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object
   viewed, but also the manner of the view and the state and circumstances
   of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining
   to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which have influence in
   their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no small
   difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not
   necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only mention some
   things in general.

   I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the
   apparent nature and circumstances of the object. And there are various
   things of this sort, that have influence in rendering the object more
   or less agreeable; as,

   1. That which appears in the object, rendering it beautiful and
   pleasant, or deformed and irksome to the mind; viewing it as it is in
   itself.

   2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or
   the consequence of it. Such concomitants and consequences being viewed
   as circumstances of the object, are to be considered as belonging to
   it; and as it were parts of it, as it stands in the mind's view a
   proposed object of choice.

   3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that appears, with
   respect to distance of time; being either nearer or farther off. It is
   a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily; and
   disagreeable, to have it delayed: so that if there be two equal degrees
   of pleasure set in the mind's view, and all other things are equal, but
   one is beheld as near, and the other afar off; the nearer will appear
   most agreeable, and so will be chosen. Because, though the
   agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themselves,
   yet not as viewed in their circumstances; one of them having the
   additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness.

   II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of
   choice, as it stands in the mind's view, is the manner of view. If the
   object be something which appears connected with future pleasure, not
   only will the degree of apparent pleasure have influence, but also the
   manner of the view, especially in two respects.

   1. With respect to the degree of assent, with which the mind judges the
   pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain
   happiness, than an uncertain one; and a pleasure viewed as more
   probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind,
   than that which is viewed as less probable.

   2. With respect to the degree of the idea or apprehension of the future
   pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts,
   either past, present, or future, we have much more of an idea or
   apprehension of some things than others; that is, our idea is much more
   clear, lively, and strong. Thus the ideas we have of sensible things by
   immediate sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by
   mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when absent. My idea of
   the sun when I look upon it is more vivid, than when I only think of
   it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is usually
   stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes,
   the idea we have of things by contemplation, are much stronger and
   clearer, than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much
   stronger idea of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some
   sort of food that he loves, than at another. Now the strength of the
   idea or the sense that men have of future good or evil, is one thing
   that has great influence on their minds to excite volition. When two
   kinds of future pleasure are presented for choice, though both are
   supposed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, yet
   of one the mind has a far more lively sense, than of the other; this
   last has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind,
   and move the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the
   pleasure of which it has a strong and lively sense, than that of which
   it has only a faint idea. The view of the former is attended with the
   strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the want of it;
   and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its
   appetite gratified. And if several future enjoyments are presented
   together, as competitors for the choice of the mind, some of them
   judged to be greater, and others less; the mind also having a more
   lively idea of the good of some, and of others a less; and some are
   viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others; and those
   enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear
   least so in others: in this case, all other things being equal, the
   agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some
   way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgment, the
   degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the
   degree of the liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good; because
   all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object
   appears at present agreeable; and accordingly will volition be
   determined.

   I might further observe, that the state of the mind which views a
   proposed object of choice, is another thing that contributes to the
   agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object; the particular temper
   which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and
   established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the
   frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That
   object which appears agreeable to one, does not so to another. And the
   same object does not always appear alike agreeable to the same person,
   at different times. It is most agreeable to some men, to follow their
   reason; and to others, to follow their appetites: to some men, it is
   more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination, than to gratify it;
   others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more
   disagreeable to some men than others, to counteract a former
   resolution. In these respects, and many others which might be
   mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different
   persons; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times.

   But possibly it is needless to mention the "state of the mind,'' as a
   ground of the agreeableness of objects distinct from the other two
   mentioned before; viz. The apparent nature and circumstances of the
   objects viewed, and the manner of the view. Perhaps, if we strictly
   consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes
   no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects, any other way, than
   as it makes the objects themselves appear differently beautiful or
   deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and, as it
   occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of
   beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.

   However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance
   that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is,
   in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never
   departs from that which, at the time, and with respect to the direct
   and immediate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing,
   all things considered. If the immediate objects of the Will are a man's
   own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he
   wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to
   walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what
   at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to
   speak; if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep
   silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the
   sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily,
   and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is
   most agreeable to them. To say, that they do what pleases them, but yet
   not what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say, they do
   what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say,
   that they do what they please and yet do not what they please.

   It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will always
   follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the
   understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole
   faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called
   reason or judgment. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant
   what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness,
   taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true, that the Will
   always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of
   reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most
   agreeable, all things being put together which pertain to the mind's
   present perceptions in any respect: although that dictate of reason,
   when it takes place, has concern in the compound influence which moves
   the Will; and should be considered in estimating the degree of that
   appearance of good which the Will always follows; either as having its
   influence added to other things, or subducted from them. When such
   dictate of reason concurs with other things, then its weight is added
   to them, as put into the same scale; but when it is against them, it is
   as a weight in the opposite scale, resisting the influence of other
   things: yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight,
   and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition to it.

   These things may serve, I hope, in some measure, illustrate and confirm
   the position laid down in the beginning of section, viz. "That the Will
   is always determined by the strongest motive," or by that view of the
   mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite
   volition. But whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the
   thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, yet my failing
   in this will not overthrow the position itself; which carries much of
   its own evidence with it, and is a point of chief importance to the
   purpose of the ensuing discourse: And the truth of it, I hope, will
   appear with great clearness, before I have finished what I have to say
   on the subject of human liberty.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [107] This appears to be the author's meaning, in order to preserve a
   consistency with his professed sentiment of divine influence. He
   believed that a real Christian's mind is born of the Spirit; and that
   such a state of mind induces one choice rather than another. But he
   could not maintain that divine influences, which is a subjective cause
   of one volition rather than another, must be "in the view or
   apprehension of the of the understanding." For "the wind bloweth where
   it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell
   whence it cometh, wither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the
   Spirit." Beside, the most proper acceptation of the term "motive" seems
   to plead in favor of the restriction suggested in the text by the word
   "objectively;" and the use of this distinction may appear more fully
   hereafter. W.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. III.

   Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility,
   Inability, &c. and of Contingence

   The words necessary, impossible, &c. are abundantly used in
   controversies about Free-Will and Moral Agency; and therefore the sense
   in which they are used should clearly understood.

   Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be necessary when it
   must be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a
   definition of Necessity, any more than I explained the word must, by
   the phrase, there being a Necessity. The words must, can, and cannot,
   need explication as much as the words necessary, and impossible;
   excepting that the former are words that in earliest life we more
   commonly use.

   The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a relative term; and
   relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing,
   which opposition is overcome, or proves insufficient to hinder or alter
   it. That is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word,
   which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To
   say, that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is
   impossible that it should not be. But the word impossible is manifestly
   a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a
   thing to pass, which is insufficient for the effect; as the word unable
   is relative, and has relation to ability, or endeavor, which is
   insufficient. Also the word irresistible is relative, and has always
   reference to resistance which is made, or may be made, to some force or
   power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power,
   or hinder the effect. The common notion of Necessity and Impossibility
   implies something that frustrates endeavor or desire.

   Here several things are to be noted.

   1. Things are said to be necessary in general, which are or will be
   notwithstanding any supposable opposition from whatever quarter. But
   things are said to be necessary to us, which are or will be
   notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case from us. The same
   may be observed of the word impossible, and other such like terms.

   2. These terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c. more especially
   belong to controversies about liberty and moral agency, as used in the
   latter of the two senses now mentioned, viz. as necessary or impossible
   to us, and with relation to any supposable opposition or endeavor of
   ours.

   3. As the word Necessity, in its vulgar and common use, is relative,
   and has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition; so
   when we speak of anything as necessary to us, it is with relation to
   some supposable opposition of our Wills, or some voluntary exertion or
   effort of ours to the contrary. For we do not properly make opposition
   to an event, any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things are
   said to be what must be, or necessarily are, as to us, when they are,
   or will be, though we desire or endeavor the contrary, or try to
   prevent or remove their existence: but such opposition of ours always
   either consists in, or implies, opposition of our wills.

   It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used,
   are understood in this manner. A thing is said to be necessary, when we
   cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is said to be
   impossible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to
   pass, and endeavor it; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek
   it; but all our desires and endeavors are, or would be, vain. And that
   is said to be irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition,
   resistance, and endeavor to the contrary. And we are said to be unable
   to do a thing when our supposable desires and endeavors are
   insufficient.

   We are accustomed, in the common use of language, thus to apply and
   understand these phrases: we grow up with such a habit; which, by the
   daily use of these terms from our childhood, becomes fixed and settled;
   so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire, and endeavor
   of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, whenever we hear the
   words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so associated, that they
   unavoidably go together; one suggests the other, and never can be
   easily separated as long as we live. And though we use the words, as
   terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceedingly
   circumspect, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and
   so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner, which will deceive
   and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, even when we pretend
   to use them as terms of art.

   4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms
   necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, &c. are used in cases
   wherein no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed, but the
   very nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will,
   or endeavor; they are then not used in their proper signification. The
   reason is manifest; in such cases we cannot use the words with
   reference to a supposable opposition, will, or endeavor. And therefore
   if any man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them
   nonsensically, or in some new sense, diverse from their original and
   proper meaning. As for instance; if any one should affirm after this
   manner, That it is necessary for a man, or what must be, that he should
   choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue
   to vice; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it
   should be otherwise than that he should have this choice, so long as
   this choice continues; such a one would use the terms must,
   irresistible, &c. with either perfect insignificance, or in some new
   sense, diverse from their common use; which is with reference, as has
   been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness, and resistance;
   whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any such thing:
   for the case supposed is that of being willing, and choosing.

   5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms necessary,
   impossible, &c. are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a
   sense quite diverse from their common and original signification; for
   they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposable.
   Thus they use them with respect to God's existence before the creation
   of the world, when there was no other being; with regard to many of the
   dispositions and acts of the divine Being, such as his loving himself,
   his loving righteousness, hating sin, &c. So they apply them to many
   cases of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings
   wherein all opposition of the Will is excluded in the very supposition
   of the case.

   Metaphysical or philosophical Necessity is nothing different from their
   certainty. I speak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the
   certainty that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the
   certainty of the knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the
   infallibility of the proposition which affirms them.

   What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical Necessity,
   namely, "That by which a thing cannot but be," or "whereby it cannot be
   otherwise," fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts:
   First, the words can, or cannot, need explanation as much as the word
   Necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as
   the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when
   we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by saying, it
   must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is
   that by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is
   liable to the fore-mentioned great inconvenience; the words cannot, or
   unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or
   that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which as I
   have now observed, the word Necessity, as used by philosophers, has no
   reference.

   Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed
   connexion between the things signified by the subject and predicate of
   a proposition, which affirms something to be true. When there is such a
   connexion, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in
   a philosophical sense; whether any opposition or contrary effort be
   supposed, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition,
   which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality,
   act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connexion, then the
   existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a
   metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word necessity, in the
   following discourse, when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not
   inconsistent with liberty.

   The subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms existence of
   something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion several ways.

   (1.) They may have a full and perfect connexion in and of themselves;
   because it may imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose
   them not connected. Thus many things are necessary in their own nature.
   So the eternal existence of being generally considered, is necessary in
   itself: because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny
   the existence of being in general, or to say there was absolute and
   universal nothing; and is as it were the sum of all contradictions; as
   might be shown if this were a proper place for it. So God's infinity
   and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary in its own
   nature, that two and two should be four; and it is necessary that all
   right lines drawn from the center of a circle to the circumference
   should be equal. It is necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do
   to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable
   metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves: the
   subject and predicate of the proposition which affirm them, are
   perfectly connected of themselves.

   (2.) The connexion of the subject and predicate of a proposition, which
   affirms the existence of something, may be fixed and made certain,
   because the existence of that thing is already come to pass; and either
   now is, or has been; and so has, as it were, made sure of existence.
   And therefore, the proposition which affirms present and past existence
   of it, may by this means be made certain, and necessarily and
   unalterably true; the past event has fixed and decided the matter, as
   to its existence; and has made it impossible but that existence should
   be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already
   come to pass, is now become necessary; it is become impossible it
   should be otherwise than true, that such a thing has been.

   (3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something
   to be, may have a real and certain connexion consequentially; and so
   the existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary; as it may
   be surely and firmly connected with something else, that is necessary
   in one of the former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly
   connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature, or
   with something which has already received and made sure of existence.
   This Necessity lies in, or may be explained by, the connexion of two or
   more propositions one with another.--Things which are perfectly
   connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary
   themselves, by a Necessity of consequence.

   And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which
   will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are
   necessary only in this last way. Their existence is not necessary in
   itself; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their
   existence become necessary by being already come to pass. Therefore,
   the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or
   can be necessary, is by a connexion with something that is necessary in
   its own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the
   one being supposed the other certainly follows.--And this also is the
   only way that all things past, excepting those which were from
   eternity, could be necessary before the come to pass; and therefore the
   only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that
   ever has had or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily,
   or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the
   Necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of
   the will.

   It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe
   concerning metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeable to the distinction
   before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly understood) things that exist
   may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular
   Necessity. The existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a
   general Necessity, when, all things considered, there is a foundation
   for the certainty of their existence; or when in the most general and
   universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the proposition,
   which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connexion.

   An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be necessary with
   a particular Necessity, when nothing that can be taken into
   consideration, in or about a person, thing, or time, alters the case at
   all, as to the certainty of an event, or the existence of a thing; or
   can be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of the
   connexion of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms
   the existence of the thing; so that it is all one, as to that person,
   or thing, at least, at that time, as if the existence were necessary
   with a Necessity that is most universal and absolute. Thus there are
   many things that happen to particular persons, in the existence of
   which no will of theirs has any concern, at least, at that time; which,
   whether they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general,
   yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at
   that time; as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair.--I
   shall have occasion to apply this observation to particular instances
   in the following discourse.--Whether the same things that are necessary
   with a particular Necessity, be not also necessary with a general
   Necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that be as it
   will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the
   kinds of Necessity.

   These things may he sufficient for the explaining of the terms
   necessary and Necessity, as terms of art, and as often used by
   metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity, in a sense
   diverse from, and more extensive than, their original meaning, in
   common language, which was before explained.

   What has been said to show the meaning of the terms necessary and
   necessity, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms,
   impossible and impossibility. For there is no difference, but only the
   latter are negative, and the former positive. Impossibility is the same
   as negative Necessity, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And
   it is used as a term of art in a like diversity from the original and
   vulgar meaning, with Necessity.

   The same may be observed concerning the words unable and Inability. It
   has been observed, that these terms, in their original and common use,
   have relation to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as
   insufficient for the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavored.
   But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines,
   especially writers on controversies about Free Will, they are used in a
   quite different and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many
   cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the thing to pass
   is or can be supposed.

   As the words necessary, impossible, unable, &c. are used by polemic
   writers, in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like
   has happened to the term contingent. Any thing is said to be
   contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original
   meaning of such words, when its connexion with its causes or
   antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not
   discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. And
   especially is any thing said to be contingent, or accidental, with
   regard to us, when it comes to pass without our foreknowledge, and
   besides our design and scope.

   But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense;
   not for that whose connexion with the series of things we cannot
   discern, so as to foresee the event, but for something which has
   absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has
   any fixed and certain connexion.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. IV.

   Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.

   That Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible
   connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a
   proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is
   distinguished into moral and natural Necessity.

   I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper
   and perfect distinction; but shall only explain how these two sorts of
   Necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they
   are used in the following discourse.

   The phrase, moral Necessity, is used variously: sometimes it is used
   for a Necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under
   Necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, from which he
   cannot be discharged. Again, the word Necessity is often used for great
   obligation in point of interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant
   that apparent connexion of things, which is the ground of moral
   evidence; and so is distinguished from absolute Necessity, or that sure
   connexion of things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In
   this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high degree
   of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind, in
   their conduct and behavior in the world, as they would consult their
   own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of
   society. And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of
   connexion and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the
   strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which there is
   in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. And
   it is in this sense, that I use the phrase, moral necessity, in the
   following discourse.

   By natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men
   are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from
   what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the
   heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men, placed in certain
   circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by Necessity:
   they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects
   presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so
   they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms
   are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white,
   that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural
   Necessity men's bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support
   them.

   But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of
   Necessity.

   1. Moral Necessity may be as absolute as natural Necessity. That is,
   the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a
   natural, necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the Will
   in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive, or
   whether the Will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can
   ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not; if that matter
   should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some
   cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be
   so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly
   connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all
   will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if
   they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And
   therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain
   degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly
   impossible to surmount it; for this plain reason, because whatever
   power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that
   power is not infinite; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man
   can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees
   of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of
   difficulty; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an
   hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased,
   his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As
   therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a sure
   and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects; so this only is
   what I call by the name of moral Necessity.

   2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural Necessity, I would
   not he understood to suppose, that if any thing come to pass by the
   former kind of Necessity, the nature of things is not concerned in it,
   as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a moral
   habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the Will infallibly
   follows, this is not owing to the nature of things. But natural and
   moral are the terms by which thee two kinds of Necessity have usually
   been called; and they must be distinguished by some names, for there is
   a difference between them, that is very important in its consequences.
   This difference, however, does not lie so much in the nature of the
   connexion, as in the two terms connected. The cause with which the
   effect is connected, is of a particular kind; viz. that which is of a
   moral nature; either some previous habitual disposition, or some motive
   exhibited to the understanding. And the effect is also of a particular
   kind; being likewise of a moral nature; consisting in some inclination
   or volition of the soul, or voluntary action.

   I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural in distinction from
   moral Necessity, is so called, because mere nature, as the word is
   vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing of choice. The word
   nature is often used in opposition to choice; not because nature has
   indeed never any hand in our choice; but, probably, because we first
   get our notion of nature from that obvious course of events, which we
   observe in many things where our choice has no concern; and especially
   in the material world; which, in very many parts of it, we easily
   perceive to be in a settled course; the stated order, and manner of
   succession, being very apparent. But where we do not readily discern
   the rule and connexion, (though there be a connexion, according to an
   established law, truly taking place,) we signify the manner of event by
   some other name. Even in many things which are seen in the material and
   inanimate world, which do not obviously come to pass according to any
   settled course, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of
   nature, but by such names as accident, chance, contingence, &c. So men
   make a distinction between nature and choice; as if they were
   completely and universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny
   but that choice, in many cases, arises from nature, as truly as other
   events. But the connexion between acts of choice, and their causes,
   according to established laws, is not so obvious. And we observe that
   choice is, as it were, a new principle of motion and action, different
   from that established order of things which is most obvious, and seen
   especially in corporeal things. The choice also often interposes,
   interrupts, and alters the chain of events in these external objects,
   and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone.
   Hence it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely
   distinct from nature, and properly set in opposition to it. Names being
   commonly given to things, according to what is most obvious, and is
   suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and
   research.

   3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified
   by the name of moral Necessity, the word Necessity is not used
   according to the original design and meaning of the word: for, as was
   observed before, such terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c.
   in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative;
   having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour,
   that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and
   endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity; which is a
   certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of
   the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd, to
   suppose the same individual will to oppose itself, in its present act;
   or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice:
   as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the same moving
   body, at the same time.-- And therefore the very case supposed never
   admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome
   this Necessity.

   What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain
   what is intended by natural and moral Inability. We are said to be
   naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will,
   because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or
   because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the
   Will; either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or
   external objects. Moral Inability consists not in any of these things;
   but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary
   inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and
   excite the act of the Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the
   contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in
   one word, that moral Inability consists in the opposition or want of
   inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a
   thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives,
   it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an
   inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such
   circumstances, and under the influence of such views.

   To give some instances of this moral Inability.--A woman of great
   honour and chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to
   her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus
   unable to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain
   opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such
   restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard,
   under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking
   strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent
   acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so
   under the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love
   those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection. A strong habit
   of virtue, and a great degree of holiness, may cause a moral Inability
   to love wickedness in general, and may render a man unable to take
   complacence in wicked persons or things; or to choose a wicked in
   preference to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of
   habitual wickedness may lay a man under an Inability to love and choose
   holiness; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy
   Being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good.

   Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral Inability,
   viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is
   particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I
   mean an Inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that
   kind, through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and
   stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very
   ill-natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as
   another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts; and a man whose
   heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert grateful
   acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By
   particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the
   will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of
   present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the
   understanding, on this occasion.--If it be so, that the Will is always
   determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an
   Inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not
   being possible, in any case, that the Will should, at present, go
   against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest
   advantage to induce it.--The former of these kinds of moral inability
   is most commonly called by the name of Inability; because the word, in
   its most proper and original signification, has respect to some stated
   defect. And this especially obtains the name of Inability also upon
   another account:--because, as before observed, the word Inability, in
   its original and most common use, is a relative term; and has respect
   to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to
   bring to pass the thing desired and endeavored. Now there may be more
   of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts which
   arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from
   transient occasions and causes. Indeed will and endeavour against, or
   diverse from present acts of the Will are in no case supposable,
   whether those acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to
   suppose the Will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, it is.
   But yet their may be will and endeavour against future acts of the
   Will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a
   distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the Will
   at one time, may be against the acts of the Will at another time; and
   there may be desires and endeavors to prevent or excite future acts of
   the Will; but such desires and endeavors are, in many cases, rendered
   insufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit: when the occasion
   returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such
   opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable slavery and
   bondage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an
   alteration, with respect to such future acts, as are only occasional
   and transient; because the occasion or transient cause, if foreseen,
   may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral
   Inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of
   Inability. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly resist
   itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits; so reason may
   resist present acts of the Will, and its resistance be insufficient;
   and this is more commonly the case also, when the acts arise from
   strong habit.

   But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it,
   that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its
   original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the
   proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present
   will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is
   said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to
   the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so
   malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able
   to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be
   never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest
   propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in
   his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly said to be
   unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly
   said, that a person cannot perform those external actions, which are
   dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed,
   if the act of the Will were present. And if it be improperly said, that
   he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the
   Will, it is in some respect more improperly said, that he is unable to
   exert the acts of the Will themselves; because it is more evidently
   false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will: for to say so,
   is a downright contradiction; it is to say, he cannot will, if he does
   will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man
   to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when
   once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing else remains to
   be done. Therefore, in these things, to ascribe a non-performance to
   the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is
   not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and
   a capacity of nature, and every thing else, sufficient, but a
   disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. V.

   Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.

   The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, in
   common speech, is The power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one
   has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from
   hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any
   respect. as he wills. [108] --And the contrary to Liberty, whatever
   name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct
   as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.

   If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in
   the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever
   learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow,
   that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can
   properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a
   faculty, power or property, as is called Will. For that which is
   possessed of no will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing
   according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will,
   nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of
   Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very Will itself, is not
   to speak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the
   original and proper signification of words.--For the Will itself is not
   an Agent that has a will: the power of choosing, itself, has not a
   power of choosing. That which has the power of volition is the man, or
   the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the
   Liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent who is possessed
   of the Will; and not the Will which he is possessed of. We say with
   propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly; but not
   that the bird's power of flying has a power arid Liberty of flying. To
   be free is the property of an Agent, who is possessed of powers and
   faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous.
   But these qualities are the properties of persons; and not the
   properties of properties.

   There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty in common
   speech. One is constraint; otherwise called force, compulsion, and
   coaction; which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary
   to his will. The other is restraint; which is, his being hindered, and
   not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no
   will, cannot be the subject of these things.--I need say the less on
   this head, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth, with so great
   clearness, in his Essay on the Human Understanding.

   But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called
   Liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct
   as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it;
   without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause of
   that choice; or at all considering how the person came to have such a
   volition; whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal
   habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent
   volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was
   necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let
   the person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is
   nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the
   man is perfectly free, according to, the primary and common notion of
   freedom.

   What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty,
   according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and
   primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians,
   Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely
   different signification.--These several things belong to their notion
   of Liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-determining power in the
   Will, or a certain sovereignty the Will has over itself, and its own
   acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be
   dependent, in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor
   determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs
   to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act
   of volition, be in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing that
   belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the
   word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all
   necessity, or any fixed and certain connexion with some previous ground
   or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much
   to consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this
   sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever, he may be at Liberty to
   act according to his will.

   A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a
   moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a
   moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral
   Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of
   such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or
   punishments; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in
   his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of
   understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral
   faculty.

   The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on
   the earth, in warming and causing it to bring forth its fruit; but it
   is not a moral agent: its action, though good, is not virtuous or
   meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of
   it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent:
   what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment.
   The brute creatures are not moral Agents: the actions of some of them
   are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet seeing
   they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from
   choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and
   reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being
   influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful
   or virtuous, nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral
   treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults or
   good deeds.

   Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between
   the moral Agency of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial,
   because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements, by which
   they are capable of being influenced, arising from the difference of
   circumstances. A ruler, acting in that capacity only, is not capable of
   being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and
   promises, rewards and punishments, as the subject is; though both may
   be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the
   moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a
   ruler towards his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that
   respect from the moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God's
   actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor,
   have moral qualifications, and are morally good in the highest degree.
   They are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him
   as influenced, in the highest degree, by that which, above all others,
   is properly a moral inducement; viz. the moral good which He sees in
   such and such things: and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a
   moral Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain
   and rule of all virtue and moral good; though by reason of his being
   supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under the influence
   of law or command, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments,
   counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral Agent are in
   God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding to
   perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of
   discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are
   praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a
   capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of
   acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing
   those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein
   does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which we
   read of, Gen. i. 26, 27.; chap. ix.) by which God distinguished man
   from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature,
   whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much consists the
   natural image of God; whereas the spiritual and moral image, wherein
   man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency with which he
   was endowed.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [108] I say not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary
   forebearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, &c. are instances of
   persons' conduct, about which Liberty is exercised; though they are not
   so properly called doing.
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

  PART II.

   WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH SORT OF
   FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE
   LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN
   BE CONCEIVED OF.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. I.

   Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of
   Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power.

   Having taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be
   observed, concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases
   made use of in controversies concerning human liberty, and particularly
   observed what Liberty is according to the common language and general
   apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by
   Arminians; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of
   the Will, and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or
   in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the
   subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or
   threatenings, rewards or punishments; or whether that which has been
   described, as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not
   sufficient, and the only Liberty, which makes or can make any one a
   moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things. In this Part,
   I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as
   that Freedom of Will which Arminians insist on; and shall inquire,
   whether any such sort of Liberty be necessary to moral agency, &c. in
   the next part.

   And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self-determining
   Power in the Will: wherein, according to the Arminians, does most
   essentially consist the Will's freedom; and shall particularly inquire,
   whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to
   suppose that the Will itself determines all the free acts of the Will.

   Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such ways of
   speaking as the Will determining itself; because actions are to be
   ascribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents; which
   improper way of speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as
   Mr. Locke observes. But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they
   speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul
   willing. I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will,
   as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of
   willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their
   meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and
   plainest absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the powers or
   principles of acting, or doing such things, we mean that the agents
   which have these Powers of acting, do them, in the exercise of those
   Powers. So where we say, valor fights courageously, we mean, the man
   who is under the influence of valor fights courageously. When we say,
   love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that
   object. When we say, the understanding discerns, we mean the soul in
   the exercise of that faculty. So when it is said, the will decides or
   determines, this meaning must be, that the person, in the exercise of:
   Power of willing and choosing, or the soul, acting voluntarily,
   determines.

   Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the soul
   determines them in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing; or,
   which is the same thing, it determines them of choice; it determines
   its own acts, by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the
   Will, then choice orders and determines the choice; and acts of choice
   are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct of other acts of
   choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free acts,
   then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of
   choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the will be
   also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the Will is
   self-determined: that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul
   voluntarily chooses; or, which is the same thing, it is an act
   determined still by a preceding act of the will, choosing that. Which
   brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the
   Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and
   determining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free
   act of the Will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the Will,
   determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not
   self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom:
   but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be
   not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest at first view,
   but shall be demonstrated presently.

   If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and
   determines their motions, does also govern itself, and determines its
   own actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even by
   antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet
   shall move, by an act of choice: and there is no other way of the
   Will's determining, directing, or commanding any thing at all.
   Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if
   it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own
   actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it determines other
   things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will
   consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its
   command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself,
   it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent
   volition, directing and commanding that: and if that directing volition
   be also free, in that also the Will is determined; that is to say, that
   directing volition is determined by another going before that; and so
   on, till we come to the first volition in the whole series: and if that
   first volition be free, and the Will self-determined in it, then that
   is determined by another volition preceding that. Which is a
   contradiction; because by the supposition, it can have none before it,
   to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that
   first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then
   that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the
   Arminian notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's
   self-determination. And if that first act of the Will which determines
   and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the following acts
   which are determined by it can be free.--If we suppose there are five
   acts in the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth, and the
   fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the second by the
   first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and so not free,
   then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that each
   of them are as they are, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the
   Will, but to the determination of the first in the series, which is not
   dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in
   determining. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be,
   and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of
   their existence is not from the Will. The case is just the same, if
   instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should suppose a
   succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act he
   not free, being determined by something out of the Will, and this
   determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and
   so on; none of them are free, but all originally depend on, and are
   determined by, some cause out of the Will; and so all freedom in the
   case is excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to this
   notion of freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand
   links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move the
   next, and that the next; and so the whole chain must be determined to
   motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first
   link; and that is moved by something else; in this case, though all the
   links, but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain, yet it
   appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is
   from any self-moving or self-determining power in the chain, any more
   than if every link were immediately moved by something that did not
   belong to the chain.--If the Will be not free in the first act, which
   causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused
   by that first act; for though indeed the Will caused it, yet it did not
   cause it freely; because the preceding act, by which it was caused, was
   not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the second act, so
   neither can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because in
   like manner, that third was determined by an act of the Will that was
   not free. And so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the
   next; and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one: if
   the first on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all
   the rest, be not a free act, the Will is not free in causing or
   determining any one of those acts; because the act by which it
   determines them all is not a free act; and therefore the Will is no
   more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at
   all.--Thus, this Arminian notion of Liberty of the Will, consisting in
   the will's Self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself
   wholly out of the world.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. II.

   Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered.

   If to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said,
   that when the Arminians speak of the Will determining its own acts,
   they do not mean that the Will determines them by any preceding act, or
   that one act of the Will determines another; but only that the faculty
   or power of Will, or the soul in the use of that power, determines its
   own volitions; and that it does it without any act going before the act
   determined; such an evasion would be full of the most gross
   absurdity.--I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing; and I do
   not know but I should wrong the Arminians, in supposing that any of
   them would make use of it. But, it being as good a one as I can invent,
   I would observe upon it a few things.

   First, If the power of the will determines an act of volition, or the
   soul in the use or exercise of that power determines it, that is the
   same thing as for the soul to determine volition by an act of will, For
   an exercise of the power of will, and an act of that power, are the
   same thing. Therefore to say, that the power of will, or the soul in
   the use or exercise of that power, determines volition, without an act
   of will preceding the volition determined, is a contradiction.

   Secondly, If a power of will determines the act of the Will, then a
   power of choosing determines it. For, as was before observed, in every
   act of will, there is choice, and a power of willing is a power of
   choosing. But if a power of choosing determines the act of volition, it
   determines it by choosing it. For it is most absurd to say, that a
   power of choosing determines one thing rather than another, without
   choosing any thing. But if a power of choosing determines volition by
   choosing it, then here is the act of volition determined by an
   antecedent choice, choosing that volition.

   Thirdly, To say, that the faculty, or the soul, determines its own
   volition, but not by any act, is a contradiction. Because for the soul
   to direct, decide, or determine any thing, is to act; and this is
   supposed: for the soul is here spoken of as being a cause in this
   affair, doing something; or, which is the same thing, exerting itself
   in order to an effect, which effect is the determination of volition,
   or the particular kind and manner of an act of will. But certainly,
   this action is not the same with the effect, in order to the production
   of which it is exerted; but must be something prior to it.

   The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the Will, speak of a
   certain sovereignty in the Will, whereby it has power to determine its
   own volitions. And therefore the determination of volition must itself
   be an act of the Will; for otherwise it can be no exercise of that
   supposed power and sovereignty. Again, if the Will determines itself,
   then either the Will is active in determining its volitions, or it is
   not. If active, then the determination is an act of the Will; and so
   there is one act of the Will determining another. But if the Will is
   not active in the determination, then how does it exercise any liberty
   in it? These gentlemen suppose that the thing wherein the Will
   exercises liberty, is in its determining its own acts. But how can this
   be, if it be not active in determining? Certainly the Will, or the
   soul, cannot exercise any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or
   wherein it doth not exercise itself. So that if either part of this
   dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in
   self-determining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the Will
   in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the Will is
   determined by another; and so we have the absurdity of every free act,
   even the very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there
   be no act or exercise of the Will in determining its own acts, then no
   liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that
   no liberty consists in the Will's power to determine its own acts: or,
   which is the same thing, that there is no such thing as liberty
   consisting in a self-determining power of the Will.

   If it should be said, That although it be true, if the soul determines
   its own volitions, it must be active in so doing, and the determination
   itself must be an act; yet there is no need of supposing this act to be
   prior to the volition determined; but the Will or soul determines the
   act of the Will in willing; it determines its own volition, in the very
   act of volition; it directs and limits the act of the Will, causing it
   to be so and not otherwise, in exerting the act, without any preceding
   act to exert that. If any should say after this manner, they must mean
   one of these three things: either, (1.) That the determining act,
   though it be before the act determined in the order of nature, yet is
   not before it in order of time. Or, (2.) That the determining act is
   not before the act determined, either in the order of time or nature,
   nor is truly distinct from it; but that the soul's determining the act
   of volition is the same thing with its exerting the act of volition:
   the mind's exerting such a particular act, is its causing and
   determining the act. Or, (3.) That volition has no cause, and is no
   effect; but comes into existence, with such a particular determination,
   without any ground or reason of its existence and determination.--I
   shall consider these distinctly.

   (1.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before
   the act determined in order of time, it will not help the case at all,
   though it should be allowed. If it be before the determined act in the
   order of nature, being the cause or ground of its existence, this as
   much proves it to be distinct from, and independent on it, as if it
   were before in the order of time. As the cause of the particular motion
   of a natural body in a certain direction, may have no distance as to
   time, yet cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but must
   be as distinct from it, as any other cause, that is before its effect
   in the order of time: as the architect is distinct from the house which
   he builds, or the father distinct from the son which he begets. And if
   the act of the Will determining be distinct from the act determined,
   and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to
   another, till we come to the first in the series, which has no act of
   the Will before it in the order of nature, determining it; and
   consequently is an act not determined by the Will, and so not a free
   act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act which determines
   all the rest, none of them are free acts. As when there is a chain of
   many links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand;
   all the rest may follow and be moved at the same instant, without any
   distance of time; but yet the motion of one link is before that of
   another in the order of nature; the last is moved by the next, and that
   by the next, and so till we come to the first; which not being moved by
   any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain, this as much
   proves that no part is moved by any self-moving power in the chain, as
   if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of
   time.

   (2.) If any should say, that the determining act is not before the
   determined act, either in the order of time, or of nature, nor is
   distinct from it; but that the exertion of the act is the determination
   of the act; that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is for it
   to cause and determine that act of volition: I would on this observe,
   that the thing in question seems to be forgotten, or kept out of sight,
   in a darkness and unintelligibleness of speech; unless such an objector
   would mean to contradict himself.--The very act of volition itself is
   doubtless a determination of mind; i.e. it is the mind's drawing up a
   conclusion, or coming to a choice between two or more things proposed
   to it. But determining among external objects of choice, is not the
   same with determining the act of choice itself, among various possible
   acts of choice.--The question is, What influences, directs, or
   determines the mind or Will to come to such a conclusion or choice as
   it does? Or what is the cause, ground, or reason, why it concludes
   thus, and not otherwise? Now it must be answered, according to the
   Arminian notion of freedom, that the Will influences, orders, and
   determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say, it must be by
   some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, influenced, and determined
   by something, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either in
   order of time or nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant
   by a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is someway the
   cause or reason of the thing, with respect to which it is said to be
   prior.

   If the particular act or exertion of will, which comes into existence,
   be any thing properly determined at all, then it has some cause of
   existing, and of existing in such a particular determinate manner, and
   not another; some cause, whose influence decides the matter: which
   cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that
   the Will or mind orders, influences, and determines itself to exert an
   act by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion both cause and
   effect; or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of
   such an act. For the question is, What is the cause and reason of the
   soul's exerting such an act? To which the answer is, The soul exerts
   such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion
   must be distinct from, and in the order of nature prior to, itself.

   (3.) If the meaning be, that the soul's exertion of such a particular
   act of will, is a thing that comes to pass of itself, without any
   cause; and that there is absolutely no reason of the soul being
   determined to exert such a volition, and make such a choice, rather
   than another; I say, if this be the meaning of Arminians, when they
   contend so earnestly for the Will determining its own acts, and for
   liberty of Will consisting in self-determining power; they do nothing
   but confound themselves and others with words without a meaning. In the
   question, What determines the Will? and in their answer, that the Will
   determines itself; and in all the dispute, it seems to be taken for
   granted, that something determines the Will; and the controversy on
   this head is not, whether its determination has any cause or foundation
   at all; but where the foundation of it is, whether in the will itself,
   or somewhere else. But if the thing intended be what is above
   mentioned, then nothing at all determines the Will; volition having
   absolutely no cause or foundation of its existence, either within or
   without.--There is a great noise made about self-determining power, as
   the source of all free acts of the Will: but when the matter comes to
   be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all is the source of
   these acts, neither self-determining power, nor any other, but they
   arise from nothing; no cause, no power, no influence, being at all
   concerned in the matter.

   However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the Will are
   events which come to pass without a cause, is certainly implied in the
   Arminian notion of liberty of Will; though it be very inconsistent with
   many other things in their scheme, and repugnant to some things implied
   in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the particular
   determination of volition is without any cause; because they hold the
   free acts of the Will to be contingent events; and contingence is
   essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things
   which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a
   cause which antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to
   be just as they are, do not happen contingently. If something
   foregoing, by a casual influence and connexion, determines and fixes
   precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then it does not
   remain a contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or no.

   And because it is a question in many respects very important in this
   controversy, Whether the free acts of the Will are events which come to
   pass without a cause; I shall be particular in examining this point in
   the two following sections.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. III.

   Whether any event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to
   pass without a Cause of its existence.

   Before I enter on any argument on this subject, I would explain how I
   would be understood, when I use the word Cause in this discourse;
   since, for want of a better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a
   sense which is more extensive than that in which it is sometimes used.
   The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that
   which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or
   bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive
   productive influence; which yet are Causes in this respect, that they
   have truly the nature of a reason why some things are, rather than
   others; or why they are thus, rather than otherwise. Thus the absence
   of the sun in the night, is not the Cause of the fall of dew at that
   time, in the same manner as its beams are the cause of the ascent of
   vapors in the day-time; and its withdrawment in the winter, is not in
   the same manner the Cause of the freezing of the waters, as its
   approach in the spring is the cause of their thawing. But yet the
   withdrawment or absence of the sun is an antecedent, with which these
   effects in the night and winter are connected, and on which they
   depend; and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they
   come to pass at that time, rather than at other times; though the
   absence of the sun is nothing positive, nor has any positive influence.

   It may be further observed, that when I speak of connexion of Causes
   and effects, I have respect to moral Causes, as well as those that are
   called natural in distinction from them. Moral Causes may be Causes in
   as proper a sense as any Causes whatsoever; may have as real an
   influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason of an Event's
   coming to pass.

   Therefore I sometimes use the word Cause, in this inquiry, to signify
   any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which
   an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so
   depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part,
   why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than
   otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent
   Event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the
   proposition which affirms that Event is true; whether it has any
   positive influence, or not. And agreeably to this, I sometimes use the
   word effect for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps
   rather an occasion than a Cause, most properly speaking.

   I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off
   occasion, from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against
   some things which I may say concerning the dependence of all things
   which come to pass, on some Cause, and their connexion with their
   Cause.

   Having thus explained what I mean by Cause, I assert, that nothing ever
   comes to pass without a Cause. What is self-existent must be from
   eternity, and must be unchangeable: but as to all things that begin to
   be, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation
   of their existence without themselves.--That whatsoever begins to be,
   which before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist,
   seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God
   hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of
   all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or to
   come.

   And this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes,
   or things and the manner and circumstances of things. Thus, if we see a
   body which has hitherto been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and
   begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some
   Cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the existence of a
   body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body, which had
   hitherto moved in a certain direction, should suddenly change the
   direction of its motion; or if it should put off its old figure, and
   take a new one; or change its color: the beginning of these new modes
   is a new Event, and the human mind necessarily supposes that there is
   some Cause or reason of them.

   If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all arguing from
   effects to causes ceaseth, and so all knowledge of any existence,
   besides what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition,
   particularly all our proof of the being of God, ceases: we argue His
   being from our own being, and the being of other things, which we are
   sensible once were not, but have begun to be; and from the being of the
   world, with all its constituent parts, and the manner of their
   existence; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own
   nature, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But
   if things, not in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a
   Cause, all this arguing is vain.

   Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things no
   foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God, without any evidence
   of it from his works. I do suppose there is a great absurdity in
   denying Being in general, and imagining an eternal, absolute, universal
   nothing: and therefore that there would be, in the nature of things, a
   foundation of intuitive evidence, that there must be an eternal,
   infinite, most perfect Being; if we had strength and comprehension of
   mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and universal Being.
   But then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of
   God by arguing; our evidence would be intuitive: we should see it, as
   we see other things that are necessary in themselves, the contraries of
   which are in their own nature absurd and contradictory; as we see that
   twice two is four; and as we see that a circle has no angles. If we had
   as clear an idea of universal, infinite entity, as we have of these
   other things, I suppose we should most intuitively see the absurdity of
   supposing such Being not to be; should immediately see there is no room
   for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most
   general, abstracted notion of it should not be. But we have not that
   strength and extent of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive,
   independent manner: but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of
   the Being of God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom. i.20. The
   invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly
   seen; being understood by the things that are made; even his eternal
   power and Godhead. We first ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from
   effects, that there must be an eternal Cause; and then secondly, prove
   by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be necessarily
   existent; and then thirdly, from the proved necessity of his existence,
   we may descend, and prove many of his perfections a priori. [109]

   But if once this grand principle of common sense be given up, that what
   is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause; and we begin to
   maintain, that things which heretofore have not been, may come into
   existence, and begin to be of themselves, without any cause; all our
   means of ascending in our arguing from the creature to the Creator, and
   all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this
   case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the
   world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their Being,
   their order, beauty, and use. For if things may come into existence
   without any Cause at all, then they doubtless may without any Cause
   answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally suppose and
   determine both these things; namely, that what begins to be has a
   Cause, and also that it has a Cause proportionable to the effect. The
   same principle which leads us to determine, that there cannot be any
   thing coming to pass without a Cause, leads us to determine that there
   cannot be more in the effect than in the Cause.

   Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without
   a Cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we
   should be without evidence of the existence of any thing whatsoever,
   but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness. For we have no
   way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to Causes:
   from the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things not
   immediately in view; from sensations now excited in us, we infer the
   existence of things without us, as the Causes of these sensations; and
   from the existence of these things, we argue other things, on which
   they depend, as effects on Causes. We infer the past existence of
   ourselves, or any thing else, by memory; only as we argue, that the
   ideas, which are now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas
   and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas
   which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other
   things only by means of these, as necessarily connected with others,
   and dependent on them. But if things may be without Causes, all this
   necessary connexion and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of
   our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity or difficulty in
   supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself
   without a Cause; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing
   the same of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty,
   multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty: nothing multiplied by
   nothing, does not increase the sum.

   And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing, of the acts of
   the Will coming to pass without a Cause, it is the cause in fact, that
   millions of millions of Events are continually coming into existence
   contingently, without any Cause or reason why they do so, all over the
   world, every day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant
   succession, in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient
   nothing, this effectual No-Cause, is always ready at hand, to produce
   this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he
   has occasion.

   If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz. acts of the Will,
   seemed to come to pass of themselves; and it were an Event that was
   continual, and that happened in a course, wherever were found subjects
   capable of such Events; this very thing would demonstrate that there
   was some Cause of them, which made such a difference between this Event
   and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For
   contingence is blind, and does not pick and choose a particular sort of
   Events. Nothing has no choice. This No-Cause, which causes no
   existence, cannot cause the existence which comes to pass, to be of one
   particular sort only, distinguished from all others. Thus, that only
   one sort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water, and that this
   comes so often, so constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in
   all ages, shows that there is some Cause or reason of the falling of
   water out of the heavens; and that something besides mere contingence
   has a hand in the matter.

   If we should suppose Non-entity to be about to bring forth; and things
   were coming into existence, without any Cause or antecedent, on which
   the existence, or kind, or manner of existence depends; or which could
   at all determine whether the things should be stones, or stars, or
   beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion
   or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensations in animals, or new
   ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions in the Will; or any
   thing else of all the infinite number of possibles; then certainly it
   would not be expected, although many millions of millions of things
   were coming into existence in this manner, all over the face of the
   earth, that they should all be only of one particular kind, and that it
   should be thus in all ages, and that this sort of existences should
   never fail to come to pass where there is room for them, or a subject
   capable of them, and that constantly, whenever there is occasion.

   If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of Event that
   renders it possible for it to come into existence without a Cause, and
   should say, that the free acts of the Will are existences of an
   exceeding different nature from other things; by reason of which they
   may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it,
   though other things cannot: if they make this objection in good
   earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting
   themselves; for they would be giving an account of some ground of the
   existence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there
   is no ground of its existence. Therefore I would observe, that the
   particular nature of existence, be it never so diverse from others, can
   lay no foundation for that thing coming into existence without a Cause;
   because to suppose this, would be to suppose the particular nature of
   existence to be a thing prior to the existence, and so a thing which
   makes way for existence, without a cause or reason of existence. But
   that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming into being, or
   for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to
   the existence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is
   something belonging to the effect, cannot have influence backward, to
   act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called Volition,
   can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards
   it is too late for its influence: for then the thing has made sure of
   existence already, without its help.

   So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of
   the Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the
   human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole
   universe, should come into existence without a Cause. And if once we
   allow, that such a sort of effect as a Volition may come to pass
   without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects
   may do so too? It is not the particular kind of effect that makes the
   absurdity of supposing it has being without a Cause, but something
   which is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz. That they are
   not self- existent, or necessary in the nature of things.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [109] To the inquirer after the truth it may here be recommended, as a
   matter of some consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference
   between an argument a priori and one a posteriori, a distinction of
   considerable use, as well as of long standing, among divines,
   metaphysicians, and logical writers. An argument from either of these,
   when legitimately applied, may amount to a demonstration, when used for
   instance, relatively to the being and perfections of God; but the one
   should be confined to the existence of Deity, while the other is
   applicable to his perfections. By the argument a posteriori we rise
   from the effect to the cause, from the stream to the fountain, from
   what is posterior to what is prior; in other words, from what is
   contingent to what is absolute, from number to unity; that is, from the
   manifestation of God to his existence. By the argument a priori we
   descend from the cause to the effect, from the fountain to the stream,
   from what is prior to what is posterior; that is, from the necessary
   existence of God we safely infer certain properties and perfections. To
   attempt a demonstration of the existence of a first cause, or the Being
   of God, a priori, would be most absurd; for it would be an attempt to
   prove a prior ground or cause of existence of a first cause; or, that
   there is some cause before the very first. The argument a priori,
   therefore, is not applicable to prove the divine existence. For this
   end, the argument a posteriori alone is legitimate; and its
   conclusiveness rests on this axiom, that "there can be no effect
   without a cause."-The absurdity of denying this axiom is abundantly
   demonstrated by our author.--W.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. IV.

   Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the
   nature of the soul.

   The author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the
   Creatures, in answer to that objection against his doctrine of a
   self-determining power in the Will, (p. 68--69.) That nothing is, or
   comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in
   this manner rather than another, allows that it is thus in corporeal
   things, which are, properly and philosophically speaking, passive
   being; but denies it is thus in spirits, which are beings of an active
   nature, who have the spring of action within themselves, and can
   determine themselves. By which it is plainly supposed, that such an
   event as an act of the Will, may come to pass in a spirit, without a
   sufficient reason why it comes to pass, or why it is after this manner,
   rather than another. But certainly this author, in this matter, must be
   very unwary and inadvertent. For,

   1. The objection or difficulty proposed by him seems to be forgotten in
   his answer or solution. The very difficulty, as he himself proposes it,
   is this: How an event can come to pass without a sufficient reason why
   it is, or why it is in this manner rather than another? Instead of
   solving this difficulty, with regard to Volition, as he proposes, he
   forgets himself, and answers another question quite diverse, viz. What
   is a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather
   than another? And he assigns the active being's own determination as
   the Cause, and a Cause sufficient for the effect; and leaves all the
   difficulty unresolved, even, How the soul's own determination, which he
   speaks of, came to exist, and to be what it was, without a Cause? The
   activity of the soul may enable it to be the Cause of effects; but it
   does not at all enable it to be the subject of effects which have no
   Cause; which is the thing this author supposes concerning acts of the
   Will. Activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce
   effects, and determine the manner of their existence, within itself,
   without a Cause, than out of itself, in some other being. But if an
   active being should, through its activity, produce and determine an
   effect in some external object, how absurd would it be to say, that the
   effect was produced without a Cause!

   2. The question is not so much, How a spirit endowed with activity
   comes to act, as why it exerts such an act, and not another; or why it
   acts with such a particular determination? If activity of nature be the
   Cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts, and does not
   lie still; yet that alone is not the Cause why its action is thus and
   thus limited, directed, and determined. Active nature is a general
   thing; it is an ability or tendency of nature to action, generally
   taken; which may be a Cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is
   given; but this alone cannot be a sufficient Cause why the soul exerts
   such a particular act, at such a time, rather than others. In order to
   this there must be something besides a general tendency to action;
   there must also be a particular tendency to that individual action.--If
   it should be asked, why the soul of man uses its activity, in such a
   manner as it does; and it should be answered, that the soul uses its
   activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it has activity; would
   such an answer satisfy a rational man? Would it not rather be looked
   upon as a very impertinent one?

   3. An active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but
   what are consequent upon his acting: he produces nothing by his
   activity, any other way than by the exercise of his activity, and so
   nothing but the fruits of its exercise: he brings nothing to pass by a
   dormant activity. But the exercise of his activity is action; and so
   his action, or exercise of his activity, must be prior to the effects
   of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in another
   being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the
   fruit of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted,
   and the effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if
   the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant
   about himself, to produce and determine some effect in himself; still
   the exercise of his activity must go before the effect, which he brings
   to pass and determines by it. And therefore his activity cannot be the
   Cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise of activity
   itself, whence the effects of activity arise; for that would imply a
   contradiction; it would be to say, the first exercise of activity is
   before the first exercise of activity, and is the Cause of it.

   4. That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its own
   acts, but by first acting; or be a determining Cause of different acts,
   or any different effects, sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of
   another, any other way than in consequence of its own diverse acts, is
   manifest by this; that if so, then the same Cause, the same causal
   influence, without variation in any respect, would produce different
   effects at different times. For the same substance of the soul before
   it acts, and the same active nature of the soul before it is exerted,
   i. e. before in the order of nature, would be the Cause of different
   effects, viz. different Volitions at different times. But the substance
   of the soul before it acts, and its active nature before it is exerted,
   are the same without variation. For it is some act that makes the first
   variation in the Cause, as to any causal exertion, force, or influence.
   But if it be so, that the soul has no different causality, or diverse
   causal influence, in producing these diverse effects; then it is
   evident, that the soul has no influence in the diversity of the effect;
   and that the difference of the effect cannot be owing to any thing in
   the soul; or which is the same thing, the soul does not determine the
   diversity of the effect; which is contrary to the supposition.--It is
   true, the substance of the soul before it acts, and before their is any
   difference in that respect, may be in a different state and
   circumstances: but those whom I oppose, will not allow the different
   circumstances of the soul to be the determining Causes of the acts of
   the Will; as being contrary to their notion of self-determination.

   5. Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the
   soul, strictly speaking, but free Volitions; then it will follow, that
   the soul is an active being in nothing further than it is a voluntary
   or elective being; and when ever it produces effects actively, it
   produces effects voluntarily and electively. But to produce effects
   thus, is the same thing as to produce effects in consequence of, and
   according to its own choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not
   by its activity produce all its own acts of will or choice themselves;
   for this, by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts of choice
   voluntarily an electively or in consequence of its own free acts of
   choice, which brings the matter directly to the forementioned
   contradiction, of a free act of choice before the first free act of
   choice.--According to these gentlemen's own notion of action, if there
   arises in the mind a Volition without a free act of the Will to produce
   it, the mind is not the voluntary Cause of that Volition; because it
   does not arise from, nor is regulated by, choice or design. And
   therefore it cannot be, that the mind should be the active, voluntary,
   determining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to the
   affair.--The mind being a designing Cause, only enables it to produce
   effects in consequence of its design; it will not enable it to be the
   designing Cause of all its own designs. The mind being an elective
   Cause, will enable it to produce effects only in consequence of its
   elections, and according to them; but cannot enable it to be the
   elective Cause of all its own elections; because that supposes an
   election before the first election. So the mind being an active Cause
   enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own acts, but
   cannot enable it to be the determining Cause of all its own acts; for
   that is, in the same manner, a contradiction; as it supposes a
   determining act conversant about the first act, and prior to it, having
   a causal influence on its existence, and manner of existence.

   I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul having
   power to cause and determine its own Volitions, as a being to whom God
   has given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the
   soul, sometimes at least, to excite Volitions at its pleasure, or
   according as it chooses. And this certainly supposes, in all such
   cases, a choice preceding all Volitions which are thus caused, even the
   first of them. Which runs into the forementioned great absurdity.

   Therefore the activity of the nature of the soul affords no relief from
   the difficulties with which the notion of a self-determining power in
   the Will is attended, nor will it help, in the least, its absurdities
   and inconsistences.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. V.

   Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be
   supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help
   the cause of Arminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the
   case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.

   What was last observed in the preceding section, may show--not only
   that the active nature of the soul cannot be a reason why an act of the
   Will is, or why it is in this manner rather than another, but
   also--that if it could be proved, that volitions are contingent events,
   their being and manner of being not fixed or determined by any cause,
   or any thing antecedent; it would not at all serve the purpose of
   Arminians, to establish their notion of freedom, as consisting in the
   Will's determination of itself, which supposes every free act of the
   Will to be determined by some act of the Will going before; inasmuch as
   for the Will to determine a thing, is the same as for the soul to
   determine a thing by willing; and there is no way that the Will can
   determine an act of the Will, than by willing that act of the Will, or,
   which is the same thing, choosing it. So that here must be two acts of
   the Will in the case, one going before another, one conversant about
   the other, and the latter the object of the former, and chosen by the
   former. If the Will does not cause and determine the act by choice, it
   does not cause or determine it at all; for that which is not determined
   by choice, is not determined voluntarily or willingly: and to say, that
   the Will determines something which the soul does not determine
   willingly, is as much as to say, that something is done by the Will,
   which the soul doth not with its Will.

   So that if Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in the Will determining
   its own acts, be maintained, the old absurdity and contradiction must
   be maintained, that every free act of Will is caused and determined by
   a foregoing free act of Will. Which doth not consist with the free acts
   arising without any cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed
   by any thing foregoing. So that this evasion must be given up, as not
   at all relieving this sort of liberty, but directly destroying it.

   And if it should be supposed, that the soul determines its own acts of
   W ill some other way, than by a foregoing act of Will; still it will
   help not their cause If it determines them by an act of the
   understanding, or some other power, then the Will does not determine
   itself; and so the self--determining power of the Will is given up. And
   what liberty is there exercised, according to their own opinion of
   liberty, by the soul being determined by something besides its own
   choice? The acts of the Will, it is true, may be directed, and
   effectually determined and fixed; but it is not done by the soul's own
   Will and pleasure: there is no exercise at all of choice or Will in
   producing the effect: and if Will and choice are not exercised in it,
   how is the liberty of the Will exercised in it?

   So that let Arminians turn which way they please with their notion of
   liberty, consisting in the Will determining its own acts, their notion
   destroys itself. If they hold every free act of Will to be determined
   by the soul's own free choice, or foregoing free act of Will;
   foregoing, either in the order of time, or nature; it implies that
   gross contradiction, that the first free act belonging to the affair,
   is determined by a free act which is before it. Or if they say, that
   the free acts of the Will are determined by some other act of the soul,
   and not an act of Will or choice; this also destroys their notion of
   liberty consisting in the acts of the Will being determined by the Will
   itself; or if they hold that the acts of the Will are determined by
   nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contingent in
   that sense, that they are determined and fixed by no cause at all; this
   also destroys their notion of liberty, consisting in the Will
   determining its own acts.

   This being the true state of the Arminian notion of liberty, the
   writers who defend it are forced into gross inconsistences, in what
   they say upon this subject. To instance in Dr. Whitby; he, in his
   discourse on the freedom of the Will, [110] opposes the opinion of the
   Calvinists, who place man's liberty only in a power of doing what he
   will, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he
   himself mentions the very same notion of liberty, as the dictate of the
   sense and common reason of mankind, and a rule laid down by the light
   of nature; viz. that liberty is a power of acting from ourselves, or
   doing what we will. [111] This is indeed, as he says, a thing agreeable
   to the sense and common reason of mankind; and therefore it is not so
   much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against
   himself: for if liberty does not consist in this, what else can be
   devised that it should consist in? If it be said, as Dr. Whitby
   elsewhere insists, that it does not only consist in liberty of doing
   what we will, but also a liberty of willing without necessity; still
   the question returns, what does that liberty of willing without
   necessity consist in, but in a power of willing as we please, without
   being impeded by a contrary necessity? or in other words, a liberty for
   the soul in its willing to act according to its own choice? Yea, this
   very thing the same author seems to allow, and suppose again and again,
   in the use he makes of sayings of the fathers, whom he quotes as his
   vouchers. Thus he cites the words of Origen, which he produces as a
   testimony on his side; [112] "The soul acts by her own choice , and it
   is free for her to incline to whatever part she will." And those of
   Justin Martyr; [113] "The doctrine of the Christians is this, that
   nothing is done or suffered according to fate, but that every man doth
   good or evil according to his own free choice. And from Eusebius, these
   words; [114] "If fate be established, philosophy and piety are
   overthrown.--All these things depending upon the necessity introduced
   by the stars, aloud not upon meditation and exercise proceeding from
   our own free choice. And again, the words of Maccarius; [115] "God, to
   preserve the liberty of man's Will, suffered their bodies to die, that
   it might be in their choice. to turn to good or evil."--"They who are
   acted by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any necessity, but have
   liberty to turn themselves, and do what they will in this life."

   Thus, the Doctor in effect comes into that very notion of liberty,
   which the Calvinists have; which he at the same time condemns, as
   agreeing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely, The soul acting by its
   own choice, men doing good or evil according to their own free choice,
   their being in that exercise which proceeds from their own free choice,
   having it in their choice to turn to good or evil, and doing what they
   will." So that if men exercise this liberty in the acts of the Will
   themselves, it must be in exerting acts of Will according to their own
   free choice; or, exerting acts of Will that proceed from their choice.
   And if it be so, then let every one judge whether this does not suppose
   a free choice going before the free act of Will, or whether an act of
   choice does not go before that act of the Will which proceeds from it.
   And if it be thus with all free acts of the Will, then let every one
   judge, whether it will not follow that there is a free choice going
   before the first free act of the Will exerted in the case! And finally,
   let every one judge whether in the scheme of these writers there be any
   possibility of avoiding these absurdities.

   If liberty consists, as Dr. Whitby himself says, in a man's doing what
   he will; and a man exercises this liberty, not only in external
   actions, but in the acts of the Will themselves; then so far as liberty
   is exercised in the latter, it consists in willing what he wills: and
   if any say so, one of these two things must be meant, either, 1. That a
   man has power to will, as he does will; because what he wills, he
   wills; and therefore power to will what he has power to will. If this
   be their meaning, then all this mighty controversy about freedom of the
   Will and self-determining power, comes wholly to nothing; all that is
   contended for being no more than this, that the mind of man does what
   it does, and is the subject of what it is the subject, or that what is,
   is; wherein none has any controversy with them. Or, 2. The meaning must
   be, that a man has power to will as he chooses to will: that is, he has
   power by one act of choice to choose another; by an antecedent act of
   Will to choose a consequent act: and therein to execute his own choice.
   And if this be their meaning, it is nothing but shuffling with those
   they dispute with, and baffling their own reason. For still the
   question returns, wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent act of
   Will which chose the consequent act. The answer according to the same
   principles must be, that his liberty in this also lies in his willing
   as he would, or as he chose, or agreeable to another act of choice
   preceding that. And so the question returns in infinitum, and the like
   answer must be made in infinitum: in order to support their opinion,
   their must be no beginning, but free acts of Will must have been chosen
   by foregoing free acts of Will in the soul of every man, without
   beginning.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [110] In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. P. 350,351, 358.

   [111] Ibid. p. 325, 326.

   [112] Ibid. p. 342.

   [113] Ibid. p 360.

   [114] In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. P. 363

   [115] Ibid. p. 369, 370.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. VI.

   Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly
   indifferent in the view of the mind .

   A great. argument for self-determining power, is the supposed
   experience we universally have of an ability to determine our Wills, in
   cases wherein no prevailing motive is presented: the Will, as is
   supposed, has its choice to make between two or more things, that are
   perfectly equal in the view of the mind; and the Will is apparently,
   altogether indifferent; and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a
   choice; the Will can instantly determine itself to one, by a sovereign
   power which it has over itself, without being moved by any
   preponderating inducement.

   Thus the fore-mentioned author of an Essay on the Freedom of the Will,
   &c. (p. 25, 26, 27.) supposes, "That there are many instances, wherein
   the Will is determined neither by present uneasiness, nor by the
   greatest apparent good, nor by the last dictate of the understanding,
   nor by any thing else, but merely by itself, as a sovereign
   self-determining power of the soul; and that the soul does not will
   this or that action, in some cases, by any other influence but because
   it will. Thus, says he, I can turn my face to the south, or the north;
   I can point with my finger upward, or downward.--And thus, in some
   cases, the Will determines itself in a very sovereign manner, because
   it will, without a reason borrowed from the understanding: and hereby
   it discovers its own perfect power of choice, rising from within
   itself, and free from all influence or restraint of any kind." And (p.
   66, 70, 73, 74.) this author very expressly supposes the Will in many
   cases to be determined by no motive at all, and acts altogether without
   motive, or ground of preference.--Here I would observe,

   1. The very supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and
   overthrows itself. For the thing supposed, wherein this grand argument
   consists, is, that among several things the Will actually chooses one
   before another, at the same time that it is perfectly indifferent;
   which is the very same thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at
   the same time that it has no preference. What is meant cannot be, that
   the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until it
   has a preference; for certainly this author did not imagine he had a
   controversy with any person in supposing this. Besides, it appears in
   fact, that the thing which he supposes, is--not that the Will chooses
   one thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it
   chooses, but that the Will is indifferent when it chooses; and that it
   being otherwise than indifferent is not until afterwards, in
   consequence of its choice; that the chosen thing appearing preferable,
   and more agreeable than another, arises from its choice already made.
   His words are, (p. 30.) "Where the objects which are proposed appear
   equally fit or good, the Will is left without a guide or director; and
   therefore must take its own choice, by its own determination; it being
   properly a self-determining power. And in such cases the Will does as
   it were make a good to itself by its own choice, i.e. creates its own
   pleasure or delight in this self-chosen good. Even as a man by seizing
   upon a spot of unoccupied land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his
   own possession and property, and as such rejoices in it. Where things
   were indifferent before, the Will finds nothing to make them more
   agreeable, considered merely in themselves, but the pleasure it feels
   arising from its own choice, and its perseverance therein. We love many
   things which we have chosen, and purely because we chose them."

   This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer many things,
   purely because we have preferred and chosen them before.--These things
   must needs be spoken inconsiderately by this author. Choice or
   preference cannot be before itself in the same instance, either in the
   order of time or nature: It cannot be the foundation of itself, or the
   consequence of itself. The very act of choosing one thing rather than
   another, is preferring that thing, and that is setting a higher value
   on that thing. But that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than
   another, is not, in the first place, the fruit of its setting a higher
   value on that thing.

   This author says, (p. 36.) "The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and
   yet the Will may determine itself to choose one or the other." And
   again, in the same page, "I am entirely indifferent to either; and yet
   my Will may determine itself to choose." And again, "Which I shall
   choose must be determined by the mere act of my Will." If the choice is
   determined by a mere act of Will, then the choice is determined by a
   mere act of choice. And concerning this matter, viz. That the act of
   the Will itself is determined by act of choice, this writer is express.
   (p. 72.) Speaking of the case, where there is no superior fitness in
   objects presented, he has these words: "There it must act by its own
   choice., and determine itself as it pleases." Where it is supposed that
   the very determination, which is the ground and spring of the Will's
   act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more
   agreeable than another; and this preference and superior pleasure is
   the ground of all it does in the case. And if so, the mind is not
   indifferent when it determines itself, but had rather determine itself
   one way than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all in
   indifference; not so much as in the first step it takes. If it be
   possible for the understanding to act in indifference, yet surely the
   Will never does; because the Will beginning to act is the very same
   thing as it beginning to choose or prefer. And if in the very first act
   of the Will, the mind prefers something, then the idea of that thing
   preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the mind: or,
   which is the same thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence on
   the Will. So that this wholly destroys the thing supposed, viz. That
   the mind can by a sovereign power choose one of two or more things,
   which in the view of the mind are, in every respect, perfectly equal,
   one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing
   influence on the mind above another.

   So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will
   to choose one of two or more things, concerning which it is perfectly
   indifferent, does at the same time, in effect, deny the thing he
   supposes, even that the Will, in choosing, is subject to no prevailing
   influence of the view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible
   to offer this argument without overthrowing it; the thing supposed in
   it being that which denies itself. To suppose the Will to act at all in
   a state of perfect indifference, is to assert that the mind chooses
   without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it
   pleases, is to say that it can follow its pleasure, when it has no
   pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any difficulty in the
   instances of two cakes, or two eggs, &c. which are exactly alike, one
   as good as another; concerning which this author supposes the mind in
   fact has a choice, and so in effect supposes that it has a preference;
   it as much concerned himself to solve the difficulty, as it does those
   whom he opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his purpose,
   they prove that a man chooses without choice. And yet this is not to
   his purpose; because if this is what he asserts, his own words are as
   much against him, and does as much contradict him, as the words of
   those he disputes against can do.

   2. There is no great difficulty in showing, in such instances as are
   alleged, not only that it must needs be so, that the mind must be
   influenced in its choice by something that has a preponderating
   influence upon it, but also how it is so. A little attention to our own
   experience, and a distinct consideration of the acts of our own minds,
   in such cases, will be sufficient to clear up the matter.

   Thus, supposing I have a chess-board before me; and because I am
   required by a superior, or desired by a friend, or on some other
   consideration, I am determined to touch some one of the spots or
   squares on the board with my finger. Not being limited or directed, in
   the first proposal, to any one in particular; and there being nothing
   in the squares, in themselves considered, that recommends any one of
   all the sixty-four, more than another; in this case, my mind determines
   to give itself up to what is vulgularly called accident, [116] by
   determining to touch that square which happens to be most in view,
   which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or which happens to be
   then most in my mind, or which I shall be directed to by some other
   such like accident. Here are several steps of the mind proceeding
   (though all may be done, as it were, in a moment). The first step is
   its general determination that it will touch one of the squares. The
   next step is another general determination to give itself up to
   accident, in some certain way; as to touch that which shall be most in
   the eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident. The
   third and last step is a particular determination to touch a certain
   individual spot, even that square, which, by that sort of accident the
   mind has pitched upon, has actually offered itself beyond others. Now
   it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind
   proceed in absolute indifference, but in each of them is influenced by
   a preponderating inducement. So it is in the first step, the mind's
   general determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots: the mind is
   not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no; it is induced to
   it, for the sake of making some experiment, or by the desire of a
   friend, or some other motive that prevails. So it is in the second
   step, the mind determining to give itself up to accident, by touching
   that which shall be most in the eye, or the idea of which shall be most
   prevalent in the mind, &c. The mind is not absolutely indifferent
   whether it proceeds by this rule or no; but chooses it, because it
   appears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to
   fulfil the general purpose. And so it is in the third and last step,
   which is determining to touch that individual spot which actually does
   prevail in the mind's view. The mind is not indifferent concerning
   this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reason; which
   is, that this is a prosecution of the preceding determination, which
   appeared requisite, and was fixed before in the second step.

   Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering him a moment, in such
   a case. Among a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye,
   or in idea, beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear
   sunshine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumerable images
   may be at once painted in it by the rays of light; but the attention of
   the mind is not equal to several of them at once; or if it be, it does
   not continue so for any time. And so it is with respect to the ideas of
   the mind in general: several ideas are not in equal strength in the
   mind's view and notice at once; or at least, does not remain so for any
   sensible continuance. There is nothing in the world more constantly
   varying, than the ideas of the mind; they do not remain precisely in
   the same state for the least perceivable space of time; as is evident
   by this:--That all time is perceived by the mind, only by the
   successive changes of its own ideas. Therefore while the perceptions of
   the mind remain precisely in the same state, there is no perceivable
   length of time, because no sensible succession at all.

   As the acts of the Will, in each step of the forementioned procedure,
   do not come to pass without a particular cause, but every act is owing
   to a prevailing inducement; so the accident, as I have called it, or
   that which happens in the unsearchable course of things, to which the
   mind yields itself, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that
   comes to pass without a cause. The mind in determining to be guided by
   it, is not determined by something that has no cause; any more than if
   it be determined to be guided by a lot, or the casting of a die. For
   though the die falling in such a manner be accidental to him that casts
   it, yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it
   does. The involuntary changes in the succession of our ideas, though
   the cause may not be observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable
   motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual,
   infinitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on the
   surface of the water.

   There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of
   confusion in the minds of them who insist upon it, that the Will acts
   in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in
   its determinations in such cases as have been mentioned. [117]

   1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep
   it distinctly in view. The question they dispute about, is, Whether the
   mind be indifferent about the objects presented, one of which is to be
   taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as two eggs, two cakes, which appear
   equally good. Whereas the question to be considered, is, Whether the
   person be indifferent with respect to his own actions; whether he does
   not, on some consideration or other, prefer one act with respect to
   these objects before another. The mind in its determination and choice,
   in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant about
   the objects presented; but the acts to be done concerning these
   objects. The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly
   make any choice between them; but the next act of the Will being about
   the external actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. these may
   not appear equal, and one action may properly be chosen before another.
   In each step of the mind's progress, the determination is not about the
   objects, unless indirectly and improperly, but about the actions, which
   it chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and
   for reasons not taken at all from the objects.

   There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ever at all
   properly choose one of the objects before another: either before it has
   taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man chooses to take or touch one
   rather than another; but not because it chooses the thing taken, or
   touched, but from foreign considerations. The case may be so, that of
   two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons, prefer taking that
   which he undervalues, and choose to neglect that which his mind
   prefers. In such a case, choosing the thing taken, and choosing to
   take, are diverse: and so they are in a case where the things presented
   are equal in the mind's esteem, and neither of them preferred. All that
   fact and experience makes evident, is, that the mind chooses one action
   rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in
   order to be to their purpose, should be to prove that the mind chooses
   the action in perfect indifference, with respect to that action; and
   not to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indifference,
   with respect to the object; which is very possible, and yet the Will
   not act at all without prevalent inducement, and proper preponderation.

   2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter, seems to
   be, not distinguishing between a general indifference, or an
   indifference with respect to what is to be done in a more distant and
   general view of it, and a particular indifference, or an indifference
   with respect to the next immediate act, viewed with its particular and
   present circumstances. A man may be perfectly indifferent with respect
   to his own actions, in the former respect; and yet not in the latter.
   Thus in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares of a
   chess-board; when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them,
   I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch; because as yet I view the
   matter remotely and generally, being but in the first step of the
   mind's progress in the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the
   last step, and the very next thing to be determined is which, is to be
   touched, having already determined that I will touch that which happens
   to be most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a
   particular one, the act of touching that, considered thus immediately,
   and in these particular present circumstances, is not what my mind is
   absolutely indifferent about.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [116] I have elsewhere observed, what that is which is vulgarly called
   accident; that it is nothing akin to the Arminian metaphysical notion
   of contingence, or something not connected with any thing foregoing;
   but that it is something that comes to pass in the course of things,
   unforeseen by men, and not owing to their design.

   [117] The reader is particularly requested to give due attention to
   these two remarks, especially the former, as being of the utmost
   importance in the controversy. If he be pleased to examine, with this
   view, the most popular advocates for the liberty of indifference, he
   will find them continually confounding the objects of choice, and the
   acts of choice. When they have shown, with much plausibility, that
   there is no perceivable difference, or ground of choice, in the
   objects, they hastily infer the same indifferences as applicable to the
   acts of choice. --W.
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      SECT. VII.

   Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.

   What has been said in the foregone section, has a tendency in some
   measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion of such as place Liberty
   in Indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the will is without all
   antecedent bias; that the determination of the Will to either side may
   be entirely from itself, and that it may be owing only to its own
   power, and the sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this
   way rather than that. [118]

   But inasmuch as this has been of such long standing, and has been so
   generally received, and so much insisted on by Pelagians,
   Semi-Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and others, it may
   deserve a more full consideration. And therefore I shall now proceed to
   a more particular and thorough inquiry into this notion.

   Now lest some should suppose that I do not understand those that place
   Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me with misrepresenting their
   opinion, I would signify, that I am sensible, there are some, who, when
   they talk of Liberty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express
   themselves as though they would not be understood to mean the
   Indifference of the inclination or tendency of the Will, but an
   Indifference of the soul's power, of willing; or that the Will, with
   respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent, can go
   either way indifferently, either to the right hand or left, either act
   or forbear to act, one as well as the other. This indeed seems to be a
   refining of some particular writers only, and newly invented, which
   will by no means consist with the manner of expression used by the
   defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. I wish such refiners
   would thoroughly consider, whether they distinctly know their own
   meaning, when they make a distinction between an Indifference of the
   soul as to its power or ability of choosing, and the soul's
   Indifference as to the preference or choice itself; and whether they do
   not deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct meaning
   at all. The Indifference of the soul as to its ability or power to
   will, must be the same thing as the Indifference of the state of the
   power or faculty of the Will, or the Indifference of the state which
   the soul itself, which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in,
   as to the exercise of that power, in the choice it shall by and by
   make.

   But not to insist any longer on the inexplicable abstruseness of this
   distinction; let what will be supposed concerning the meaning of them
   that use it, this much must at least be intended by Arminians when they
   talk of Indifference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend
   any thing, in any respect to their purpose, viz. That it is such an
   Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already; but free from
   actual possession, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that there
   may be room for the exercise of the self-determining power of the Will;
   and that the Will's freedom consists in, or depends upon, this vacancy
   and opportunity that is left for the Will itself to be the determiner
   of the act that is to be the free act.

   And here I would observe in the first place, that to make out this
   scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect and absolute; there
   must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or
   inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts
   its own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly
   owing to itself: if when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its
   choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of
   Indifference, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere
   self-determination.--The least degree of an antecedent bias must be
   inconsistent with their notion of Liberty. For so long as prior
   inclination possesses the Will, and is not removed, the former binds
   the latter, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act
   otherwise than agreeably to it. Surely the Will cannot act or choose
   contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the Will. To suppose
   otherwise, would be the same thing as to suppose that the Will is
   inclined contrary to its present prevailing inclination, or contrary to
   what it is inclined to. That which the Will prefers, to that, all
   things considered, it preponderates and inclines. It is equally
   impossible for the Will to choose contrary to its own remaining and
   present preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer contrary to its
   own present preference, or choose contrary to its own present choice.
   The Will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence of an old
   preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free act; or
   any, that shall now be an act of self-determination. That which is a
   self-determined free act, must be one which the Will determines in the
   possession and use of a peculiar sort of Liberty; such as consists in a
   freedom from every thing, which, if it were there, would make it
   impossible that the Will, at that time, should be otherwise than that
   way to which it tends. [119]

   If any one should say, there is no need that the Indifference should be
   perfect; but although a former inclination still remains, yet, if it be
   not very strong, possibly the strength of the Will may oppose and
   overcome it:--This is grossly absurd; for the strength of the Will, let
   it be never so great, gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to
   cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose
   contrary to its own present choice.

   Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent preponderation of
   the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at
   liberty to determine itself the contrary way. And if the Will
   determines itself the same way, it was not a free determination,
   because the Will is not wholly at liberty in so doing; its
   determination is not altogether from itself, but it was partly
   determined before, in its prior inclination: and all the freedom the
   Will exercises in the case, is in an increase of inclination, which it
   gives itself, added to what it had by a foregoing bias; so much is from
   itself, and so much is from perfect indifference. For though the Will
   had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that additional degree of
   inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore the previous tendency is of
   no consideration, with respect to the act wherein the Will is free. So
   that it comes to the same thing which was said at first, that as to the
   act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect
   Indifference, or equilibrium.

   To illustrate this: suppose a sovereign self-moving power in a natural
   body; but that the body is in motion already, by an antecedent bias;
   for instance, gravitation towards the centre of the earth; and has one
   degree of motion by virtue of that previous tendency; but by its
   self-moving power it adds one degree more to its motion, and moves so
   much move swiftly towards the centre of the earth than it would do by
   its gravity only: it is evident, all that is owing to a self-moving
   power in this case, is the additional degree of motion; and that the
   other degree which it had from gravity, is of no consideration in the
   case; the effect is just the same, as if the body had received from
   itself one degree of motion from a state of perfect rest. So, if we
   suppose a self-moving power given to the scale of a balance, which has
   a weight of one degree beyond the opposite scale; and if we ascribe to
   it an ability to add to itself another degree of force the same way, by
   its self-moving power; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it
   a power to give itself one degree of preponderation from a perfect
   equilibrium; and so much power as the scale has to give itself an
   over-balance from a perfect equipoise, so much self-moving
   self-preponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power
   this way is always to be measured from perfect equilibrium.

   I need say no more to prove, that if Indifference be essential to
   Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference; and that so far as the Will
   is destitute of this, so far is it destitute of that freedom by which
   it is in a capacity of being its own determiner, without being at all
   passive, or subject to the power and sway of something else, in its
   motions and determinations.

   Having observed these things, let us now try whether this notion of the
   Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference and equilibrium, and the
   Will's self-determination in such a state, be not absurd and
   inconsistent.

   And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth; that
   every free act is done in a state of freedom, and not only after. such
   a state, If an act of the Will be an act wherein the soul is free, it
   must be exerted in a state of freedom, and in the time of freedom. It
   will not suffice, that the act immediately follows a state of Liberty;
   but Liberty must yet continue, and co-exist with the act; the soul
   remaining in possession of Liberty. Because that is the notion of a
   free act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises
   Liberty. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act, in
   possession of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use of it.

   Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of
   Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty, viz. as implying a
   state of Indifference; or whether the soul ever exerts an act of
   preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect
   equilibrium, not inclining on way more than another. The very putting
   of the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirmative
   answer: for how ridiculous would it be for nay body to insist, that the
   soul chooses one thing before another, when at the very same instant it
   is perfectly indifferent with respect to each! This is the same thing
   as to say, the soul prefers one thing to another, at the very same time
   that it has no preference.--Choice and preference can no more be in a
   state of Indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than
   the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of
   equilibrium. Motion may be the next moment after rest; but cannot
   co-exist with it, in any, even the least, part of it. So choice may be
   immediately after a state of Indifference, but cannot co-exist with it:
   even the very beginning of it is not in a state of Indifference. And
   therefore, if this be Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is
   ever performed in a state of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty.
   Volition and Liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being
   essential on to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one
   excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and
   darkness, or life and death. So that the Will acts not at all, does not
   so much as begin to act, in the time of such Liberty: freedom has
   ceased to be,, at the first moment of action; and therefore Liberty
   cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a
   denomination, any more than if it had ceased to be twenty years before
   the action began. The moment that Liberty ceases to be, it ceases to be
   a qualification of any thing. If light and darkness succeed one another
   instantaneously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make
   any thing lightsome or bright, at the first moment of perfect darkness,
   any more than months or years after. Life denominates nothing vital, at
   the first moment of perfect death. So freedom, if it consists in or
   implies Indifference, can denominate nothing free, at the first moment
   of preference or preponderation. Therefore it is manifest, that no
   Liberty which the soul is possessed of , or ever uses, in any of its
   acts of volition, consists in Indifference; and that the opinion of
   such as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very essence of
   Liberty, is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory.

   If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but a
   trick and delusion; and to evade the reasoning, should say, that the
   thing wherein the Will exercises its Liberty, is not in the act of
   choice or preponderation itself, but in determining itself to a certain
   choice or preference; that the act of the Will wherein it is free, and
   uses its own sovereignty, consists in its causing or determining the
   change or transition from a state of indifference to a certain
   preference or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which
   has hitherto been even; and that the Will exerts this act in a state of
   Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect
   master of itself.--I say, if any one chooses to express his notion of
   Liberty after this, or some such manner, let us see if he can succeed
   any better than before.

   What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect
   equilibrium, without preference, determines to change itself from that
   state, and excite in itself a certain choice or preference. Now let us
   see whether this does not come to the same absurdity we had before. If
   it be so that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent,
   determines to put itself out of that state, and to give itself a
   certain preponderation; than I would inquire, whether the soul does not
   determine this of choice; or whether the Will coming to a determination
   to do so, be not the same thing as the soul coming to a choice to do
   so. If the soul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercise
   of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily. And if the soul
   does not determine it voluntarily, or of its own Will, then in what
   sense does its Will determine it? And if the Will does not determine
   it, then how is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the determination?
   What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those determinations,
   wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and
   wherein the Will is not concerned? But if it be allowed, that this
   determination is an act of choice, and it be insisted on, that the
   soul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect Indifference, chooses
   to put itself out of that state, and to turn itself one way; then the
   soul is already come to a choice; and chooses that way. And so we have
   the very same absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a
   state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the same time:
   the soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of
   perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the
   other.--And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide
   the absurdity, in the obscurity of expression, increases the
   inconsistence. To say, the free act of the Will, or the act which the
   Will exerts in a state of freedom and Indifference, does not imply
   preference in it, but is what the will does in order to cause or
   produce a preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to
   will and to choose are the same thing) without choice, and prefers
   without preference, in order to cause or produce the beginning of a
   preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is
   exerted without choice, in order to produce itself!

   If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of Liberty and
   a state of Indifference are not the same, and that the former may be
   without the latter; but should say, that Indifference is still
   essential to freedom, as it is necessary to go immediately before it;
   it being essential to the freedom of an act of Will that it should
   directly and immediately arise out of a state of Indifference; still
   this will not help the cause of Arminian Liberty, or make it consistent
   with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a state of
   Indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent choice or
   preference. But if the act arises directly out of a state of
   Indifference, without any intervening choice to determine it, then the
   act not being determined by choice, is not determined by the Will; the
   mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free
   will have no hand in the determination of the act. Which is entirely
   inconsistent with their notion of the freedom of volition.

   If any should suppose, that these absurdities may be avoided, by
   saying, that the Liberty of the mind consists in a power to suspend the
   act of the Will, and so to keep it in a state of Indifference, until
   there has been opportunity for consideration; and so shall say, that
   however Indifference is not essential to Liberty in such a manner, that
   the mind must make its choice in a state of Indifference, which is an
   inconsistency, or that the act of Will must spring immediately out of
   Indifference; yet Indifference may be essential to the Liberty of acts
   of the Will in this respect; viz. That Liberty consists in a power of
   the mind to forbear or suspend the act of volition, and keep the mind
   in a state of Indifference for the present, until there has been
   opportunity for proper deliberation: I say, if any one imagines that
   this helps the matter, it is a great mistake: it reconciles no
   inconsistency, and relieves no difficulty.--For here the following
   things must be observed:

   1. That this suspending of volition, if there be properly any such
   thing, is itself an act of volition. If the mind determines to suspend
   its act, it determines it voluntarily; it chooses, on some
   consideration, to suspend it. And this choice or determination, is an
   act of the Will: And indeed it is supposed to be so in the very
   hypothesis; for it is supposed that the Liberty of the Will consists in
   its power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein
   the Will exercises its Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty
   in it, if it be not an act of the Will? The Liberty of the Will is not
   exercised in any thing but what the Will does.

   2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the Will,
   but it is supposed to be the only free act of the Will; because it is
   said, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the Will
   consists.--If so, then this is all the act of Will that we have to
   consider in this controversy. And now, the former question returns upon
   us; viz. Wherein consists the freedom of the will in those acts wherein
   it is free? And if this act of determining a suspension be the only act
   in which the Will is free, then wherein consists the Will's freedom
   with respect to this act of suspension? And how is Indifference
   essential to this act? The answer must be, according to what is
   supposed in the evasion under consideration, that the Liberty of the
   Will in this act of suspension, consists in a power to suspend even
   this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation.
   But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest nonsense: for it
   is the act of suspension itself that we are speaking of; and there is
   no room for a space of deliberation and suspension in order to
   determine whether we will suspend or no. For that supposes, that even
   suspension itself may be deferred: which is absurd; for the very
   deferring the determination of suspension, to consider whether we will
   suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of
   suspension, to consider whether to suspend, the act is, ipso facto,
   suspended. There is no medium between suspending to act, and
   immediately acting; and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the
   one or the other one moment.

   And besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity another way:
   for now, it seems, Liberty consists wholly in the mind having power to
   suspend its determination whether to suspend or no; that there may be
   time for consideration, whether it be best to suspend. And if Liberty
   consists in this only, then this is the Liberty under consideration. We
   have to inquire now, how Liberty, with respect to this act of
   suspending a determination of suspension, consists in Indifference, or
   how Indifference is essential to it. The answer, according to the
   hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a power of
   suspending even this last-mentioned act, to have time to consider
   whether to suspend that. And then the same difficulties and inquiries
   return over again with respect to that; and so on for ever. Which, if
   it would show any thing, would show only that there is no such thing as
   a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom back in infinitum; and
   that is to drive it out of the world.

   And besides all this, there is a delusion, and a latent gross
   contradiction in the affair another way; inasmuch as in explaining how,
   or in what respect, the Will is free, with regard to a particular act
   of volition, it is said, that its Liberty consists in a power to
   determine to suspend that act, which places Liberty not in that act of
   volition which the inquiry is about, but altogether in another
   antecedent act. Which contradicts the thing supposed in both the
   question and answer. The question is, wherein consists the mind's
   Liberty in any particular act of volition? And the answer, in
   pretending to show wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that act, in
   effect says, it does not lie in that act at all, but in another, viz. a
   volition to suspend that act. And therefore the answer is both
   contradictory, and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose. For
   it does not show wherein the Liberty of the Will consists in the act in
   question; instead of that, it supposes it does not consist in that act
   at all, but in another distinct from it, even a volition to suspend
   that act, and take time to consider of it. And no account is pretended
   to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein
   this answer supposes the Liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz. the
   act of suspension, or of determining the suspension.

   On the whole, it is exceeding manifest, that the Liberty of the mind
   does not consist in Indifference, and that Indifference is not
   essential or necessary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the
   Arminians suppose; that opinion being full of nothing but
   self-contradiction.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [118] Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a distinction of
   different kinds of freedom; one of God, and perfect spirits above;
   another of persons in a state of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to
   consist with necessity; the latter he holds to be without necessity;
   and this latter he supposes to be requisite to our being the subject of
   praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments, precepts and prohibitions,
   promises and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a covenant
   treaty. And to this freedom he supposes Indifference to be requisite.
   In his Discourse on the five points, )p. 299, 300.) he says; "It is a
   freedom, (speaking of a freedom not only from co-action, but from
   necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of trial or
   probation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and
   our persons of rewards or punishments." Excellent to this purpose, are
   the words of Mr Thorndake: We say not, that Indifference is requisite
   to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone in this state of
   treveil and preficience; the ground of which is God's tender of a
   treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen man,
   together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and
   threats, those exhortations and dehortations, it is enforced with."

   [119] There is a little intricacy in this mode of expression. It may be
   thus illustrated. Suppose it were asserted. "That it is impossible for
   the Will to be otherwise at any one given time, than that way to which
   it tends." Such a proposition one might think, none who understood the
   terms would controvert; for it would be to controvert this proposition,
   "The Will is as its tendency." And yet, the advocates for a
   self-determining power must assert a liberty which denies this plain
   proposition.--W.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. VIII.

   Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all
   Necessity

   It is chiefly insisted on by Arminians, in this controversy, as a thing
   most important and essential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the
   acts of the Will, are contingent events; understanding contingence as
   opposite, not only to constraint, but to all Necessity. Therefore I
   would particularly consider this matter.

   And, First, I would inquire, whether there is or can be any such thing,
   as a volition which is contingent in such a sense, as not only to come
   to pass without any Necessity of constraint or co-action, but also
   without a Necessity of consequence, or an infallible connexion with any
   thing foregoing.--Secondly, Whether, if it were so, this would at all
   help the cause of Liberty.

   I. I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does or can
   come to pass, in this manner, contingently.

   And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that
   nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or a reason, why it
   exists in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this has
   been particularly applied to the acts of the Will. Now if this be so,
   it will demonstrably follow, that the acts of the Will are never
   contingent, or without Necessity, in the sense spoken of; inasmuch as
   those things which have a cause, or a reason of their existence, must
   be connected with their cause. This appears by the following
   considerations.

   1. For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet
   not to be connected with its cause, is an inconsistence. For if the
   event be not connected with the cause, it is not dependent on the
   cause; its existence is as it were loose from its influence, and may
   attend it, or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows
   or attends the influence of the cause, or not: And that is the same
   thing as not to he dependent on it. And to say, the event is not
   dependent on its cause, is absurd; it is the same thing as to say, it
   is not its cause, nor the event the effect of it; for dependence on the
   influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect. If there be no
   such relation between one thing and another, consisting in the
   connexion and dependence of one thing an the influence of another, then
   it is certain there is no such relation between them as is signified by
   the terms cause and effect. So far as an event is dependent on a cause,
   and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no
   more. The cause does, or brings to pass, no more in any event, than is
   dependent on it. If we say, the connexion and dependence is not total,
   but partial, and that the effect, though it has some connexion and
   dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it; that is the same thing
   as to say, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that
   cause, but that only part of it arises from thence, and part some other
   way.

   2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with
   their causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which
   come to pass without any cause, contrary to the supposition. For if
   there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the
   influence of the cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent
   whether it would attend or follow the influence of the cause, or no; it
   might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the same, its
   influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why
   did it follow, rather than not follow? Of this there is no cause or
   reason. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it
   is, viz. the following of the effect on the influence of the cause,
   with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be no necessary
   connexion of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may suppose
   that sometimes the event will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when
   the cause is the same, and in every respect in the same state and
   circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange
   phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect
   should follow, in another not? It is evident by the supposition, that
   this is wholly without any cause or ground. Here is something in the
   present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world, that
   is absolutely without a cause. Which is contrary to the supposition,
   and contrary to what has been before demonstrated.

   3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of
   their existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their
   cause, is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause.
   Thus; if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with
   its influence, and influential circumstances; then, as I observed
   before, it is a thing possible and supposable, that the cause may
   sometimes exert the same influence, under the same circumstances, and
   yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any
   instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the
   cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been
   sufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the supposition, in
   another instance, the same cause, with perfectly the same influence,
   and when all circumstances which have any influence are the same, it
   was followed with the effect. By which it is manifest, that the effect
   in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause, but
   must come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the
   influence of the cause was not sufficient to produce the effect. And if
   it was not sufficient to produce it, then the production of it could
   not be owing to that influence, but must be owing to something else, or
   owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing to the influence of
   the cause, then it is not the cause. Which brings us to the
   contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is the ground and
   reason of the existence of a thing, and at the same time is not the
   ground and reason of its existence.

   If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further
   reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that which seems to be the
   cause in the supposed case, can be no cause; its power and influence
   having, on a full trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect:
   and if it be not sufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it.
   To say otherwise, is to say, there is power to do that which there is
   not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power exerted, and
   in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect be
   actually produced at one time; all these things concurring, will
   produce the effect at all times. And so we may turn it the other way;
   that which proves not sufficient at one time, cannot he sufficient at
   another, with precisely the same influential circumstances. And
   therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing to that cause; unless
   the different time be a circumstance which has influence: but that is
   contrary to the supposition; for it is supposed that all circumstances
   that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to
   suppose the time to be the cause; which is contrary to the supposition
   of the other thing being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has
   no influence, then it is evident that it is as much of an absurdity to
   say, the cause was sufficient to produce the effect at one time, and
   not at another; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the effect
   at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at
   the same time.

   On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary
   connexion with its cause, or with that which is the true ground and
   reason of its existence. And therefore, if there be no event without a
   cause, as was proved before, then no event whatsoever is contingent, in
   the manner that Arminians suppose the free acts of the Will to be
   contingent.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. IX.

   Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the
   Understanding.

   It is manifest, that no Acts of the Will are contingent, in such a
   sense as to be without all necessity, or so as not to be necessary with
   a necessity of consequence and Connexion; because every Act of the Will
   is some way connected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest
   apparent good is, in the manner which has already been explained;
   namely, that the soul always wills or chooses that which, in the
   present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all
   that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because, as was observed
   before, nothing is more evident than that, when men act voluntarily,
   and do what they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to
   them; and to say otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do
   not choose what appears to suit them best, or what seems most pleasing
   to them; or that they do not choose what they prefer. Which brings the
   matter to a contradiction.

   And as it is very evident in itself, that the Acts of the Will have
   some Connexion with the Dictates or views of the Understanding, so this
   is allowed by some of the chief of the Arminian writers; particularly
   by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy
   to the doctrine of necessity, allows the same thing. In his Christian
   Philosophy, (p. 196.) he with much approbation cites another
   philosopher, as of the same mind, in these words: "No man (says an
   excellent philosopher) sets himself about any thing, but upon some view
   or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does; and
   whatsoever faculties he employs, the Understanding, with such light as
   it has, well or ill formed, constantly leads; and by that light, true
   or false, all her operative powers are directed. The Will itself, how
   absolute and incontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in
   its obedience to the Dictates of the Understanding. Temples have their
   sacred images; and we see what influence they have always had over a
   great part of mankind; but in truth, the ideas and images in men's
   minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them; and to
   these they all pay universally a ready submission." But whether this be
   in a just consistence with themselves, and their own notions of
   liberty, I desire may now be impartially considered.

   Dr. Whitby plainly supposes, that the Acts and determinations of the
   Will always follow the Understanding's view of the greatest good to be
   obtained, or evil to be avoided; or, in other words, that the
   determinations of the Will constantly and infallibly follow these two
   things in the Understanding: 1. The degree of good to be obtained, and
   evil to be avoided, proposed to the Understanding, and apprehended,
   viewed, and taken notice of by it. 2. The degree of the Understanding's
   apprehension of that good or evil; which is increased by attention and
   consideration. That this is an opinion in which he is exceeding
   peremptory, (as he is in every opinion which he maintains in his
   controversy with the Calvinists,) with disdain of the contrary opinion,
   as absurd and self-contradictory, will appear by the following words,
   in his Discourse on the Five Points. [120]

   "Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Understanding to
   perceive, is evidence proposed, and apprehended, considered or adverted
   to: for nothing else can be requisite to make us come to the knowledge
   of the truth. Again, what makes the Will choose, is something approved
   by the Understanding; and consequently appearing to the soul as good.
   And whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the
   Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as evil. Whence all that
   God requires of us is and can be only this; to refuse the evil, and
   choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, apprehended,
   and considered, is not sufficient to make the Understanding approve; or
   that the greatest good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when
   equally believed and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will
   to choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, that which
   alone doth move the Will to choose or to refuse, is not sufficient to
   engage it so to do; which being contradictory to itself, must of
   necessity be false. Be it then so, that we naturally have an aversion
   to the truths proposed to us in the gospel; that only can make us
   indisposed to attend to them, but cannot hinder our conviction, when we
   do apprehend them, and attend to them.--Be it, that there is in us also
   a renitency to the good we are to choose; that only can indispose us to
   believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be it, that we
   are prone to the evil that we should decline; that only can render it
   the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of evils. But yet,
   what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still be
   chosen; and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we
   do continue under that conviction, be refused by us. It therefore can
   be only requisite, in order to these ends, that the Good Spirit should
   so illuminate our Understandings, that we attending to and considering
   what lies before us, should apprehend and be convinced of our duty; and
   that the blessings of the gospel should be so propounded to us, as that
   we may discern them to be our chiefest good; and the miseries it
   threateneth, so as we may be convinced that they are the worst of
   evils; that we may choose the one, and refuse the other."

   Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted,
   that the greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil threatened, when
   equally believed and reflected on, is sufficient to engage the Will to
   choose the good, and refuse the evil, and is that alone which doth move
   the Will to choose or to refuse; and that it is contradictory to
   itself, to suppose otherwise; and therefore must of necessity be false;
   and then what we do really believe to be our chiefest good will still
   be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst
   we continue under that conviction, be refused by us. Nothing could have
   been said more to the purpose, fully to signify, that the
   determinations of the Will must evermore follow the illumination,
   conviction, and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the
   greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of good and
   evil understood, and the degree of Understanding, notice, and
   conviction of that proposed good and evil; and that it is thus
   necessarily, and can be otherwise in no instance: because it is
   asserted, that it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be
   otherwise.

   I am sensible, the Doctor's aim in these assertions is against the
   Calvinists; to show, in opposition to them, that there is no need of
   any physical operation of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and
   determine that to a good choice, but that God's operation and
   assistance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the Understanding; which
   he supposes to be enough, if those ideas are attended to, infallibly to
   obtain the end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more directly
   and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in choosing and
   refusing, is necessary; directly contrary to his own notion of the
   liberty of the Will. For if the determination of the Will, evermore, in
   this manner, follows the light, conviction, and view of the
   Understanding, concerning the greatest good and evil, and this be that
   alone which moves the Will, and it be a contradiction to suppose
   otherwise; then it is necessarily so, the Will necessarily follows this
   light or view of the Understanding, not only in some of its acts, but
   in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will does not
   determine itself in any one of its own acts; but every act of choice
   and refusal depends on, and is necessarily connected with, some
   antecedent cause; which cause is not the Will itself, nor any act of
   its own, nor any thing pertaining to that faculty, but something
   belonging to another faculty, whose acts go before the Will, in all its
   acts, and govern and determine them.

   Here, if it should be replied, that although it be true, that according
   to the Doctor, the final determination of the Will always depends upon,
   and is infallibly connected with, the Understanding's conviction, and
   notice of the greatest good; yet the Acts of the Will are not
   necessary; because that conviction of the Understanding is first
   dependent on a preceding Act of the Will, in determining to take notice
   of the evidence exhibited; by which means the mind obtains that degree
   of conviction, which is sufficient and effectual to determine the
   consequent and ultimate choice of the Will; and that the Will, with
   regard to that preceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend
   or no, is not necessary; and that in this, the liberty of the Will
   consists, that when God holds forth sufficient objective light, the
   Will is at liberty whether to command the attention of the mind to it
   or not.

   Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a reply as this.
   For that preceding Act of the Will, in determining to attend and
   consider, still is an Act of the Will; if the Liberty of the Will
   consists in it, as is supposed, as if it be an Act of the Will, it is
   an act of choice or refusal. And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts
   be true, it is determined by some antecedent light in the Understanding
   concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For he asserts, it is
   that light which alone doth move the Will to choose or refuse. And
   therefore the Will must be moved by that, in choosing to attend to the
   objective light offered, in order to another consequent act of choice:
   so that this act is no less necessary than the other. And if we suppose
   another Act of the Will, still preceding both these mentioned, to
   determine both, still that also must be an Act of the Will, an act of
   choice; and so must, by the same principles, be infallibly determined
   by some certain degree of light in the Understanding concerning the
   greatest good. And let us suppose as many Acts of the Will, one
   preceding another, as we please, yet are they every one of them
   necessarily determined by a certain degree of light in the
   Understanding, concerning the greatest and most eligible good in that
   case; and so, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of
   freedom. And if it be said, the reason why men do not attend to light
   held forth, is because of ill habits contracted by evil acts committed
   before, whereby their minds are indisposed to consider the truth held
   forth to them, the difficulty is not at all avoided: still the question
   returns, What determined the Will in those preceding evil acts? It
   must, by Dr. Whitby's principles, still be the view of the
   Understanding concerning the greatest good and evil. If this view of
   the Understanding be that alone which doth move the Will to choose or
   refuse, as the Doctor asserts, then every act of choice or refusal,
   from a man's first existence, is moved and determined by this view; and
   this view of the Understanding exciting and governing the act, must be
   before the act. And therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in
   every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside
   the Will, and a cause that does not proceed from or depend on any act
   of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolishes the Doctor's whole
   scheme of Liberty of Will; and he, at one stroke, has cut the sinews of
   all his arguments from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness, and
   sincerity of God, in his commands, promises, threatenings, calls,
   invitations, and expostulations; which he makes use of, under the heads
   of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient and
   effectual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man; and has made vain
   all his exclamations against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as
   charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrisy,
   fallaciousness, and cruelty.

   Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of
   God, [121] to evade the argument to prove the necessity of volition,
   from its necessary Connexion with the last Dictate of the
   Understanding, supposes the latter not to be diverse from the Act of
   the Will itself. But if it be so, it will not alter the case as to the
   necessity of the Act. If the Dictate of the Understanding be the very
   same with the determination of the Will, as Dr. Clark supposes, then
   this determination is no fruit or effect of choice; and if so, no
   liberty of choice has any hand in it: it is necessary; that is, choice
   cannot prevent it. If the last Dictate of the Understanding be the same
   with the determination of volition itself, then the existence of that
   determination must be necessary as to volition; in as much as volition
   can have no opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it
   having existence already before volition has opportunity to determine
   any thing. It is itself the very rise and existence of volition. But a
   thing after it exists, has no opportunity to determine as to its own
   existence; it is too late for that.

   If liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz. in the Will
   determining its own acts, having free opportunity and being without all
   necessity; this is the same as to say, that liberty consists in the
   soul having power and opportunity to have what determinations of the
   Will it pleases. And if the determinations of the Will, and the last
   Dictates of the Understanding, be the same thing, then liberty consists
   in the mind having power and opportunity to choose its own Dictates of
   Understanding. But this is absurd; for it is to make the determination
   of choice prior to the Dictate of Understanding, and the ground of it;
   which cannot consist with the Dictate of the Understanding being the
   determination of choice itself.

   Here is no alternative, but to recur to the old absurdity of one
   determination before another, and the cause of it; and another before,
   determining that; end so on in infinitum. If the last Dictate of the
   Understanding be the determination of the Will itself, and the soul be
   free with regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom;
   then the soul, before that dictate of its Understanding exists,
   voluntarily and according to its own choice determines, in every case,
   what that Dictate of the Understanding shall be; otherwise that
   Dictate, as to the Will, is necessary; and the acts determined by it
   must also be necessary. So that there is a determination of the mind
   prior to that Dictate of the Understanding, an act of choice going
   before it, choosing and determining what that Dictate of the
   Understanding shall be: and this preceding act of choice, being a free
   Act of Will, must also be the same with another last Dictate of the
   Understanding: And if the mind also be free in that Dictate of
   Understanding, that must be determined still by another; and so on for
   ever.

   Besides, if the Dictate of the Understanding, and determination of the
   Will be the same, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes
   them the same. Whether they be the same or no, I will not now dispute;
   but only would observe, that if it be so, and the Arminian notion of
   liberty consists in a self-determining power in the Understanding, free
   of all necessity; being independent, undetermined by any thing prior to
   its own acts and determinations; and the more the Understanding is thus
   independent, and sovereign over its own determinations, the more free:
   then the freedom of the soul, as a moral agent, must consist in the
   independence of the Understanding on any evidence or appearance of
   things, or any thing whatsoever that stands forth to the view of the
   mind, prior to the Understanding's determination. And what a liberty is
   this! consisting in an ability, freedom, and easiness of judging,
   either according to evidence, or against it; having a sovereign command
   over itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or disagreeably to
   what is plainly exhibited to its own view. Certainly, it is no liberty
   that renders persons the proper subjects of persuasive reasoning,
   arguments, expostulations, and such like moral means and inducements.
   The use of which with mankind is a main argument of the Arminians, to
   defend their notion of liberty without all necessity. For according to
   this, the more free men are, the less they are under the government of
   such means, less subject to the power of evidence and reason, and more
   independent on their influence, in their determinations.

   And whether the Understanding and Will are the same or no, as Dr. Clark
   seems to suppose, yet in order to maintain the Arminian notion of
   liberty without necessity, the free Will is not determined by the
   Understanding, nor necessarily connected with the Understanding; and
   the further from such Connexion, the greater the freedom. And when the
   liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the Will have no
   Connexion at all with the Dictates of the Understanding. And if so, in
   vain are all the applications to the Understanding, in order to induce
   to any free virtuous act; and so in vain are all instructions,
   counsels, invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and
   persuasives whatsoever: for these are but applications to the
   Understanding, and a clear and lively exhibition of the objects of
   choice to the mind's view. But if, after all, the Will must be
   self-determined, and independent on the Understanding, to what purpose
   are things thus represented to the Understanding, in order to determine
   the choice?
     __________________________________________________________________

   [120] Second Edit. P. 211, 212, 213.

   [121] Edit. VI. p. 93.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. X.

   Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with
   particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's
   assertions and reasonings about the Freedom of the Will.

   That every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what
   has been already proved) has a necessary connexion with its cause, and
   so is necessary by a necessity of connexion and consequence, is evident
   by this, that every act of the Will whatsoever is excited by some
   motive: which is manifest, because, if the mind, in willing after the
   manner it does, is excited by no motive or inducement, then it has no
   end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it aims at
   nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it does not
   go after any thing, or exert any inclination or preference towards any
   thing, Which brings the matter to a contradiction; because for the mind
   to will something, and for it to go after something by an act of
   preference and inclination, are the same thing.

   But if every act of the Will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive
   is the cause of the act. If the acts of the Will are excited by
   Motives, then Motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which
   is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the
   existence of the acts of the Will is properly the effect of their
   Motives. Motives do nothing, as Motives or inducements, but by their
   influence; and so much as is done by their influence is the effect of
   them. For that is the notion of an effect, something that is brought to
   pass by the influence of something else.

   And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives, then they
   are necessarily connected with their Motives. Every effect and event
   being as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is
   the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest,
   that volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power
   in the Will: the volition, which is caused by previous Motive and
   inducement, is not caused by the Will exercising a sovereign power over
   itself, to determine, cause, and excite volitions in itself. This is
   not consistent with the Will acting in a state of indifference and
   equilibrium, to determine itself to a preference; for the way in which
   Motives operate, is by biassing the Will, and giving it a certain
   inclination or preponderation one way.

   Here it may he proper to observe, that Mr. Chubb in his Collection of
   Tracts on Various Subjects, has advanced a scheme of liberty, which is
   greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly subversive of itself:
   and that many ways.

   1. He is abundant in asserting, that the Will, in all its acts, is
   influenced by Motive and excitement; and that this is the previous
   ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never otherwise in
   any instance. He says, (p. 262.) "No action can take place without some
   Motive to excite it." And, (p. 263,) "Volition cannot take place
   without some previous reason or motive to induce it." And, (p. 310.)
   Action would not take place without some reason or Motive to induce it;
   it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted
   without some previous reason to dispose the mind to action." (So also
   p. 257.) And he speaks of these things, as what we may be absolutely
   certain of, and which are the foundation, the only foundation we have
   of certainty respecting God's moral perfections. (p. 252 - 255, 261 -
   264.)

   And yet, at the same time, by his scheme, the influence of Motives upon
   us to excite to action, and to be actually a ground of volition, is
   consequent on the volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly
   insists upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the
   subject of those volitions, which Motives excite, it chooses to be so.
   It chooses, whether it will comply with the Motive, which presents
   itself in view, or not; and when various Motives are presented, it
   chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject. (p. 256.)
   "Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting, agreeably with,
   or contrary to, any Motive that presents." (p. 257.) "Every man is at
   liberty to act, or refrain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to,
   what each of these Motives, considered singly, would excite him
   to.--Man has power, and is as much at liberty, to reject the Motive
   that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty, to reject those
   Motives that do not." (And so p. 310, 311.) "In order to constitute a
   moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act, or to
   refrain from acting, upon such moral Motives, as he pleases." And to
   the like purpose in many other places. According to these things, the
   Will acts first, and chooses or refuses to comply with the Motive that
   is presented, before it falls under its prevailing influence: and it is
   first determined by the mind's pleasure or choice, what Motives it will
   be induced by, before it is induced by them.

   Now, how can these things hang together? How can the mind first act,
   and by its act of volition and choice determine what Motives shall be
   the ground and reason of its volition and choice? For this supposes,
   the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effect; and that
   the volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, so as
   actually to be the ground of the volition; and make the prevailing of
   the Motive, the consequence of the volition, of which yet it is the
   ground. If the mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and to
   yield to its excitement, the excitement comes in too late, and is
   needless afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a
   Motive which invites to a thing, that implies, and in fact is, a
   choosing of the thing invited to; and the very act of choice is before
   the influence of the Motive which induces, and is the ground of the
   choice; the son is before-hand with the father that begets him: the
   choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive,
   which very influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice. And so
   vice versa, the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the
   influence of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is the
   consequence of that very choice.

   And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive before it falls
   under its influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce
   it to act and choose, be the fruit and consequence of its act and
   choice, then how is the Motive "a previous ground and reason of the act
   and choice, so that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take
   place without some previous reason and Motive to induce it;" and that
   this act is consequent upon, and follows the Motive? Which things Mr.
   Chubb often asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth. So that the
   very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both before and
   after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing!

   II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of the Will
   first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether it will comply with
   it, in order to it becoming a ground of the Will's acting, before any
   act of volition can take place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and
   excitements to the action of the Will, " the passive ground or reason
   of that action." Which is a remarkable phrase; than which I presume
   there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and consistent
   meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he
   represents the Motive volition as passive, he must mean--passive in
   that affair, or passive with respect to that action, which he speaks
   of; otherwise it is nothing to the design of his argument: he must
   mean, (if that can be called a meaning,) that the Motive to volition is
   first acted upon or towards by the volition, choosing to yield to it,
   making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence
   from thence; and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation
   and existence. Which is the same absurdity, as if one should say, that
   the soul of man, previous to its existence, chose by what cause it
   would come into existence, and acted upon its cause, to fetch influence
   thence, to bring it into being; and so its cause was a passive ground
   of its existence!

   Mr. Chubb very plainly supposes Motive or excitement to be the ground
   of the being of volition. He speaks of it as the ground or reason of
   the exertion of an act of the Will, (p. 391, and 392.) and expressly
   says, that "volition cannot take place without some previous ground or
   Motive to induce it," (p. 363.) And he speaks of the act as "from the
   Motive, and from the influence of the Motive," (p. 352.) "and from the
   influence that the Motive has on the man, for the production of an
   action," (p. 317.) Certainly there is no need of multiplying words
   about this; it is easily judged, whether Motive can be the ground of
   volition taking place, so that the very production of it is from the
   influence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the
   ground of the volition, is passive, or acted upon the volition. But
   this I will say, that a man, who insists so much on clearness of
   meaning in others, and is so much in blaming their confusion and
   inconsistence, ought, if he was able, to have explained his meaning in
   this phrase of "passive ground of action," so as to show it not to be
   confused and inconsistent.

   If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb, when he speaks of Motive as a
   "passive ground of action," does not mean passive with regard to that
   volition which it is the ground of, but some other antecedent volition,
   (though his purpose and argument, and whole discourse, will by no means
   allow of such a supposition,) yet it would not help the matter in the
   least. For, (1.) If we suppose an act, by which the soul chooses to
   yield to the invitation of a Motive to another volition; both these
   supposed volitions are in effect the very same. A volition to yield to
   the force of a Motive inviting to choose something, comes to just the
   same thing as choosing the thing which the Motive invites to, as I
   observed before. So that here can be no room to help the matter, by a
   distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive be passive, not with
   respect to the same volition to which the Motive excites, but to one
   truly distinct and prior; yet, by Mr. Chubb, that prior volition cannot
   take place without a Motive or excitement, as a previous ground of its
   existence. For he insists, that "it is absurd to suppose any volition
   should take place without some previous Motive to induce it," So that
   at last it comes to just the same absurdity: for if every volition must
   have a previous Motive, then the very first in the whole series must be
   excited by a previous Motive; and yet the Motive to that first volition
   is passive; but cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent
   volition, because, by the supposition, it is the very first: therefore
   if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be so with
   regard to that very volition of which it is the ground, and that is
   excited by it.

   III. Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above, that every volition has some
   motive, and that "in the nature of the thing, no volition can take
   place without some Motive to induce it;" yet he asserts, that volition
   does not always follow the strongest Motive; or, in other words, is not
   governed by any superior strength of the Motive that is followed,
   beyond Motives to the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His
   own words (p. 258.) are as follow: "Though with regard to physical
   causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet it is otherwise
   with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger,
   sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the ground of this difference is
   evident, namely, that what we call moral causes, strictly speaking, are
   no causes at all, but barely passive reasons of or excitements to the
   action, or to the refraining from acting: which excitements we have
   power, or are at liberty, to comply with or reject, as I have showed
   above." And so throughout the paragraph, he in a variety of phrases
   insists, that the Will is not always determined by the strongest
   Motive, unless by strongest we preposterously mean actually prevailing
   in the event; which is not in the Motive, but in the Will; but that the
   Will is not always determined by the Motive which is strongest, by any
   strength previous to the volition itself. And he elsewhere abundantly
   asserts, that the Will is determined by no superior strength or
   advantage, that Motives have, from any constitution or state of things,
   or any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual determination
   of the Will. And indeed his whole discourse on human liberty implies
   it, his whole scheme is founded upon it.

   But these things cannot stand together. There is a diversity of
   strength in Motives to choice, previous to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb
   himself supposes, that they do previously invite, induce, excite, and
   dispose the mind to action. This implies, that they have something in
   themselves that is inviting, some tendency to induce and dispose to
   volition previous to volition itself. And if they have in themselves
   this nature and tendency, doubtless they have it in certain limited
   degrees, which are capable of diversity; and some have it in greater
   degrees, others in less; and they that have most of this tendency,
   considered with all their nature and circumstances, previous to
   volition, are the strongest Motives, and those that have least, are the
   weakest Motives.

   Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive which is
   strongest, or has most previous tendency or advantage, all things
   considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakest, or that
   which, as it stands previously in the mind's view, has least tendency
   to induce it; herein the Will apparently acts wholly without Motive,
   without any previous reason to dispose the mind to it, contrary to what
   the same author supposes. The act, wherein the Will must proceed
   without a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the
   weakest Motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees previous
   reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other; and at
   the same time to suppose, that there is nothing in the Motive, in its
   nature, state, or any circumstance of it whatsoever, as it stands in
   the previous view of the mind, that gives it any preference: but on the
   contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition with it, in all
   these respects, has most belonging to it that is inviting and moving,
   and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly
   as much as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive
   for the act of preference, and yet no previous reason for it. By the
   supposition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives, which tends to
   preference, previous to the act of preference, it is not in that which
   is preferred, but wholly in the other: and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that
   the act of preference is from previous ground and reason, in the Motive
   which is preferred. But are these things consistent? Can there be
   previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no
   previous tendency in it to that event? If one thing follows another,
   without any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it
   very plain, that it follows it without any manner of previous reason
   why it should follow.

   Yea, in this case, Mr. Chubb supposes, that the event follows an
   antecedent, as the ground of its existence, which has not only no
   tendency to it, but a contrary tendency. The event is the preference,
   which the mind gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in
   the previous view of the mind; the immediate antecedent is the view the
   mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous view of
   the mind, all the preferableness, or previous tendency to preference,
   is supposed to be on the other side, or in the contrary Motive; and all
   the unworthiness of preference, and so previous tendency to comparative
   neglect, or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred: and yet
   in this view of the mind is supposed to be the previous ground or
   reason of this act of preference, exciting it, and disposing the mind
   to it. Which I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not.
   If it be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency
   of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground and reason why that
   consequent does not follow; and the want of a previous tendency to an
   event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reason
   why that event does follow.

   An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind
   acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand
   in competition in the mind's view. If the mind, in this comparative
   act, prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the
   mind herein acts absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any
   temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts
   of food, to both which he finds an appetite, but has a stronger
   appetite to one than the other; and there be no circumstances or
   excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one
   or the other, but merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes
   between them, he chooses that which he has least appetite to, and
   refuses that to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice
   made absolutely without previous Motive, Excitement, Reason, or
   Temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to
   either; because his volition in this case is a comparative act,
   following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses, in which
   view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against
   all previous ground and motive. And if there be any principle in man,
   from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner, from the same
   principle volition may arise wholly without Motive on either side. If
   the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive, then it can go without
   Motive: for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the
   Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without. Motive. If
   so, this demonstrates the independence of volition on Motive; and no
   reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that "in
   the nature of things volition cannot take place without a motive to
   induce it."

   If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of
   nature, in such a manner, that when unequal weights are put into the
   scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale to descend,
   which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater weight; this
   would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not
   depend on weights in the scales; at least, as much as if the balance
   should move itself, when there is no weight in either scale. And the
   activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the
   greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when
   there is no weight at all.

   Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot stir at all without some
   Motive; and also supposes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and
   none to the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that Motive. This
   is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the Will on Motives; if
   it were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a
   little without them; or help itself a little against a Motive, without
   help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his
   supposing that the Will, when it has before it various opposite
   Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence from
   them, and neglect the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to
   be wholly independent on Motives.

   It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's hypothesis, that volition must be
   without any previous ground in any Motive, thus: if it be, as he
   supposes, that the Will is not determined by any previous superior
   strength of the Motive, but determines and chooses its own Motive,
   then, when the rival Motives are exactly equal, in all respects, it may
   follow either; and may, in such a case, sometimes follow one, sometimes
   the other. And if so, this diversity which appears between the acts of
   the Will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the Motives;
   for all that is previously in the Motives, is supposed precisely and
   perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect
   identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the
   ground and reason of diversity in the consequent. Perfect identity in
   the ground, cannot be a reason why it is not followed with the same
   consequence. And therefore the source of this diversity of consequence
   must be sought for elsewhere.

   And lastly, it may be observed, that however much Mr. Chubb insists,
   that no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it, which
   previously disposes the mind to it; yet, as he also insists that the
   mind, without reference to any superior strength of Motives, picks and
   chooses for its Motive to follow; he himself herein plainly supposes,
   that, with regard to the mind's preference of one Motive before
   another--it is not the motive that disposes the Will, but--the Will
   disposes itself to follow the Motive.

   IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsistent with
   agency; and that to suppose a being to be an agent in that which is
   necessary, is a plain contradiction, p. 311. and throughout his
   discourses on the subject of Liberty, he supposes, that necessity
   cannot consist with agency or freedom; and that to suppose otherwise,
   is to make Liberty and Necessity, Action and Passion, the same thing.
   And so he seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking,
   but volition; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind,
   in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free,
   only as they are the effects of an act that is not necessary.

   And yet, according to him, volition itself is the effect of volition;
   yea, every act of free volition; and therefore every act of free
   volition must, by what has now been observed from him, be necessary.
   That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is
   abundantly supposed by him. In p. 341, he says, "If a man is such a
   creature as I have proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a power
   of Liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the
   subject of his own free choice, so that he might, if he had pleased,
   have chosen and done the contrary."--Here he supposes all that is good
   or evil in man is the effect of his choice; and so that his good or
   evil choice itself is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these
   words, "he might if he had pleased, have chosen the contrary." So in p
   356, "Though it be highly reasonable, that a man should always choose
   the greater good,--yet he may, if he pleases, choose otherwise." Which
   is the same thing as if he had said, he may if he chooses choose
   otherwise. And then he goes on,--"that is, he may, if he pleases,
   choose what is good for himself," &c. And again in the same page, "The
   Will is not confined by the understanding, to any particular sort of
   good, whether greater or less; but it is at liberty to choose what kind
   of good it pleases."--If there be any meaning in the last words, it
   must be this, that the Will is at liberty to choose what kind of good
   it chooses to choose; supposing the act of choice itself determined by
   an antecedent choice. The Liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a
   man's power to move his body, agreeable to an antecedent act of choice,
   but to use or exert the faculties of his soul. Thus, (p. 379.) speaking
   of the faculties of the mind, he says, "Man has power, and is at
   liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse
   them, as he pleases." And that he supposes an act of choice or exercise
   of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to, those acts thus
   chosen, directing, commanding, and producing the chosen acts, and even
   the acts of choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283. "He can command
   his actions; and herein consists his Liberty; he can give or deny
   himself that pleasure, as he pleases. And p. 377. If the actions of
   men--are not the produce of a free choice, or election, but spring from
   a necessity of nature,--he cannot in reason be the object of reward or
   punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man, whether good or
   evil, is the produce of will or free choice; so that a man in either
   case, had it in his power, and was at liberty to have chosen the
   contrary, he is the proper object of reward or punishment, according as
   he chooses to behave himself." Here, in these last words, he speaks of
   Liberty of choosing according as he chooses. So that the behavior which
   he speaks of as subject to his choice, is his choosing itself, as well
   as his external conduct consequent upon it. And therefore it is
   evident, he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice
   themselves, when he speaks of all free actions, as the produce of free
   choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he says elsewhere, (p.
   372, 373.)

   Now these things imply a twofold great inconsistence.

   1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice
   is commanded by, and is the produce of, free choice, is to suppose the
   first free act of choice belonging to the case, yea, the first free act
   of choice that ever man exerted, to be the produce of an antecedent act
   of choice. But I hope I need not labor at all to convince my readers,
   that it is an absurdity to say, the very first act is the produce of
   another act that went before it.

   2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb insists, that every
   free act of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of
   choice; yet even then, according to his principles, no one act of
   choice would be free, but every one necessary; because, every act of
   choice being the effect of a foregoing act, every act would be
   necessarily connected with that foregoing cause. For Mr. Chubb himself
   says, (p. 389.) "When the self-moving power is exerted, it becomes the
   necessary cause of its effects."--So that his notion of a free act,
   that is rewardable or punishable, is a heap of contradictions. It is a
   free act, and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is necessary; and
   therefore by him it is a contradiction, to suppose it to be free.
   According to him, every free act is the produce of a free act; so that
   there must be an infinite number of free acts in succession, without
   any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning. And therefore here is
   an infinite number of free acts, every one of them free; and yet not
   any one of them free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a
   necessary effect. All the acts are rewardable or punishable, and yet
   the agent cannot, in reason, be the object of reward or punishment, on
   account of any one of these actions. He is active in them all, and
   passive in none; yet active in none, but passive in all, &c.

   V. Mr. Chubb most strenuously denies, that Motives are causes of the
   acts of the Will; or that the moving principle in man is moved, or
   caused to be exerted by Motives. His words, (p. 388 and 389.) are, "If
   the moving principle in man is moved, or caused to be exerted, by
   something external to man, which all Motives are, then it would not be
   a self-moving principle, seeing it would be moved by a principle
   external to itself. And to say, that a self-moving principle is moved,
   or caused to be exerted, by a cause external to itself; is absurd and a
   contradiction," &c.--And in the next page, it is particularly and
   largely insisted, that Motives are causes in no case, that "they are
   merely passive in the production of action, and have no causality in
   the production of it,--no causality, to be the cause of the exertion of
   the Will.

   Now I desire it may be considered, how this can possibly consist with
   what he says in other places. Let it be noted here,

   1. Mr. Chubb abundantly speaks of Motives as excitements of the acts of
   the Will; and says, that Motives do excite volition, and induce it, and
   that they are necessary to this end; that in the reason and nature of
   things, volition cannot take place without Motives to excite it. But
   now, if Motives excite the Will, they move it; and yet he says, it is
   absurd to say, the Will is moved by Motives. And again, if language is
   of any significancy at all, if Motives excite volition, then they are
   the cause of its being excited; and to cause volition to be excited, is
   to cause it to be put forth or exerted. Yea, Mr. Chubb says himself,
   (p. 317.) Motive is necessary to the exertion of the active faculty. To
   excite, is positively to do something; and certainly that which does
   something, is the cause of the thing done by it. To create, is to cause
   to be created; to make, is to cause to be made; to kill, is to cause to
   be killed; to quicken, is to cause to be quickened; and to excite, is
   to cause to be excited. To excite, is to be a cause, in the most proper
   sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by
   positive influence. The notion of exciting, is exerting influence to
   cause the effect to arise or come forth into existence.

   2. Mr. Chubb himself (p. 3l7.) speaks of Motives as the ground and
   reason of action by influence, and by prevailing influence. Now, what
   can be meant by a cause, but something that is the ground and reason of
   a thing by its influence, an influence that is prevalent and effectual?

   3. This author not only speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of
   action, by prevailing influence; but expressly of their influence as
   prevailing for the production of an action, (p. 317.) which makes the
   inconsistency still more palpable and notorious. The production of an
   effect is certainly the causing of an effect; and productive influence
   is causal influence, if any thing is; and that which has this influence
   prevalently, so as thereby to become the ground of another thing, is a
   cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause. This
   influence, Mr. Chubb says, Motives have to produce an action; and yet,
   he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they are causes.

   4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Motives as disposing
   the Agent to action, by their influence. His words are these: "As
   Motive, which takes place in the understanding, and is the product of
   intelligence, is necessary to action, that is, to the exertion of the
   active faculty, because that faculty would not be exerted without some
   previous reason to dispose the mind to action; so from hence it plainly
   appears, that when a man is said to be disposed to one action rather
   than another, this properly signifies the prevailing influence that one
   Motive has upon a man for the production of an action, or for the being
   at rest, before all other Motives, for the production of the contrary.
   For as motive is the ground and reason of any action, so the Motive
   that prevails, disposes the agent to the performance of that action."

   Now, if motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause the mind to
   be disposed; and to cause the mind to be disposed is to cause it to be
   willing; and to cause it to be willing is to cause it to will; and that
   is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the Will. And yet
   this same Mr. Chubb holds it to be absurd, to suppose Motive to be a
   cause of the act of the Will.

   And if we compare these things together, we have here again a whole
   heap of inconsistences. Motives are the previous ground and reason of
   the acts of the Will; yea, the necessary ground and reason of their
   exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the
   nature of things, take place; and they do excite these acts of the
   Will, and do this by a prevailing influence; yea, an influence which
   prevails for the production of the act of the Will, and for the
   disposing of the mind to it; and yet it is absurd, to suppose Motive to
   be a cause of an act of the Will, or that a principle of Will is moved
   or caused to be exerted by it, or that it has any causality in the
   production of it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion of
   the Will.

   A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the
   strange inconsistences which his notion of Liberty--consisting in the
   Will's power of self-determination void of all necessity, united with
   that dictate of common sense, that there can be no volition without a
   Motive--drove him into, may be sufficient to convince us, that it is
   utterly impossible ever to make that notion of Liberty consistent with
   the influence of Motives in volition. And as it is in a manner
   self-evident, that there can be no act of Will, or preference of the
   mind, without some Motive or inducement, something in the mind's view
   which it aims at, and goes after; so it is most manifest, that there is
   no such Liberty in the universe as Arminians insist on; nor any such
   thing possible, or conceivable.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. XI.

   The evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral
   Agents.

   That the acts of the Wills of moral Agents are not contingent events,
   in such a sense, as to be without all necessity, appears by God's
   certain Foreknowledge of such events.

   In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove, that God
   has a certain Foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of moral Agents; and
   secondly, show the consequence, or how it follows from hence, that the
   Volitions of moral Agents are not contingent, so as to be without
   necessity of connexion and consequence.

   First, I am to prove, that God has an absolute and certain
   Foreknowledge of the free actions of moral Agents.

   One would think it wholly needless to enter on such an argument with
   any that profess themselves Christians: but so it is; God's certain
   Foreknowledge of the free acts of moral Agents, is denied by some that
   pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God; and especially
   of late. I therefore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience
   in the Most High, as fully as the designed limits of this essay will
   admit; -supposing myself herein to have to do with such as own the
   truth of the Bible.

   Arg. I. My first argument shall be taken from God's prediction of such
   events. Here I would, in the first place, lay down these two things as
   axioms.

   1. If God does not foreknow, He cannot foretell such events; that is,
   He cannot peremptorily and certainly foretell them. If God has no more
   than an uncertain guess concerning events of this kind, then he can
   declare no more than an uncertain guess. Positively to foretell, is to
   profess to foreknow, or declare positive Foreknowledge.

   2. If God does not certainly foreknow the future Volitions of moral
   Agents, then neither can he certainly foreknow those events which are
   dependent on these Volitions. The existence of the one depending on the
   existence of the other, the knowledge of the existence of the one
   depends on the knowledge of the existence of the other; and the one
   cannot be more certain than the other.

   Therefore, how many, how great, and how extensive soever the
   consequences of the Volitions of moral Agents may be; though they
   should extend to an alteration of the state of things through the
   universe, and should be continued in a series of successive events to
   all eternity, and should in the progress of things branch forth into an
   infinite number of series, each of them going on in an endless chain of
   events; God must be as ignorant of all these consequences, as he is of
   the Volition whence they first take their rise: and the whole state of
   things depending on them, how important, extensive, and vast soever,
   must be hid from him.

   These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I now proceed
   to observe the following things.

   1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their
   wickedness and good practice, things rewardable and punishable, have
   often been foretold by God.--Pharaoh's moral conduct, in refusing to
   obey God's command, in letting his people go, was foretold. God says to
   Moses, Exod. iii. 19. "I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let
   you go." Here God professes not only to guess at, but to know Pharaoh's
   future disobedience. In Exod. vii. 4. God says, "but Pharaoh shall not
   hearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt," &c. And chap.
   ix. 30. Moses says to Pharaoh, "as for thee, and thy servants, i know
   that ye will not fear the Lord." See also Exod. xi. 9.--The moral
   conduct of Josiah, by name, in his zealously exerting himself to oppose
   idolatry, in particular acts, was foretold above three hundred years
   before he was born, and the prophecy sealed by a miracle, and renewed
   and confirmed by the words of a second prophet, as what surely would
   not fail, (1 Kings xiii. 1-6, 32..) This prophecy was also in effect a
   prediction of the moral conduct of the people, in upholding their
   schismatical and idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry
   of those priests of the high places, which it is foretold Josiah should
   offer upon that altar of Bethel. Micaiah foretold the foolish and
   sinful conduct of Ahab, in refusing to hearken to the word of the Lord
   by him, and choosing rather to hearken to the false prophets, in going
   to Ramoth-Gilead to his ruin, (1 Kings xxi. 20-22.) The moral conduct
   of Hazael was foretold, in that cruelty he should be guilty of; on
   which Hazael says, "What, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this
   thing!" [122] The prophet speaks of the event as what he knew, and not
   what he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12. "I know the evil that thou wilt
   do unto the children of Israel: Thou wilt dash their children, and rip
   up their women with child." The moral conduct of Cyrus is foretold,
   long before he had a being, in his mercy to God's people, and regard to
   the true God, in turning the captivity of the Jews, and promoting the
   building of the temple, (Isa. xliv. 28; lxv. 13. compare 2 Chron.
   xxxvi. 22, 23.and Ezra i. 1-4.) How many instances of the moral conduct
   of the kings of the North and South, particular instances of the wicked
   behaviour of the kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold in Daniel xi.!
   Their corruption, violence, robbery, treachery, and lies. And
   particularly, how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of
   Antiochus Epiphanes, called there "a vile person," instead of
   Epiphones, or illustrious! In Daniel xi., and also in ver. 9, 14,
   23-27., are foretold his flattery, deceit, and lies, his having "his
   heart set to do mischief," and set "against the holy covenant," his
   "destroying and treading under foot the holy people," in a marvellous
   manner, his "having indignation against the holy covenant, setting his
   heart against it, and conspiring against it, "his" polluting the
   sanctuary of strength, treading it under foot, taking away the daily
   sacrifice, and placing the abomination that maketh desolate;" his great
   pride, " magnifying himself against God, and uttering marvellous
   blasphemies against Him," until God in indignation should destroy him.
   Withal, the moral conduct of the Jews, on occasion of his persecution,
   is predicted. It is foretold, that "he should corrupt many by
   flatteries," (Daniel xi. 32-34.) But that others should behave with a
   glorious constancy and fortitude, in opposition to him, (Daniel xi. 32.
   ) And that some good men should fall and repent, (Daniel xi. 35.)
   Christ foretold Peter's sin, in denying his Lord, with its
   circumstances, in a peremptory manner. And so, that great sin of Judas,
   in betraying his master, and its dreadful and eternal punishment in
   hell, was foretold in the like positive manner, Matt. xxvi. 21-25, and
   parallel places in the other Evangelists.

   2. Many events have been foretold by God, which are dependent on the
   moral conduct of particular persons, and were accomplished, either by
   their virtuous or vicious actions. Thus, the children of Israel's going
   down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham, (Gen. xv.)
   which was brought about by the wickedness of Joseph's brethren in
   selling him, and the wickedness of Joseph's mistress, and his own
   signal virtue in resisting her temptation. The accomplishment of the
   thing prefigured in Joseph's dream, depended on the same moral conduct.
   Jotham's parable and prophecy, (Judges ix. 15-20.) was accomplished by
   the wicked conduct of Abimelech, and the men of Shechem. The prophecies
   against the house of Eli, (1 Sam. ii.; iii.) were accomplished by the
   wickedness of Doeg the Edomite, in accusing the priests; and the great
   impiety, and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroying the priests at Nob.
   (1 Sam. xxii.) Nathan's prophecy against David, (2 Sam. xii. 11, 12.)
   was fulfilled by the horrible wickedness of Absalom, in rebelling
   against his father, seeking his life, and lying with his concubines in
   the sight of the sun. The prophecy against Solomon, (1 Kings xi.
   11-13.) was fulfilled by Jeroboam's rebellion and usurpation, which are
   spoken of as his wickedness, (2 Chron. xiii. 5, 6.compare 2 Chron.
   xiii. 18.) The prophecy against Jeroboam's family, ( 1 Kings xiv.) was
   fulfilled by the conspiracy, treason, and cruel murders of Bassha, (2
   Kings xv. 27.&c.) The predictions of the prophet Jehu against the house
   of Bassha, (1 Kings xvi.at the beginning,) were fulfilled by the
   treason and parricide of Zimri, (1 Kings xvi. 9-13, 20.)

   3. How often has God foretold the future moral conduct of nations and
   people, of numbers, bodies, and successions of men; with God's judicial
   proceedings, and many other events consequent and dependent on their
   virtues and vices; which could not be foreknown, if the Volitions of
   men, wherein they acted as moral Agents, had not been foreseen! The
   future cruelty of the Egyptians in oppressing Israel, and God's judging
   and punishing them for it, was foretold long before it came to pass,
   (Gen. xv. 13, 14.) The continuance of the iniquity of the Amorites, and
   the increase of it until it should be full, and they ripe for
   destruction, was foretold above four hundred years before, (Gen. xv.
   16. Acts vii. 6, 7.) The prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem,
   and the land of Judah, were absolute; (2 Kings xx. 17-19.; xxii.
   15-20.). It was foretold in Hezekiah's time, and was abundantly
   insisted on in the book of the prophet Isaiah, who wrote nothing after
   Hezekiah's days. It was foretold in Josiah's time, in the beginning of
   a great reformation, (2 Kings xxii.) And it is manifest by innumerable
   things in the predictions of the prophets, relating to this event, its
   time, its circumstances, its continuance, and end; the return from the
   captivity, the restoration of the temple, city, and land, &c. I say,
   these show plainly, that the prophecies of this great event were
   absolute. And yet this event was connected with, and dependent on, two
   things in men's moral conduct: first, the injurious rapine and violence
   of the king of Babylon and his people, as the efficient cause; which
   God often speaks of as what he highly resented, and would severely
   punish; and secondly, the final obstinacy of the Jews. That great event
   is often spoken of as suspended on this, (Jer. iv. 1; Jer. v. 1;Jer.
   vii. 1-7; Jer.xi. 1-6; Jer. xvii. 24-27; Jer. xxv. 1-7; Jer. xxvi. 1-8,
   13; Jer. xxxviii. 17, 18.) Therefore this destruction and captivity
   could not be foreknown, unless such a moral conduct of the Chaldeans
   and Jews had been foreknown. And then it was foretold, that the people
   should be finally obstinate, to the utter desolation of the city and
   land, (Isa. vi. 9-11. Jer. i. 18, 19. vii. 27-29. Ezek. iii. 7; xxiv.
   13, 14.)

   The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the land of Israel,
   in their idolatry and rejection of the true God, was foretold by him,
   and the prediction confirmed with an oath, (Jer. xliv. 26, 27.) And God
   tells the people, (Isa. xlviii. 3, 4-8.) that he had predicted those
   things which should be consequent on their treachery and obstinacy,
   because he knew they would be obstinate; and that he had declared these
   things beforehand, for their conviction of his being the only true God,
   &c.

   The destruction of Babylon, with many of the circumstances of it, was
   foretold, as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and
   haughtiness of the heads of that monarchy, Nebuchadnezzar and his
   successors, and their wickedly destroying other nations, and
   particularly for their exalting themselves against the true God and his
   people, before any of these monarchs had a being; (Isa. xiii.; xiv.;
   xlvii.;compare Habak. ii. 5-20, and Jer. l.; li.) That Babylon's
   destruction was to be "a recompense, according to the works of their
   own hands," appears by Jer. xxv. 14.--The immorality of which the
   people of Babylon, and particularly her princes and great men, were
   guilty, that very night that the city was destroyed, their revelling
   and drunkenness at Belshazzar's idolatrous feast, was foretold, (Jer.
   li. 39, 57.)

   The return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity is often very
   particularly foretold, with many circumstances, and the promises of it
   are very peremptory: (Jer. xxxi. 35-40; xxxii. 6-15, 41-44; xxxiii.
   24-26.) And the very time of their return was prefixed; (Jer. xxv. 11,
   12; xxix. 10, 11. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21. Ezek. iv. 6.and Dan. ix. 2.) And
   yet the prophecies represent their return as consequent on their
   repentance. And their repentance itself is very expressly and
   particularly foretold, (Jer. xxix. 12, 13, 14; xxxi. 8, 9, 18-31.;
   xxxiii. 8; l. 4, 5. Ezek. vi. 8, 9, 10; vii. 16.; xiv. 22, 23.; xx. 43,
   44.)

   It was foretold under the Old Testament, that the Messiah should suffer
   greatly through the malice and cruelty of men; as is largely and fully
   set forth, Psal. xxii.applied to Christ in the New Testament, (Matt.
   xxvii. 35, 43. Luke xxiii. 34. John xix. 24. Heb. ii. 12.) And likewise
   in Psal. lxix.which, it is also evident by the New Testament, is spoken
   of Christ; (John xv. 25; vii. 5.&c.; and John ii. 17. Rom. xv. 3. Matt.
   xxvii. 34, 48. Mark xv. 23. John xix. 29.) The same thing is also
   foretold, Isa. liii.; l. 6.and Mic. v. 1. This cruelty of men was their
   sin, and what they acted as moral Agents. It was foretold, that there
   should be an union of heathen and Jewish rulers against Christ, (Psal.
   ii. 1, 2.compared with Acts iv. 25-28.) It was foretold, that the Jews
   should generally reject and despise the Messiah, (Isa. xlix. 5, 6, 7;
   liii. 1-3. Psal. xxii. 6, 7; lxix. 4, 8, 19, 20.) And it was foretold,
   that the body of that nation should be rejected in the Messiah's days,
   from being God's people, for their obstinacy in sin; (Isa. xlix. 4-7;
   viii. 14, 15, 16.compared with Rom. x. 19.and Isa. 1xv.at the
   beginning, compared with Rom. x. 20, 21.) It was foretold, that Christ
   should be rejected by the chief priests and rulers among the Jews,
   (Psal. cxviii. 22.compared with Matt. xxi. 42.; Acts iv. 11.; 1 Pet.
   ii. 4, 7.)

   Christ himself foretold his being delivered into the hands of the
   elders, chief priests, and scribes, and his being cruelly treated by
   them, and condemned to death; and that he by them should be delivered
   to the Gentiles: and that he should be mocked and scourged, and
   crucified, (Matt. xvi. 21; xx. 17-19. Luke ix. 22. John viii. 28.) and
   that the people should be concerned in and consenting to his death,
   (Luke xx. 13-18.) especially the inhabitants of Jerusalem; (Luke xiii.
   33-35.) He foretold, that the disciples should all be offended because
   of him, that night in which he was betrayed, and should forsake him;
   (Matt. xxvi. 31. John xvi. 32.) He foretold, that he should be rejected
   of that generation, even the body of the people, and that they should
   continue obstinate to their ruin; (Matt. xii. 45; xxi. 33-42; xxii.
   1-7. Luke xiii. 16, 21, 24; xvii. 25.; xix. 14, 27, 41-44.; xx. 13-18;
   xxiii. 34-39.)

   As it was foretold in both the Old Testament and the New that the Jews
   should reject the Messiah, so it was foretold that the Gentiles should
   receive him, and so be admitted to the privileges of God's people; in
   places too many to be now particularly mentioned. It was foretold in
   the Old Testament, that the Jews should envy the Gentiles on this
   account; (Deut. xxxii. 21.compared with Rom. x. 19.) Christ himself
   often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true religion, and
   become his followers and people; (Matt. viii. 10, 11, 12; xxi. 41-43.;
   xxii. 8-10. Luke xiii. 28; xiv. 16-24.; xx. 16. John x. 16.) He also
   foretold the Jews envy of the Gentiles on this occasion; (Matt. xx.
   12-16. Luke xv. 26-32.) He foretold, that they should continue in this
   opposition and envy, and should manifest it in the cruel persecutions
   of his followers, to their utter destruction; (Matt. xxi. 33-42; xxii.
   6.; xxiii. 34-39. Luke xi. 49-51.) The obstinacy of the Jews is also
   foretold, (Acts xxii. 18.) Christ often foretold the great persecutions
   his followers should meet with, both from Jews and Gentiles; (Matt. x.
   16-18, 21, 22, 34-36; xxiv. 9. Mark xiii. 9. Luke x. 3; xii. 11, 49-53;
   xxi. 12, 16, 17. John xv. 18-21; xvi. 1-4, 20-22, 23.) He foretold the
   martyrdom of particular persons; (Matt. xx. 23. John xiii. 36; xxi. 18,
   19, 22.) He foretold the great success of the gospel in the city of
   Samaria, as near approaching; which afterwards was fulfilled by the
   preaching of Philip, (John iv. 35-38 ) He foretold the rising of many
   deceivers after his departure, (Matt. xxiv. 4, 5, 11.) and the apostasy
   of many of his professed followers; (Matt. xxiv. 10; 12.)

   The persecutions, which the apostle Paul was to meet with in the world,
   were foretold; (Acts ix. 16; xx. 23; xxi. 11.) The apostle says, to the
   christian Ephesians, (Acts xx. 29, 30.) "I know, that after my
   departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the
   flock; also of your ownselves shall men arise, speaking perverse
   things, to draw away disciples after them." The apostle says, he knew
   this: but he did not know it, if God did not know the future actions of
   moral Agents.

   4. Unless God foreknows the future acts of moral Agents, all the
   prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great Antichristian
   apostasy; the rise, reign, wicked qualities, and deeds of "the man of
   sin," and his instruments and adherents; the extent and long
   continuance of his dominion, his influence on the minds of princes and
   others, to corrupt them, and draw them away to idolatry, and other foul
   vices; his great and cruel persecutions; the behaviour of the saints
   under these great temptations, &c. &.c. I say, unless the Volitions of
   moral Agents are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without
   knowing the things foretold.

   The predictions relating to this great apostasy are all of a moral
   nature, relating to men's virtues and vices, and their exercises,
   fruits, and consequences, and events depending on them; and are very
   particular; and most of them often repeated, with many precise
   characteristics, descriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct,
   influence, effects, extent, duration, periods, circumstances, final
   issue, &c. which it would be tedious to mention particularly. And to
   suppose, that all these are predicted by God, without any certain
   knowledge of the future moral behaviour of free Agents, would be to the
   utmost degree absurd.

   5. Unless God foreknow the future acts of men's Wills, and their
   behaviour as moral Agents, all those great things which are foretold
   both in the Old Testament and the New, concerning the erection,
   establishment, and universal extent of the kingdom of the Messiah, were
   predicted and promised while God was in ignorance whether any of these
   things would come to pass or no, and did but guess at them. For that
   kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things external,
   but is within men, and consists in the dominion of virtue in their
   hearts, in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; and in
   these things made manifest in practice, to the praise and glory of God.
   The Messiah came "to save men from their sins, and deliver them from
   their spiritual enemies; that they might serve him in righteousness and
   holiness before him: he gave himself for us, that he might redeem us
   from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous
   of good works." And therefore his success consists in gaining men's
   hearts to virtue, in their being made God's willing people in the day
   of his power. His conquest of his enemies consists in his victory over
   men's corruptions and vices. And such a victory, and such a dominion is
   often expressly foretold: that his kingdom shall fill the earth; that
   all people, nations, and languages should serve and obey him; and so
   that all nations should go up to the mountain of the house of the Lord,
   that he might teach them his ways, and that they might walk in his
   paths; and that all men should be drawn to Christ, and the earth be
   full of the knowledge of the Lord (true virtue and religion) as the
   waters cover the seas; that God's laws should be put into men's inward
   parts, and written in their hearts; and that God's people should be all
   righteous, &c. &c.

   A very great part of the Old-Testament prophecies is taken up in such
   predictions as these.--And here I would observe, that the prophecies of
   the universal prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah, and true
   religion of Jesus Christ, are delivered in the most peremptory manner,
   and confirmed by the oath of God, Isa. xlv. 22-25, "Look unto me, and
   be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none
   else. I have sworn by my Self, the word is gone out of my mouth in
   righteousness, and shall not return, that unto Me every knee shall bow,
   and every tongue shall swear. Surely, shall one say, in the Lord have I
   righteousness and strength: even to Him shall men come," &c. But, here,
   this peremptory declaration and great oath of the Most High, are
   delivered with such mighty solemnity, respecting things which God did
   not know, if he did not certainly foresee the Volitions of moral
   Agents.

   And all the predictions of Christ and his apostles, to the like
   purpose, must be without knowledge: as those of our Saviour comparing
   the kingdom of God to a grain of mustard-seed, growing exceeding great,
   from a small beginning; and to leaven, hid in three measures of meal,
   until the whole was leavened, &c.--And the prophecies in the epistles
   concerning the restoration of the Jewish nation to the true church of
   God, and bringing in the fulness of the Gentiles; and the prophecies in
   all the Revelation concerning the glorious change in the moral state of
   the world of mankind, attending the destruction of Antichrist, "the
   kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his
   Christ;" and its being granted to the church to be "arrayed in that
   fine linen, white and clean, which is the righteousness of saints," &c.

   Corol. 1. Hence that great promise and oath of God to Abraham, Isaac,
   and Jacob, so much celebrated in Scripture, both in the Old Testament
   and the New, namely, "That in their seed all the nations and families
   of the earth should be blessed," must be made on uncertainties, if God
   does not certainly foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents. For the
   fulfilment of this promise consists in that success of Christ in the
   work of redemption, and that setting up of his spiritual kingdom over
   the nations of the world, which has been spoken of. Men are "blessed in
   Christ" no otherwise than as they are brought to acknowledge him, trust
   in him, love and serve him, as is represented and predicted in Psal
   1xxii. 11. "All kings shall fall down before Him; all nations shall
   serve him." With Psal 1xxii. 17. "Men shall be blessed in him; all
   nations shall call him blessed." This oath to Jacob and Abraham is
   fulfilled in subduing men's iniquities; as is implied in that of the
   prophet Micah vii. 19, 20.

   Corol. 2. Hence also it appears, that the first gospel promise that
   ever was made to mankind, that great prediction of the salvation of the
   Messiah, and his victory over Satan, made to our first parents, (Gen.
   iii. 15.) if there be no certain Prescience of the Volitions of moral
   Agents, must have no better foundation than conjecture. For Christ's
   victory over Satan consists in men's being saved from sin, and in the
   victory of virtue and holiness over that vice and wickedness which
   Satan by his temptations has introduced, and wherein his kingdom
   consists.

   6. If it be so, that God has not a Prescience of the future actions of
   moral Agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of Scripture in
   general are without Foreknowledge. For Scripture prophecies, almost all
   of them, if not universally, are either predictions of the actings and
   behaviour of moral Agents, or of events depending on them, or some way
   connected with them; judicial dispensations, judgments on men for their
   wickedness, or rewards of virtue and righteousness, remarkable
   manifestations of favour to the righteous, or manifestations of
   sovereign mercy to sinners, forgiving their iniquities, and magnifying
   the riches of divine grace; or dispensations of Providence, in some
   respect or other, relating to the conduct of the subjects of God's
   moral government, wisely adapted thereto; either providing for what
   should be in a future state of things, through the Volitions and
   voluntary actions of moral Agents, or consequent upon them, and
   regulated and ordered according to them. So that all events that are
   foretold, are either moral events, or others which are connected with
   and accommodated to them.

   That the predictions of Scripture in general must be without knowledge,
   if God does not foresee the Volitions of men, will further appear, if
   it be considered, that almost all events belonging to the future state
   of the world of mankind, the changes and revolutions which come to pass
   in empires, kingdoms, and nations, and all societies, depend, in ways
   innumerable, on the acts of men's Wills; yea, on an innumerable
   multitude of millions of Volitions. Such is the state and course of
   things in the world of mankind, that one single event, which appears in
   itself exceeding inconsiderable, may, in the progress and series of
   things, occasion a succession of the greatest and most important and
   extensive events; causing the state of mankind to be vastly different
   from what it would otherwise have been, for all succeeding generations.

   For instance, the coming into existence of those particular men, who
   have been the great conquerors of the world, which, under God, have had
   the main hand in all the consequent state of the world, in all
   after-ages; such as Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius
   Caesar, &c. undoubtedly depended on many millions of acts of the Will,
   in their parents. And perhaps most of these Volitions depended on
   millions of Volitions in their contemporaries of the same generation;
   and most of these on millions of millions of Volitions in preceding
   generations.--As we go back, still the number of Volitions, which were
   some way the occasion of the event, multiply as the branches of a
   river, until they come at last, as it were, to an infinite number. This
   will not seem strange to any one who well considers the matter; if we
   recollect what philosophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of
   those things which are the principia, or stamina vitae, concerned in
   generation; the animalcula in semine masculo, and the ova in the womb
   of the female; the impregnation or animating of one of these in
   distinction from all the rest, must depend on things infinitely minute
   relating to the time and circumstances of the act of the parents, the
   state of their bodies, &c. which must depend on innumerable foregoing
   circumstances and occurrences; which must depend, infinite ways, on
   foregoing acts of their Wills; which are occasioned by innumerable
   things that happen in the course of their lives, in which their own and
   their neighbor's behaviour must have a hand, an infinite number of
   ways. And as the Volitions of others must be so many ways concerned in
   the conception and birth of such men; so, no less, in their
   preservation, and circumstances of life, their particular
   determinations and actions, on which the great revolutions they were
   the occasions of, depended. As, for instance, when the conspirators in
   Persia, against the Magi, were consulting about a succession to the
   empire, it came into the mind of one of them, to propose, that he whose
   horse neighed first, when they came together the next morning, should
   be king. Now, such a thing coming into his mind, might depend on
   innumerable incidents, wherein the Volitions of mankind had been
   concerned. But, in consequence of this accident, Darius, the son of
   Hystaspes, was king. And if this had not been, probably his successor
   would not have been the same, and all the circumstances of the Persian
   empire might have been far otherwise: Then perhaps Alexander might
   never have conquered that empire; and then probably the circumstances
   of the world in all succeeding ages, might have been vastly otherwise.
   I might further instance in many other occurrences; such as those on
   which depended Alexander's preservation, in the many critical junctures
   of his life, wherein a small trifle would have turned the scale against
   him; and the preservation and success of the Roman people, in the
   infancy of their kingdom and commonwealth, and afterwards; upon which
   all the succeeding changes in their state, and the mighty revolutions
   that afterwards came to pass in the habitable world, depended. But
   these hints may be sufficient for every discerning considerate person,
   to convince him, that the whole state of the world of mankind, in all
   ages, and the very being of every person who has ever lived in it, in
   every age, since the times of the ancient prophets, has depended on
   more Volitions, or acts of the Wills of men, than there are sands on
   the sea-shore.

   And therefore, unless God does most exactly and perfectly foresee the
   fixture acts of men's Wills, all the predictions which he ever uttered
   concerning David, Hezekiah, Josiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander;
   concerning the four monarchies, and the revolutions in them; and
   concerning all the wars, commotions, victories, prosperity, and
   calamities, of any kingdoms, nations, or communities in the world, have
   all been without knowledge.

   So that, according to this notion, God not foreseeing the Volitions and
   free actions of men, he could foresee nothing appertaining to the state
   of the world of mankind in future ages; not so much as the being of one
   person that should live in it: and could foreknow no events, but only
   such as he would bring to pass himself by the extraordinary
   interposition of his immediate power; or things which should come to
   pass in the natural material world, by the laws of motion, and course
   of nature, wherein that is independent on the actions or works of
   mankind: that is, as he might, like a very able mathematician and
   astronomer, with great exactness calculate the revolutions of the
   heavenly bodies, and the greater wheels of the machine of the external
   creation.

   And if we closely consider the matter, there will appear reason to
   convince us, that he could not, with any absolute certainty, foresee
   even these. As to the first, namely, things done by the immediate and
   extraordinary interposition of God's power, these cannot be foreseen,
   unless it can be foreseen when there shall be occasion for such
   extraordinary interposition. And that cannot be foreseen, unless the
   state of the moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus
   interposes, it is with regard to the state of the moral world,
   requiring such divine interposition. Thus God could not certainly
   foresee the universal deluge, the calling of Abraham, the destruction
   of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and Israel's redemption
   out of it, the expelling of the seven nations of Canaan, and the
   bringing Israel into that land; for these all are represented as
   connected with things belonging to the state of the moral world. Nor
   can God foreknow the most proper and convenient time of the day of
   judgment and general conflagration; for that chiefly depends on the
   course and state of things in the moral World.

   Nor, Secondly, can we on this supposition reasonably think, that God
   can certainly foresee what things shall come to pass, in the course of
   things, in the natural and material world, even those which in an
   ordinary state of things might be calculated by a good astronomer. For
   the moral world is the end of the natural world; and the course of
   things in the former, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with
   respect to the latter. Therefore he, has seen cause, from regard to the
   state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily to interpose, to
   interrupt, and lay an arrest on the course of things in the natural
   world; and unless he can foresee the Volitions of men, and so know
   something of the future state of the moral world, he cannot know but
   that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner,
   as ever he had: nor can he foresee how, or when, he shall have occasion
   thus to interpose.

   Corol. 1. It appears from the things observed, that unless God foresees
   the Volitions of moral Agents, that cannot be true which is observed by
   the apostle James, (Acts xv. 18.) "Known unto God are all his works
   from the beginning of the world."

   Corol. 2. It appears, that unless God foreknows the Volitions of moral
   Agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have no better foundation than
   mere conjecture; and that, in most instances, a conjecture which must
   have the utmost uncertainty; depending on an innumerable multitude of
   Volitions, which are all, even to God, uncertain events: however, these
   prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very many of them
   in the most positive manner, with asseverations; and some of them with
   the most solemn oaths.

   Corol. 3. It also follows, that if this notion of God's ignorance of
   future Volitions be true, in vain did Christ say, after uttering many
   great and important predictions, depending on men's moral actions,
   (Matt. xxiv. 35.) "Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall
   not pass away."

   Corol. 4. From the same notion of God's ignorance, it would follow,
   that in vain has he himself often spoken of the predictions of his
   word, as evidences of Foreknowledge; of that which is his prerogative
   as GOD, and his peculiar glory, greatly distinguishing him from all
   other beings; (as in Isa. xli. 22-26; xliii. 9, 10; xliv. 8; xlv. 21;
   xlvi. 10; xlviii. 14.)

   Arg. II. If God does not foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents, then
   he did not foreknow the fall of man, nor of angels, and so could not
   foreknow the great things which are consequent on these events; such as
   his sending his Son into the world to die for sinners, and all things
   pertaining to the great work of redemption; all the things which were
   done for four thousand years before Christ came, to prepare the way for
   it; and the incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of
   Christ; setting Him at the head of the universe as King of heaven and
   earth, angels and men; and setting up his church and kingdom in this
   world, and appointing him the Judge of the world; and all that Satan
   should do in the world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ: and the
   great transactions of the day of judgment, &c. And if God was thus
   ignorant, the following scriptures, and others like them, must be
   without any meaning, or contrary to truth. (Eph. i. 4.) "According as
   he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world." (1 Pet.
   i. 20.)" Who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the
   world." (2 Tim. i. 9.) "Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy
   calling; not according to our works, but according to his own purpose,
   and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began."
   So (Eph. iii. 11.) speaking of the wisdom of God in the work of
   redemption, "according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in
   Christ Jesus." (Tit. i. 2.)"In hope of eternal life, which God that
   cannot lie, promised before the world began." (Rom. viii. 29.) "Whom he
   did foreknow, them he also did predestinate," &c. (1 Pet. i. 2.)"Elect,
   according to the foreknowledge of God the Father."

   If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the redemption by Jesus
   Christ, nor the Volitions of man since the fall; then he did not
   foreknow the saints in any sense; neither as particular persons, nor as
   societies or nations; either by election, or by mere foresight of their
   virtue or good works; or any foresight of any thing about them relating
   to their salvation; or any benefit they have by Christ, or any manner
   of concern of theirs with a Redeemer.

   ARG. III. On the supposition of God's ignorance of the future Volitions
   of free Agents, it will follow, that God must in many cases truly
   repent what he has done, so as properly to wish he had done otherwise:
   by reason that the event of things in those affairs which are most
   important, viz. the affairs of his moral kingdom, being uncertain and
   contingent, often happens quite otherwise than he was before aware of.
   And there would be reason to understand that, in the most literal
   sense, (Gen. vi. 6.) "It repented the Lord, that he had made man on the
   earth, and it grieved him at his heart," (and 1 Sam. xv. 11) contrary
   to Num. xxiii. 19."God is not the son of Man, that he should repent;"
   and 1 Sam. xv. 29."Also the Strength of Israel will not lie, nor
   repent; for he is not a man that he should repent." Yea, from this
   notion it would follow, that God is liable to repent and be grieved at
   his heart, in a literal sense, continually; and is always exposed to an
   infinite number of real disappointments in governing the world; and to
   manifold, constant, great perplexity and vexation: but this is not very
   consistent with his title of " God over all, blessed for evermore;"
   which represents him as possessed of perfect, constant, and
   uninterrupted tranquillity and felicity, as God over the universe, and
   in his management of the affairs of the world, as supreme and universal
   ruler. (See Rom. i. 25. ix. 5. 2 Cor. xi. 31. 1 Tim. vi. 15.)

   ARG. IV. It will also follow from this notion, that as God is liable to
   be continually repenting of what he has done; so he must be exposed to
   be constantly changing his mind and intentions, as to his future
   conduct; altering his measures, relinquishing his old designs, and
   forming new schemes and projects. For his purposes, even as to the main
   parts of his scheme, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom,
   must be always liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he
   must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of
   order, through the contingence of the actions of moral Agents: he must.
   be a Being, who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must
   necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of
   repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this
   plain reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an
   infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent
   and uncertain. In such a situation, he must have little else to do, but
   to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his
   disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best manner the case
   will allow, The Supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great
   and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made,
   and of which he has the care, through his being utterly unable to find
   out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall befall his
   system; for which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable
   provision. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he
   should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing
   things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and
   extensive influence, and endless consequence to the universe; which he
   may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he
   had known before, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly.
   And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices,
   purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make
   him continually change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him
   into confusion.

   But how do these things consist with reason, or with the word of God?
   Which represents, that all God's works, all that he has ever to do, the
   whole scheme and series of his operations, are from the beginning
   perfectly in his view; and declares, that whatever devices and designs
   are in the hearts of men, "the counsel of the Lord shall stand, and the
   thoughts of his heart to all generations," (Prov. xix. 21. Psal.
   xxxiii. 10, 11.) And "that which the Lord of hosts hath purposed, none
   shall disannul," Isa. xiv. 27.) And that he cannot be frustrated in one
   design or thought, (Job xlii. 2.) And "that which God doth, it shall be
   for ever, that nothing can be put to it, or taken from it," (Eccl. iii.
   14.) The stability and perpetuity of God's counsels are expressly
   spoken of as connected with his foreknowledge, (Isa. xlvi. 10.)
   "Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the
   things that are not yet done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I
   will do my pleasure."--And how are these things consistent with what
   the Scripture says of God's immutability, which represents him as
   "without variableness, or shadow of turning;" and speaks of him, most
   particularly, as unchangeable with regard to his purposes, (Mal. iii.
   6.) "I am the Lord; I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not
   consumed." (Exod. iii. 14.) "i am that i am." (Job xxiii. 13, 14.) He
   is in one mind; and who can turn him? And what his soul desireth, even
   that he doth: for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me."

   ARG. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of future Volitions of moral
   Agents be thoroughly considered in its consequences, it will appear to
   follow from it, that God, after he had made the world, was liable to be
   wholly frustrated of his end in the creation of it; and so has been, in
   like manner, liable to be frustrated of his end in all the great works
   he had wrought. It is manifest, the moral world is the end of the
   natural: the rest of the creation is but a house which God hath built,
   with furniture, for moral Agents: and the good or bad state of the
   moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural
   Agency, and so depends on their Volitions. And therefore, if these
   cannot be foreseen by God, because they are contingent, and subject to
   no kind of necessity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to
   go wrong, to any assignable degree; yea, liable to be utterly ruined.
   As on this scheme, it may well be supposed to be literally said, when
   mankind, by the abuse of their moral Agency, became very corrupt before
   the flood, " that the Lord repented that he had made man on the earth,
   and it grieved him at his heart;" so, when he made the universe, he did
   not know but that he might be so disappointed in it, that it might
   grieve him at his heart that he had made it. It actually proved, that
   all mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the angels
   apostatized: and how could God know before, that all of them would not?
   And how could God know but that all mankind, notwithstanding means used
   to reclaim them, being still left to the freedom of their own Will,
   would continue in their apostasy, and grow worse and worse, as they of
   the old world before the flood did?

   According to the scheme I am endeavouring to confute, the fall of
   neither men nor angels could be foreseen, and God must be greatly
   disappointed in these events; and so the grand contrivance for our
   redemption, and destroying the works of the devil, by the Messiah, and
   all the great things God has done in the prosecution of these designs,
   must be only the fruits of his own disappointment; contrivances to
   mend, as well as he could, his system, which originally was all very
   good, and perfectly beautiful; but was broken and confounded by the
   free Will of angels and men. And still he must be liable to be totally
   disappointed a second time: he could not know, that he should have his
   desired success, in the incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and
   exaltation of his only-begotten Son, and other great works accomplished
   to restore the state of things: he could not know, after all, whether
   there would actually be any tolerable measure of restoration; for this
   depended on the free Will of man. There has been a general great
   apostasy of almost all the Christian world, to that which was worse
   than heathenism; which continued for many ages. And how could God,
   without foreseeing men's Volitions, know whether ever Christendom would
   return from this apostasy? And which way would he foretell how soon it
   would begin? The apostle says, it began to work in his time; and how
   could it be known how far it would proceed in that age? Yea, how could
   it be known that the gospel which was not effectual for the reformation
   of the Jews, would ever be effectual for the turning of the heathen
   nations from their heathen apostasy, which they had been confirmed in
   for so many ages?

   It is represented often in Scripture, that God, who made the world for
   himself, and created it for his pleasure, would infallibly obtain his
   end in the creation, and in all his works; that as all things are of
   him, so they would all be to him; and that in the final issue of
   things, it would appear that he is "the first, and the last." (Rev.
   xxi. 6.) "And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the
   beginning and the end, the first and the last." But these things are
   not consistent with God's liability to be disappointed in all his
   works, nor indeed with his failing of his end in any thing that he has
   undertaken.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [122] 2 Kings viii. 13.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. XII.

   God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents,
   inconsistent with such a Contingence of those volitions as is without
   all Necessity.

   Having proved, that God has a certain and infallible Prescience of the
   voluntary acts of moral agents, I come now, in the second place, to
   show the consequence; how it follows from hence, that these events are
   necessary, with a Necessity of connexion or consequence.

   The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had opportunity to
   observe, deny this consequence; and affirm, that if such Foreknowledge
   be allowed, it is no evidence of any Necessity of the event foreknown.
   Now I desire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly
   inquired into. I cannot but think. that on particular and full
   consideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so
   or not.

   In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the
   following things.

   l. It is very evident, that, with regard to a thing whose existence is
   infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already
   hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary.
   Here may be noted the following particulars:

   1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in
   things which are past, their past existence is now necessary: having
   already made sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of
   alteration in that respect; it is now impossible that it should be
   otherwise than true, that the thing has existed.

   2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the
   volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a
   thing which already has, and long ago had existence; and so, now its
   existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise,
   than that this Foreknowledge should be or should have been.

   3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly
   connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves
   necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected
   with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself
   necessarily true. To say otherwise would be a contradiction: it would
   be in effect to say, that the connexion was indissoluble, and yet was
   not so, but might be broken. If that, the existence of which is
   indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary,
   is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not exist,
   notwithstanding that indissoluble connexion of its existence.--Whether
   the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.

   4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and
   infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of
   moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible, and indissoluble
   connexion between those events and that Foreknowledge; and that
   therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are necessary
   events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that, whose
   existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have
   been.

   To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the
   connexion of the event with that Foreknowledge is dissoluble and
   fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the same thing as to
   affirm, that there is no necessary connexion between a proposition
   being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that
   it is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge
   of future volitions, the event is necessary; or, in other words, that
   it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For if it be not
   impossible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but
   that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not
   now be true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is not impossible,
   but that there now should be no truth in that proposition, which is now
   infallibly known to be true.

   II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is
   contingent, and without all Necessity, may be proved thus; it is
   impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without
   evidence. To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction: because for a
   thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be
   evident to that understanding: and for a thing to be evident to any
   understanding is the same thing, as for that understanding to see
   evidence of it: but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see
   evidence where there is none; for that is the same thing, as to see
   that to be which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is
   absolutely without evidence, that truth is absolutely unknowable,
   insomuch that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known.

   But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent,
   without all Necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely
   without evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of
   these two sorts, either self-evidence or proof; an evident thing must
   be either evident in itself; or evident in something else: that is,
   evident by connexion with something else. But a future thing, whose
   existence is without all Necessity, can have neither of these sorts of
   evidence. It cannot be self-evident: for if it be, it may be now known,
   by what is now to be seen in the thing itself; its present existence,
   or the Necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the
   supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present
   existence to be seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be
   necessarily existent for the future: so that its future existence is
   not self-evident. And secondly, neither is there any proof, or evidence
   in any thing else, or evidence of connexion with something else that is
   evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed
   that there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of
   the contingent event is connected. For such a connexion destroys its
   contingence, and supposes Necessity. Thus it is demonstrated, that
   there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the
   future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all
   Necessity, (if any such event there be,) neither self-evidence nor
   proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and so cannot
   be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing, cannot be known.

   Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven
   hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine
   Being; and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at
   once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular
   nature and form; all in absolute Contingence, without any concern of
   God, or any other cause, in the matter; without any manner of ground or
   reason of its existence; or any dependence upon, or connexion at all
   with any thing foregoing: I say, that if this be supposed, there was no
   evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be
   seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself, as yet, was not. And
   there was no evidence of it to be seen in any thing else; for evidence
   in something else, is connexion with something else: but such connexion
   is contrary to the supposition. There was no evidence before, that this
   thing would happen; for by the supposition, there was no reason why it
   should happen, rather than something else, or rather than nothing. And
   if so, then all things before were exactly equal, and the same, with
   respect to that and other possible things; there was no preponderation,
   no superior weight or value; and therefore, nothing that could be of
   weight or value to determine any understanding. The thing was
   absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable. An increase of
   understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency, and
   makes no advance, towards discerning any signs or evidences of it, let
   it be increased never so much; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The
   increase of the strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to
   discern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply
   involved in clouds and darkness; but it has no tendency to enable to
   discern evidence where there is none. If the sight be infinitely
   strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable
   to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease; yet
   it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence
   which is not; but on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to
   discern with great certainty that there is none.

   III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be
   necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not
   impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that
   God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God's
   knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God
   certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will
   infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contingent,
   that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent
   with itself; or that one thing he knows, is utterly inconsistent with
   another thing he knows. It is the same as to say, he now knows a
   proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of
   contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all
   Necessity, that nothing hinders but it may not be, then the proposition
   which asserts its future existence, is so uncertain, that nothing
   hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows
   all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is
   inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true; and so
   inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing
   be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent,
   if he views things as they are. If the event be not necessary, then it
   is possible it may never be: and if it be possible it may never be, God
   knows it may possibly never be; and that is to know that the
   proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true; and
   that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which surely is
   inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are
   in themselves contingent events, without all Necessity, then it is no
   argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine
   peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of
   ignorance and mistake; because it would argue, that he supposes that
   proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things
   considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that
   God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive
   of, is ridiculous; as much so, as to say, that God may know
   contradictions to be true, for ought we know; or that he may know a
   thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain,
   though we cannot conceive how; because he has ways of knowing which we
   cannot comprehend.

   Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute
   decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account
   of any Necessity of the event, which follows from such decrees, than
   the absolute Foreknowledge of God. Because the connexion between the
   event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as
   between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more
   impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than
   that the event and absolute Knowledge should disagree. The connexion
   between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the
   supposition: because it is supposed, that the certainty and
   infallibility of the Knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so,
   the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connexion, between
   the Knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree
   be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the
   connexion, or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not
   so, the certainty of Knowledge might be increased by the addition of a
   decree; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the
   Knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible
   degree.

   There is as much impossibility but that the things which are infallibly
   foreknown, should be, or, which is the same thing, as great a Necessity
   of their future existence, as if the event were already written down,
   and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and
   there was the most indissoluble and perfect connexion possible between
   the writing and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as
   impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had existed
   already; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary than
   this.

   And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been
   proved there is, then Necessity of connexion and consequence is not at
   all inconsistent with any liberty which man, or any other creature,
   enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees, which
   do not at all increase the Necessity, are not inconsistent with the
   liberty which man enjoys, on any such account, as that they make the
   event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it
   should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are inconsistent
   with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of
   probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on
   account of any Necessity which absolute decrees infer.

   Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great difference between God's
   Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to Necessity of future
   events. In his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 474, &c.) he says,
   "God's Prescience has no influence at all on our actions.--Should God,
   says he, by immediate revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of
   any man's state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any
   influence upon his actions? Surely none at all.--Our knowledge doth not
   affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more fixture,
   than they could be without it. Now, Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge.
   As therefore Knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither
   has Foreknowledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the
   Foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter
   or diminish that freedom. Whereas God's decree of election is powerful
   and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such
   means, as shall unfrustrably produce the end.--Hence God's Prescience
   renders no actions necessary." And to this purpose, (p. 473.) he cites
   Origen, where he says, "God's Prescience is not the cause of things
   future, but their being future is the cause of God's Prescience that
   they will be:" and Le Blanc, where he says, "This is the truest
   resolution of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that
   things are future; but their being future is the cause they are
   foreseen." In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being
   and Attributes of God, (p. 95 - 99.) And the Author of The Freedom of
   the Will, in God and Creature, speaking to the like purpose with Dr.
   Whitby, represents "Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things
   known, to make them necessary, than After-knowledge," or to that
   purpose.

   To all which I would say; that what is said about Knowledge, its not
   having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to
   the purpose, nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning.
   Whether Prescience be the thing that makes the event necessary or no,
   it alters not the case. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the
   Necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes
   the Necessity. [123] If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this proves the
   event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible but that
   the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or
   some other way, if there be any other way: because, as was said before,
   it is absurd to say, that a proposition is known to be certainly and
   infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.

   The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that,
   inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an event to be
   necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does not prove it to be
   necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for
   it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove or be an
   evidence of a thing being necessary, but that which has a causal
   influence to make it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain
   Foreknowledge of the future existence of an event be not the thing
   which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet
   it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is impossible it should
   fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not
   the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that
   there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is
   as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to
   the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly
   foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arises from the
   Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident as any thing can be,
   that it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true,
   should prove not to be true; therefore there is a Necessity that it
   should be otherwise; whether the Knowledge be the cause of this
   Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of the Knowledge.

   All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-knowledge,
   or concomitant Knowledge, proves the thing known now to he necessary,
   by some means or other; or proves that it is impossible it should now
   be otherwise than true.--I freely allow, that Foreknowledge does not
   prove a thing to be necessary any more than After-knowledge: but then
   After-knowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves that it is now
   become impossible but that the proposition known should be true.
   Certain After-knowledge proves that it is now, by some means or other,
   become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates past
   existence on the event, should be true. And so does certain
   Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the time of the Knowledge, it is, by
   some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which
   predicates future existence on the event, should be true. The necessity
   of the truth of the propositions, consisting in the present
   impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirmed, in both
   cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the Knowledge; there
   can be no certainty of Knowledge without it.

   There must he a certainty in things themselves, before they are
   certainly known, or which is the same thing, known to be certain. For
   certainty of Knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the
   certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known. Therefore
   there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of
   Knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain.
   And there is nothing but the necessity of truth known, or its being
   impossible but that it should be true; or, in other words, the firm and
   infallible connexion between the subject and predicate of the
   proposition that contains that truth. All certainty of Knowledge
   consists in the view of the firmness of that connexion. So God's
   certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view
   of the firm and indissoluble connexion of the subject and predicate of
   the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that
   possible event; the predicate is its future existence, but if future
   existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then
   the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows
   the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may
   possibly never be, then, he sees a firm connexion between a subject and
   predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contradiction.

   I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, that mere Knowledge does not
   affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future. But
   yet, I say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future
   and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of futurity, supposes
   futurity; and a certain Knowledge of futurity, supposes certain
   futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other
   certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of Knowledge, than
   a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or, which
   is the same thing, the Necessity of the event.

   I would observe one thing further; that if it be as those forementioned
   writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the
   effect of the existence of the event foreknown; this is so far from
   showing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the
   existence of that event, that it rather shows the contrary the more
   plainly. Because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled
   and firm, that it is as if it had already been; inasmuch as in effect
   it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual
   influence and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz. Prescience:
   the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes the cause, and
   depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which
   is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it
   having already the possession of existence, and has made sure of it.
   But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground,
   and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.

   To illustrate this matter; let us suppose the appearances and images of
   things in a glass, for instance, a reflecting telescope, to be the real
   effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of sight) which they
   resemble: if it be so, then, as these images in the telescope have had
   a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that
   it should be otherwise than that they have existed; so they being the
   true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the
   existence of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible, firm, and
   necessary, as the existence of these effects; the one being connected
   with, and wholly depending on the other.--Now let us suppose future
   existences, some way or other, to have influence back, to produce
   effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in
   a glass, a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding
   ages; but yet that these images are real effects of these future
   existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their cause.
   These effects and images having already had actual existence, render
   that matter of their existence perfectly firm and stable, and utterly
   impossible to be otherwise; and this proves, as in the other instance,
   that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is also
   equally sure, firm, and necessary; and that it is alike impossible but
   that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects
   have. And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent
   effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have
   existed there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as
   truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is not altered.

   Another thing which has been said by some Arminians, to take off the
   force of what is urged from God's Prescience, against the continuance
   of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose; "That when we
   talk of Foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so
   speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most
   perfect Knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is
   no such thing as before and after in God, but he sees all things by one
   perfect unchangeable view, without any succession."--To this I answer,

   1. It has been already shown, that all certain Knowledge proves the
   Necessity of the truth known; whether it be before, after, or at the
   same time.--Though it be true, that there is no succession in God's
   Knowledge, and the manner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet
   thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, present,
   or to come, that God is ever uncertain of. He never is, never was, and
   never will be without infallible Knowledge of it; he always sees the
   existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always sees
   things just as they are in truth; hence there never is in reality any
   thing contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never
   to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it
   is because those things, which are future to us, are as present to God,
   as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to say, that
   future events are always in God's view as evident, clear, sure, and
   necessary, as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein
   the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never is
   a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of
   existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to
   pass.

   God viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably, as that there is no
   succession in his ideas or judgment, does not hinder but that there is
   properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect Knowledge of
   the moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred years hence: yea
   the objection supposes this; and therefore it certainly does not hinder
   but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral
   actions should not come to pass.

   We know, that God foreknows the future voluntary actions of men, in
   such a sense, as that he is able particularly to foretell them, and
   cause them to be recorded, as he often has done; and therefore that
   necessary connexion which there is between God's Knowledge and the
   event known, as much proves the event to be necessary beforehand, as if
   the Divine Knowledge were in the same sense before the event, as the
   prediction or writing is. If the Knowledge be infallible, then the
   expression of it in the written prediction is infallible; that is,
   there is an infallible connexion between that written prediction and
   the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should ever be
   otherwise, than that the prediction and the event should agree: and
   this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but that the event
   should come to pass: and this is the same as to say that its coming to
   pass is necessary.--So that it is manifest, that there being no proper
   succession in God's mind, makes no alteration as to the Necessity of
   the existence of the events known. Yea,

   2. This is so far from weakening the proof, given of the impossibility
   of future events known, not coming to pass, as that it establishes the
   foregoing arguments, and shows the clearness of the evidence. For,

   (1.) The very reason, why God's Knowledge is without succession, is,
   because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of
   clearness and certainty. All things, whether past, present, or to come,
   being viewed with equal evidence and fulness; future things being seen
   with as much clearness, as if they were present; the view is always in
   absolute perfection; and absolute constant perfection admits of no
   alteration, and so no succession; the actual existence of the thing
   known, does not at all increase or add to the clearness or certainty of
   the thing known: God calls the things that are not, as though they
   were; they are all one to him as if they had already existed. But
   herein consists the strength of the demonstration before given; that it
   is as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they existed
   already. This objection, instead of weakening the argument, sets it in
   the strongest light; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that the
   existence of future events is in God's view so much as if it already
   had been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least
   alteration or variation in his Knowledge of them.

   (2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God's Knowledge:
   for it is the immutability of Knowledge that makes it to be without
   succession. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I
   insist on, viz. that it is utterly impossible the known events should
   fail of existence. For if that were possible, then a change in God's
   Knowledge and view of things, were possible. For if the known event
   should not come into being, as God expected, then he would see it, and
   so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there
   would be change and succession in his Knowledge. But as God is
   immutable, and it is infinitely impossible that his view should be
   changed; so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the
   foreknown event should not exist; and that is to be impossible in the
   highest degree; and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is
   more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed, by the
   succession of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to
   eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; so that his whole
   eternal duration is vitae interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta
   possessio.

   On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geometrical
   theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of strict
   demonstration, than that God's certain Prescience of the volitions of
   moral agents is inconsistent with such a Contingence of these events,
   as is without all Necessity; and so is inconsistent with the Arminian
   notion of liberty.

   Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concerning the absolute
   decrees of God, does not all infer any more fatality in things, than
   will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of the most Arminian
   divines, who acknowledge God's omniscience, and universal Prescience.
   Therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the
   Calvinists, as implying Hobbes's doctrine of Necessity, or the stoical
   doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists, than
   their own doctrine: and therefore it doth not become those divines, to
   raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this account.

   Corol. 3. Hence all arguments of Arminians, who own God's omniscience,
   against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform
   the conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring
   spiritual duties, and against the Calvinistic doctrine of efficacious
   grace; on this ground, that those doctrines, though they do not suppose
   men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose them under
   Necessity, must fall to the ground. And their arguments against the
   Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God's
   commands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of his counsels
   and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the
   Calvinists as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer
   Necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections must be justly
   esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being leveled against
   their own doctrine, as well as against that of the Calvinists. [124]
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   [123] This distinction is of great importance in the present
   controversy; and the want of attending to the true ground on which it
   stands, has been, we presume, the principal cause of Dr. Whitby's
   objections, and those of most, if not all, other Arminian writers. They
   seem to consider, in this argument, no other necessity but the
   decretive, as maintained by their opponents; and therefore infer, that
   to allow any kind of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible
   decree. From this view the transition is easy to another conclusion,
   viz. that if any thing is foreknown because it is decreed, every thing
   is foreknown on the same ground, of for the same reason.--And then,
   this proving too much --the decretive appointment of all the evil in
   the universe, which they are sure is incompatible with the divine
   character, and therefore impossible--they reject the whole doctrine of
   necessity as a ground of foreknowledge; and suppose that, though they
   cannot clearly disprove what is advanced against them, they infer that
   there is somehow a sophism in the reasoning of their opponents, or some
   false principle assumed were they but happy enough to detect it. But
   our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the connexion by
   which every event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, is so
   because decreed. The truth is, that some events are foreknown to be
   certain because foreordained; and others, because of the tendency there
   is in the nature of things themselves.--Should any, in the way of
   objection, assert, that the nature of things is itself derived from the
   divine will, or decree; we apprehend there is no evidence to support
   such an assertion. For instance, is it owing to a decree that the
   nature of any created being is dependent on the first cause? That a
   creature, however exalted, is not infinite? That any relation should
   subsist between the Creator and a creature? Or that, if equal
   quantities be taken from equal quantities, the remainders will be
   equal? Is there any room, in thought, for a supposition of nay decree
   in the case? Nay more, does it appear possible for a decree to have
   made such things otherwise? Let it be observed, however, that God is
   the almighty Sovereign over nature--not indeed so far as to alter the
   nature of things, which in reality is no object of power, any more than
   to make spirit to be the same thing as matter, and vice versa, or the
   working of contradictions is an object of power, but--by the position
   of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it
   be supposed, if God create a world, that world must depend upon him, as
   a necessary consequence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and
   identity of things. For what is it to create, but for an independent
   cause to impart, ad extra, a dependent existence? So that to deny
   dependence, is to deny creation. But though the consequences be
   necessary, if the antecedent be established; yet the antecedent itself
   is not necessary, except from the decree; for there is not, in the
   nature of things, any antecedent necessity that a world be created.
   That is, to suppose its non-existence implies no contradiction, it
   being evidently the effect of sovereign pleasure. Hence to deny the
   consequence, on supposition of the antecedent, is to deny the nature of
   things, and to assert a contradiction, thought the antecedent itself be
   not necessary. And hence also in the instance now specified among
   others innumerable, the antecedent is an object of decree, but not the
   consequence. It is as absurd to say, that God decreed the dependence of
   the world upon himself, as it is to say, he decreed that two and two
   shall be equal to four, rather than to five. These remarks, duly
   considered in their just consequences, will abundantly show, that some
   things are necessary because decreed,--as the creation, the
   preservation, and the government of the world; the redemption, the
   purification, and the salvation of the church:--and that other
   things--as all imperfections, dependence, relations, and especially
   moral evils--come to be necessary, and so capable of being foreknown,
   only by connexion, of consequence. That is, if the antecedent, which is
   under the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be admitted, the
   consequence follows infallibly from the nature of things. But if
   another antecedent be established, another consequence will follow,
   with equal certainty, also from the nature of things. For instance: if
   holiness be given and continued to a redeemed creature, as an
   antecedent; excellence, honour, and happiness are the necessary
   consequences. But if sin operate without control, as the antecedent,
   dishonour and misery must be the necessary consequence from the same
   cause.--W.

   [124] In these two sections our author has abundantly demonstrated,
   that foreknowledge infers necessity; such a necessity as exists in the
   connexion of a consequent with its antecedent; and has represented, in
   various lights, how the most contradictory and absurd conclusions
   follow from the opposite hypothesis. But as his argument, strictly
   speaking, did not require a further explanation or distinction of the
   principles on which it rested, which yet are important, it may not be
   improper in this place briefly to inquire into the rationale of those
   principles; by which his reasoning may appear with additional evidence,
   and the radical principles themselves confirmed by their connexion with
   others. As these remarks are presented in the form of a series
   analytically disposed, we shall prefix to them the corresponding
   ordinal numbers. 1. Any kind of necessity is a sufficient ground of
   foreknowledge, in the view of omniscience; but as is the kind of
   necessity, or the nature of the connexion between cause and effect, so
   is the nature of the foreknowledge. But this difference in the nature
   of the connexion affects--not the certainty of the event, but the mode
   of causation; or from what cause the certainty arises. 2. All
   necessity, or certainty of connexion between antecedent and consequent,
   must arise form one of these two cources, viz. the nature of things,
   or, the decree of god. Chance is nothing; and nothing has no
   properties, consequently has no causal influence. 3. The necessity
   which arises from the nature of things, is either absolute or
   hypothetical. absolute necessity belongs only to the first cause, or
   God. He exists absolutely; and to suppose him not to exist, or not to
   have exited, is a contradiction. For the supposition itself is made by
   a confessedly contingent being; but a contingent being necessarily
   implies an absolute being, with as much certainty as an effect implies
   a cause; and consequently a first cause. 4. The first cause excepted,
   every other being, or mode of being, or nay event whatever, is only of
   hypothetical necessity. Any event is necessary, only on account of its
   relation to the first cause. This relation, or necessary connexion,
   between an event and the first cause, is either in the way of contrast,
   or in the way of dependence. 5. There are two things necessarily
   related to the first cause by way of contrast; passive power, which is
   a natural evil--if limited existence, dependence, and insufficiency, in
   their necessary tendency, may be so called--and sin, which is a moral
   evil; or something which, in point of obligation, ought not to be. 6.
   The other mode of necessary relation to the first cause, arising from
   the nature of things, is a that of dependence. Every contingent being
   and event must necessarily depend upon god, as an effect depends upon
   its cause. Nor is it conceivable without involving the grossest
   contradiction and absurdity, that any contingent being should continue
   to exist, any more that begin to exist, independent of the first cause.
   Sublata causa, tollitur effectus, is justly entitled to be called an
   axiom in metaphysical science. 7. It was before observed, that all
   necessity must arise either from the nature of things, or from the
   decree of God. What arises from the nature of things, as a consequence,
   has for its antecedent, either an efficient of a deficient cause. 8. A
   defect, no less that active efficiency, may be an antecedent, as
   founded in the nature of things, from whence a corresponding
   consequence must follow; but there is no defect in any antecedent but
   may be counteracted by a decree; so far counteracted, as that the
   defect shall not be an operative cause. 9. The purposes of God are a
   series of antecedents, from whence follow, by the very nature of
   things, corresponding good consequences, and good only; but the defect
   which is inseparable from created existence, considered in itself, is
   also a cause in the sense of an antecedent; otherwise a created
   existence would be as indefectible as the creating of first cause,
   which involves the most absurd consequences. 10. Defect is either
   natural or moral; and each arises from the nature of things, as
   contradistinguished to decree, but in a different manner. natural
   defect arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast to God's
   natural perfections; which contrast forms the primary difference
   between creator and creature. 11. This natural defect is different from
   defectibility; for defectibility expresses, in strictness, an effect
   not a cause; a liableness to defection. But the question returns, what
   renders a creature liable to defect? To say, Its liableness to defect,
   or its defectibility, assigns no true cause: for the question returns
   as before, what makes it liable, what makes it defectible? 12. Perhaps
   there is no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent
   circumlocution, that PASSIVE POWER, to express that natural defect,
   which exists in a created nature as a contrast to the natural (not the
   moral) perfections of God. 13. Passive power is as inapplicable to God,
   as it is applicable to a creature; for natural perfection is as
   applicable to him, as natural imperfection is to us.--Therefore to say,
   that a creature is not he subject of passive power, is the same as to
   say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is: which
   is the grossest pantheism--the deification of every creature, of every
   atom that exists. 14. All antecedents originate in either passive power
   or the divine decrees. From the former proceed, according to the nature
   of things, all evil consequences; from the latter, all good. 15. moral
   defect, is a contrast to the moral perfections, excellence, or holiness
   of God; and arises, as a necessary consequence--not from the divine
   decree as its antecedent, but --from the hypothetical nature of things;
   that is, passive power, IF not aided by a decretive interposition, and
   IF also united to liberty of choice in an accountable being. 16. The
   removal of the antecedent is the prerogative of the supreme Lord of
   nature: but IF the antecedent be not removed, that is, altered from
   what it was as to its causal influence, the consequences can no more be
   prevented, than the nature of things can be changed. 17. That nature of
   things, or that necessity of consequence, whereby the effect is
   infallibly connected with its cause, is nothing else but the essence of
   truth, emanating from the first cause, the god of truth, or the true
   god. 18. We now observe, that an event may be necessarily connected
   with its cause by a divine decree. If the divine will contemplate an
   end, and decree accordingly, it necessarily implies that the means, or
   the antecedents to this consequence, are decreed. 19. Hence, an event
   may be necessary, either because virtually determined by the divine
   will, be a series of antecedents; or because the nature of things
   operates without being affected, as to their causal influence, by
   decretive antecedents. 20. To suppose any sort, of any degree of
   defect, to be decreed, is absurd in different ways. It is contrary to
   an established axiom, that from good nothing but good can proceed - and
   it is absurd to impute that to a divine decree, which antecedently
   arises from the nature of things. 21. In reality, divine decrees (as
   before hinted) are nothing else than a wonderful chain or series of
   positions, which are so many antecedents, counteracting defects arising
   from the hypothetical nature of things. Whence it necessarily follows,
   that if there were no passive powers there could be no divine decrees.
   For if good, and only good, arose from the nature of things; the
   decree, which has good only for its object, would be superfluous, and
   therefore unworthy of divine volition. 22. Hence also, whatever event
   is in itself good, is an object of divine decree in its antecedent; and
   the event itself is connected with the decretive position by the very
   essence of truth. But whatever is in itself evil arises from the
   hypothetical nature of things not counteracted by decretive positions.
   23. In God, his absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite, and
   unchangeable nature, is to be regarded as an antecedent; from which all
   possible happiness is the necessary consequence. Such an antecedent is
   no the result of mere, arbitrary, or decretive will, but of absolute
   necessity, but all antecedents in a creature, or every causal
   influence, of which good, or happiness, whether natural or moral, is
   the consequence, must be the positions of decretive will, as the only
   possible mode of securing a good result. 24. As is the antecedent, so
   is the consequent; for the connexion is formed by eternal truth. If
   therefore a good event --for instance, a virtuous of holy choice--be
   the consequent, the antecedent is a decretive position. 25. In
   reference to God, the proper and only ground of infallible certainty
   that his choice is good and praiseworthy, is the goodness of his
   nature. Were we to admit in thought the possibility of a defectible
   nature in him, in the same proportion must we admit a possible failure
   in the goodness of his choice. And in reference to a created being, the
   proper and only ground of certainty that his choice will be good, is
   the antecedent goodness of his nature or disposition. This alone is a
   sufficient causal influence; but the goodness of a creature's
   disposition can be secured, as a ground of certainty, only by decretive
   influence of a nature corresponding with the nature of the effect. 26.
   From these principles and considerations, which can here be but briefly
   stated, as necessarily connected with their legitimate consequences, we
   infer, that God foresees all good, in every created being, in every
   mode, in every event, by the evidence of a decretive necessity; a
   necessity resulting form actual influx, or perpetual energy, in the
   position of antecedents, and the essence of truth connecting the causal
   influence with the effect. 27. From the same principles we learn, that
   God foresees or foreknows all evil--however blended with the good, as
   the different colours in a pencil of light are blended--in every being,
   and in every event where found, by that necessity which is hypothetical
   only; a necessity resulting form the nature of things left to their own
   causal influence; which influence, in any circumstances, will manifest
   itself in the way of contrast, of dependence or both united. 28. Again:
   Volitions are acts of the mind, and each voluntary act is compounded of
   a natural and moral quality. The natural quality of a voluntary act
   proceeds form decretive necessity; for there is nothing in it but what
   is good, decreed, and effected by the first cause. The moral quality of
   a voluntary act is either good or evil. 29. A voluntary act morally
   good, is altogether of decretive necessity, both as to its physical and
   moral quality; and is therefore foreknown because of decretive
   appointment and energy. But a voluntary act morally bad, is partly of
   decretive, and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that of
   consequence. 30. The physical quality of a voluntary act morally bad,
   is of decretive necessity, and is foreknown because foreappointed; but
   the moral quality of the same act, or its badness, is foreknown only by
   relation, connexion, or consequence. Thus deformity is the absence of
   beauty, and may be known by the standard of beauty from which it
   deviates. Weakness is the absence of strength, and may be known by
   relation. A shadow is known by the interception of rays, and may be
   known in the same manner. Darkness is caused by the absence of light,
   and may be known by the light excluded. 31. How the bad quality of a
   moral act may be foreknown by the evidence of relation, will further
   appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil itself. For
   what is moral, evil, or sin, but what ought not to be, in point of
   moral obligation? Now for at all knowing, or foreknowing, what ought
   not to be, which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or
   evidence is the knowledge of what ought to be. 32. If therefore what
   ought to be, is known to the omniscient by constituted relations, or
   voluntary appointment; what ought not to be may be known by evident
   consequences.--W.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. XIII.

   Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with
   any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a
   sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.

   Every act of the Will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause,
   then, according to what has already been demonstrated, it is not
   contingent, but necessary; the effect being necessarily dependent and
   consequent on its cause, let that cause be what it will. If the cause
   is the Will itself, by antecedent acts choosing and determining; still
   the determined caused act must be a necessary effect. The act, that is
   the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause, cannot
   prevent the efficiency of its cause; but must be wholly subject to its
   determination and command, as much as the motions of the hands and
   feet. The consequent commanded acts of the Will are as passive and as
   necessary, with respect to the antecedent determining acts, as the
   parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command
   them. And therefore, if all the free acts of the Will are all
   determined effects determined by the Will itself, that is by antecedent
   choice, then they are all necessary; they are all subject to, and
   decisively fixed by, the foregoing act, which is their cause: yea, even
   the determining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by
   another act preceding, if it be a free and voluntary act; and so must
   be necessary. So that by this, all the free acts of the Will are
   necessary, and cannot be free unless they are necessary: because they
   cannot be free, according to the Arminian notion of freedom, unless
   they are determined by the Will; and this is to be determined by
   antecedent choice, which being their cause, proves them necessary. And
   yet they say, Necessity is utterly inconsistent with Liberty. So that,
   by their scheme, the acts of the Will cannot be free unless they are
   necessary, and yet cannot be free if they be necessary!

   But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, that the free acts of
   the Will have no cause, and are connected with nothing whatsoever that
   goes before and determines them, in order to maintain their proper and
   absolute Contingence, and this should be allowed to be possible; still
   it will not serve their turn. For if the volition come to pass by
   perfect Contingence, and without any cause at all, then it is certain,
   no act of the Will, no prior act of the soul, was the cause, no
   determination or choice of the soul had any hand in it. The Will, or
   the soul, was indeed the subject of what happened to it accidentally,
   but was not the cause. The Will is not active in causing or
   determining, but purely the passive subject; at least, according to
   their notion of action and passion. In this case, Contingence as much
   prevents the determination of the Will, as a proper cause; and as to
   the Will, it was necessary, and could be no otherwise. For to suppose
   that it could have been otherwise, if the Will or soul had pleased, is
   to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of choice or
   pleasure, contrary to what is now supposed; it is to suppose that it
   might have been otherwise, if its cause had ordered it otherwise. But
   this does not agree to it having no cause or orderer at all. That must
   be necessary as to the soul, which is dependent on no free act of the
   soul: but that which is without a cause, is dependent on no free act of
   the soul; because, by the supposition, it is dependent on nothing, and
   is connected with nothing. In such a case, the soul is necessarily
   subjected to what accident brings to pass, from time to time, as much
   as the earth that is inactive, is necessarily subjected to what falls
   upon it. But this does not consist with the Arminian notion of Liberty,
   which is the Will's power of determining itself in its own acts, and
   being wholly active in it, without passiveness, and without being
   subject to necessity.--Thus, Contingence belongs to the Arminian notion
   of Liberty, and yet is inconsistent with it.

   I would here observe, that the author of the Essay on the Freedom of
   the Will, in God and the Creature, (p. 76, 77.) says as follows. "The
   word Chance always means something done without design. Chance and
   design stand in direct opposition to each other: and Chance can never
   be properly applied to acts of the Will, which is the spring of all
   design, and which designs to choose whatsoever it doth choose, whether
   there be any superior fitness in the thing which it chooses, or no; and
   it designs to determine itself to one thing, where two things,
   perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because it will." But herein
   appears a very great inadvertence. For if the Will be the spring of all
   design, as he says, then certainly it is not always the effect of
   design; and the acts of the Will themselves must sometimes come to
   pass, when they do not spring from design; and consequently come to
   pass by Chance, according to his own definition of Chance. And if the
   Will designs to choose whatever it does choose, and designs to
   determine itself, as he says, then it designs to determine all its
   designs. Which carries us back from one design to a foregoing design
   determining that, and to another determining that; and so on in
   infinitum. The very first design must be the effect of foregoing
   design, or else it must be by Chance, in his notion of it.

   Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to the connexion of
   the acts of the Will with something foregoing that is their cause, not
   much unlike to the other; which is this: either human liberty may well
   stand with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the
   understanding, and so is consistent with Necessity; or it is
   inconsistent with and contrary to such a connexion and Necessity. The
   former is directly subversive of the Arminian notion of Liberty,
   consisting in freedom from all Necessity. And if the latter be chosen,
   and it be said, that liberty is inconsistent with any such necessary
   connexion of volition with foregoing views of the understanding, it
   consisting in freedom from any such Necessity of the Will as that would
   imply; then the Liberty of the soul consists, partly at least, in
   freedom from restraint, limitation, and government, in its actings, by
   the understanding, and in Liberty and liableness to act contrary to the
   views and dictates of the understanding: and consequently the more the
   soul has of this disengagedness in its acting, the more Liberty. Now
   let it be considered to what this brings the noble principle of human
   Liberty, particularly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its
   perfection, viz. a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act
   altogether at random, without the least connexion with, or restraint or
   government by, any dictate of reason, or any thing whatsoever
   apprehended, considered, or viewed by the understanding; as being
   inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the Will over its
   own determinations.--The notion mankind have conceived of Liberty, is
   some dignity or privilege, something worth claiming. But what dignity
   or privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild Contingence as
   this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unreasonably, and as
   much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were
   as destitute of perception, as the smoke that is driven by the wind!
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

  PART III.

   WHEREIN IS INQUIRED, WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL AS ARMINIANS
   HOLD, BE NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, PRAISE AND
   DISPRAISE, &C.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. I.

   God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy.

   Having considered the first thing proposed, relating to that freedom of
   Will which Arminians maintain; namely, Whether any such thing does,
   ever did, or ever can exist, I come now to the second thing proposed to
   be the subject of inquiry, viz. Whether any such kind of liberty be
   requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward
   and punishment, &c.

   I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the
   Supreme moral Agent, and Fountain of all Agency and Virtue.

   Dr. Whitby in his Discourse on the five Points, (p. 14.) says, "If all
   human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we
   being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for
   who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge
   that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid?" To the like
   purpose he speaks in places innumerable; especially in his Discourse on
   the Freedom of the Will; constantly maintaining, that a freedom not
   only from co-action, but necessity, is absolutely requisite, in order
   to actions being either worthy of blame, or deserving of praise. And to
   this agrees, as is well known, the current doctrine of Arminian
   writers, who, in general, hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward
   or punishment, nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom.
   And yet Dr. Whitby (p. 300.) allows, that God is without this freedom;
   and, Arminians, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally
   acknowledge, that God is necessarily holy, and his will necessarily
   determined to that which is good.

   So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy God--who
   always used to be esteemed by God's people not only virtuous, but a
   Being in whom is all possible virtue, in the most absolute purity and
   perfection, brightness and amiableness; the most perfect pattern of
   virtue, and from whom all the virtue of others is but as beams from the
   sun; and who has been supposed to be, (being thus every where
   represented in Scripture,) on the account of his virtue and holiness,
   infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honoured, admired,
   commended, extolled, and praised, than any creature--this Being,
   according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other Arminians, has no
   virtue at all; virtue, when ascribed to him, is but on empty name; and
   he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under
   necessity, he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no
   thanks to him for it. It seems, the holiness, justice, faithfulness,
   &c. of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of the nature of that
   which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that these
   things in God are good; but then we must understand them, that they are
   no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing commendable, than the
   good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent; as the
   brightness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but
   not virtuous, because these properties are necessary to these bodies,
   and not the fruit of self-determining power.

   There needs no other confutation of this notion, to Christians
   acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and particularly
   representing it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is
   represented, as in every respect, in the highest manner virtuous, and
   supremely praiseworthy, would be endless, and is altogether needless to
   such as have been brought up in the light of the gospel.

   It were to be wished, that Dr. Whitby and other divines of the same
   sort, had explained themselves, when they have asserted, that that
   which is necessary, is not deserving of praise; at the same time that
   they have owned God's perfection to he necessary, and so in effect
   representing God as not deserving praise. Certainly, if their words
   have any meaning at all, by praise, they must mean the exercise or
   testimony of esteem, respect, or honourable regard. And will they then
   say, that men are worthy of that esteem, respect, and honour for their
   virtue, small and imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of,
   for his infinite righteousness, holiness, and goodness? If so, it must
   be, because of some sort of peculiar Excellency in the virtuous man,
   which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference; some
   dignity, that is entirely distinguished from any Excellency or
   amiableness in God; not in dependence, but in pre-eminence; which
   therefore he does not receive from God, nor is God the fountain or
   pattern of it; nor can God, in that respect, stand in competition with
   him, as the object of honour and regard; but man may claim a peculiar
   esteem, commendation, and glory, to which God can have no pretension.
   Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his necessary holiness, to
   intermeddle with that grateful respect and praise, due to the virtuous
   man, who chooses virtue, in the exercise of a freedom ad utrumque; any
   more than a precious stone, which. cannot avoid being hard and
   beautiful.

   And if it be so, let it be explained what that peculiar respect is,
   that is due to the virtuous man, which differs in nature and kind, in
   some way of pre-eminence, from all that is due to God. What is the name
   or description of that peculiar affection? Is it esteem, love,
   admiration, honour, praise, or gratitude? The Scripture every where
   represents God as the highest object of all these: there we read of the
   soul magnifying the Lord, of "loving him with all the heart, with all
   the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength;" admiring him,
   and his righteous acts, or greatly regarding them, as marvelous and
   wonderful; honouring, glorifying, exalting, extolling, blessing,
   thanking, and praising him; giving unto him all the glory of the good
   which is done or received, rather than unto men; "that no flesh should
   glory in his presence;" but that he should be regarded as the Being to
   whom all glory is due. What then is that respect? What passion,
   affection, or exercise is it, that Arminians call praise, diverse from
   all these things, which men are worthy of for their virtue, and which
   God is not worthy of, in any degree?

   If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and actions, be
   as inconsistent with being worthy of praise, as a necessity of
   co-action; as is plainly implied in, or inferred from, Dr. Whitby's
   discourse; then why should we thank God for his goodness, any more than
   if he were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of
   our fellow-creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or
   from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or extrinsical
   necessity? Arminians suppose, that God is necessarily a good and
   gracious Being; for this they make the ground of some of their main
   arguments against many doctrines maintained by Calvinists; they say,
   these are certainly false, and it is impossible they should be true,
   because they are not consistent with the goodness of God. This
   supposes, that it is impossible but that God should be good: for if it
   be possible that he should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the
   truth of these doctrines ceases according to their own argument.

   That virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, rewardable, is not
   for want of merit in his moral perfections and actions, sufficient to
   deserve rewards from his creatures; but because he is infinitely above
   all capacity of receiving any reward. He is already infinitely and
   unchangeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he
   is worthy of our supreme benevolence for his virtue: and would be
   worthy of our beneficence, which is the fruit and expression of
   benevolence, if our goodness could extend to him. If God deserves to be
   thanked and praised for his goodness, he would, for the same reason,
   deserve that we should also requite his kindness, if that were
   possible. "What shall I render unto the Lord for all his benefits?" is
   the natural language of thankfulness: and so far as in us lies, it is
   our duty to render again according to benefits received. And that we
   might have opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude to
   God, as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely above our
   reach, he has appointed others to be his receivers, and to stand in his
   stead, as the objects of our beneficence; such are especially our
   indigent brethren.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. II.

   The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily
   holy, yet truly virtuous, praise-worthy, rewardable, &c.

   I have already considered how Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that a
   freedom, not only from coaction, but necessity, is requisite either to
   virtue or vice, praise or dispraise, reward or punishment. He also
   insists on the same freedom as absolutely requisite to a person being
   the subject of a law, of precepts, or prohibitions; in the book before
   mentioned, (p. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373, 410.)
   And of promises and threatenings, (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 340,
   363.) And as requisite to a state of trial, p. 297, &c.

   Now, therefore, with an eye to thee things, I would inquire into the
   moral conduct and practices of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he
   exhibited in his human nature, in his state of humiliation. And first,
   I would show, that His holy behaviour was necessary; or that it was
   impossible it should be otherwise, than that he should behave himself
   holily, and that he should he perfectly holy in each individual act of
   his life. And secondly, that his holy behaviour was properly of the
   nature of virtue, and was worthy of praise; and that he was the subject
   of law, precept, or commands, promises and rewards; and that he was in
   a state of trial.

   I. It was impossible, that the Acts of the Will of Christ's human soul
   should, in any instance, degree, or circumstance, be otherwise than
   holy, and agreeable to God's nature and Will. The following things make
   this evident.

   1. God had promised so effectually to preserve and up hold him by his
   Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could not fail of the end
   for which he came into the world; but he would have failed, had he
   fallen into sin. We have such a promise, (Isa. xliii. 1-4.) "Behold my
   Servant, whom I uphold; mine Elect, in whom my soul delighteth: I have
   put my Spirit upon him: he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles:
   he shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the
   street.--He shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail,
   nor be discouraged, till he have set judgment in the earth; and the
   isles shall wait his law." This promise of God's Spirit put upon him,
   and his not crying and lifting up his voice, &c. relates to the time of
   Christ's appearance on earth; as is manifest from the nature of the
   promise, and also the application of it in the New Testament, (Matt.
   xii. 18.) And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God's
   Spirit, that he should be preserved from sin; particularly from pride
   and vain-glory; and from being overcome by any temptations he should be
   under to affect the glory of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince,
   or the applause and praise of men: and that he should be so upheld,
   that he should by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming into
   the world, of bringing forth judgment unto victory, and establishing
   his kingdom of grace in the earth. And in the following verses, this
   promise is confirmed, with the greatest imaginable solemnity. Isaiah
   42:5 "Thus saith the Lord, he that created the heavens, and stretched
   them out; he that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of
   it; he that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them
   that walk therein: I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and
   will hold thine hand; and will keep thee, and give thee for a Covenant
   of the people, for a Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes, to
   bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness
   out of the prison-house. I am Jehovah, that is my name," &c.

   Very parallel with these promises is another, (Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9.)
   which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's humiliation
   on earth.--"Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy
   One, to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a
   servant of rulers; kings shall see and arise, princes also shall
   worship; because of the Lord that is faithful, and the Holy One of
   Israel, and he shall choose thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable
   time have I heard thee; in a day of salvation have I helped thee; and I
   will preserve thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, to
   establish the earth," &.c.

   And in Isa. l. 5, 6.we have the Messiah expressing his assurance, that
   God would help him, by so opening his ear, or inclining his heart to
   God's commandments, that he should not be rebellious, but should
   persevere, and not apostatize, or turn his back: that through God's
   help, he should be immovable in obedience, under great trials of
   reproach and suffering; setting his face like a flint: so that he knew
   he should not be ashamed, or frustrated in his design; and finally
   should be approved and justified, as having done his work faithfully.
   Isa. l. 5. 6. "The Lord hath opened mine ear; so that I was not
   rebellious, neither turned away my back: I gave my back to the smiters,
   and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from
   shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help me; therefore shall I
   not be confounded: therefore have I set my face as a flint, and I know
   that I shall not be ashamed. He is near that justifieth me: who will
   contend with me? Let us stand together. Who is mine adversary? Let him
   come near to me. Behold the Lord God will help me: who is he that shall
   condemn me? Lo, they shall all wax old as a garment, the moth shall eat
   them up."

   2. The same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to
   the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom, and success, in his office
   and character of a Mediator: which glory could not have been obtained,
   if his holiness had failed, and he had been guilty of sin. God's
   absolute promise makes the things promised necessary, and their failing
   to take place absolutely impossible: and, in like manner, it makes
   those things necessary, on which the thing promised depends, and
   without which it cannot take effect. Therefore it appears, that it was
   utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail, from such
   absolute promises as these, (Psal. cx. 4.) "The Lord hath sworn, and
   will not repent, thou art a priest for ever, after the order of
   Melchizedec." And from every other promise in that psalm, contained in
   each verse of it. (And Psal. ii. 6, 7.) "I will declare the decree: The
   Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee:
   Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance," &c.
   (Psal. xlv. 3, 4,&c.) "Gird thy sword on thy thigh, O most mighty, with
   thy glory and thy majesty; and in thy majesty ride prosperously." And
   so every thing that is said from thence to the end of the psalm. (See
   Isa. iii. 13-15; liii. 10-12.) And all those promises which God makes
   to the Messiah, of success, dominion, and glory in the character of a
   Redeemer, (Isa. chap. xlix.)

   3. It was often promised to the church of God of old, for their
   comfort, that God would give them a righteous, sinless Saviour. (Jer.
   xxiii. 5, 6.) "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will rise
   up unto David a righteous branch; and a king shall reign and prosper,
   and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days shall
   Judah be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely. And this is the name
   whereby he shall be called, The Lord our righteousness." (So, Jer.
   xxxiii. 15.) "I will cause the branch of righteousness to grow up unto
   David, and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land."
   (Isa. xi. 6, 7.) "For unto us a child is born;--upon the throne of
   David and of his kingdom, to order it and to establish it with judgment
   and justice, from henceforth, even for ever: the zeal of the Lord of
   hosts will do this." (Isa. xi. 1.&c.) "There shall come forth a rod out
   of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and the
   Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him,--the spirit of knowledge, and
   the fear of the Lord:--with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and
   reprove with equity:--Righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins,
   and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." (Isa. lii. 13.) "My servant
   shall deal prudently." (Isa. liii. 9.) "Because he had done no
   violence, neither was guile found in his mouth." If it be impossible,
   that these promises should fail, and it be easier for heaven and earth
   to pass away, than for one jot or title of them to pass away, then it
   was impossible that Christ should commit any sin.--Christ himself
   signified, that it was impossible but that the things which were spoken
   concerning him, should be fulfilled. (Luke xxiv. 44.) "That all things
   must be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and in the
   prophets, and in the psalms concerning me." (Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.) "But
   how then shall the scripture be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" (Mark
   xiv. 49.) "But the scriptures must be fulfilled." And so the apostle,
   (Acts I. 16, 17.) "This scripture must needs have been fulfilled."

   4. All the promises, which were made to the church of old, of the
   Messiah as a future Saviour, from that made to our first parents in
   paradise, to that which was delivered by the prophet Malachi show it to
   be impossible that Christ should not have persevered in perfect
   holiness. The ancient predictions given to God's church, of the Messiah
   as a Saviour, were of the nature of promises; as is evident by the
   predictions themselves, and the manner of delivering them. But they are
   expressly and very often called promises in the New Testament; (as in
   Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73. Acts xiii. 32, 33. Rom. i. 1-3; xv. 8. Heb. vi.
   13., &c.) These promises were often made with great solemnity, and
   confirmed with an oath; as, (Gen. xxii. 16, 17.), "By myself have I
   sworn, saith the Lord, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in
   multiplying I will multiply thy seed, as the stars of heaven, and as
   the sand which is upon the sea-shore:--And in thy seed shall all the
   nations of the earth be blessed." ( Compare Luke i. 72, 73.and Gal.
   iii. 8, 15, 16.) The apostle in Heb. vi. 17, 18.speaking of this
   promise to Abraham, says, "Wherein God willing more abundantly to show
   to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it
   by an oath; that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible
   for God to lie, we might have strong consolation." In which words, the
   necessity of the accomplishment, or (which is the same thing) the
   impossibility of the contrary, is fully declared. So God confirmed the
   promise of the Messiah's great salvation, made to David, by an oath;
   (Psal. lxxxix. 3, 4.) "I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have
   sworn unto David my servant; thy seed will I establish for ever, and
   build up thy throne to all generations." There is nothing so abundantly
   set forth in Scripture, as sure and irrefragable, as this promise and
   oath to David. (See Psalm. lxxxix. 34-36. 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. Isa. lv. 4.
   Acts ii. 29, 30; xiii. 34.) The Scripture expressly speaks of it as
   utterly impossible that this promise and oath to David, concerning the
   everlasting dominion of the Messiah, should fail. (Jer. xxxiii. 15.,
   &c.) "In those days, and at that time, I will cause the Branch of
   righteousness to grow up unto David.--For thus saith the Lord, David
   shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel."
   (Jer. xxxiii. 20, 21.) "If you can break my covenant of the day, and my
   covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and night in
   their season; then may also my covenant be broken with David my
   servant, that he should not have a son to reign upon his throne." (So
   in Jer. xxxiii. 25, 26.) Thus abundant is the Scripture in representing
   how impossible it was, that the promises made of old concerning the
   great salvation and kingdom of the Messiah should fail: which implies,
   that it was impossible that this Messiah, the second Adam, the promised
   seed of Abraham, and of David, should fall from his integrity, as the
   first Adam did.

   5. All the promises that were made to the church of God under the Old
   Testament, of the great enlargement of the church, and advancement of
   her glory, in the days of the gospel, after the coming of the Messiah;
   the increase of her light, liberty, holiness, joy, triumph over her
   enemies, &c. of which so great a part of the Old Testament consists;
   which are repeated so often, are so variously exhibited, so frequently
   introduced with great pomp and solemnity, and are so abundantly sealed
   with typical and symbolical representations; I say, all these promises
   imply, that the Messiah should perfect the work of redemption: and this
   implies, that he should persevere in the work, which the Father had
   appointed him, beings in all things conformed to his Will. Thee
   promises were often confirmed by an oath. (See Isa. liv. 9.with the
   context; Isa. lxii. 18.) And it is represented as utterly impossible
   that these promises should fail. (Isa. xlix. 15.with the context, Isa.
   liv. 10.with the context; Isa. li. 4-8; Isa. xl. 8.with the context.)
   And therefore it was impossible that the Messiah should fail, or commit
   sin.

   6. It was impossible that the Messiah should fail of persevering in
   integrity and holiness, as the first Adam did, because this would have
   been inconsistent with the promises, which God made to the blessed
   Virgin, his mother, and to her husband; implying, that he should "save
   his people from their sins," that God would "give him the throne of his
   father David," that he should "reign over the house of Jacob for ever;"
   and that "of his kingdom there shall be no end." These promises were
   sure, and it was impossible they should fail, and therefore the Virgin
   Mary, in trusting fully to them, acted reasonably, having an immovable
   foundation of her faith; as Elizabeth observes, ( ver. 45.) "And
   blessed is she that believeth; for there shall be a performance of
   those things which were told her from the Lord."

   7. That it should have been possible that Christ should sin, and so
   fail in the work of our redemption, does not consist with the eternal
   purpose and decree of God, revealed in the Scriptures, that he would
   provide salvation for fallen man in and by Jesus Christ, and that
   salvation should be offered to sinners through the preaching of the
   gospel. Thus much is implied in many scriptures, (as 1 Cor. ii.
   7.--Eph. i. 4, 5; iii. 9-11.--1 Pet. I. 19, 20.) Such an absolute
   decree as this, Arminians allow to be signified in many texts; their
   election of nations and societies, and general election of the
   christian church, and conditional election of particular persons, imply
   this. God could not decree before the foundation of the world, to save
   all that should believe in and obey Christ, unless, he had absolutely
   decreed, that salvation should be provided, and effectually wrought out
   by Christ. And since (as the Arminians themselves strenuously maintain)
   a decree of God infers necessity; hence it became necessary, that
   Christ should persevere and actually work out salvation for us, and
   that he should not fail by the commission of sin.

   8. That it should have been possible for Christ's holiness to fail, is
   not consistent with what God promised to his Son, before all ages. For
   that salvation should be offered to men, through Christ, and bestowed
   on all his faithful followers, is at least implied in that certain and
   infallible promise spoken of by the apostle, (Tit. i. 2.) "In hope of
   eternal life; which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world
   began." This does not seem to be controverted by Arminians. [125]

   9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his Father's
   Will, is inconsistent with the promise made to the Father by the Son,
   the Logos that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took
   the human nature: as may be seen in Ps. xl. 6-8.(compared with the
   apostle's interpretation, Heb. x. 5-9.) "Sacrifice and offering thou
   didst not desire: mine ears hast thou opened, (or bored;)
   burnt-offering and sin-offering thou hast not required. Then said I,
   Lo, I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to
   do thy Will, O my God, yea, thy law is within my heart." Where is a
   manifest allusion to the covenant, which the willing servant, who loved
   his master's service, made with his master, to be his servant for ever,
   on the day wherein he had his ear bored; which covenant was probably
   inserted in the public records, called the volume of the book, by the
   judges, who were called to take cognizance of the transaction; (Exod.
   xxi.) If the Logos, who was with the Father before the world, and who
   made the world, thus engaged in covenant to do the Will of the Father
   in the human nature, and the promise was as it were recorded, that it,
   might be made sure, doubtless it was impossible that it should fail;
   and so it was impossible that Christ should fail of doing the Will of
   the Father in the human nature.

   10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the Will of
   his Father, and so to have failed of effectually working out redemption
   for sinners, then the salvation of all the saints, who were saved from
   the beginning of the world, to the death of Christ, was not built on a
   firm foundation. The Messiah, and the redemption which he was to work
   out by his obedience unto death, was the saving foundation of all that
   ever were saved. Therefore, if when the Old-Testament saints had the
   pardon of their sins and the favour of God promised them, and salvation
   bestowed upon them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when he
   came, might commit sin, then all this was on a foundation that was not
   firm and stable, but liable to fail; something which it was possible
   might never be. God did as it were trust to what his Son had engaged
   and promised to do in future time, and depended so much upon it, that
   he proceeded actually to save men on the account of it, though it had
   been already done. But this trust and dependence of God, on the
   supposition of Christ's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was
   leaning on a staff that was weak, and might possibly break. The saints
   of old trusted on the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out
   and completed by the Messiah, and built their comfort upon it: Abraham
   saw Christ's day, and rejoiced; and he and the other Patriarchs died in
   the faith of the promise of it, (Heb. xi. 13.) But on this supposition,
   their faith, their comfort, and their salvation, was built on a
   fallible foundation; Christ was not to them "a tried stone, a sure
   foundation;" (Isa. xxviii. 16.) David entirely rested on the covenant
   of God with him, concerning the future glorious dominion and salvation
   of the Messiah; and said it was all his salvation, and all his desire;
   and comforts himself that this covenant was an "everlasting covenant,
   ordered in ail things and sure," (2 Sam. xxiii.5.) But if Christ's
   virtue might fail, he was mistaken: his great comfort was not built so
   "sure" as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the
   determinations of the Free Will of Christ's human soul; which was
   subject to no necessity, and might be determined either one way or the
   other. Also the dependence of those, who "looked for redemption in
   Jerusalem, and wailed for the consolation of Israel," (Luke ii. 25,
   38.) and the confidence of the disciples of Jesus, who forsook all and
   followed him, that they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom,
   were built on a sandy foundation.

   11. The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his course of
   obedience, and while in the midst of temptations and trials, was
   abundant in positively predicting his own future glory in his kingdom,
   and the enlargement of his church, the salvation of the Gentiles
   through him, &c. and in promises of blessings he would bestow on his
   true disciples in his future kingdom; on which promises he required the
   full dependence of his disciples, (John xiv.) But the disciples would
   have no ground for such dependence, if Christ had been liable to fail
   in his work: and Christ himself would have been guilty of presumption,
   in so abounding in peremptory promises of great things, which depended
   on a mere contingence; viz. the determinations of his Free Will,
   consisting in a freedom ad ulrumque, to either sin or holiness,
   standing in indifference, and incident, in thousands of future
   instances, to go either one way or the other.

   Thus it is evident, that it was impossible that the Acts of the Will of
   the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy, and conformed
   to the Will of the Father; or, in other words, they were necessarily so
   conformed.

   I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it being a thing
   denied by some of the greatest Arminians, by Episcopius in particular;
   and because I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely
   determining the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians,
   concerning the necessity of such a freedom of Will as is insisted on by
   the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, command or prohibition,
   promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise,
   merit or demerit. I now therefore proceed,

   II. To consider whether christ, in his holy behaviour on earth, was not
   thus a moral agent, subject to commands, promises, &c.

   Dr. Whitby very often speaks of what he calls a freedom ad utrumlibet,
   without necessity, as requisite to law and commands: and speaks of
   necessity as entirely inconsistent with injunctions and prohibitions.
   But yet we read of Christ being the subject of His Father's commands,
   (John x. 18; xv. 10.) And Christ tells us, that every thing that he
   said, or did, was in compliance with "commandments he had received of
   the Father;" (John xii. 49, 50; xiv. 31.) And we often read of Christ's
   obedience to his Father's commands,(Rom. v. 19. Phil. ii. 18. Heb. v.
   8.)

   The forementioned writer represents promises offered as motives to
   person to do their duty, or a being moved and induced by promises, as
   utterly inconsistent with a state wherein persons have not a liberty ad
   utrumlibet, but are necessarily determined to one. (See particularly,
   p. 298, and 311.) But the thing which this writer asserts, is
   demonstrably false, if the christian religion be true. If there be any
   truth in Christianity or the Holy Scriptures, the man Christ Jesus had
   his Will infallibly and unalterably determined to good, and that alone;
   but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made to him, on condition
   of his persevering in and perfecting the work which God had appointed
   him; (Isa. liii. 10, 11, 12. Psal. ii.; cx. Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9.) In
   Luke xxii. 28, 20.Christ says to his disciples, "Ye are they which have
   continued with me in my temptations; and I appoint unto you a kingdom,
   as my Father hath appointed unto me." The word most properly signifies
   to appoint by covenant, or promise. The plain meaning of Christ's words
   is this: "As you have partaken of my temptations and trials, and have
   been steadfast, and have overcome; I promise to make you partakers of
   my reward, and to give you a kingdom; as the Father has promised me a
   kingdom for continuing steadfast and overcoming in those trials." And
   the words are well explained by those in Rev. iii. 21." To him that
   overcometh, will I grant to sit with me on my throne; even as I also
   overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne." And Christ had
   not only promises of glorious success and rewards made to his obedience
   and sufferings, but the Scriptures plainly represent him as using these
   promises for motives and inducements to obey and suffer; and
   particularly that promise of a kingdom which the Father had appointed
   him, or sitting with the Father on his throne; (as in Heb. xii. 1, 2.)
   "Let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth easily beset us,
   and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking
   unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith; who for the joy that
   was set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set
   down on the right hand of the throne of God."

   And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert, that the holy
   and excellent temper and behaviour of Jesus Christ, and that obedience
   which he performed under such great trials, was not virtuous or
   praiseworthy; because his Will was not free ad utrumque, to either
   holiness or sin, but was unalterably determined to one; that upon this
   account, there is no virtue at all in all Christ's humility, meekness,
   patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world,
   heavenly-mindedness, submission to the Will of God, perfect obedience
   to his commands unto death, even the death of the cross, his great
   compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his
   faithfulness to God and man, under such great trials; his praying for
   his enemies, even when nailing him to the cross; that virtue, when
   applied to these things, is but an empty name; that there was no merit
   in any of these things; that is, that Christ was worthy of nothing at
   all on account of them, worthy of no reward, no praise, no honour or
   respect from God or man; because his will was not indifferent, and free
   either to these things, or the contrary; but under such a strong
   inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it
   impossible that he should choose the contrary; that upon this account,
   to use Dr. Whitby's language, it would be sensibly unreasonable that
   the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things.

   According to this doctrine, that creature who is evidently set forth in
   Scripture as the first-born of every creature, as having in all things
   the pre-eminence, and as the highest of all creatures in virtue,
   honour, and worthiness of esteem, praise, and glory, on account of his
   virtue, is less worthy of reward or praise, than the very least of
   saints; yea, no more worthy than a clock or mere machine, that is
   purely passive, and moved by natural necessity.

   If we judge by scriptural representations of things, we have reason to
   suppose, that Christ took on him our nature, and dwelt with us in this
   world, in a suffering state, not only to satisfy for our sins; but that
   he, being in our nature and circumstances, and under our trials, might
   be our most fit and proper example, leader, and captain, in the
   exercise of glorious and victorious virtue, and might be a visible
   instance of the glorious end and reward of it; that we might see in Him
   the beauty, amiableness, and true honour and glory, and exceeding
   benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to
   practice; and might thereby learn, and be animated, to seek the like
   glory and honour, and to obtain the like glorious reward. (See Heb. ii.
   9-14; v. 8, 9.; xii. 1, 2, 3. John xv. 10. Rom. viii. 17. 2 Tim. ii.
   11, 12. 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20; iv. 1-3.) But if there was nothing of any
   virtue or merit, or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise, or
   commendation at all, in all that he did, because it was all necessary,
   and he could not help it; then how is here any thing so proper to
   animate and incite us, free creatures, by patient continuance in
   well-doing, to seek for honour glory, and virtue?

   God speaks of himself as peculiarly well pleased with the righteousness
   of this distinguished servant. (Isa. xlii. 21.) "The Lord is well
   pleased for his righteousness' sake." The sacrifices of old are spoken
   of as a sweet savor to God, but the obedience of Christ as far more
   acceptable than they. (Psal. xl. 6, 7.) "Sacrifice and offering thou
   didst not desire: mine ear hast thou opened [as thy servant performing
   willing obedience;] burnt- offering and sin-offering hast thou not
   required. Then said I, Lo, I come, [as a servant that cheerfully
   answers the calls of his master:] I delight to do thy will, O my God,
   and thy law is within mine heart." (Matt. xvii. 5.) "This is my beloved
   Son, in whom I am well-pleased." And Christ tells us expressly, that
   the Father loves Him for that wonderful instance of his obedience, his
   voluntary yielding himself to death, in compliance with the Father's
   command, (John x. 17, 18.) "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I
   lay down my life:--No man taketh it from me; but I lay it down of
   myself--This commandment received I of my Father."

   And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death, if it was
   not worthy of praise, and of the most glorious rewards, the heavenly
   hosts were exceedingly mistaken, by the account that is given of them,
   (Rev. v. 8-12.) "The four beasts, and the four and twenty elders, fell
   down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials
   full of odours;--and they sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to
   take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain.--And
   I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne,
   and the beasts, and the elders, and the number of them was ten thousand
   times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands, saying with a loud
   voice, Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches,
   and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing."

   Christ speaks of the eternal life which he was to receive, as the
   reward of his obedience to the Father's commandments. (John xii. 49,
   50.)" I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he
   gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak: and I
   know that his commandment is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak
   therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak."--God promises
   to divide him a portion with the great, &c. for his being his righteous
   servant, for his glorious virtue under such great trials and
   afflictions. (Isa. liii. 11, 12.) "He shall see the travail of his soul
   and be satisfied; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify
   many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a
   portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong,
   because he hath poured out his soul unto death." The Scriptures
   represent God as rewarding him far above all his other servants. (Phil.
   ii. 7-9.) "He took on him the form of a servant, and was made in the
   likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled
   himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross:
   wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above
   every name." (Psal. xlv. 7.) "Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest
   wickedness; therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of
   gladness above thy fellows."

   There is no room to pretend, that the glorious benefits bestowed in
   consequence of Christ's obedience, are not properly of the nature of a
   reward. What is a reward, in the most proper sense, but a benefit
   bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent in quality or
   behaviour, in testimony of well-pleasedness in that moral excellency,
   and of respect and favour on that account? If we consider the nature of
   a reward most strictly, and make the utmost of it, and add to the
   things contained in this description proper merit or worthiness, and
   the bestowment of the benefit in consequence of a promise; still it
   will be found, there is nothing belonging to it, but what the Scripture
   most expressly ascribes to the glory bestowed on Christ, after his
   sufferings; as appears from what has been already observed: there was a
   glorious benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally
   excellent, being called Righteousness and Obedience; there was great
   favour, love, and well-pleasedness, for this righteousness and
   obedience, in the bestower; there was proper merit, or worthiness of
   the benefit, in the obedience; it was bestowed in fulfilment of
   promises, made to that obedience; and was bestowed therefore, or
   because he had performed that obedience.

   I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while here in the
   flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam, as Christ is
   called, (1 Cor. xv. 45. Rom. v. 14.) taking on him the human nature,
   and so the form of a servant, and being under the law, to stand and act
   for us, was put into a state of trial, as the first Adam was.--Dr.
   Whitby mentions these three things as evidences of persons being in a
   state of trial, (on the five Points, p. 298, 299.) namely, their
   afflictions being spoken of as their trials or temptations, their being
   the subjects of promises, and their being exposed to Satan's
   temptations. But Christ was apparently the subject of each of these.
   Concerning promises made to him, I have spoken already. The
   difficulties and afflictions he met with in the course of his
   obedience, are called his temptations or trials, (Luke xxii. 28.) "Ye
   are they which have continued with me in my temptations or trials."
   (Heb. ii. 18.) "For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted [or
   tried,] he is able to succor them that are tempted." And, (Heb. iv.
   15.) "We have not an high-priest, which cannot be touched with the
   feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we
   are, yet without sin." And as to his being tempted by Satan it is what
   none will dispute.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [125] See Dr. Whitby on the five Points, p. 48,49,50.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. III.

   The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man in
   general, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with
   Blameworthiness.

   Dr. Whitby asserts freedom, not only from coaction, but Necessity, to
   be essential to any thing deserving the name of sin, and to an action
   being culpable; in these words, (Discourse on Five Points, edit. 3. p.
   348.) "If they be thus necessitated, then neither their sins of
   omission or commission could deserve that name: it being essential to
   the nature of sin, according to St. Austin's definition, that it be an
   action a quo liberum est abstinere. Three things seem plainly necessary
   to make an action or omission culpable; 1. That it be in our power to
   perform or forbear it: for, as Origen, and all the fathers, say, no man
   is blameworthy for not doing what he could not do." And elsewhere the
   Doctor insists, that "when any do evil of Necessity, what they do is no
   vice, that they are guilty of no fault, [126] are worthy of no blame,
   dispraise, [127] or dishonour, [128] but are unblamable." [129]

   If these things are true, in Dr. Whitby's sense of Necessity, they will
   prove all such to be blameless, who are given up of God to sin, in what
   they commit after they are thus given up,--That there is such a thing
   as men being judicially given up to sin, is certain, if the Scripture
   rightly informs us; such a thing being often there spoken of: as in
   Psal. lxxxi. 12."So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust, and they
   walked in their own counsels." (Acts vii. 42.) "Then God turned, and
   gave them up to worship the host of heaven." (Rom. i. 24.) "Wherefore,
   God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own
   hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves." (Rom. I.
   26.) "For this cause God gave them up to vile affections." (Rom. i.
   28.) "And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge,
   God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not
   convenient."

   It is needless to stand particularly to inquire, what God's "giving men
   up to their own hearts' lusts" signifies: it is sufficient to observe,
   that hereby is certainly meant God so ordering or disposing things, in
   some respect or other, either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the
   consequence should be men continuing in their sins. So much as men are
   given up to, so much is the consequence of their being given up,
   whether that be less or more. If God does not order things so, by
   action or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then the event
   proves that they are not given up to that consequence. If good be the
   consequence, instead of evil, then God's mercy is to be acknowledged in
   that good; which mercy must be contrary to God's judgment in giving up
   to evil. If the event must prove, that they are given up to evil as the
   consequence, then the persons, who are the subjects of this judgment,
   must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary.

   If not only coaction, but all Necessity, will prove men blameless, then
   Judas was blameless, after Christ had given him over, and had already
   declared his certain damnation, and that he should verily betray him.
   He was guilty of no sin in betraying his Master, on this supposition;
   though his so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin,
   more heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him. And the Jews in
   Egypt, in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no sin, in their not
   worshiping the true God, after God had "sworn by his great name, that
   his name should be no more named in the mouth of any man of Judah, in
   all the land of Egypt," (Jer. xliv. 26.

   Dr. Whitby (Disc. on five Points, p. 302, 303.) denies, that men, in
   this world, are ever so given up by God to sin, that their Wills should
   be necessarily determined to evil; though he owns, that hereby it may
   become exceeding difficult for men to do good, having a strong bent and
   powerful inclination to what is evil.--But if we should allow the case
   to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no
   better agree with his notions of that liberty, which is essential to
   praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to render the avoiding of
   sin impossible. For if an impossibility of avoiding sin wholly excuses
   a man; then for the same reason, its being difficult to avoid it,
   excuses him in part; and this just in proportion to the degree of
   difficulty.--If the influence of moral impossibility or inability be
   the same, to excuse persons in not doing or not avoiding any thing, as
   that of natural inability, (which is supposed,) then undoubtedly, in
   like manner, mortal difficulty has the same influence to excuse with
   natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impossibility wholly
   excuses, and also that natural difficulty excuses in part, and makes
   the act or omission less blamable in proportion to the difficulty. All
   natural difficulty, according to the plainest dictates of the light of
   nature, excuses in some degree, so that the neglect is not so blamable,
   as if there had been no difficulty in the case: and so the greater the
   difficulty is, still the more excusable, in proportion to the increase
   of the difficulty. And as natural impossibility wholly excuses, and
   excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficulty approaches to
   impossibility, still the nearer a person is to blamelessness in
   proportion to that approach. And if the case of moral impossibility or
   Necessity, be just the same with natural Necessity or coaction, as to
   its influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the same reason, the
   case of natural difficulty does not differ in influence, to excuse a
   neglect, from moral difficulty, arising from a strong bias or bent to
   evil, such as Dr. Whitby owns in the case of those that are given up to
   their own hearts' lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be
   lessened, in proportion to the difficulty, and approach to
   impossibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite
   impossible, and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of
   difficulty, the person is in great part excused, and is nine degrees in
   ten less blameworthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all; and
   he has but one degree of blameworthiness. The reason is plain, on
   Arminian principles; viz. because as difficulty, by antecedent bent and
   bias on the Will, is increased, liberty of indifference, and
   self-determination in the Will, is diminished; so much hindrance,
   impediment is there, in the way of the Will acting freely, by mere
   self-determination. And if ten degrees of such hindrance take away all
   such liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts in ten, and leave
   but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one degree of
   blameableness, cateris paribus, in the neglect; the man being no
   further blamable in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in
   that affair: for blame or praise (say they) arises wholly from a good
   use or abuse of liberty.

   From all which it follows, that a strong bent and bias one way, and
   difficulty of going the contrary, never causes a person to be at all
   more exposed to sin, or any thing blamable: because, as the difficulty
   is increased, so much the less is required and expected. Though in one
   respect, exposedness to sin is increased, viz. by an increase of
   exposedness to the evil action or omission; yet it is diminished in
   another respect, to balance it; namely, as the sinfulness or
   blamableness of the action or omission is diminished in the same
   proportion. So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to
   guilt or blame, is left just as it was.

   To illustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to be
   intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a self-moving power, by
   virtue of which it could act and produce effects to a certain degree,
   ex. gr. to move itself up or down with a force equal to a weight of ten
   pounds; and that it might therefore be required of it, in ordinary
   circumstances, to move itself down with that force; for which it has
   power and full liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it failed
   of it. But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in the
   opposite scale, which in force entirely counterbalances its self-moving
   power, and so renders it impossible for it to move down at all; and
   therefore wholly excuses it from any such motion. But if we suppose
   there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its
   motion not impossible, but yet more difficult; so that it can now only
   move down with the force of one pound: but however, this is all that is
   required of it under these circumstances; it is wholly excused from
   nine parts of its motion: and if the scale, under these circumstances,
   neglect to move, and remain at rest, all that it will be blamed for,
   will be its neglect of that one tenth part of its motion; for which it
   had as much liberty and advantage, as in usual circumstances it has for
   the greater motion, which in such a case would be required. So that
   this new difficulty does not at all increase its exposedness to any
   thing blameworthy.

   And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a man's duty,
   or proclivity to sin, through a being given up to hardness of heart, or
   indeed by any other means whatsoever, is an inconsistence, according to
   Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The
   avoiding of sin and blame, and the doing of what is virtuous and
   praiseworthy, most be always equally easy.

   Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue. sin, &c. led him
   into another great inconsistence. He abundantly insists, that necessity
   is inconsistent with the nature of sin or fault. He says, in the
   forementioned treatise, (p. 14.) Who can blame a person for doing what
   he could not help? And, (p. 15.) It being sensibly unjust, to punish
   any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid. And, (p.
   341.) to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the fathers, saying, Why
   doth God command, if man hath not free will and power to obey? And
   again, in the same and the next page, Who will not cry out, that it is
   folly to command him, that hath not liberty to do what is commanded;
   and that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power to
   do what is required? And, (p. 373.) he cites another saying, A law is
   given to him that can turn to both parts; i.e. obey or transgress it;
   but no law can be against him who is bound by nature.

   And yet the same Dr. Whitby asserts, that fallen man is not able to
   perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these words: "The nature
   of Adam had power to continue innocent, and without sin; whereas, it is
   certain our nature never had." But if we have not power to continue
   innocent and without sin, then sin is not inconsistent with Necessity,
   and we may be sinful in that which we have not power to avoid; and
   those things cannot be true, which he asserts elsewhere, namely, "That
   if we be necessitated, neither sins of omission nor commission, would
   deserve that name," (p. 348.) If we have it not in our power to be
   innocent, then we have it not in our power to be blameless; and if so,
   we are under a Necessity of being blameworthy. And how does this
   consist with what he so often asserts, that Necessity is inconsistent
   with blame or praise? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect
   obedience to all the commands of God, then we are under a Necessity of
   breaking some commands, in some degree; having no power to perform so
   much as is commanded. And if so, why does he cry out of the
   unreasonableness and folly of commanding beyond what men have power to
   do?

   Arminians in general are very inconsistent with themselves, in what
   they say of the Inability of fallen man in this respect. They
   strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God, to require any
   thing of us beyond our present power and ability to perform; and also
   hold that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and that
   Christ died to satisfy for the imperfections of our obedience, and has
   made way, that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of
   perfect; wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves into the
   grossest inconsistence. For (as I have observed elsewhere) "they hold
   that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution
   or law, that they were under originally, and instead of it, has
   introduced a more mild constitution, and put us under a new law, which
   requires no more than imperfect sincere obedience, in compliance with
   our poor infirm impotent circumstances since the fall."

   Now how can these things be made consistent? I would ask, of what law
   are these imperfections of our obedience a breach? If they are a breach
   of no law that we were ever under, then they are not sins. And if they
   be not sins, what need of Christ dying to satisfy for them? But if they
   are sins, and the breach of some law, what law is it? They cannot be a
   breach of their new law, for that requires no other than imperfect
   obedience, or obedience with imperfections: and therefore to have
   obedience attended with imperfections, is no breach of it; for it is as
   much as it requires. And they cannot be a breach of their old law: for
   that, they say, is entirely abolished; and we never were under
   it.--They say, it would not be just in God to require of us perfect
   obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can
   perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And, therefore, by their
   own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be
   punished. What need therefore of Christ dying, to satisfy for them?
   What need of his suffering, to satisfy for that which is no fault, and
   in its own nature deserves no suffering? What need of Christ dying, to
   purchase, that our imperfect obedience should be accepted, when,
   according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other
   obedience than imperfect should be required? What need of Christ dying
   to make way for God's accepting of such obedience, as it would be
   unjust in him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ dying to
   prevail with God not to do unrighteously?--If it be said, that Christ
   died to satisfy that old law for us, that so we might not be under it,
   but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law; still
   I would inquire, what need of Christ dying, that we might not be under
   a law, which (by their principles) it would be in itself unjust that we
   should be under, whether Christ had died or no, because, in our present
   state, we are not able to keep it?

   So the Arminians are inconsistent with themselves, not only, in what
   they say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone for those
   imperfections, which we cannot avoid, but also in what they say of the
   grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the sincere obedience of
   the new law. "I grant indeed, (says Dr. Stebbing, [130] ) that by
   original sin, we are utterly disabled for the performance of the
   condition, without new grace from God. But I say then, that he gives
   such a grace to all of us, by which the performance of the condition,
   is truly possible; and upon this ground he may and doth most
   righteously require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to speak properly, by
   grace he must mean, that assistance which is of grace, or of free
   favour and kindness. But yet in the same place he speaks of it as very
   unreasonable, unjust, and cruel, for God to require that, as the
   condition of pardon, that is become impossible by original sin. If it
   be so, what grace is there in giving assistance and ability to perform
   the condition of pardon? Or why is that called by the name of grace,
   that is an absolute debt, which God is bound to bestow, and which it
   would be unjust and cruel in him to withhold, seeing he requires that,
   as the condition of pardon, which he cannot perform without it?
     __________________________________________________________________

   [126] Discourse on the five Points, p. 347, 360, 361, 377

   [127] 303, 326, 329, and many other places.

   [128] 371.

   [129] 304, 361.

   [130] Treatise of the Operations of the Spirit. 2 edit. P. 112,113.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. IV.

   Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to
   obey. [131]

   It being so much insisted on by Arminian writers, that necessity is
   inconsistent with law or command, and particularly, that it is absurd
   to suppose God by his command should require that of men which they are
   unable to do; not allowing in this case for any difference between
   natural and moral Inability; I would therefore now particularly
   consider this matter.--And for greater clearness I would distinctly lay
   down the following things.

   I. The Will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of
   the Will, is the proper object of Precept or Command. That is, such a
   state or acts of men's Wills, are in many cases properly required of
   them by Commands; and not only those alterations in the state of their
   bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. This is most
   manifest; for it is the soul only that is properly and directly the
   subject of Precepts or Commands; that only being capable of receiving
   or perceiving Commands. The motions or state of the body are matter of
   Command, only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with its
   acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most
   direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any Command,
   but the faculty of the Will; and it is by this faculty only, that the
   soul can directly disobey, or refuse compliance: for the very notions
   of consenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, &c.
   are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts of
   the Will. Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and
   yielding of the Will of one, to the Will of another. Disobedience is
   the not consenting, not complying of the Will of the commanded, to the
   manifested Will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of
   the Will, as certain motions of the body and alterations in the soul,
   are Obedience or Disobedience only indirectly, as they are connected
   with the state or actions of the Will, according to an established law
   of nature. So that it is manifest, the Will itself may be required: and
   the being of a good Will is the most proper, direct, and immediate
   subject of Command; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by
   Command or Precept, nothing can; for other things can be required no
   otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good Will.

   Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the Will, or a series of acts,
   one following another, and one the effect of another, the first and
   determining act is properly the subject of Command, and not only the
   consequent acts, which are dependent upon it. Yea, this more especially
   is that to which Command or Precept has a proper respect; because it is
   this act that determines the whole affair: in this act the Obedience or
   Disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all
   governed and determined by it. This governing act must be the proper
   object of Precept, or none.

   Corol. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if there
   be any act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of choice
   in the case, directing and determining what the acts of the Will shall
   be; that act of the soul cannot properly be subject to any Command or
   Precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly,
   immediately or remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to Commands
   directly, because they are no acts of the Will; being by the
   supposition prior to all acts of the Will, determining and giving rise
   to all its acts: they not being acts of the Will, there can be in them
   no consent to or compliance with any Command. Neither can they be
   subject to Command or Precept indirectly or remotely; for they are not
   so much as the effects or consequences of the Will, being prior to all
   its acts. So that if there be any Obedience in that original act of the
   soul, determining all volitions, it is an act of Obedience wherein the
   Will has no concern at all; it preceding every act of Will. And
   therefore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is
   wholly involuntarily; there is no willing Obedience or rebellion, no
   compliance or opposition of the Will in the affair: and what sort of
   Obedience or rebellion is this?

   And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the Will consisting in
   the soul's determining its own acts of Will, instead of being essential
   to moral agency, and to men being the subjects of moral government, is
   utterly inconsistent with it. For if the soul determines all its acts
   of Will, it is therein subject to no Command or moral government, as
   has been now observed; because its original determining act is no act
   of Will or choice, it being prior, by the supposition, to every act of
   Will. And the soul cannot be the subject of Command in the act of the
   Will itself, which depends on the foregoing determining act, and is
   determined by it; inasmuch as this is necessary, being the necessary
   consequence and effect of that prior determining act, which is not
   voluntary. Nor can the man be the subject of Command or government in
   his external actions; because these are all necessary, being the
   necessary effects of the acts of the Will themselves. So that mankind,
   according to this scheme, are subjects of Command or moral government
   in nothing at all; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and
   no room is left for virtue or vice in the world.

   So that the Arminian scheme, and not that of the Calvinists, is utterly
   inconsistent with moral government, and with all use of laws, precepts,
   prohibitions, promises, or threatenings. Neither is there any way
   whatsoever to make their principles consist with these things. For if
   it be said, that there is no prior determining act of the soul,
   preceding the acts of the Will, but that volitions are events that come
   to pass by pure accident, without any determining cause, this is most
   palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts; for nothing is
   more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate
   perfect accident: which, by the supposition of its being pure accident,
   is in no case regulated by any thing preceding; but happens, this way
   or that, perfectly by chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect
   uselessness of laws and precepts also follows from the Arminian notion
   of indifference, as essential to that liberty, which is requisite to
   virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to bind to one side; and the end
   of Commands is to turn the Will one way: and therefore they are of no
   use, unless they turn or bias the Will that way. But if liberty
   consists in indifference, then their biassing the Will one way only,
   destroys liberty; as it puts the Will out of equilibrium. So that the
   will, having a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon
   it, is not wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it
   will, without influence from without.

   II. Having shown that the Will itself, especially in those acts which
   are original, leading and determining in any case, is the proper
   subject of Precept and Command--and not only those alterations in the
   body, &c. which are the effects of the Will--I now proceed, in the
   second place, to observe, that the very opposition or defect of the
   Will itself, in its original and determining act in the case, to a
   thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a
   moral inability to that thing: or, in other words, whenever a Command
   requires a certain state or act of the Will, and the person commanded,
   notwithstanding the Command and the circumstances under which it is
   exhibited, still finds his Will opposite or wanting, in that, belonging
   to its state or acts, which is original and determining in the affair,
   that man is morally unable to obey that Command.

   This is manifest from what was observed in the first part concerning
   the nature of moral Inability, as distinguished from natural: where it
   was observed, that a man may then be said to be morally unable to do a
   thing, when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary
   inclination, or has a want of inclination, under such circumstances and
   views. It is also evident, from what has been before proved, that the
   Will is always, and in every individual act, necessarily determined by
   the strongest motive; [132] and so is always unable to go against the
   motive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength and
   advantage to move the Will.--But not further to insist on these things,
   the truth of the position now laid down, viz. that when the Will is
   opposite to, or failing of a compliance with, a thing, in its original
   determination or act, it is not able to comply, appears by the
   consideration of these two things.

   1. The Will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or
   inclination, and when actually under its influence, is not able to
   exert itself to the contrary, to make an alteration, in order to a
   compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself; and that for
   this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to change itself.
   Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise: for that would
   be at present to choose something diverse from what is at present
   chosen. If the Will, all things now considered, inclines or chooses to
   go that way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go
   the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the other way. To
   suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined to change itself to a
   different inclination, is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined
   otherwise than it is now inclined. The Will may oppose some future
   remote act that it is exposed to, but not its own present act.

   2. As it is impossible that the Will should comply with the thing
   commanded, with respect to its leading act, by any act of its own, in
   the time of that diverse or opposite leading and original act, or after
   it has actually come under the influence of that determining choice or
   inclination; so it is impossible it should be determined to a
   compliance by any foregoing act; for, by the very supposition, there is
   no foregoing act; the opposite or noncomplying act being that act which
   is original and determining in the case. Therefore it must be so, that
   if this first determining act be found non-complying, on the proposal
   of the command, the mind is morally unable to obey. For to suppose it
   to be able to obey, is to suppose it to be able to determine and cause
   its first determining act to be otherwise, and that it has power better
   to govern and regulate its first governing and regulating act, which is
   absurd; for it is to suppose a prior act of the Will, determining its
   first determining act; that is, an act prior to the first, and leading
   and governing the original and governing act of all; which is a
   contradiction.

   Here if it should be said, that although the mind has not any ability
   to will contrary to what it does will, in the original and leading act
   of the Will, because there is supposed to be no prior act to determine
   and order it otherwise, and the Will cannot immediately change itself,
   because it cannot at present incline to a change; yet the mind has an
   ability for the present to forbear to proceed to action, and taking
   time for deliberation; which may be an occasion of the change of the
   inclination.

   I answer, (1.) In this objection, that seems to be forgotten which was
   observed before, viz. that the determining to take the matter into
   consideration, is itself an act of the Will: and if this be all the act
   wherein the mind exercises ability and freedom, then this, by the
   supposition, must be all that can be commanded or required by precept.
   And if this act be the commanding act, then all that has been observed
   concerning the commanding act of the Will remains true, that the very
   want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are speaking
   concerning the first and leading act of the Will about the affair; and
   if determining to deliberate, or, on the contrary, to proceed
   immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading act; or
   whether it be or no, if there be another act before it, which
   determines that; or whatever be the original and leading act; still the
   foregoing proof stands good, that the non-compliance of the leading act
   implies moral Inability to comply.

   If it should be objected, that these things make all moral Inability
   equal, and suppose men morally unable to will otherwise than they
   actually do will, in all cases, and equally so in every instance.--In
   answer to this objection, I desire two things may be observed.

   First, That if by being equally unable, be meant, as really unable;
   then, so far as the Inability is merely moral, it is true; the Will, in
   every instance, acts by moral necessity, and is morally unable to act
   otherwise, as truly and properly in one case as another; as, I humbly
   conceive, has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has
   been said in the preceding part of this essay. But yet, in some
   respect, the Inability may be said to be greater in some instances than
   others: though the man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can
   truly be called Inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do
   some things than others. As it is in things, which men are naturally
   unable to do. A person, whose strength is no more than sufficient to
   lift the weight of one hundred pounds, is as truly and really unable to
   lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds; but yet he is
   further from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and
   so, according to the common use of speech, has a greater Inability for
   it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally unable to
   choose contrary to a present inclination, which in the least degree
   prevails; or, contrary to that motive, which, all things considered,
   has strength and advantage now to move the Will, in the least degree,
   superior to all other motives in view: but yet he is further from
   ability to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted
   inclination, or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength. And
   again, the Inability may, in some respects, be called greater in some
   instances than others, as it may be more general and extensive to all
   acts of that kind. So men may be said to be unable in a different
   sense, and to be further from moral ability, who have that moral
   Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only that
   Inability which is occasional and particular. [133] Thus in cases of
   natural Inability; he that is born blind may be said to be unable to
   see, in a different manner, and is, in some respects, further from
   being able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud
   or mist.

   And besides, that which was observed in the first part of this
   discourse, concerning the Inability which attends a strong and settled
   habit, should be there remembered; viz. that a fixed habit is attended
   with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is distinguished from
   occasional volition, namely, that endeavours to avoid future volitions
   of that kind, which are agreeable to such a habit, much more frequently
   and commonly prove vain and insufficient. For though it is impossible
   there should be any sincere endeavours against a present choice, yet
   there may be against volitions of that kind, when viewed at a distance.
   A person may desire and use means to prevent future exercises of a
   certain inclination; and, in order to it, may wish the habit might be
   removed; but his desires and endeavours may be ineffectual. The man may
   be said in some sense to be unable; yea, even as the word unable is a
   relative term, and has relation to ineffectual endeavours; yet not with
   regard to present, but remote endeavours.

   Secondly, It must be borne in mind, according to what was observed
   before, that indeed no Inability whatsoever, which is merely moral, is
   properly called by the name of Inability; and that in the strictest
   propriety of speech, a man may be said to have a thing in his power, if
   he has it at his election, and he cannot be said to be unable to do a
   thing, when he can, if he now pleases, or whenever he has a proper,
   direct, and immediate desire for it. As to those desires and
   endeavours, that may be against the exercises of a strong habit, with
   regard to which men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises,
   they are remote desires and endeavours in two respects. First, as to
   time; they are never against present volitions, but only against
   volitions of such a kind, when viewed at a distance. Secondly, as to
   their nature; these opposite desires are not directly and properly
   against the habit and inclination itself, or the volitions in which it
   is exercised; for these, in themselves considered, are agreeable: but
   against something else that attends them, or is their consequence; the
   opposition of the mind is leveled entirely against this; the volitions
   themselves are not at all opposed directly, and for their own sake; but
   only indirectly and remotely, on the account of something foreign.

   III. Though the opposition of the Will itself, or the very want of Will
   to a thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that thing; yet, if
   it be, as has been already shown, that the being of a good state or act
   of Will, is a thing most properly required by Command; then, in some
   cases, such a state or act of Will may properly be required, which at
   present is not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded.
   And therefore those things may properly be commanded, for which men
   have a moral Inability.

   Such a state or act of the Will, may be required by Command, as does
   not already exist. For if that volition only may be commanded to be,
   which already is, there could be no use of precept: Commands in all
   cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only may such a
   Will be required, as is wanting before the Command is given, but also
   such as may possibly be wanting afterwards; such as the exhibition of
   the Command may not be effectual to produce or excite. Otherwise, no
   such thing as disobedience to a proper and rightful Command is possible
   in any case; and there is no case possible, wherein there can be a
   faulty disobedience. Which Arminians cannot affirm, consistently with
   their principle: for this makes obedience to just and proper Commands
   always necessary, and disobedience impossible. And so the Arminian
   would overthrow himself, yielding the very point we are upon, which he
   so strenuously denies, viz. that Law and Command are consistent with
   necessity.

   If merely that inability will excuse disobedience, which is implied in
   the opposition or defect of inclination, remaining after the Command is
   exhibited, then wickedness always carries that in it which excuses it.
   By how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by so much
   is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much the more,
   therefore, has he of moral Inability to the good required. His moral
   Inability consisting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the
   very thing wherein his wickedness consists; and yet, according to
   Arminian principles, it must be a thing inconsistent with wickedness;
   and by how much the more he has of it, by so much is he the further
   from wickedness.

   Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Inability alone
   (which consists in disinclination) never renders any thing improperly
   the subject matter of Precept or Command, and never can excuse any
   person in disobedience, or want of conformity to a command.

   Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capacity, or
   external hindrance, (which alone is properly called Inability,) without
   doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing improperly the matter of
   Command. If men are excused from doing or acting any good thing,
   supposed to be commanded, it must be through some defect or obstacle
   that is not in the Will itself, but either in the capacity of
   understanding, or body, or outward circumstances.--Here two or three
   things may be observed,

   1. As to spiritual acts, or any good thing in the state or imminent
   acts of the Will itself, or of the affections, (which are only certain
   modes of the exercise of the Will,) if persons are justly excused, it
   must be through want of capacity in the natural faculty of
   understanding. Thus the same spiritual duties, or holy affections and
   exercises of heart, cannot be required of men, as may be of angels; the
   capacity of understanding being so much inferior. So men cannot be
   required to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no
   opportunity to see, or hear of, or know in any way agreeable to the
   natural state and capacity of the human understanding. But the
   insufficiency of motives will not excuse; unless their being
   insufficient arises not from the moral state of the Will or inclination
   itself, but from the state of the natural understanding. The great
   kindness and generosity of another may be a motive insufficient to
   excite gratitude in the person that receives the kindness, through his
   vile and ungrateful temper: in this case, the insufficiency of the
   motive arises from the state of the Will or inclination of heart, and
   does not at all excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficient to
   excite gratitude, being unknown, there being no means of information
   adequate to the state and measure of the person's faculties, this
   insufficiency is attended with a natural Inability, which entirely
   excuses it.

   2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind,
   which do not consist in the imminent acts or state of the Will
   itself--but are supposed to be required as effects of the Will, in
   cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding--that
   Inability, and that only, excuses, which consists in want of connexion
   between them and the Will. If the Will fully complies, and the proposed
   effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected
   with his volition, the man is perfectly excused; he has a natural
   Inability to the thing required. For the Will itself, as has been
   observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by
   Command; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the Will.
   If therefore, there be a full compliance of Will, the person has done
   his duty; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his
   volition, that is not criminally owing to him.

   3. Both these kinds of natural Inability, and all Inability that
   excuses, may be resolved into one thing; namely, want of natural
   capacity or strength; either capacity of understanding, or external
   strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would
   be no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of
   understanding and strength.

   Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability may properly be
   the matter of Precept or Command, then they may also of invitation and
   counsel. Commands and invitations come very much to the same thing; the
   difference is only circumstantial: Commands are as much a manifestation
   of the Will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies
   of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in
   nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main difference between
   Command and invitation consists in the enforcement of the Will of him
   who commands or invites. In the latter it is his kindness, the goodness
   from which his Will arises: in the former it is his authority. But
   whatever be the ground of Will in him that speaks, or the enforcement
   of what he says, yet, seeing neither his Will, nor his expectation, is
   any more testified in the one case than the other; therefore, a person
   being directed by invitation, is no more an evidence of insincerity in
   him that directs--in manifesting either a Will or expectation which he
   has not--than a person being known to be morally unable to do what he
   is directed by command is an evidence of insincerity. So that all this
   grand objection of Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to
   exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual duties, from the
   sincerity of God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.
   [134]
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   [131] The subject of "obligation to obedience," or moral obligation,
   though expressed in the title of this section, is not professedly
   handled by our author, either here or in any other part of the work.
   His professed object in this place is to prove that obligation to obey
   commands is not weakened by moral inability. But though this conclusion
   is established by many considerations, yet the nature and grounds of
   obligation are not pointed out, which might afford evidence WHY moral
   obligation is consistent with moral inability? The subject is
   confessedly profound; but, perhaps, the following series of remarks may
   contribute in some degree to assist our inquiries and to bring them to
   a satisfactory conclusion. 1. Obligation, if we regard the term, is a
   binding power, or an irresistible force; but, in reference to morality
   and voluntary actions, obligation is expressive of a hypothetical
   indispensable connexion between an antecedent and a consequent; or
   between an end proposed, and the means of obtaining it. Thus, if a
   moral agent would attain the end, he is obliged or bound indispensably,
   to use the required means. And, on the contrary, if a moral agent adopt
   a different antecedent form what is required, not only he shall not
   attain to the proposed consequent, but another consequent is to follow,
   indispensably connected with the antecedent actually adopted, by a
   necessity of consequences. Therefore, 1. The consequent or the end,
   which is proposed by the moral Governor, is always a supposed good; for
   it would be unworthy of a governor wise and good to propose any other,
   especially as the antecedent prescribed and required is indispensably
   connected with it. But if the connexion be broken by the free agent, by
   the adoption of an antecedent naturally connected with a different
   consequent, he then becomes naturally obliged, or forced, to sustain a
   proportionable evil. 2. In the system of moral government, it is the
   prerogative of the supreme Governor to propose the consequent of the
   indispensable connexion; and it is the part of the moral agent, who in
   the act of choice is left free, to choose the antecedent, which the
   governor has objectively furnished, and indispensably required. To this
   choice his is morally or hypothetically bound, yet is naturally free;
   and if the required choice be made, the good follows; but if not, the
   corresponding evil follows. For instance; if the forgiveness of sin be
   the consequent proposed, and repentance the antecedent required: the
   agent is morally bound to repent, but naturally free. If, however, he
   break through the moral bond, which is done by abusing his natural
   freedom, or continuing his wrong choice, forgiveness does not follow,
   but he stands exposed to the natural and threatened consequence of that
   wrong choice, or impenitence. 3. Hence it is obvious, that in the
   system of Providence, and the execution of all decretive designs, it is
   the prerogative of the Sovereign of the universe to establish the chain
   of all antecedents, and the consequents follow from the nature of
   things: but in the system of moral government, it is equally obvious,
   the reverse takes place; for here the supreme Governor proposes, and
   establishes objectively, the chain of consequents, while the moral
   agent, or the obligee, establishes optionally the antecedents; and as
   the actual choice of an antecedent is, such will be the actual
   consequence. When the moral agent chooses that antecedent which is
   required, or which is conformable to rectitude, the proposed consequent
   is obtained by the nature of things; but when that which is not
   required, or is not conformable to rectitude, is chosen for an
   antecedent, the evil consequence flows from the same nature of things,
   that is from the essence of eternal truth. 4. Required antecedents are
   either a state of mind, or voluntary actions; according as the
   particular consequent proposed may be. For example, if happiness be the
   end or consequent proposed, holiness, or a holy state of mind, is the
   mean, or antecedent required. If we would see the Lord, we must be
   holy, or pure in heart, by a new birth unto righteousness. If
   justification be the end proposed, believing is a mean required. For to
   us righteousness shall be imputed, IF we believe. If a subsequent
   favourable treatment of the obligee be the end proposed; obedience, or
   conformity to rule, is the mean required. 5. When an agent is said to
   be obliged in or by any thing or consideration, that thing or
   consideration in or by which he is obliged, is to be considered as the
   consequent proposed; and the state or act leading to it is the
   antecedent required. To be obliged in conscience, in duty, in law, in
   honour &c., expresses the end to be obtained by a certain state or
   conduct as the mean or antecedent required. Thus for instance, if
   conscience be satisfied, if duty be discharged, if law be conformed to,
   or if honour be secured, the required antecedent means must be adopted,
   or such acts must be performed. 6. If the required antecedents be not
   performed, it is manifest that the free agent has voluntarily
   established other antecedents, and the injurious consequents of these
   last flow (as before observed) from the nature of things; which
   consequents will be similar or dissimilar to those proposed by the
   supreme Governor, in proportion, as the antecedent established
   voluntarily by the agent, is similar or dissimilar to what was
   required. Hence we may see the true standard and measure of guilt, and
   of the different gradations of praise or blame. 7. Having considered
   the nature of moral obligation, let us now advert to the subject of it.
   This inquiry has more immediately for its object the qualifications of
   the moral agent, or those considerations whereby he stands obliged, in
   contradistinction to those beings in the universe that are not moral
   agents. An attentive and long-continued investigation of the subject
   has taught us, that they are included in these three particulars: (1.)
   A natural capacity of moral enjoyment. (2.) A sufficiency of suitable
   means. And (3.) A freedom form compulsion in the choice of
   means.--Whatever being is possessed of these qualifications is morally
   obliged; for he has a suitable ability to establish his own antecedents
   as required, in order that the proposed consequents may follow. 8. The
   first qualification is a natural capacity of moral enjoyments. This
   belongs to no being that is not a free agent; but to every being who is
   so, it inseparably belongs. This, more than any superior degree of
   reason, (however great, and however forcible the influence from that
   superiority.) constitutes the chief and most essential difference
   between men and brutes. That such a capacity is an indispensably
   requisite qualification, is clear. For free agency necessarily implies,
   a consequent moral advantage, or a natural good to be morally enjoyed,
   either explicitly proposed by the moral Governor, or fairly implied in
   the system of moral government; but this could not be proposed if there
   were no capacity of enjoyment as now stated. And this consequent
   advantage may properly be called the perpetual enjoyment of God, the
   chief good; because the chief end of all subordinate enjoyments, as
   well as of all obedience, and the sum total of all happiness, is the
   conscious enjoyment of divine favour and excellence. 9. The second
   qualification is a sufficiency of suitable means. This is indispensably
   requisite; for to require an end while the means are our of the agent's
   reach, or physically out of his power, and that under the forfeiture of
   the governor's displeasure, is of the very essence of in justice. But
   the divine Governor is "a God of truth, and without in iniquity: just
   and right is he." And that these means ought to be sufficient and
   suitable in their own nature to attain the end, in other words, that
   the antecedents required to be adopted by the agent, are infallibly
   connected with the proposed consequent, is equally plain, for the same
   reason that there should be any means at all. For means in themselves
   insufficient and unsuitable have no true connexion with the end
   proposed; even as a law in itself bad, has morally no obliging power.
   10. The third qualification is a freedom from constraint and compulsion
   in the choice of means, or in the voluntary establishment of
   antecedents. By "constraint" and "compulsion" we mean a physical
   interference with the free agent in his act of choice, in such a sense,
   as that the choice would not be the genuine effect of the motive; or,
   that the nature of the fruit should not correspond with the nature of
   the tree; but some extraneous force interposing would make the nature
   of the volition to be different form the nature of the mind or
   disposition, which other wise would be its immediate cause. 11. Divine
   influence is admitted to be requisite, in order to prepare the state of
   the mind for a right choice, even as a good tree is requisite for the
   good fruit; but this is no interference with the act of choice itself,
   nor has it the least tendency to break the connexion between motive and
   choice, or between the mind and its volition.--Such influence, indeed,
   forms one glorious link of the decretive chain, which the sovereign
   Governor has established as so many antecedents; and a right choice, in
   a free agent thus divinely influenced, or formed anew, is the
   unrestrained and unimpelled effect which follows by a necessity of
   consequence. In other words, no bad choice can possibly follow, but by
   a failure in the cause, the mind or disposition itself. 12. On this
   principle it is, that the sovereign Being himself never errs in his
   choice. The source from which the act of choice proceeds is perfectly
   good, (an infinitely holy nature,) and the connexion between this cause
   and the effect, which is a right choice, is infallibly and in the
   nature of things necessarily secure. Hence it is that we never admit,
   or suspect, an error in his choice, however great his freedom; and
   hence we have a firm ground of confidence, that the Judge of the whole
   earth will do right. 13. The three qualifications mentioned belong to
   man as a free agent; but we must not confound this idea with that of a
   subject of moral government. An infant may be the subject of
   government, both human and divine; but cannot be, properly speaking, a
   free agent. Hence it follows that the first of the qualifications
   mentioned alone is essential to constitute a subject of moral
   government, in a the most extensive sense of the term; but in order to
   constitute that class of subjects who are also free agents, the other
   two are essential. 14. When these three qualifications are found in any
   free agent, nothing more is requisite to constitute moral obligation.
   An end is proposed--means firmly connected with that end are afforded,
   and required to be used - these means are physically in the power of
   the agent - who is also free from all constraint and compulsion in his
   act of choice. If these qualifications are not sufficient morally to
   oblige, we are fully persuaded nothing can be sufficient.--As to the
   notion, that moral ability is necessary to constitute moral obligation,
   which is maintained alike by many Arminians and most Antinomians, )for
   extremes will sometimes meet,) our author abundantly demonstrates its
   futility and absurd contradictions.--W.

   [132] Our author does not mean by "motive," the object presented to the
   mind according to its intrinsic worth; but he takes into the account
   also the state of the mind itself, in reference to that object,
   according to which will be the appearance of it. Therefore, strictly
   speaking, the motive, as he has intimated at the commencement of this
   work, denotes the object as it stands in the view of the mind. If we do
   not maintain this distinction, the dispute will soon degenerate into a
   confused logomachy; and we should be forced, in defending this
   position--that the will is "necessarily determined by the strongest
   motive"--to adopt this, the most absurd of all conclusions, that the
   will of every man in the present state always chooses what is really
   best, or never errs in its elections. Whereas the world is full of
   errors and delusions; things the most excellent in themselves, are
   commonly rejected, and others the most worthless are preferred. But
   this could not happen, except on this principle, that the reality of
   worth differs, in those instances, from the appearance of it. In such
   cases, the difference is not in the object, but in the mind, when the
   choice takes place. For instance; suppose the blessed God in his true
   character as revealed in the Scriptures, the chief and an unchangeable
   good, be proposed to the contemplation of a wicked man, and his will
   rejects that good. Now, as the mind is incapable of rejecting a good,
   or of choosing an evil, as such; it is plain, that the proper and
   immediate cause of difference between the reality and the appearance of
   good, is in the state of the mind. Here lies the essence of an
   erroneous choice,--the will preferring an object which is apparently
   but not really preferable. Hence it follows irrefragably, that the
   state of the mind is the true and proper source of a right and wrong
   choice. This is it that influences the appearance of an object, so as
   to stand in the apprehension and practical judgement of the mind as
   worse or better than it really is. Therefore, the true state of the
   mind and the real state of the object of choice, united, are the
   genuine parents of the objective appearance in the mind, morally
   considered, or according to the qualities of good and evil; and this
   offspring--objective appearance-- is what our author calls "the
   strongest motive."--W.

   [133] See this distinction of moral Inability explained in Part. Sect.
   IV.

   [134] On the subject of Sincerity or Insincerity in prohibitions,
   commands, counsels, invitations, and the like, in cases where God
   foreknows that the event will not take place by the compliance of the
   moral agent addressed, we may remark a few particulars in addition to
   our author's reasoning: 1. The sincerity of prohibitions and commands,
   counsels and invitations, and the like, is foundeth--not in the event
   of things as good or bad, or the knowledge of events, or the purpose
   that secures some, or the necessity of consequence from which others
   flow, nor in the moral ability of the agent, but--in the very nature
   and tendency of the things themselves which are prohibited, commanded,
   or proposed, as good or evil, either intrinsically, if of a moral
   nature, or else relatively, if of positive appointment. Therefore, 2.
   Whether the event be compliance or non-compliance, the command, or
   invitation, &c. is perfectly sincere. For, in truth, these are neither
   more nor less than testimonies respecting the goodness or badness of
   the things in question, in the sense before mentioned, and the
   consequent obligations of the agent respecting them, under a forfeiture
   either declared or implied. Consequently, 3. Insincerity can attach to
   a command only on supposition that the goodness or badness of the event
   were the ground of the signified will, while at the same time another
   event, diverse from that which actually takes place, was purposed by
   the same will. But, 4. Strictly speaking, no events, as such, are the
   objects of purpose; but rather, the purpose respects the good
   antecedents, whereby good events, following by the necessity of
   consequence, are infallibly secured. Besides, 5. It is highly absurd,
   as must appear from the nature of law and obligation, to suppose that
   the sincerity of legislative or inviting will should depend on the
   event of compliance or non-compliance. Surely the sincerity of a
   lawgiver is not affected, whether all obey, or only some, or even none.
   Legislation is a testimony with sanctions, that the thing prohibited is
   evil, or the thing commanded is good, to the party. Hence, 6. The
   consequent, whether good or bad, is objectively established, or
   hypothethically proposed, by the legislator: and the antecedent is
   supposed to be within the reach, or, physically considered, placed
   within the power, of the agent. Therefore, 7. The agent's abuse of his
   physical power, in reference to the antecedent, constitutes the
   criminality, and the right use of it constitutes the virtue, of an
   action. And then alone is physical power, in fact, used aright when it
   is the instrument of moral rectitude, or a right state of mind. Do men
   gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so, every good tree
   bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil
   fruit. A good tree (as such ) cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither
   can a corrupt tree (as such ) bring forth good fruit.--W.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. V.

   That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed to excuse
   in the non-performance of things in themselves good, particularly
   considered.

   It is much insisted on by many, that some men, though they are not able
   to perform spiritual duties, such as repentance of sin, love to God, a
   cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel,
   &c. yet may sincerely desire and endeavor after these things; and
   therefore must be excused; it being unreasonable to blame them for the
   omission of those things, which they sincerely desire and endeavour to
   do, but cannot. Concerning this matter, the following things may be
   observed.

   1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake, and gross absurdity; even
   that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of
   love, acceptance, choice, rejection, &c. consisting in the exercise of
   the Will itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart;
   and yet not able to perform or exert them. This is absurd, because it
   is absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly, and
   sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is
   contrary to his inclination: for that is to suppose him not to be
   inclined to that which he is inclined to. If a man, in the state and
   acts of his Will and inclination, properly and directly falls in with
   those duties, he therein performs them: for the duties themselves
   consist in that very thing; they consist in the state and acts of the
   Will being so formed and directed. If the soul properly and sincerely
   falls in with a certain proposed act of Will or choice, the soul
   therein makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in
   with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to
   move in that direction.

   2. That which is called a Desire and Willingness for those inward
   duties, in such as do not perform them, has respect to these duties
   only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly so called; not only
   because (as was observed before) it respects those good volitions only
   in a distant view, and with respect to future time; but also because
   evermore, not these things themselves, but something else that is
   foreign, is the object that terminates these volitions and Desires.

   A drunkard, who continues in his drunkenness, being under the power of
   a violent appetite to strong drink, and without any love to virtue; but
   being also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and
   grieved at the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may
   in a sort desire the virtue of temperance; and though his present Will
   is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart
   to forbear future acts of intemperance, and forsake his excesses,
   through an unwillingness to part with his money: but still he goes on
   with his drunkenness; his wishes and endeavours are insufficient and
   ineffectual: such a man has no proper, direct, sincere Willingness to
   forsake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it; for he
   acts voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess: his Desire is very
   improperly called a Willingness to be temperate; it is no true Desire
   of that virtue; for it is not that virtue, that terminates his wishes;
   nor have they any direct respect at all to it. It is only the saving of
   his money, or the avoiding of poverty, that terminates and exhausts the
   whole strength of his Desire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only
   very indirectly and improperly, even as a necessary means of gratifying
   the vice of covetousness.

   So, a man of an exceedingly corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love
   to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the contrary, being very profanely and
   carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion,
   and enmity against them; yet being of a family, that, from one
   generation to another, have most of them died, in youth, of an
   hereditary consumption; and so having little hope of living long; and
   having been instructed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ,
   and latitude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation
   from eternal misery; if under these circumstances he should, through
   fear of eternal torments, wish he had such a disposition; but his
   profane and carnal heart remaining, he continues still in his habitual
   distaste of; and enmity to God and religion, and wholly without any
   exercise of that love and gratitude, (as doubtless the very devils
   themselves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of their temper, would
   wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell:) in
   this case, there is no sincere Willingness to love Christ and choose
   him as his chief good: these holy dispositions and exercises are not at
   all the direct object of the Will: they truly share no part of the
   inclination or desire of the soul; but all is terminated on deliverance
   from torment: and these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding
   this forced consent, are looked upon as in themselves undesirable; as
   when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, in order to save his
   life. From these things it appears,

   3. That this indirect Willingness is not that exercise of the Will
   which the command requires; but is entirely a different one; being a
   volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different
   objects; wholly falling short of that virtue of Will, to which the
   command has respect,

   4. This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the
   duty required, cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself,
   which is commanded; being not the thing which answers and fulfils the
   command, and being wholly destitute of the virtue which the command
   seeks.

   Further to illustrate this matter: If a child has a most excellent
   father that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness,
   and has every way, in the highest degree, merited his love and dutiful
   regard, and is withal very wealthy; but the son is of so vile a
   disposition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet,
   apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by
   bringing him finally to those abject circumstances, which are
   exceedingly adverse to his avarice and ambition; he, therefore, wishes
   it were otherwise: but yet remaining under the invincible power of his
   vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his settled
   hatred of his father. Now, if such a son's indirect Willingness to love
   and honour his father, at all acquits or excuses before God, for his
   failing of actually exercising these dispositions towards him, which
   God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either, That it
   answers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the
   supposition; because the thing commanded is love and honour to his
   worthy parent. If the command be proper and just, as is supposed, then
   it obliges to the thing commanded; and so nothing else but that can
   answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there is
   that virtue or goodness in his indirect Willingness, that is equivalent
   to the virtue required; and so balances or countervails it, and makes
   up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition.
   The Willingness the son has merely from a regard to money and honour,
   has no goodness in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial
   respect required.

   Sincerity and reality, in that indirect Willingness, which has been
   spoken of, does not make it the better. That which is real and hearty
   is often called sincere; whether it be in virtue or vice. Some persons
   are sincerely bad; others are sincerely good; and others may be sincere
   and hearty in things, which are in their own nature indifferent; as a
   man may be sincerely desirous of eating when he is hungry. But being
   sincere, hearty, and in good earnest, is no virtue, unless it be in a
   thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere and hearty in joining a
   crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and
   besought Christ not to torment them, it was no mere pretense; they were
   very hearty in their desires not to be tormented: but this did not make
   their Will or Desire virtuous. And if men have sincere Desires, which
   are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the
   want of any required virtue.

   And as a man's Sincerity in such an indirect Desire or willingness to
   do his duty, as has been mentioned, cannot excuse for the want of
   performance; so it is with Endeavours arising from such a Willingness.
   The Endeavours can have no more goodness in them, than the Will of
   which they are the effect and expression. And, therefore, however
   sincere and real, and however great a person's Endeavours are; yea,
   though they should be to the utmost of his ability; unless the Will
   from which they proceed be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no
   avail or weight whatsoever in a moral respect. That which is not truly
   virtuous is, in God's sight, good for nothing: and so can be of no
   value, or influence, in his account, to make up for any moral defect.
   For nothing can counterbalance evil, but good. If evil be in one scale,
   and we put a great deal into the other of sincere and earnest Desires,
   and many and great Endeavours; yet, if there be no real goodness in
   all, there is no weight in it; and so it does nothing towards balancing
   the real weight, which is in the opposite scale. It is only like
   subtracting a thousand noughts from before a real number, which leaves
   the sum just as it was.

   Indeed such Endeavours may have a negatively good influence. Those
   things, which have no positive virtue, have no positive moral
   influence; yet they may be an occasion of persons avoiding some
   positive evils. As if a man were in the water with a neighbor to whom
   he had ill will, and who could not swim, holding him by his hand; this
   neighbor was much in debt to him,--the man is tempted to let him sink
   and drown--but refuses to comply with the temptation; not from love to
   his neighbor, but from the love of money, and because by his drowning
   he should lose his debt; that which he does in preserving his neighbor
   from drowning, is nothing good in the sight of God: yet hereby he
   avoids the greater guilt that would have been contracted, if he had
   designedly let his neighbor sink and perish. But when Arminians, in
   their disputes with Calvinists, insist so much on sincere Desires and
   Endeavours, as what must excuse men, must be accepted of God, &c. it is
   manifest they have respect to some positive moral weight or influence
   of those Desires and Endeavours. Accepting, justifying, or excusing on
   the account of sincere Endeavours, (as they are called,) and men doing
   what they can, &c. has relation to some moral value, something that is
   accepts as good, and as such, countervailing some defect.

   But there is a great and unknown deceit, arising from the ambiguity of
   the phrase, sincere Endeavours. Indeed there is a vast indistinctness
   and unfixedness in most, or at least very many of the terms used to
   express things pertaining to moral and spiritual matters. Whence arise
   innumerable mistakes, strong prejudices, inextricable confusion, and
   endless controversy.--The word sincere is most commonly used to signify
   something that is good: men are habituated to understand by it the same
   as honest and upright; which terms excite an idea of something good in
   the strictest and highest sense; good in the sight of him, who sees not
   only the outward appearance, but the heart. And, therefore, men think
   that if a person be sincere, he will certainly be accepted. If it be
   said that any one is sincere in his Endeavours, this suggests, that his
   heart is good, that there is no defect of duty, as to virtuous
   inclination; he honestly and uprightly desires and endeavours to do as
   he is required; and this leads them to suppose, that it would be very
   hard and unreasonable to punish him, only because he is unsuccessful in
   his Endeavours, the thing endeavored after being beyond his
   power.--Whereas it ought to be observed, that the word sincere has
   these different significations.

   1. Sincerity, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no more than
   reality of Will and Endeavour, with respect to any thing that is
   professed or pretended; without any consideration of the nature of the
   principle or aim, whence this real Will and true Endeavour arises. If a
   man has some real Desire either direct or indirect to obtain a thing,
   or does really endeavour after it, he is said sincerely to desire or
   endeavour, without any consideration of the goodness of the principle
   from which he acts, or any excellency or worthiness of the end for
   which he acts. Thus a man who is kind to his neighbour's wife, who is
   sick and languishing, and very helpful in her case, makes a show of
   desiring and endeavouring her restoration to health and vigor; and not
   only makes such a show, but there is a reality in his pretense, he does
   heartily and earnestly desire to have her health restored, and uses his
   true and utmost Endeavours for it: he is said sincerely to desire and
   endeavour after it, because he does so truly or really; though perhaps
   the principle he acts from, is no other than a vile and scandalous
   passion; having lived in adultery with her, he earnestly desires to
   have her health and vigor restored, that he may return to his criminal
   pleasures. Or,

   2. By Sincerity is meant, not merely a reality of Will and Endeavour of
   some sort, and from some consideration or other, but a virtuous
   Sincerity. That is, that in the performance of those particular acts,
   that are the matter of virtue or duty, there be not only the matter,
   but the form and essence of virtue, consisting in the aim that governs
   the act, and the principle exercised in it. There is not only the
   reality of the act, that is as it were the body of the duty; but also
   the soul, which should properly belong to such a body. In this sense, a
   man is said to be sincere, when he acts with a pure intention; not from
   sinister views: he not only in reality desires and seeks the thing to
   be done, or qualification to be obtained, for some end or other; but he
   wills the thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed;
   the virtue of the thing is properly the object of the Will.

   In the former sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to a
   mere pretense, and show of the particular thing to be done or
   exhibited, without any real Desire or Endeavour at all. In the latter
   sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to that show of
   virtue there is in merely doing the matter of duty, without the reality
   of the virtue itself in the soul. A man may be sincere in the former
   sense, and yet in the latter be in the sight of God, who searches the
   heart, a vile hypocrite.

   In the latter kind of sincerity, only, is there any thing truly
   valuable or acceptable in the sight of God. And this is what in
   Scripture is called Sincerity, uprightness, integrity, "truth in the
   inward parts," and "being of a perfect heart." And if there be such a
   Sincerity, and such a degree of it as there ought to be, and there be
   any thing further that the man is not able to perform, or which does
   not prove to be connected with his sincere Desires and Endeavours, the
   man is wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God; his Will shall
   surely be accepted for his deed: and such a sincere Will and Endeavour
   is all that in strictness is required of him, by any command of God.
   But as to the other kind of Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, having
   no virtue in it, (as was observed before,) it can be of no avail before
   God, in any case, to recommend, satisfy, or excuse, and has no positive
   moral weight or influence whatsoever.

   Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in the reason and
   nature of things appears from the consideration of any moral weight in
   the former kind of Sincerity, leading us to suppose, that God has made
   any positive promises of salvation, or grace, or any saving assistance,
   or any spiritual benefit whatsoever, to any Desires, prayers,
   Endeavours, striving, or obedience of those, who hitherto have no true
   virtue or holiness in their hearts; though we should suppose all the
   Sincerity, and the utmost degree of Endeavour, that is possible to be
   in person without holiness.

   Some object against God requiring, as the condition of salvation, those
   holy exercises, which are the result of a supernatural renovation; such
   as a supreme respect to Christ, love to God, loving holiness for its
   own sake, &c. that these inward dispositions and exercises are above
   men's power, as they are by nature; and therefore that we may conclude,
   that when men are brought to be sincere in their Endeavours, and do as
   well as they can, they are accepted; and that this must be all that God
   requires, in order to their being received as the objects of his
   favour, and must be what God has appointed as the condition of
   salvation. Concerning this, I would observe, that in such manner of
   speaking as "men being accepted because they are sincere, and do as
   well as they can," there is evidently a supposition of some virtue,
   some degree of that which is truly good; though it does not go so far
   as were to be wished. For if men do what they can, unless their so
   doing be from some good principle, disposition, or exercise of heart,
   some virtuous inclination or act of the Will; their so doing what they
   can, is in some respect not a whit better than if they did nothing at
   all. In such a case, there is no more positive moral goodness in a man
   doing what he can, than in a windmill doing what it can; because the
   action does no more proceed from virtue: and there is nothing in such
   Sincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that should render it any
   more a fit recommendation to positive favour and acceptance, or the
   condition of any reward or actual benefit, than doing nothing; for both
   the one and the other are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight or
   value.

   Corol. 2. Hence also it follows, there is nothing that appears in the
   reason and nature of things, which can justly lead us to determine,
   that God will certainly give the necessary means of salvation, or some
   way or other bestow true holiness and eternal life on those heathens,
   who are sincere (in the sense above explained) in their Endeavours to
   find out the Will of the Deity, and to please him, according to their
   light, that they may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and
   obtain happiness in the future state, through his favour
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. VI.

   Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly
   inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or
   inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of Liberty and moral
   Agency.

   To suppose such a freedom of Will, as Arminians talk of, to be
   requisite to Virtue and Vice, is many ways contrary to common sense.

   If Indifference belong to Liberty of Will, as Arminians suppose, and it
   be essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of
   Liberty, as they also suppose; it will follow, that it is essential to
   a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Indifference: and
   if it be performed in a state of Indifference, then doubtless it must
   be performed in the time of Indifference. And so it will follow, that
   in order to the Virtue of an act, the heart must be indifferent in the
   time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent and cold
   the heart is with relation to the act performed, so much the better;
   because the act is performed with so much the greater Liberty. But is
   this agreeable to the light of nature? Is it agreeable to the notions
   which mankind in all ages have of Virtue, that it lies in what is
   contrary to Indifference, even in the tendency and inclination of the
   heart to virtuous action; and that the stronger the inclination, and so
   the further from Indifference, the more virtuous the heart, and so much
   the more praiseworthy the act which proceeds from it?

   If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated)
   that there may be an act of Will in a state of Indifference; for
   instance, this act, viz. The Will determining to put itself out of a
   state of Indifference, and to give itself a preponderation one way;
   then it would follow, on Arminian principles, that this act or
   determination of the Will is that alone wherein Virtue consists,
   because this only is performed, while the mind remains in a state of
   Indifference, and so in a state of Liberty: for when once the mind is
   put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state; and
   therefore all the acts, which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias,
   can have the nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the thing which
   the Will can do, while yet in a state of Indifference, and so of
   Liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the matter
   into consideration; then this determination is that alone wherein
   Virtue consists, and not proceeding to action after the scale is turned
   by consideration. So that it will follow, from these principles, that
   whatever is done after the mind, by any means, is once out of its
   equilibrium, and arises from an inclination, has nothing of the nature
   of Virtue or Vice, and is worthy of neither blame or praise. But how
   plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the
   notion they have of sincerely virtuous actions! Which is, that they
   proceed from a heart well disposed and well inclined; and the stronger,
   the more fixed and determined, the good disposition of the heart, the
   greater the sincerity of Virtue, and so the more of its truth and
   reality. But if there be any acts, which are done in a state of
   equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect Indifference and
   coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or
   disposition in the heart; and, consequently, according to common sense,
   have no sincere goodness in them, having no Virtue of heart in them. To
   have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favours Virtue, and is
   friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it.

   And besides, the actions that are done in a state of Indifference, or
   that arise immediately out of such a state, cannot be virtuous,
   because, by the supposition, they are not determined by any preceding
   choice. For if there be preceding choice, then choice intervenes
   between the act and the state of Indifference; which is contrary to the
   supposition of the act arising immediately out of Indifference. But
   those acts which are not determined by preceding choice, cannot be
   virtuous or vicious, by Arminian principles, because they are not
   determined by the Will. So that neither one way, nor the other, can any
   actions be virtuous or vicious, according to those principles. If the
   action be determined by a preceding act of choice, it cannot be
   virtuous; because the action is not done in a state of Indifference,
   nor does immediately arise from such a state; and so is not done in a
   state of Liberty, If the action be not determined by a preceding act of
   choice, then it cannot be virtuous; because then the Will is not
   self-determined in it. So that it is made certain, that neither Virtue
   nor Vice can ever find any place in the universe!

   Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action that it be
   performed in a state of Indifference, under a notion of that being a
   state of liberty, is contrary to common sense; as it is a dictate of
   common sense, that Indifference itself, in many cases, is vicious, and
   so to a high degree. As if when I see my neighbour or near friend, and
   one who has in the highest degree merited of me, in extreme distress,
   and ready to perish, I find an Indifference in my heart with respect to
   any thing proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his relief.
   So if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God, or kill my father,
   or do numberless other things, which might be mentioned; the being
   indifferent, for a moment, would be highly vicious and vile.

   And it may be further observed, that to suppose this Liberty of
   Indifference is essential to Virtue and Vice, destroys the great
   difference of degrees of the guilt of different crimes, and takes away
   the heinousness of the most flagitious, horrid iniquities; such as
   adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury, blasphemy, &c. For, according to
   these principles, there is no harm at all in having the mind in a state
   of perfect Indifference with respect to these crimes; nay, it is
   absolutely necessary in order to any Virtue in avoiding them, or Vice
   in doing them. But for the mind to be in a state of Indifference with
   respect to them, is to be next door to doing them: it is then
   infinitely near to choosing, and so committing the fact: for
   equilibrium is the next step to a degree of preponderation; and one,
   even the least degree of preponderation (all things considered) is
   choice. And not only so, but for the Will to be in a state of perfect
   equilibrium with respect to such crimes, is for the mind to be in such
   a state, as to be full as likely to choose them as to refuse them, to
   do them as to omit them. And if our minds must be in such a state,
   wherein it is as near to choosing as refusing, and wherein it must of
   necessity, according to the nature of things, be as likely to commit
   them, as to refrain from them; where is the exceeding heinousness of
   choosing and committing them? If there be no harm in often being in
   such a state, where in the probability of doing and forbearing are
   exactly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one
   than the other; then, according to the nature and laws of such a
   contingence, it may be expected, as an inevitable consequence of such a
   disposition of things, that we should choose them as often as reject
   them: that it should generally so fall out is necessary, as equality in
   the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the
   cause, or of the antecedent state of things from which the effect
   arises. Why then should we be so exceedingly to blame, if it does so
   fall out?

   It is many ways apparent, that the Arminian scheme of Liberty is
   utterly inconsistent with the being of any such things as either
   virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions. If Liberty of Indifference
   be essential to moral Agency, then there can be no Virtue in any
   habitual inclinations of the heart; which are contrary to Indifference,
   and imply in their nature the very destruction and exclusion of it.
   They suppose nothing can be virtuous in which no Liberty is exercised;
   but how absurd is it to talk of exercising Indifference under bias and
   preponderation!

   And if self-determining power in the Will be necessary to moral Agency,
   praise, blame, &c. then nothing done by the Will can be any further
   praiseworthy or blameworthy, than so far as the Will is moved, swayed,
   and determined by itself, and the scales turned by the sovereign power
   the Will has over itself. And therefore the Will must not be out of its
   balance, preponderation must not be determined and effected
   before-hand; and so the self-determining act anticipated. Thus it
   appears another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent with that
   Liberty, which Arminians suppose to be necessary to Virtue or Vice; and
   so it follows, that habitual bias itself cannot be either virtuous or
   vicious.

   The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning the Inconsistence
   of Necessity with Liberty, praise, dispraise, &c. None will deny, that
   bias and inclination may be so strong as to be invincible, and leave no
   possibility of the Will determining contrary to it; and so be attended
   with Necessity. This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Will of God,
   angels, and glorified saints, with respect to good; and the Will of
   devils, with respect to evil. Therefore, if Necessity be inconsistent
   with Liberty; then, when fixed inclination is to such a degree of
   strength, it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, praise, or blame. And,
   if so, then the nearer habits are to this strength, the more do they
   impede Liberty, and so diminish praise and blame. If very strong habits
   destroy Liberty, the lesser ones proportionably hinder it, according to
   their degree of strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is
   the act most virtuous or vicious, when performed without any
   inclination or habitual bias at all; because it is then performed with
   most Liberty.

   Every prepossessing fixed bias on the mind brings a degree of moral
   inability for the contrary; because so far as the mind is biased and
   prepossessed, so much hindrance is there of the contrary. And therefore
   if moral inability be inconsistent with moral Agency, or the nature of
   Virtue and Vice, then, so far as there is any such thing as evil
   disposition of heart, or habitual depravity of inclination; whether
   covetousness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else; so much the
   more excusable persons are; so much the less have their evil acts of
   this kind the nature of Vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent
   dispositions and inclinations they have so much are they the less
   virtuous.

   It is evident, that no habitual disposition of heart can be in any
   degree virtuous or vicious, or the actions which proceed from them at
   all praiseworthy or blameworthy. Because, though we should suppose the
   habit not to be of such strength, as wholly to take away all moral
   ability and self-determining power; or may be partly from bias, and in
   part from self-determination; yet in this case, all that is from
   antecedent bias must be set aside, as of no consideration; and in
   estimating the degree of Virtue or Vice, no more must be considered
   than what arises from self-determining power, without any influence of
   that bias, because Liberty is exercised in no more: so that all that is
   the exercise of habitual inclination is thrown away, as not belonging
   to the morality of the action. By which it appears, that no exercise of
   these habits, let them be stronger or weaker, can ever have any thing
   of the nature of either Virtue or Vice.

   Here if any one should say, that notwithstanding all these things,
   there may be the nature of Virtue and Vice in the habits of the mind;
   because these habits may be the effects of those acts, wherein the mind
   exercised Liberty; that however the forementioned reasons will prove
   that no habits, which are natural, or that are born or created with us,
   can be either virtuous or vicious; yet they will not prove this of
   habits, which have been acquired and established by repeated free acts.

   To such an objector I would say, that this evasion will not at all help
   the matter. For if freedom of Will be essential to the very nature of
   Virtue and Vice, then there is no Virtue or Vice but only in that very
   thing, wherein this Liberty is exercised. If a man in one or more
   things, that he does, exercises Liberty, and then by those acts is
   brought into such circumstances, that his Liberty ceases, and there
   follows a long series of acts or events that come to pass necessarily;
   those consequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or
   punishable; but only the free acts that established this necessity; for
   in them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are
   necessary, have no more of the nature of Virtue or Vice, than health or
   sickness of body have properly the nature of Virtue or Vice, being the
   effects of a course of free acts of temperance or intemperance; or than
   the good qualities of a clock are of the nature of Virtue, which are
   the effects of free acts of the artificer; or the goodness and
   sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral Virtues, being the
   effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If Liberty be
   absolutely requisite to the morality of actions, and necessity wholly
   inconsistent with it, as Arminians greatly insist; then no necessary
   effects whatsoever, let the cause be never so good or bad, can be
   virtuous or vicious; but the Virtue or Vice must be only in the free
   cause. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby supposes, the necessity that
   attends the good and evil habits of the saints in heaven, and damned in
   hell, which are the consequence of their free acts in their state of
   probation, are not rewardable or punishable.

   On the whole, it appears, that if the notions of Arminians concerning
   Liberty and moral Agency be true, it will follow, that there is no
   virtue in any such habits or qualities as humility, meekness, patience,
   mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness; nothing at all
   praiseworthy in loving Christ above father and mother, wife and
   children, or our own lives; or in delight in holiness, hungering and
   thirsting after righteousness, love to enemies, universal benevolence
   to mankind: and, on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or
   worthy of dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly, malignant, devilish
   dispositions; in being ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God, and
   things sacred and holy; or in being most treacherous, envious, and
   cruel towards men. For all these things are dispositions and
   inclinations of the heart. And in short, there is no such thing as any
   virtuous or vicious quality of mind; no such thing as inherent virtue
   and holiness, or vice and sin: and the stronger those habits or
   dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the
   further they are from being so indeed; the more violent men's lusts
   are, the more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude, and maliciousness,
   still the further are they from being blameworthy. If there be a man
   that by his own repeated acts, or by any other means, is come to be of
   the most hellish disposition, desperately inclined to treat his
   neighbours with injuriousness, contempt, and malignity; the further
   they should be from any disposition to be angry with him, or in the
   least to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a person, who is
   of a most excellent spirit, strongly inclining him to the most amiable
   actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c. so much is he further from any
   thing rewardable or commendable. On which principles, the man Jesus
   Christ was very far from being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness
   and kindness which he performed, these propensities being strong in his
   heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God is
   infinitely remote from any thing commendable, his good inclinations
   being infinitely strong, and he, therefore, at the utmost possible
   distance from being at Liberty. And in all cases, the stronger the
   inclinations of any are to Virtue, and the more they love it, the less
   virtuous, and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious they
   are.--Whether these things are agreeable to Scripture, let every
   Christian, and every man who has read the Bible, judge: and whether
   they are agreeable to common sense, let every one judge, that has human
   understanding in exercise.

   And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that Virtue and Vice
   are wholly excluded out of the world; and that there never was, nor
   ever can be, any such thing as one or the other; either in God, angels,
   or men. No propensity, disposition, or habit can be virtuous or
   vicious, as has been shown; because they, so far as they take place,
   destroy the freedom of the Will, the foundation of all moral Agency,
   and exclude all capacity of either Virtue or Vice.---And if habits and
   dispositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the
   exercise of these dispositions be so: for the exercise of bias is not
   the exercise of free self-determining Will, and so there is no exercise
   of Liberty in it. Consequently, no man is virtuous or vicious, either
   in being well or ill disposed, nor in acting from a good or bad
   disposition. And whether this bias or disposition be habitual or not,
   if it exists but a moment before the act of Will which is the effect of
   it, it alters not the case, as to the necessity of the effect. Or if
   there be no previous disposition at all, either habitual or occasional,
   that determines the act, then it is not choice that determines it: it
   is therefore a contingence, that happens to the man, arising from
   nothing in him; and is necessary, as to any inclination or choice of
   his; and, therefore, cannot make him either the better or worse; any
   more than a tree is better than other trees, because it oftener happens
   to be lighted upon by a nightingale; or a rock more vicious than other
   rocks, because rattle-snakes have happened oftener to crawl over it.
   So, that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or bad dispositions,
   either fixed or transient; nor any Virtue or Vice in acting from any
   good or bad previous inclination; nor yet any Virtue or Vice in acting
   wholly without any previous inclination. Where then Shall we find room
   for virtue or vice?
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. VII.

   Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all Influence of
   Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions.

   As Arminian notions of that liberty which is essential to virtue or
   vice, are inconsistent with common sense, in their being inconsistent
   with all virtuous or vicious habits and dispositions; so they are no
   less inconsistent with all influence of Motives in moral actions.--Such
   influence equally against those notions of liberty, whether there be,
   previous to the act of choice, a preponderancy of the inclination, or a
   preponderancy of those circumstances, which have a tendency to move the
   inclination. And, indeed, it comes to just the same thing: to say, the
   circumstances of the mind are such as tend to sway and turn its
   inclination one way, is the same thing, as to say, the inclination of
   the mind, as under such circumstances, tends that way.

   Or if any think it most proper to say, that Motives do alter the
   inclination, and give a net bias to the mind, it will not alter the
   case, as to the present argument. For if Motives operate by giving the
   mind an inclination, then they operate by destroying the mind's
   indifference, and laying it under a bias. But to do this, is to destroy
   the Arminian freedom: it is not to leave the Will to its own
   self-determination, but to bring it into subjection to the power of
   something extrinsic, which operates upon it, sways and determines it,
   previous to its own determination. So that what is done from Motive,
   cannot he either virtuous or vicious. Besides, if the acts of the Will
   are excited by Motives, those Motives are the causes of those acts of
   the Will; which makes the acts of the Will necessary; as effects
   necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause. And if the influence
   and power of the Motive causes the volition, then the influence of the
   Motive determines volition, and volition does not determine itself; and
   so is not free, in the sense of Arminians, (as has been largely shown
   already,) and consequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious.

   The supposition which has already been taken notice of as an
   insufficient evasion in other cases, would be, in like manner,
   impertinently alleged in this case; namely, the supposition that
   liberty consist in a power of suspending action for the present, in
   order to deliberation. If it should be said, Though it be true, that
   the Will is under a necessity of finally following the strongest
   Motive; yet it may, for the present, forbear to act upon the Motive
   presented, till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it,
   and compare its real weight with the merit of other Motives. I answer
   as follows:

   Here again, it must be remembered, that if determining thus to suspend
   and consider, be that act of the Will, wherein alone liberty is
   exercised, then in this all virtue and vice must consist; and the acts
   that follow this consideration, and are the effects of it, being
   necessary, are no more virtuous or vicious than some good or bad
   events, which happen when they are fast asleep, and are the
   consequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore, I would
   here observe two things:

   1. To suppose, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consists in
   determining, whether to take time for consideration or not, is not
   agreeable to common sense, For, according to such a supposition, the
   most horrid crimes, adultery, murder, sodomy, blasphemy, &c. do not at
   all consist in the horrid nature of the things themselves, but only in
   the neglect of thorough consideration before they were perpetrated,
   which brings their viciousness to a small matter, and makes all crimes
   equal. If it be said, that neglect of consideration, when such heinous
   evils are proposed to choice, is worse than in other cases: I answer,
   this is inconsistent, as it supposes the very thing to be, which, at
   the same time, is supposed not to be; it supposes all moral evil, all
   viciousness and heinousness, does not consist merely in the want of
   consideration. It supposes some crimes in themselves, in their own
   nature, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to consideration, or
   inconsideration, which lays the person under a previous obligation to
   consider in some cases more than others.

   2. If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consisted
   only in the act of the Will, whereby it determines whether to consider
   or no, it would not alter the case in the least, as to the present
   argument. For still in this act of the Will on this determination, it
   is induced by some Motive, and necessarily follows the strongest
   Motive; and so is necessarily, even in that act wherein alone it is
   either virtuous or vicious.

   One thing more I would observe, concerning the inconsistence of
   Arminian notions of moral Agency with the Influence of Motives.--I
   suppose none will deny, that it is possible for such powerful Motives
   to be set before the mind, exhibited in so strong a light, and under
   such advantageous circumstances, as to be invincible; and such as the
   mind cannot but yield to. In this case, Arminians will doubtless say,
   liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if Motives are exhibited with
   half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their
   strength, and go halfway towards destroying it. If a thousand degrees
   of Motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred take it half away. If
   one degree of the influence of Motive does not at all infringe or
   diminish liberty, then no more do two degrees; for nothing doubled, is
   still nothing. And if two degrees do not diminish the Will's liberty,
   no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six thousand. For nothing however
   multiplied comes to but nothing. If there be nothing in the nature of
   Motive or moral suasion, that is at all opposite to liberty, then the
   greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if there be somewhat, in
   the nature of the thing, against liberty, then the least degree of it
   hurts in some degree; and consequently diminishes virtue. If invincible
   Motives to that action which is good, take away all the freedom of the
   act, and so all the virtue of it; then the more forcible the Motives
   are, so much the worse, so much the less virtue; and the weaker the
   Motives are, the better for the cause of virtue; and none is best of
   all.

   Now let it be considered, whether these things are agreeable to common
   sense. If it should be allowed, that there are some instances wherein
   the soul chooses without any Motive, what virtue can there be in such a
   choice? I am sure there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice
   is made for no good end; being made for no end at all. If it were for
   any end, the view of the end would be the Motive exciting to the act;
   and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good aim, then there
   is no good intention in it: and, therefore, according to all our
   natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of
   the smoke, which is driven to and fro by the wind, without any aim or
   end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor wherefore, it
   is moved.

   Corol. 1. By these things it appears, that the argument against the
   Calvinists, taken from the use of counsels, exhortations, invitations,
   expostulations, &c. so much insisted on by Arminians, is truly against
   themselves. For these thing's can operate no other way to any good
   effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to
   excite and determine the acts of the Will. [135] But it follows, on
   their principles, that the acts of Will excited by such causes, cannot
   be virtuous; because, so far as they are from these, they are not from
   the Will's self-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not
   worth while to offer any arguments to persuade men to any virtuous
   volition or voluntary action; it is in vain to set before them the
   wisdom and amiableness of ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly
   of way of vice. This notion of liberty and moral Agency frustrates all
   endeavours to draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion, precept
   or example: for though these things may induce them to what is
   materially virtuous, yet at the same time they take away the form of
   virtue, because they destroy liberty; as they, by their own power, put
   the Will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take
   the work of self-determining power out of its hands. And the clearer
   the instructions given, the more powerful the arguments used, and the
   more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely they are to
   frustrate their own design; because they have so much the greater
   tendency to put the Will out of its balance, to hinder its freedom of
   self-determination; and so to exclude the very form of virtue, and the
   essence of whatsoever is praiseworthy.

   So it clearly follows, from these principles, that God has no hand in
   any man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or
   moral influence; that none of the moral methods he uses with men to
   promote virtue in the world, have any tendency to the attainment of
   that end; that all the instructions he has given men, from the
   beginning of the worked to this day, by prophets or apostles, or by his
   Son Jesus Christ; that all his counsels, invitations, promises,
   threatenings, warnings, and expostulations; that all means he has used
   with men, in ordinances, or providences; yea, all influences of his
   Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency at all to
   excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any thing
   morally good and commendable, in any respect.--For there is no way that
   these or any other means can promote virtue, but one of these three.
   Either, (1.) By a physical operation on the heart. But all effects that
   are wrought in men in this way, have no virtue in them, by the
   concurring voice of all Arminians. Or, (2.) Morally, by exhibiting
   Motives to the understandings, to excite good acts in the Will. But it
   has been demonstrated, that volitions excited by Motives, are
   necessary, and not excited by a self-moving power; and therefore, by
   their principles, there is no virtue in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving
   the Will an opportunity to determine itself concerning the objects
   proposed, either to choose or reject, by its own uncaused, unmoved,
   uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be all, then all those
   means do no more to promote virtue than vice: for they do nothing but
   give the Will opportunity to determine itself either way, either to
   good or bad, without laying it under any bias to either: and so there
   is really as much of an opportunity given to determine in favour of
   evil, as of good.

   Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will certainly follow from the
   Arminian doctrine, which they charge on others; namely, that God acts
   an inconsistent part in using so many counsels, warnings, invitations,
   entreaties, &c. with sinners, to induce them to forsake sin, and turn
   to the ways of virtue; and that all are insincere and fallacious. It
   will follow, from their doctrine, that God does these things when he
   knows, at the same time, that they have no manner of tendency to
   promote the effect he seems to aim at; yea, knows that if they have any
   influence, this very influence will be inconsistent with such an
   effect, and will prevent it. But what an imputation of insincerity
   would this fix on him, who is infinitely holy and true!--So that theirs
   is the doctrine which, if pursued in its consequences, does horribly
   reflect on the Most High, and fix on him the charge of hypocrisy; and
   not the doctrine of the Calvinist, according to their frequent and
   vehement exclamations and invectives.

   Corol 2. From what has been observed in this section, it again appears,
   that Arminian principles and notions, when fairly examined and pursued
   in their demonstrable consequences, do evidently shut all virtue out of
   the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such
   thing, in any case; or that any such thing should ever be conceived of.
   For, by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies
   absurdity and contradiction. For it is absurd in itself, and contrary
   to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind without any good
   intention or aim; and, by their principles, it is absurd to suppose a
   virtuous act with a good intention or aim; for to act for an end, is to
   act from a Motive. So that if we rely on these principles, there can be
   no virtuous act with a good design and end; and it is self-evident,
   there can be none without: consequently there can be no virtuous act at
   all.

   Corol. 3. It is manifest, that Arminian notions of moral Agency, and
   the being of a faculty of Will, cannot consist together; and that if
   there can be any such thing as either a virtuous or vicious act, it
   cannot be an act of the Will; no Will can be at all concerned in it.
   For that act which is performed without inclination, without Motive,
   without end, must be performed without any concern of the Will. To
   suppose an act of the Will without these, implies a contradiction. If
   the soul in its act has no motive or end; then, in that act (as was
   observed before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts no
   inclination to any thing; and this implies, that in that act it desires
   nothing, and chooses nothing; so that there is no act of choice in the
   case: and that is as much as to say, there is no act of Will in the
   case. Which very effectually shuts all vicious and virtuous acts out of
   the universe; inasmuch as, according to this, there can be no vicious
   or virtuous act wherein the Will is concerned: and according to the
   plainest dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the
   principles of Arminians themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious
   act wherein the Will is not concerned. And therefore there is no room
   for any virtuous or vicious acts at all.

   Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings are
   influenced by either previous inclination or Motive, another strange
   thing will follow; and this is, that God not only cannot foreknow any
   of the future moral actions of his creatures, but he can make no
   conjecture, can give no probable guess concerning them. For all
   conjecture in things of this nature must depend on some discerning or
   apprehension of these two things, previous Disposition and Motive,
   which, as has been observed, Arminian notions of moral Agency, in their
   real consequence, altogether exclude.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [135] The true reason why counsels, exhortations, &c. commonly called
   motives, are consistent with the doctrine of necessity held by
   Calvinists, may be here noticed, in addition to some hints before
   given. In order to this, we must guard against ambiguity in the word
   "motive," which at one time is intended for the object exhibited,
   abstractedly considered: at another, the object concretively, as it
   stands in the view of the mind. The opposers of that necessity for
   which our author pleads must in order to make even a show of
   consistency, understand the word "motive" in the first of these
   acceptations. And if so, it is nothing marvellous that they should
   maintain the existence of a power in the human mind which can, on the
   one hand, successfully oppose the strongest possible motive; an don the
   other, be determined by a weaker, and even sometimes by the weakest
   motive. For how often is the most insignificant bauble preferred to
   infinite excellence! But consistent Calvinists do not understand the
   term in any such manner, but rather as an effect compounded of the
   state of the mind and the real object. And, seeing the object, in
   itself considered, is not changed by mental perception, the difference
   of the effect, or change of mental view, must arise from the mind
   itself. Hence one motive, in the Arminian sense, may produce, in the
   other acceptation of the term, a thousand different motives, according
   to the different mental states to which the object is presented.
   Therefore counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c. are most rationally
   employed by Calvinists; for that which determines the human will to
   action, is the motive as it is perceived, or that which results from an
   application of the object to the mind. According to them, without an
   object presented there can be no motive, anymore than there can be a
   motive without a mind to which it is presented. Without evangelical
   truth, and an evangelical mind, or disposition, there can be no
   evangelical determining motive. Consequently, if the mind be at all
   roused from ignorance and apathy, determining motives must be produced
   in it by a representation of objects, by counsels, exhortations,
   invitations, expostulations, &c. These will succeed, or fail of
   success, morally, according to the state of the mind. But as the agent
   is free from co-action, constraint, and compulsion, in the act of
   choosing, the true inferences--not that such use of the means is
   unsuitable or inconsistent, but--that here is clearly implied the great
   necessity, the rationality, and the perfect consistency of prayer to
   the God of grace, for success on the use of means. Paul may plant, and
   Apollos may water, but God giveth the increase. To influence the mind
   without moral motives, is the prerogative of God. All hearts are in his
   hand to form them as he pleases. If the tree be good by sovereign
   influence, or a new birth, the fruit of love to God and hatred to sin,
   holy fear, unfeigned faith, humble hope, &c. will follow, according to
   the objects presented. A crop will not follow without the union of two
   things, seed and soil. If both be good, the crop will be good, but not
   otherwise. That motive which determines the will, cannot arise from any
   other cause than the object and the disposition united. And then only
   can the determining motive be good, when it results from a good object
   applied to a good disposition, or state of mind. These things duly
   considered will sufficiently prove why Calvinists use counsels,
   exhortations, invitations, &c.--W.
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

  PART IV.

   wherein the chief grounds of the reasonings of arminians, in support
   and defence of the fore-mentioned notions of liberty, moral agency, &c.
   And against the opposite doctrine, are considered.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. I.

   The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and
   acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature. [136]

   One main foundation of the reasons, which are brought to establish the
   forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, vice, &c. is a supposition,
   that the virtuousness of the dispositions, or acts of the Will,
   consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts of the Will,
   but wholly in the Origin or Cause of them: so that if the disposition
   of the mind, or acts of the Will, be never so good, yet if the Cause of
   the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is nothing virtuous or
   praiseworthy in it; and, on the contrary, if the Will, in its
   inclination or acts, be never so bad, yet unless it arises from
   something that is our vice or fault, there is nothing vicious or
   blameworthy in it. Hence their grand objection and pretended
   demonstration, or self- evidence, against any virtue and
   commendableness, or vice and blameworthiness, of those habits or acts
   of the Will, which are not from some virtuous or vicious determination
   of the Will itself.

   Now, if this matter be well considered, it will appear to be altogether
   a mistake, yea, a gross absurdity; and that it is most certain, that if
   there be any such thing, as a virtuous or vicious disposition, or
   volition of mind, the virtuousness or viciousness of them consists not
   in the Origin or Cause of these things, but in the Nature of them.

   If the Essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness
   or fault, does not lie in the Nature of the dispositions or acts of
   mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their Cause,
   then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for instance, if the
   vice of a vicious act of Will, lies not in the Nature of the act, but
   the Cause; so that its being of a bad Nature will not make it at all
   our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours, as
   its Cause, or something in us that is our fault; then, for the same
   reason, neither can the viciousness of that Cause lie in the Nature of
   the thing itself, but in its Cause: that evil determination of ours is
   not our fault, merely because it is of a bad Nature, unless it arises
   from some Cause in us that is our fault. And when we are come to this
   higher Cause, still the reason of the thing holds good; though this
   Cause be of a bad Nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that
   account, unless it arises from something faulty in us. Nor yet can
   blameworthiness lie in the Nature of this Cause, but in the Cause of
   that. And thus we must drive faultiness back from step to step, from a
   lower Cause to a higher, in infinitum; and that is, thoroughly to
   banish it from the world, and to allow it no possibility of existence
   any where in the universality of things. On these principles, vice, or
   moral evil, cannot consist in any thing that is an effect; because
   fault does not consist in the Nature of things, but in their Cause; as
   well as because effects are necessary, being unavoidably connected with
   their Cause: therefore the Cause only is to blame. And so it follows,
   that faultiness can lie only in that Cause, which is a Cause only, and
   no effect of anything. Nor yet can it lie in this; for then it must lie
   in the Nature of the thing itself; not in its being from any
   determination of ours, nor anything faulty in us which is the Cause,
   nor indeed from any Cause at all; for, by the supposition, it is no
   effect, and has no Cause. And thus, he that will maintain, it is not
   the Nature of habits or acts of Will that makes them virtuous or
   faulty, but the Cause, must immediately run himself out of his own
   assertion; and in maintaining it, will insensibly contradict and deny
   it.

   This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not from their
   Nature, or from any thing inherent in them, but because they are from a
   bad Cause, it must be on account of the badness of the Cause: a bad
   effect in the Will must be bad, because the Cause is bad, or of an evil
   Nature, or has badness as a quality inherent in it: and a good effect
   in the Will must be good, by reason of the goodness of the Cause, or
   its being of a good Kind and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the
   very supposition of fault and praise lying not in the Nature of the
   thing, but the Cause, contradicts itself, and does at least resolve the
   Essence of virtue and vice into the Nature of things, and supposes it
   originally to consist in that.--And if a caviler has a mind to run from
   the absurdity, by saying, "No, the fault of the thing, which is the
   Cause, lies not in this, that the Cause itself is of an evil Nature,
   but that the Cause is evil in that sense, that it is from another bad
   Cause." Still the absurdity will follow him; for, if so, then the Cause
   before charged is at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to
   the higher Cause, and must consist in that's being evil, or of an evil
   Nature. So now, we are come again to lay the blame of the thing
   blameworthy, to the Nature of the thing, and not to the Cause. And if
   any is so foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from step to step,
   till he is come to that which is the first Cause concerned in the whole
   affair, and will say, all the blame lies in that; then, at last, he
   must be forced to own, that the faultiness of the thing, which he
   supposes alone blameworthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the thing, and
   not in the Original or Cause of it; for the supposition is, that it has
   no Original, it is determined by no act of ours, is caused by nothing
   faulty in us, being absolutely without any Cause. And so the race is at
   an end, but the evader is taken in his flight.

   It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that moral evil,
   with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill
   deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the Nature of certain
   dispositions of the heart and acts of the Will; and not in the
   deformity of something else, diverse from the very thing itself; which
   deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the Cause of it. Which would be
   absurd, because that would be to suppose a thing that is innocent and
   not evil, is truly evil and faulty, because another thing is evil. It
   implies a contradiction; for it would be to suppose, the very thing,
   which is morally evil and blameworthy, is innocent and not blameworthy;
   but that something else, which is its Cause, is only to blame. To say,
   that vice does not consist in the thing which is vicious, but in its
   Cause, is the same as to say, that vice does not consist in vice, but
   in that which produces it.

   It is true, a Cause may be to blame, for being the Cause of vice: it
   may be wickedness in the Cause that it produces wickedness. But it
   would imply a contradiction, to suppose that these two are the same
   individual wickedness. The wicked act of the Cause in producing
   wickedness, is one wickedness; and the wickedness produced, if there be
   any produced, is another. And therefore, the wickedness of the latter
   does not lie in the former, but is distinct from it; and the wickedness
   of both lies in the evil Nature of the things which are wicked.

   The thing, which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves
   punishment; which is but the expression of hatred. And that, which
   renders virtue lovely, is that on account of which it is fit to receive
   praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love.
   But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful Nature; and that
   which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable Nature. It is a certain
   beauty or deformity that are inherent in that good or evil will, which
   is the soul of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it,) which
   is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise,
   according to the common sense of mankind. If the Cause or occasion of
   the rise of a hateful disposition or act of Will, be also hateful;
   suppose another antecedent evil will; that is entirely another sin,
   and, deserves punishment by itself, under a distinct consideration.
   There is worthiness of dispraise in the Nature of an evil volition, and
   not wholly in some foregoing act, which is its Cause; otherwise the
   evil volition, which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than
   sickness, or some other natural calamity, which arises from a Cause
   morally evil.

   Thus, for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise,
   according to common sense; not because something as bad, or worse than
   ingratitude, was the Cause that produced it; but because it is hateful
   in itself, by its own inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is
   amiable, and worthy of praise, not merely because something else went
   before this love of virtue in our minds, which caused it to take place
   there--for instance, our own choice; we choose to love virtue, and, by
   some method or other, wrought ourselves into the love of it--but
   because of the amiableness and condecency of such a disposition and
   inclination of heart. If that was the case, that we did choose to love
   virtue, and so produced that love in ourselves, this choice itself
   could be no otherwise amiable or praiseworthy, than as love to virtue,
   or soma other amiable inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If
   that choice was amiable at all, it must be so on account of some
   amiable quality in the Nature of the choice. If we chose to love
   virtue, not in love to virtue, or any thing that was good, and
   exercised no sort of good disposition in the choice, the choice itself
   was not virtuous nor worthy of any praise, according to common sense,
   because the choice was not of a good Nature.

   It may not be improper here to take notice of something said by an
   author, that has lately made a mighty noise in America. "A necessary
   holiness (says he [137] ) is no holiness.--Adam could not be originally
   created in righteousness and true holiness, because he must choose to
   be righteous, before he could be righteous. And therefore he must
   exist, he must be created, yea, he must exercise thought and
   reflection, before he was righteous." There is much more to the same
   effect, (p. 437, 438, 439, 440.) If these things are so, it will
   certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no
   righteous choice; there is no righteousness or holiness in it, because
   no choosing to be righteous goes before it. For he plainly speaks of
   choosing to be righteous, as what must go before righteousness; and
   that which follows the choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot
   be righteousness or holiness: for an effect is a thing necessary, and
   cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its Cause; and therefore is
   unavoidably dependent upon the Cause; and he says a necessary holiness
   is no holiness. So that neither can a choice of righteousness be
   righteousness or holiness, nor can any thing that is consequent on that
   choice, and the effect of it, be righteousness or holiness; nor can any
   thing that is without choice, be righteousness or holiness. So that by
   his scheme, all righteousness and holiness is at once shut out of the
   world, and no door left open, by which it can ever possibly enter into
   the world.

   I suppose, the way that men came to entertain this absurd inconsistent
   notion--with respect to internal inclinations and volitions themselves,
   (or notions that imply it,) viz. that the Essence of their moral good
   or evil lies not in their Nature, but their Cause--was, that it is
   indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that it is so with respect
   to all outward actions, and sensible motions of the body; that the
   moral good or evil of them does not lie at all in the motions
   themselves; which, taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature;
   and the Essence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them, lies
   in those internal dispositions and volitions which are the Cause of
   them. Now, being always used to determine this, without hesitation or
   dispute, concerning external Actions; which in the common use of
   language are signified by such phrases, as men's actions or their
   doings; hence, when they came to speak of volitions, and internal
   exercises of their inclinations, under the same denomination of their
   actions, or what they do, they unwarily determined the case must also
   be the same with these as with external actions; not considering the
   vast difference in the Nature of the case.

   If any shall still object and say, why is it not necessary that the
   Cause should be considered, in order to determine whether any thing be
   worthy of blame or praise? is it agreeable to reason and common sense,
   that a man is to be praised or blamed for that which he is not the
   Cause or author?

   I answer, such phrases as being the Cause, being the author, and the
   like, are ambiguous. They are most vulgarly understood for being the
   designing voluntary Cause, or Cause by antecedent choice: and it is
   most certain, that men are not, in this sense, the Causes or authors of
   the first act of their Wills, in any case; as certain as any thing is,
   or ever can be; for nothing can be more certain, than that a thing is
   not before it is, nor a thing of the same kind before the first thing
   of that kind; and so no choice before the first choice.--As the phrase,
   being the author, may be understood, not of being the producer by an
   antecedent act of Will, but as a person may be said to be the author of
   the act of Will itself, by his being the immediate agent, or the being
   that is acting, or in exercise in that act; if the phrase of being the
   author, is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires
   men being the authors of their own acts of Will, in order to their
   being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise, on account of them. And
   common sense teaches, that they must be the authors of external
   actions, in the former sense, namely, their being the Causes of them by
   an act of Will or choice, in order to their being justly blamed or
   praised: but it teaches no such thing with respect to the acts of the
   Will themselves.--But this may appear more manifest by the things which
   will be observed in the following SECTION.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [136] This may appear to some to be an identical proposition "The
   essence of a thing lies in its nature;" but it is not wholly so, and
   the whole of the proposition is exceedingly important, on account of
   the negative part, or the incidental proposition it contains, viz. The
   essence of virtue and vice lies not in their cause. A single
   consideration may be sufficient to show the truth and importance of one
   part of this last proposition. If the essence of virtue lay in its
   cause, how could the first cause, or the uncaused nature, be virtuous?
   If therefore the first cause be virtuous, or have the essence of
   virtue, as all atheists will allow, it is plain that essence must lie
   in the nature of that cause itself. Hence, as God is the standard of
   all moral excellence, created natures are morally excellent in
   proportion as they resemble him. And as virtue is an imitable
   excellence, and as good reason can be assigned why the resemblance
   should not hold in this particular, it is highly probably, a priori,
   that, in reference to created natures, the essence of their virtue lies
   not in its cause. To demonstrate this last, is the design of the
   present section. Again, as the essence of virtue lies not in its cause,
   so neither does the essence of vice lie in its cause. But the
   philosophical ground of this part of the general proposition demands
   more particular attention. And as this proposition--"the essence of
   vice lies not in its cause," affects the whole system of morals, and
   indeed of theology, we beg leave to propose a series of remarks which,
   it is hoped, will cast some light on the subject. 1. Causes are of two
   kinds, and of two only, either positive or negative. Positive causes
   produce positive effects, from the first cause through all secondary
   causes: and these positive secondary causes are nothing else but so may
   decretive antecedents, which act physically and their consequences
   follow from the nature of things; even as number follows the repetition
   of units, or happiness results from true virtue. 2. The term "cause" is
   applied less properly to express a negative idea; for it expresses
   merely an antecedent of a consequent. For instance, if we say that a
   man cannot read because he is blind, or cannot walk because he has no
   legs, or cannot go to heaven because he does not love God, and the
   like; it is manifest that blindness, want of legs, and want of love to
   God, are "causes" only as antecedents are causes to their consequents,
   without positive influence. 3. Negative causes, though they have no
   positive operations in producing their consequents, are no less the
   ground of certainty than those causes, properly so called, which exist
   in physical operations. For the consequent follows the antecedent with
   equal certainty, whether the connexion be formed by decretive will and
   energy, as in all positive causes, or by the nature of things only,
   which is essential truth, as in all negative causes. 4. The cause of
   vicious acts, is a vicious disposition; in other words, it is the want,
   or the absence of a virtuous disposition. The essence of the vicious
   act, however, is not in the cause, or disposition. The vice of the
   disposition is one thing, and the vice of the act is another. For as
   the nature of the disposition, and the nature of the act, are
   different; so the vice, or the moral badness of the one, is a different
   badness from that of the other. The one and the other is a bad thing
   whatever be the cause, and irrespective of any. Hence, 5. Evil
   dispositions or acts should be denominated such, not from their cause
   but from their nature. Were it otherwise, personal fault, or blame,
   could never exist; for the vicious act would transfer the blame to the
   disposition, and the disposition to the cause of that; whereby persons
   would be free from blame, and this would attach to principles only. But
   to suppose a moral agent incapable of blameworthiness, which on the
   supposition would be the case, is a gross absurdity. It would be to
   suppose an accountable being, who at the same time can be accountable
   for nothing; and it would be to impute blame to principles, or a
   principle, which is incapable of moral agencies. 6. The cause of
   virtuous acts, or, if we may so speak, the soil in which they grow, is
   a previous inclination or disposition to good, before any actual choice
   takes place. This may be called a virtuous inclination, or disposition.
   But the original and predisposing cause of that, is divine energy,
   influx, or influence; in other words, an assimilating emanation form
   the holy nature and decretive will of God. 7. Nevertheless, this is not
   a good, or a virtue, attributable to man, until he is actually
   possessed of it, or it becomes his, as a quality of his nature. God,
   the Father of lights, from whom every good and perfect gift proceedeth,
   is the cause of that virtuous disposition; but while the virtue
   remained in the cause, and not in the man, it was no human virtue. Nor
   does the essence of human virtue lie in the communication itself, for
   this was the effect of divine will; but no will can alter the nature of
   virtue: therefore, the essence of virtue consists not in the cause,
   whether we understand by "cause", the Will that communicates the
   virtuous disposition, or the communication itself. Consequently, the
   absence of virtue is so completely confined to the disposition of the
   agent, and the consequent acts, as to exclude every thing else that may
   be termed its cause. 8. The cause of vicious acts, whatever it be, is
   opposite to the cause of virtuous acts; for these acts have
   diametrically opposite effects. That vicious acts have a cause, as well
   as virtuous ones, cannot be denied by any reflecting person, for this
   plain reason, that there is nothing in the universality of things,
   beings, qualities, &c. but had a cause, either positive or negative, as
   before explained. Neither agency, liberty, nor nay thing else,
   considered as an effect, or a consequent, can exist without a cause, or
   antecedent. The denial of this, and universal scepticism, are the same
   thing. Then all reasoning, and all common sense, vanish. Then body and
   spirit, cause and effects, good and evil, &c. are huddled up in endless
   confusion, without either first or last, great or small, order or
   proportion. 9. The original, predisposing cause of a vicious
   disposition, is the very opposite of the original, predisposing cause
   of a virtuous disposition. This last, it has been shown, is divine
   energy, which is a positive cause; the other, the opposite of this, is
   a negative cause. The cause of good, as before observed, is a cause
   properly so called, in the way of physical influence; but the cause of
   evil is called "a cause" improperly, as it implies no physical
   influence, but only stands as an antecedent to a consequent; from which
   however the consequent may be inferred with as much certainty as if the
   influence were physical and mechanical. Whether you suppose positive
   quantities, or negative quantities, consequences are equally certain,
   it is no less true that 5-2=3, than 1-33=6. Whether you say, If the sun
   were not, it would cause darkness; or say, If the sun shine, it will
   cause light; the difference is only in the nature of the cause, as
   either positive or negative, not in the certainty of the consequence.
   10. It would be very absurd and contradictory to say that the cause of
   vice is vicious. For that would be the same as to say, that a thing was
   before it existed. To be vicious is to have vice; and for this to be
   the cause of vice, is for it to be the cause of itself, or self-caused,
   which is absurd. It is therefore impossible that the cause of vice
   should be vicious; consequently the essence of vice is no where but in
   its own proper nature, to the exclusion of every cause whatever. And
   yet, as it is an effect, it must have a cause. 11. The principle
   question to be determined, in this investigation, is, What is precisely
   the original, predisposing, negative cause of a vicious disposition?
   The answer is plain and short; it is that property of a creature which
   renders it absolutely dependent for its being and well-being. Or, it is
   that property which is the very opposite too independence,
   self-sufficiency, and immutability: and therefore is a property
   peculiar to a creature, and cannot belong to God. 12. Nor can this be
   said to be an actually existing property form eternity; since it cannot
   belong to God, and nothing, the only alternative, has no property. It
   is not therefore the Manichean eternal evil principle, if by this be
   meant any thing actually existing, as coeval with a good principle.
   Good is a principle positively eternal; but what we speak of is a mere
   negative principle, and owes its existence as a property to a created
   nature; and were every creature annihilated, this property would also
   cease to be. 13. But what shall we call this principle, property, or
   predisposing cause of vice? Shall we call it defectibility, defect,
   limitation, or imperfection of existence? Not the first; for the
   question would return, What makes a creature defectible? Not the
   second; for the term is ambiguous, as there are several kinds of
   defect, natural and moral, and therefore, as the word is of common use,
   and of frequent occurrence, it would require perpetual explanations.
   Not the third, or the fourth; for the same reason. A term therefore not
   ambiguous, and sufficiently expressive, should be employed; as we
   employ technical terms to express a specific object. For this purpose,
   no term, perhaps, is less exceptionable, or more suitable, than passive
   power; for it is free from ambiguity, and is sufficiently expressive of
   the idea already explained. The idea of passivity is clearly implied in
   the name, as in the thing; and the term power seems preferable to
   property, or quality, because less ambiguous, and yet more expressive
   to convey the intended idea of metaphysical influence of cause and
   effect. 14. To which we may add, That "passive power" is by no means a
   new coined expression; but has often been used to express the very idea
   to which it is here applied. Thus, above a century and a half ago, that
   eminently pious and profoundly learned divine, Theophilus Gale, in his
   "Court of the Gentiles," says: "The root and origin of all creatural
   dependence, is the creature's passive power, and God's absolute
   dominion over it. - Now all limits as to nature and essence speak a
   mixture of nihility, passive power and dependence resulting therefrom;
   whence Damascene adds, The Deity only is impassible;' namely, because
   exempt form nihility, passive power, and dependence. This nihility or
   nothingness of the creature is the same with its passive power either
   physic or metaphysic, natural or obediential; whereby it is limited,
   and confined to such or such a degree of entity, existence, and
   operation." (Court of Gent. Part IV. B. ii. Ch. xi. 4.) 15. Now that
   the essence of vice consisteth not in this property is plain, in that
   passive power is essential to a creature, which vice neither is nor can
   be. It is the soul in which vice grows, and without which it could not
   grow, or have existence, but is not itself vicious; otherwise we should
   be forced to seek the cause of that cause in perpetual retrogradation,
   and move from one difficulty to another into endless absurdity. The
   predisposing cause of vice, therefore, is passive power which in itself
   is not vicious, or morally evil. But how moral evil came to exist, and
   what is its true origin, will be more conveniently considered in a
   subsequent part of this work. 16. As the essence of the virtue and vice
   of disposition and acts lies not in their cause, so neither does it lie
   in their effects; that is, dispositions and acts are not to be
   denominated virtuous or vicious on account of their effects or
   consequences, such as their being productive of happiness or misery.
   For as the properties of any thing must be different from those of its
   cause, however similar, so must those properties differ from their
   effects. The immediate effect of virtue is--not happiness to the
   individual, for instance, but--that the agent is approvable or
   praiseworthy. But were the essence of virtue to consist in "its
   tendency to ultimate happiness," as some have affirmed, immediate
   approbation and praise could not be safely given to any individual act
   or disposition, as its relation to ultimate happiness could not be
   ascertained but by the final event. If the essence of the virtue or
   vice were not in the act or disposition, but to be denominated from its
   effects, many other absurdities would follow. For instance, 17. That
   supposition, the supreme excellence of Jehovah would not be approvable
   and praiseworthy on its own account, or its intrinsic excellency, but
   only because of its effects and consequences. On that principle, to
   hate God would be nothing bad, it would have no intrinsic demerit; or
   to love God would be nothing good, nothing in itself praiseworthy, were
   it not for consequences. Which is not only absurd, but blasphemous also
   and shocking. 18. That sentiment is evidently founded on the
   supposition that every thing, property, quality, and event, is the
   fruit of divine will; and therefore that every thing must be equally
   good in itself, though relatively good or bad to the individual: even
   as matter and motion, and their laws, are equally good in themselves,
   but not relatively so to the individuals who suffer from them. But this
   is a great mistake, as it confounds things totally distinct in their
   nature, such as positive and negative causes, natural necessity and
   moral certainty. Decretive positions and their consequences are one
   ground of certainty; negative causes and their consequences are
   another; therefore, from the certainty of result in the divine view we
   cannot rightly infer that all results are decreed. Decretive positions
   comprehend neither negative causes, nor the nature of things. For an
   intelligent being to love God, is agreeable to the nature of things; it
   is what ought to be independent of any decretive position, or legal
   demand in reference to the case. In like manner, for an intelligent
   being to hate God is a voluntary contradiction to the nature of
   things--or the essence of eternal truth which is above all will, or is
   not founded in will--as well as to constitued law. Again, 19. To deny
   the "intrinsic merit and demerit of voluntary actions independent on
   their consequences," as some do, (Belaham's Elements, p. 309.) is to
   deny the nature of things; and this is nothing less than an attempt to
   divide eternal unity, to give the lie direct to essential truth, and to
   convert the first uncaused essence in to contradictory contingencies.
   The nature of things is nothing else, radically, but the nature of God,
   which is essential truth as well as essential goodness. Decretive
   positions, or an arbitrary constitution of things by divine will,
   therefore can no more alter the intrinsic merit or demerit of actions,
   affections, habits, or characters, then divine will can alter the
   character of essential truth, or choose real contradictions. Moreover,
   20. Ultimate happiness is the effect or consequence of virtue as a
   reward. Now to make the merit or excellence of virtue to depend on
   ultimate happiness, while happiness is the reward of virtue, is most
   inconsistent; it is to reward for nothing rewardable. If virtue be not
   of intrinsic worth, it must be a mere moral nothing, as to
   rewardableness, and therefore ultimate happiness would be a reward for
   a mere moral nothing; that is, happiness would be no reward, which is
   contradictory. 21. As to vice, its consequence is punishment. If indeed
   this consequence were the mere effect of arbitrary positions, or
   sovereign appointment: if it were the plan of God first to cause the
   existence of vice, and then to punish the subject of it, as what the
   good of the whole required, there would be great plausibility in the
   sentiment we oppose. But the assumption itself is fundamentally
   erroneous. It confounds hypothetical antecedents, as the whole of
   decretive plans may be termed, with that eternal truth which connects
   them with their consequences. To suppose the hatred of God, for
   instance, to have no intrinsic demerit in it, or that it is bad only as
   dependent on its consequences; is the same as to say, it is agreeable
   to the nature of things, comformable to eternal truth, that God should
   be hated, and therefore that he must approve of it--only to the agent
   it is attended with bad consequences. That is, on the supposition, God
   has appointed misery as the consequent, for doing nothing that is in
   itself bad; yea for doing what is perfectly innocent, agreeable to the
   nature of things, comformable to eternal truth, and acceptable to God,
   as every thing which he appoints must be. Whether such a sentiment be
   nearest a-kin to "profound philosophy" or to something else, let the
   competent reader judge.--W.

   [137] Scrip. Doc. Of Original Sin, p. 180. 3d Edit.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. II.

   The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of Action,
   and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of
   the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.

   One thing, that is made very much a ground of argument and supposed
   demonstration by Arminians, in defense of the forementioned principles,
   concerning moral Agency, virtue, vice, &c., is their metaphysical
   notion of Agency and Action. They say, unless the soul has a
   self-determining power, it has no power of Action; if its volitions be
   not caused by itself, but are excited and determined by some extrinsic
   cause, they cannot be the soul's own acts; and that the soul cannot be
   active, but must be wholly passive, in those effects which it is the
   subject of necessarily, and not from its own free determination.

   Mr. Chubb lays the foundation of his scheme of Liberty, and of his
   arguments to support it, very much in this position, that man is an
   Agent, and capable of Action. Which doubtless is true: but
   self-determination belongs to his notion of Action, and is the very
   essence of it. Whence he infers, that it is impossible for a man to act
   and be acted upon, in the same thing, at the same time; and that no
   Action can be the effect of the Action of another: and he insists, that
   a necessary Agent, or an Agent that is necessarily determined to act,
   is a plain contradiction. [138]

   But those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which men build on
   the meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a word; especially when that
   meaning is abstruse, inconsistent, and entirely diverse from the
   original sense of the word in common speech.

   That the meaning of the word Action, as Mr. Chubb and many others use
   it, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent, is manifest, because it
   belongs to their notion of an Action, that it is something wherein is
   no passion or passiveness; that is, (according to their sense of
   passiveness,) it is under the power, influence, or Action of no cause.
   And this implies, that Action has no cause, and is no effect; for to be
   an effect implies passiveness, or the being subject to the power and
   Action of its cause. And yet they hold, that the mind's Action is the
   effect of its own determination, yea, the mind's free and voluntary
   determination; which is the same with free choice. So that Action is
   the effect of something preceding, even a preceding act of choice: and
   consequently, in this effect the mind is passive, subject to the power
   and Action of the preceding cause, which is the foregoing choice, and
   therefore cannot be active. So that here we have this contradiction,
   that Action is always the effect of foregoing choice, and therefore
   cannot be Action; because it is passive to the power of that preceding
   causal choice; and the mind cannot be active and passive in the same
   thing, at the same time. Again they say, necessity is utterly
   inconsistent with Action, and a necessary Action is a contradiction;
   and so their notion of Action implies contingence, and excludes all
   necessity. And therefore, their notion of Action implies, that it has
   no necessary dependence on, or connexion with, any thing foregoing; for
   such a dependence or connexion excludes contingence, and implies
   necessity. And yet their notion of Action implies necessity, and
   supposes that it is necessary, and cannot he contingent. For they
   suppose, that whatever is properly called Action, must be determined by
   the Will and free choice; and this is as much as to say, that it must
   he necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by, something
   foregoing; namely, a foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to
   their notion of Action, that it is the beginning of motion, or of
   exertion of power; but yet it is implied in their notion of Action,
   that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is
   consequent and dependent on a preceding exertion of power, viz. the
   power of Will and choice: for they say there is no proper Action but
   what is freely chosen; or, which is the same thing, determined by a
   foregoing act of free choice. But if any of them shall see cause to
   deny this, and say they hold no such thing as that every Action is
   chosen or determined by a foregoing choice; but that the very first
   exertion of Will only, undetermined by any preceding act, is properly
   called Action; then I say, such a man's notion of Action implies
   necessity; for what the mind is the subject of, without the
   determination of its own previous choice, it is the subject of
   necessarily, as to any hand that free choice has in the affair; and
   without any ability the mind has to prevent it, by any will or election
   of its own; because by the supposition it precludes all previous acts
   of the Will or choice in the case, which might prevent it. So that it
   is again, in this other way, implied in their notion of act, that it is
   both necessary and not necessary, Again it belongs to their notion of
   an act, that it is no effect of a predetermining bias or
   preponderation, but springs immediately out of indifference; and this
   implies, that it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing
   preponderation: if it be not habitual, but occasional, yet if it causes
   the act, it is truly previous, efficacious, and determining. And yet,
   at the same time, it is essential to their notion of the act, that it
   is what the agent is the author of freely and voluntarily, and that is,
   by previous choice and design.

   So that, according to their notion of the act, considered with regard
   to its consequences, these following things are all essential to it;
   viz. That it should be necessary, and not necessary; that it should be
   from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and
   design, and not the fruit of choice and design; that it should he the
   beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous
   exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring
   immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect
   of preponderation; that it should be self-originated, and also have its
   original from something else; that it is what the mind causes itself,
   of its own will, and can produce or prevent, according to its choice or
   pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, precluding all
   previous choice in the affair.

   So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of it, is
   something of which there is no idea; it is nothing but a confusion of
   the mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning, and is an
   absolute nonentity; and that in two respects: (1.) There is nothing in
   the world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must
   belong to its description, according to what they suppose to be
   essential to it. And, (2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be,
   any notion or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For,
   if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways destroy
   itself. But it is impossible any idea or notion should subsist in the
   mind, whose very nature and essence which constitutes it, destroys
   it.--If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an
   account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should
   say, "He had been in Terra del Fuego, and there had seen an animal,
   which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself,
   and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an
   appetite, and was hungry before it had a being; that his master, who
   led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him,
   and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved, he always took
   a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet
   always went tail foremost; and this, though he had neither head nor
   tail:" it would be no impudence at all, to tell such a traveler, though
   a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of such an animal
   as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.

   As the forementioned notion of Action is very inconsistent, so it is
   wholly diverse from the original meaning of the word. The more usual
   signification of it, in vulgar speech, seems to be some motion or
   exertion of power, that is voluntary, or that is the effect of the
   Will; and is used in the same sense as doing: and most commonly it is
   used to signify outward Actions. So thinking is often distinguished
   from acting, and desiring and willing from doing.

   Besides this more usual and proper signification of the word Action,
   there are other ways in which the word is used, that are less proper,
   which yet have place in common speech. Oftentimes it is used to signify
   some motion or alteration in inanimate things, with relation to some
   object and effect. So the spring of a watch is said to act upon the
   chain and wheels; the sunbeams, to act upon plants and trees: and the
   fire, to act upon wood. Sometimes, the word is useful to signify
   motions, alterations, and exertions of power, which are seen in
   corporeal things, considered absolutely; especially when these motions
   seem to arise from some internal cause which is hidden; so that they
   have a greater resemblance of those motions of our bodies, which are
   the effects of natural volition, or invisible exertions of Will. So the
   fermentation of liquor, the operations of the loadstone, and of
   electrical bodies, are called the Action of these things. And sometimes
   the word Action is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of Will
   and inclination: so meditating, loving, hating, inclining,
   disinclining, choosing, and refusing, may be sometimes called acting;
   though more rarely (unless it be by philosophers and metaphysicians)
   than in any of the other senses.

   But the word is never used in vulgar speech for the self-determinate
   exercise of the Will, or an exertion of the soul that arises without
   any necessary connexion with any thing foregoing. If a man does
   something voluntarily, or as the effect of his choice, then in the most
   proper sense, and as the word is most originally and commonly used, he
   is said to act; but whether that choice or volition be self-determined,
   or no; whether it be connected with foregoing, habitual bias; whether
   it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some intrinsic
   cause, never comes into consideration in the meaning of the word.

   And if the word Action is arbitrarily used by some men otherwise, to
   suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no argument can reasonably
   be founded on such a use of this term, to prove any thing but their own
   pleasure. For divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such
   arguments, as though they were sufficient to support and demonstrate a
   whole scheme of moral philosophy and divinity, is certainly to erect a
   mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on a shadow. And though it may
   now perhaps, through custom, have become natural for then to use the
   word in this sense, (if that may be called a sense or meaning, which is
   inconsistent with itself,) yet this does not prove, that it is
   agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can
   be any thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And
   though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are so far
   from experiencing any such thing, that it is impossible for them to
   have any conception of it.

   If it should be objected, that Action and Passion are doubtless words
   of a contrary signification; but to suppose that the agent, in its
   Action, is under the power and influence of something intrinsic, is to
   confound Action and passion, and make them the same thing:

   I answer, that Action and Passion are doubtless, as they are sometimes
   used, words of opposite signification; but not as signifying opposite
   existences, but only opposite relations. The words cause and effect are
   terms of opposite signification; but, nevertheless, if I assert, that
   the same thing may, at the same time, in different respects and
   relations, be both cause and effect, this will not prove that I
   confound the terms. The soul may be both active and passive in the same
   thing in different respects; active with relation to one thing, and
   passive with relation to another. [139] The word Passion, when set in
   opposition to Action, or rather activeness, is merely a relative: it
   signifies no effect or cause, nor any proper existence; but is the same
   with Passiveness, or a being passive, or a being acted upon by
   something. Which is a mere relation of a thing to some power or force
   exerted by some cause, producing some effect in it, or upon it. And
   Action, when set properly in opposition to Passion, or Passiveness, is
   no real existence; it is not the same with an Action, but is a mere
   relation: it is the activeness of something on another thing, being the
   opposite relation to the other, viz. a relation of power, or force,
   exerted by some cause, towards another thing, which is the subject of
   the effect of that power. Indeed, the word Action is frequently used to
   signify something not merely relative, but more absolute, and a real
   existence; as when we say an Action; when the word is not used
   transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or
   mind, without any relation to any object or effect: and as used thus,
   it is not properly the opposite of Passion; which ordinarily signifies
   nothing absolute, but merely the relation of being acted upon. And
   therefore if the word Action be used in the like relative sense, then
   Action and Passion are only two contrary relations. And it is no
   absurdity to suppose, that contrary relations may belong to the same
   thing at the same time, with respect to different things. So to
   suppose, that there are acts of the soul by which a man voluntarily
   moves, and acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet
   themselves are effects of something else, and wherein the soul itself
   is the object of something acting upon, and influencing that, do not at
   all confound Action and Passion. The words may nevertheless be properly
   of opposite signification: there may be as true and real a difference
   between acting and being caused to act, though we should suppose the
   soul to be both in the same volition, as there is between living and
   being quickened, or made to live. It is no more a contradiction, to
   suppose that Action may be the effect of some other cause, besides the
   agent, or being that acts, than to suppose, that life may be the effect
   of some other cause, besides the being that lives.

   What has led men into this inconsistent notion of Action, when applied
   to volition--as though it were essential to this internal Action, that
   the agent should be self-determined in it, and that the Will should be
   the cause of it--was probably this; that according to the sense of
   mankind, and the common use of language, it is so, with respect to
   men's external Actions; which originally, and according to the vulgar
   use and most proper sense of the word, are called Actions. Men in these
   are self-directed, self-determined, and their Wills are the cause of
   the motions of their bodies, and the external things done; so that
   unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the Action be
   determined by their antecedent volition, it is no Action or doing of
   theirs. Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but exceeding
   absurdly, to suppose the same concerning volition itself, that that
   also must be determined by the Will; which is to be determined by
   antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is; not considering the
   contradiction it implies.

   But it is very evident, that in the metaphysical distinction between
   Action and passion, (though long since become common and the general
   vogue) due care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of
   things, or to any distinct, clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other
   philosophical metaphysical terms, used in these disputes; which has
   occasioned inexpressible difficulty, contention, error, and confusion.

   And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity was
   inconsistent with Action, as these terms are applied to volition.
   First, these terms, Action and necessity are changed from their
   original meaning, as signifying external voluntary Action and
   constraint (in which meaning they are evidently inconsistent) to
   signify quite other things, viz. volition itself, and certainty of
   existence. And when the change of signification is made, care is not
   taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the difference of
   sense; but still the same things are unwarily attributed to Action and
   necessity, in the new meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to
   them in their first sense; and on this ground, maxims are established
   without any real foundation, as though they were the most certain
   truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.

   But, however strenuously it is maintained, that what is necessary
   cannot he properly called Action, and that a necessary Action is a
   contradiction, yet it is probable there are few Arminian divines, who
   thoroughly tried, would stand to these principles. They will allow,
   that God is, in the highest sense, an active Being, and thee highest
   Fountain of life and Action; and they would not probably deny, that
   what are called God's acts of righteousness, holiness, and
   faithfulness, are truly and properly God's acts, and God is really a
   holy Agent in them; and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God
   necessarily acts justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for
   him to act unrighteously and unholily.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [138] Were the human mind, indeed, not the subject of either passive
   power, on the one hand, as the predisposing cause of vice; or of divine
   holy influence, on the other, as the predisposing cause of real virtue;
   and were the determining motive what some have represented it to be,
   the object itself, irrespective of the changeable state of mind
   perceiving it; the objection, that "a necessary agent is a plain
   contradiction," or, in other words, that man is no proper agent, would
   be unanswerable. For the rank and place of man in creation, and his
   relative circumstances in the arrangement of providence, being the
   result of decretive appointment, if he himself were not liable to any
   change but by the same appointment, it would follow, that if the
   objects themselves determined him to choose, and to choose always
   according to the strongest motive, his very volitions in the acts
   themselves would be necessitated decretively, to the exclusion of all
   hypothetical or moral possibility of failure; and therefore could never
   be erroneous, any more than the first cause could act erroneously. On
   such principles, moral evil, vice or fault, could have no existence. No
   effect cold be otherwise than good, amiable, and perfectly innocent; a
   moral possibility of failure being excluded by natural necessity. For
   the volition itself to be so necessitated, and not in a moral or
   hypothetical manner only, is the same thing as giving it no opportunity
   of choice or preference, or constraining it to choose one way by a
   settled purpose, with a natural impossibility of acting otherwise. But
   if every act of man be thus the result of settled purpose, why should
   he be blamed for any one act whatever? He does nothing but what he is
   constrained, or decretively necessitated to perform, the contrary being
   rendered naturally impossible; and if he deserves no praise, he can
   incur no blame, any more than a clock for not keeping time. Such a
   necessary agent would be indeed a plain contradiction. There is much
   reason to apprehend that some philosophical necessarians have no better
   notion of agency than that which Mr. Chubb charges, and justly charges,
   with "a plain contradiction." For those who hold the sentiment, that
   every act, even as to its moral quality, and every event, are of
   decretive appointment, in subserviency to ultimate good, must allow, in
   order to be tolerably consistent, that the Supreme Being is "the only
   proper agent in the universe;" ( Belsham's Elements of the Philosophy
   of the Mind, p. 254.) and thus reduce human agency, and things else
   called agency in a creature, to an appointed necessary choice, however
   odious in its nature, mischievious in its tendency, or painful in
   experience. Thus, according to them, God is the only proper agent in
   all foul crimes and horrid blasphemies, on earth and in hell! They have
   a right to define their terms, and to say what they mean by agency in
   God, or in a creature, and to state their hypothesis accordingly; but
   others also have a right to deduce the genuine consequences of that
   hypothesis, and to show wherein its error lies.--The design of these
   notes is not to excite a spirit of unprofitable controversy, but to
   assist the serious inquirer in detecting errors and recognizing truths
   of radical importance in ethics and theology; and, it is hoped, that to
   promote these ends the following observations may conduce. 1. It is
   granted, that in reference to natural acts, the Supreme Being is the
   "only proper agent in the universe," as they all spring from his
   energy. In this respect he is the first cause of all causes,
   efficiently; and the description of the post is philosophically just:
   he "Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze, Glows in the stars, and
   blossoms in the trees, Lives through all life, extends through all
   extent, Spreads undivided, operates unspent." POPE 2. It is also
   granted, that, in all acts morally good, the created agent is the
   subject of necessity several ways. He has an active nature from
   decretive necessity, which it is not in his power to alter. He is also,
   accordingly, compelled to some act of choice, from the activity of his
   nature. He is, moreover, the subject of physical influence of a holy
   and purifying nature, whereby the goodness of his choice is infallibly
   secured; and without which there could be no assignable ground of
   certainty that any action would be morally good. There is also a
   necessity of connexion, arising from the nature of things, or the
   essence of truth, first between the disposition and the act, or that
   the act will be of the same nature, morally considered, with the
   disposition from which it proceeds; and secondly, between the act and
   the end, or consequent, which is happiness. 3. It is moreover allowed,
   that in all acts morally evil, the soul is passive in reference to that
   necessity of dependence which is inseparable from a created nature,
   which may be called passive power; without which the existence of moral
   evil would be impossible. This necessity also arises form the nature of
   things, not from decree; for no decree can alter its existence, (though
   it may, and actually does, counteract it.) any more than it can alter
   the state of a creature from dependence into independence on the first
   cause. A creature without passive power involves the most palpable
   absurdities. For its very definition is, "that property in a creature
   whereby it differs essentially form the independence, self-sufficience,
   and indefectibility of the Creator;" and to deny it, is to suppose that
   a creature may be independent, self-sufficient, and indefectible - that
   in these respects the creature and the Creator are on a par--that a
   necessary and a contingent being are the same, in those very things
   which constitute their essential difference! Were it not for this
   property in an agent, he could never sin; for all his acts would be
   physically necessary, without any hypothetical medium, or moral
   alternative. 4. He is a moral agent, whose volitions might have been
   otherwise than they are, if the motives, and consequently the state of
   his mind, had been otherwise. But to suppose that his volitions might
   have been otherwise than they are, the motives and the state of the
   mind being the same, would be to make him in his volitions the sport of
   chance, or a mere non-entity. 5. He then is a moral agent who has, in
   reference to volition, a moral alternative, or a hypothetical
   possibility of a different choice. Where this alternative, or this
   possibility, is not, there the agent (if he may be so called) is not
   morally obliged, and therefore is not accountable. 6. But if so, where
   does the ground of such an alternative lie? It lies in the agent's
   mind, or the disposition whence the volition springs, and whence its
   character is derived. If God influence the mind so as to make it, in a
   given degree, to resemble his own moral nature; in that degree would
   the choice made be morally good. But if passive power be not
   counteracted by such influence, (which being gracious, God is not bound
   in equity to do.) in any given degree, the nature of things, the
   essence of truth; connects, in a corresponding degree, the state of
   mind with the volition. 7. Hence it is plain, that moral influence, as
   such, effects nothing certain; but always requires a previous state of
   mind, in order to insure a certainty of good effect; and that previous
   state of mind is effected by no other possible means but a physical
   energy or agency, producing assimilation. There must be a virtuous mind
   before a virtuous choice; the quality of the act is derived from the
   agent. 8. One thing, which has been a source of much obscurity and
   confusion in reference to moral agency, is the supposition that the
   mind is equally free, in all respects, when choosing good and when
   choosing evil; in other words, that the one volition and the other
   becomes morally certain, form the same sort of necessity. But this is
   not the real case. Indeed the necessity of connexion between the
   previous state of mind and the corresponding volition, is the same; for
   it is, in each case, nothing else but the nature of things; but that
   necessity which effects a state of mind previous to good volitions, is
   as different from the other necessity which effects a state of mind
   previous to volitions morally evil, as light is from darkness. They
   proceed from opposite quarters, and operate in contrary directions. A
   holy disposition is generated by decretive holy influence; the other
   disposition (which ought not however to be called unholy) proceeds form
   the hypothetical nature of things. Such a disposition, though no
   morally vicious, yet generates vice in union with free agency. 9. It is
   highly worthy of remark, that though a good volition must proceed from
   a good heart, morally considered; yet a bad volition does not,
   originally and necessarily, proceed from a morally bad heart. The
   reason is, that the one state of heart proceeds form God., from his
   decretive holy will; the other proceeds form passive power, which is
   only a natural evil, and not a moral. Besides, were the disposition
   which immediately precedes a bad volition necessarily, or in a every
   case, evil, in a moral sense, either moral evil could have no place at
   all in the universe, no origin whatever, or else it must be the same as
   passive power. But passive power is a contrast, not to the moral
   perfections of God, but his natural; and has, when alone, no moral
   quality. And, seeing it belongs as a property to every creature, as
   such, were it any thing morally evil, moral evil would be essential to
   the very being of every creature; which is absurd. 10. Hence it is
   plain, that freedom is experienced in a higher sense or a greater
   degree, in bad volitions, than in good ones in such a sense, and to
   such a degree, as to justify this mode of expression. That man is
   necessitated to good, but free to evil. This however may need some
   explanatory qualification; for he is not so necessitated to good, as
   not to be morally or hypothetically free; nor so free to evil as not to
   be subject to a necessity of consequence. He who acts or chooses amiss
   without constraint, compulsion, or interfering voluntary force in that
   act, notwithstanding his passive power, is properly a free agent; for
   in the moral quality of the act, there is properly and strictly no will
   concerned but his own. But he who acts or chooses aright, is subject to
   a physical, decretive necessity, as to his disposition and a physical
   concourse of divine energy in the natural act of the will. He is indeed
   morally free, inasmuch as his volition might have been of a different,
   yea, of an opposite moral quality, if the state of his mind had been
   different. Hence it is evident, that in a good will, choice, or act,
   man is an agent in a less proper or secondary sense; but in a bad will,
   choice, or act, man is an agent, a moral agent, a free agent, in the
   most proper and strict sense. And in the production of an act morally
   good two wills are concerned, that of the agent, and the decretive will
   of God; in that of evil, only one, the agent's own will. 11. If the
   Supreme Being is the only proper agent in the universe, either moral
   agency is no proper agency, or else man is not a moral agent; and if
   so, his is not accountable, and has no concern in religion or morals.
   Besides, if God be the only proper agent in the universe, how come
   there to exist evil deeds? God's agency is good, else we have no
   evidence that he is a good being; but there are in the world evil deeds
   proceeding from evil minds, which common sense and universal consent
   allow, and the nature of the thing proves, to be properly evil
   agencies; consequently man is an agent, a moral agent, properly so
   called. 12. If there be no proper agent in the universe but the supreme
   Being, there is no evil in the nature of bad volitions, but only in
   their effects. Sin, on that supposition, is not bad in its own nature,
   but only injurious in it effects on the sinner. Sin is not to be hated,
   it seems, on its own account, as odious, but only shunned as dangerous.
   But as this must arise, according to the system of its abettors, from a
   sovereign appointment, it follows, that millions of beings are by this
   very appointment, doomed to the greatest sufferings in the universe,
   for that in which they had no proper agency--no possible alternative!
   Where is equity, of benevolence? The only clue out of this labyrinth,
   and out of many others formed by writers on human agency, is, we are
   fully persuaded , a right view of passive power, in its nature, origin,
   and tendency, in conjunction with a morally or hypothetically free
   choice. W.

   [139] This distinction is of considerable moment. The soul is passive,
   for instance, in reference to that necessity of dependence which is
   inseparable from a created nature; and when the subject of providential
   energy in natural acts; and also when the subject of that divine
   influence which purifies and enables the mind, and whereby holy effects
   are secured; and in all these respects it is passive at the very time
   that it is active in its choice or preference. In other words, the mind
   is necessitated in some respects; as, to exist, to think, to will, to
   suffer, or to enjoy; at the same instant that it is free in other
   respects, as, from contingence, (understanding thereby an event without
   any cause,) and from compulsions, or physical necessity in its acts as
   moral.--W.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. III.

   The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose
   those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or
   Blame.

   It is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is
   contrary to common Sense, and the natural notions and apprehensions of
   mankind, to suppose otherwise than that necessity (making no
   distinction between natural and moral necessity) is inconsistent, with
   Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. And their
   arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in; and have been not
   a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as
   clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures: it has seemed to them indeed
   difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the notions men
   commonly have of justice and equity. And the true reasons of it seem to
   be the following:

   I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Sense, that natural
   necessity is wholly inconsistent with just Praise or Blame. If men do
   things which in themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass,
   and attended with very happy effects, properly against their Wills; or
   do them from a necessity that is without their Wills, or with which
   their Wills have no concern or connexion; then it is a plain dictate of
   common Sense, that such doings are none of their virtue, nor have they
   any moral good in them; and that the persons are not worthy to be
   rewarded or praised; or at all esteemed, honoured, or loved on that
   account. And, on the other hand, that if, from like necessity, they do
   those things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and
   do them because they cannot help it; the necessity is such, that it is
   all one whether they will them, or no; and the reason why they are
   done, is from necessity only, and not from their Wills; it is a very
   plain dictate of common Sense, that they are not at all to blame; there
   is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done; nor are
   they, who are thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished,
   hated, or in the least disrespected, on that account.

   In like manner, if things in themselves good and desirable are
   absolutely impossible, with a natural impossibility, the universal
   reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and perfectly excuses
   persons in their not doing them.

   And it is also a plain dictate of common Sense, that if the doing
   things, in themselves good, or avoiding things in themselves evil, is
   not absolutely impossible, with such a natural impossibility, but very
   difficult, with a natural difficulty; that is, a difficulty prior to,
   and not at all consisting in, Will and inclination itself, and which
   would remain the same, let the inclination be what it will; then a
   person's neglect or omission is excused in some measure, though not
   wholly; his sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be done were
   easy. And if instead of difficulty and hindrance, there be a contrary
   natural propensity in the state of things, to the thing to be done, or
   effect to he brought to pass, abstracted from any consideration of the
   inclination of the heart; though the propensity be not so great as to
   amount to a natural necessity; yet being some approach to it, so that
   the doing of the good thing be very much from this natural tendency in
   the state of things, and but little from a good inclination; then it is
   a dictate of common Sense, that there is so much the less virtue in
   what is done; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The reason
   is easy, viz. because such a natural propensity or tendency is an
   approach to natural necessity; and the greater the propensity, still so
   much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And, therefore, as
   natural necessity takes away or shuts out all virtue, so this
   propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue; that is, it diminishes
   it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the state of things,
   is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it is
   complete and absolute, wholly takes away Blame; so such difficulty
   takes away some Blame, or diminishes Blame; and makes the thing done to
   be less worthy of punishment.

   II. Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, must, cannot,
   cannot help it, cannot avoid it, necessary, unable, impossible,
   unavoidable, irresistible, &c., use them to signify a necessity of
   constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or impossibility; or some
   necessity that the Will has nothing to do in; which may be, whether men
   will or no; and which may be supposed to be just the same, let men's
   inclinations and desires be what they will. Such kind of terms, in
   their original use, I suppose among all nations, are relative; carrying
   in their signification (as was before observed) a reference or respect
   to some contrary Will, desire, or endeavour, which, it is supposed, is,
   or may be, in the case. All men find, and begin to find in early
   childhood, that there are innumerable things that cannot be done, which
   they desire to do; and innumerable things, which they are averse to,
   that must be, they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choose
   them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men so soon and so
   often find, and which so greatly and early affects them in innumerable
   cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed; and it is to
   signify such a necessity, that they are first used, and that they are
   most constantly used, in the common affairs of life; and not to signify
   any such metaphysical, speculative, and abstract notion, as that
   connexion in the nature or course of things, which is between the
   subject and predicative of a proposition, and which is the foundation
   of the certain truth of that proposition; to signify which, they who
   employ themselves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin and
   metaphysical relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed these
   terms, for want of others. But we grow up from our cradles in a use of
   such terms and phrases entirely different from this, and carrying a
   sense exceeding diverse from that in which they are commonly used in
   the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists. And it being, as was
   said before, a dictate of the universal sense of mankind, evident to us
   as soon as we begin to think, that the necessity signified by these
   terms, in the sense in which we first learn them, does excuse persons,
   and free them from all Fault or Blame; hence our idea of excusableness
   or faultlessness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit,
   which is begun in childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up
   with us, and is strengthened by constant use and custom, the connexion
   growing stronger and stronger.

   The habitual connexion, which is in men's minds between Blamelessness
   and those forementioned terms, must, cannot, unable, necessary,
   impossible, unavoidable, &c. becomes very strong, because, as soon as
   ever men begin to use reason and speech, they have occasion to excuse
   themselves, from the natural necessity signified by these terms, in
   numerous instances.--I cannot do it--I could not help it.--And all
   mankind have constant and daily occasion to use such phrases in this
   sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the concerns of
   life, with respect to disappointments, and things that happen, which
   concern and affect ourselves and others, that are hurtful, or
   disagreeable to us or them, or things desirable, that we or others fail
   to obtain.

   That our being accustomed to an union of different ideas, from early
   childhood, makes the habitual connexion exceeding strong, as though
   such connexion were owing to nature, is manifest in innumerable
   instances. It is altogether by such an habitual connexion of ideas,
   that men judge of the bigness or distance of the objects of sight, from
   their appearance. Thus it is owing to such a connexion early
   established, and growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain,
   which he sees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nose, or
   further off than the end of it. Having been used so long to join a
   considerable distance and magnitude with such an appearance, men
   imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense: whereas, it would be quite
   otherwise with one that had his eyes newly opened, who had been born
   blind: he would have the same visible appearance, but natural sense
   would dictate no such thing, concerning the magnitude or distance of
   what appeared.

   III. When men, after they had been so habituated to connect ideas of
   Innocency or Blamelessness with such terms, that the union seems to be
   the effect of mere nature, come to hear the same terms used, and learn
   to use them in the forementioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify
   quite another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation to
   a contrary supposable Will and endeavour; the notation of plain and
   manifest Blamelessness, by this means, is, by a strong prejudice,
   insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case to which it by no means
   belongs: the change of the use of the terms, to a signification which
   is very diverse, not being taken notice of, or adverted to. And there
   are several reasons why it is not.

   l. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear
   in their meaning: few use them in a fixed determined sense. On the
   contrary, their meaning is very vague and confused. Which commonly
   happens to the words used to signify things intellectual and moral, and
   to express what Mr. Locke calls mixt modes. If men had a clear and
   distinct understanding of what is intended by these metaphysical terms,
   they would be able more easily to compare them with their original and
   common sense; and so would not be so easily led into delusion by words
   of this sort.

   2. The change of the signification of the terms is the more insensible,
   because the things signified, though indeed very different, yet do in
   some generals agree. In necessity, that which is vulgarly so called,
   there is a strong connexion between the thing said to be necessary, and
   some thing antecedent to it, in the order of nature; so there is also a
   philosophical necessity. And though in both kinds of necessity, the
   connexion cannot be called by that name, with relation to an opposite
   will or endeavour, to which it is superior; which is the case in vulgar
   necessity; yet in both, the connexion is prior to Will and endeavour,
   and so, in some respect, superior. In both kinds of necessity, there is
   a foundation for some certainty of the proposition, that affirms the
   event.--The terms used being the same, and the things signified
   agreeing in these and some other general circumstances; and the
   expressions as used by philosophers being not well defined, and so of
   obscure and loose signification; hence persons are not aware of the
   great difference; and the notions of innocence or faultiness, which
   were so strongly associated with them, and were strictly united in
   their minds, ever since they can remember, remain united with them
   still, as if the union were altogether natural and necessary; and they
   that go about to make a separation, seem to them to do great violence
   even to nature itself.

   IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile it with
   reason, that men should be blamed for that which is necessary, with a
   moral necessity, (which, as was observed before, is a species of
   philosophical necessity) is, that for want of due consideration, men
   inwardly entertain that apprehension, that this necessity may be
   against men's Wills and sincere endeavors. They go away with that
   notion, that men may truly will, and wish, and strive, that it may be
   otherwise; but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many
   think thus concerning themselves: some wicked men think they wish that
   they were good, that they love God and holiness; but yet do not find
   that their wishes produce the effect.--The reasons why men think so,
   are as follow:

   1. They find what may be called an indirect willingness to have a
   better Will, in the manner before observed. For it is impossible, and a
   contradiction to suppose the Will to be directly and properly against
   itself. And they do not consider that this indirect willingness is
   entirely a different thing from properly willing what is the duty and
   virtue required; and that there is no virtue in that sort of
   willingness which they have. They do not consider, that the volitions,
   which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the Will
   at all against the moral evil of not loving God; but only some
   disagreeable consequences. But the making of the requisite distinction
   requires more care of reflection and thought, than most men are used
   to. And men, through a prejudice in their own favour, are disposed to
   think well of their own desires and dispositions, and to account them
   good and virtuous, though their respect to virtue be only indirect and
   remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous that truly excites or
   terminates their inclinations.

   2. Another thing that insensibly leads and beguiles men into a
   supposition that this moral necessity or impossibility is, or may be,
   against men's Wills and true endeavors, is the derivation of the terms
   often used to express it. Such words for instance, as unable,
   unavoidable, impossible, irresistible; which carry a plain reference to
   a supposable power exerted, endeavors used, resistance made, in
   opposition to the necessity: and the persons that hear them, not
   considering, nor suspecting, but that they are used in their proper
   sense; that sense being therefore understood, there does naturally, and
   as it were necessarily, arise in their minds a supposition, that it may
   be so indeed, that true desires and endeavors may take place, but that
   invincible necessity stands in the way, and renders them vain and to no
   effect.

   V. Another thing which makes persons more ready to suppose it to be
   contrary to reason, that men should be exposed to the punishments
   threatened to sin, for doing those things which are morally necessary,
   or not doing those things morally impossible, is, that imagination
   strengthens the argument, and adds greatly to the power and influence
   of the seeming reasons against it, from the greatness of that
   punishment. To allow that they may be justly exposed to a small
   punishment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there were any good
   reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that such
   necessity was inconsistent with faultiness, or just punishment, the
   demonstration would be equally certain with respect to a small
   punishment, or any punishment at all, as a very great one: but it is
   not equally easy to the imagination. They that argue against the
   justice of damning men for those things that are thus necessary, seem
   to make their argument the stronger, by setting forth the greatness of
   the punishment in strong expressions:--"That a man should be cast into
   eternal burnings, that he should be made to fry in hell to all
   eternity, for those things which he had no power to avoid, and was
   under a fatal, unfrustrable, invincible necessity of doing," &c.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. IV.

   It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to
   suppose moral Necessity In be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward
   and Punishment.

   Whether the reasons, that have been given, why it appears difficult to
   some persons, to reconcile with common sense the praising or blaming,
   rewarding or punishing, those things which are morally necessary, are
   thought satisfactory, or not; yet it most evidently appears, by the
   following things, that if this matter be rightly understood, setting
   aside all delusion arising from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms,
   this is not at all inconsistent with the natural apprehensions of
   mankind, and that sense of things which is found every where in the
   common people; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted
   from their natural channel, by metaphysical and philosophical
   subtilties; but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very
   voice and dictate of, this natural and vulgar sense.

   I. This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar notion of
   blameworthiness is. The idea which the common people, through all ages
   and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this; a person
   being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure; containing these
   two things: 1. His doing wrong, when he does as he pleases. 2. His
   pleasure being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly
   expressing their notion; a person having his heart wrong, and doing
   wrong from his heart. And this is the sum total of the matter.

   The common people do not ascend up in their reflections and
   abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations, and dependences of
   things, in order to form their notion of faultiness or blameworthiness.
   They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings, what first
   determines the Will; whether it be determined by something extrinsic,
   or intrinsic; whether volition determines volition, or whether the
   understanding determines the Will; whether there be any such tiling as
   metaphysicians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning); whether
   there be a sort of a strange unaccountable sovereignty in the Will, in
   the exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all
   its own sovereign acts. They do not take any part of their notion of
   Fault or Blame from the resolution of any such questions. If this were
   the case, there are multitudes, yea the far greater part of mankind,
   nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die,
   without having any such notion, as that of Fault, ever entering into
   their heads, or without so much as once having any conception that any
   body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. If this were
   the case, it would be a long time before men came to have such notions.
   Whereas it is manifest, they are in fact some of the first notions that
   appear in children; who discover, as soon as they can think, or speak,
   or act at all as rational creatures, a sense of desert. And, certainly,
   in forming their notion of it, they make no use of metaphysics. All the
   ground they go upon, consists in these two things: experience and a
   Natural sensation of a certain fitness or agreeableness, which there is
   in uniting such moral evil as is above described, viz. a being or doing
   wrong with the Will, and resentment in others, and pain inflicted on
   the person in whom this moral evil is. Which natural sense is what we
   call by the name of conscience.

   It is true, the common people and children, in their notion of any
   faulty act or deed, of any person, do suppose that it is the person's
   own act and deed. But this is all that belongs to what they understand
   by a thing being a person's own deed or action; even that it is
   something done by him of choice. That some exercise or motion should
   begin of itself, does not belong to their notion of an action, or
   doing. If so, it would belong to their notion of it, that it is the
   cause of its own beginning: and that is as much as to say, that it is
   before it begins to be. Nor is their notion of an action some motion or
   exercise, that begins accidentally, without any cause or reason; for
   that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common sense, namely,
   that every thing that begins to be, has some cause or reason why it is.

   The common people, in their notion of a faulty or praiseworthy work
   done by any one, do suppose, that the man does it in the exercise of
   liberty. But then their notion of liberty is only a person having
   opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no notion of liberty
   consisting in the Will first acting, and so causing its own acts;
   determining, and so causing its own determinations; or choosing, and so
   causing its own choice. Such a notion of liberty is what none have, but
   those that have darkened their own minds with confused metaphysical
   speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous terms. If a man is not
   restrained from acting as his Will determines, or constrained to act
   otherwise; then he has liberty, according to common notions of liberty,
   without taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the
   determinations of a man's free Will being the effects of the
   determinations of his free Will.--Nor have men commonly any notion of
   freedom consisting in indifference. For if so, then it would be
   agreeable to their notion, that the greater indifference men act with,
   the more freedom they act with; whereas, the reverse is true. He that
   in acting proceeds with the fullest inclination, does what he does with
   the greatest freedom, according to common sense. And so far is it from
   being agreeable to common sense, that such liberty as consists in
   indifference is requisite to Praise or Blame, that, on the contrary,
   the dictate of every man's natural sense through the world is, that the
   further he is from being indifferent in his acting good or evil, and
   the more he does either with full and strong inclination, the more is
   he esteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.

   II. If it were inconsistent with the common sense of mankind, that men
   should be either blamed or commended in any volitions, in case of moral
   Necessity or impossibility; then it would surely also be agreeable to
   the same sense and reason of mankind, that the nearer the case
   approaches to such a moral Necessity or impossibility--either through a
   strong antecedent moral propensity, on the one hand, [140] or a great
   antecedent opposition and difficulty, on the other--the nearer does it
   approach to a person being neither blamable nor commendable: so that
   acts exerted with such preceding propensity, would be worthy of
   proportionably less Praise; and when omitted, the act being attended
   with such difficulty, the omission would be worthy of the less Blame.
   It is so, as was observed before, with natural Necessity and
   impossibility, propensity and difficulty: as it is a plain dictate of
   the sense of all mankind, that natural Necessity and impossibility take
   away all Blame and Praise; and therefore, that the nearer the approach
   is to these, through previous propensity or difficulty, so Praise and
   Blame are proportionally diminished. And if it were as much a dictate
   of common sense, that moral Necessity of doing, or impossibility of
   avoiding, takes away all Praise and Blame, as that natural Necessity or
   impossibility does; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it would be as
   much the dictate of common sense, that an approach of moral Necessity
   of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, diminishes Praise and Blame, as
   that an approach to natural Necessity and impossibility does so. It is
   equally the voice of common sense, that persons are excusable in part,
   in neglecting things difficult against their Wills, as that they are
   excusable wholly in neglecting things impossible against their Wills.
   And if it made no difference, whether the impossibility were natural
   and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to
   excusableness; so neither would it make any difference, whether the
   difficulty, or approach to Necessity, be natural, against the Will, or
   moral, lying in the propensity of the Will.

   But it is apparent, that the reverse of these things is true. If there
   be an approach to a moral Necessity in a man's exertion of good acts of
   Will, they being the exercise of a strong propensity to good, and a
   very powerful love to virtue; it is so far from being the dictate of
   common sense, that he is less virtuous, and the less to be esteemed,
   loved, and praised; that it is agreeable to the natural notions of all
   mankind, that he is so much the better man, worthy of greater respect,
   and higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination is, and the
   nearer it approaches to Necessity in that respect; or to impossibility
   of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a vicious one; still the
   more virtuous, and worthy of higher commendation. And, on the other
   hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind; as, for instance, acts of
   pride or malice from a rooted and strong habit or principle of
   haughtiness and maliciousness, and a violent propensity of heart to
   such acts; according to the natural sense of men, he is so far from
   being the less hateful and blamable on that account, that he is so much
   the more worthy to be detested and condemned, by all that observe him.

   Moreover, it is manifest that it is no part of the notion, which
   mankind commonly have of a blamable or praiseworthy act of the Will,
   that it is an act which is not determined by an antecedent bias or
   motive, but by the sovereign power of the Will itself; because, if so,
   the greater hand such causes have in determining any acts of the Will,
   so much the less virtuous or vicious would they be accounted; and the
   less hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverse is true;
   men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy, for the agent
   being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but
   the more. And if good inclination, or motive, has but little influence
   in determining the agent, they do not think his act so much the more
   virtuous, but the less. And so concerning evil acts, which are
   determined by evil motives or inclinations.

   Yea, if it be supposed, that good or evil dispositions are implanted in
   the hearts of men, by nature itself, (which, it is certain, is vulgarly
   supposed in innumerable cases,) yet it is not commonly supposed, that
   men are worthy of no Praise or Dispraise for such dispositions;
   although what is natural, is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior
   to all acts of the Will whatsoever. Thus, for instance, if a man
   appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is
   supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no
   dictate of the common sense and apprehension of men, that such
   dispositions are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons are not
   worthy of disesteem, or odium and dishonour; or that the proud or
   malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions, are worthy of
   no resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of
   them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked
   acts, that come from such a fountain, than an extenuation of them. It
   being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by men in the
   height of their indignation: they will say, "It is his very nature: he
   is of a vile natural temper; it is as natural to him to act so, as it
   is to breathe; he cannot help serving the devil," &c. But it is not
   thus with regard to hurtful mischievous things, that any are the
   subjects or occasions of, by natural necessity, against their
   inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of
   mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse.--Thus it is very plain,
   that common sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of
   necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral
   quality and desert of men's actions.

   And these dictates are so natural and necessary, that it may be very
   much doubted whether the Arminians themselves have ever got rid of
   them; yea, their greatest doctors, that have gone furthest in defence
   of their metaphysical notions of liberty, and have brought their
   arguments to their greatest strength, and as they suppose, to a
   demonstration, against the consistence of virtue and vice with any
   necessity: it is to be questioned, whether there is so much as one of
   them, but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts of a
   man, under the power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of
   temper, would not, from the forementioned natural sense of mind, resent
   it far otherwise, than if as great sufferings came upon him from the
   wind that blows and the fire that burns by natural necessity; and
   otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct of a
   man perfectly delirious; yea, though he first brought his distraction
   upon him some way by his own fault.

   Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make between natural and
   moral Necessity, as though it were altogether impertinent in this
   controversy; "that which is necessary, say they, is necessary; it is
   that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is
   impossible, is impossible, and cannot be done; and, therefore, none can
   be to blame for not doing it." And such comparisons are made use of, as
   the commanding of a man to walk, who has lost his legs, and condemning
   him and punishing him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a man,
   who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But in these
   things Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common sense determine
   whether there be not a great difference between these two cases: the
   one, that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into
   prison; and after he has lain there a while, the king comes to him,
   calls him to come forth; and tells him, that if he will do so, and will
   fall down before him and humbly beg his pardon, he shall he forgiven,
   and set at liberty, and also be greatly enriched, and advanced to
   honour: the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of
   his offence against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase
   himself, and accept of the king's offer; but is confined by strong
   walls, with gates of brass, and bars of iron. The other case is, that
   of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty,
   ungrateful, wilful disposition; and moreover, has been brought up in
   traitorous principles; and has his heart possessed with an extreme and
   inveterate enmity to his lawful sovereign; and for his rebellion is
   cast into prison, and lies long there, loaded with heavy chains, and in
   miserable circumstances. At length the compassionate prince comes to
   the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison-doors
   to be set wide open; calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth
   to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him
   unworthily, and ask his forgiveness; he shall be forgiven, set at
   liberty, and set in a place of great dignity and profit in his court.
   But he is so stout, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be
   willing to accept the offer; his rooted strong pride and malice have
   perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart:
   the opposition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an
   influence on his mind far superior to the king's grace and
   condescension, and to all his kind offers and promises. Now, is it
   agreeable to common sense, to assert and stand to it, that there is no
   difference between these two cases, as to any worthiness of blame in
   the prisoners; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and the
   required act in each case is impossible 1 It is true, a man's evil
   dispositions may be as strong and immovable as the bars of a castle.
   But who cannot see, that when a man, in the latter case, is said to be
   unable to obey the command, the expression is used improperly, and not
   in the sense it has originally and in common speech? and that it may
   properly be said to be in the rebel's power to come out of prison,
   seeing he can easily do it if he pleases; though by reason of his vile
   temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it
   should please him?

   Upon the whole, I presume there is no person of good understanding, who
   impartially considers these things, but will allow, that it is not
   evident, from the dictates of common sense, or natural notions, that
   moral Necessity is inconsistent with Praise and Blame. And, therefore,
   if the Arminians would prove any such inconsistency, it must be by some
   philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common sense.

   There is a grand illusion in the pretended demonstration of Arminians
   from common sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations lies
   in that prejudice, that arises through the insensible change of the use
   and meaning of such terms as liberty , able, unable, necessary,
   impossible, unavoidable, invincible, action, &c. from their original
   and vulgar sense, to a metaphysical sense, entirely diverse; and the
   strong connexion of the ideas of blamelessness, &c. with some of these
   terms, by a habit contracted and established, while these terms were
   used in their first meaning. This prejudice and delusion, is the
   foundation of all those positions they lay down as maxims, by which
   most of the scriptures they allege in this controversy, are
   interpreted, and on which all their pompous demonstrations from
   Scripture and reason depend. From this secret delusion and prejudice
   they have almost all their advantages: it is the strength of their
   bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of
   all the right they have to treat their neighbours in so assuming a
   manner, and to insult others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves,
   as "weak bigots, men that dwell in the dark caves of superstition,
   perversely set, obstinately shutting their eyes against the noon-day
   light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the first-born of
   absurdities," &c. &c. But perhaps, an impartial consideration of the
   things which have been observed in the preceding parts of this inquiry,
   may enable the lovers of truth better to judge, whose doctrine is
   indeed absurd, abstruse, self-contradictory, and inconsistent with
   common sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the
   reason of mankind.

   Corol. From the things which have been observed, it will follow, that
   it is agreeable to common sense to suppose, that the glorified saints
   have not their freedom at all diminished, in any respect; and that Cod
   himself has the highest possible freedom, according to the true and
   proper meaning of the term; and that he is, in the highest possible
   respect, an agent, and active in the exercise of his infinite holiness;
   though he acts therein, in the highest degree, necessarily: and his
   actions of this kind are in the highest, most absolutely perfect,
   manner virtuous and praiseworthy; and are so, for that very reason,
   because they are most perfectly necessary.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [140] It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies
   moral necessity, but only some very high degree; which none will deny.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. V.

   Objections, that this scheme of Necessity renders all Means and
   Endeavours for avoiding Sin, or obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain,
   and to no purpose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines, in
   affairs of morality and religion, answered.

   Arminians say, If sin and virtue come to pass by a Necessity consisting
   in a sure connexion of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents,
   it can never be worth while to use any Means or Endeavours to obtain
   the one, and avoid the other; seeing no Endeavours can alter the
   futurity of the event, which is become necessary by a connexion already
   established.

   But I desire, that this matter may be fully considered; and that it may
   be examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow that
   Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing,
   must be more in vain, on the supposition of such a connexion of
   antecedents and consequents, than if the contrary be supposed.

   For Endeavours to be in vain, is for them not to be successful; that is
   to say, for them not eventually to be the Means of the thing aimed at,
   which cannot be, but in one of these two ways; either, first, That
   although the Means are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow;
   or, secondly, If the event does follow, it is not because of the Means,
   or from any connexion or dependence of the event on the Means, the
   event would have come to pass as well without the Means as with them.
   If either of these two things are the case, then the Means are not
   properly successful, and are truly in vain. The success or non-success
   of Means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain,
   consists in those Means being connected, or not connected, with the
   effect, in such a manner as this, viz. That the effect is with the
   Means, and not without them; or. that the being of the effect is, on
   the one hand, connected with Means, and the want of the effect, on the
   other hand, is connected with the want of the Means. If there be such a
   connexion as this between Means and end, the Means are not in vain: the
   more there is of such a connexion, the further they are from being in
   vain; and the less of such a connexion, the more they are in vain.

   Now, therefore, the question to be answered--in order to determine,
   whether it follows from this doctrine of the necessary connexion
   between foregoing things, and consequent ones, that Means used in order
   to any effect, are more in vain than they would be otherwise--is,
   whether it follows from it, that there is less of the forementioned
   connexion between Means and effect; that is, whether on the supposition
   of there being a real and true connexion between antecedent things and
   consequent ones, there must be less of a connexion between Means and
   effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connexion
   between antecedent things and consequent ones: and the very stating of
   this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one
   that will open his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed, without
   the grossest absurdity and inconsistence. Means are foregoing things,
   and effects are following things: And if there were no connexion
   between foregoing things and following ones, there could be no
   connexion between Means and end; and so all Means would be wholly vain
   and fruitless. For it is only by virtue of some connexion, that they
   become successful: It is some connexion observed, or revealed, or
   otherwise known, between antecedent things and following ones, that
   directs in the choice of Means. And if there were no such thing as an
   established connexion, there could be no choice, as to Means; one thing
   would have no more tendency to an effect, than another; there would be
   no such thing as tendency in the case. All those things, which are
   successful Means of other things, do therein prove connected
   antecedents of them: and therefore to assert, that a fixed connexion
   between antecedents and consequents makes Means vain and useless, or
   stands in the way to hinder the connexion between Means and end, is
   just so ridiculous, as to say, that a connexion between antecedents and
   consequents stands in the way to hinder a connexion between antecedents
   and consequents.

   Nor can any supposed connexion of the succession or train of
   antecedents and consequents, from the very beginning of all things, the
   connexion being made already sure and necessary, either by established
   laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign
   immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions,
   or any other way (if any other there be); I say, no such necessary
   connexion of a series of antecedents and consequents can in the least
   tend to hinder, but that the Means we use may belong to the series; and
   so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the
   consequents we aim at, in the established course of things. Endeavours
   which we use, are things that exist; and, therefore, they belong to the
   general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are supposed to
   be connected: and so Endeavours are supposed to be connected with some
   effects, or some consequent things or other. And certainly this does
   not hinder but that the events they are connected with, may be those
   which we aim at, and which we choose, because we judge them most likely
   to have a connexion with those events, from the established order and
   course of things which we observe, or from something in divine
   revelation.

   Let us suppose a real and sure connexion between a man having his eyes
   open in the clear day-light, with good organs of sight, and seeing; so
   that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with
   his not opening his eyes; and also the like connexion between such a
   man attempting to open his eyes, and his actually doing it: the
   supposed established connexion between these antecedents and
   consequents, let the connexion be never so sure and necessary,
   certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such
   circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing: his
   aiming at that event, and the use of the Means, being the effect of his
   Will, does not break the connexion, or hinder the success.

   So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of
   the Necessity of events by a certainty of connexion and consequence: On
   the contrary, it is truly forcible against the Arminian doctrine of
   contingence and self-determination; which is inconsistent with such a
   connexion. If there be no connexion between those events, wherein
   virtue and vice consist, and any thing antecedent; then, there is no
   connexion between these events and any Means or Endeavours used in
   order to them: and if so, then those means must be in vain. The less
   there is of connexion between foregoing things and following ones, so
   much the less there is between Means and end, Endeavours and success;
   and in the same proportion are Means and Endeavours ineffectual and in
   vain.

   It will follow from Arminian principles, that there is no degree of
   connexion between virtue or vice, and any foregoing event or thing: or,
   in other words, that the determination of the existence of virtue or
   vice does not in the least depend on the influence of any thing that
   comes to pass antecedently, as its cause, Means, or ground; because, so
   far as it is so, it is not from self-determination: and, therefore, so
   far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And so it
   follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent
   upon, or connected with, as, any foregoing event or existence, its
   cause, ground, or Means. And if so, then all foregoing Means must be
   totally in vain.

   Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any consistence with the
   Arminian scheme, be any reasonable ground of so much as a conjecture
   concerning the consequence of any Means and Endeavours, in order to
   escaping vice or obtaining virtue, or any choice or preference of
   Means, as having a greater probability of success by some than others;
   either from any natural connexion or dependence of the end on the
   Means, or through any divine constitution, or revealed way of God,
   bestowing or bringing to pass these things, in consequence of any
   Means, Endeavours, Prayers, or Deeds. Conjectures, in this latter case,
   depend on a supposition, that God himself is the Giver or determining
   Cause of the events sought: but if they depend on self-determination,
   then God is not the determining or disposing Author of them: and if
   these things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be made,
   from any revelation he has given, concerning any method of his disposal
   of them.

   Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow, that men cannot have
   any reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture, that their Means and
   Endeavours to obtain virtue or avoid vice will be successful, but they
   may be sure, they will not; they may be certain, that they will be in
   vain; and that if ever the thing, which they seek, comes to pass, it
   will not be at all owing to the Means they use. For Means and
   Endeavours can have no effect at all, in order to obtain the end, but
   in one of these two ways: either, (1.) Through a natural tendency and
   influence, to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts,
   either by causing the disposition of the heart to be more in favour of
   such acts, or by bringing the mind more into the view of powerful
   motives and inducements; or, (2.) By putting persons more in the way of
   God's bestowment of the benefit. But neither of these can be the case.
   Not the latter; for, as has been just now observed, it does not consist
   with the Arminian notion of self-determination, which they suppose
   essential to virtue, that God should be the bestower, or (which is the
   same thing) the determining, disposing author of virtue. Not the
   former; for natural influence and tendency suppose causality,
   connexion, and necessity of event, which are inconsistent with Arminian
   liberty. A tendency of Means, by biassing the heart in favour of
   virtue, or by bringing the Will under the influence and power of
   motives in its determinations, are both inconsistent with Arminian
   liberty of Will, consisting in indifference, and sovereign
   self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.

   But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine of
   necessity, which has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage
   a total neglect of all Endeavours as vain, the following things may be
   considered.

   The question is not, Whether men may not thus improve this doctrine: we
   know that many true and wholesome doctrines are abused: but, whether
   the doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement; or
   whether, on the supposition of the truth of the doctrine, such a use of
   it would not be unreasonable? If any shall affirm, that it would not,
   but that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives just occasion
   for it, it must be on this supposition; namely, that such an invariable
   necessity of all things already settled, must render the interposition
   of all Means, Endeavours, Conclusions or Actions, of ours, in order to
   the obtaining any future end whatsoever, perfectly insignificant;
   because they cannot in the least alter or vary the course and series of
   things, in any event or circumstance; all being already fixed
   unalterably by necessity: and that therefore it is folly, for men to
   use any Means for any end; but their wisdom, to save themselves the
   trouble of Endeavours, and take their ease. No person can draw such an
   inference from this doctrine, and come to such a conclusion, without
   contradicting himself, and going counter to the very principles he
   pretends to act upon: for he comes to a conclusion, and takes a course,
   in order to an end, even his ease, or saving himself from trouble; he
   seeks something future, and uses Means in order to a future thing, even
   in his drawing up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing, and use
   no Means in order to any thing in future; he seeks his future ease, and
   the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior necessity, that
   determines all things, makes vain all actions or conclusions of ours,
   in order to any thing future; then it makes vain all conclusions and
   conduct of ours, in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease,
   with the time, manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed,
   by all-determining necessity, as much as any thing else. If he says
   within himself, "What future happiness or misery I shall have, is
   already, in effect, determined by the necessary course and connexion of
   things; therefore, I will save myself the trouble of labour and
   diligence, which cannot add to my determined degree of happiness, or
   diminish my misery; but will take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort
   of sloth and negligence." Such a man contradicts himself: he says, the
   measure of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and he
   will not try to diminish the one, nor add to the other: but yet, in his
   very conclusion, he contradicts this; for, he takes up this conclusion,
   to add to his future happiness, by the ease and comfort of his
   negligence; and to diminish his future trouble and misery, by saving
   himself the trouble of using Means and taking Pains.

   Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this improvement of the
   doctrine of necessity, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of
   Means for their own happiness. For the principles they must go upon, in
   order to this, are inconsistent with their making any improvement at
   all of the doctrine: for to make some improvement of it, is to be
   influenced by it, to come to some voluntary conclusion, in regard to
   their own conduct, with some view or aim: but this, as has been shown,
   is inconsistent with the principles they pretend to act upon. In short,
   the principles are such as cannot he acted upon at all, or, in any
   respect, consistently. And, therefore, in every pretence of acting upon
   them, or making any improvement at all of them, there is a
   self-contradiction.

   As to that objection against the doctrine, which I have endeavoured to
   prove, that it makes men no more than mere machines; I would say, that
   notwithstanding this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly, and
   unspeakably different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and
   understanding, with a faculty of Will, and so is capable of volition
   and choice; in that his Will is guided by the dictates or views of his
   understanding; and in that his external actions and behaviour, and in
   many respects also his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are
   subject to his Will; so that he has liberty to act according to his
   choice, and do what he pleases; and by means of these things, is
   capable of moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations and actions
   as, according to the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise,
   esteem, love, and reward; or, on the contrary, of disesteem,
   detestation, indignation, and punishment.

   In these things is all the difference from mere machines, as to liberty
   and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity, or privilege, in any
   respect: all the difference that can be desired, and all that can be
   conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the Arminians
   themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themselves;
   though their explications overthrow and abolish the things asserted,
   and pretended to be explained. For they are forced to explain a
   self-determining power of Will, by a power in the soul, to determine as
   it chooses or wills; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a
   power of choosing, and, in many instances, can do as he chooses. Which
   is quite a different thing from that contradiction, his having power of
   choosing his first act of choice in the case.

   Or, if their scheme make any other difference than this, between men
   and machines, it is for the worse: it is so far from supposing men to
   have a dignity and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner
   of their being determined still more unhappy. Whereas, machines are
   guided by an intelligent cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or
   owner; the will of man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute
   blind contingence!
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. VI.

   Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been
   maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical doctrine of Fate, and the
   opinions of Mr. Hobbes.

   When Calvinists oppose the Arminian notion of the freedom of Will, and
   contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the Will,
   nor any other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind
   of necessity; their opposers exclaim against them, as agreeing with the
   ancient Stoics in their doctrine of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his
   opinion of Necessity.

   It would not be worth while to take notice of so impertinent an
   objection, had it not been urged by some of the chief Arminian
   writers.--There were many important truths maintained by the ancient
   Greek and Roman philosophers, and especially the Stoics, that are never
   the worse for being held by them. The Stoic philosophers, by the
   general agreement of Christian divines, and even Arminian divines, were
   the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of all the heathen
   philosophers; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to
   Christianity of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of
   these philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even of
   Arminian divines, produced, not as arguments for the falseness of the
   doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of some of the
   greatest truths of the christian religion, relating to the unity and
   perfections of the Godhead, a future state, the duty and happiness of
   mankind, &c. and how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest and
   best of the heathen, harmonized with and confirms the gospel of Jesus
   Christ.

   And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he
   alleges the agreement of the Stoics with us, wherein he supposes they
   maintained the like doctrine, as an argument against the truth of ours;
   yet, this very Dr. Whitby alleges the agreement of the Stoics with the
   Arminian, wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with them,
   as an argument for the truth of their doctrine. [141] So that, when the
   Stoics agree with them, it is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a
   confutation of ours, as showing that our opinions are contrary to the
   natural sense and common reason of mankind: nevertheless, when the
   Stoics agree with us, it argues no such thing in our favour; but, on
   the contrary, is a great argument against us, and shows our doctrine to
   be heathenish!

   It is observed by some Calvinistic writers, that the Arminians
   symbolize with the Stoics, in some of those doctrines wherein they are
   opposed by the Calvinists; particularly in their denying an original,
   innate, total corruption and depravity of heart; and in what the; held
   of man's ability to make himself truly virtuous and conformed to God,
   and in some other doctrines.

   It may be further observed, that certainly it is no better objection
   against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the
   doctrine of the ancient Stoic philosophers; than it is against theirs,
   wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in some respects, with the
   opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers, the followers of
   Epicurus, the father of atheism and licentiousness, and with the
   doctrine of the Sadducces and Jesuits.

   I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient Stoic
   philosophers held concerning Fate, in order to determine what is truth;
   as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to
   differ from them. It seems, that they differed among themselves; and
   probably the doctrine of Fate, as maintained by most of them, was, in
   some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of
   them held such a Fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in
   our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a Fate. If they held any
   such Fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions
   that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice;
   I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated, that the
   scheme I maintain is no such scheme. If the Stoics, by Fate, meant any
   thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of
   advantage and benefit of in use of means and endeavours, or would make
   it less worth while for men to desire and seek after any thing wherein
   their virtue and happiness consists; I hold no doctrine that is clogged
   with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever;
   and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingence; as has
   been shown. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is
   inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any
   perfection, dignity, privilege, or benefit, or any thing desirable, in
   any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty
   that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such doctrine. If they
   held any such doctrine of Fate, as is inconsistent with the world being
   in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent,
   that presides--not as the soul of the world, but--as the Sovereign Lord
   of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice, and
   design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable,
   without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power
   or influence of any thing before, above, or without himself; I wholly
   renounce any such doctrine.

   As to Mr. Hobbes maintaining the same doctrine concerning necessity; I
   confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it
   will, we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear
   evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad man. This great
   truth, "that Jesus is the Son of God," was not spoiled because it was
   once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is
   so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by the pen,
   of some ill minded, mischievous man, that it must never be received, we
   shall never know, when we hold any of the most precious and evident
   truths by a sure tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this
   truth, that is to be lamented; but the truth is not to be thought
   worthy of rejection on that account. It is common for the corrupt
   hearts of evil men to abuse the best things to vile purposes.

   I might also take notice of its having been observed, that the
   Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes [142] in many more things than the
   Calvinists. As, in what he is said to hold concerning original sin, in
   denying the necessity of supernatural illumination, in denying infused
   grace, in denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone; and
   other things.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [141] Whitby on the five Points. Edit.3. p. 325, 326, 327.

   [142] Dr. Gill, in his Answers to Dr. Whitby. Vol. III. p. 183, &c.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. VII.

   Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.

   Some may, possibly, object against what has been supposed of the
   absurdity and inconsistency of a self-determining power in the Will,
   and the impossibility of its being otherwise, than that the Will should
   be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive which (as
   it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to
   any appearing on the other side; that if these things are true, it will
   follow, that not only the Will of created minds, but the Will of God
   himself, is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which the
   author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature,
   (page. 85, 86.) says: "What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all
   our ideas of the dominion of God? does it not destroy the glory of his
   liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and
   Benefactor of the world, that most free and Sovereign Agent, all the
   glory of this sort of freedom? does it not seem to make him a kind of
   mechanical medium of fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's doctrine of
   fatality and Necessity, into all things that God hath to do with! Does
   it not seem to represent the blessed God, as a Being of vast
   understanding, as well as power, and efficiency, but still to leave him
   without a Will to choose among all the objects within his view? In
   short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort of Almighty Minister of
   Fate, under its universal and supreme influence; as it was the
   professed sentiment of some of the ancients, that Fate was above the
   gods.

   This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an application to men's
   imaginations and prejudices, rather than to mere reason. I would now
   calmly endeavour to consider, whether there be any reason in this
   frightful representation. But, before I enter upon a particular
   consideration of the matter, I would observe; that it is reasonable to
   suppose, it should be much more difficult to express or conceive things
   according to exact metaphysical truth, relating to the nature and
   manner of the existence of things in the Divine Understanding and Will,
   and the operation of these faculties (if I may so call them) of the
   Divine Mind, than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within
   our view, more proportionate to the measure of our comprehension, and
   more commensurate to the use and import of human speech. Language is
   indeed very deficient, in regard of terms to express precise truth
   concerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words
   were first formed to express external things; and those that are
   applied to express things internal and spiritual, are almost all
   borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense. Whence they are, most
   of them, attended with a great deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in
   their signification, occasioning innumerable doubts, difficulties, and
   confusions, in inquiries and controversies about things of this nature.
   But language is much less adapted to express things existing in the
   mind of the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.

   We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature
   of our own souls. And notwithstanding all the progress which has been
   made, in past ages, and the present, in this kind of knowledge, whereby
   our metaphysics, as it relates to these things, is brought to greater
   perfection than once it was; yet, here is still work enough left for
   future inquiries and researches, and room for progress still to be
   made, for many ages and generations. But we had need to be infinitely
   able metaphysicians, to conceive with clearness, according to strict,
   proper, and perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Essence,
   and the modes of action and operation in the powers of the Divine Mind

   And it may be noted particularly, that though we are obliged to
   conceive of some things in God as consequent and dependent on others,
   and of some things pertaining to the Divine Nature and Will as the
   foundation of others, and so before others in the order of nature: as,
   we must conceive of the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the
   order of nature, to his happiness; the perfection of his understanding,
   as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees; the holiness of his
   nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determinations. And yet,
   when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent,
   fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first
   Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute
   simplicity and immutability, and the first cause of all things:
   doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations, than
   when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and
   liable to perpetual mutation and succession.

   Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the forementioned
   author's exclamation, about the necessary determination of God's Will,
   in all things, by what he sees to be fittest and best;

   That all the seeming force of such objections and exclamations must
   arise from an imagination, that there is some sort of privilege or
   dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it
   impossible to do any other, than always choose what is wisest and best;
   as though there were some disadvantage, meanness, and subjection, in
   such a Necessity; a thing by which the Will was confined, kept under,
   and held in servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a
   strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held
   him fast, and from which he could, by no means, deliver himself.
   Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no
   disadvantage or dishonour to a being, necessarily to act in the most
   excellent and happy manner, from the necessary perfection of his own
   nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority, or dependence, nor
   any want of dignity, privilege, or ascendency. [143] It is not
   inconsistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God. The
   sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleases
   him; whereby "he doth according to his will in the armies of heaven,
   and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand,
   or say unto him, what dost thou?--The following things belong to the
   sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power;
   whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without control, without any
   confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least
   measure, to any other power; and so without any hinderance or
   restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult,
   for him to accomplish his Will; and without any dependence of his power
   on any other power, from whence it should be derived, or of which it
   should stand in any need: so far from this, that all other power is
   derived from him, and is absolutely dependent on him. (2.) That he has
   supreme authority; absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills,
   without subjection to any superior authority, or any derivation of
   authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent
   authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the head of
   all dominion, and fountain of all authority; and also without restraint
   by any obligation, implying either subjection, derivation, or
   dependence, or proper limitation. (3.) That his Will is supreme,
   underived, and independent on any thing without himself; being in every
   thing determined by his own counsel, having no other rule but his own
   wisdom; his Will not being subject to or restrained by the Will of any
   other, and other Wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his
   Wisdom, which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived,
   self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said, as in Isa.
   xl. 14. "With whom took he counsel? And who instructed him and taught
   him in the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and showed him
   the way of understanding?" There is no other Divine Sovereignty but
   this; and this is properly absolute sovereignty: no other is desirable;
   nor would any other be honourable, or happy: and indeed, there is no
   other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the
   Divine Sovereign, that his Will is determined by his own infinite,
   all-sufficient wisdom in every thing; and is in nothing at all directed
   either by inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become
   senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design,
   or end.

   If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every thing by
   supreme wisdom, then it is in every thing necessarily determined to
   that which is most wise. And, certainly, it would be a disadvantage and
   indignity, to be otherwise. For if the Divine Will was not necessarily
   determined to what in every case is wisest and best, it must be subject
   to some degree of undesigning contingence; and so in the same degree
   liable to evil. To suppose the Divine Will liable to be carried hither
   and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contingence,
   which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate
   whatsoever, (if any such thing were possible,) would certainly argue a
   great degree of imperfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the
   Deity. If it be a disadvantage, for the Divine Will to be attended with
   this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at
   random, the greater dignity and advantage. And, consequently, to be
   perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and universally and
   entirely left to senseless unmeaning continence, to act absolutely at
   random, would be the supreme glory!

   It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise
   volition is necessary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that
   his existence is necessary. If it be something too low, for the Supreme
   Being to have his Will determined by moral Necessity, so as
   necessarily, in every case, to Will in the highest degree holily and
   happily; then why is it not also something top low, for him to have his
   existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite
   happiness, determined by Necessity? It is no more to God's dishonour,
   to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And, if neither of
   them be is the beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as faith
   itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness.--It is strange,
   to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is
   necessarily rational, immutably good to his dishonour, then it is not
   to his dishonour necessarily to act holily and wisely. And if it be not
   dishonourable to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible
   degree, no more is it mean and dishonourable, necessarily to act holily
   and wisely in the highest possible degree; or which is the same thing,
   to do that, in every case, which, above all other things, is wisest and
   best.

   The reason why it is not dishonourable to be necessarily most holy is,
   because holiness in itself is an excellent and honourable thing. For
   the same reason, it is no dishonour to be necessarily most wise, and,
   in every case, to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest
   of all; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honourable.

   The forementioned author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will, &c. as
   has been observed, represents that doctrine of the Divine Will being in
   every thing necessarily determined by superior fitness, as making the
   blessed God a kind of Almighty Minister and mechanical medium of fate:
   he insists, (p. 93, 94.) that this moral Necessity and impossibility
   is, in effect, the same thing with physical and natural Necessity, and
   impossibility: and says, (p. 54, 55.) "The scheme which determines the
   Will always and certainly by the understanding, and the understanding
   by the appearance of things, seems to take away the true nature of vice
   and virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest of vices, seem
   rather to be matters of fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and
   necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and present
   situation of persons and things; for this existence and situation
   necessarily makes such an appearance to the mind; from this appearance
   flows a necessary perception and judgment, concerning these things;
   this judgment necessarily determines the Will; and thus, by this chain
   of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and
   become natural ideas, and necessary things, instead of moral and free
   actions."

   And yet this same author allows, (p. 30, 31.) That a perfectly wise
   being will constantly and certainly choose what is most fit; and says,
   (p. 102, 103.) "I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever
   there is such antecedent superior fitness of things, God acts according
   to it, so as never to contradict it; and, particularly, in all his
   judicial proceedings as a Governor and Distributer of rewards and
   punishments." Yea, he says expressly, (p. 42.) "That it is not possible
   for God to act otherwise, than according to this fitness and goodness
   in things."

   So that, according to this author, putting these several passages of
   his Essay together, there is no virtue, nor any thing of a moral
   nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts and exercises of God's
   holiness, justice, and faithfulness; and he never does any thing which
   is in itself supremely worthy, and, above all other things, fit and
   excellent, but only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate; and in what
   he does as the Judge, and moral Governor of the world, he exercises no
   moral excellency; exercising no freedom in these things, because he
   acts by moral Necessity, which is, in effect, the same with physical or
   natural Necessity; and therefore, he only acts by an Hobbistical
   fatality; "as a Being indeed of vast understanding, as well as power
   and efficiency, (as he said before,) but without a will to choose,
   being a kind of Almighty Minister of fate, acting under its supreme
   influence. "For he allows, that in all these things, God's Will is
   determined constantly and certainly by a superior fitness, and that it
   is not possible for him to act otherwise. And if these things are so,
   what glory or praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or
   taking the most fit, holy, wise, and excellent course, in any one
   instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common
   sense of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the honour
   of any being, that through the moral perfection of his nature, he
   necessarily acts with supreme wisdom and holiness; but on the contrary,
   his praise is the greater: herein consists the height of his glory.

   The same author (p. 56.) supposes, that herein appears the excellent
   "character of a wise and good man, that though he can choose contrary
   to the fitness of things, yet he does not; but suffers himself to be
   directed by fitness;" and that, in this conduct, "he imitates the
   blessed God." And yet, he supposes it is contrary wise with the blessed
   God; not that he suffers himself to be directed by fitness, when "he
   can choose, contrary to the .fitness of things;" but that "he cannot
   choose contrary to the fitness of things;" as he says, p. 42. "That it
   is not possible for God to act otherwise than according to this
   fitness, where there is any fitness or goodness in things:" Yea, he
   supposes, (p. 31.) That if a man "were perfectly wise and good, he
   could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by
   the fitness of things."

   One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section; and
   that is, that if it derogate nothing from the glory of God, to be
   necessarily determined by superior fitness in some things, then neither
   does it to he thus determined in all things; from any thing in the
   nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from (God's freedom,
   independence, absolute supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his
   nature, state, or manner of acting; or as implying any infirmity,
   restraint, or subjection. And it the thing be such as well consists
   with God's glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it;
   then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many things,
   lest thereby we should detract from God's glory too much.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [143] "It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the
   Supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is
   best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's purpose;
   for this is a necessity, not of nature and of fate, but of fitness and
   wisdom: a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom, and most
   perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an
   unalterable rectitude of will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it
   impossible for a wise being to act foolishly." dark's Demonstration of
   the Being and Attributes of God. Edit. 6. p. 64. "Though God is a most
   perfect free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest
   in the whole. The reason is evident; because perfect wisdom and
   goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as necessity
   itself; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most
   perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom
   and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity
   by which it is acted; It being as great an absurdity and impossibility
   in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or Infinite
   Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in nature, for
   absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There
   was, indeed, no necessity in nature, that God should at first create
   such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all; because he
   is. in himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was, also,
   no necessity in nature, that he should preserve and continue things in
   being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient
   without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was
   fit and wise and good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, and
   Infinite Goodness communicate itself: and therefore it was necessary,
   in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be
   made at such a time, and continued to long, and indeed with various
   perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it
   wisest and best that they should." Ibid. p. 112, 113. "It is not a
   fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act,
   according to the last result of a fair examination.--This is so far
   from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very
   improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end
   and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a
   determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect
   indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the
   good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from
   being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it
   would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act,
   or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on
   the other side.--It is as much a perfection, that desire or the power
   of preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting
   should be determined by the will: and the certainer such determination
   is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing
   but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of
   any action, we were not free. This very end of our freedom being, that
   we might attain the good we choose; and, therefore, every man is
   brought under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being,
   to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is
   best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some
   other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's
   will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that
   a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the same
   time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present
   thoughts, before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it,
   and would have it before any other; unless he can have and not have it,
   will and not will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to
   be admitted.--If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy
   perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more
   steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no
   reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if
   it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what
   Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God
   himself cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty
   hinders not his being determined by what is best.--But to give a right
   view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask. Would any one be a
   changeling, because he is less determined by wise determination, than a
   wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the
   fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break loose
   from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination
   and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be
   liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I
   think, nobody would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but
   he that is mad already." Locke Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit 7. p. 215. 216.
   "This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always
   and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things;
   that is. must will all things that are wisest and best to be done.
   There is no getting free of this consequence. If it can will at all, it
   must will this way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of
   willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing
   otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge
   which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the will without
   error. Here, then, is the origin of moral Necessity; and that is,
   really, of freedom.--Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is
   determined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things,
   it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if
   that were possible. But it is unskilfulness, to suppose this an
   objection. The great principle is once established, viz. That the
   Divine Will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of
   things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more
   strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect the Deity
   must be allowed to be: it is this that makes him an amiable and
   adorable Being, whose will and power are constantly, immutably
   determined, by the consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of
   a surd Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It is the
   beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all
   the advantage of reason and goodness.--It is strange, to see men
   contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily
   rational, immutably good and wise; when a man is allowed still the
   perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined
   by reason and truth." Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul Edit. 3.
   Vol. II. p. 408, 404.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. VIII.

   Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions
   considered.

   The author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being
   perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most
   fit, where there is a superior fitness and goodness in things; and that
   it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect
   confessed, that in those things where there is any real preferableness,
   it is no dishonour, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to
   act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the
   agreement of such a Necessity with the fate of the Stoics, and the
   Necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if
   in all the different things, among which God chooses, there were
   evermore a superior fitness or preferableness on one side, then it
   would be no dishonour, or any thing unbecoming, for God's Will to be
   necessarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is
   giving up entirely the argument, from the unsuitableness of such a
   Necessity to the liberty, supremacy, independence, and glory of the
   Divine Being; and resting the whole weight of the affair on the
   decision of another point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed,
   that in all the various possible things, which are in God's view, and
   may he considered as capable objects of his choice, there is not
   evermore a preferableness in one thing above another. This is denied by
   this author; who supposes, that in many instances, between two or more
   possible things, which come within the view of the Divine Mind, there
   is a perfect indifference and inequality, as to fitness or tendency, to
   attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer any of his
   designs. Now, therefore, I would consider whether this be evident.

   The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is
   urged, that, in many instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no
   difference between various possible objects of choice, which God has in
   view: and, (2.) that the difference between many things is so
   inconsiderable, or of such a nature, that it would be unreasonable to
   suppose it to be of any consequence; or to suppose that any of God's
   wise designs would not be answered in any one way as well as the other.

   Therefore,

   1. The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances
   wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference,
   between different objects of choice, that are proposed to the Divine
   Understanding?

   And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be considered,
   whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the question
   proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there is an
   inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is inquired whether different
   objects of choice may not be absolutely without difference? If they are
   absolutely without difference, then how are they different objects of
   choice! If there be absolutely no difference, in any respect, then
   there is no variety or distinction: for distinction is only by some
   difference. And if there be no variety among proposed objects of
   choice, then there is no opportunity for variety of choice, or
   difference of determination. For that determination of a thing, which
   is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, hut
   the same. That this is no quibble, may appear more fully in a short
   time.

   The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some instances, chooses
   to do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are
   perfectly without difference, are two.

   1. That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely
   considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from
   another: and that therefore, when God determined to create the world in
   such a part of infinite duration and space, rather than others, he
   determined and preferred, among various objects, between which there
   was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference.

   Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time before the
   world was created, distinguished by successive parts, properly and
   truly so; or a succession of limited and unmeasurable periods of time,
   following one another, in an infinitely long series: which must needs
   be a groundless imagination. The eternal duration which was before the
   world, being only the eternity of God's existence; which is nothing
   else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole
   of his unlimited life, together and at once; Vitæ interminabilis, totu
   simul et perfecta possessio. Which is so generally allowed, that I need
   not stand to demonstrate it. [144]

   So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the
   creation, of an infinite length, breadth, and depth, truly and properly
   distinguished into different measurable parts, limited at certain
   stages, one beyond another, in an infinite series. Which notion of
   absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now
   mentioned, of absolute and infinite duration. It is as improper, to
   imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by
   a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite
   duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one after
   another. A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain
   periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our
   imagination, in one case as the other; and there is equal reason in
   each case, to suppose that our imagination deceives us. It is equally
   improper to talk of months and years of the Divine Existence, as of
   square miles of Deity: and we equally deceive ourselves, when we talk
   of the world being differently fixed, with respect to either of these
   sorts of measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the
   world might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad
   expanse of infinity; or, that it might have been differently fixed in
   the long line of eternity: and all arguments and objections, which are
   built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extension or
   duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or castles in the air.

   2. The second argument, to prove that the Most High wills one thine
   rather than another, without any superior fitness or preferableness in
   the thing preferred, is God's actually placing in different parts of
   the world, panicles, or atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and
   alike. The forementioned author says, (p. 78, &c.) "If one would
   descend to the minute specific particles, of which different bodies are
   composed, we should see abundant reason to believe, that there are
   thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which are
   perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct determination to
   the Will of God, where to place them." He there instances in particles
   of water, of which there are such immense numbers, which compose the
   rivers and oceans of this world; and the infinite myriads of the
   luminous and fiery particles, which compose the body of the sun; so
   many, that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them
   should be exactly equal and alike.

   Answ. (1.) To this I answer: that as we must suppose matter to be
   infinitely divisible, it is very unlikely, that any two of all these
   particles are exactly equal and alike; so unlikely, that it is a
   thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is otherwise:
   and that although we should allow a great similarity between the
   different particles of water and fire, as to their general nature and
   figure; and however small we suppose those particles to be, it is
   infinitely unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in
   dimensions and quantity of matter.--If we should suppose a great many
   globes of the same nature with the globe of the earth, it would be very
   strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the same number
   of particles of dust and water in them. But infinitely less strange,
   than that two particles of light should have just the same quantity of
   matter. For a particle of light, according to the doctrine of the
   infinite divisibility of matter, is composed of infinitely more
   assignable parts, than there are particles of dust and water in the
   globe of the earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of
   these particles should be equal; so it is, that they should be alike in
   other respects: to instance in the configuration of their surfaces. If
   there were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it would be
   very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same number of
   particles of dust, water, and stone, in their surfaces, and all posited
   exactly alike, one with respect to another, without any difference, in
   any part discernible either by the naked eye or microscope; but
   infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should be
   perfectly of the same figure. For there are infinitely more assignable
   real parts on the surface of a particle of light, than there are
   particles of dust, water, and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial
   globe.

   Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two particles, or atoms
   of matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different
   parts of the creation; as I will not deny it to be possible for God to
   make two bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different places; yet
   it will not follow, that two different or distinct acts or effects of
   the Divine Power have exactly the same fitness for the same ends. For
   these two different bodies are not different or distinct, in any other
   respects than those wherein they differ: they are two in no other
   respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are
   perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they can be
   distinguished, or be distinct, only in those things which are called
   circumstances; as place, time, rest, motion, or some other present or
   past circumstances or relations. For it is difference only that
   constitutes distinction. If God makes two bodies, in themselves every
   way equal and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances
   and relations, but only their place; then in this only is there any
   distinction or duplicity. The figure is the same, the measure is the
   same, the solidity and resistance are the same, and every thing the
   same but only the place. Therefore what the Will of God determines is
   this, that there should be the same figure, the same extension, the
   same resistance, &c. in two different places. And for this
   determination he has some reason. There is some end, for which such a
   determination and act has a peculiar fitness, above all other acts.
   Here is no one thing determined without an end, and no one thing
   without a fitness for that end, superior to any thing else. If it be
   the pleasure of God to cause the same resistance, and the same figure,
   to be in two different places and situations, we can no more justly
   argue from it, that here must be some determination or act of God's
   Will that is wholly without motive or end, than we can argue, that
   whenever, in any case, it is a man's Will to speak the same words, or
   make the same sounds, at two different times, there must be some
   determination or act of his Will, without any motive or end. The
   difference of place, in the former case, proves no more than the
   difference of time does in the other. If any one should say, with
   regard to the former case, that there must be something determined
   without an end; viz. that of those two similar bodies, this in
   particular should be made in this place, and the other in the other,
   and should inquire, why the Creator did not make them in a
   transposition, when both are alike, and each would equally have suited
   either place? The inquiry supposes something that is not true; namely,
   that the two bodies differ and are distinct in other respects besides
   their place. So that with this distinction inherent in them, they
   might, in their first creation, have been transposed, and each might
   have begun its existence in the place of the other.

   Let us, for clearness sake, suppose, that God had, at the beginning,
   made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both perfect spheres, and
   perfectly solid, without pores, and perfectly alike in every respect,
   and placed them near one to another, one towards the right hand, and
   the other towards the left, without any difference as to time, motion,
   or rest, past or present, or any circumstance, but only their place;
   and the question should be asked, why God in their creation placed them
   so? why that which is made on the right hand, was not made on the left,
   and vice versa? Let it be well considered, whether there be any sense
   in such a question; and whether the inquiry does not suppose something
   false and absurd. Let it be considered, what the Creator must have done
   otherwise than he did, what different act of Will or power he must have
   exerted, in order to the thing proposed. All that could have been done,
   would have been to have made two spheres, perfectly alike, in the same
   places where he has made them, without any difference of the things
   made, either in themselves or in any circumstance; so that the whole
   effect would have been without any difference, and, therefore, just the
   same. By the supposition, the two spheres are different in no other
   respect but their place; and therefore in other respects they are the
   same. Each has the same roundness; it is not a distinct rotundity, in
   any other respect but its situation. There are, also, the same
   dimensions, differing in nothing but their place. And so of their
   resistance, and every thing else that belongs to them.

   Here, if any chooses to say, "that there is a difference in another
   respect, viz. that they are not numerically the same: that it is thus
   with all the qualities that belong to them: that it is confessed, they
   are, in some respects, the same; that is, they are both exactly alike;
   but yet numerically they differ. Thus the roundness of one is not the
   same numerical, individual roundness with that of the other." Let this
   be supposed; then the question about the determination of the Divine
   Will in the affair, is, why did God will, that this individual
   roundness should be at the right hand, and the other individual
   roundness at the left? why did not he make them in a contrary position?
   Let any rational person consider, whether such questions be not words
   without a meaning; as much as if God should see fit for some ends, to
   cause the same sounds to be repeated, or made at two different times;
   the sounds being perfectly the same in every other respect, but only
   one was a minute after the other; and it should be asked, upon it, why
   God caused these sounds, numerically different, to succeed one the
   other in such a manner? why he did not make that individual sound,
   which was in the first minute, to be in the second, and the individual
   sound of the last minute to be in the first? which inquiries would be
   even ridiculous; as, I think, every person must see at once, in the
   case propose of two sounds, being only the same repeated, absolutely
   without any difference, but that one circumstance of time. If the Most
   High sees it will answer some good end, that the same sound be made
   thunder at two distinct times, and therefore wills that it should be
   so, must it needs therefore be, that herein there is some act of God's
   Will without any motive or end? God saw fit often, at distinct times,
   and on different occasions, to say the very same words to Moses;
   namely, those, I am Jehovah. And would it not be unreasonable to infer,
   as a certain consequence, from this, that here must be some act or acts
   of the Divine Will, in determining and disposing the words exactly
   alike, at different times, wholly without aim or inducement? But it
   would be no more unreasonable than to say, that there must be an act of
   God without any inducement, if he sees it best, and, for some reasons,
   determines that there shall be the same resistance, the same
   dimensions, and the same figure, in several distinct places.

   If, in the instance of the two spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed
   possible that God might have made them in a contrary position; that
   which is made at the right hand, being made at the left; then I ask,
   Whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God had made but one
   of them, and that in the place of the right hand globe, that he might
   have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically
   different from what he did make it; though perfectly alike, and in the
   same place; and at the same time, and in every respect, in the same
   circumstances and relations? Namely, Whether he might not have made it
   numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left hand;
   and so have left that which is now created at the right hand, in a
   state of non-existence? And, if so, whether it would not have been
   possible to have made one in that place, perfectly like these, and yet
   numerically differing from both? And let it be considered, whether,
   from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies, perfectly equal
   and alike, which numerical difference is something inherent in the
   bodies themselves, and diverse from the difference of place or time, or
   any circumstance whatsoever; it will not follow, that there is an
   infinite number of numerically different possible bodies, perfectly
   alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining power, when he
   goes about to create bodies.

   Therefore let us put the case thus: Supposing that God, in the
   beginning, had created but one perfectly solid sphere, in a certain
   place: and it should be inquired, Why God created that individual
   sphere, in that place, at that time? and why he did not create another
   sphere perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the same place,
   at the same time? Or why he. chose to bring into being there, that very
   body, rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies, perfectly
   like it; either of which he could have made there as well, and would
   have answered his end as well. Why he caused to exist, at that place
   and time, that individual roundness, rather than any other of the in
   finite number of individual rotundities, just like it? Why that
   individual resistance, rather than any other of the infinite number of
   possible resistances, just like it? And it might as reasonably be
   asked, Why, when God first caused it to thunder, he caused that
   individual sound then to be made, and not another just like it? Why did
   he make choice of this very sound, and reject all the infinite number
   of other possible sounds just like it, but numerically differing from
   it, and all differing one from another? I think, every body must be
   sensible of the absurdity and nonsense of what is supposed in such
   inquiries. And, if we calmly attend to the matter, we shall be
   convinced, that all such kind of objections as I am answering, are
   founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of conceiving
   things, and the obscureness of language, and great want of clearness
   and precision in the signification of terms.

   If any should find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a great
   length into metaphysical niceties and subtilties; I answer, the
   objection to which they are a reply, is a metaphysical subtilty, and
   must be treated according to the nature of it. [145]

   II. Another thing alleged is, that innumerable things which are
   determined by the Divine Will, and chosen and done by God rather than
   others, differ from those that are not chosen in so inconsiderable a
   manner, that it would be unreasonable to suppose the difference to be
   of any consequence, or that there is any superior fitness or goodness,
   mat God can have respect to in the determination.

   To which I answer; it is impossible for us to determine, with any
   certainty or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and
   appears to us of no consideration, therefore there is absolutely no
   superior goodness, and no valuable end, which can be proposed by the
   Creator and Governor of the world, in ordering such a difference. The
   forementioned author mentions many instances. One is, there being one
   atom in the whole universe more, or less. But, I think, it would be
   unreasonable to suppose, that God made one atom in vain, or without any
   end or motive. He made not one atom, but what was a work of his
   Almighty Power, as much as the whole globe of the earth, and requires
   as much of a constant exertion of Almighty Power to uphold it; and was
   made and is upheld with understanding and design, as much as if no
   other had been made but that. And it would be as unreasonable to
   suppose, that he made it without any thing really aimed at in so doing,
   as much as to suppose, that he made the planet Jupiter without aim or
   design.

   It is possible, that the most minute effects of the Creator's power,
   the smallest assignable difference between the things which God has
   made, may be attended, in the whole series of events, and the whole
   compass and extent of their influence, with very great and important
   consequences. If the laws of motion, and gravitation, laid down by Sir
   Isaac Newton, hold universally, there is not one atom, nor the least
   assignable part of an atom, but what has influence, every moment,
   throughout the whole material universe, to cause every part to be
   otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that particular
   corporeal existence. And however the effect is insensible for the
   present, yet it may, in length of time, become great and important.

   To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the same way, in
   straight lines, perfectly parallel one to another; but to be diverted
   from this parallel course, and drawn one from another, as much as might
   be, by the attraction of an atom, at the distance of one of the
   furthest of the fixed stars from the earth; these bodies being turned
   out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get
   further and further distant, one from the other; and though the
   distance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may
   become very great. So the revolution of a planet round the sun being
   retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater
   or less, and more or less elliptical, and so its periodical time longer
   or shorter, no more than may be by the influence of the least atom,
   might, in length of time, perform a whole revolution sooner or later
   than otherwise it would have done; which might make a vast alteration
   with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of the
   least particle may, for ought we know, have such effect on something in
   the constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to
   arise in the mind at a certain time, than otherwise would have been;
   which, in length of time, (yea, and that not very great,) might
   occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of mankind. And so
   innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least assignable
   alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences.

   Another argument, which the fore-mentioned author brings against a
   necessary determination of the Divine Will, by a superior fitness, is,
   that such doctrine derogates from the freeness of God's grace and
   goodness, in choosing the objects of his favour and bounty, and from
   the obligation upon men to thankfulness for special benefits, (p. 89,
   &c.) In answer to this objection, I would observe,

   1. That it derogates no more from the goodness of God, to suppose the
   exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom,
   than to suppose it determined by chance, and that his favours are
   bestowed altogether at random, his Will being determined by nothing but
   perfect accident, without any end or design whatsoever; which must be
   the case, as has been demonstrated, if Volition be not determined by a
   prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect contingence, wherein
   neither previous inducement nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not
   owing more to goodness or benevolence, than that which is owing to the
   influence of a wise end.

   2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that deter mines the Will of
   God, in the choice of the objects of his favours, be any moral quality
   in the object, recommending that object to his benevolence above
   others, his choosing that object is not so great a manifestation of the
   freeness and sovereignty of his grace, as if it were otherwise. But
   there is no necessity for supposing this, in order to our supposing
   that he has some wise end in view, in determining to bestow his favours
   on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between the
   merit of the object of God's favour, or a moral qualification of the
   object attracting that favour and recommending to it, and the natural
   fitness of such a determination of the act of God's goodness, to answer
   some wise design of his own, some end in the view of God's
   omniscience.--It is God's own act, that is the proper and immediate
   object of his Volition.

   3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts
   from wise design in determining the particular subjects of his favours:
   none will say, I presume, that when God distinguishes, by his bounty,
   particular societies or persons, he never, in any instance, exercises
   any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if it be
   not denied to be so in some instances, then I would inquire, whether in
   these instances God's goodness is less manifested, than in those
   wherein God has no aim or end at all? And whether the subjects have
   less cause of thankfulness? And if so, who shalt be thankful for the
   bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of
   the distinction being made without an end? How shall it be known when
   God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not? It is very manifest,
   with respect to the apostle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing
   him to be a Christian and an apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c.
   The apostle himself mentions one end. (1 Tim. i. 15, 16.) "Christ Jesus
   came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for
   this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might show
   forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter
   believe on him to life everlasting." But yet the apostle never looked
   on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches or divine grace in his
   election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to
   observe,

   4. Our supposing such a moral Necessity in the acts of God's Will, as
   has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the
   riches of God's grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favour,
   that, in many instances, this moral necessity may arise from goodness,
   and from the great degree of it. God may choose this object rather than
   another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs, and
   inclinations of his goodness; being more sinful, and so more miserable
   and necessitous than others, the inclinations of infinite mercy and
   benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God in
   sending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the
   exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another.

   One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on
   the head of the Necessity of the acts of God's Will; and that is, that
   something much more like a servile subjection of the Divine Being to
   fatal Necessity, will follow from Arminian principles, than from the
   doctrines which they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose,
   with respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on
   the Volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of
   the universe, to which all others are subordinate; I say, they suppose,
   with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them,
   antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his about them. And if so,
   they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or Volitions
   of his, and independent on them, and to which his Volitions must be
   subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed
   futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So that here,
   instead of a moral Necessity of God's Will, arising from, or consisting
   in, the infinite perfection and blessedness of the Divine Being, we
   have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the
   perfect nature of the Divine Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and
   Design, and entirely independent on these things, and which they have
   no hand in, because they are prior to them; and to which God's Will is
   truly subject, being obliged to conform or accommodate himself to it,
   in all his purposes and decrees, and in every thing he does in his
   disposals and government of the world; the moral world being the end of
   the natural; so that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that
   state of the moral world, which consists in, or depends upon, the acts
   and state of the Wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition
   from eternity. Such a subjection to Necessity as this, would truly
   argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy of the
   Supreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of
   the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral Necessity
   of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant
   to the absolute sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy
   of his Will; and really subjects the Will of the Most High to the Will
   of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [144] "If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any
   mutation or succession of one thing to another, would appear to be also
   removed. Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood.
   What is it that succeeds? One minute to another, perhaps, velut unda
   supervenit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that the minutes
   are things separately existing. This is the common notion; and yet it
   is a manifest prejudice. Time is nothing but the existence of created
   successive beings, and eternity the necessary existence of the
   Deity--Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no change or succession
   in his nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive. We seem to
   commit a double oversight in this case; first, we find succession in
   the necessary nature and existence of the Deity himself: which is
   wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this
   succession to eternity, considered abstractedly from the eternal Being;
   and suppose it, one known not what, a thing subsisting by itself, and
   flowing, one minute after another. This is the work of pure
   imagination, and contrary to the reality of things. Hence the common
   metaphorical expressions. Time runs apace, let us lay hold on the
   present minute, and the like. The philosophers themselves mislead us by
   their illustration. They compare eternity to the motion of a point
   running on for ever, and making a trace less infinite line. Here the
   point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing the present
   minute; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it: that is, they
   ascribe motion to a mere nonentity. to illustrate to us a successive
   eternity, made up of finite successive parts. If once we allow an
   all-perfect mind, which hath an eternal, immutable, and infinite
   comprehension of all things, always (and allow it we must) the
   distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a
   mind.--In a wont, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or
   existence of the Deity will appear to be Vitæ interminabilis, tota,
   simill et perfecta possessio; how much soever this may have been a
   paradox hitherto." Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Vol. ii
   409, 410, 411. Edit. 3.

   [145] "For men to have recourse to subtilties in raising difficulties,
   and then complain, that they should be taken off by minutely examining
   these subtilties, is a strange kind of procedure.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. IX.

   Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been
   maintained, that it makes God the Author of Sin.

   It is urged by Arminians, that the doctrine of the Necessity of men's
   Volitions, or their necessary connexion with antecedent events and
   circumstances, makes the First Cause, and Supreme Orderer of all
   things, the Author of Sin; in that he has so constituted the state and
   course of things, that sinful Volitions become necessary, in
   consequence of his disposal. Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the
   Freedom of the Will, [146] cites one of the ancients, as on his side,
   declaring that this opinion of the Necessity of the Will "absolves
   sinners, as doing nothing of their own accord which was evil, and would
   cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world, upon
   God, and upon his providence, if that were admitted by the assertors of
   this fate; whether he himself did necessitate them to do these things,
   or ordered matters so, that they should be constrained to do them by
   some other cause." And the Doctor says, in another place, [147] "In the
   nature of the thing, and in the opinion of philosophers, causa
   deficiens, in rebus necrssariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda
   est. In things necessary, the deficient cause must be reduced to the
   efficient. And in this case the reason is evident; because the not
   doing what is required, or not avoiding what is forbidden, being a
   defect, must follow from the position of the necessary cause of that
   deficiency."--Concerning this, I would observe the following things.

   I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing peculiar to
   this scheme; it is no difficulty or disadvantage wherein it is
   distinguished from the scheme of Arminians; and, therefore, not
   reasonably objected by them.

   Dr. Whitby supposes that if sin necessarily follows from God
   withholding assistance, or if that assistance be not given, which is
   absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil; then, in the nature of
   the thing, God must be as properly the author of that evil, as if he
   were the efficient cause of it. From whence, according to what he
   himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be the proper
   author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness: he must be the
   efficient cause of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfect
   malignity against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of
   the insatiable cruelty of their disposition. For he allows, that God
   has so forsaken them, and does so withhold his assistance from them,
   that they are incapacitated from doing good, and determined only to
   evil. [148] Our doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of
   men's sin in this world, no more, and in no other sense, than his
   doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of the hellish pride
   and malice of the devils. And doubtless the latter is as odious an
   effect as the former.

   Again, if it will follow at alt, that God is the Author of Sin, from
   what has been supposed of a sure and infallible connexion between
   antecedents and consequents, it will follow because of this, viz. that
   for God to be the author or orderer of those things which, he knows
   beforehand, will infallibly be attended with such a consequence, is the
   same thing, in effect, as for him to be the author of that consequence.
   But, if this be so, this is a difficulty which equally attends the
   doctrine of Arminians themselves; at least, of those of them who allow
   God's certain foreknowledge of all events. For, on the supposition of
   such a foreknowledge, this is the case with respect to every sin that
   is committed: God knew, that if he ordered and brought to pass such and
   such events, such sins would infallibly follow. As for instance, God
   certainly foreknew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered
   things so, that there should be such a man born, at such a time, and at
   such a place, and that his life should he preserved, and that he
   should, in Divine Providence, be led into acquaintance with Jesus; and
   that his heart should be so influenced by God's Spirit or providence,
   as to be inclined to be a follower of Christ; and that he should be one
   of those twelve, which should be chosen constantly to attend him as his
   family; and that his health should be preserved, so that he should go
   up to Jerusalem, at the last passover in Christ's life; and it should
   be so ordered, that Judas should see Christ's kind treatment of the
   woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have that reproof from Christ
   which he had at that time, and see and near other things which excited
   his enmity against his Master, and other circumstances should be
   ordered, as they were ordered; it would most certainly and infallibly
   follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would soon after hang
   himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to hell, for his horrid
   wickedness.

   Therefore, this supposed difficulty ought not to be brought as an
   objection against the scheme which has been maintained, as disagreeing
   with the Arminian scheme, seeing it is no difficulty owing to such a
   disagreement, but a difficulty wherein the Arminians share with us.
   That must be unreasonably made an objection against our differing from
   them, which we should not escape or avoid at all by agreeing with
   them.--And therefore I would observe,

   II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the Author of Sin,
   ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, The Author
   of Sin. I know the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something
   very ill. If by the Author of Sin, be meant the Sinner, the Agent, or
   Actor of Sin, or the Doer of a wicked thing; so it would be a reproach
   and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the Author of Sin. In this sense, I
   utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin; rejecting such an imputation
   on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any
   such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But if, by
   the Author of Sin, is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of Sin;
   and, at the same lime, a disposer of the state of events, in such a
   manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that Sin,
   if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly
   follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the Author of
   Sin, I do not deny that God is the Author of Sin, (though I dislike and
   reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry
   another sense,) it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the
   Author of Sin. This is not to be the Actor of Sin, but, on the
   contrary, of holiness. What God doth herein, is holy; and a glorious
   exercise of the infinite excellency of his nature. And, I do not deny,
   that God being thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid
   down; and, I assert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is
   maintained by most of the Arminian divines.

   That it is most certainly so, that God is in such a manner the Disposer
   and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any credit is to be given to the
   Scripture; as well as because it is impossible, in the nature of
   things, to be otherwise. In such a manner God ordered the obstinacy of
   Pharaoh, in his refusing to obey God's commands, to let the people go.
   Exod. iv. 21.) "I will harden his heart, and he shall not let the
   people go." ( Chap. vii. 2-5.) "Aaron thy brother shall speak unto
   Pharaoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land. And I
   will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in
   the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you; that I may
   lay mine hand upon Egypt, by great judgments," &c. ( Chap. ix. 12.)
   "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto
   them, as the Lord had spoken unto Moses." ( Chap. x. 1, 2.) "And the
   Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh; for I have hardened his
   heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might show these my signs
   before him, and that thou mayest tell it in the ears of thy son, and
   thy son's son, what things I have wrought in Egypt, and my signs which
   I have done amongst them, that ye may know that 1 am the Lord." ( Chap.
   xiv. 4.) "And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after
   them: and I will be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host." (
   Ver. 8.) "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh king of Egypt, and
   he pursued after the children of Israel." And it is certain, that in
   such a manner God, for wise and good ends, ordered that event, Joseph
   being sold into Egypt by his brethren. ( Gen. xlv. 5.) "Now, therefore,
   be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for
   God did send me before you to preserve life." ( Ver. 7, 8.) "God did
   send me before you to preserve a posterity in the earth, and to save
   your lives by a great deliverance: so that now it was not you that sent
   me hither, but God." (Psal. cvii. 17.) "He sent a man before them, even
   Joseph, who was sold for a servant." It is certain, that thus God
   ordered the Sin and folly of Sihon king of the Amorites, in refusing to
   let the people of Israel pass by him peaceably. (Deut. ii. 30.) "But
   Sihon king of Heshbon would not let us pass by him; for the Lord thy
   God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might
   deliver him into thine hand." It is certain, that God thus ordered the
   Sin and folly of the kings of Canaan, that they attempted not to make
   peace with Israel, but, with a stupid boldness and obstinacy, set
   themselves violently to oppose them and their God. (Josh. xi. 20.) "For
   it was or the Lord, to harden their hearts, that they should come
   against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that
   they might have no favour; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord
   commanded Moses." It is evident, that thus God ordered the treacherous
   rebellion of Zedekiah against the king of Babylon. (Jer. lii. 3.) "For
   through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem, and Judah,
   until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled
   against the king of Babylon." (So 2 Kings xxiv. 20.) And it is
   exceeding manifest, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous
   ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in spoiling and ruining the nations round
   about. (Jer. xxv. 9.) "Behold, I will send and take all the families of
   the north, saith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar my servant, and will
   bring them against this land, and against all the nations round about;
   and will utterly destroy them, and make them an astonishment, and an
   hissing, and perpetual desolations." ( Chap. xliii. 10, 11.) "I will
   send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant: and I
   will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall
   spread his royal pavilion over them. And when he cometh, he shall smite
   the land of Egypt, and deliver such as are for death to death, and such
   as are for captivity to captivity, and such as are for the sword to the
   sword." Thus God represents himself as sending for Nebuchadnezzar, and
   taking him and his armies, and bringing him against the nations, which
   were to be destroyed by him, to that very end, that he might utterly
   destroy them, and make them desolate; and as appointing the work that
   he should do so particularly, that the very persons were designed that
   he should kill with the sword, and those that should be killed with
   famine and pestilence, and those that should be carried into captivity;
   and that in doing all these things, he should act as his servant; by
   which, less cannot be intended, than that he should serve his purposes
   and designs. And in Jer. xxvii. 4-6. God declares, how he would cause
   him thus to serve his designs, viz. by bringing this to pass in his
   sovereign disposals, as the great Possessor and Governor of the
   universe, that disposes all things just as pleases him. Jer. xxvii.
   4-6. "Thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel; I have made the
   earth, the man and the beast that arc upon the ground, by my great
   power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed
   meet unto me; and now I have given all these lands into the hands of
   Nebuchadnezzar my servant, and the beasts of the field have I given
   also to serve him." And Nebuchadnezzar is spoken of as doing these
   things, by having his arms strengthened by God, and having God's sword
   put into his hands, for this end. (Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 26.) Yea, God
   speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and cruelly
   destroying all sorts, without distinction of sex or age, as the weapon
   in God's hand, and the instrument of his indignation, which God makes
   use of to fulfil his own purposes, and execute his own vengeance. (Jer.
   li. 20, &c.) "Thou art my battle-axe, and weapons of war. For with thee
   will I break in pieces the nations, and with thee I will destroy
   kingdoms, and with thee I will break in pieces the horse and his rider,
   and with thee I will break in pieces the chariot and his rider; with
   thee also will I break in pieces man and woman; and with thee I will
   break in pieces old and young; and with thee will I break in pieces the
   young man and the maid," &c. It is represented, that the designs of
   Nebuchadnezzar and those that destroyed Jerusalem, never could have
   been accomplished, had not God determined them. (Lam. iii. 37.) "Who is
   he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not?"
   And yet the king of Babylon thus destroying the nations, and especially
   the Jews, is spoken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally
   destroyed him. (Isa. xiv. 4-6,12. Hab. ii. 5-12. and Jer. chap. i. and
   li.) It is most manifest, that God, to serve his own designs,
   providentially ordered Shimei's cursing of David. (2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11.)
   "The Lord hath said unto him. Curse David.--Let him curse, for the Lord
   hath bidden him."

   It is certain, that God thus, far excellent, holy, gracious ends,
   ordered the fact which they committed, who were concerned in Christ's
   death; and that therein they did but fulfil God's designs. As, I trust,
   no Christian will deny it was the design of God, that Christ should be
   crucified, and that for this end he came into the world. It is very
   manifest by many scriptures, that the whole affair of Christ's
   crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the treachery of Judas, that
   made way for it, was ordered in God's providence, in pursuance of his
   purpose; notwithstanding the violence that is used with those plain
   scriptures, to obscure and pervert the sense of them. (Acts ii. 23.)"
   Him being delivered, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of
   God [149] ye have taken, and with wicked hands have crucified and
   slain." Luke xxii. 21, 22. [150] "But behold the hand of him that
   betrayeth me, is with me on the table: and truly the Son of man goeth,
   as it was determined." (Acts iv. 27, 28.) "For of a truth, against the
   holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius
   Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered
   together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined
   before to be done." (Acts iii. 17, 18.) "And now, brethren, I wot that
   through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers; but these things,
   which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that
   Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." So that what these
   murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to pass or
   ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word.

   In Rev. xvii. 17. "The agreeing of the kings of the earth to give their
   kingdom to the beast;" though it was a very wicked thing in them, is
   spoken of as "fulfilling God's will," and what "God had put into their
   hearts to do" It is manifest, that God sometimes permits sin to be
   committed, and at the same time orders things so, that if he permits
   the fact, it will come to pass, because on some accounts, he sees it
   needful and of importance, that it should come to pass. (Matt. xviii.
   7.) "It must needs be, that offences come; but woe to that man by whom
   the offence cometh." With (1 Cor. xi. 19.) "For there must also be
   heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest
   among you."

   Thus it is certain and demonstrable, from the holy Scriptures, as well
   as the nature of things, and the principles of Arminians, that God
   permits sin; and at the same time, so orders things, in his providence,
   that it certainly and infallibly will come to pass, in consequence of
   his permission. I proceed to observe in the next place,

   III. That there is a great difference between God being; concerned
   thus, by his permission, in an event and act, which, in the inherent
   subject and agent of it, is sin, (though the event will certainly
   follow on his permission,) and his being concerned in it by producing
   it and exerting the act of sin; or between his being the orderer of its
   certain existence, by not hindering it, under certain circumstances,
   and his being the proper actor or author of it, by a positive agency or
   efficiency. And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby offers about a
   saying of philosophers, that causa defitiens, in rebus necessariis, ad
   causam per se efficientem reducenda est. As there is a vast difference
   between the sun being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the
   atmosphere, and the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence
   and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and
   frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby it descends below the
   horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of
   events; but it is not the proper cause, efficient, or producer of them;
   though they are necessarily consequent on that motion, under such
   circumstances: no more is any action of the Divine Being the cause of
   the evil of men's Wills. If the sun were the proper cause of cold and
   darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the
   fountain of light and heat: and then something might be argued from the
   nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it
   might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark and cold, and
   that his beams are black and frosty. But from its being the cause no
   otherwise than by its departure, no such thing can be inferred, but the
   contrary; it may justly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot
   body, if cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its
   withdrawment; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are
   connected with and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it
   argue the sun to be the fountain of light and neat. So, inasmuch as sin
   is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most High,
   but, on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and
   energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the
   want of his influence; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his
   operation evil, or has any thing of the nature of evil; but, on the
   contrary, that he, and his agency, are altogether good and holy, and
   that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing,
   indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them to
   themselves, and necessarily sin when he dues so, that therefore their
   sin is not from themselves, but from God; and so, that God must be a
   sinful being: as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always
   dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, that
   therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams
   must needs be black.

   IV. It properly belongs to the supreme and absolute Governor of the
   universe, to order all important events within his dominion, by his
   wisdom: but the events in the moral world are of the most important
   kind; such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their
   consequences.

   These events will be ordered by something. They will either be disposed
   by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance; that is, they will be
   disposed by blind and undesigning causes, if that were possible, and
   could be called a disposal. Is it not better, that the good and evil
   which happen in God's world, should be ordered, regulated, bounded, and
   determined by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise Being, who
   perfectly comprehends within his understanding and constant view, the
   universality of things, in all their extent and duration, and sees all
   the influence of every event, with respect to every individual thing
   and circumstance, throughout the grand system, and the whole of the
   eternal series of consequences; than to leave these things to fell out
   by chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no
   understanding or aim? Doubtless, in these important events, there is a
   better and a worse, as to the time, subject, place, manner, and
   circumstances of their coming to pass, with regard to their influence
   on the state and course of things. And if there be, it is certainly
   best that they should be determined to that time, place, &c. which is
   best. And therefore it is in its own nature fit, that wisdom, and not
   chance, should order these things. So that it belongs to the Being, who
   is the possessor of infinite wisdom, and is the creator and owner of
   the whole system of created existences, and has the care of all; I say,
   it belongs to him, to take care of this matter; and he would not do
   what is proper for him, if he should neglect it. And it is so far from
   being unholy in him, to undertake this affair, that it would rather
   have been unholy to neglect it; as it would have been a neglecting what
   fitly appertains to him; and so it would have been a very unfit and
   unsuitable neglect.

   Therefore the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to this matter:
   especially considering, that if God should leave men's volitions, and
   all moral events, to the determination and disposition of blind
   unmeaning causes, or they should be left to happen perfectly without a
   cause; this would be no more consistent with liberty, in any notion of
   it, and particularly not in the Arminian notion of it, than if these
   events were subject to the disposal of Divine Providence, and the Will
   of man were determined by circumstances which are ordered and disposed
   by Divine Wisdom; as appears by what has been already observed. But it
   is evident, that such a providential disposing, and determining of
   men's moral actions, though it infers a moral necessity of those
   actions, yet it does not in the least infringe the real liberty of
   mankind; the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to
   moral agency, which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with
   such necessity.

   On the whole, it is manifest, that God may be, in the manner which has
   been described, the Orderer and Disposer of that event, which, in the
   inherent subject and agent, is moral Evil; and yet his so doing may be
   no moral Evil. He may will the disposal of such an event, and its
   coming to pass for good ends, and his Will not be an immoral or sinful
   Will, but a perfect, holy Will. And he may actually, in his providence,
   so dispose and permit things, that the event may be certainly and
   infallibly connected with such disposal and permission, and his act
   therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy act. Sin may
   be an evil thing, and yet that there should be such a disposal and
   permission, as that it should come to pass, may be a good thing. This
   is no contradiction, or inconsistence. Joseph's brethren selling him
   into Egypt, consider it only as it were acted by them, and with respect
   to their views and aims, which were evil, was a very bad thing; but it
   was a good thing, as it was an event of God's ordering, and considered
   with respect to his views and aims, which were good. (Gen. I. 20.) "As
   for you, ye thought Evil against me; but God meant it unto Good." So
   the crucifixion of Christ, if we consider only those things which
   belong to the event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are
   comprehended within the compass of the affair considered as their act,
   their principles, dispositions, views, and aims; so it was one of the
   most heinous things that ever was done; in many respects the most
   horrid of all acts; but consider it as it was willed and ordered of
   God, in the extent of his designs and views, it was the most admirable
   and glorious of all events; and God willing the event was the most holy
   volition of God, that ever was made known to men; and God's act in
   ordering it, was a divine act, which, above all others, manifests the
   moral excellency of the Divine Being.

   The consideration of these things may help us to a sufficient answer to
   the cavils of Arminians, concerning what has been supposed by many
   Calvinists, of a distinction between a secret and revealed Will of God,
   and their diversity one from the other; supposing that the Calvinists
   herein ascribe inconsistent Wills to the Most High: which is without
   any foundation. God's secret and revealed Will, or, in other words, his
   disposing and preceptive Will, may be diverse, and exercised in
   dissimilar acts, the one in disapproving and opposing, the other in
   willing and determining, without any inconsistence. Because, although
   these dissimilar exercises of the Divine Will may, in some respects,
   relate to the same things, yet, in strictness, they have different and
   contrary objects, the one evil and the other good. Thus, for instance,
   the crucifixion of Christ was a thing contrary to the revealed or
   preceptive Will of God; because, as it was viewed and done by his
   malignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy
   nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy inclination of
   his heart revealed in his law. Yet this does not at all hinder but that
   the crucifixion of Christ, considered with all those glorious
   consequences, which were within the view of the Divine Omniscience,
   might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious
   event; and consequently be agreeable to his Will, though this Will may
   be secret, i. e. not revealed in God's law. And thus considered, the
   crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret exercises
   of God's Will were of a kind that is dissimilar, and contrary to his
   revealed Will, respecting the same, or like objects; if the objects of
   both were good, or both evil; then, indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds
   of volition or inclination to God, respecting these objects, would be
   to ascribe an inconsistent Will to God: but to ascribe to Him different
   and opposite exercises of heart, respecting different objects, and
   objects contrary one to another, is so far from supposing God's Will to
   be inconsistent with itself, that it cannot be supposed consistent with
   itself any other way. For any being to have a Will of choice respecting
   good, and, at the same time, a Will of rejection and refusal respecting
   evil, is to be very consistent: but the contrary, viz. to have the same
   Will towards these contrary objects, and to choose and love both good
   and evil, at the same time, is to be very inconsistent.

   There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may hate a thing as it
   is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his
   Will it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe,
   there is no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he
   is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole
   compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless
   series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in
   the world. [151] And, if so, it will certainly follow, that an
   infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose
   that there should be such a thing. And, if so, then such a choice is
   not evil, out a wise and holy choice. And if so, then that Providence
   which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise and holy Providence. Men
   do will sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it: they love
   it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as
   sin, or for the sake of any thing evil; though it be his pleasure so to
   order things, that, he permitting, sin will come to pass, for the sake
   of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His
   willing to order things so that evil should come to pass, for the sake
   of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate evil, as
   evil: and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasonably forbid
   evil as evil, and punish it as such.

   The Arminians themselves must be obliged, whether they will or no, to
   allow a distinction of God's Will, amounting to just the same thing
   that Calvinists intend by their distinction of a secret and revealed
   Will. They must allow a distinction of those things which God thinks
   best should be, considering all circumstances and consequences, and so
   are agreeable to his disposing Will, and those things which he loves,
   and are agreeable to his nature, in themselves considered. Who is there
   that will dare to say, that the hellish pride, malice, and cruelty of
   devils, are agreeable to God, and what he likes and approves? And yet,
   I trust, there is no christian divine but will allow, that it is
   agreeable to God's Will so to order and dispose things concerning them,
   so to leave them to themselves, and give them up to their own
   wickedness, that this perfect wickedness should be a necessary
   consequence. Dr. Whitby's words plainly suppose and allow it. [152]
   These following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth, and
   indisputable evidence.

   1. That God is a perfectly happy Being, in the most absolute and
   highest sense possible.

   2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every thing
   that is contrary to happiness; and so, that in strict propriety of
   speech, there is no such thing as any pain, grief, or trouble, in God.

   3. When any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and
   things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is the less pleased,
   or has less pleasure, his pleasure and happiness is diminished, and he
   suffers what is disagreeable to him, or is the subject of something
   that is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief.
   [153]

   From this last axiom it follows, that if no distinction is to be
   admitted between God's hatred of sin, and his Will with respect to the
   event and the existence of sin, as the all-wise Determiner of all
   events, under the view of all consequences through the whole compass
   and series of things; I say, then it certainly follows, that the coming
   to pass of every individual act of sin is truly, all things considered,
   contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crossed in it; and
   this in proportion as he hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is
   infinite, by reason of the infinite contrariety of his Holy Nature to
   sin; so his Will is infinitely crossed, in every act of sin that
   happens. Which is as much as to say, he endures that which is
   infinitely disagreeable to him, by means of every act of sin that he
   sees committed. And, therefore, as appears by the preceding positions,
   he endures truly and really, infinite grief or pain from every sin. And
   so he must be infinitely crossed, and suffer infinite pain, every day,
   in millions of millions of instances: he must continually be the
   subject of an immense number of real, and truly infinitely great
   crosses and vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the most
   miserable of all Beings.

   If any objector should say; all that these things amount to, is, that
   God may do evil that good may come; which is justly esteemed immoral
   and sinful in men; and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent
   with the moral perfections of God. I answer, that for God to dispose
   and permit evil, in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do
   evil that good may come; for it is not to do evil at all.--In order to
   a thing being morally evil, there must be one of these things belonging
   to it, either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own
   nature; or it must have a bud tendency; or it must proceed from an evil
   disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things
   can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such events, as the
   immoral acts of creatures, for good ends. (1.) It is not unfit in its
   own nature, that he should do so. For it is in its own nature fit, that
   infinite wisdom, and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and
   evil in the world. And it is fit, that the Being who has infinite
   wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner, and Supreme Governor of the world,
   should take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitness
   or unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for
   any other beings to go about to order this affair; because they are not
   possessed of a wisdom that in any manner fits them for it; and, in
   other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this affair; nor
   does it belong to them, they not being the owners and lords of the
   universe.

   We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good man knew with
   absolute certainty it would be best, all things considered, that there
   should be such a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be
   contrary to his wisdom and goodness, for him to choose that it should
   be so. It is no evil desire, to desire good, and to desire that which,
   all things considered, is best. And it is no unwise choice, to choose
   that that should be, which it is best should be; and to choose the
   existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz. that it is
   best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be
   chosen. On the contrary, it would be a plain defect in wisdom and
   goodness, for him not to choose it. And the reason why he might not
   order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire it,
   but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him. But it is
   no harm for him who is, by right, and in the greatest propriety, the
   Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every thing in such a manner,
   as it would be a point of wisdom in him to choose that they should be
   ordered. If it would be a plain defect of wisdom and goodness in a
   being, not to choose that that should be, which he certainly knows it
   would, all things considered, be best should be, (as was but now
   observed,) then it must be impossible for a Being who has no defect of
   wisdom and goodness, to do otherwise than choose it should be; and
   that, for this very reason, because he is perfectly wise and good. And
   if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and goodness for him to choose
   that it should be, and the ordering of all things supremely and
   perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom and
   goodness, to order that it should be. If the choice is good, the
   ordering and disposing things according to that choice must also be
   good. It can be no harm in one to whom it belongs "to do his Will in
   the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth," to
   execute a good volition. If this Will be good, and the object of his
   Will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing or
   willing it is not willing evil that good may come. And if so, then his
   ordering, according to that Will, is not doing evil that good may come.

   2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order and
   permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For
   that it is of good tendency, is the very thing supposed in the point
   now in question.--Christ's crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in
   them that perpetrated it, was of a most glorious tendency as permitted
   and ordered of God.

   3. Nor is there any need of supposing, it proceeds from any evil
   disposition or aim; for by the supposition, what is aimed at is good,
   and good is the actual issue, in the final result of things [154]
     __________________________________________________________________

   [146] On the five Points, p. 361.

   [147] Ibid. p. 486.

   [148] On the five Points, p. 302, 305.

   [149] Grotius, as well as Beza. observes, NOT ENGLISH must here signify
   decree; and Elsner has shown that it has that signification in approved
   NOT ENGLISH writers. And it is certain NOT ENGLISH signifies one given
   up into the hands of an enemy:"-- Dodd. in Loc.

   [150] "As this passage is not liable to the ambiguities which some have
   apprehended in Acts ii. 23. and iv. 28. (which yet seem on the whole to
   be parallel to it, in their most natural construction,) I look upon it
   as an evident proof, that these things are, in the language of
   Scripture, said to be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and
   marked out by God, as the word (NOT ENGLISH ) most naturally signifies)
   which he sees in fact will happen, in consequences of his volitions,
   without any necessitating agency; as well as those events, of which he
   is properly the author." Dodd, in Loc.

   [151] Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted
   writer, of our nation, that nobody who is acquainted with him, will
   suspect to be very favourable to Calvinism. "It is difficult, says he,
   to handle the necessity of evil in such a manner, as not to stumble
   such as are not above being alarmed at propositions which have an
   uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the
   matter, they will find, that consistently with the unlimited power of
   the supreme cause, it may be said, that in the best ordered system,
   evils must have place."--Turnbull's Principles of Moral Philosophy, p.
   327, 328. He is there speaking of moral evils, as may be seen. Again
   the same author, in his second vol. entitled, Christian Philosophy, (p.
   35.) has these words: "If the Author and Governor of all things be
   infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is right; of all possible systems
   he hath chosen the best: and. consequently, there a no absolute evil in
   the universe.--This being the case, all the seeming imperfections or
   evils in it are such only in a partial view; and. with respect to the
   whole system, they are goods. Ibid. 37. "Whence then comes evil, is the
   question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in
   philosophy. And, indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the world
   in an absolute sense, we diametrically contradict what hath been just
   now proved of God. For if there be any evil in the system, that it not
   good with respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil:
   or, at best, very imperfect: and an author must be as his workmanship
   is; as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of this
   difficulty is at hand; That there is no evil in the universe. What! Are
   there no pains, no imperfections? Is there no misery, no vice in the
   world? or are not these evils? Evils indeed they are; that is, those of
   one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful,
   and abominable: but they are not evil or mischievous with respect to
   the whole?" Ibid. p. 42. 'But he is. at the same time, said to create
   evil, darkness. confusion; and yet to do no evil, but to be the author
   of good only. He is called the "Father of lights," the Author of "every
   perfect and good gift, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of
   turning." who "tempteth no man," but "giveth to all men liberally, and
   upbraideth not" And yet. by the prophet (Isa. xlv. 7.) he is introduced
   saying of himself, "I form light and create darkness; I make peace, and
   create evil: I the Lord, do all these things." What Is the meaning, the
   plain language of all this, but that the Lord delighteth in goodness,
   and (as the scripture speaks) evil is "his strange work?" He intends
   and pursues the universal good of his creation: and the evil which
   happens, is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleasure in
   evil, but because it is requisite to the greater good pursued.

   [152] Whitby on the five Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 309.

   [153] Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable, to talk of
   God's Will and Desires being truly and properly crossed, without his
   suffering any uneasiness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than
   it is to talk of something that may be called a revealed Will, which
   may, in some respect, be different from a secret purpose, which purpose
   may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed.

   [154] From the whole strain of our author's defence of his principles,
   in reference to the existence of sin in the universe, though there are
   many excellent remarks interspersed, and sound reasoning as far as his
   data would admit, yet he is evidently embarrassed; makes concessions
   which his general principles of moral necessity did not require, and
   shelters himself under covers that afford him in reality no effectual
   protection. To say, that the existence of sin is only a common
   difficulty, which belongs to every hypothesis--that though God is the
   author of sin, in some sense, yet he is not the agent, therefore the
   phrase should be disliked and rejected that though God wills the event
   of sin, yet he wills it not as an evil, but for excellent ends--that
   the events of moral evils are disposed by wisdom--that God may be the
   orderer and disposer of moral evil, which in the agent is infinitely
   evil, but in the orderer of it no evil at all--that in order to a thing
   being morally evil it must be unfit and unsuitable, or of a bad
   tendency, or from an evil disposition; but that in willing the event of
   sin neither can be attributed to God--that if a wise and good man knew,
   with absolute certainty, that it would be best, all things considered,
   there should be moral evil, he might choose that it should be so--that
   the reason why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be
   because he might not desire, but only the ordering of that matter does
   not belong to him--and that, in the language of Turnbull, "there is no
   Eric in the universe,--no absolute evil; sins are evils only in a
   partial view, but with respect to the whole system they are not evil or
   mischievous, but goods," &c. to say these things, and more of a similar
   cast, is not calculated to satisfy a mind that wants the best evidence
   which the nature of the case will admit; and we strongly suspect, from
   his manner of writing, that our author's own mind was not satisfied
   with the solution which he has attempted. In former notes we have had
   occasion only to explain principles adopted; or to point out others
   either more evident, or more radical, on which those of the author were
   founded, or with which they stood inseparably connected. But at the
   close of the present section we feel ourselves obliged to attempt, at
   least, the rectification of his principles; or perhaps more properly,
   to point out other principles, which, we conceive, are attended with no
   such embarrassment, are exposed to no self-contradiction, and which
   represent the Great Supreme in a much more amiable light The task is
   indeed arduous; but let it not be thought impossible; nor let the
   imperfection of language be confounded with the inadequacy of
   principles. And while we solicit the candour of the reader--whereby he
   will be prepared to make such allowances as the nature of the subject
   requires, be prevented from drawing hasty conclusions of the
   impracticability of bringing the subject of inquiry to a satisfactory
   issue, or of presumption in attempting it--we no less demand a
   strictness of examination. The real inquirer after truth, the christian
   divine, and the moral philosophers, should be solicitous, not to have
   the "last word," in controversy, but to make all possible advances in
   ascertaining the genuine grounds of acknowledged truths, in discovering
   radical principles, and in ascertaining their just bearings and
   tendencies. 1. The true point of inquiry is--not whether there be moral
   evil, or whether God be just? but--how the actual existence of sin, or
   moral evil, in the universe, is to be reconciled with the moral
   perfections and character of God? Therefore, the thing wanted is a
   middle term, or argumentative medium, whereby it may be shown that this
   proposition is true, viz. There is no real inconsistency between the
   existence of sin and the moral perfections of God. 2. We may therefore
   consider the following propositions as first principles: axioms. There
   does exist in the universe moral evil. II. God is infinitely free from
   injustice, unholiness, and all imperfections. Hence. corollary. There
   is no real inconsistent between the existence of moral evil and the
   moral perfections of God. 3. Now the question returns. What is the best
   evidence that there is no such inconsistency? Those who are satisfied
   with these plain propositions the axioms, and corollary, may have the
   evidence of faith, than there is no inconsistence between the subject
   and predicate of the last proposition. They may know so much of God as
   to be assured, that the existence of sin in the world is no impeachment
   of the moral character of the Most High. For such evidence it behoves
   us to be thankful. Millions are now in heaven, who enjoyed no other
   evidence while on earth than that of faith. But this is no sufficient
   reason why those who have opportunity should make no further inquiries
   into the subject. Some, indeed, suppose, that no rational evidence is
   in the present state attainable by man. But why any should so conclude
   it is difficult to say, except it be, that they wish to make their own
   minds the standard of all others, or their own attainments the ne plus
   ultra of moral philosophy. Such persons are not likely to acknowledge
   or perceive the real evidence, on supposition that it is laid before
   them, as their minds will be strongly prejudiced against all reasoning
   on the subject 4. One thing, however, is incontrovertible, as
   necessarily connected with the axioms, that the existence of moral
   evil, and the spotless and infinitely excellent moral character of God.
   are perfectly consistent; and therefore there must be somewhere good
   evidence of it And another thing is equally plain, that the brighter
   the evidence we have of the truth of the proposition which asserts the
   consistency of the two axioms, the more will be our acquaintance with
   God's real character, and the real nature of sin, which all must allow
   to be advantageous. To which we may add; that increased evidence of
   such a proposition is far from being injurious, may be further inferred
   from this consideration, that the higher any beings rise in holiness
   and happiness, the more clear will be that evidence to their view. 5.
   The terms of the question are so plain, and so generally understood,
   that it is scarcely necessary to notice them; we may, however, briefly
   observe, that moral evil is what stands in direct opposition to the
   moral character of God; and that this latter includes universal
   rectitude, or holiness, and perfect benevolence. Therefore, postulate.
   Whatever is perfectly consistent with universal rectitude, and perfect
   benevolence, is consistent with the moral perfections of God. The
   reader will observe, that what is asserted of rectitude and
   benevolence, is different; the one is said to be universal and the
   other perfect only. Every attribute of Jehovah is in ITSELF both
   perfect and universal; but not relatively so. Thus his rectitude is
   both perfect in itself, and universal with respect to its object: but
   his benevolence, however infinitely perfect, is restricted as to its
   objects, both in extent and in degree. And this restriction is
   necessary two ways: 6. First, the objects of benevolence, at least in
   this world, compose a system; and every system, whether natural or
   moral, implies a subordination and comparative superiority of parts;
   therefore the very idea of a systematic whole implies a restriction of
   benevolence as to extent and degree. 7. Secondly, the exercise of
   benevolence is an exercise of will; and the exercise of will implies
   diversity of objects, and a preference of some, rather than others, to
   occupy the more excellent parts of the whole system; so that perfect
   universality, or a strict equality of benevolence, without a
   distinguishing preference, is necessarily excluded by the very nature
   of benevolence in exercise. 8. Divine benevolence, therefore, admits of
   gradations, from the smallest degree conceivable to the utmost extent
   of the system; while rectitude admits of no such degree. Were we to
   attempt an illustration of so abstracted a subject by mental images, we
   might say. that rectitude in its exercise towards the creatures, may be
   compared to a plain surface as widely extended as the universe, of
   infinitely perfect polish, and without a flaw in any part. Hence, in
   its exercise. It is universal as its objects; and can no more admit of
   degrees, than a perfect polish can admit of flaws. On the contrary,
   benevolence may be compared to a cone, in an inverted form, the vertex
   of which is in contact with a point of that plane, and which, from the
   least possible degree, is capable of rising at sovereign pleasure, in
   its exercise towards the universe, to such a height, as that the base
   of it may be, or may not be, of equal extent with the plane below. 9.
   From just views of benevolence we may infer, that its exercise is
   purely free, and undeserved by the creature; being the fruit of will,
   choice, and sovereign pleasure. The absence of it, with respect to
   creatures, implies no flaw in perfect rectitude. Every degree of
   benevolence, from the least to the greatest, must be altogether
   optional. Perfect rectitude, with respect to created beings, and each
   individual creature, may subsist, without any more benevolence than
   what is necessarily included in mere existence. 10. This being the
   case, the state of the universe, in reference to perfect rectitude, and
   irrespective of benevolence, may be further compared to a balance in
   perfect equilibrium. The least weight of benevolence makes it
   preponderate, proportionally, in favour of virtue and happiness; but
   without which weight neither could take place. 11. But, according to
   what has been said in a former note, every created being is the subject
   of passive power; which, with respect to its influence on the creature,
   is, in some respect, the opposite of benevolence. In some, not in all
   respects. Benevolence is an exercise of will, and implies an agent; but
   passive power is a quality or principle inseparable from every
   creature, and from the universe at large. In reference to a former
   illustration, this may be compared to another cone exactly opposite,
   the vertex of which, from below, meets that of the other in the same
   plane. The intermediate point, and Indeed every point in the same
   plane, may represent the perfect rectitude of God towards every
   individual; the inverted cone above, divine benevolence; the cone
   below, passive power, with its base necessarily equal to the whole
   plane, as it respects the created universe. 12. Hence we may say that
   the neutral state of any being is placed in the plane; his degree of
   influence from passive power, the predisposing cause of vice, is
   represented by a corresponding given part of the cone below; and his
   degree of predisposition to virtue from divine benevolence, is
   represented by a corresponding given part of the cone above. Or, to
   change the comparison, if a perfectly poised balance be made to
   represent perfect rectitude, then we may suppose weights at each end in
   all possible proportions, from the smallest to the greatest. Passive
   power not being the effect of will, but of the relative nature of
   things, and inseparably connected with one end of the balance, it is
   evident, that it can be counteracted in its tendency only by the weight
   of benevolence, or sovereign pleasure. Therefore, whoever on earth or
   in heaven, rises to, and is confirmed in virtue, his attainment must be
   the effect of mere benevolence. And whoever on earth, or in hell, falls
   into, and is confirmed in vice, bis deterioration must be the effect of
   passive power, as the predisposing cause of vice, which nothing in the
   universe can counteract but sovereign, free, unmerited benevolence. 13.
   Consequently, all the good and happiness in the universe is the effect
   of benevolence, or sovereign pleasure, and exists above the plane of
   perfect rectitude; but all the evil and misery in the world is the
   effect of passive power, in union with free agency, and exists below
   the plane of rectitude. The one generates virtue, and raises to
   happiness and heaven; the other generates vice, and sinks to misery and
   hell. 14. Every thing in the universe planned, decreed, and effected by
   Jehovah, is a structure of benevolence. All he effects is good, and
   only good. The evil that exists is not his work. Benevolence has
   decreed an endless chain of antecedents, including the natural and
   moral worlds; and the consequents peculiar to them result therefrom
   with infallible certainty. But other antecedents, in this world, and in
   hell, are constantly interposed by free agents under the influence of
   passive power, whose consequences also follow with equal Infallible
   certainty. To the eye of created intelligence these counter positions,
   and opposite consequents, appear blended in an inextricable manner,
   like the different rays of light in the same pencil, different gasses
   in a given space, and different subtle fluids in the same body. But to
   the eye of Omniscience they appear perfectly distinct, in their proper
   nature, in all their directions and bearings, in all their tendencies
   and effects. 15. Instead, therefore, of saying, "There is no evil in
   the universe," we should say, "There is much evil in the universe;
   there is much on earth, and more in hell; but none of God's
   appointment." It is demonstrable, that passive power can no more be an
   object of appointment, than the most direct contradictions; and yet it
   is equally demonstrable that such a principle is the inseparable
   concomitant of every creature. It is of prior consideration to moral
   agency; for whatever is a property of a created nature as such, is of
   prior consideration to the agency of that creature. Consequently it is
   a property neither divinely appointed, nor yet a moral evil. 16.
   Liberty, in one sense, bears the same relation to good and evil, as
   rectitude does to benevolence and passive power. Liberty in itself is
   equally a medium between good and evil, as rectitude is between
   benevolence and passive power; and the medium is of a nature perfectly
   distinct from both extremes. To which we may add, that liberty united
   to or under the influence of, sovereign benevolence, generates virtue;
   but liberty united to, or under the influence of, passive power,
   generates vice. 17. From the premises it may be seen, that the
   existence of all evil, and especially moral evil, in the universe, is
   not inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. It is evident also
   that in no sense whatever except by a total misapplication of terms,
   can God be said to be "the author of sin." Nor can it be said that God
   "wills the event of sin;" but the contrary is plain, that he does not
   will it either in a decretive, a legislative, or any other sense. 18.
   The great source of confusion into which many authors have plunged
   themselves, is, that they draw too hasty an inference in attempting to
   make not hindering an event to be ultimately the same as willing it.
   Upon their data, indeed, it may be true, while they regard every event
   alike to be the effect of divine energy, and even the worst, in order
   to answer a good end. And this will always be the case, for
   self-consistency requires it, until we see and acknowledge a
   metaphysical negative cause of moral evil, and an eternal nature of
   things antecedent to all will, with their infallible effects, when not
   counteracted by sovereign benevolence. 19. Let us now view the subject
   in the light of terms a little different. Much error often arises
   through the defect of language; and where there is danger of
   misapprehension, it may be of use to change expressions. Hereby a
   difficult subject may be taken by different handles, or a reader may
   apprehend it by one handle, which he could not by another. Let us then
   substitute the word equity Instead of rectitude. and undeserved favour
   instead of benevolence. postulate. Whatever is perfectly consistent
   with equity is also perfectly consistent with the moral character of
   God. 20. Whatever to the pure effect at equity and the nature of
   things, or essential truth, united, cannot be inconsistent with the
   moral perfections of God; the existence of morel evil in the universe
   is the pure effect of these; therefore the existence of moral evil in
   the universe cannot be inconsistent with the moral perfections of God.
   21. The only ground of hesitation here is, now moral evil is the effect
   of equity and the nature of things? Liberty itself is a natural good,
   and therefore is the fruit of divine favour; and toe mere exercise of
   liberty must be ascribed to the same cause. But he who is
   hypothetically free to good, must be in like manner free to evil. For
   this hypothetical freedom either to good or to evil is what constitutes
   the morality of his acts of choice. Take away this hypothetical
   freedom, and you take away the essence of moral agency. It is plain,
   then, that to possess this freedom and consequent moral agency, is not
   inconsistent with the equity, rectitude, or moral perfections of God.
   Yet it is demonstrable that freedom cannot be influenced in its choice,
   so as to constitute it virtuous or vicious, holy or sinful, morally
   right or wrong, good or evil, but from two causes radically; divine
   favour and passive power. If the agent be under the influence of divine
   favour, a happy result, in the same proportion, is secured by the same
   essential truth as renders the choice of the great I AM, Infallibly
   good; which no one will say is inconsistent with the divine
   perfections. For though favour raises the agent above what rigid or
   pure equity can do, there is no incontinence between them; any more
   than between paying a just debt, and bestowing also a free gift in
   addition. But if the agent be not under the influence of undeserved
   favour, the only alternative is, that be must necessarily be under the
   influence of passive power. And as nothing can possibly secure a happy
   result but undeserved favour, or benevolent influence, a negative cause
   becomes an infallible ground of certainty of an opposite result Again.
   22. When God gives to creatures what is their due, he deals with them
   in equity, but when God gives them less grace than is actually
   sufficient to secure from sin, or will in fact do so, he gives them
   their due. Were it otherwise, it would be impossible for any to sin. If
   to give them so much favour, or benevolent influence, as would actually
   preserve them from sin, were their due, it is plain that the God of
   equity would give them their due. and preserve them from sin
   accordingly. But the fact is widely otherwise. They are not all
   preserved from sin, though all might be. through the interposition of
   sovereign favour; therefore it is not their due, or equity does not
   require it 23. If it be said, it is owing to their own fault; it is
   very true; but how came any creature to be faulty? God made angels and
   men upright. And he has always dealt with every creature, however
   debased by sin, in equity. He has also given to every creature capable
   of sinning. liberty unconstrained. He often influences the disposition
   by benevolence; and the goodness of God, by providential and gracious
   dispensations, leadeth to repentance. But never has he dealt with any
   unjustly, or given them less than their due. Not a fallen spirit,
   however deeply sunk, can verify such a charge. Assuredly, they have
   destroyed themselves, but in God is the only help. A principle, of
   which God is not the author, as before explained in union with the
   abuse of their liberty, satisfactorily accounts for the fact. Our evil
   is of ourselves; but all our good is from God. 24. From what has been
   said, we may safely draw this inference, that tile existence of moral
   evil in the universe, is not inconsistent with the moral perfections of
   God. And the proposition would be equally true, had the proportion of
   moral evil been greater than it is. But some will continue to cavil, it
   is probable, because every objection is not professedly answered, and
   some difficulties, or divine arcana, will always remain. They will
   still be asking, why benevolence is not more universal, and thereby
   moral evil altogether prevented? Why the cone (to which benevolence has
   been compared) is not a cylinder, whose base is commensurate with the
   plane of creatural existence, and whose top rises ad infinitum? They
   might as well inquire. Why is not every atom a sun? Why not every drop
   an ocean? Why not every moment an age? Why not every worm an angel? Why
   not the solar system as large as all material systems united? Why the
   number of angels and men not a thousand times greater? And, to complete
   the absurdity of demanding evidence for every thing, as an objection
   against demonstrable truth. Why is not any given part on the surface of
   a cone, a cylinder, or a globe, not in the centre? To all such
   inquiries -and if advanced as objections impertinent inquiries--it is
   sufficient to reply, Infinite Wisdom has planned an universe, in which
   divine benevolence appears wonderfully conspicuous; and even the evils,
   whether natural or moral, which are intermixed, and which in their
   origin are equally remote from divine causation and from chance, are
   overruled to answer purposes the most benevolent, and the most
   wonderfully sublime. corollaries. 1. The only possible way of avoiding
   the most ruinous consequences--moral evil and misery--is to direct the
   will, through the instrumentality of its freedom, to a state of union
   to God, submission to his will, and an imitation of his moral
   perfections, according to his most merciful appointment 2. To creatures
   fallen below the line of rectitude, and yet the subjects of hope,
   prayer to God for grace, undeserved favour, or benevolent influence, is
   an exercise the most becoming, a duty to be most necessary and
   important, and a privilege of the first magnitude.--W.
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      SECT. X.

   Concerning sins first Entrance into the world.

   The things which have already been offered, may serve to obviate or
   clear many of the objections which might be raised concerning sin's
   first coming into the world; as though it would follow from the
   doctrine maintained, that God must be the author of the first sin,
   through his so disposing things, that it should necessarily follow from
   his permission, that the sinful act should be committed, &c. I need
   not, therefore, stand to repeat what has been said already, about such
   a necessity not proving God to be the author of sin, in any ill sense,
   or in any such sense as to infringe any liberty of man, concerned in
   his moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt, and punishment.

   But, should it nevertheless be said, that if God, when he had made
   roan, might so order his circumstances, that from these, together with
   his withholding further assistance and divine influence, his sin would
   infallibly follow, why might not God as well have first made man with a
   fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart?

   I answer, 1. It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in
   the world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs
   to a creature, as such, and should appear so to do, that it might
   appear not to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could
   not have been, if man had been made at first with sin in his heart; nor
   unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first introduced by
   an evil act of the creature. If sin had not arisen from the
   imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that
   it did not arise from God, as the positive cause, and real source of
   it.--But it would require room that cannot be here allowed, fully to
   consider all the difficulties which have been started, concerning the
   first Entrance of sin into the world.--And therefore,

   2. I would observe, that objections against the doctrine that has been
   laid down, in opposition to the Arminian notion of liberty, from these
   difficulties, are altogether impertinent; because no additional
   difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a scheme in this manner
   differing from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by
   agreeing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that the Arminians say,
   about the contingency or self-determining power of man's Will, can
   serve to explain, with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition
   of mankind could take place, and man he justly charged with the blame
   of it. To say, the Will was self-determined, or determined by free
   choice, in that sinful volition--which is to say, that the first sinful
   volition was determined by a foregoing sinful volition--is no solution
   of the difficulty. It is an odd way of solving difficulties, to advance
   greater, in order to it. To say, two and two make nine, or, that a
   child begat his rather, solves no difficulty: no more does it, to say,
   the first sinful act of choice was before the first sinful act of
   choice, and chose and determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it
   any better solution, to say, the first sinful volition chose,
   determined, and produced itself; which is to say, it was before it was.
   Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty, to
   say, the first sinful volition arose accidentally, without any cause at
   all; any more than it will solve that difficult question, How the world
   could be made out of nothing? to say, it came into being out of
   nothing, without any cause; as has been already observed. And if we
   should allow, that the first evil volition should arise by perfect
   accident, without any cause; it would relieve no difficulty, about God
   laving the blame of it to man. For how was man to blame for perfect
   accident, which had no cause, and which, therefore, he was not the
   cause of, any more than if it came by some external cause?--Such kind
   of solutions are no better, than if some person, going about to solve
   some of the strange mathematical paradoxes, about infinitely great and
   small quantities--as, that some infinitely great quantities are
   infinitely greater than some other infinitely great quantities; and
   also that some infinitely small quantities, are infinitely less than
   others, which yet are infinitely little--should say, that mankind have
   been under a mistake, in supposing a greater quantity to exceed a
   smaller; and that a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes but a single
   unit. [155]
     __________________________________________________________________

   [155] * On the subject of the origin of moral evil, our author is more
   concise than usual. His design in this very short section, is merely to
   show, that the difficulties which have been started, concerning tbe
   first entrance of sin into the world, are such as cannot be discussed
   in a small compass; and, that the Arminian cause gains nothing by
   urging them. That cause has been sufficiently examined in several parts
   of this Inquiry; but the true and precise origin of moral evil,
   requires further notice. It is indeed of infinitely greater Importance
   to be acquainted with that celestial art, and that sacred influence,
   whereby we may emerge from the gulf of sin to holiness and heaven, than
   to be accurately versed in the science of its origination. And so it is
   far more important to see objects, and improve sight, than to be able
   to demonstrate the theory of vision: to recover health, and to use it
   aright, than to have skill to ascertain the cause and the symptom of
   disease; to contribute vigorously in extinguishing a fire that
   threatens to destroy our dwellings and ourselves, than to know the
   author of the calamity; to participate the effects of varied seasons,
   than to understand, astronomically, the precise reason of those
   variations. The mariner may navigate without knowing why his needle
   points to the north; and the celestial bodies in the solar system were
   as equally regular in their motions before Sir Isaac Newton had
   existence, as they have been since he has ascertained those laws and
   proportions according to which they move And yet the science of optics
   is not useless, the healing art is not to be despised, to discover an
   incendiary is desirable, and never is that philosopher who attempts to
   ascertain the cause of natural phenomena, held up as blameworthy. In
   like manner, though millions are delivered from the influence of sin,
   and raised to the most exalted eminence of happiness, who never knew,
   or even sought to know, scientifically, the origination of sin; this is
   no good reason that such knowledge is useless, or even unimportant. As
   we do not wish to swell these notes unnecessarily, we beg leave to
   refer to what we have said elsewhere on the subject, particularly in
   notes on the former part of this Treatise, on Dr. Doddridge's Lectures,
   and on a Sermon, concerning "Predestination to Life," second edition,
   in connexion with what we now add. (See Doddr. Works, vol. iv. p. 363,
   &c. vol v. p. 208. c. Notes.)--As the basis of our present
   demonstration, we begin with proposing a few axioms. axioms. 1. No
   effect can exist without an adequate cause. On this truth are founded
   all reasonings and all metaphysical evidence. 2. Sin is an effect, and
   has a cause. On this truth are founded all moral means and all
   religious principles. 3. The origin of moral evil cannot be moral evil;
   or, the cause of sin cannot be sin itself. Except we admit this, the
   same thing may be and not be, at the same time, and in the same
   respect--the same thing may be sin and no sin--cause and no cause--or,
   contrary to the first axiom, a contingent event may be the cause of
   itself, or may exist without an adequate cause. 4. There is no positive
   cause but what is ultimately from God. If otherwise, something positive
   may begin to be without a positive cause; or, something may exist
   without an adequate cause; which is the same as an effect to exist
   without a cause, contrary to the first axiom. 5. There may be a
   negative, metaphysical cause, where there is no decretive divine
   operation to effect it were there no negative metaphysical causes, such
   ideas as absence, ignorance, folly, weakness, and the like, could have
   no metaphysical effects; contrary to universal experience. And we must
   renounce all ideas of congruity to suppose that such things are the
   mere effects of divine decree and operation. Having premised these
   positions as axioms not to be disputed, we proceed to make a few
   observations, which, though equally true, may not be equally obvious.
   6. The origin of moral evil cannot be one principle. For were it one,
   it must be either a positive or negative cause. If positive, it would
   be ultimately from God; but this would exclude a moral alternative, the
   very essence of moral agency, and consequently be incompatible with the
   existence of moral evil. But if a negative cause, it must ultimately be
   referred to the prime negative cause, which can be no other than
   passive power, as before explained; which is nothing independent of
   positive existence; and consequently can have no effect but in union
   with positive existence. 7. It remains, then, that the origin of moral
   evil is a compound of two causes at least. Yet not more than two;
   because, as we shall see, these are sufficient, and more would be
   superfluous, in order to produce the effect. 8. Now the question
   remains, What are these compound principles? Are they two positive
   causes, two negative causes, or one of each? They cannot be two
   positive causes; for then they might be ultimately reduced to one, the
   first cause; as before proved, gr. 4, 6. Nor can they be two negative
   ones; for ultimately there is but one cause properly negative.
   Consequently, 9. The first entrance of sin into the world, or the true
   and precise origin of moral evil, may be found in two causes united;
   the one positive and the other negative. But neither of which is
   morally good or morally evil; if the cause were morally good, the
   effect could not be morally bad; and if morally evil, it would be
   contrary to the third axiom, and to common sense. These two causes are,
   first, liberty, a cause naturally good; secondly, passive power, a
   cause naturally evil. And these two causes are as necessary for the
   production of moral evil, as two parents for the production of a human
   being according to the taws of nature, 9. Dr. Clarke, whose brief
   account has been more implicitly admitted than any other, says, that
   moral evil "arises wholly from the abuse of liberty; which God gave to
   his creatures for other purposes, and which it was reasonable and fit
   to give them for the perfection and order of the whole creation: only
   they, contrary to God's intention and command, have abused what was
   necessary for the perfection of the whole, to the corruption and
   depravation of themselves." This extract from Dr. Clarke (in his
   Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. p. 113. 5th edit) has
   been advanced by celebrated writers, as "containing all that can be
   advanced with certainty " on the subject. But surety those minds must
   be easily satisfied, who can be satisfied with such evidence. Dr.
   Clarke allows and proves, that liberty is a perfection, rather than an
   evil. How came it then to product evil? He answers, "This arises wholly
   from the abuse of liberty. But what is the cause of this effect called
   "the abuse of liberty?" This in fact is the whole of the difficulty,
   and yet he leaves it untouched. The free agent fails in the exercise of
   liberty; this failure is an effect; but there is no effect without a
   cause; therefore this failure must have a cause; and this cause (not
   the abuse of liberty) must bring us to the origin of moral evil. 10.
   What Dr. Clarke has left untouched may yet be ascertained. We think it
   has been fairly excluded, by what has been already advanced, from every
   thing except liberty and passive power. Therefore, the abuse of liberty
   can arise only from its associate. But how can this operate as a cause
   of the abuse of liberty? In order to answer this question, we must
   recollect what liberty itself is, viz. a natural power, or instrument
   of the mind, capable of producing moral effects. Not a self-determining
   power, which would be contrary to the first axiom; and which our author
   has abundantly demonstrated to be full of contradictions, and an utter
   impossibility. It must, then, be determined by motives. But motives, as
   before shown, (in a former note,) are the objects of choice in union
   with the state of the mind, as a compound effect. Now the cause why the
   real good, suppose the chief good, which is absolutely unchangeable, is
   not chosen, and an inferior good appears at the instant of choice
   preferable, and is in fact preferred, must arise from that part of the
   motive which is the state of the mind. 11. Now there an only two states
   of the mind conceivable whereby liberty can be influenced; the one, a
   state naturally evil; the other, a state morally good. Were we to say,
   that the state was morally evil, at the first entrance of sin, we
   should contradict the third axiom. And were we to say, that the cause
   was only naturally good, we should contradict the first axiom.
   Therefore the cause of the abuse of liberty, is a state naturally evil.
   No other cause can possibly be assigned, without involving a
   contradiction. Bat what is a state naturally evil, and without any
   mixture of moral evil? It can be no other but a state under the
   influence of what we call passive power. 12. Let us view the subject in
   another light. Perfect liberty, in reference to virtue and vice, the
   scale of merit and demerit, and its attendant degrees of happiness or
   misery, is a medium, standing between all extremes--between virtue and
   vice, merit and demerit, happiness and misery. If we regard divine
   rectitude or equity, according to a former simile, in reference to the
   moral system, as an universal plane, liberty may be said to coincide
   with it. And being a natural perfection, or. when exerted, a good which
   has a positive cause, it is the effect of benevolent energy. If the
   mind be under unmerited, sovereign, benevolent influence, its liberty
   attaches itself to real good; then the agent rises on the scale of
   excellence, and therefore of happiness. But if the mind be under
   passive influence, or the influence of passive power, (a depraved
   nature and confirmed vicious habits being now out of the question,) its
   liberty attaches itself to apparent good, in opposition to real; then
   vice is generated, the agent sinks on the scale of deterioration, and
   consequently of misery. 13. It appears, then, that the will, in the
   exercise of its freedom, when producing moral effects, is the
   instrument of the disposition; and that the character of the effect
   bears an infallible and exact proportion to that of the predisposing
   cause. Yet the will in the exercise of choice is so free, that all
   constraint, coaction, and impulse, are entirely excluded from that
   which constitutes the morality of the act. Here lies the essence of
   moral agency, and the ground of accountableness. The agent has a moral
   alternative; IF he be different minded may choose otherwise than he
   actually does if under benevolent influence, he will, in proportion,
   infallibly choose aright; if under equitable, passive influence, the
   apparent good will not be the real one, and consequently the choice
   will be morally bad. Means, objects perfectly suitable and sufficient,
   are exhibited to view; but these of themselves would never determine
   the will, otherwise the same effect would always follow the same means.
   Temptations also are presented; these in like manner of themselves
   never determine the will, otherwise temptation and sin would be
   infallibly connected. Then the holy Jesus could not have withstood the
   numerous and powerful solicitations of the tempter. But why did he
   withstand all? Because objects of temptation did not constitute the
   whole of motives; because objects operate according to the state of the
   mind; and because in him benevolent influence counteracted passive
   power. Hence, when the prince of this world came, he found nothing in
   him; and hence he rose to the greatest height of glory, having "a name
   above every name." 14. There is no end of objections and cavils,
   however demonstrative the proof; for such there have been against all
   the first principles of religion--the being of God--a revelation of his
   will to that human race--the doctrine of a future state, &c. &c. Some
   may say, Why should sin be made to originate in these two things,
   liberty and passive power? We answer, it has been demonstrated, that
   all metaphysical, positive and negative, causation, in reference to
   moral evil, is reducible to these two; and therefore they might as well
   ask. Why one and one make two, rather than any other number? 15. Others
   may say, Why not proceed from God alone? They might as well ask, Why is
   not the sun the cause of darkness? Love, the cause of enmity? Wisdom,
   the cause of folly? Happiness, the cause of misery? Order, the cause of
   confusion? But the effect, it may be said, is the same. We reply, the
   assignation of a cause, whether true or false, does not alter the
   nature of phenomena. It would be, indeed, a strange phenomenon,
   hitherto unknown, and unknowable, for an hypothesis, however
   demonstrable, to alter the nature of the things in question. The effect
   are the same. Very true. But the question is not about the effects; the
   inquiry is about the true cause of those effects, in opposition to
   false philosophy. The effect of moral evil is misery, or deserved
   suffering. Now does it make no difference, in justifying the ways of
   God to men, whether a rational, immortal being suffer deservedly or
   undeservedly? To suffer for moral evil, is to suffer deservedly; but
   were sin and suffering from God alone, or the effect of constituted
   laws, this could not be the case. To say. that this partial suffering
   may be ultimately counterbalanced by a restoration, is begging the
   question, that there will be a restoration And if there were, what is
   it better than an apology for past injustice? To suffer undeservedly,
   is to suffer unjustly; and to punish at all is an act of injustice, if
   undeserved, as well as to punish for ever. 16. It may be again asked,
   What advantage is there in fixing on this origin of moral evil, rather
   than another? We reply by putting another question. Why should we put
   up with a false cause assigned for any thing? Surely, phenomena more
   interesting, more alarming in their nature, and more awful in their
   consequences, than moral evils, cannot arrest human observation. And it
   would be passing strange to suppose, that the ascertaining of their
   true cause and origin is not an important part of philosophy, and
   deserving of the closest investigation. What can be more dishonourable
   to the moral character of Deity, than to make sin originate in his will
   alone? Or, if this be its origin, how preposterous to call it moral
   evil, as distinguished from natural. How cruel and unjust, beyond
   precedent, to punish it; and how absurd the idea of threatening
   punishment for what was irreversibly appointed! 17. Some may say, Why
   may we not be satisfied with the idea of permission? If properly
   understood, we acknowledge that this goes a considerable way. But we
   suspect, few seem acquainted with the full implication of the term. God
   permits. True; if by it we mean he does not hinder. The free agent acts
   amiss when he it not hindered. This only shows, that God might hinder
   if he pleased; but it assigns no cause why the agent acts amiss.
   Permitting or not hindering, IMPLIES a cause distinct from divine
   causation. And the question returns, what is the cause of sin taking
   place when not hindered? In vain do we fix on chance, or a
   self-determining power; these explain nothing, and in fact are nothing,
   as our author has demonstrated various ways. In vain do we say. sin
   arises from the abuse of liberty. For the question recurs. What is the
   cause of that abuse? If this be not explained, nothing is effected. In
   vain shall we say, it proceeds from the cause of causes. For that cause
   is good only. From such a cause only good can proceed; and to ascribe
   sin to this cause is as proper as to say that moral evil is a good
   thing, and ought to be rewarded rather than punished. If this be not a
   reprovable mode of calling "evil good, and good evil," (Isa. v. 90.) we
   know not what is. corollaries. 18. Those who renounce the idea of
   passive power, as before explained. and its influence on the mind of a
   free agent, as a negative metaphysical cause; can never find the true,
   philosophical cause of vice and sin, and consequently of deserved
   suffering. As soon might they ascertain the laws of the planetary
   motions, while rejecting the principle of gravitation If it be asked,
   What is the link of connexion between this principle and the event? We
   reply, Essential truth, the same truth as connects 2+2=4 or 2-1=1. 19.
   Those who renounce a sovereign, benevolent, physical, holy influence on
   the mind can never And the true, philosophical origin of virtue and
   holiness, and consequently happiness. 20. From the premises we infer,
   that the highest wisdom, the best interest, and the greatest honour of
   a rational and accountable being, is to employ his liberty, and all his
   powers, in the way of absolute submission to the divine will; in
   supreme affection, fear and love, to the infinite majesty and
   self-existent excellence of God; and in the way or humble and diligent
   obedience, according to the manifestation which God has made for
   himself.--W.
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      SECT. XI.

   Of a supposed Inconsistence between these principles and God's moral
   character.

   The things which have been already observed, may be sufficient to
   answer most of the objections, and silence the great exclamations of
   Arminians against the Calvinists, from the supposed inconsistence of
   Calvinistic principles with the moral perfections of God, as exercised
   in his government of mankind. The consistence of such a doctrine of
   necessity as has been maintained, with the fitness and reasonableness
   of God's commands, promises and threatenings, rewards and punishments,
   has been particularly considered. The cavils of our opponents, as
   though our doctrine of necessity made God the author of sin, have been
   answered; and also their objections against these principles, as
   inconsistent with God's sincerity, in his counsels, invitations and
   persuasions, has been already obviated, in what has been observed
   respecting the consistence of what Calvinists suppose, concerning the
   secret and revealed Will of God. By that it appears, there is no
   repugnance in supposing it may be the secret Wilt of God, that his
   ordination and permission of events should be such, that it shall be a
   certain consequence, that a thing never will come to pass; which yet it
   is man's duty to do, and so God's preceptive Will, that he should do;
   and this is the same thing as to say, God may sincerely command and
   require him to do it. And if he may be sincere in commanding him, he
   may, for the same reason, be sincere in counselling, inviting, and
   using persuasions with him to do it. Counsels and invitations are
   manifestations of God's preceptive Will, or of what God loves, and what
   is in itself, and as man's act, agreeable to his heart; and not of his
   disposing Will, and what he chooses as a part of his own infinite
   scheme of things. It has been particularly shewn, Part III. Sect. IV.
   that such a necessity as has been maintained, is not inconsistent with
   the propriety and fitness of divine commands; and for the same reason,
   not inconsistent with the sincerity of invitations and counsels, in the
   Corollary at the end of that section. Yea, it hath been shown, Part
   III. Sect. VII. Corol. 1. that this objection of Arminians, concerning
   the sincerity and use of divine exhortations, invitations, and
   counsels, is demonstrably against themselves.

   Notwithstanding, I would further observe, that the difficulty of
   reconciling the sincerity of counsels, invitations, and persuasions
   with such an antecedent known fixedness of all events, as has been
   supposed, is not peculiar to this scheme, as distinguished from that of
   the generality of Arminians, which acknowledge the absolute
   foreknowledge of God: and therefore, it would be unreasonably brought
   as an objection against my differing from them. The main seeming
   difficulty in the case is this: that God, in counselling, inviting, and
   persuading, makes a show of aiming at, seeking, and using endeavours
   for the thing exhorted and persuaded to; whereas, it is impossible for
   any intelligent being truly to seek, or use endeavours for a thing,
   which he at the same time knows, most perfectly, will not come to pass;
   and that it is absurd to suppose, he makes the obtaining of a thing his
   end, in his calls and counsels, which he, at the same time, infallibly
   knows will not be obtained by these means. Now, if God knows this, in
   the utmost certainty and perfection, the way by which he comes by this
   knowledge makes no difference. If he knows it is by the necessity which
   he sees in things, or by some other means; it alters not the case. But
   it is in effect allowed by Arminians themselves, that God's inviting
   and persuading men to do things, which he, at the same time, certainly
   knows will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity; because they
   allow, that God has a certain foreknowledge of all sinful actions and
   omissions. And as this is implicitly allowed by most Arminians, so all
   that pretend to own the Scriptures to be the word of God, must be
   constrained to allow it.--God commanded and counselled Pharaoh to let
   his people go, and used arguments and persuasions to induce him to it;
   he laid before him arguments taken from his infinite greatness and
   almighty power, (Exod. vii. 16) and forewarned him of the fatal
   consequences of his refusal, from time to time; ( chap. viii. 1, 2, 20,
   21. Exod. viii. 1, 2, 20, 21., Exod. ix. 1-5, 13-17.Exod. x. 3, 6. and
   x. 3, 6.) He commanded Moses, and the elders of Israel, to go and
   beseech Pharaoh to let the people go; and at the same time told them,
   he knew surely that he would not comply with it. (Exod. iii. 18, 19.)
   "And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of
   Egypt, and you shall say unto him, The Lord God of the Hebrews hath met
   with us; and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' journey into
   the wilderness, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God:" and, "I
   am sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go." So our blessed
   Saviour, the evening wherein he was betrayed, knew that Peter would
   shamefully deny him, before the morning; for he declares it to him with
   asseverations, to show the certainty of it; and tells the disciples,
   that all of them should be offended because of him that night; (Matt.
   xxvi. 31-35. John xiii. 38. Luke xxii. 31-34. John xvi. 32.) And yet it
   was their duty to avoid these things; they were very sinful things,
   which God had forbidden, and which it was their duty to watch and pray
   against; and they were obliged to do so from the counsels and
   persuasions Christ used with them, at that very time, so to do; (Matt.
   xxvi. 41.) "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." So that
   whatever difficulty there can be in this matter, it can be no objection
   against any principles which have been maintained in opposition to the
   principles of Arminians; nor does it any more concern me to remove the
   difficulty, than it does them, or indeed all, that call themselves
   Christians, and acknowledge the divine authority of the
   Scriptures.--Nevertheless, this matter may possibly (God allowing) be
   more particularly and largely considered, in some future discourse on
   the doctrine of predestination. [156]

   But I would here observe, that however the defenders of that notion of
   liberty which I have opposed, exclaim against the doctrine of
   Calvinists, as lending to bring men into doubts concerning the moral
   perfections of God; it is their scheme, and not the scheme of
   Calvinists, that indeed is justly chargeable with this. For it is one
   of their most fundamental points, that a freedom of Will consisting in
   self-determination, without all necessity, is essential to moral
   agency. This is the same thing as to say, that such a determination of
   the Will, without all necessity, must be in all intelligent beings, in
   those things wherein they are moral agents, or in their moral acts: and
   from this it will follow, that God's Will is not necessarily
   determined, in any thing he does, as a moral agent, or in any of his
   acts that are of a moral nature: So that in all things, wherein he acts
   holily, justly, and truly, he does not act necessarily; or his Will is
   not necessarily determined to act holily and justly; because, if it
   were necessarily determined, he would not be a moral agent in thus
   acting: his Will would be attended with necessity; which, they say, is
   inconsistent with moral agency: "He can act no otherwise; he is at no
   liberty in the affair; he is determined by unavoidable, invincible
   necessity: therefore such agency is no moral agency; yea, no agency at
   all, properly speaking: a necessary agent is no agent: he being
   passive, and subject to necessity, what he does is no act of his, but
   an effect of a necessity prior to any act of his." This is agreeable to
   their manner of arguing. Now then, what is become of all our proof of
   the moral perfections of God? How can we prove, that God certainly
   will, in any one instance, do that which is just and holy; seeing his
   "Will is determined in the matter by no necessity We have no other way
   of proving that any thing certainly will be, but only by the necessity
   of the event. Where we can see no necessity, but that the thing may be,
   or may not be, there we are unavoidably left at a loss. We have no
   other way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral perfections of
   God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves them, (p. 252, 261-263. of his
   Tracts,) viz. that God must, necessarily, perfectly know what is most
   worthy and valuable in itself, which, in the nature of things, is best
   and fittest to be done. And, as this is most eligible in itself, he,
   being omniscient, must see it to be so; and being both omniscient and
   self-sufficient, cannot have any temptation to reject it; and so must
   necessarily will that which is best. And thus, by this necessity of the
   determination of God's Will to what is good and best, we demonstrably
   establish God's moral character.

   Corol. From what has been observed, it appears, that most of the
   arguments from Scripture which Arminians make use of to support their
   scheme, are no other than begging the question. For in these they
   determine in the first place, that without such a freedom of Will as
   they hold, men cannot be proper moral agents, nor the subjects of
   command, counsel, persuasion, invitation, promises, threatening,
   expostulations, rewards, and punishments; and that without such freedom
   it is to no purpose for men to take any care, or use any diligence,
   endeavours, or means, in order to their avoiding sin, or becoming holy,
   escaping punishment, or obtaining happiness: and having supposed these
   things, which are grand things in question in the debate, then they
   heap up scriptures, containing commands, counsels, calls, warnings,
   persuasions, expostulations, promises, and threatenings; (as doubtless
   they may find enough such; the Bible being confessedly full of them,
   from the beginning to the end;) and then they glory, how full the
   Scripture is on their side, how many more texts there are that
   evidently favour their scheme, than such as seem to favour the
   contrary. But let them first make manifest the things in question,
   which they suppose and take for granted, and show them to be consistent
   with themselves; and produce clear evidence of their truth; and they
   have gained their point, as all will confess, without bringing one
   scripture. For none denies, that there are commands, counsels,
   promises, threatenings, &c. in the Bible. But unless they do these
   things, their multiplying such texts of Scripture is insignificant and
   vain.

   It may further be observed, that such scriptures as they bring, are
   really against them, and not for them. As it has been demonstrated,
   that it is their scheme, and not ours, is inconsistent with the use of
   motives and persuasives, or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men
   to the practice of virtue, or abstaining from wickedness. Their
   principles, and not ours, are repugnant to moral agency, and
   inconsistent with moral government, with law or precept, with the
   nature of virtue or vice, reward or punishment, and with every thing
   whatsoever of a moral nature, either on the part of the moral governor,
   or in the state, actions, or conduct of the subject.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [156] It does not appear that the author did any thing more, towards
   accomplishing this design, than to pen some thoughts, probably with a
   view to an elaborate treatise, which are included in his Miscellaneous
   Remarks and Observations.--W.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. XII.

   Of a supposed tendency of these principles to Atheism and
   Licentiousness.

   If any object against what has been maintained, that it tends to
   Atheism; I know not on what grounds such an objection can be raised,
   unless it be, that some Atheists have held a doctrine of necessity
   which they suppose to be like this. But if it be so, I am persuaded the
   Arminians would not look upon it just, that their notion of freedom and
   contingence should be charged with a tendency to all the errors that
   ever any embraced, who have held such opinions. The Stoic philosophers,
   whom the Calvinists are charged with agreeing with, were no Atheists,
   but the greatest Theists, and nearest akin to Christians in their
   opinions concerning the unity and the perfections of the Godhead, of
   all the heathen philosophers. And Epicurus, that chief father of
   Atheism, maintained no such doctrine of necessity, but was the greatest
   maintainer of contingence.

   The doctrine of necessity, which supposes a necessary connexion of all
   events, on some antecedent ground and reason of their existence, is the
   only medium we have to prove the being of God. And the contrary
   doctrine of contingence, even as maintained by Arminians, (which
   certainly implies, or infers, that events may come into existence, or
   begin to be, without dependence on any thing foregoing, as their cause,
   ground, or reason,) takes away all proof of the being of God; which
   proof is summarily expressed by the apostle, in Rom. i. 20. And this is
   a tendency to Atheism with a witness. So that, indeed, it is the
   doctrine of Arminians, and not of the Calvinists, that is justly
   charged with a tendency to Atheism; it being built on a foundation that
   is the utter subversion of every demonstrative argument for the proof
   of a Deity; as has been shown, Part II. Sect. III.

   And whereas it has often been said, that the Calvinistic doctrine of
   necessity saps the foundations of all religion and virtue, and tends to
   the greatest licentiousness of practice: this objection is built on the
   pretence, that our doctrine renders vain all means and endeavours, in
   order to be virtuous and religious. Which pretence has been already
   particularly considered in the 6th section of this Part; where it has
   been demonstrated, that this doctrine has no such tendency; but that
   such a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary doctrine:
   inasmuch as the notion of contingence, which their doctrine implies, in
   its certain consequences, overthrows all connexion in every degree,
   between endeavour and event, means and end.

   And besides, if many other things, which have been observed to belong
   to the Arminian doctrine, or to be plain consequences of it, be
   considered, there will appear just reason to suppose, that it is that
   which must rather tend to licentiousness. Their doctrine excuses all
   evil inclinations, which men find to be natural; because, in such
   inclinations, they are not self-determined, as such inclinations are
   not owing to any choice or determination of their own Wills. Which
   leads men wholly to justify themselves in all their wicked actions, so
   far as natural inclination has had a hand in determining their Wills to
   the commission of them. Yea, these notions, which suppose moral
   necessity and inability to be inconsistent with blame or moral
   obligation, will directly lead men to justify the vilest acts and
   practices, from the strength of their wicked inclinations of all sorts;
   strong inclinations inducing a moral necessity; yea, to excuse every
   degree of evil inclination, so far as this has evidently prevailed, and
   been the thing which has determined their Wills: because, so far as
   antecedent inclination determined the Will, so far the Will was without
   liberty of indifference and self-determination. Which, at last, will
   come to this, that men will justify themselves in all the wickedness
   they commit. It has been observed already, that this scheme of things
   exceedingly diminishes the guilt of sin, and the difference between the
   greatest and smallest offences; [157] and if it be pursued in its real
   consequences, it leaves room for no such thing, as either virtue or
   vice, blame or praise in the world. [158] And again, how naturally does
   this notion of the sovereign self-determining power of the Will, in all
   things virtuous or vicious, and whatsoever deserves either reward or
   punishment, tend to encourage men to put off the work of religion and
   virtue, and turning from sin to God; since they have a sovereign power
   to determine themselves, just when they please; or if not, they are
   wholly excusable in going on in sin, because of their inability to do
   any other.

   If it should be said, that the tendency of this doctrine of necessity
   to licentiousness, appears by the improvement many at this day actually
   make of it, to justify themselves in their dissolute courses; I will
   not deny that some men do unreasonably abuse this doctrine, as they do
   many other things, which are true and excellent in their own nature:
   but I deny, that this proves the doctrine itself has any tendency to
   licentiousness. I think, the tendency of doctrines, by what now appears
   in the world, and in our nation in particular, may much more justly be
   argued, from the general effect which has been seen to attend the
   prevailing of the principles of Arminians, and the contrary principles;
   as both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it
   be indeed, as is pretended, that Calvinistic doctrines undermine the
   very foundation of all religion and morality, and enervate and disannul
   all rational motives to holy and virtuous practice; and that the
   contrary doctrines give the inducements to virtue and goodness their
   proper force, and exhibit religion in a rational light, tending to
   recommend it to the reason of mankind, and enforce it in a manner that
   is agreeable to their natural notions of things: I say, if it be thus,
   it is remarkable, that virtue and religious practice should prevail
   most, when the former doctrines, so inconsistent with it, prevailed
   almost universally: and that ever since the latter doctrines, so
   happily agreeing with it, and of so proper and excellent a tendency to
   promote it, have been gradually prevailing, vice, profaneness, luxury,
   and wickedness of all sorts, and contempt of all religion, and of every
   kind of seriousness and strictness of conversation, should
   proportionably prevail; and that these things should thus accompany one
   another, and rise and prevail one with another, now for a whole age
   together! It is remarkable, that this happy remedy (discovered by the
   free inquiries and superior sense and wisdom of this age) against the
   pernicious effects of Calvinism, so inconsistent with religion, and
   tending so much to banish all virtue from the earth, should, on so long
   a trial, be attended with no good effect; but that the consequence
   should be the reverse of amendment; that in proportion as the remedy
   takes place, and is thoroughly applied, so the disease should prevail;
   and the very same dismal effect take place, to the highest degree,
   which Calvinistic doctrines are supposed to have so great a tendency
   to; even the banishing of religion and virtue, and the prevailing of
   unbounded licentiousness of manners! If these things are truly so, they
   are very remarkable, and matter of very curious speculation.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [157] Part III Sect VI.

   [158] Part III Sect VI. Ibid Sect VII. Part IV. Sect. I. Part. III.
   Sect. III. Corol 1. after the first head
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. XIII.

   Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the
   Calvinistic doctrine is supposed, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.

   It has often been objected against the defenders of Calvinistic
   principles, that in their reasonings, they run into nice scholastic
   distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtilties, and set these in
   opposition to common sense. And it is possible, that, after the former
   manner, it may be alleged against the reasoning by which I have
   endeavoured to confute the Arminian scheme of liberty and moral agency,
   that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. Concerning this, I would
   observe the following things:

   I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that
   it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of
   metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or
   no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be
   good, it is as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced
   to, as what language it is delivered in: and for a man to go about to
   confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his arguments
   are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could
   not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The
   question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic,
   or mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? But whether the
   reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing
   arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the
   papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging it
   is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should
   be in ten thousand places at the same time. It is by metaphysical
   arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not
   corporeal, that lead or sand cannot think; that thoughts are not square
   or round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the
   being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their
   clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is
   by metaphysics only that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to
   a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that
   it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one
   God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, indeed, we have no strict
   demonstration of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by
   metaphysics. We can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of
   any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his
   creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature
   of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great
   truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am
   willing my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and
   justest reason, and that a clear, distinct, and determinate meaning of
   the terms I use should be insisted on; but let not the whole be
   rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet,
   metaphysical.

   II. If the reasoning, which has been made use of, be in some sense
   metaphysical, it will not follow, that therefore it must need be
   abstruse, unintelligible, and akin to the jargon of the schools. I
   humbly conceive, the foregoing reasoning at least to those things which
   are most material belonging to it, depends on no abstruse definitions
   or distinctions, or terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and
   undetermined signification, or any points of such abstraction and
   subtilty, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and
   darkness. There is no high degree of refinement and abstruse
   speculation, in determining, that a thing is not before it is, and so
   cannot be the cause of itself; or that the first act of free choice,
   has not another act of free choice going before that, to excite or
   direct it; or in determining, that no choice is made, while the mind
   remains in a state of absolute indifference; that preference and
   equilibrium never coexist; and that therefore no choice is made in a
   state of liberty, consisting in indifference: and that so far as the
   Will is determined by motives, exhibiting and operating previous to the
   act of the Will, so far it is not determined by the act of the Will
   itself; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a
   cause, or some antecedent ground or reason, why it then begins to be;
   that effects depend on their causes, and are connected with them; that
   virtue is not the worse, nor sin the better, for the strength of
   inclination with which it is practised, and the difficulty which thence
   arises of doing otherwise; that when it is already infallibly known
   that the thing will be, it is not contingent whether it will ever be or
   no; or that it can be truly said, notwithstanding, that it is not
   necessary it should be, but it either may be, or may not be. And the
   like might be observed of many other things which belong to the
   foregoing reasoning.

   If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing reasoning is nothing
   but mere metaphysical sophistry: and that it must be so, that the
   seeming force of the arguments all depends on some fallacy and wile
   that is hid in the obscurity which always attends a great degree of
   metaphysical abstraction and refinement; and shall be ready to say,
   "Here is, indeed, something tends to confound the mind, but not to
   satisfy it: for who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men are
   fitly blamed or commended, punished or rewarded, for those volitions
   which are not from themselves, and of whose existence they are not the
   causes. Men may refine, as much as they please, and advance the
   abstract notions, and make out a thousand seeming contradictions, to
   puzzle our understandings; yet there can be no satisfaction in such
   doctrine as this: the natural sense of the mind of man will always
   resist it." [159] I humbly conceive, that such an objector, if he has
   capacity, and humility, and calmness of spirit sufficient, impartially
   and thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not really
   what he would be at; and indeed, his difficulty is nothing but a mere
   prejudice, from an inadvertent customary use of words, in a meaning
   that is not clearly understood, nor carefully reflected upon. Let the
   objector reflect again, if he has candour and patience enough, and does
   not scorn to be at the trouble of close attention in the affair.--He
   would have a man's volition be from himself. Let it be from himself,
   most primarily and originally of any way conceivable; that is, from its
   own choice; how will that help the matter, as to his being justly
   blamed or praised, unless that choice itself be blameworthy or
   praiseworthy? And how is the choice itself (an ill choice, for
   instance) blameworthy, according to these principles, unless that be
   from himself too, in the same manner; that is, from his own choice? But
   the original and first determining choice in the affair is not from his
   choice: his choice is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself
   some other way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help the
   matter. If it be not from himself of choice, then it is not from
   himself voluntarily: and if so, he is surely no more to blame, than if
   it were not from himself at all. It is vanity to pretend, it is a
   sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing but metaphysical
   refinement and subtilty, and so attended with obscurity and
   uncertainty.

   If it be the natural sense of our minds, that what is blameworthy in a
   man must be from himself, then it doubtless is also, that it must be
   from something bud in himself, a bad choice, or bad disposition. But
   then our natural sense is, that this bad choice or disposition is evil
   in itself, and the man blameworthy for it, on its own account, without
   taking into our notion of its blameworthiness, another bad choice, or
   disposition going before this, from whence this arises: for that is a
   ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate contradiction, which
   our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing to do with, and never
   comes into the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make
   of the affair. As was demonstrated before, natural sense does not place
   the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but
   the nature of them. An evil thing being from a man, or from something
   antecedent in him, is not essential to the original notion we have of
   blameworthiness: but it is its being the choice of the heart; as
   appears by this, that if a thing be flam us, and not from our choice,
   it has not the nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, according to
   our natural sense. When a thing is from a man, in that sense, that it
   is from his Will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his Will is
   in it: so far as the Will is in it, blame is in it, and no further.
   Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to inquire whether
   the bad Will be from a bad Will: there is no consideration of the
   original of that bad Will; because, according to our natural
   apprehension, blame originally consists in it. Therefore a thing being
   from a man, is a secondary consideration, in the notion of blame or ill
   desert. Because those things, in our external actions, are most
   properly said to be from us, which are from our choice; and no other
   external actions, but those that are from us in this sense, have the
   nature of blame; and they indeed, not so properly because they are from
   us, as because we are in them, i. e. our Wills are in them; not so much
   because they are from some property of ours, as because they are our
   properties.

   However, all these external actions being truly from us as their cause;
   and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and in the common affairs of
   life, to speak of men's actions and conduct which we see, and which
   affect human society, as deserving ill or well, as worthy of blame or
   praise; hence it is come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously
   taken all their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the
   dictates of common sense, about these overt acts of men; to the running
   of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion. And,
   therefore, I observe,

   III. It is so far from being true, (whatever may be pretended,) that
   the proof of the doctrine which has been maintained, depends on certain
   abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the
   Arminian scheme, without needing such clouds and darkness for its
   defence, is supported by the plain dictates of common sense; that the
   very reverse is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is
   fact, that they, and not we, have confounded things with metaphysical,
   unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn them from the light
   of plain truth, into the gross darkness of abstruse metaphysical
   propositions, and words without a meaning. Their pretended
   demonstrations depend very much on such unintelligible, metaphysical
   phrases, as self-determination, and sovereignty of the Will; and the
   metaphysical sense they put on such terms, as necessity, contingency,
   action, agency, &c. quite diverse from their meaning as used in common
   speech; and which, as they use them, are without any consistent
   meaning, or any manner of distinct consistent ideas; as far from it as
   any of the abstruse terms and perplexed phrases of the peripatetic
   philosophers, or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the
   cant of the wildest fanatics. Yea, we may be bold to say, these
   metaphysical terms, on which they build so much, are what they use
   without knowing what they mean themselves; they are pure metaphysical
   sounds, without any ideas whatsoever in their minds to answer them;
   inasmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any notion
   in the mind consistent with these expressions, as they pretend to
   explain them; because their explanations destroy themselves. No such
   notions as imply self-contradiction, and self-abolition, and this a
   great many ways, can subsist in the mind; as there can be no idea of a
   whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension
   without dimensions, or of an effect which is before its
   cause.--Arminians improve these terms, as terms of art, and in their
   metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things which are
   contrary to common sense, in a high degree. Thus, instead of the plain
   vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face
   of the earth and in all ages, have, consisting in opportunity to do as
   one pleases; they have introduced a new strange liberty, consisting in
   indifference, contingence, and self-determination; by which they
   involve themselves and others in great obscurity, and manifold gross
   inconsistence. So, instead of placing virtue and vice, as common sense
   places them very much, in fixed bias and inclination, and greater
   virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination; these,
   through their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty
   consisting in indifference to be essential to all virtue and vice. So
   they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but
   metaphysical confusion, into many principles about moral agency, blame,
   praise, reward, and punishment, which are, as has been shown, exceeding
   contrary to the common sense of mankind; and perhaps to their own
   sense, which governs them in common life.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [159] A certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for
   necessity are nothing but quibbling, or logomachy, using words without
   a meaning, or begging the question.--I do not know what kind of
   necessity any authors to whom he may have reference are advocates for;
   or whether they have managed their arguments well or ill. As to the
   arguments I have made use, if they are quibbles they may be shown to be
   so; such knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat may
   be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect
   to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon. I shall have just
   occasion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my
   argumentations. I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined:
   and if there be nothing but begging the question, or mere logomachy, or
   dispute of words, let it be made manifest and shown how the seeming
   strength of the argument depends on my using words without a meaning,
   or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an
   indeterminate and unsteady manner; and that the weight of my reasons
   rest mainly on such a foundation; and then, I shall either be ready to
   retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind
   part, or shall be justly exposed for my obstinacy. The same author is
   abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls logomachy and
   sophistry, to experience.--A person can experience only what passes in
   his own mind. But yet. as we may well suppose, that all men have the
   same human faculties; so a man may well argue from his own experience
   to that of others. In things that show the nature of these faculties,
   and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good a right to
   allege his experience as another. As to my own experience, I find, that
   in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body,
   in many respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my will concerning
   those motions; and that my will has some command or my thoughts; and
   that the acts of my will are my own. i. e. that they are acts of my
   will, the volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I
   will, I will. Which, I presume, is the sum of what others experience in
   this affair. But as to finding by experience, that my will is
   originally determined by itself: or that, my will first choosing what
   volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows; and
   that this is the first rise of the determination of my will in any
   affair; or that any volition arises in my mind contingently; I declare,
   I know nothing in myself, by experience, of this nature: and nothing
   that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any
   such thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose or suspect any such
   thing, than to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before
   they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions,
   before I can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them, for
   the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect, and
   this, for ought I know, may make some imagine, that volition has no
   cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason from hence
   to determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave
   myself my own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a
   cause became I first found myself possessed of being, before I had
   knowledge of a cause of my being.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. XIV.

   The conclusion.

   Whether the things which have been alleged, are liable to any tolerable
   answer in the way of calm, intelligible, and strict reasoning, 1 must
   leave others to judge: but I am sensible they are liable to one sort of
   answer. It is not unlikely, that some, who value themselves on the
   supposed rational and generous principles of the modern fashionable
   divinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the sight
   of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be
   proved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of so much
   notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual
   exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt, about the fate of
   the heathen, Hobbes's Necessity, and making men mere machines;
   accumulating the terrible epithets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable,
   irresistible, &c. and it may be, with addition of horrid and
   blasphemous; and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things,
   which have been said, in colours which shall be shocking to the
   imaginations, and moving to the passions of those, who have either too
   little capacity, or too much confidence of the opinions they have
   imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious
   and circumspect examination. [160] Or difficulties may be stated and
   insisted on, which do not belong to the controversy; because, let them
   be more or less real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are
   owing to any thing distinguishing of this scheme from that of the
   Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the
   former, and adhering to the latter. Or some particular things may be
   picked out, which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the
   generality; and these may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and
   contemptuous words; and from thence, the whole discourse may be treated
   with triumph and insult.

   It is easy to see, how the decision of most of the points in
   controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, depends on the
   determination of this grand article concerning the Freedom of the Will
   requisite to moral agency; and that by clearing and establishing the
   Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the chief arguments are obviated by
   which Arminian doctrines in general are supported, and the contrary
   doctrines demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest, that
   Cod's moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents,
   making them the objects of his commands, counsels, calls, warnings,
   expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards, and punishments, is
   not inconsistent with a determining disposal of all events, of every
   kind, throughout the universe, in his providence; either by positive
   efficiency, or permission. Indeed, such an universal determining
   providence, infers some kind of necessity of all events, such a
   necessity as implies an infallible previous fixedness of the futurity
   of the event: but no other necessity of moral events, or volitions of
   intelligent agents, is needful in order to this, than moral necessity;
   which does as much ascertain the futurity of the event as any other
   necessity. But, as has been demonstrated, such a necessity is not at
   all repugnant to moral agency, and a reasonable use of commands, calls,
   rewards, punishments, &c. Yea, not only are objections of this kind
   against the doctrine of an universal determining providence, removed by
   what has been said; but the truth of such a doctrine is demonstrated.
   As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future events is
   established by previous necessity, either natural or moral; so it is
   manifest, that the sovereign Creator and Disposer of the world has
   ordered this necessity, by ordering his own conduct, either in
   designedly acting, or forbearing to act. For, as the being of the world
   is from God, so the circumstances in which it had its being at first,
   both negative and positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these
   ways; and all the necessary consequences of these circumstances, must
   be ordered by him. And God's active and positive interpositions, after
   the world was created, and the consequences of these interpositions;
   also every instance of his forbearing to interpose, and the sure
   consequences of this forbearance, must all be determined according to
   his pleasure. And therefore every event, which is the consequence of
   any thing whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or
   circumstances, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of
   its existence, must be ordered of God; either by a designing efficiency
   and interposition, or a designed forbearing to operate or interpose.
   But, as has been proved, all events whatsoever are necessarily
   connected with something foregoing, either positive or negative, which
   is the ground of its existence. It follows, therefore, that the whole
   series of events is thus connected with something in the state of
   things either positive or negative, which is original in the series; i.
   e, something which is connected with nothing preceding that, but God's
   own immediate conduct, either his acting or forbearing to act. From
   whence it follows, that as God designedly orders his own conduct, and
   its connected consequences, it must necessarily be, that he designedly
   orders all things.

   The things which have been said, obviate some of the chief objections
   of Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine of the total depravity
   and corruption of man's nature, whereby his heart is wholly under the
   power of sin, and he is utterly unable, without the interposition of
   sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do any
   thing that is truly good and acceptable in God's sight. For the main
   objection against this doctrine, that it is inconsistent with the
   freedom of man's Will, consisting in indifference and self-determining
   power; because it supposes man to be under a necessity of sinning, and
   that God requires things of him, in order to his avoiding eternal
   damnation, which he is unable to do; and that this doctrine is wholly
   inconsistent with the sincerity of counsels, invitations, &c. Now, this
   doctrine supposes no other necessity of sinning, than a moral
   necessity; which, as has been shown, does not at all excuse sin; and
   sup-posses no other inability to obey any command, or perform any duty,
   even the most spiritual and exalted, but a moral inability, which, as
   has been proved, does not excuse persons in the non-performance of any
   good thing, or make them not to be the proper objects of commands,
   counsel, and invitations. And, moreover, it has been shown, that there
   is not, and never can be, either in existence, or so much as in idea,
   any such freedom of Will, consisting in indifference and
   self-determination, for the sake of which, this doctrine of original
   sin is cast out: and that no such freedom is necessary, in order to the
   nature of sin, and a just desert of punishment.

   The things which have been observed, do also take off the main
   objections of Arminians against the doctrine of efficacious grace; and,
   at the same time, prove the grace of God in a sinner's conversion (if
   there be any grace or divine influence in the affair) to be
   efficacious, yea, and irresistible too, if by irresistible is meant,
   that which is attended with a moral necessity, which it is impossible
   should ever be violated by any resistance. The main objection of
   Arminians against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their
   self-determining freedom of Will; and that it is repugnant to the
   nature of virtue, that it should be wrought in the heart by the
   determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its being owing
   to a self-moving power; that, in that case, the good which is wrought,
   would not be our virtue, but rather God's virtue; because not the
   person in whom it is wrought is the determining author of it, but God
   that wrought it in him. But the things which are the foundation of
   these objections, have been considered; and it has been demonstrated,
   that the liberty of moral agents does not consist in self-determining
   power; and that there is no need of any such liberty, in order to the
   nature of virtue; nor does it at all hinder, but that the state or act
   of the Will may be the virtue of the subject, though it be not from
   self-determination, but the determination of an intrinsic cause; even
   so as to cause the event to be morally necessary to the subject of
   it.--And as it has been proved, that nothing in the state or acts of
   the Will of man is contingent; but that, on the contrary, every event
   of this kind is necessary, by a moral necessity; arid has also been now
   demonstrated, that the doctrine of an universal determining Providence,
   follows from that doctrine of necessity, which was proved before: and
   so, that God does decisively, in his providence, order all the
   volitions of moral agents, either by positive influence or permission:
   and it being allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair of
   man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or less, is by some
   positive influence, and not by mere permission, as in the affair of a
   sinful volition: if we put these things together, it will follow, that
   God's assistance or influence must be determining and decisive, or must
   be attended with a moral necessity of the event; and so, that God gives
   virtue, holiness, and conversion to sinners, by an influence which
   determines the effect, in such a manner, that the effect will
   infallibly follow by a moral necessity; which is what Calvinists mean
   by efficacious and irresistible grace.

   The things which have been said, do likewise answer the chief
   objections against the doctrine of God's universal and absolute decree,
   and afford infallible proof of this doctrine; and of the doctrine of
   absolute, eternal, personal election in particular. The main objections
   against these doctrines are, that they infer a necessity of the
   volitions of moral agents, and of the future and moral state and acts
   of men; and so are not consistent with those eternal rewards and
   punishments, which are connected with conversion and impenitence; nor
   can be made to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the
   precepts, calls, counsels, warnings, and expostulations of the word of
   God; or with the various methods and means of grace, which God uses
   with sinners to bring them to repentance; and the whole of that moral
   government, which God exercises towards mankind: and that they infer an
   inconsistence between the secret and revealed Will of God; and make God
   the author of sin. But all these things have been obviated in the
   preceding discourse. And the certain truth of these doctrines,
   concerning God's eternal purposes, will follow from what was just now
   observed concerning God's universal providence; how it infallibly
   follows from what has been proved, that God orders all events, and the
   volitions of moral agents amongst others, by such a decisive disposal,
   that the events are infallibly connected with his disposal. For if God
   disposes all events, so that the infallible existence of the events is
   decided by his providence, then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides
   things knowingly, and on design. God does not do what he does, nor
   order what he orders, accidentally and unawares: either without or
   beside his intention. And if there be a foregoing design of doing and
   ordering as he does, this is the same with a purpose or decree. And as
   it has been shown, that nothing is new to God, in any respect, but all
   things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity; hence it
   will follow, that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew,
   founded on any new views or appearances, but are all eternal purposes.
   And as it has been now shown, how the doctrine of determining
   efficacious grace certainly follows from things proved in the foregoing
   discourse; hence will necessarily follow the doctrine of particular,
   eternal, absolute election. For if men are made true saints, no
   otherwise than as God makes them so, and distinguishes them from
   others, by his efficacious power and influence, that decides and fixes
   the event; and God thus makes some saints, and not others, on design or
   purpose, and (as has been now observed) no designs of God are new; it
   follows, that God thus distinguished from others, all that ever become
   true saints, by his. eternal design or decree. 1 might also show, how
   God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree, and how
   such a decree can be proved to a demonstration from it: but that this
   discourse may not be lengthened out too much, that must be omitted for
   the present. [161]

   From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in
   some sense may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visible
   Christians, yea, the whole world, by his death; vet there must be
   something particular in the design of his death, with respect to such
   as he intended should actually be saved thereby. As appears by what has
   been now shown, God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain
   number in his proper absolute design, and of a certain number only; and
   therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in any thing God does,
   in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the
   salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a
   design with respect to no other, most strictly speaking; for it is
   impossible, that God should prosecute any other design than only such
   as he has: he certainly does not, in the highest propriety and
   strictness of speech, pursue a design that he has not. And, indeed,
   such a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly
   follow, from the doctrine of God s foreknowledge, as from that of the
   decree. For it is as impossible, in strictness of speech, that God
   should prosecute a design, or aim at a thing, which he at the same time
   most perfectly knows will not be accomplished, as that he should use
   endeavours for that which is beside his decree. [162]

   By the things which have been proved, are obviated some of the main
   objections against the doctrine of the infallible and necessary
   perseverance of saints, and some of the main foundations of this
   doctrine are established. The main prejudices of Arminians against this
   doctrine seem to be these; they suppose such a necessary, infallible
   perseverance to be repugnant to the freedom of the Will; that it must
   be owing to man's own self-determining power he first becomes virtuous
   and holy; and so, in like manner, it must be left a thing contingent,
   to be determined by the same freedom of Will, whether he Ģill persevere
   in virtue and holiness; and that otherwise his continuing stedfast in
   faith and obedience would not be his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and
   rewardable; nor could his perseverance be properly the matter of divine
   commands, counsels, and promises, nor his apostasy be properly
   threatened, and men warned against it. Whereas, we find all these
   things in Scripture: there we find stedfastness and perseverance in
   true Christianity, represented as the virtue of the saints, spoken of
   as praiseworthy in them, and glorious rewards promised to it; and also
   find, that God makes it the subject of his commands, counsels, and
   promises; and the contrary, of threatenings and warnings. But the
   foundation of these objections has been removed, by showing that moral
   necessity and infallible certainty of events is not inconsistent with
   these things; and that, as to freedom of Will, lying in the power of
   the Will to determine itself, there neither is any such thing, nor is
   there any need of it, in order to virtue, reward, commands, counsels,
   &c.

   And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute election do
   certainly follow from the things proved in the preceding discourse; so
   some of the main foundations of the doctrine of perseverance, are
   thereby established. If the beginning of true faith and holiness, and a
   man becoming a true saint at first, does not depend on the
   self-determining power of the Will, but on the determining efficacious
   grace of God; it may well be argued, that it is also with respect to
   men being continued saints, or persevering in faith and holiness. The
   conversion of a sinner being not owing to a man's self-determination,
   but to God's determination, and eternal election, which is absolute,
   and depending on the sovereign Will of God, and not on the free Will of
   man; as is evident from what has been said: and it being very evident
   from the Scriptures, that the eternal election of saints to faith and
   holiness, is also an election of them to eternal salvation; hence their
   appointment to salvation must also be absolute, and not depending on
   their contingent, self-determining Will. From all which it follows,
   that it is absolutely fixed in God's decree, that all true saints shall
   persevere to actual eternal salvation.

   But I must leave all these things to the consideration of the impartial
   reader; and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propose it to
   his consideration, whether many of the first reformers, and others that
   succeeded thorn, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his
   church, and the greatest instruments of their deliverance from error
   and darkness, and of the support of the cause of piety among them, have
   not been injured, in the contempt with which they have been treated by
   many late writers, for their teaching and maintaining such doctrines as
   are commonly called Calvinistic. Indeed, some of these new writers, at
   the same time that they have represented the doctrines of these ancient
   and eminent divines, as in the highest degree ridiculous, and contrary
   to common sense, in an ostentation of a very generous charity, have
   allowed that they were honest well-meaning men: yea, it may be some of
   them, as though it were in great condescension and compassion to them,
   have allowed, that they did pretty well for the day in which they
   lived, and considering the great disadvantages they laboured under:
   when, at the same time, their manner of speaking has naturally and
   plainly suggested to the minds of their readers, that they were
   persons, who--through the lowness of their genius, and the greatness of
   the bigotry with which their minds were shackled, and their thoughts
   confined, living in the gloomy caves of superstition--fondly embraced,
   and demurely and zealously taught, the most '' absurd, silly, and
   monstrous opinions, worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen
   possessed of that noble and generous freedom of thought, which happily
   prevails in this age of light and inquiry. When, indeed, such is the
   case that we might, if so disposed, speak as big words as they, and on
   far better grounds. And really all the Arminians on earth might be
   challenged without arrogance or vanity, to make these principles of
   theirs, wherein they mainly differ from their fathers, whom they so
   much I despise, consistent with common sense; yea, and perhaps to
   produce any doctrine ever embraced by the blindest bigot of the church
   of Rome, or the most ignorant Mussulman, or extravagant enthusiast,
   that might be reduced to more demonstrable inconsistencies, and
   repugnancies to common sense, and to themselves; though their
   inconsistencies indeed may not lie so deep, or be so artfully veiled by
   a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate signification of
   phrases. I will not deny, that these gentlemen, many of them, are men
   of great abilities, and have been helped to higher attainments in
   philosophy, than those ancient divines, and have done great service to
   the church of God in some respects: but I humbly conceive, that their
   differing from their fathers, with such magisterial assurance, in these
   points in divinity, must be owing to some other cause than superior
   wisdom.

   It may also be worthy of consideration, whether the great alteration
   which has been made in the state of things in our nation, and some
   other parts of the protestant world, in this and the past age, by
   exploding so generally Calvinistic doctrines--an alteration so often
   spoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the friends of truth,
   learning, and virtue, as an instance of the great increase of light in
   the Christian church--be indeed a happy change, owing to any such cause
   as an increase of true knowledge and understanding in the things of
   religion; or whether there is not reason to fear, that it may be owing
   to some worse cause.

   And I desire it may be considered, whether the boldness of some writers
   may not deserve to be reflected on, who have not scrupled to say, that
   if these and those things are true, (which vet appear to be the
   demonstrable dictates of reason, as well as the certain dictates of the
   mouth of the Most High,) then God is unjust, and cruel, and guilty of
   manifest deceit and double dealing, and the like. Yea, some have gone
   so far as confidently to assert, that if any book which pretends to be
   Scripture, teaches such doctrines, that alone is sufficient warrant for
   mankind to reject it, as what cannot be the word of God. Some, who have
   not gone so far, have said, that if the Scripture seems to teach any
   such doctrines, so contrary to reason, we are obliged to find out some
   other interpretation of those texts, where such doctrines seem to be
   exhibited. Others express themselves yet more modestly: they express a
   tenderness and religious fear, lest they should receive and teach any
   thing that should seem to reflect on God's moral character, or be a
   disparagement to his methods of administration, in his moral
   government; and therefore express themselves as not daring to embrace
   some doctrines, though they seem to be delivered in Scripture,
   according to the more obvious and natural construction of the words.
   But indeed it would show a truer modesty and humility, if they would
   more entirely rely on God's wisdom and discernment, who knows
   infinitely better than we what is agreeable to his own perfections, and
   never intended to leave these matters to the decision of the wisdom and
   discernment of men; but by his own unerring instruction, to determine
   for us what the truth is; knowing how little our judgment is to be
   depended on, and how extremely prone vain and blind men are to err in
   such matters.

   The truth of the case is, that if the Scripture plainly taught the
   opposite doctrines to those that are so much stumbled at, viz. the
   Arminian doctrine of free Will, and others depending thereon, it would
   be the greatest of all difficulties that attend the Scriptures,
   incomparably greater than its containing any, even the most mysterious,
   of those doctrines of the first reformers, which our late freethinkers
   have so superciliously exploded. Indeed, it is a glorious argument of
   the divinity of the Holy Scriptures, that they teach such doctrines,
   which in one age and another, through the blindness of men's minds, and
   strong prejudices of their hearts, are rejected, as most absurd and
   unreasonable, by the wise and great men of the world; which yet, when
   they are most carefully and strictly examined, appear to be exactly
   agreeable to the most demonstrable, certain, and natural dictates of
   reason. By such things it appears, that "the foolishness of God is
   wiser than men. (1 Cor. i. 19, 20.) "For it is written, I will destroy
   the wisdom of the wise; I will bring to nothing the understanding of
   the prudent. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the
   disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this
   world?" And as it was in time past, so probably it will be in time to
   come, as it is also written, ( ver. 27-29.) "But God hath chosen the
   foolish things of the world, to confound the wise; and God hath chosen
   the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty;
   and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God
   chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that
   are: that no flesh should glory in his presence." Amen.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [160] A writer of the present age, whom I have several times had
   occasion to mention, speaks once and again of those who hold the
   doctrine of Necessity, as scarcely worthy of the name of philosophers.
   I do not know, whether he has respect to any particular notion of
   necessity, that some may have maintained; and, if so, what doctrine of
   necessity it is that he means. Whether I am worthy of the name of a
   philosopher, or not, would be a question little to the present purpose.
   If any, and ever so many, should deny it. I should not think it worth
   the while to enter into a dispute on that question: Though at the same
   time I might expect some better answer should be given to the arguments
   brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain; and I might further
   reasonably desire, that it might be considered, whether it does not
   become those, who are truly worthy of the name of philosophers, to be
   sensible, that there is a difference between argument and contempt,
   yea, and a difference between the contemptibleness of the person that
   argues, and the inconclusiveness of the arguments he offers.

   [161] Certain foreknowledge does imply some necessity. But our author
   is not sufficiently guarded, or else not sufficiently explicit, when he
   says, that foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree. For
   certainty, or hypothetical necessity, may arise from the nature of
   things, and from negative causes. as well as from a decree. If. indeed,
   the remark be limited to the subject immediately preceding, it is an
   important truth.--W.

   [162] The terms design and endeavours are not sufficiently
   discriminating. It is here supposed that it is unworthy of God to use
   endeavours which are beside his decree, or to prosecute a design which
   he knows will not be accomplished. Is it not a matter of plain fact
   that he uses endeavours which are beside his decree, and prosecutes a
   design which he knows will not be accomplished, through the whole
   system of legislation and government? Is it not the very design of
   legislation and government to prevent crimes as well as to punish them,
   and to promote obedience and conformity to law? Legislative design,
   therefore, is not accomplished in the commission of crimes, otherwise
   the legislator, as such, could not find fault for breach of law. Our
   Lord used endeavours with the inhabitants of Jerusalem, &c. beside his
   decree, yet with perfect propriety. If we keep in mind that the divine
   Will subsists under two relations, according to the two-fold state of
   man, who is at once a subject of decree and a subject of government, we
   shall see the propriety of calling it decretive and rectoral.
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

    APPENDIX.
     __________________________________________________________________

      SECT. XV.

   Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality and
   Natural Religion, in a Letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland.
   [163]

   Rev. Sir,

   The intimations you have given me of the use which has by some been
   made of what I have written on the Freedom of the Will, &c. to
   vindicate what is said on the subject of liberty and necessity, by the
   author of the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural
   Religion, has occasioned my reading this author's Essay on that subject
   with particular care and attention. And I think it must be evident to
   every one, that has read both his Essay and my Inquiry, that our
   schemes are exceedingly different from each other. The wide difference
   appears particularly in the following things.

   This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place with respect to
   all men's actions, as is inconsistent with liberty, [164] and plainly
   denies that men have any liberty in acting. Thus, (p. 168.) after he
   had been speaking of the necessity of our determinations, as connected
   with motives, he concludes with saying, "In short, if motives are not
   under our power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can at
   bottom have--no liberty." Whereas, I have abundantly expressed it as my
   mind, that man, in his moral actions, has true liberty: and that the
   moral necessity which universally takes place, is not in the least
   inconsistent with any thing that is properly called liberty, and with
   the utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or
   be conceived of.

   I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of moral necessity
   of men's volitions, which I suppose to be universal, at least some
   degree of liberty denied; that though it be true I allow a sort of
   liberty, yet those who maintain a self-determining power in the Will,
   and a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold a higher sort of
   freedom than I do: but I think this is certainly a great mistake.

   Liberty, as I have explained it, is the power, opportunity, or
   advantage that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting himself,
   in any respect, according to his pleasure; without considering how his
   pleasure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has
   been demonstrated, that no necessity of men's volitions that I
   maintain, is inconsistent with this liberty: and I think it is
   impossible for any one to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty
   than this: If any imagine they desire, and that they conceive of, a
   higher and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude
   themselves with confused ambiguous words, instead of ideas. If any one
   should here say, "Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the
   liberty a man has of conducting himself in any respect as he pleases,
   viz. a liberty of choosing as he pleases." Such an one, if he
   reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own proposal. For, is not
   choosing as he pleases, conducting himself, in some respect, according
   to his pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that
   pleasure? If he says, "Yes, I came by that pleasure by my own choice."
   If he be a man of common sense, by this time he will see his own
   absurdity: for he must needs see that his notion or conception, even of
   this liberty, does not contain any judgment or conception how he comes
   by that choice, which first determines his pleasure, or which
   originally fixed his own Will respecting the affair. Or if any shall
   say, "That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own
   choice, but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice,
   preference, or inclination of his own, but by a determination arising
   contingently out of a state of absolute indifference;" this is not
   rising higher in his conception of liberty: as such a determination of
   the Will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that
   places liberty in a power of doing something not according to his own
   choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than he that
   places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If
   there were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its
   choice or according to its pleasure, what advantage would it give? and
   what liberty, worth contending for, would be exercised in it? Therefore
   no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean, can rise higher in his conceptions
   of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained: which notion
   is perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men's
   actions, which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say, it is
   beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher
   imagination of liberty; let them talk of sovereignty of the Will,
   self-determining power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary
   decision, liberty ad utrumvis, power of choosing differently in given
   cases, &c. &c. as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in
   their strenuous dispute about these things, aim at they know not what,
   fighting for something they have no conception of, substituting a
   number of confused unmeaning words, instead of things, and instead of
   thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would
   have; but they never can answer the challenge.

   The author of the Essays, through his whole Essay on Liberty and
   Necessity, goes on the supposition, that, in order to the being of real
   liberty, a man must have a freedom that is opposed to moral necessity:
   and yet he supposes, (p. 175.) that "such a liberty must signify a
   power in the mind of acting without and against motives, a power of
   acting without any view, purpose, or design, and even of acting in
   contradiction to our own desires and aversions, and to all our
   principles of action; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with
   a rational nature." Now, who ever imagined such a liberty as this, a
   higher sort or degree of freedom, than a liberty of following one's own
   views and purposes, and acting agreeably to his own inclinations and
   passions! Who will ever reasonably suppose, that a liberty which is an
   absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature, is above that
   which is consistent with the nature of a rational, intelligent,
   designing agent.

   The author of the Essays seems to suppose such a necessity to take
   place, as is inconsistent with some supposable power of arbitrary
   choice, [165] or that there is some liberty conceivable, whereby men's
   own actions might be more properly in their power, [166] and by which
   events might be more dependent on ourselves: [167] contrary to what I
   suppose to be evident in my Inquiry. What way can be imagined, of our
   actions being more in our power, from ourselves, or dependent on
   ourselves, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to
   act from our own inclination, pursue our own views, and execute our own
   designs? Certainly, to be able to act thus, is as properly having our
   actions in our power, and dependent on ourselves, as a being liable to
   be the subject of acts and events contingently and fortuitously,
   without desire, view, purpose, or design, or any principle of action
   within ourselves; as we must be, according to this author's own
   declared sense, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is
   opposed, to moral necessity.

   This author seems every where to suppose, that necessity, most properly
   so called, attends all men's actions; and that the terms, necessary,
   unavoidable, impossible, &c. are equally applicable to the case of
   moral and natural necessity. In p. 173. he says, The idea of necessary
   and unavoidable equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity.
   And in p. 184. All things that fall out in the natural and moral world
   are, alike necessary. P. 174. This inclination and choice is
   unavoidable, caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this
   lies the necessity of our actions, that, in such circumstances, it was
   impossible we could act otherwise. He often expresses himself in like
   manner elsewhere, speaking in strong terms of men's actions as
   unavoidable, what they cannot forbear, having no power over their own
   actions, the order of them being unalterably fixed, and inseparably
   linked together, &c. [168]

   On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connexion between
   antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to
   the acts of men's Wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by
   the name of Necessity improperly; and that all such terms as must,
   cannot, impossible, unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible, &c.
   when applied here, are not applied in their proper signification, and
   are either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignificance, or in a
   sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and their
   use in common speech: and, that such a necessity as attends the acts of
   men's Will, is more properly called certainty, than necessity; it being
   no other than the certain connexion between the subject and predicate
   of the proposition which affirms their existence.

   Agreeably to what is observed in my Inquiry, I think it is evidently
   owing to a strong prejudice, arising from an insensible habitual
   perversion and misapplication of such like terms, as necessary,
   impossible, unable, unavoidable, invincible, &c. that they are ready to
   think, that to suppose a certain connexion of men's volitions, without
   any foregoing motives or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence
   whatsoever, is truly and properly to suppose a strong irrefragable
   chain of causes and effects, as stand in the way of, and makes utterly
   vain, opposite desires and endeavours, like immovable and impenetrable
   mountains of brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant,
   pates of brass, and bars of iron: whereas, all such representations
   suggest ideas as far from the truth, as the east is from the west.
   Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any
   fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and choosing, as they
   please, with full freedom; yea, with the highest degree of liberty that
   ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart
   of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavour to make some
   persons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it: for
   if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains, which
   has been long fixed by the use of the terms necessary, must, cannot,
   impossible, &c. the association with these terms of certain ideas,
   inconsistent with liberty, is not broken; and the judgment is
   powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long bent and grown
   stiff, if it be straightened, will return to its former cavity again
   and again.

   The author of the Essays most manifestly supposes, that if men had the
   truth concerning the real necessity of all their actions clearly in
   view, they would not appear to themselves, or one another, as at all
   praiseworthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable
   for their actions: [169] which supposes, that men are not to be blamed
   or praised for any of their actions, and are not under any obligations,
   nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by reason of this
   necessity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavoured to prove,
   throughout the third part of my Inquiry. I humbly conceive it is there
   shown, that this is so far from the truth, that the moral necessity of
   men's actions which truly take place, is requisite to the being of
   virtue and vice, or any thing praiseworthy or culpable: that the
   liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in
   opposition to that necessity, is inconsistent with the being of these;
   as it would suppose that men are not determined in what they do, by any
   virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions,
   or aims whatsoever; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. And
   is it not remarkable, that this author should suppose, that, in order
   to men's actions truly having any desert, they must be performed
   without any view, purpose, design, or desire, or any principle of
   action, or any thing agreeable to a rational nature? as it will appear
   that he does, if we compare, p. 206, 207, with p. 175.

   The author of the Essays supposes, that God has deeply implanted in
   man's nature a strong and invincible apprehension, or feeling, as he
   calls it, of a liberty, and contingence of his own actions, opposite to
   that necessity which truly attends them; and which in truth does not
   agree with real fact, [170] is not agreeable to strict philosophic
   truth, [171] is contradictory to the truth of things, [172] and which
   truth contradicts, [173] not tallying with the real plan: [174] and
   that therefore such feelings are deceitful, [175] and are in reality of
   the delusive kind, [176] He speaks of them as a wise delusion, [177] as
   nice artificial feelings, merely that conscience may have a commanding
   power: [178] meaning, plainly, that these feelings are a cunning
   artifice of the Author of nature, to make men believe they are free,
   when they are not. [179] He supposes that, by these feelings, the moral
   world has a disguised appearance, [180] &c. He supposes that all
   self-approbation, and all remorse of conscience, all commendation or
   condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of desert, and all that
   is connected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which at present
   are suggested by the words ought, should, arise from this delusion, and
   would entirely vanish without it. [181]

   All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly insisted on and
   endeavoured to demonstrate in my Inquiry; where I have largely shown,
   that it is agreeable to the natural sense of mankind, that the moral
   necessity or certainty that attends men's actions, is consistent with
   praise and blame, reward and punishment; [182] and that it is agreeable
   to our natural notions, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and
   abhorrence, and all its other ill-deservings, consists in a certain
   deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart, and
   not in the evil of something else, diverse from these supposed to be
   their cause or occasion. [183]

   I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in the world of
   mankind, who is conscious to a sense or feeling, naturally and deeply
   rooted in his mind, that, in order to a man's performing any action
   that is praiseworthy or blameworthy, he must exercise a liberty that
   implies and signifies a power of acting without any motive, view,
   design, desire, or principle of action? For such a liberty, this author
   supposes, that must be which is opposed to moral necessity, as I have
   already observed.

   Supposing a man should actually do good, independent of desire, aim,
   inducement, principle, or end, is it a dictate of invincible natural
   sense, that his act is more meritorious or praiseworthy, than if he had
   performed it for some good end, and had been governed in it by good
   principles and natives? and so I might ask, on the contrary, with
   respect to evil actions. [184]

   The author of the Essays supposes that the liberty without necessity of
   which we have a natural feeling, implies contingence; and, speaking of
   this contingence, be sometimes calls it by the name of chance. And it
   is evident, that his notion of it, or rather what he says about it,
   implies things happening loosely, fortuitously, by accident, and
   without a cause. [185] Now I conceive the slightest reflection may be
   sufficient to satisfy any one, that such a contingence of men's
   actions, according to our natural sense, is so far from being essential
   to the morality or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it;
   and that, on the contrary, the dependence of our actions on such
   causes, as inward inclinations, incitements, and ends, is essential to
   the being of it. Natural sense teaches men, when they see any thing
   done by others of a good or evil tendency, to inquire what their
   intention was, what principles and views they were moved by, in order
   to judge low far they are to be justified or condemned; and not to
   determine, that, in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the
   action must be performed altogether fortuitously, proceeding from
   nothing, arising from no cause. Concerning this matter, I have fully
   expressed my mind in the Inquiry.

   If the liberty of which we have a natural sense, as necessary to
   desert, consists in the mind's self-determination, without being
   determined by previous inclinations or motive, then indifference is
   essential to it, yea absolute indifference; as is observed in my
   Inquiry. But men naturally have no notion of any such liberty as this,
   as essential to the morality or demerit of their actions; but on the
   contrary, such a liberty, if it were possible, would be inconsistent
   with our natural notions of desert, as is largely shown in the Inquiry.
   [186] If it be agreeable to natural sense, that men must be indifferent
   in determining their own actions; then, according to the same, the more
   they are determined by inclination, either good or bad, the less they
   have of desert: the more good actions are performed from good
   disposition, the less praiseworthy; and the more evil deeds are from
   evil dispositions, the less culpable; and, in general, the more men's
   actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be commended or
   condemned: which all must know is very contrary to natural sense.

   Moral necessity is owing to the power and government of the inclination
   of the heart, either habitual or occasional, excited by motive: but,
   according to natural and common sense, the more a man does any thing
   with full inclination of heart, the more is it to be charged to his
   account for his condemnation, if it be an ill action, and the more to
   be ascribed to him for his praise, if it be good.

   If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingence, from a
   state of indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or
   else the fault would be in being so perfectly indifferent, that the
   mind was equally liable to a bad or good determination. And if this
   indifference be liberty, then the very essence of the blame or fault
   would lie in the liberty itself, or the wickedness would, primarily and
   summarily, be in being a free agent. If there were no fault in being
   indifferent, then there would be no fault in the determination being
   agreeable to such a state of indifference: that is, there could be no
   fault found, that opposite determinations actually happen to take place
   indifferently, sometimes good and sometimes bad, as contingence governs
   and decides. And if it be a fault to be indifferent to good and evil,
   then such indifference is no indifference to good and evil, but is a
   determination to evil, or to a fault; and such an indifferent
   disposition would be an evil disposition, tendency, or determination of
   mind.

   So inconsistent are these notions of liberty, as essential to praise or
   blame. The author of the Essays supposes men's natural delusive sense
   of a liberty of contingence, to be, in truth, the foundation of all the
   labour, care, and industry of mankind; [187] and that if men's
   "practical ideas had been formed on the plan of universal necessity,
   the ignava ratio, the inactive doctrine of the Stoics, would have
   followed; and that there would have been no room for forethought about
   futurity, or any sort of industry and care:" [188] plainly implying,
   that, in this case, men would see and know that all their industry and
   care signified nothing, was in vain, and to no purpose, or of no
   benefit; events being fixed in an irrefragable chain, and not at all
   depending on their care and endeavour; as he explains himself,
   particularly, in the instance of men's use of means to prolong life:
   [189] not only very contrary to what I largely maintain in my Inquiry,
   [190] but also very inconsistently with his own scheme, in what he
   supposes of the ends for which God has so deeply implanted this
   deceitful feeling in man's nature; in which he manifestly supposes
   men's care and industry not to be in vain and of no benefit, but of
   great use, yea of absolute necessity, in order to their obtaining the
   most important ends and necessary purposes of human life, and to fulfil
   the ends of action to the best advantage; as he largely declares. [191]
   Now, how shall these things be reconciled? That, if men had a clear
   view of real truth, they would see that there was no room for their
   care and industry, because they would see it to be in vain, and of no
   benefit; and yet that God, by having a clear view of real truth, sees
   their being excited to care and industry will be of excellent use to
   mankind, and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea absolutely
   necessary in order to it: and that therefore the great wisdom and
   goodness of God to men appears, in artfully contriving to put them on
   care and industry for their good, which good could not be obtained
   without them; and yet both these things are maintained at once, and in
   the same sentences and words, by this author. The very reason he gives,
   why God has put this deceitful feeling into men, contradicts and
   destroys itself; that God in his great goodness to men gave them such a
   deceitful feeling, because it was very useful and necessary for them,
   and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care and industry for
   their own good, which care and industry is useful and necessary to that
   end; and yet the very thing for which, as a reason, this great benefit
   of care and industry is given, is God's deceiving men in this very
   point, in making them think their care and industry to be of great
   benefit to them, when indeed it is of none at all; and if they saw the
   real truth, they would see all their endeavours to be wholly useless,
   that there was no room for them, and that the event does not at all
   depend upon them. [192]

   And besides, what this author says plainly implies, (as appears by what
   has been already observed,) that it is necessary men should be
   deceived, by being made to believe that future events are contingent,
   and their own future actions free, with such a freedom, as signifies
   that their actions are not the fruit of their own desires, or designs,
   but altogether contingent, fortuitous, and without a cause. But how
   should a notion of liberty, consisting in accident or loose chance,
   encourage care and industry? I should think it would rather entirely
   discourage every thing of this nature. For surely, if our actions do
   not depend on our desires and designs, then they do not depend on our
   endeavours, flowing from our desires and designs. This author himself
   seems to suppose, that if men had, indeed, such a liberty of
   contingence, it would render all endeavours to determine or move men's
   future volitions, in vain: he says, that, in this case, to exhort, to
   instruct, to promise, or to threaten, would be to no purpose. [193]
   Why? Because (as he himself gives the reason) "then our Will would be
   capricious and arbitrary, and we should be thrown loose altogether, and
   our arbitrary power could do us good or ill only by accident." But if
   such a loose fortuitous state would render vain others' endeavours upon
   us, for the same reason would it make useless our endeavours on
   ourselves: for events that are truly contingent and accidental, and
   altogether loose from, and independent of, all foregoing causes, are
   independent on every foregoing cause within ourselves, as well as in
   others.

   I suppose that it is so far from being true, that our minds are
   naturally possessed with a notion of such liberty as this, so strongly,
   that it is impossible to root it out, that indeed men have no such
   notion of liberty at all, and that it is utterly impossible, by any
   means whatsoever, to implant or introduce such a notion into the mind
   As no such notions as imply self-contradiction and self-abolition can
   subsist in the mind, as I have shown in my Inquiry; I think a mature
   sensible consideration of the matter is sufficient to satisfy any one,
   that even the greatest and most learned advocates themselves for
   liberty of indifference and self-determination, have no such notion;
   and that indeed they mean something wholly inconsistent with, and
   directly subversive of, what they strenuously affirm, and earnestly
   contend for. By a man having a power of determining his own Will, they
   plainly mean a power of determining his Will as he pleases, or as he
   chooses; which supposes that the mind has a choice, prior to its going
   about to confirm any action or determination to it. And if they mean
   that they determine even the original or prime choice, by their own
   pleasure or choice, as the thing that causes and directs it; I scruple
   not most boldly to affirm, that they speak they know not what, and that
   of which they have no manner of idea; because no such contradictory
   notion can come into, or have a moment's subsistence in, the mind of
   any man living, as an original or first choice being caused, or brought
   into being, by choice. After all, they say, they have no higher or
   other conception of liberty, than that vulgar notion of it, which I
   contend for, viz. a man's having power or opportunity to do as he
   chooses: or if they had a notion that every act of choice was
   determined by choice, yet it would destroy their notion of the
   contingence of choice; for then no one act of choice would arise
   contingently, or from a state of indifference, but every individual
   act, in all the series, would arise from foregoing bias or preference,
   and from a cause predetermining and fixing its existence, which
   introduces at once such a chain of causes and effects, each preceding
   link decisively fixing the following, as they would by all means avoid.

   And such kind of delusion and self-contradiction as this, does not
   arise in men's minds by nature: it is not owing to any natural feeling
   which God has strongly fixed in the mind and nature of man; but to
   false philosophy, and strong prejudice, from a deceitful abuse of
   words. It is artificial; not in the sense of the author of the Essays,
   supposing it to be a deceitful artifice of God; but artificial as
   opposed to natural, and as owing to an artificial deceitful management
   of terms, to darken and confound the mind. Men have no such thing when
   they first begin to exercise reason; but must have a great deal of time
   to blind themselves with metaphysical confusion, before they can
   embrace, and rest in, such definitions of liberty as are given, and
   imagine they understand them.

   On the whole, I humbly conceive, that whosoever will give himself the
   trouble of weighing, what I have offered to consideration in my
   Inquiry, must be sensible, that such a moral necessity of men's actions
   as I maintain, is not at all inconsistent with any liberty that any
   creature has, or can have, as a free, accountable, moral agent, and
   subject of moral government; and that this moral necessity is so far
   from being inconsistent with praise and blame, and the benefit and use
   of men's own care and labour, that, on the contrary, it implies the
   very ground and reason, why men's actions are to be ascribed to them as
   their own, in such a manner as to infer desert, praise and blame,
   approbation and remorse of conscience, reward and punishment; and that
   it establishes the moral system of the universe, and God's moral
   government, in every respect, with the proper use of motives,
   exhortations, commands, counsels, promises, and threatenings; and the
   use and benefit of endeavours, care and industry. There is therefore no
   need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all concealed; nor
   is there any danger in contemplation and profound discovery in these
   things. So far from this that the truth in this matter is of vast
   importance, and extremely needful to be known; and the more clearly and
   perfectly the real fact is known, and the more constantly it is in
   view, the better. More particularly, that the clear and full knowledge
   of that, which is the true system of the universe, in these respects,
   would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the true christian
   scheme of divine administration in the city of God, and the gospel of
   Jesus Christ, in its most important articles. Indeed these things never
   can be well established, and the opposite errors--so subversive of the
   whole gospel, which at this day so greatly and generally prevail--be
   well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained, answered,
   till these points are settled. While this is not done, it is, to me,
   beyond doubt, that the friends of those great gospel truths, will but
   poorly maintain their controversy with the adversaries of those truths:
   they will be obliged often to shuffle, hide, and turn their backs; and
   the latter will have a strong fort, from whence they never can be
   driven, and weapons to use, from which those whom they oppose will find
   no shield to screen themselves; and they will always puzzle, confound,
   and keep under the friends of sound doctrine; and glory, and vaunt
   themselves in their advantage over them; and carry their affairs with a
   high hand, as they have done already for a long time past.

   I conclude, Sir, with asking your pardon for troubling you with so much
   in vindication of myself from the imputation of advancing a scheme of
   necessity, like that of the author of the Essays on the Principles of
   Morality and Natural Religion. Considering that what I have said is not
   only in vindication of myself, but, as I think, of the most important
   articles of moral philosophy and religion; I trust in what I know of
   your candour, that you will excuse,

   Your obliged friend and brother,

   J. Edwards.

   Stockbridge, July 25th, 1757
     __________________________________________________________________

   [163] The "Essays" to which this Appendix relates, were the production
   of Lord Kaimes.

   [164] P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.

   [165] P. 169.

   [166] P. 191, 195, 197, 206.

   [167] P. 183.

   [168] P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206.

   [169] P. 207, 209, and other places.

   [170] P. 200.

   [171] P. 152.

   [172] P. 183.

   [173] P. 186.

   [174] P. 205.

   [175] P.203, 204, 211.

   [176] P. 183.

   [177] P. 209.

   [178] P. 211.

   [179] P. 153.

   [180] P. 214.

   [181] P. 160, 194, 199, 205, 206, 207, 210.

   [182] P. Inquiry Part IV. Sect. 4. throughout.

   [183] Idem. Part IV. Sect. 1. throughout.

   [184] See this matter illustrated in my Inquiry. Part IV. Sect. 4.

   [185] P. 156-159, Sect. 6 and 7.

   [186] Especially in Part III.

   [187] P. 184.

   [188] P. 189.

   [189] P. 184, 185.

   [190] P. Especially Part IV. Sect. 5.

   [191] P. 188-192 and many other places.

   [192] P. 188, 189, &c.

   [193] * P. 178, 213, 214.