

of certainty, nor can there be any certainty of will separate from the certainty of the understanding. And yet more ridiculous is the Jesuit's argument, when he tells us, that "what we have reason to hope for, we do not hope for it, but expect it;"* the folly of which distinction between hope and expectation, I need not say any thing further to it, than to assure you, that the apostle Peter was wholly ignorant of Bellarmine's logic, when he exhorts believers to be ready to give *λογον περι της εν υμιν ελπιδος*, "a reason of the hope that was in" them. (1 Peter iii. 15.)

But, Secondly, the phrase, "full assurance of hope," supposes an *actual building of our hope upon these good grounds, or an actual conclusion from rational principles, that we are pardoned, and shall be saved.*—It is one thing to consider the grounds of such a conclusion, another thing to conclude actually from those grounds. Assured hope, as it is accompanied with rational evidences, so it is accompanied with right use of right reason to draw the inference. Weak hope sometimes acts as children will do,—it grants the premisses, and yet denies the conclusion; but strong hope is accompanied with a full power to infer the assured conclusion from those assured premisses, which those afore-named assuring graces did lay down. Knowledge saith, "Whoever believes shall be saved;" faith saith, "Peter doth believe;" "Therefore," hope saith, "Peter shall be saved." † And this hope is that which will never "make ashamed, because" hereby "the love of God is shed abroad" more abundantly "in our hearts by the Holy Ghost given unto us." (Rom. v. 5.) "Let every man" therefore thus "prove his own work, and then he shall have rejoicing in himself, and not in another." (Gal. vi. 4.)

SERMON XXI. (XX.)

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BAPTISM AND THE LORD'S SUPPER ARE THE ONLY SACRAMENTS OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE UNDER THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THERE ARE BUT TWO SACRAMENTS UNDER THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Add thou not unto his words, lest he reprove thee, and thou be found a liar.—Proverbs xxx. 6.

THE independency of Proverbs informs us, that we may spare the labour of reflections upon the context; seeing every proverb is big with its own sense, and fully comprehends its own design and reach.

* *Duplex est certitudo, alia voluntatis, alia intellectus: et videtur non posse certitudinem intellectus cum spe convenire, quia quod scimus nos habituros, non speramus, sed expectamus.*—BELLARMINUS *De Justif.* lib. xiii. cap. 11. † *Dicit Fides, Parata sunt magna: dicit Spes, Mihi ista servantur.*—BERNARDI *Serm. l.* "Says Faith, 'Great things are prepared: ' For me,' says Hope, 'they are reserved.'"—EDIT.

The words now read unto you, as the ground and measure of this Morning Exercise, are weighty as to their charge and arguments.

The charge is here imperative, born of authority, and brought into the light, to bound the daring usurpations of aspiring fools. The throne of God ought not to be invaded by the sons of men; nor must a peerage in his empire be usurped or claimed by distant mortals, whose policy and safety it is to be auditors and scholars, and not dictators, in the matters of God's kingdom. The best man is only *δυναμενος του αλλου ειναι*, ["able to be the property of another,"] and *φυσει δουλος*, ["a slave by nature,"] as Aristotle speaks; and therefore, as *he* said, *Βελτιστοι γινομεθα προς τους θεους βαδιζοντες*. * *σο προς τον θεον βαδιζων βελτιστος* ["he that goes to God is best"] in respect to God, whose absolute property, and unlimited prerogative by any thing but the blessed harmony of his own infinite perfections, together with his own omnipotence, omniscience, holiness, and all-sufficiency, being both matchless and incommunicable, do speak him so fitly and undoubtedly our Owner, Governor, and Father, as that tender observance and obsequiousness must unavoidably more become us than bold pretences to his throne and sceptre. God's words are like himself, such glorious emanations of his own majesty and excellence as will neither suit nor bear the mean additions of aspiring man. All men are subjects, and must act by their derived authority and commission. God's words are like the sun, moving in a distinct and proper sphere, and scorning the accessions of our more dim and languid lamps. All that put-in their claims for legislation in church or state, are under law for what they impose and speak, and are to be presented to the bar of God, in answer to this universal summon, namely, "Give an account of thy stewardship; for thou wast but a steward, and must be no longer so." (Luke xvi. 2.) "Add thou not" therefore "to his words, lest he reprove thee."

QUERY I. "What are those additions that are not forbidden to us here? Is every thing a sinful addition that is not found expressly in the words of God?"

1. Words that explain the sense, and force, and usefulness of God's words are not forbidden here. (Neh. viii. 8.) Letters, syllables, and words are not the mind of God, farther than their signification reaches. Words are the vehicles of sense, the indices of the heart; till they are known and opened, we are but barbarians unto others. (1 Cor. xiv. 11.) There is no commandment transgressed by a true explication of those words whereby God signifies his mind: and to acquaint men with the proofs and characters whereby it may be manifest that this is God's mind, is none of those additions which God forbids to make unto his words.

2. Express determinations of times and places in particular, for the discharge of such incumbent duties as must be done in general, and cannot be discharged in particular without the fixing of time and place. How can assemblies meet together, or public worship be discharged, till a particular time and place be both stated and known?

3. Pertinent and distinct applications of general rules unto particular cases, and consequently such express reasons and arguments as shall prove

* PLUTARCHUS *Περι Δεισδαιμονιας*. "We are then best, when we are approaching the gods." — EDIT.

them pertinent and improvable, as to the case in hand. Fastings and feastings, prayers and praises, alms, forbearance, silence and speaking, are, in the general, attended with laws imposed upon all; but *quoad hic et nunc*, the calls and circumstances of emergent providences must state and fix the case, and show the duty "in its season."

4. The modes of worship may vary in their frame and use, and may be, under circumstances, ordered so to do, and yet the precept of my text observed. I may be bound to preach, or praise, or pray; but yet the subject, length, or method, and the peculiar words and phrases, may be variously determined by present choice and order.

5. The use of natural or accessory helps, no ways destructive but subservient to our stated work, may be determined to be used, and yet this law remain inviolated. I may use or forbear my notes; use all those helps that are at hand, and "find out words acceptable." (Eccles. xii. 10.)

6. Whatever may commodiously preserve, promote, and quicken due purity, truth, and order, and is no ways inconsistent with God's laws, and the true interest, ends, credit, and harmony of Christian godliness, in all its exercises, comes not within the censure of my text.

QUERY II. "What is it that we must not add unto these words of God?"

I answer: These things:—

1. Nothing as God's which is not his; as articles of faith, new points of doctrine, promises, threatenings, prophecies, revelations, traditions, or miracles, pretended to be of God, that are not so, either as to God's errand or operation.

2. Nothing to vie with God's revealed truths or laws, as to authority or importance: for this is to usurp the throne of God, and claim a peerage with absolute supremacy.

3. Nothing that savours of such additional supplements as seem to argue God of ignorance, imprudence, or negligence: for this is to turn accusers or upbraiders of the Holy One, as guilty of defects, miscarriages, and mistakes.

4. Nothing that does destroy the end, or contradicts the errand, or tends to weaken the awful and successful influences, of the words of God: for this refers to nothing but disappointment and disturbance of the noble ends and proper course of laws and government.

5. Nothing that builds what God destroys, or ruins what God designs expressly and resolves to build. The wise and righteous Governor of the world is most impatient of such contradictions. When God takes down a ceremonial frame of worship, to clear his way to better dispensations, then to cloud his heavens with pompous institutions, is to disturb and vex the eyes of spiritual worshippers, even with the dust and rubbish of what was taken down and thrown aside. Thus also the commands of God must not be rendered void through men's traditions. (Matt. xv. 2—9.)

6. Nothing that makes a wrong construction of God's words. False glosses, and corrupt interpretations of the truths of God, are vain and bold additions. Can we imagine that those words can signify God's mind which have no sense in them nor stated import, before the pope and councils have set their stamp and seal upon them? Are they bound to

construe right? or are they at perfect liberty to make the same expression true and false at pleasure?

7. In one word: Nothing that supersedes, or is co-ordinate with, or derogatory to, God's words, in doctrine, government, and worship, or prejudicial, burdensome, or unprofitable unto the purity, peace, and order, edification, or needful harmony and consolation, of souls and churches, strong or weak.

QUERY III. "What are those reasons that are produced in my text as dissuasive from these additions?"

1. *The case must be debated.*—The word used in the text comes from פָּקַד; that signifies "to dispute the case, and debate the matter by argument." God pondereth all the ways of man. All claims shall be inquired into. Bold usurpations and aspirings must be reflected on with a *Quo jure hoc fecistis?* ["By what right have ye done this?"] God will never prodigally diffuse his own prerogative. Others must act by deputation and derived authority; and both their commissions and discharge must be produced and canvassed in open court. He that will bring every thing into open court, will not forbear inquiries after those that so audaciously usurp his crown and sceptre, and storm his throne. Therefore we must carry [ourselves] as within the prospect of that great tribunal, where our precarious allegations must abide the test.

2. *The guilty will then be exposed in open court.*—God will be conqueror in judgment; and it will appear a crime unanswerable, to have the Broad Seal counterfeited. Woe to all the bold pretenders to the infallible chair, whose claims are larger than their right and warrant! If Aaron and Miriam found it so costly to challenge Moses or a peerage with him, what will become of those who will not suffer God to abide greatest and undisturbed in the throne, when Majesty appears to vindicate supreme authority from all those bold invasions which the usurping tyrant of God's church hath made? Its vigorous lustre will make his bold pretences, like a thin exhalation, to melt away and vanish. Supremacy is a tender thing; and to build "stubble, wood, and hay" upon the best foundation, will be found no man's gain. (1 Cor. iii. 12.) "What is the chaff to the wheat?" The word of God is tried, and may be trusted to; but he that leans upon the reeds of Egypt, will make his confident recumbencies at least assuredly preparatory unto his most shameful fall. He that is found a liar at the bar of God, cannot escape the smartest censures and most severe reflections that ever yet astonished and amazed delinquents. God will not patronize the lies and forgeries of any swelling or aspiring bubbles. Creatures must know their distance and the truth. It is here our reputation is the most tendered thing; and he that is found a liar here, as speaking from God that which is not of him, and that as for God which really is against him, must then expect a very round discharge from God. Hence then let us take occasion to inquire,

QUERY IV. "Whether baptism and the Lord's supper be the only sacraments of the covenant of grace under the New Testament."

1. We shall pass over now the consideration of those words in Greek and Hebrew which Bellarmine lays so great a weight upon; as, מַלְאִיִּם, סִמְנִיִּם, and רוּחַ, and אֵימָה, "a sign," (Gen. xvii. 11,) rendered by σημεῖον, σφραγίς, ["a seal,"] (Rom. iv. 11,) ἀντίτυπον, ["a figure,"] (1 Peter

iii. 21,) ὑποδειγμα, ["an example,"] (Heb. viii. 5; ix. 23,) μυστηριον ["a mystery"]; *Latinè mysterium quod aliud existit, aliud significat*; * from whence it is also called συμβολον ["a symbol"]. All which words, being of larger or more restrained signification, may be applied to more or fewer things at pleasure.

2. Nor need we dwell upon the covenant of grace, seeing it is agreed on all hands to be a contract betwixt God and man, through the mediation of Jesus Christ, for the return and reconcilment of sinners to God; and so, their justification, adoption, sanctification, and glorification. And by our speaking of the sacraments of this covenant, we prescind the thoughts of sacraments in innocence. And as in our gospels-times this covenant is published in its last and best edition and impression; and hath been sealed and ratified with the blood of sprinkling, and, as the testament of our dying Friend, exhibited to the world by the Lord himself, and those commissioned by him; (Heb. ii. 3;) and held forth plainly, powerfully, and successfully, without the veil and burdens of its former dispensations under the legal economy; so are we to consider here what sacraments and seals are annexed to and fixed upon it, waving all former sacraments as to their frame or number.

3. Therefore the term "sacraments," well opened and applied, must clear and end the controversy in this article.

And here we must premise, that the term is unscriptural, not written in it, but derived elsewhere. And so we must inquire after such things as these:

I. *How many things in authors are signified by the term?*

II. *How far it may be applicable to more than these assigned in the question, and so how far the controversy lies more in words than things.*

III. *Wherein it is only applicable to these two.*

IV. *What are the arguments and reasons of the Papists, whereby they prove the number of them to be seven? and so give them their answer.*

V. *Why the Protestants assert but two.*

Which, when they are well dispatched, may better show the truth and measures of the case in hand before us.

I. *As to the various use and acceptation of the word.*—I find the word "sacrament" used in these several senses:

1. It is taken for that "pledge, pawn," or *pignus*, which they that fought did leave in the hands of their chief priest during their fight. When the fight was ended, the conqueror took his own, and the other, in *pœnam injustæ litigationis*, ["as a punishment for his unjust litigation,"] lost his, and it was devoted to the treasury. (VARRO *De Ling. Lat. lib. iv.*) And this pledge was called "a sacrament."

2. It is taken for that oath *quo quis sacris interpositis obligatur*.† And this oath or obligation was *sacramentum*, in that it was *obligatio Numinis et religionis interventu confirmata*.‡ And hence *sacramentum militare* [is used] for such as were listed by oath, and bound to continue

* "That which is one thing, but signifies another, is, in Latin, designated 'a mystery.'"—EDIT.
 † "With which any one is bound after the performance of sacred rites."—EDIT.
 ‡ "An obligation confirmed by the intervention of the Deity and religion."—EDIT.

till the war was done. So VEGETIUS. (*De Re militari*, lib. ii.) Thus also Jerome calls the oath of Hippocrates upon his disciples *sacramentum*. (Tom. i. *Epist. ad Nepot. de Vit. Cleric. et Sacerdot.*) And Juvenal, in his sixteenth Satire, calls the very *militēs sacramento rogatos*, ["soldiers, who were bound with an oath or sacrament,"] "sacraments" themselves :

*Premia nunc alia atque alia emolumenta notemus
Sacramentorum.*—JUVENALIS *Sat.* xvi. 35.

3. Hence probably it is, that our *votum baptismale* ["baptismal vow"] was called *sacramentum*; as, *Recordare tyrocinii tui diem; quo, Christo in baptismate consequultus, in sacramenti verba jurasti.*†

4. Sometimes it is taken for no more than a mere *arcanum*, or "secret;" thus, "the sacrament of incarnation:" and often in this sense have you *sacramentum* in the Vulgar Latin. (Dan. ii. 18, 30; iv. 6; Eph. i. 9; iii. 4; Col. i. 27; 1 Tim. iii. 16.) Thus any thing of occult and sacred signification, (as parables, types,) in things or persons, &c.,—they may be called "sacraments," as Jerome, *ubi supra*; and then our number may exceed a septenary.

5. Sometimes it is taken for the sign, the thing signified, and the action, inward and outward, and the word itself, whereby God commands the *signum propter rem signatam* ["the sign on account of the thing of which it is significant"].

6. Sometimes it is taken for any *sacrae rei signum*. And thus there may be as many sacraments as there can be signs of holy matters by words or things.

7. Most to our purpose, it imports our dedication of ourselves to God by vow, expressed by solemn ceremony, signifying a mutual covenant betwixt God and us, and his reception of us.

II. *As to its application to the case in hand.*—Let us inquire how far it may be accommodated to more than two; and then how far only to these two,—baptism, and the Lord's supper. Which take as follows:—

1. If it be true what Bellarmine asserts, that "it suffices as to the nature of a sacrament that it is a sensible sign, let the sense be what it will," then, I confess, there are more sacraments than two; for every word and thing may be a sacrament that may be seen, or felt, or heard, or tasted. Then can neither of these two be a single sacrament, but each hath many sacraments in one. Then penance, matrimony, orders, confirmation, &c., are truly sacraments. Then books and sermons will be sacraments. Yea, our very words and actions in all our joint approaches unto God, will mutually be sacraments from each to other. But did not all the sacraments of the Old Testament consist of visible signs? Is there no difference betwixt the preached word and sacraments as such? Did Christ administer the sacrament to all he preached or spake unto? How is it that St. Austin makes the word and elements to constitute a sacrament? And do not sacraments require a consecration? If not, what makes the elements a sacrament? If they do, then what

* "But there are other benefits, my friend,
And greater, which the sons of war attend."—GIFFORD'S Translation.

† HIERONYMUS, tom. i. epist. 1, *ad Heliodorum, de Laude Vitae solitariae*. "Remember the day of thy first campaign, or initiation; on which, being buried with Christ in baptism, thou awarest to the words of the sacrament."—EDDIE.

must consecrate the words of consecration? And so *in infinitum*. And, lastly, did the council of Florence determine aright or not, when, in their definition of a sacrament, they did distinguish the matter and form each from other? If they did, then a sensible sign, barely as such, is not a sacrament. For if it were, then could it not derive its sacramental use and nature from Christ's institution; for its own aptitude, if men had pleased to use it and determine it, had been sufficiently productive of its sacramental use and nature. If they did not, what confidence can we put in councils that have mistaken in such weighty cases? The truth is, at this rate of speech they have secured their seven, and made sufficient room for twenty thousand more.

2. If "sacrament" only import "a secret," then Babylon itself becomes a sacrament; then types and parables, and all the intrigues of church and state, are sacraments; and so, whatever needs interpretation.

3. If by "a sacrament" they mean the shadowing forth by signs of any thing of a sacred nature, then there are more than seven; then all the furniture of the tabernacle and temple, and all the instituted rites of Moses, must have been sacraments; and *pari ratione* ["by like reason"] all gospel-ordinances, institutions, and transactions.

4. If by "a sacrament" they mean all dedicating signs, then there may be more than two. All signs of dedications unto office and relations, as well as all entire Christianity, may be called so: thus if I lift my hands or eyes to God, or solemnly subscribe an instrument whereby I give myself to God in any service, I make a sacrament and receive it.

5. If by "a sacrament" they mean the signification of a vow or promise in any kind to God; thus orders, confirmation, &c., may be called "sacraments;" and the signification of every thing I undertake for God, as master, servant, subject, or sovereign, may be called so: nor shall we say, there are no more than two.

6. If by "a sacrament" they mean something of divine institution, as expressive of some sacred undertaking and relation, I shall yet grant there are more sacraments than two. Thus matrimony, orders, confirmation, penance, and extreme unction, too, as stated and intended under those circumstances in James v., are sacraments.

7. If by "a sacrament" they mean something in some respects of the same nature, use, and ends with baptism and the supper of the Lord, I shall grant there are more sacraments than two. All offices and relations bind to respective faithfulness. Confirmation is the fresh owning of the same obligations which baptism laid upon us: I am called to regular penance by both these sacraments. I may remember Christ by reading, speaking, &c. I may signify my owning of my covenant, and may renew it, by fasting, praying, and professing many ways.

8. If by "a sacrament" be meant some significations of the grace of God to me, both relative and real, so there may be more sacraments than two: thus every ordinance; providence, and thing, expressive of God's grace to me, may bear the name of sacrament. All helps, encouragements, and advantages for heaven and holiness do clearly signify God's care and kindness to me. Thus the apostle's ministry may be a sacrament, as a clear indication of God's kindness to him.

9. There are some sacraments of order that may be truly such, as

holy orders, matrimony; and of office, civil, economical, and ecclesiastical, whose root may be the covenant of grace: but sacraments of Christianity import something more.

III. *As to its more restrained and intended use.*—A sacrament is a stated ceremony ordained by Christ, made up of visible signs; whereby our hearty dedication and full consent to all the terms and tenders of the covenant of grace, and God's acceptance of us thereunto, is signified, solemnized, and ratified by God and us, according to the propositions and injunctions of the New Testament. Which, when it is proved, will make it manifest, that either their asserting of seven is a most shameful and abusive noise both of provoking and dividing words, or else of deep and dangerous mistake in things, and too weak to bear their Tridentine anathema. Now if we view the whole description in its parts, we must consider these things, to state and clear the case in hand:—

1. *Whether the whole was not intended, in the first use and accommodation of the word "sacrament," to the concerns of Christianity.*

2. *Whether all this be not included in baptism and the eucharist.*

3. *Whether it can be possibly included in any of the five sacraments besides?*

1. Therefore, *as to the first use and application of it to the case in hand.*—It is clear it was thus used by Tertullian, and by him applied to baptism. For, speaking *ad Martyres* about their solemn abrenunciation which was made in baptism, and about other interrogations proposed at the same time, *Vocati*, saith he, *ad militiam, in sacramenti verba respondimus, &c.*: * "And thence," saith he, "did the whole action receive its name." And so, *Adversus Praxeam: Fides in Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, secundum Christianorum sacramentum, &c.*: † which must at least oblige us to, and influence, all suitableness of spirit and practice to the sacred Trinity, according to their several *σχέσεις* and "relations" to us, according to Rom. vi. 3—6. And on the same account the Greeks called our two sacraments *mysteria* ["mysteries"]; and the church generally understood the word in this sense, in opposition to the Heathens' initiation of their disciples into their idolatrous religions. And thus the ancients write of only two sacraments; as Tertullian, Justin, Irenæus, &c. Though Tertullian mention indeed unction, and imposition of hands; (*De Resur. Carn.*;) yet doth he not relate them as distinct, but as appendent, ceremonies to baptism. Thus also Cyril of Jerusalem intends the same of chrism. The time would fail to speak of Dionysius, Ambrose, &c. And it is manifest, that the doctrines of the seven sacraments were not started till broached by Hugo and Peter Lombard, from whom the Papists at first sucked it; and terribly have they improved it, to bring about their most mischievous ends.

2. *To the second, that this description doth suit the eucharist and baptism, [there] is no dispute.*—Whence Bellarmine himself, reflecting upon Chemnitius, who asserted eight things as constitutive of a sacrament in that sense that baptism and the eucharist are such:—as, (1.) A visible material element or sign. (2.) A divine institution of it.

* "Being called into active service, we responded to the words of the sacrament."—EDIT. † "Faith in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, according to the sacrament of the Christians."—EDIT.

(3.) And that commanded in the New Testament, and instituted there. (4.) And this to the end of the world. (5.) Attended with a promise of grace. (6.) And this annexed to the sacramental sign, and clothed therewith, even by divine ordination. (7.) And this promise comprehending all the benefits of our redemption in close and full relation to eternal life. (8.) And all this signed, sealed, offered, and applied *virtute Dei*, ["by the power of God,"] to all that entertain these sacraments by faith:—hence Bellarmine, instead of denying the truth and full propriety of this application, attempts to prove them applicable unto penance, and thence would argue it to be a sacrament.

3. As to the third, *whether the other five can be as truly and fully called "sacraments" with equal correspondence to these eight particulars*, this must be tried by an equal balance and true examination of all particularly. And therefore the five sacraments which must be brought unto the test are these: (1.) *Confirmation*. (2.) *Extreme unction*. (3.) *Matrimony*. (4.) *Orders*. (5.) *Penance*, which is transferred unto the last, to introduce the residue of my work.

(1.) *As to confirmation*.—What elements are made the visible and proper signs? By what institution is it ordained? and by what promise of grace, with respect to pardon and eternal glory, is it encouraged and annexed? Or wherein will they fix its common and adequate relation and proportion to the two great sacraments? What is their confirmation (by *chrism* on infants) for the receiving of the Holy Ghost, but an audacious, apish imitation of miraculous operations by the apostles' hands? Nor can their equivocal juggles about the promise of the Spirit relieve them in the case, if the gift thereof, as sanctifying and comforting, of equal necessity and extent to all times and Christians, be distinguished from its miraculous and extraordinary operations and dispensings, which were to be appropriated to that sealing age, both as to Christians, and extraordinary officers and circumstances.

(2.) *As to extreme unction*, grounded upon Mark viii. 23, James v. 14:—When they can prove that these things are to be referred to ordinary and perpetual ceremonies in the church throughout all ages, and not to the extraordinary circumstances and ceremonies of a sealing day, wherein it is necessary that the gospel be sealed and proved by miracles at its first introduction into the world, they are more likely to win the day, and prove their unction sacramental. But do not their own Waldensis, Alphonsus e Castro, and famous Estius himself, conclude, that James and Mark speak of miraculous cures? Were not the parties to be anointed stricken and held with great diseases, partly contracted and deserved by grievous provocations, and partly inflicted to illustrate that miraculous power which was then on foot? What, though there be somewhat of analogy betwixt bodily diseases, and sin itself? yet certainly oil had been more proper to the *vitium* ["viciousness"] than the *reatus* ["guilt"] of their sins. An analogy is requisite in a sacrament; and the promise in James v. is of remission; and oil, that may have some analogy to wounds, bears little or none to spots, or guilt of punishment.

(3.) *As to matrimony*.—Who made it a sacrament under the New Testament? Or what is there in the ordinance to make it answerable to the thing? And if it be a sacrament, yet it is but economical. And it

is no more divine than as it is an instituted relative state by God ; and so is the covenant betwixt masters and servants ; and thus the inauguration of a king may be a civil sacrament. But a sacrament of the covenant of grace is made compatible to all believers ; but this is not so, but the priest must be barred from this sacrament, lest it impair his purity. But they allege, "It is called 'a mystery.'" (Eph. v. 32.) And have not the woman and the beast the same name ? (Rev. xvii. 1, 5, 7.) Yea, doth not Cajetan affirm this place no argument that matrimony is a sacrament ? Aware, it is likely, he was of that which follows closely in the text ; namely, "I speak of Christ," &c. What trifling subtleties do they (the Papists) use to amuse the world ! as if they did design to be more studious to walk in darkness, than to prevent or heal the wounds and breaches of the church.

(4.) *As to orders.*—Though this may be a sacrament of order, and truly so, yet is not that commensurate with a sacrament of Christianity. All are not ministers that may be possessed of present grace, and have a title to remission of sins and everlasting glory. And it seems something odd, that one sacrament of the same covenant should make men incapable of another ; as also that two different sacraments, inconsistent on the one hand, should have the same sign. And it is yet more strange that this should be equal to baptism and the eucharist, and yet should want a visible element for its sign.

(5.) *And as for penance.*—As far as God requires it, and states its use and nature, doth not baptism relate and bind us to it ? Is it not baptism of repentance for the remission of sins ? What is the external rite ? and where is the accession of the word unto the sign whereby it must be made a sacrament ? What is there in this penance commensurate with baptism ?

IV. *As to their many reasons amongst the Schoolmen for their septenary number.*—Let them name any thing substantial that is not reducible to these two sacraments. Their septenary number of different conditions, or virtues, or distempers,—these two sacraments will comprehend them all ; for they contain what is fully suitable to every state, urges to every virtue, and tends to cure our spiritual distempers. And what need we seven of theirs, when Christ hath instituted two to do the work ? But let us consider what they say.

1. We will insist upon the reasons therefore, whereon they would establish the septenary number of their sacraments, and answer them.

(1.) They tell us, that the number seven is famous, and of frequent use and strict importance, in the scriptures ; as Aaron's garments put on by his sons seven days, the atonement for the altar seven days, blood sprinkled seven times, Naaman washing seven times. Thus it is a number famous in expiations, and otherwise. Hence now Eliphaz must take seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to Job. (Job xlii. 8.) Seven gifts of the Spirit ; and thus seven of the apocryphical seals, trumpets, stars, &c. To which I answer : It is wonderful, they took no notice of this too,—that the number of seven commenced from the complete finishing of nature as to its order and existence, and God's resting from his labours ; all which was done within a septenary of days, making the first week, as it was in the beginning.*

* Since the writing of this head, I have found [that] some Papists insist on this very thing.

(2.) Were this digested into an argument, thus it would run: Whatever number is of famous use and mention in the scripture, must be the number of sacraments, under the New Testament, of the covenant of grace: But seven is such a number, &c.: *Ergo* it is the number of sacraments; and consequently, there are seven. And what, if the major proposition be denied? will they not be sorely exercised to prove it? What, if we change the number in the minor, and say, that one is the number of famous use and frequent mention? will it not then be found, that whatsoever answers this medium for one, will do their work for seven? I mean to answer it. How many ones are used and mentioned in Eph. iv. 4, 6?—one God, Christ, faith, baptism, church, Spirit, hope, heaven, &c. What do they think of two lights or luminaries, two tables of the law, two cherubims, two covenants, two commandments? What do they think of twelve patriarchs, twelve tribes, twelve apostles, twelve thousand sealed, twelve gates, &c.? Are these therefore twelve sacraments? And so of other numbers. Now if this argument be followed close, they must be brought to this,—that either this is no argument for their number of sacraments, or that their number must rise and fall according to what number we shall pitch upon, and so there may be one, or two, or seven, or twelve sacraments, &c.; and so in what sense, and why so many and no more? And, further, thus the reason would press as hard for seven sacraments under the law as gospel. And, as to expiations and consecrations, do not two rams, two goats, two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons, bid as fair for only two sacraments, as seven of other things can bid for seven sacraments?

And thus much for this argument fetched from the congruence or apt agreement of numbers.

2. Let us take notice of those arguments which Aquinas brings for the proof of seven sacraments. (*Pars Tertia*, quæst. lxxv. art. 1.)

(1.) *The analogy or proportion betwixt natural and spiritual life.*—And here it is worth inquiry, whether all they say be not intended in these two:

(i.) For the *esse per generationem* [“existence by generation”]: this is designedly in our baptism, which is the laver of regeneration, considered relatively, as we are baptized into new relations, to which our cordial acceptance in capable subjects (I mean, the adult) is absolutely necessary before God, and a profession thereof (probably serious) before the church. And whether this be grace or no, let it be considered for the doubting under its proper head.

(ii.) And as for those that talk of inward, real, subjective grace, by the application of the outward elements, and that this grace is in the elements, they must assert this to be wrought at the rate of a miracle; which, when it is proved to be wrought by proper, necessary, instituted resultancy from the sacraments, shall be assented to. And I believe they will find it hard to prove subjective grace wrought by the sacraments themselves, otherwise than by moral objective influence. And whatever else is wrought, is done by some distinct operations of the Spirit, even as it is done when the word of God is made to work effectually. And as for the rest, the same answer will serve them all. As increase in confirmation, nourishment in the eucharist, medicinal

reparations of the lapsed by penance, removal of the relics of diseases by exercise and diet, to which they make extreme unction to be analogous; orders in relation to public exercise, to complete vital perfection; and matrimony for the propagation of a holy seed. For these, I would fain know, whether the two sacraments which we plead for and they own, do not refer to all these things, in that they bind us to, and, in their kind, help us in, all that is pretended as designed by the other five. And as for confirmation, doth it bind us to, or seal to us, any thing new, distinct materially from baptism? Or is it not rather (orderly dispensed) the renewal of the baptismal covenant?

(2.) *As for what is alleged, by way of remedy against distempers, or in relation to those distinct graces and virtues wherein we are concerned.*—Both are considered, and abundant provisions against the one and for the other are made, in these two sacraments; so far as they are proper to Christianity, as such; and so speak all Christians, as such, to be concerned in them. And if any thing falls out to some that is not incident to all, it is fit that it be referred to its proper head, in order, or prudence, or the like. And if they will contend about the name of “sacrament,” let them have it, provided that in things they will distinguish (and let us understand they do so) betwixt what is a sacrament of order, and what is a sacrament of entire Christianity; and that they will explain their own Tridentine words. (CARANZÆ *Epit. Conc.*, in *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii. cap. 3, *de Sacram. in Genere*. See Rainolds against Hart, in his “Conference,” chap. viii. div. 4, p. (mihi) 602.)

V. And having now despatched the point of the seven sacraments, (about which I could have spoken more, but that I care not for those controversies that are made so intricate by a resolved espousing of words and phrases, whose sense is arbitrary and undetermined,) amongst which, penance was transferred unto the last, it will not be amiss to make some short reflections upon the Popish doctrine of human satisfactions, which they make a branch of penance, and, with contrition and confession, to be constitutive of it.*

The council of Trent asserts it false and alien from the word of God, to say, that the fault is never remitted by God, but the whole punishment is pardoned too.† And so the Trent doctors, striking harmony with the Roman Catechism, assert, that when God forgives a sinner, he yet forgives not all the punishment, but leaves the party by his own works to satisfy till it be washed away; and these works are all good actions, inward or outward, proceeding from virtue; as confessions, alms, fastings, prayers, sufferings in this life, or in purgatory: and the things that we satisfy God for by our good works, are, 1. Temporal punishments. 2. The relics of sin. 3. The fault itself. 4. The same punishments wherewith the damned are afflicted, eternity only being abstracted from them.

And here we must consider,

* I cannot now speak to this head or part of human satisfactions largely; but I shall content myself at present with some brief touches and reflections thereupon. For this matter is *divisim et membratim* [“separately and by pieces”] more closely and fully handled by others in this Exercise. † *Concil. Trident.* sess. xvi. cap. 8, 9; *Rom. Catech. de Satisfact.*

(I.) How they *distinguish*.

(II.) What they *conclude*. And so how far they come to us, and wherein we part.

(I.) *For the distinctions*.—They are upon three heads principally.

DISTINCTION I. *They distinguish upon sin*.—And they tell us, that it is considered here as, 1. Either before baptism; or, 2. After baptism.

1. That before baptism is either original or actual; and, 2. That after baptism is considerable either, (1.) In relation to its object most immediately concerned, which is either, (i.) God, or, (ii.) Man; (though in the general notion every sin against man is against God too, whose laws are broken by our irregularities as to ourselves, or one another;) and then, as, (2.) In relation to its quality or aggravation; it is either venial or mortal: and here you must consider, (i.) The fault, (ii.) The stain, and then, (iii.) The punishment; which we transfer to be considered as the next head of distinctions, where we shall consider it; and to the other part, it is thus replied:—

1. *Sin is considerable in the general notion as a transgression of the law of God*.—Now the law is transgressed in reference to either our *hearts or actions*.

First. *Sin in the heart* is considerable as to,

(1.) *Its derivation into the heart or nature of man, by original transmission to all the children of apostate Adam*; or,

(2.) *Its interest and indwellings in the heart, and corrupting prevalent influences upon it*.

(1.) And so here we must distinguish betwixt, (i.) What God doth as an offended righteous Ruler in a course of punishment, making severe and just reflections upon our nature because of the violation of the law of our creation; and, (ii.) What is done by man as under the circumstance of his primitive forfeiture and disease, which our parents' first miscarriage brought into the world. And then we say, (i.) God justly might and did withdraw that Spirit of holiness from Adam which he by sinning thrust away, and left him in that ataxy and disorder which man so willingly threw himself into, so as that he had no holiness and rectitude to transmit to his posterity. And, (ii.) Apostate, and thereupon corrupted, Adam could not communicate a better nature to posterity than he had himself. Nor, (iii.) Was God bound in governing justice to set his seed under such comfortable circumstances as he did set himself: And, (iv.) The rather because the miseries of all his seed was part of the punishment which was due to him; even as their holiness and felicity ought to have been a powerful motive, and should have been a sure reward, to his obedience and continuance in his due integrity.

(2.) *Now as to its indwellings and interest in the heart, and dreadful influences upon it*.—They still abide, in some measure, and are owned and acknowledged in our baptismal covenant, wherein we do accept of the Spirit as our Sanctifier; which he could not be unless we were defiled, and acknowledged ourselves to be so. Nor can we any more conclude the perfection of the sanctification of our natures by our being baptized into the Holy Ghost, than we can conclude our perfect glorification and salvation by being baptized into the Father and the Son; all being to be wrought and perfected in a way of gradual motions, proficently, answer-

ably to those healing rules and remedies that are before and with us, to be observed and improved by us.

Secondly. *And as to sinful actions*, they are the products of our sinful hearts; and we promise to prevent them, as much as in us lies, for time to come, even as we do profess and exercise repentance for what is past and gone. And here our covenant-closures, and answerable conversations afterwards, are no further satisfactory unto God, than as they answer his commanding will, as our obedience to him, and as the performed conditions of our salvation which God hath made such.

2. *Sin, in relation to its object, is either against God or man.*—Consisting either in doing what we ought not, or not doing what we ought, and as we ought to do, with reference to all those circumstances and relations in which and under which we stand as to God and man, either ourselves or others; and on both these we should or do reflect with an answerable frame of spirit thereunto, as far as our miscarriages have been and are known to have been committed against God or man, or both. And here by God, I mean, the sacred Trinity, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. And thus our sins before and after baptism are the same as to their formal nature, (namely, they are transgressions of the law of God whenever they are committed,) although by some accessory circumstances they may differ in degree. And thus it is true, that to break the laws of God after the solemn vow of baptism to the contrary is worse than to do it before, and may require some smarter discipline and repentance, in that the obligation of a vow that is made (and such a solemn vow as is baptism) doth greatly aggravate the sin. And hence, it is likely, did arise that primitive penance imposed upon professors lapsed after baptism into Heathenism, or other scandalous miscarriages, in order to their own recovery and establishment; the satisfaction of the church about the useful truth of their repentance with reference to their restoration; the vindication of the purity of Christianity, against the calumnies of others; and the prevention of the revolts of others; and so the quickening of all to regular care and watchfulness about their perseverance and proficiency in Christian growth and godliness; that so thereby it might be manifest in the eyes of all about them, how much the rules and discipline of Christianity did secure, promote, and quicken all righteousness, sobriety, and godliness, at the highest rate in the world.

3. *Sin, in relation to the strength and measures of its malignity, and as it refers to the quality of our state, is either consistent or inconsistent with the state of saving grace.*—And here it is not so much to be considered what is lawful or unlawful, as what is possible or impossible to be in a truly regenerate heart. It is possible, a good heart may not do every thing that is required of him, and yet it is unlawful to let the least thing be by him neglected. I have yet met with none that dare declare and stand to it, that there hath never been the least remissness or neglect that by their utmost possible care could be prevented, since they were first converted unto God; but all, in every thing they do with God and for God, dread to be dealt with according to their best performances in exact proportion to their merit. We do depend upon Christ's merits and intercession, and use his name to beg our pardon

for irregularities even in our holiest performances; and certainly the serious heart will dread to compliment with its God. And therefore when the Papists talk of venial and mortal sins, and tell us that mortal sins can have no satisfaction but from Christ, but venial sins may be satisfied for by ourselves, let them but freely tell us what they mean.

(1.) Is any sin so venial as that it cannot merit the wrath of God hereafter, by any law which he hath made? Is not the transgression of God's law the formal nature of sin? Doth not that very law pronounce every delinquent worthy of death? Is not death the indication and execution of divine displeasure? Is not death comprehensive of all miseries, as it was stated in the sanction of the first law? Are not sins dignified from their object? A gentle stroke, when given in anger, though in its nature it be but little, yet if given to a prince, receives another stamp and character. And as to God, if the matter be great, there is no dispute but the sin is great, as blasphemy, &c.; if it be small, the sin is great, because the great God is denied his will, although his claims were mean and easy as to the matter of them. Did God bid us do some great thing, would we not do it? How much more when he commands what is but small for us to do! would not the neglect savour of great contempt even in a small affair?

(2.) Do they by "venial sins" mean such as do not prove our full revolt from God, because it is possible such a sin may be committed by one that yet doth hold to God as his great and only end and rest? Why, then, we own, as well as they, that every fault and slip proves not a person to be forthwith graceless.

(3.) Do they by "venial sins" intend such sins as do or may be pardoned upon repentance, faith, and new obedience? If so, it will put them sorely to it to mention any sin, though never so heinous in its nature, (the sin against the Holy Ghost excepted,) which a right hearty, practical repentance and faith in the Lord Jesus, &c., may not obtain the pardon of; and in this sense no sins are mortal but those which unavoidably bring the soul to hell at last, and that through final infidelity and impenitence. And hence we shall the better understand what can be meant by these sins being to be satisfied for by us, and in what sense they may be so. For if they mean that the blood of Jesus was not needful to make them pardonable upon those terms, proposals, and conditions of their pardon which God hath tendered in the gospel, Christ is apparently contemned and undervalued; but if they mean, that the pardon will not be had unless the conditions be performed by us, it is most true; and if they mean something else, they must declare and prove it to us.

DISTINCTION II. *As for the things for which our satisfactions must be made, they tell us they are, 1. Temporal punishments: as, (1.) All the miseries of this life in relation to our bodies, goods, or name. (2.) Death itself. (3.) The pains of purgatory, which are loss and pain, the same with hell itself in kind and nature, though different in duration, and, it may be, something in degree. For as to the eternity of pains in hell, it is but an accident thereof; and for substance we must satisfy; for the eternity thereof Christ is responsible, who hath made them temporal that they might be removed by our satisfactions. And then we must*

satisfy, 2. For the relics of sin. 3. For the fault itself. And, 4. For the punishment of the damned in hell, if the eternity thereof be but abstracted from it. To which I answer,

1. *Whoever is concerned to make satisfaction, is considered either in relation to property, as a debtor, &c. ; or in relation to law, as a malefactor.*—Now as to the case in hand, as *sinner*s are looked upon as debtors, so they relate to God as their Proprietary, and absolute Lord of his own ; and so they may be looked upon as having taken or detained from God something that is not theirs, but his, which yet he might have parted with, and yet do himself no hurt ; or else something which they have neither right unto, nor can God part withal without his prejudice or damage.

1. If in their former sense the thing be taken, (1.) Then satisfaction demanded from ourselves, or from another, rather resulted from God's will than from his wisdom. For it had been no incongruity for God to have retreated from his right, where neither his truth nor wisdom is concerned to forbid it : for who can blame a creditor for want of goodness, (where there wants nothing else,) in that he doth forgive a debtor ? (2.) Then there was no need of satisfaction in the case. God's single power could have recovered his own. (3.) For God to have his own again, was all that he could look for, in that he had no prejudice but the mere alienation of his own again, and that not so much from his property as his possession. For no man's apostasy from God could rob God of his title unto the man ; for that is too fast and absolute to be changed. And if God be only concerned as to his possession, when his goods are come again into his own hands, no greater satisfaction can be made. (4.) When God hath all his own again, there can be nothing left to make him satisfaction with, seeing God hath a right to all that we can do as our Proprietary, and ever had, and could never justly be denied it.

But, secondly, if you take the matter in the latter sense, as [*that*] something is taken or detained, unto God's real prejudice and damage :—

(1.) Then also God's omnipotence could have repaired his loss. But, (2.) Nothing can possibly impoverish God, whose absolute and infinite happiness and riches are nothing but himself, whose property is absolute, and his omnipotence its full security.

But now, if our sins speak a relation to a violated law, and so God be considered as a Ruler, then we must mean, that we must compensate that injury which, in the course of government, we have already done to God, by the dishonour we have done him in contradicting God's righteous will, breaking his laws, and disturbing or dissolving his fixed course in government ; or we must do something else that shall as well secure the Governor's honour, answer his ends and will in government, as our destruction for our folly can amount to ; and what that is, we possibly may understand hereafter, as the Papists do interpret and intend it.

2. *As to the things for which these human satisfactions are required.*—They are, it seems, temporal punishments. But, (1.) Is it not strange, the punishment should be borne in our own persons, and in its kind too, and yet that satisfaction should be made at the same time too ? Is it good sense to say, that there must be *redditio ejusdem*, “ the payment or restoring of the same thing exacted,” which is the bearing of the penalty :

and yet at the same time doing or bearing *æquivalentis*, "something proportionable and in lieu thereof." (2.) As for the pains of purgatory, I shall leave that to a better pen, that is concerned in that head; and thither I refer the reader. (3.) As to death itself, are voluntariness and patience satisfactory here? If so, for what? Is it the stroke of death? Why is it not then dispensed with, and so we made immortal, to scape that dreadful blow? And, further, why may not such a frame of patience and submissiveness prevent the stroke? What makes them satisfactory? Is it because they are pleasing unto God? Then Enoch satisfied for his death, and therefore scaped it; (Heb. xi. 5;) and yet another doth as truly satisfy for death that bears it, as he that bears it not. (4.) As to those other punishments in this life, the holiest man may have them all, and oftentimes feels them more than he that never was solicitous to please his Maker, or make him satisfaction. It is not at the choice of any whether the punishments that God inflicts shall be borne or no; and nature teaches men to choose the gentlest strokes; and if the sufferings of this life be not voluntary, undue, equivalent, they make not compensatory satisfaction. (5.) As to those relics of sin, what satisfaction are they capable of, distinct from their being purged away by the grace of God in the due use of proper means, and from our release as to their binding of us over to the wrath of God, and the due sentence of his law? (6.) As to the fault itself, how, and in what sense, is it capable of our satisfaction? Can any thing make it true, that I was never guilty of the fact I did? That a sinner hath been a sinner, is an eternal truth, after delinquencies and faults committed. Can any thing make it true, [that] I ought to have done what I have done amiss? Can any thing make it true, that what was done amiss never deserved the wrath of God? or that it was not just and fit, that he who broke the law of God should die? Can any thing make it warrantable, that I should break the law of God, or safe for me to do it, when God saith it is not? And when you have considered in sin the fact and faultiness, and the chargeableness of both upon the sinner, and the truth of all, and have prescindend these in the consideration of its being satisfied for by us, you will find it can in no sense be capable of satisfaction, but as to our being purged from its commanding, or released from its condemning, power. And can I do any thing for God that can be as grateful to God, as it would have been to him that I had never sinned against him? Or can any thing be done by me that can do equal service to my Ruler's will and honour, and the due ends of government, with my perfect innocence and obedience? Or can I do any thing for God, that in strict proportion of desert can merit any being cleansed from the stain and blemish which a fault hath left upon me? If not, then let the Papists tell me in what sense a fault can be capable of our satisfactions that shall keep it from connoting, either, (1.) Punishment; and so it is no further pardoned than the punishment is remitted; or, (2.) Purgation; and then it doth import no more than being sanctified or reformed.

From whence it follows, that their fundamental maxim is a precarious though confident assertion and conclusion, or an ambiguous cheat; namely, that "they that say, that the fault is never remitted by God, but the whole punishment is pardoned too, speak that which is false, and

in no wise owned by the word of God." For, (1.) It is evident, that nothing can make an act that was sinful when committed clear from the charge and censure of having been a fault; and in this sense, sinful actions are incapable of remission, and therefore foreign to the case in hand. (2.) If they mean hereby, (I mean, by "a fault remitted,") the extirpation of a sinful principle, and prevention of the same sinful action or miscarriage in kind; and so that this may be in many who are not excused from the just inflictions of miseries of life, and pains of death; it is granted, that the best men alive are not unjustly dealt with, if they be visited with the punishments of life and death, because of the garden-quarrel, and those corrupted natures which were derived thereby, together with our personal delinquencies. (3.) But if they mean by "the remission of a fault," God's taking off those punishments, and discharging from the sentence of the law, whereto the fault had bound me, the remission of the fault and punishment are of the same extent.

DISTINCTION III. *They distinguish upon satisfaction, and say that satisfaction either doth relate to rigorous justice, or to gratuitous acceptance.*

1. The former cannot be made by any thing but, (1.) What is our own; (2.) What is undue; (3.) What is of equal dignity and value. And these things, say they, cannot be attributed to any but Christ himself, who alone can *Deo paria reddere* ["render what is of equal worth to God"]. But then, 2. The latter satisfaction is by *gratuitous acceptance*; and so, by the favourable condescension of the offended Ruler, men may satisfy as far as God will give them assisting and accepting grace. And thus what with the Spirit's help by inward grace, and the tincture of the blood of Jesus by God's grace upon our works to make them satisfy, we, being one with Christ our Head, and communicating of his satisfaction for us, derive that merit from him into our works which make them satisfactory; which works, being the works of the Spirit, and coming thence, derive a certain infinity and equality; whereupon ensues the grace of evangelical counsels, whereby we are exhorted and persuaded to what we are not commanded; and thereupon it follows, that we have something that is our own, and undue to God, and therefore satisfactory; and the more easily satisfactory because of the third grace of remission, which removes the eternity from the punishment, and makes it temporal, that so our satisfaction for it may be more possible and easy. So then that may be done by grace for satisfaction, which in strict justice is impossible. And then do but consider what, (i.) God enjoins you to: as vehement and intense contrition; and this will do your work for death and purgatory;—outward laborious works, as fastings, prayer, &c.; as also almsdeeds. (ii.) Consider what may be enjoined by others: as the priests' enjoining the visitings of shrines of saints, so many Aves and Pater-nosters, and other penance. And, (iii.) What you may do yourselves, by voluntary pilgrimages, fastings, scourgings, sackcloth, weepings, prayers in such numbers and measures, and all other severities by self-punishment; and set upon these with an intent to satisfy, and the punishment of your sins will be reversed, because these things are more than you are bound to do, or God required of you.

I premit the points of indulgences, purgatory, and other men's satisfactions; for they are the business and employment of better heads

and pens, engaged in this Morning Exercise. And as for treasures, and the pope's power to dispense them, I think, if he can do it, he is bound to pardon all on earth, and release those in purgatory; and lives in mortal sin if he love not his neighbour as himself. And I believe, were he in purgatory, he would thank those kindly that would release him quickly; and then the precept binds him to do as he would be done by. But, on the other part, these reflections may suffice which follow.

1. Satisfaction is defined by the Schoolmen, by "a voluntary reddition of something equivalent, otherwise undue;" (for so the word *satis* doth import, and satisfaction signifies "something that is sufficient;") and sufficiency imports "an equal correspondence of that which is returned, to that for which it is returned," and that both *in beneficiis et pœnis*, "in benefits and punishments."* And hence it follows, that he who returns less for sin than divine justice doth exact, doth not satisfy, although he do to the full what is enjoined him by his confessor. Though yet he do *aliquam pœnam peccato suo debitam solvere, solummodo in futuro quod minus injunctum est et solummodo in præsentibus*; † yet even here they are not agreed in the case. For though those mentioned in the margin assert this doctrine, yet others say, that satisfaction is not to be made by something otherwise undue; as, Durandus, dist. xv. quæst. 1; Cajetanus, *Tract. de Satisfact.* quæst. 1: and Angles (*Flores Quæst.* pars i. quæst. *de Satisfact.* p. (mih) 253) concludes, that works otherwise due *ratione præcepti*, "as commanded," if they be done in grace, are satisfactory for the pains of purgatory; ‡ and martyrdom is his instance; and he tells us, that he is injurious that prays for a martyr to him; and this he makes to be the sense of Cajetan and Durand. But, to address ourselves unto the case in hand: satisfaction, being the doing of something that is sufficient, hath a relation to either,

(1.) *Commutative justice*, relating as to personal debts or injuries. And here the ground of his demanding satisfaction that is wronged, or creditor, is his own personal just interest and title to what he claims; and the just measures of our satisfaction are to be fetched from both the just intrinsical value and worth of what we are to make him satisfaction for, and also its relative worth to him whose loss by the absence of his own proper goods, and all the damage that accrues to him thereby must have its equal compensation from him that is debtor or injurious; unless some other accidents, as the debtor's inability, or creditor's distance, or the like, make it impossible to make this satisfaction; and then *nemo tenetur ad impossibile* ["no one is bound to that which is impossible"]. Or,

(2.) It relates to *distributive justice*, as the wrong which doth require our satisfaction may relate to law and government. And here the Ruler's honour and the ends of government must give and state the measures of our satisfaction. For, in the whole, our satisfaction, if truly such, must bear proportion hereunto. And then whatever, upon the whole, doth exceed the bounds and claims of God's propriety, excellence,

* ALTENSTAIG in *Lexico*; GABRIEL, dist. lb. quæst. ii. artic. 1; ex SCOTO in dist. iii. quæst. i. lib. 4. † "Though yet he do pay some punishment due to his sin, being about to pay in future what has not at present been enjoined and paid."—EDIT. ‡ And the same Angles concludes a little after, that the priest can *imponere pro satisfactione peccatorum opera aliis debita* ["impose, for satisfaction for sins, works otherwise due"]. And for their differences through most of this doctrine of satisfaction, see WHITE's "Way to the Church," p. 133.

authority, and beneficence, and all that merit which doth and must result herefrom, cannot be called "undue," and therefore amount to satisfaction in the strict sense. But in a comprehensive and large sense, God may be said to be satisfied in several senses. (i.) As his will is pleased by doing what is demanded of us under our present or supposed circumstances; and thus we satisfy his will as far as we do what he commands us. (ii.) By reparation of the governing wrong and injury that is done him; and thus that satisfaction which must answer the wrong that is already done by our apostasy from God, is and can be only made by Christ. But that injury which would ensue from the impunity of delinquents, (here I mean such delinquents as finally reject the remedy that God hath given them by Christ,) must be prevented by their own bearing of their deserved and entailed penalty; and thus God is satisfied against their wills by their effectual transmission to their deserved racks and tortures. Or, (iii.) By perfect innocent obedience to the whole law; and they that challenge, let them maintain, possess, and prove it. Or, (iv.) By a full answering of God's vindictive justice, by suffering here what is equivalent to the full latitude and importance of their deserved punishments in hell. And where is that self-austerity and discipline here in exercise, or possibly to be met with, that is equivalent to God's revenging strokes and wrath in hell? Who hath an arm like God, to strike like him? Or who would, if he could, afflict himself at the proportionable rate of God's omnipotent revenge, whenas the prospect of Christ's approaching cup had such impressions on his heart and countenance? But we pass on to the next head.

2. Satisfaction is here spoken of under a double notion and relation, and so divided into, (1.) That which refers to *strict and rigorous justice*; or, (2.) To *gratuitous acceptance*. In the former, Christ only is concerned, as only capable of making it; because what Christ did, and was to do, as satisfactory, was, (i.) His own, (ii.) Undue, (iii.) And of equal value and dignity. But in the latter, our capacity is large and good. And here we have, (i.) The matter of our possible satisfaction: some things voluntary,—pilgrimages, fastings, &c.; some things enjoined, First. By God; as vehement and intense contrition, laborious works, and almsdeeds, &c. And, Secondly. By the priest; as the visiting of shrines of saints, so many Aves and Pater-nosters, with other penance. And then we have, (ii.) The grounds and means whereby our voluntary and enjoined works are ripened into such dignity and value as shall make them satisfactory; namely, First, God's condescending and accepting grace. Secondly. The tincture of the blood of Christ, our union to him, and communicating of his satisfaction, from whence our works derive their merit. And, Thirdly, The inward workings and assisting grace of the Spirit, by which our works proceed from inward virtue, and so derive a certain infinity and equality. So that now the door is widely open to evangelical counsels, to which you are exhorted and persuaded, but not commanded.

(1.) Then, let us hence consider *how far Christ's satisfaction doth extend itself, and see what room there is left for human satisfactions, that so we may the better find and fix them, and so consider them more exactly in their proper place and office*. And,

(i.) They here acknowledge, that the matter of Christ's satisfaction, beside its being undue and his own, is of equal dignity and value. But then I ask, With what is it of equal dignity and value? Is it not with the injury which he, as Governor, received by the apostasy of his creatures? or with that rectoral gain which he would otherwise get from their destruction? or both? What injury could God be capable of, but contradicting his governing will, eclipsing his governing honour, and preventing or obstructing his noble ends in government, whereby it was made and rendered unbecoming God to place his heart upon, and distribute his choicest blessings to, the sons of men, in such methods, and upon such terms, as might make his subjects justly think he was grown regardless of his honour, laws, and government? Revolted man must either be destroyed or saved. If he be ruined, the glorious explications of God's incomprehensible love and wisdom, by pardoning grace and mercy, in such consistency with his truth and holiness, had been prevented; together with such wise supplantings of Satan's projects, hopes, and triumphs, as now He is effecting in his gospel-methods, and the revivals of religion in an apostate tribe. Had man been saved immediately, without the execution of God's violated law upon him, and any equivalent consideration in the case, the glorious effects and proper demonstrations, and so all suitable and useful apprehensions, of governing justice, wisdom, holiness, and truth, so dear and proper to the Ruler, had been prevented; and both their honour and essential existence had been exposed unto the jealousies and suspicions of his subjects; the trust and title of a ruler had not been answered by its due administrations and discharge; hopes of impunity had been started, notwithstanding after-miscarriages, to the great prejudice of laws and government, and suitable obedience thereunto. And hereupon, nothing amounts to satisfaction that brings not things unto this issue,—that sinful and apostate man's salvation shall as much secure, promote, and speak the harmony and honour of God's whole name as Governor, and all his ends in government, as man's destruction.

(ii.) They must acknowledge, that Christ hath only and effectually satisfied his Father thus far, by what he did and suffered, as that repentance, faith, and new obedience, are by the covenant of grace made the conditions of our full recovery and salvation, so as that they who fulfil the conditions of the gospel shall reap the blessings of it.

(iii.) Nor are they able or ready to deny, that all assisting and accepting grace, and all the means of grace subservient thereunto, only result and issue from Christ's satisfaction. Nor,

(iv.) Will they say, that any thing in man without respect to the Redeemer's satisfaction, and the Father's arbitrary, compassionate, and condescending grace, could have deserved of God to be accepted as a sufficient ground for re-admission to his favour, or a sufficient compensation of our demerits. For what Christ did was needless, if the great ends thereof could have been answered and attained by us without it. They dare not say, that God was bound in justice to accept of that *without*, which now is made acceptable *by*, Christ's satisfaction.

(v.) Therefore the meritoriousness and availableness of their supposed or asserted human satisfactions must, in their judgments, be derivative

from Christ, and that assisting and accepting grace that comes must be upon the reckoning of Christ's satisfaction.

(vi.) Whatever is commanded by God in Christ upon the penalty of otherwise forfeiting all the benefits of Christ's satisfaction, and our eternal happiness thereupon, can be no further called "satisfaction," than as our stated doing of what is commanded as our duty, and as the condition of our salvation performed by us ; which can no further merit our impunity, than as God hath promised and entailed that to and upon what is required of us.

(2.) Let us consider *what this satisfaction by gratuitous acceptation doth amount unto, and in what things we are to fix it.* And,

(i.) Whatever is accepted or acceptable is either so from its own intrinsic value, and then, as such, it cannot be acceptable beyond its worth ; or from its usefulness and aptitude unto its ends,* and is acceptable but as expressive of the temper and purpose of the heart, were but the ability answerable to the heart. And then we must consider the nature and degree of its mediate usefulness ; as also its consistency with other means at hand, or instituted ; for if it cannot be used, but some better means, and more grateful to him that is most concerned in the end that must be prosecuted and attained unto, must be neglected, it cannot be acceptable. And hereupon it is worth considering how far their voluntary or imposed satisfactions jumble out those needful exercises and duties that in society must be done, and all those exemplary and encouraging influences which we are bound to give to others by our own cheerfulness, praise, and joy in the possession and improvement of what we do and may enjoy with God, and for him. Or it must be judged acceptable from some clear and grounded testimonies and assurances from God, either mediate or immediate, that he will accept our voluntary offerings as satisfaction ; and, under the discovered notion and respects in which the Ruler tells us they shall be accepted, we must use and offer them. Now it is plain, that whatever God exacts from us is to be referred to either his authority, and so it must be done as duty ; or to his wisdom, and so it must be done by virtue of that proper tendency it hath unto its end ; and then the end must give the just proportion to the action, and also duty cannot be avoided in the case. For should God's counsels be neglected, we make reflections upon his wisdom, and tell him, that though he hath advised us to such a way or course, yet we have discovered another course as good ; and if we quit God's counsel and espouse our own, we practically tell him that our way is better ; and then that will prove strange "satisfaction," and "human" with a witness, that hath contempt of God and his advice inviscerated in it, or wrapped up in its bowels. Or it must be referred unto his holiness, and so it must be expressive of his image upon our hearts. And what relation the matter of mere human satisfactions has hereto, beside that "show," (Col. ii. 23,) it will be hard to prove. Or it must relate unto his covenant, compassions, grace, and love, and so be performed as its condition ; and then that doth import command, and something more. And therefore,

* I know, a little in another sense may be accepted as a testimony of thankful resentments [feeling] of favours, or an acknowledgment of distance, duty, subjection, &c. : but this is not to the case in hand.

(ii.) Gratuitous acceptance doth hold out something, in the very name and notion, that might most justly be refusable even as satisfaction, and speaks a retreat in God from what he justly might demand, though satisfaction were admitted and concluded on; which they themselves allow, by their distinguishing it from that satisfaction which hath respect to rigorous justice.

(iii.) Many things are excluded from being satisfaction, from the consideration of their being commanded, as things that must be done as ever we hope for life and glory. As, First: Whatever hath a true and proper reference to God's glory. (1 Cor. x. 31.) And, Secondly: Whatever doth promote, become, and is expressive of, our universal powerful love to God and man. (Matt. xxii. 37—40.) And, Thirdly: Whatever as to the matter of it is "true or honest, just or pure, lovely or of good report, and that hath either praise or virtue," (Phil. iv. 8, 9,) it is a comprehensive claim. Fourthly: Whatever is proportionable or suitable in measure and circumstances to our abilities, places, gifts, and offices. (1 Cor. vii. 17; 1 Peter iv. 10, 11.)

And thus to "fear God and keep his commandments is the whole of man," and in these things must he be tried for life or death at last. (Eccles. xii. 13, 14.) And now when these things are discharged, there will be little left for satisfaction-work; and I believe it will put them sorely to it for to name any thing under present circumstances, that is materially worthy of a man or Christian, that can escape the claim and discipline of these commandments; especially if you take in that comprehensive text, Titus ii. 12, and well consider the special, indispensable duties of every relation, in families, church, and state, and also what we are bound to do to credit Christianity, and to promote its interest, influences, and repute, to the recovery and salvation of all about us. These things shall be accepted, by God's favourable condescension, in order to our everlasting happiness, on the account of Christ, as readily, heartily, and effectually, as if we had never sinned, or satisfied for our sins ourselves, notwithstanding all former laws and provocations to the contrary.

Duty discharged is grateful to God; and God's commanding will is satisfied, as far as things commanded are performed. And the fulfilling of federal conditions do satisfy, and are available to the instating of us in covenant-rights and privileges, as far as the covenant of grace hath made them forcible and pleadable to these ends. And no other satisfactions can be, in whole or in part, necessary and available to procure this covenant of grace, and make the merciful, moderate, gracious conditions thereof required of us, to be performed by us, so pleadable and effectual to their ends in our recovery and salvation, as Christ hath made them.* And they, if they would leave their clouds, and face us in the open light, might see, that satisfaction, if human, which they talk of so much, cannot be found in sense, if any thing be meant thereby, save pleasing God in doing his will, and answering those proposals and fulfilling those conditions on which we may attain and reap the benefits of Christ's satisfaction; which conditions would not have done our work, had not Christ by virtue of his satisfaction deserved and obtained of God to give us life

* No works of ours could join with this that Christ did undertake and do: for his satisfaction is of itself entire, complete, and successful.

upon such low and gracious terms. And how then can they find another sense or place for satisfaction by their works? Let them but freely tell us *where it lies*, that any works of ours can be satisfactory, and *for what they can be so*.

As to the First, *wherein their value for satisfaction lies*, let them deal freely with us. Is it by something derived from Christ, or not? If not, they had been as available as now they are, if Christ had never died for us; for the substance of eternal punishments may now be done away, and their eternity had been nothing without their substance; for the eternity of that which is not, is but a mere chimera. And as to death, that universally and unavoidably entailed stroke on all, patience and voluntariness would have satisfied; but for what? Not for the stroke; for that is borne: and who would satisfy for what he cannot escape by satisfaction? Is it not hard to pay something equivalent, and bear the stroke withal? For satisfaction is not *ejusdem*, ["of the same,"] but *æquivalentis* ["of an equivalent"]; as, if it be some worse punishment, he that destroys the substance of the punishment, need never fear the eternity thereof, although there should be no satisfaction. But this will need no further confutation.

If, then, the value of our works for satisfaction be derived from Christ, it is either done *by his allowance*, or *by his ordination*, or *by mere advice*. If *by mere allowance*, this is no more than lawfulness by bare permission; and if this be enough to make a satisfaction, then every thing neither commanded nor forbidden will do the work. And this absurdity needs no loads, it being unable to bear itself. But if it be *by ordination from Christ*, where is the order? what is the place and quality thereof? Is it instrumentally causal? Then let them show wherein. Is it as a condition constituted in a covenant-way? Where then is the covenant that can make it so, and hath entailed this promise on it? Is it *by mere and bare advice*? If so, all counsel doth result from skill, and wisdom, and kindness too, in either reality or pretence. If therefore such works be expedient means, there is no friendship nor wisdom in the case; for nothing can be advised by wisdom that is not advisable in the case; for this must be resolved into will; not wisdom: *Sic volo, sic jubeo*; * and then it ceases to be at our liberty, because it is commanded. And if it be expedient in the case, it is either so by absolute order, and then neglect is sinful; or proper tendency, and then God hath made it so, and Christ's advice is the discovery of his Father's will; and then God's authority makes it duty, and our great and absolute concernment makes it necessary; and thus, arbitrary can it no longer be. For I am bound to take the most proper and expedient course and way to bring about my best concernments and designs, as far as they are laid within the compass of my utmost possible knowledge. And therefore here I am under duty and commandment still; and if I can serve God better by vows of poverty, chastity, &c., or any other evangelical counsels, than otherwise, the male of the flock ought to be offered up to God, and given him; and it is a strange course for satisfaction, to take a meaner and more improper course, when other ways are made my duty. I cannot be allowed to satisfy for punishment by the neglect of duty, or by remissness in it.

* "Such is my will; thus do I command."—ED17.

Nor can it be imagined by me, what references the imposed visiting of the shrines of saints, or such a number of Aves or Pater-nosters, can have to compensate my faults to God, seeing apostate and depraved man had rather travel far, and say a many prayers, (as being truly and apparently a more easy task, and, in the eyes of wicked men, readily taken so to be,) than to leave sins and fall to thorough duty here, or bear the flames of hell for ever, yea, or in purgatory, were there such a state and place. Nor are these courses likely to prevail on others for timely, universal, and effectual reformation and conversion.

And for the Second, *for what they can satisfy*, this will bring us to consider the second general head.

(II.) *What they conclude* either by concession or denial. And here they grant that Christ hath satisfied for sins before baptism, original and actual; for mortal sins after baptism, for the eternity of punishment, for our former incapacity of making satisfaction, which is deducible from this,—in that they make such grace so necessary to our capacity of making satisfaction, as could not come upon us unless Christ had satisfied before; namely, 1. The grace of justification, whereby the Spirit dwells in us, makes [us] one with Christ, and interested in his satisfaction; from whence that merit is derived into our works, that makes them to be satisfactions too, though in relation to another head, namely, gratuitous acceptance. 2. The grace of evangelical counsels, whereby something is rendered undue from us to God as being not commanded. 3. The grace of remission, making eternal punishments temporal, to make our satisfaction easy; and then it is plain, our venial sins and temporal punishments may be satisfied for together, and with ease and great success, by us.

To this I answer: All this hath been considered before and answered; and therefore my weary thoughts and pen shall close with some reflections upon temporal punishments and satisfactions for them; and therefore (passing by purgatory, as considered by another) temporal punishments are either such absolutely as are entailed, 1. Upon all; as death, and that is considerable as to its *stroke* or *sting*. Or, 2. Only upon some; and that as either *consequent upon their own miscarriage* in a natural or legal sense, or merely resulting *from the wise but arbitrary providence of God*. And thus my replies are these: 1. Nothing that Christ hath done, or man can do, can make us hope, conclude, or think, *the stroke of death* can be avoided; (Rom. v. 12; Heb. ix. 27; Job xxx. 23;) for God hath nowhere promised that. 2. *As to the sting of death*, covenant-grace and faithfulness, through Christ, can only pluck out that. Reflections upon grace and faithfulness at a dying hour can only make our souls triumph over their sorrows, fears, and jealousies, through the apprehensions of our approaching judgment and retributions in an eternal state. Nor can I think that any will find relief at last from pilgrimages, shrines, and scourges, &c., if this grace and faithfulness be wanting. 3. *As to strokes consequent upon our own miscarriages, through our intemperance or imprudence, or misdemeanours in reference to the laws of God or man*, our temperance, providence, and innocence, through God's good hand upon us, may prevent them as to their strokes, and full repentance, faith, and holiness may possibly allay,

if not remove, both bitterness and strokes. 4. *As to the strokes that come by the arbitrary providence of God, as the best men may not scape them, so covenant-faithfulness shall not lose by them.*

And thus you see, by what is said already, the sense and grounds of what is controverted betwixt the church of Rome and us about this head of human satisfaction; and thence you may gather what to say to what this controversy may be summed up in: the sum whereof lies in these following things, which they assert: as,

1. That "all those afflictions and temporal chastenings which God inflicts on men, with reference to their graces, sins, and exemplary usefulness, are true expiations of and satisfactions for their sins past to divine justice."

To which it is answered: (1.) God satisfies himself in what he doeth, in that his strokes are grounded, proper, and successful to his ends,—to show his name, to execute his laws, and so prevent all inconveniencies to his name and government. (2.) They that endure these strokes, and make a right improvement of them, do so far satisfy God, as satisfaction may signify their pleasing God, and answering his ends in discipline. (3.) As far as this improvement and regular bearing of God's discipline is a condition of our escaping that smarter wrath which former sins deserved, so far the fulfilling hereof shall satisfy God; that is, answer his commanding and covenanting will so far. But, (4.) It is Christ's satisfaction only, and not any proper merit in our sufferings, as antecedent thereto, or abstractedly considered therefrom, that makes our sufferings of all kinds, and our carriage under them, available to these comfortable ends and issues of being pardoned and accepted.

2. That "good works, expressive of repentance, piety, and gratitude, and tending to promote religion, mortification, self-denial, &c., or preventive of further strokes and judgments, are truly satisfactory to God for sin."

ANSWER. No further than as they, (1.) Please God's ruling, his commanding and covenanting, will; in which sense God is satisfied but only as he is pleased: and, (2.) As Christ is considered in the case, to make them acceptable and available to obtain our pardon and recovery, and final bliss, by what he hath done and suffered and obtained for us.

3. That "penance imposed by primitive Christians upon the scandalous or apostate, in order to their cure and re-admission to the church, with their consent, and to their satisfaction, and other Christian ends, is now made a satisfaction for their sins to justice."

ANSWER. God in Christ, and for his sake, is so satisfied, that is, pleased, with our repentance, as our obedience to his command, our compliance with his covenant terms, our qualification in state and temper for his further image, favour, and presence, and all the favours that conduce thereto, and result therefrom, and as our disgustings and bemoaning what hath been done amiss, and preventing the lamentable consequences of impentence to both the church and unbelieving world, as that where it is duly exercised and expressed toward God and man, in such works as ordinarily and in special cases and circumstances become repentance, as that it shall suffice on their parts, under Christ, for their restoring to

what their scandals and apostasy bereaved them of. But it is only Christ that hath deserved that our repentance through grace, and only grace, should reach these ends and benefits.

The sum of all is this: When we have abstracted the human satisfactions of the Papists from what God hath made our duty, and the condition of our salvation; or from what is due to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost from us as creatures, subjects, and delivered sinners by price and power, to be trained-up according to the methods and assistances of gospel-laws and grace; and so from what I am bound to do to satisfy my injured and endamaged neighbour, offended Governor, and the church of Christ, according to the institutions, and for the necessary and, by God and Christ, enjoined ends and interest of the gospel; how narrow and useless will human satisfactions appear to be!

And thus I have gone through this task, as thoroughly as God's breaches on my family, my manifold diversions, great distractions, mean abilities, and slender furniture, and other hinderances, would admit of; and with my closing words, and to my last gasp, (if sensible so long,) must I bewail the miserable state of church and world, that must be scandalized, disturbed, and divided by wanton fancies, prurient wits, proud hearts, and sinister designs, in having doctrines clouded or sophisticated with dark and doubtful words and phrases imposed on them.

SERMON XXII. (XXI.)

BY THE REV. EDWARD LAWRENCE, A.M.

OF MAGDALEN COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS TRANSUBSTANTIATION IN THE EUCHARIST; AND IT IS IDOLATRY IN THE PAPISTS TO WORSHIP THE CONSECRATED BREAD, THOUGH THEY THINK IT IS TURNED INTO THE BODY OF CHRIST.

THERE IS NO TRANSUBSTANTIATION IN THE LORD'S SUPPER.

For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, That the Lord Jesus the same night in which he was betrayed took bread: and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat: this is my body, which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me. After the same manner also he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood: this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me.—1 Corinthians xi. 23—25.

GOD hath exalted man above all creatures of the visible world, in giving him a being capable of religion, and thereby of eternal life and happiness in the enjoyment of Himself. And to the end that God may make himself glorious in making lost man happy, he hath in infinite wisdom and grace given us his written word, to be a perfect rule of