

THE PRACTICAL DIVINITY OF THE PAPISTS

DISCOVERED TO BE DESTRUCTIVE OF

CHRISTIANITY AND MEN'S SOULS.

[As this is a polemical treatise, it has been deemed necessary to use more than ordinary care in verifying the numerous quotations. Almost the whole have been so verified, and may be depended upon as absolutely accurate.—ED.]

AN ADVERTISEMENT.

I HAVE always thought, since I considered and understood what popery was, that the knowing of it would be a sufficient dissuasive from it, to those that regard God and their souls. This persuasion, together with compassion for those that are seduced, and desire to secure those that are in danger, engaged me in this present undertaking; wherein I have discovered what the practical divinity of that church is, how pernicious, and inconsistent with the way to salvation declared in the Scripture. I have herein the concurrence of some (few in comparison) of that church, who are sensible of such doctrine prevailing amongst them, as they say is absolutely opposite to the rules and spirit of the gospel; ¹ such as no man that hath never so little tenderness of his own salvation, but must conceive an horror at; ² such as they call a poisonous morality, more corrupt than that of pagans themselves; ³ and which permits Christians to do, what pagans, Jews, Mahometans, and barbarians, would have had in execration; ⁴ such as is, in their style, the most palpable darkness that ever came out of the bottomless pit; ⁵ such as overthrows the essential points of Christian religion, and the maxims that are most important, and of greatest necessity, in order to the salvation of men. ⁶ Of this they have given the world notice in several discourses, ⁷ two of which I have seen (though unhappily not the latter, till I had gone through the greatest part of what I intended). As to the extent of this execrable divinity, they declare, that whole societies would have these extravagancies accounted Roman traditions; ⁸ that the church is overgrown with this poisonous morality; that it is ready to be overwhelmed with the deluge of these corruptions; that the church is filled with this most palpable darkness. ⁹ Elsewhere they seem to fix this charge upon the Jesuits principally, as if they would have it thought not to reach much further; but withal tell us, that the Jesuits are the most numerous and the most powerful body of men in the whole church, and have the disposal of the consciences of all the greatest. ¹⁰ So that I can represent them no worse

¹ Representation of Curés of Paris, p. 3.

² Page 4.

³ Their Remonstrance, p. 2.

⁴ Their Answer maintaining the Factum, p. 8.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, p. 12.

Provincial Letters, Jesuits' Morals.

Remonstrance of Curés of Paris.

Answer maintaining the Factum.

¹⁰ Ibid.

than some of themselves do ; and the worst that can be said falls, by their own acknowledgment, upon the most considerable part of their church. That they should so far accuse the whole, cannot be expected (whatever occasion there be for it), so long as they think fit to continue in its communion. But then, if we regard those who are so great a part of the church upon the account of their numbers, and more in respect of their authority and influence, the maxims so branded,¹ are Roman traditions,² the true doctrine of faith, the true morality of the church, not asserted by that society alone, but equally (if not more) by Catholic writers of all sorts ; and those that quarrel thereat are factious spirits. Hereby, so far as the testimony of adversaries against themselves can clear a matter in question, there is evidence, both that the practical doctrine amongst them is pernicious and damnable, and also that it is common and generally followed.

I intend not here to impeach any maxim peculiar to the Jesuits, but that doctrine of the Romanists which is far more extensive, delivered by canonists and divines, secular and regular, of every sort, and in part by the canon law and their councils (who sometimes glance at this subject, though they make it not their business) ; that which in most particulars, and those of greatest moment, is ancients than the Society ; and in many points such, as the censurers of the Jesuits' morality do not touch, but either approve themselves, or dare not condemn, lest they should involve the whole church in the condemnation. I cannot discern that the practical divinity of the Jesuits is more corrupt than that of other Romish writers, their contemporaries ; and those that view the moral discourses of both, and compare them, will (if I much mistake not) discern no other. I never yet met with any author of that order so intolerably licentious, but might be matched, if not outvied, by others. There is no need to except Escobar or Bauny (though most branded), nor do their keen antagonists do it, when they speak of others whom they know to be no Jesuits, as the most extravagant that ever were.³ There is no reason why the odium which a community incurs should be appropriated to a party ; nor that the Society only should be noted as the sink, when the corruption is apparent everywhere. So far as the Jesuits are concerned herein, it hath been sufficiently exposed by others ; upon which account I decline those of that order, not putting the reader to rely upon any evidence from their writing. Only because it is requisite to shew their concurrence in some points, which otherwise might not pass for the common doctrine, I make use of Bellarmine freely (whom none can count a corrupter of popery, however Christianity hath been treated by him), and of Suarez sometimes (whose judgment alone is counted equivalent to a thousand others, by some⁴ that are none of the Society). I allege beside, though rarely, one or two more of those fathers, of like eminency and authority in that church ; but none of them, save in such points wherein they have not been noted for extravagancies by others ; or in such wherein those of other orders concur with, or go beyond them. The greatest advantage I make of them, is to represent the opinions of others, not their own ; and most herein of Suarez, who usually gives an account of the common doctrine out of unexceptionable authors. Those whom I principally rely on to make good the charge, are the ancients and better sort of their divines and casuists (the strictest of them in points of morality that I could meet with), such as are so far from being disciples of Ignatius, that most of them are Dominicans (most opposite of all orders to the Jesuits, and said to be the least tainted with these corruptions), and the greatest part of them were writers before their

¹ Supra.

² Defence of the Factum.

³ Remonstrance of the Curés of Paris.

⁴ Vid. Jo. Sanc. Disp. 44, n. 41.

order was founded, or appeared to the world on this subject. To these I have added other casuists of this last age, not that there is need to produce any worse than the former, but to shew that time hath made little or no alteration amongst them for the better.

The Romanists, when they are ashamed of their doctrine, or think the world will cry shame of it, are wont to disown it. It is like they may do so here, and tell us that these points, not being determined by councils, are not the doctrine of their church, but the opinions of particular doctors. This serves them for a shift in other cases with some colour, but it will be absurd to offer at it here. For though this be not their doctrine of faith, which with some generals, most about the sacraments, (reflected on in the sequel as there is occasion) is the business of their councils; yet it is the practical doctrine of their church, if it have any, and if they think their catholics concerned to be Christians more than merely in opinion. And this, under several heads, I have collected out of such writings as are the proper place of it. Therefore, to say that this is not the doctrine of their church, because the particulars are not found decided by councils, is to tell us that they are not charged with it, unless we can find it, where they know it cannot be found, and where, with any reason, it cannot be looked for. It is no more reasonable than if one, who hath taken a purse, should plead, though it be found in his hand, that he is not to be charged with it, unless we can spy it in his mouth, when yet he never opens it. That councils should give particular directions for conscience and practice, in cases innumerable, was never attempted, nor ever can be expected. Their church leaves this to her divines and casuists; and that nothing may pass them but what is agreeable to her sense, no books are to be published, but with the approbation and authority of such as are counted competent judges hereof; so that the doctrine of their authorised writers, that especially wherein they commonly agree, is the practical doctrine of that church, or else she hath none such, and consequently no care of the lives and consciences of her members; and though this be not infallible, or *de fide*, as they count the decisions of councils, yet is it as certain, they say, as the nature of the subject requires, nor do they pretend to have any infallible doctrine for particular directions herein; which yet may justly seem very strange to any man that considers that gross faults in life and practice are more infallibly damnable than errors in faith and speculation. Now, upon this their common doctrine, the substance of the charge ensuing, and the principal articles thereof, are grounded. As for the opinions of particular doctors, wherein there is no such common concurrence, though they be not so certain as the other, yet they are (even the worst of them) safe in practice, any of their people may follow them without danger, and with a good conscience; for this (as will appear hereafter) is the common judgment of their schools and doctors, and so far the doctrine of their church. And if that church did no farther own these opinions, common or particular, then, under this character, this is enough for our purpose (when the question is of the danger of popery in reference to men's salvation), that she counts such rules of life safe, and publicly allows them as direction for practice, which tend to ruin religion and men's souls. If they were not counted safe, that church which pretends to so much care of souls, since all in her communion are exposed to the danger, would be concerned to give warning of it, and brand these maxims as pernicious; but this was never yet done, nor ever like to be. These opinions, all, or the greatest part of them, were taught and published in that church, before the Council of Trent; there was time enough, in eighteen years, to take cognisance of them and their pernicious consequence; yet, when they bestowed *anathemas* so liberally, where there

was occasion, and (for the most part) where there was none, they thought not fit to bestow one curse upon these doctrines, how execrable soever; yea, some part thereof of worst consequence had there an express confirmation. Their popes since, though they could see occasion to condemn such propositions as the five ascribed to Jansenius, and those of Baius, White, and many others, could not, by the help of a judgment counted infallible, discern anything in the worst of these doctrines worthy of, or fit for, their censure. The cardinals of the inquisition at Rome, and their setters in other countries, whose business it is to spy whatever (in books particularly) is against faith and good manners, see nothing of this nature in that which destroys both. No expurgatory index (what havoc soever has been made by those tools in their best authors) hath, so far as I have observed, touched the common opinions here exposed. It is true, some others have been expunged, and I find above forty opinions of the late casuists censured by Alexander the Seventh, and the cardinals of their sacred congregation;¹ but hereby more authority is added to those I insist on, being thought good enough to pass untouched; which must therefore be counted sound doctrine and safe for practice in the judgment of their virtual church, and the chief parts of their church representative.

There is no ground to expect that this doctrine, as to the principal and most pernicious parts of it, will ever be condemned by any popes or councils of such complexion and principles as that of Trent, where it was a maxim observed religiously, that no determination should pass, which either in matter or form would disoblige any considerable party among them, much less all. The Roman interest is supported by such politics, and must be secured, whatever become of souls or saving doctrine. There are indeed some dissenters amongst them (as there are elsewhere) who complain of their moral divinity, but they are such whose power and interest can reach little further than complaints; and these are so far from being the voice or sense of their church, that their writings which exhibit such complaints are condemned at Rome² by the supreme tribunal (as they call it) of the inquisition.

In short, by the known custom and settled order of the Roman church, the people, for regulating of their hearts and lives, are to be directed by their confessors, their confessors have their direction herein from their casuists and practical authors; both priests and people must believe this to be safe, because the church hath made this provision for them, approves the course, and obligeth them to take no other. And thus that doctrine, the deadly venom whereof I here discover, must be conveyed from their casuists to all sorts amongst them; nor must they fear any danger in it, unless they will question the wisdom and goodness of their church. There can be no question but that this doctrine is thus far owned by the church of Rome; whether it be delivered fallibly or infallibly, by councils or without, is not at all here considerable. It is enough that such is the conduct provided for Roman catholics, and that it is to be followed without apprehension of danger, and cannot be declined by those that will keep the ordinary road of that church, though it lead directly to destruction.

When no other shift will serve, to hinder those from being undeceived whom they would delude, it is usual with them to make loud outcries of false citations, and that their doctrine is misrepresented. I have been very careful to give no just occasion for this, being apprehensive that he who doth it wrongs not them more than he doth himself and his cause. The places cited I have viewed again and again, where there might be any doubt of misconstruction, and set down their own words where it might seem scarce

¹ Index Expurg. sub Alexand. VII. An. 1666.

² Ibid.

credible that Christians and divines (directing conscience) should speak at such a rate; and where that would have been too tedious, have given their sense faithfully, so far as I could discern it, and directed the reader where he may find and judge thereof himself. Yet if, notwithstanding all the care and diligence I could use, it hath been my unhappiness anywhere to mistake them, upon notice from any I shall do them right; and am capable to give them further satisfaction, knowing well that I am yet far from representing their doctrine fully so bad as it is. Large volumes might be filled with the corruptions of it; I have but pointed at some, and contented myself with few authors in many particulars, where plenty might have been produced. I designed briefness, and have waived much that was ready, lest I should be tedious, considering that some who are most concerned in such discourses will have nothing at all when they think too much is offered.

I have been less solicitous about the style; it doth not always satisfy myself, so that I can allow others to find fault with it; it may be thought sometimes less grave, elsewhere too sharp and vehement. I suffered it to be what the subject would have it; and the quality thereof now and then overruled me, somewhat against my own inclination. Only I make nothing ridiculous, but find it so, and should scarce do it right if I represented it otherwise than it is. Where I seem too sharp or severe upon any occasion, I found something in the nature of the subject that forced me to it. And it is not easy (if it be congruous or just) to speak of what is monstrously extravagant or pernicious, with such calmness as we treat indifferent things.

It will be enough for me if (through God's blessing) people will hereby be brought to understand that popery designs not to trouble them either with the reality of religion, or the happiness which Christ has entailed thereon. And that their practical doctrine is contrived accordingly, will, I doubt not, be hereby manifest to all such as have a mind to see, and are not wilfully resolved to lose the way to salvation, and their souls together, by shutting their eyes against so plain a discovery of so great a danger.

INTRODUCTION.

THE danger of popery in points of faith hath been sufficiently discovered to the world by the divines of the Reformation, but their doctrine, which concerns life and practice, hath not been so much insisted on. And yet there is as much occasion for this ; for here the mischief is as great, an unchristian heart and life being at least as damning as erroneous belief ; and hereby the great apostasy and degeneracy of the papal church is as apparent, and herein they have proceeded with as much disregard of Christ and the souls of men. Their design in this seems to have been, not the promoting of Christ's interest (for that is manifestly prostituted), but the securing and greatening of a faction, which, under the profession of Christianity, might be false to all its realities. And their rule is the corrupt inclinations of depraved nature, to which they have thoroughly conformed their practical divinity, which easeth it of the duties for which it hath an aversion, how much soever enjoined, and clears its way to those sins to which it is disposed, as though there were no need to avoid them. This rule serves their design with great advantage ; but souls are more endangered hereby, and their principles become more pernicious, because they are so taking. Persuade a man that he may safely neglect the duties which he owes to God, his own soul, and others, and may gratify the lusts he is addicted to, and give him the maxims of religion, and the authority and conclusions of divines, and the teachers whom he trusts, for it, and he will like that religion, because he loves his sin, and is in danger to follow both, though he perish for it eternally. And indeed this is it which makes the condition of papists deplorable ; for though the principles of their belief, as it is popish, be mortally poisonous, yet there might be some antidote in the practicals of Christianity, retained and followed by those who are unavoidably ignorant of the danger of their more speculative errors, and so some hopes of such ; but their practical doctrine being no less corrupted, the remedy itself becomes poison, and their condition who freely let it down hopeless. Whether their errors in matters of faith be directly fundamental hath been with some of their opposers a question, but those who will view their practical doctrine may discern that it strikes through the heart of Christianity, casting off the vitals of it as superfluities, and cuts off those who will believe and follow it from the way of life ; not only by encouraging them with security to live and die in all sorts of wickedness, but also by obliging them to neglect, as needless, the greatest and most important concerns of Christians, without which God cannot be honoured by us, nor salvation attained. This will be apparent by observing what is determined in that church by those who have the conduct of their lives and consciences, concerning the worshipping of God, Christian knowledge, love to God, faith in Christ, repentance from dead works, and holiness of life ; as to the exercise of Christian virtues, the abandoning of sin, and the practice of good works ; of all which in particular the following discourse gives an account.

THE PRACTICAL DIVINITY OF THE PAPISTS

DISCOVERED TO BE DESTRUCTIVE OF

CHRISTIANITY AND MEN'S SOULS.

CHAPTER I.

Real worship of God not necessary in the Church of Rome.

There is nothing wherein the honour of God and the happiness of men is more concerned than divine worship. Religion provides for these great ends by obliging us to worship God ; this it doth indispensably, and can do no less without abandoning itself ; for this is essential to it,¹ and gives it being. And the truth and goodness of it depends as much thereon ; for no religion is true and saving but that which obligeth to worship God really. Now worship is not real unless mind and heart concur in it ; whatever it hath, without this it wants² its life and soul, and is no more worship really than a picture is a man. Hence Christ brands those who draw near to God with their lips, without their hearts, for hypocrites, Mat. xv. 7, 8, Mark vii. 6 ; such as pretend to be what they are not, and to do what really they do not ; who are but worshippers in show and fiction ; no more so indeed than the stage-player is the prince whose part he acts. The Romanists seem to acknowledge all this, and therefore ought not to deny but that it is as necessary that God should be really worshipped, as it is needful that he should have any honour in the world, or that there should be any true religion amongst men, or salvation for them. Yet notwithstanding, their practical doctrine makes it needless to worship God really. That this may be fully and distinctly manifested, let us observe, *first*, what they count requisite in *divine service* and in their *mass*. The former is their worship for every day (which goes under the name of *canonical hours* and the *divine office*), and is the proper service of their clergy and monastics ; the latter is for holidays, and is common to the people with the religious, and the only public service they are ordinarily obliged to. Afterwards we may reflect upon what else

¹ Religio est virtus per quam homines Deo debitum cultum et reverentiam exhibent. —Tullius dicit, ii. Rhet. quod religio est virtus, quæ superiori cuidam naturæ (quam divinam vocant) cultum cæremoniamque affert.—*Aquinas* ii. 2, q. lxxx. art. i.

² Nam spiritus interior adorationis, qui est ipsa vita et anima adorationis exterioris, appellatur quoque ipsa veritas adorationis.—*Vasquez de Adorat*, l i. disp. i. cap. ii. p. 18.

passeth under the notion of worship in public, and also take some notice of their devotions, or religious employments in private.

For the first of these, their divine service, if there were anything of religion or religious worship counted needful amongst them, it would be required of their clergy, and those whom by way of eminency they call religious, in their divine office especially (if anywhere); but by their doctrine it is not needful for them to worship God really there, unless he can be said to be worshipped where both himself and all that concerns worshippers indeed may (as it may by their leave) be quite neglected, and no way actually minded. They seem, at least some of them, in their discourses of worship and prayer particularly, to require as necessary thereto both an act of the mind and of the will (*attention* and *intention* they call them); but proceed with them a little, and you will find the former of these quite lost in the latter; and the latter, as they order it, dwindling into nothing. It is the common determination of their schools and doctors, that actual attention of mind is not necessary when they recite their *canonical hours*, that is, they need not mind God in their service, nor the matter of it more than the object, nor the sense of what they say, nor the words they use; not any of these need be actually minded. A purpose or intention to do it is sufficient, though that purpose be not at all performed. This is the doctrine of their great Aquinas,¹ concerning prayer in general, whom the rest² commonly follow. Attention is not necessary all the while, but the virtue of the first intention, with which a man comes to prayer, renders the whole prayer meritorious, as it falls out in other meritorious acts. And this first intention also is enough to make the prayer prevalent. So he explains his main conclusion, viz. prayer ought to be at least attentive in respect of a previous intention.³ So that they may be attentive enough, by virtue of this first intention, though they do not at all mind afterwards what they are doing, when they should be worshipping; which is just as if they should say, a man that goes to church with an intent to join in their service, but falls fast asleep when he comes there, serves God effectually, and is attentive enough by virtue of that former intention, though he sleep all the while. It seems it is sufficient in the church of Rome, and effectual, even to a degree meritorious, to worship God as one that is asleep may worship him, if he falls asleep after a good intention. However, hereby it is manifest that with them it is not needful to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service, but only to intend some such thing. If there be a purpose of worship, though God be never worshipped indeed, by their doctrine, it is enough for him. I suppose 'his holiness' would not think himself well served at this rate. The common women at Rome are to pay him a *julio* a head weekly, for the liberty he gives them to drive there their trade; now if, instead of payment, they should allege an intention of it, and declare this is all they are obliged to, and that they ought to be acquitted upon that account, though they never laid it down, he would think himself not paid hereby, but scorned; he loseth his sacred reverence, and is affronted into the bargain; yet at this rate will he

¹ Ad hunc effectum (viz. mereri) non ex necessitate requiritur quod attentio adsit orationi per totum: sed vis primæ intentionis, qua aliquis ad orandum accedit, reddit totam orationem meritoriam, sicut in aliis meritoriis actibus accidit.—ii. 2, q. lxxxiii. art. xiii.

² Ut officium ipsa attentio comitetur actualiter, nec in officio, nec in aliis orationibus, vel bonis operibus, requiritur.—*Sylvester*, sum. v. hora n. xiii. edit. Lugdun. An. 1572. D. Thom. quem omnes sequuntur, affirmat (impetrationem) non pendere ex actuali attentione, sed virtutalem ad illam sufficere, et videtur certa sententia.—*Suarez*, lib. iii. De Orat. Vocal. c. v. n. v.

³ Attentam saltem in prima intentione, oportet esse orationem, si meritoria, si impetrativa sit futura, mentemque spiritualiter refectura.—*Ibid*.

have God served by Roman catholics. Well, but if God need not be worshipped but in purpose only, and the intention may serve without the act, yet sure it must be an actual intention, or at least a purpose to worship God. If it be not the worship of God that they need intend, divine worship is clearly abandoned, both in deed and in purpose; if it must not be actual, there need be actually no thought of worshipping God. But I cannot discern that they count either of these necessary. They declare plainly that an actual intention is needless; in this they generally agree, though they differ in the terms by which they use to express it. They call it an habitual, or a virtual, or an implicit intention, in opposition to that which is express or actual; so that actually either to worship God, or to have an intention of worshipping him, is more than needs. But since they will not have it actual, let it be what sort of intention they please otherwise, yet sure the thing intended should be the worshipping of God; so that they may be said to worship in purpose, though they think it needless to do it in deed. Whether they count this necessary, may be best discerned by their own expressions, which they use in some variety. Commonly, they say, a virtual intention may serve.¹ Now this is not an intention, indeed, to worship God; but supposeth a former act, by virtue of which one is said to have an intention when really he hath none. As they call that a virtual intention to worship when a man had a purpose to attend, though he do it not at all; answerably, a virtual intention to worship will be a purpose or thought to have such a purpose, though he never have it. Let those who can apprehend how they may be said to worship God so much as in purpose, by virtue of a purpose to worship him, which they have not, but only intend to have, without effect. But it may be there is no such intention needful with them, for custom may serve to this purpose (Soto). The precept for attending the performance of divine service canonically includes two things:² first, that at the beginning of prayer every one mind what he is going to do. But for this former it is enough that it be done by virtue of some former intention and custom, as if one, when the sign is given for prayers, go, as is the custom, to the choir; by this he satisfies the precept. Now this he may be accustomed to do, without any thought of God, or of worshipping him; yet by virtue of that custom, wherein God is quite neglected, he will have their virtual intention to worship him; all the intention that they require, that is, plainly none at all, unless by virtue of neglecting God he may be said to mind him.

Or an habitual intention may serve, they sometimes tell us. Sylvester³ expresseth it thus, after Paludanus, he is bound in the beginning of the service to have an intent to perform it, so that the service may be from his reason, and not from his imagination only, *i. e.* he must go about it like a man, and not like a beast. But lest it should seem too hard for a man to go about their service, with an intention so much distinguishing him from a brute, he adds a favourable gloss.⁴ This is to be understood, saith he,

¹ Ad horas canonicas recte pronunciandas requiritur propositum intendendi et attendendi, ut sufficit virtuale.—*Martin. Navar. Manual. Confess. cap. i. num. xiii. ut c. xxv. n. cv. edit. Antwerp. an. 1608; Jac. de Graffys. Decision. Aurear. l. ii. c. li. n. iv. edit. Antwerp. an. 1596; Sylvest. sum. v. hor. n. xiv.*

² Preceptum attentionis in divino officio canonicè persolvendo, duo includit: videlicet, ut orandi initio quisque attendat quid agere aggreditur—quia vero ad prius membrum satis est, ut virtute alicujus præcedentis intentionis et consuetudinis fiat, ut si quis dum signum ad horas datur, ad chorum de more vadit,—per illud satisfacit præcepto.—*De Justitia et Jure*, lib. x. quæst. v. art. v. Edit. v. Lugdun, an. 1582.

³ Quantum ad intentionem vel attentionem, quilibet ad officium obligatus tenetur in principio officii habere intentionem satisfaciendi, ita quod officium ab intellectu et non ab imaginativa proficiatur; secundum Petr. de Pal.

⁴ Quod intellige actu, vel habitu seu virtute.—*Sum. v. hor. n. xiv.*

either in act, or habit, or virtue; so that if it be but an habitual intention, it may suffice.¹ Navarre explains it by this conditional (and others with him), if one be asked, why he takes his breviary, he would answer, that he doth it to say service.² Now hereby we are told, that rather an habitual than a virtual intention is expressed; and they acknowledge that such an intention is not sufficient³ for a human act, much less therefore for an act of worship. Since then they think that such an intention will suffice, a purpose to worship God is not needful with them, unless they can make divine worship of that which is less than human; or will have the brutes to be catholic worshippers. They tell us also that this habitual intention is in those that are asleep.⁴ So Scotus, the first founder of this distinction (and herein that which they call virtual agrees with it; indeed, Aquinas⁵ saw no cause to distinguish them; and⁶ others, who affect Scotus his subtlety, use the terms as if they were distinct, yet confound them in their instances). And thus, when all the worship which they think needful is shrunk up into an intention, yet that intention is no other than they may have in a dead sleep, when they dream of no such thing. So that their souls need be no more concerned in worshipping God, either when they are at service, or when they are addressing themselves to it, than if their church were in mount Celius with the seven sleepers. When they are coming to it (as we see here), they need have no more purpose to worship God than if they were asleep; and when they are at it (as we said before), they need no more attend to what they are a-doing than if they were not yet awake.

They say also an⁷ implicit intention will suffice; which is, as they explain it, when a man hath not expressly any thought of praying or worshipping God, when he is to read service, but only intends⁸ to accomplish the precept of the church, or to perform his task, or to do as he is wont to do. As when a man first takes orders or enters into a monastery, understanding that the church enjoins all in that capacity daily to recite their canonical hours, if he then have an intention to perform this task, to do as the church requires, or as others of that quality are wont to do, and accordingly say his *hours* as the fashion is, though he have not once a thought of God or worshipping him all his life after, either when he is going to service, or when he is reading it, yet that first intention may suffice, yea, it is of such sufficiency that any other act of mind or heart, either in worship, or in order to it, becomes

¹ Ibid. c. xxv. n. cvi. Juxta ea quæ post alios, presertim Majorem, scripsimus.—*Vide Jac Graff. ibid.*

² Navar. explicat virtuale intentionem per illam conditionalem, quia si interrogaretur quare accipit brevarium, responderet se id facere ad recitandum. Veruntamen hoc modo magis explicatur habitualis quam virtualis intentio.—*Suarez, l. iii. de Orat. c. iii. n. vi.*

³ Actus autem humanus non potest esse ab intentione tantum habituali, ut omnes supponunt, et per se constat.—*Idem. l. iv. de Horis, c. xxvi. n. iii.* Actus inde procedens non est humanus, et deliberatus.—*Bellarmin. de Sacramentis, l. i. c. xxvii. p. 92, edit. Lugd. an. 1599.*

⁴ Nec habet tantum intentionem habitualement, quod talem habet dormiens.—*Scotus. m. iv. dist. vi. quæst. vi.* Qualis etiam in dormiente inesse potest.—*Bellarmin. ibid.*

⁵ iii. quæst. lxxiii. art. viii.

⁶ Macor. Navar. Soto. Graff. g.

⁷ Jo. Macor. Navar. in Suar. de Orat. l. iii. c. iii. n. vi.

⁸ Certum imprimis est, satis superque esse, si in principio accedatur ad recitandum cum proposito implendi præceptum, etiamsi in discursu orationis in mentem non veniat, satis enim est quod non retractetur, quia manet virtus prioris attentionis. Præterea ut censeatur quis accedere ad recitandum cum proposito implendi præceptum, satis est quod ex consuetudine quadam velit illam actionem tanquam expletivam sui muneris et obligationis, vel quod in actu exercito (ut sic dicam) velit eam facere, ut solet, quia eo ipso vult illam ut impletivam præcepti. Ita sumitur ex Macor, Navar. et aliis.—*Idem. l. iv. de Hor. c. xxvi. n. vi.*

needless ; it is of such admirable efficacy, that by virtue of it they can worship God, when they mind no such thing as God, or worshipping him, no, nor ever intend it otherwise. Let us suppose that they thought it requisite to renew this implicit intention frequently, yet would it not necessarily amount to a purpose of worshipping God, for not only their task, and what they are wont to do, but the precept of the church, may be (as we shall hear them by and¹ by declare) accomplished by acts of wickedness, which sure cannot be acts of worship, nor a design to do them an intention to serve God ; yea, they may satisfy the church's injunction for divine service, though they have an express intention not to fulfil it all the while, as² Arragon and their divines of greatest reputation determine. So that if the church did enjoin them to worship God, yet no intention to worship him would be needful, because they can satisfy the church with a contrary intention. Finally, a sinful intention will serve their turn ; this passeth for their common doctrine.³

If a man intend principally his own praise or worldly advantage, and so design to serve himself, and not God, this cannot with any reason be counted an intention to worship God ; yet such a design will suffice for the worship they require, and it will be substantially good in their account, only a little tainted with a venial speck, which, though it may hinder it from being meritorious of eternal glory, yet he that never otherwise intends to pray or worship cannot be damned, and so will be saved notwithstanding. In short, the Lord requires the heart in worship ; without this, nothing else can please him, nothing in his account will be a real honour or worship of him, but only in appearance and fiction. The Romanists teach, that God need not have anything of their hearts in their service, not any one act or motion thereof, while they are at it, only some sort of intention before, while they are going about it ; but this no act of will or heart neither, but only a virtual, or habitual, or implicit something ; they have minced it so small, that an ordinary eye cannot discern in it so little, as a purpose to serve God ; yea, in fine, they have reduced it to that which is worse than nothing, and if the heart must be cumbered with any such thing as an intention about serving God, yet a sinful intention may serve, this satisfies their holy church and her precept fully ; she doth not, she cannot, require any more for God, what burdens soever in other cases she lays upon the consciences of men. But though the heart, and every act of it, be thus discharged from any concern in their service, yet it may be they will have the mind more engaged. One act thereof, and but one (mental attention), they seem to require ; and it is true some of them make show of calling for it, but as soon as ever it appears it is dismissed immediately as needless, for they conclude generally, that a purpose to attend will serve, though they attend not, and this purpose too by their handling (as we have seen) comes to nothing or worse. But suppose they did (though they do not) account an intention to worship God needful, and that actual, express, and well qualified, yet they confess⁴ an intent to worship or wait on God is not to worship him really : no more than a man is sober when he is drunk, because he intended to be sober. But they leave us no ground for this supposition, yet ascribe as much to their intention, and more than the best imaginable will bear, after they have reduced it to

¹ Soto. Canus. Medina. Corduba. Navar. Covarruv. Bonacina. infra.

² In Suarez, *ibid.* n. viii. et tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. iii. There are near thirty doctors produced for this by John Martinez de Prado, a Dominican ; tom. ii. Theol. Moral. c. xxx. q. viii. sect. i. n. i.

³ Hæc est communis sententia—omnes fatentur.—*Idem.* Sua. l. iii. de Orat. c. iii. n. v., vide infra.

⁴ Licet velle attendere, non sit attendere in re, ut vere dixit Cajetanus.—*Suar.* de Orat. lib. iii. c. iv. n. 7.

as bad as nothing. However, since all the worship they count necessary is included in this purpose, and all their pretensions depend on it, they are concerned to have it thought to be something, and they will seem cautious about it, as a thing material, so this *proviso* they lay down.¹ It must not be changed into a contrary purpose; if that should fall out, it will lose its wonderful virtue, and not make those worshippers who mind not what they are doing when they should be praying. But there is no danger of this, nor need they be solicitous about it, for (as they tell them) they change not their purpose, though they do, nothing that they intended, or do what is quite contrary to it, viz., though if they purposed to attend, yet they attend not at all, but turn their minds to other things, if they act cross to the supposed intention; yet, so long as they assume not a contrary purpose, they must be thought to mind what they are about, though they mind it not one moment; and there need be as little care, as there is danger of changing their purpose, for² carelessness cannot do it. It cannot be changed, unless a man designedly, and on set purpose, will turn his mind from what he is about to other things. Since then a person who doth not mind God, or anything that concerns his worship, when he seems engaged in it, doth not worship God at all, as is evident in itself, and they confess it, in case he mind not this on set purpose; therefore, though he doth not worship God at all, yet he worships him as much as the Romanists require, unless he wills not to worship him on set purpose; yea, though he voluntarily mind nothing that concerns a worshipper, though he deliberately and willingly let his mind run upon other things, yet so long as he is so regardless of God, and what he is about, as not to take notice of this extravagancy, he fulfils the precepts of the church, and minds divine service as much as is required.³ Thus Cajetan, Soto, and others; so that by their doctrine, if they do not worship God and voluntarily neglect it, yet they do as much as the church enjoins, so long as they take no notice that they do not worship him. And as they may voluntarily employ their minds about other things, when they should be worshipping, so may they on set purpose busy the outward man about other employments, when they are saying their service. They can perform their best devotions while (to give their own instances) they are⁴ washing themselves, or putting on their clothes, or mending pens, or laying the cloth, or making beds, or anything else which requires no more attention. Nor dare they count this a venial fault, because the⁵ Dominicans are enjoined by the rules of their order to say their service while they are doing something else. That which would spoil the devotion of others gives no impediment to theirs,

¹ Facillimum huic precepto obedire, nam nihil aliud exigit, nisi quod quis animo vacandi Deo horas inchoet, et in contrarium animus iste non mutetur, dum exsolvit divinum officium.—*Cajetan.* sum verb. horæ Canon. edit. Lugdun. An. 1544.

² Mutari autem in contrarium est impossibile, ex inadvertentia.—*Cajetan.* ibid.

³ Si quis advertit se cogitare hæc vel illa, quæ debent esse extranea tunc a sua meditatione, sed non advertit quod ab officio Divino distrahitur; quamvis voluntarie ea meditetur; non tamen voluntarie animus ab officio divino distrahitur: ac per hoc animus vacandi Deo a principio officii habitus, non est mutatus in contrarium.—*Cajetan.* ibid. Etsi ultro et voluntarie alia cogitet (ut bene ait Cajetanus) quousque inspicat se distrahi, semper reputatur inadvertenter divagari, atque adeo excusatur ab omissione præcepti de attentione, impletque adeo subinde orandi mandatum.—*Soto*, ibid. p. 341. Sic explicant Cajetan. Soto, presertim Medina; vide et Gabriel in Suar. iii. Thom. tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. iii.

⁴ Hujusmodi sunt lavare manus, se induere, pennam temperare, aut id genus similia, qui quidem actus quandoque non sunt peccata neque venialia (verbi gratia) in ordine prædicatorum.—*Jac. de Graff.* ibid. l. ii. c. li. n. x. Talis est actio vestiendi se, vel lavandi manus et ora, vel sternendi mensam, aut lectum.—*Füll.* Tract. xxiii. n. 260. vid. *Soto* ubi supra; vid. *Bonatin.* Divin. Offic. d. i. q. iii. p. 2. sect. ii. n. xii.

⁵ Vid. infra.

and good reason, for how can that be disturbed that is not, or lessened when it is already nothing? This is to worship God after the Roman mode, when neither body nor mind is taken up with the service, but both deliberately employed about something else.

But that by their principles they need be no better worshippers, will yet be more manifest if we view their doctrine concerning attention more distinctly. Aquinas and Bonaventure (whom the rest follow) give an account of three sorts hereof, according to the severals which may be minded in prayer.

The first is attention to the words, so as not to err in pronouncing them.¹

The second, to the sense of the words.

The third, to the person prayed to, and the things prayed for.

Bonaventure calls attention to the first superficial, and that to the second literal (we may as well call it human or rational), that to the third spiritual (divine or Christian attention others call it).²

Now (which is to be observed as that which unveils the whole mystery), they hold that any one of these is sufficient, not only the third or the second, but even the first, though it be the worst, and of least importance. So Angelus,³ Sylvester,⁴ Cajetan,⁵ Bellarmine,⁶ Tolet,⁷ so Aquinas,⁸ Soto, Navar, so all of them, it is (they tell us) the common doctrine universally received.⁹ And this clears all, and leads us directly through their reserves and concealments, and the ambiguity of their expressions (apt to mislead an unwary eye, and abuse a charitable mind, loath to think them so bad as they speak themselves) into the open view of their irreligious (not to say atheistical) doctrine. This makes it very evident that with them it is not needful either to worship God or intend it. For since they agree that any one of the several sorts of attention is sufficient, the first, which concerns the bare words, is enough on their account, and the other are needless. It is not requisite that they should mind either the things to be prayed for, or the God they should pray to, or the sense of the words they pronounce; it will suffice that they mind the words, to them senseless, and therein the empty and insignificant figure and sound. Now, words without sense are in themselves neither good nor bad; no worship, sure, can be imagined in them; they are no better (but less tolerable) in the mouths of men than the sound of brutes. And the mere figure and sound of letters can make men no more worshippers than conjurors; yet such is all the worshipping and praying that they count necessary. But if they had a mind to supererogate, and their Catholics were to do more than their duty, i. e. act as becomes men in their service, taking the sense

¹ Sciendum tamen quod triplex est attentio, quæ orationi vocali potest adhiberi: una quidem qua attenditur ad verba, ne aliquis in eis erret: secunda qua attenditur ad sensum verborum: tertia qua attenditur ad finem orationis, sc. ad Deum, et ad rem pro qua oratur.—*Aquin.* xxii. q. lxxxiii. a. xiii.

² Opusc. de process. Religionis, l. vii. c. iii.

³ Quocunque istorum modorum adsit intentio, non est inefficax oratio ad satisfaciendum. Et ego dico nec ad impetrandum vel reficiendum.—*Sum. Angel.* v. oratio. n. xi.

⁴ Quæcunque harum adsit, oratio non est censenda inattenta.—*Sylvest.* Sum. v. orat. n. vi.

⁵ Una istarum attentionum sufficit.—*Cajetan.* Sum. ibid.

⁶ Quælibet vero harum trium sufficit.—*Bellarm.* de bon. Operib. l. i. c. xviii. p. 1026. Edit. Lugd. An. 1599.

⁷ Secunda attentio non est necessaria—Tertia etiam attentio non est necessaria.—*Tolet.* in struct. l. ii. cap. xiii. p. 449.

⁸ Consequenter D. Thomas, Cajetan, Soto, et sæpe Navar. asserunt, quamcunque ex dictis attentionibus sufficere ad probitatem orationis et implendum præceptum.—*Suar.* de Orat. vocal. l. iii. c. iv. n. xviii.

⁹ Communis est, quia omnes dicunt minimam attentionem sufficere.—*Idem, ibid.*

along with the words, yet the third sort of attention, which concerns God, is still unnecessary, there need be no application of the mind unto God in their prayers. Surely in any religion but that which will have men abandon both sense and reason in matters plain and obvious to either, God would not be thought to be worshipped when he is not at all minded. By their common doctrine now mentioned (wherein all sorts of their authors conspire), first their minds may in their divine service not only depart from God by natural or inadvertent vagaries, but they may dismiss them from God on set purpose; for they may voluntarily and upon deliberation decline in their service what is more than enough; and the attendance of the mind upon God in prayer is plainly with them more than enough, seeing they declare that their attending to the bare words alone is sufficient. If they mind but to pronounce the words entire, no more is needful; God may be left out of their minds during their whole service; and they may be as much without God in their worship as others are said to be without him in the world, deliberately and out of choice. They leave us not to rely for this upon consequences, how evident and undeniable soever; they stick not to declare¹ that they may without sin voluntarily abandon the better sorts of attention, viz. both that which is rational and that which is spiritual. This will be no fault at all, if done upon a reasonable account; for example, if any one decline these, that he may not tire his head therewith, or anything of like nature.² It seems reasonable with them not to trouble their heads with minding God, or what becomes men in their worship of him. The reason is, because they are not obliged to serve God as well as they can.³ It is a received maxim amongst them, that they are not bound to do their best.⁴ The third sort of attention is better than the second, and the second is better than the first⁵ (that is worst of all); but when there are better and worse ways of serving God before them, they may choose the worst. The worst attendance of all, it seems, is good enough for God, even that wherein he is not at all regarded. This doctrine is so common, that I find but two who demur on it, and one of them (Cajetan) but drawn in by consequence. Only Navar, though he, as the rest, counts the first and worst sort of attention sufficient, yet thinks it may be a venial fault to retain it, so as voluntarily to exclude or hinder the better. Yet both⁶ these hold that they may voluntarily want the better, and may without fault turn their minds from God to other things, so long as they observe it not, or if they do observe it, yet so long also as they do not reflect upon it as a vagary. And both maintain⁷ that any one

¹ Ut adverterem sufficere attentionem ad verba, vel ad sensum verborum—ex quo fit ut recitans divinum officium, non teneatur meliorem attentionem quaerere, sed satisfacere, quamlibet ex dictis eligendo.—*Bonacin.* divin. off. disp. i. q. iii. p. 2, sect. ii. n. 5 cum multis aliis.

² Infertur primo quaecunque attentionem ex dictis sufficere, ut oratio sit honesta. Et siquidem voluntaria omissio melioris attentionis sit rationabilis, ut si quis nolit attendere ad perfectiorem, ne caput defatiget, vel quid simile, non impedit quominus honesta sit.—*Vid. Suarez,* de orat. l. iii. c. iv.

³ In eo modo orandi nullum est peccatum per se loquendo, et ex vi naturalis legis, ob solum defectum voluntarium melioris attentionis—quia homo non tenetur orare meliori modo quam potest, &c.—*Idem ibid.*

⁴ *Vid. Melch. Canum* Prælec. de pœnitent. part. iii. p. 841. edit. Colon. Agripp. an. 1605.

⁵ Angel. sum. v. Orat. n. xi.; Sylvest. sum. v. Orat. n. vi.; Navar. *ibid.* c. xxv. n. 105; Graff, *ibid.* l. ii. c. li. n. 9; Molanus Theol. Pract. Tract. iii. c. viii. n. xiv.

⁶ Cajetan. *supra* Navar. c. xxv. n. 106.

⁷ Quod possit quis sine peccato orare dum se induit, aut aliam similem actionem exercet—quæ actio, licet admittat inferiorem attentionem, tamen sine dubio impedit perfectiorem, et maxime spiritualem et elevatam. Non licere tales actiones exercere, est falsum, et contra usum omnium piorum; et Cajetan, et Navar, etiam fatentur.—*Suarez, ibid.* n. xii.

may pray whilst he is dressing himself, or is taken up with any other like employment. And such action, though it be consistent with the worst attention, yet undoubtedly (they say) it hinders the better, especially that which is spiritual and elevated. So that herein these authors are either reconciled to the common opinion, or fall out with themselves. And that such employments (though inconsistent with spiritual attention, *i. e.* with minding God) are lawful while they are at their service, is not only the sense of these two casuists, but to deny it is against the usage of all the pious (it seems the Roman piety is without regarding God even in his worship). All the Dominicans are particularly obliged to it (as we saw before), and have a visible demonstration for it from the ancient form of their dormitories.¹ Thus one way or other all agree that God may voluntarily be neglected in their worship without sin.

Secondly, As it is not necessary by their doctrine to worship God, so neither is there any necessity to intend it. When they have encouraged all, even their religious, not to pray at all, by assuring them they need not mind God at all, whilst they should be praying to him, yet they would persuade them notwithstanding that they may pray by virtue of a former intention. The vanity of this is shewed already (where we prove both that this is not enough, and that indeed they require not so much); but because it is the only pretence that such can be worshippers of God who think it needless to mind him, even in the most solemn addresses amongst them, it will not be amiss to see it again put quite away by their own doctrine. What must be designed in that previous intention, upon which, not only the efficacy, but the reality, of their prayers depends? Must they intend, when they are going about it, to mind the things they are to pray for, or the God they should worship, or the sense of the words they utter? No; as it is not necessary to mind any of these when they are at their worship, so neither is it needful to intend it beforehand: it will be sufficient if they do but intend to mind the senseless pronounciation of the words, and neither God nor anything else which becomes Christians, or men in acts of worship; nothing but what brutes or birds are capable of, the mere uttering of the words. This is very manifest by their common doctrine, now before us, concerning attention in prayer. Attendance to the words without the sense is sufficient, but they need not purpose beforehand to have any sort of attention more than that which is sufficient; for they will not imagine there is any need of a purpose to do that which is not needful to be done; and they declare expressly this is all which is requisite, that they come to their service with a purpose to have any sort of attention, that is sufficient;² telling us withal, that attendance to the bare words will suffice. So that in the issue the worship of God (his and our greatest concern in this world) is reduced to this: there is no need to mind God, and so not to worship him at all, either actually or virtually, since it is neither needful to do this, nor intend it. He is not worshipped in that remote and minute way which they call virtual (which is not the doing of it, but a purpose only to do it), but by virtue of a former intention; where this intention is not, it can have no

¹ *Dixerim forsan venialiter, quoniam non semper est peccatum, immo in ordine nostro præceptum nobis est, ut surgentes officium virginis dicamus: et ut antiqua indicat dormitorii dispositio: inter induendum se fratres illud inchoabant.*—*Soto*, *ibid.* l. x. q. v. art. v. *Graff.* *ibid.* l. ii. c. li. n. x.

² *Attentio necessaria consistit in habendo a principio horarum proposito actuali, vel virtuali ad eas attendendi, et postea actualiter, aut virtualiter attendendo aliqua attentione sufficienti, quæ est triplex, &c.*—*Navar.* *ibid.* c. xxv. n. clxv. *Vid. supra.* ad implendum præceptum orandi vocaliter supradicti authores asserunt, sufficere attentionem ad literam.—*S. Thom. Cajetan. Sotus. Gabriel. Vasquez. Opusc. Moral.* p. 444. *dub. v.*

virtue; but with them there need be no intention to mind God, and so by their doctrine it is not necessary to worship him one way or other.

Thirdly, Since with them it is not needful to mind anything in their service, for which they can be counted worshippers, nothing but the words, it will not be very material to take notice what attention they must give to these; yet seeing the senseless recital of the words is all that they would have them mind in divine service, one would think that this should be attended to purpose, at least actually. No; it is enough if their attention be but virtual, *i. e.* if they have a purpose to mind them, when they are going about their worship, and change it not while they are at it, though then they mind them not;¹ for as they generally hold that attention to the words is sufficient, so none question but a virtual attention thereto will serve.² It may seem strange that one should be said to attend when he attends not, but they will satisfy this with something that is as odd; they would have them think their heedlessness is excused by being more heedless, and so the more careless they are in their worship the better. For if they mind not what they are doing, when saying divine service, yet if they do this without reflection, and take no notice that they mind it not at all, they therefore mind it well enough.³ Such is the attention which the strictest of their authors require and judge sufficient; even such as is as good as none, and about that which is nothing worth. Now, this doctrine hath such an atheistical aspect, that they (who profess themselves to be, and would have the world think that they are worshippers of God) seem concerned not to expose it commonly barefaced. And indeed they give it some disguise, when they declare so much for attention of mind in worship, as that which is of the substance of worship, so essential thereto, that without this it is no worship of God, no praying at all, but a mere clamorous noise, yea, a mocking of God, and taking his name in vain.⁴ The Jesuits forbear not frequently to acknowledge this. Who would not think hereupon, that they count it most necessary for the mind to attend God in worship? Oh! but the vizor falls off, when we understand that attention of mind to nothing else but the bare words, stripped of their sense, and all respect to God, is enough with them, and that virtual only, and in purpose, though they never actually mind so little. They themselves assure us that the attending to the words only (if that were to be done indeed) is no attending God; for they make these distinct things, and will have one of them suffice without the other; and it is against the resentments of all religion, and common sense, too, that God should be said to be worshipped when he is not at all minded. And therefore, in fine, when they teach (as the best of them do, so that it passeth for their common doctrine) that superficial attention in their service is sufficient, they declare plainly enough, that in the church of Rome there is no need to worship God, no, not for their religious, in that which they call divine service.

But if we would have a plainer acknowledgment hereof than is needful, we may have it from those who declare that no attention of mind is needful in worship, and these are the greatest part of their authors, which I find

¹ Est autem attentio illa verborum—virtualis, cum incepit animo dicendi officium, et attendendi, et postea non mutat animum, quamdiu non attendat.—*Tolet. ibid.* l. ii. c. xiii.

² Actualis vel virtualis intentio sufficit ex omnium sententia ad implendum præceptum hoc.—*Suar. de hor.* l. iv. c. xxvi. n. iii. D. Thom. quem omnes sequuntur, &c. *Supra.* Bonacin. tom. i. divin. offic. disp. i. q. iii. punct. ii. n. xv. Communis Doctorum sententia.

³ Cajetan, Soto. et alii. *supra.*

⁴ Vid. Vasquez. de Adorat. l. ii. disp. viii. c. xii. n. cccxi. et c. xv. n. cccxvi. Suarez, de orat. l. iii. c. iv. n. iv. et n. v. et l. iv. c. xiv. n. 12.

alleged in this question (taking none into the account neither, but those who are ancients than the foundation of the Society). They determine, without distinguishing that all attention is needless, actual, or virtual. If the words are pronounced entire, and no external action admitted to hinder that, it is no crime with them, if as nothing else, so neither the bare words be further minded, but the thoughts be quite dismissed from them. Sylvester, the master of the sacred apostolical palace, and their prime champion against Luther, in his book dedicated to Pope Leo the Tenth, determines expressly, that to pray with attention in their canonical hours is not required by God's law.¹ If he had said, the church had not required it, he had spoken within compass, and said no more than many others before and after him; but he says that too, for having told us that Hostiensis, Antoninus, Summa Rosellæ do all hold, that the church enjoins, not attentiveness, but only saying the service, he adds, that they say true as to this, that attention is not under the precept of the church.² Of the like persuasion are Durandus, Paludanus, Angelus de Clavasio, and others. For attention, as they say, is not a command of their church, but a counsel only, which may be neglected without sin.³ Others, who make the best of it, deliver it thus. The church do not command internal acts, no more than judge of them, therefore requires not attention in worship; the precept is fully accomplished without it, by the external act alone; the want of attention is no fault, unless upon the account of the natural precept, and in reference to that it is no worse than venial.⁴ They are herein opposed by some later casuists and Jesuits (however these come to be counted more licentious). But the differing parties fully agree in making it needless to worship God. For both hold, that they need not mind either God, or the matter, or the sense of the words in their service, either actually or virtually, and both conclude that the words without the sense (and all else for which they can be considerable) need not be minded actually. All the difference is about a virtual attention to the bare words, whether the want of that (which is no attention indeed) be a mortal crime. It is just as if when they had concluded it lawful to murder a man, they should fall into a hot debate whether it were a deadly crime to disorder his hair. But so it becomes those who make no scruple to destroy religion body and soul, to make a zealous stir about the slightest appurtenances of it. Some-

¹ Attente orare in horis canonicis, non est de jure divino, Sum. v. horæ. n. xiii.

² Sed isti licet verum dicunt, quantum ad hoc, quod attentio non est sub præcepto.—*Idem. Ibid.*

³ Clericum qui distracto animo horas recitat, non peccare mortifere aiunt Durandus, Paludanus, Angelus, Sylvester, et alii quidam non improbabiler: quia attentio (in cap. dolentes de celebr. miss.) est in consilio; quia cum ecclesia internos animi actus non puniat, mentis attentionem non videtur præcipere.—*Victorel. add. Toll. l. iii. c. xiii.* Glossa tenet quod sufficit dicere ora, licet non corde, et cum ea concurrunt multi Canonisti.—*Sum. Angel. v. Oratio. n. ix.*

⁴ Evagatio quæ est advertentis et solum secundum actum interiorem, licet sit temeraria et gravis forte: non tamen est mortale, nisi propter contemptum; quoniam ecclesia non habet judicare de interioribus actibus mere. Propter quod minister ecclesiæ licet dicendo officium aliud cogitet, non videtur transgressor præcepti ex natura facti.—*Angel. sum. v. horæ. n. xxvii. Sic. et Sylv. sum. v. hor. n. xiii.* Non tenetur autem quovis præcepto esse attentus, sed sine culpa mortali potest evagari, etiam a proposito.—*Idem. ibid. n. xiv.*

Non est peccatum mortale sine attentione recitare, etiamsi ex pura negligentia, et cum advertentia fiat; ita Hostiensis, Jo. Andr. Anchoranus, Antoninus citans Umbertum et alios. Rosell, Summa Pisana, Angelic, Durandus, Paludanus, Sylvest., Turrecremata, Medina, in Suarez l. iv. de Horis Can. c. xxvi. n. i. et ii.

Qui officium divinum voluntarie distractus recitat præcepto satisfacit. Joh. Valerus alleges for this Aquinas, Paludanus, and twenty other doctors. *Vid. Acacium de Velasco tom. ii. res. mor. v. hora. res. liv.*

thing must be done with some shew of conscience, too, about its appendices, that the world may not think they retain nothing of it amongst them. And yet how palpable is the irreligion of these sophisters, who will have it a damnable crime to neglect their empty words, but no fault at all wholly to neglect the great God, even when, if ever, the whole soul should attend him. Here is evidence too much, that the church of Rome, so far as we can know her sense by her doctors, the most, and best of them, if she think it fit that God should be worshipped, yet thinks it not needful that he be minded, *i. e.* though it be convenient to pretend worship, yet it is not necessary to worship him indeed. Medina is so ingenuous as to tell us, that since the church requires not attention in their service, she doth not oblige them to pray, when she enjoins them to say their canonical hours.¹ So that all in the Church of Rome are discharged from any obligation to worship God at all, even in their most solemn service; they need not pray when they are at their church prayers. Not only he, but all of them, must acknowledge this, who will yield to that reason or authority which they count best. Their law saith, God is not prayed to with the mouth without the heart;² and it is a natural and evident principle (as themselves tell us) that vocal pronouncing of the words is not prayer, unless it is done with some attention;³ whereas most of them say no attention is requisite in their service; and that virtual attention which the rest are for, themselves say, is no attention indeed, no more than the purpose is the act when not performed. But what then becomes of their pretences to worship or devotion? May they be wholly without this? Medina easily resolves this difficulty: though he who useth their service hath no devotion, yet the church in whose words he prays, and whose minister he is, brings her devotion.⁴ So that the church brings devotion still, though none in the church, no, not the clergy, not the religious have any. The church prays effectually, in the words of those who say service, though these should blaspheme God in their hearts, while they utter the words of a prayer, and they pray in the person of the church by their common doctrine. So that though they be in mortal sin (suppose atheists or debauchees) their prayers prevail in regard of the church's holiness.⁵ Happy persons they are, as ever any were in a dream, who can pray effectually when they pray not at all, and be devout with another's devotion, and why not saved too by the church's holiness? But, then, since this is applicable to all particular persons, what is that church, by which they may have such advantages? It must be something not made up of particular persons, something abstracted from subsistence, and refined above the grossness of any reality; and the structure, their devotion and worship must be answerable, and as much beholding to imagination for

¹ *Præceptum ecclesiæ non obligat homines ad orandum, cum præcipit septem horas recitare.—De Oratione, q. xvi. ibid.*

² *Nec oratur Deus ore sine corde.—C. Cantantes, d. xcii.*

³ *Naturale et evidens principium est quod vocalis prolatio, non est oratio, nisi cum aliqua attentione fiat.—Suar. de Horis. Can. l. iv. c. xxvi n. xiii.*

⁴ *Quod si minister non apponat devotionem, ecclesia apponit, cujus verbis orat et minister est.—Ibid.*

⁵ *Si ille est in statu peccati mortalis, nihil meretur, vel satis facit, et tamen vere implet præceptum, et manus suum, solvendo pensum orationis suæ, vereque impetrat, seu impetrare potest, non tam attenta conditione personæ suæ, quam spectata ecclesiæ sanctitate in cujus nomine orat.—Suar. ibid. c. xviii. n. ix. vide Bellarm. de Missa. l. ii. c. xxvii. p. 837. Quatenus nomine ecclesiæ offertur prodest quia sanctitas ecclesiæ supplet recitantis defectum.—Bonacin. de Offic. Divin. disp. iv. punct. i. n. 3. Dignitas orationis sumenda est ex dignitate ecclesiæ, cujus nomine offertur et recitatur, non ex dignitate improbi ministri ita.—S. Thom. Navar. Nugnus. Soto. Medina. Covarravius, et alii apud Carolum Macignum. Bonacin. ibid. punct. n. xii.*

a being. Not to disturb their fancies further, it is enough that they acknowledge (what cannot be denied) that they are not obliged to worship God in their divine service; being there is no worship without attention, and no attention with them necessary, or only that which is in effect none.

But it is no wonder they make attention at their divine service not necessary, since, being in Latin, it is, to far the greatest part concerned in it, impossible. The first sort of it, which they call superficial attention, none are capable of effectually but those that are well acquainted with that language, so as not only to understand, but duly pronounce it, which few of their monastics are; indeed, it is not the talent of many of their priests. The lowest degree of attention, saith Soto, none can have, but he that knoweth the tongue.¹ The second, which they call literal attention, fewer can arrive at, it is only for expert divines. To attend to the sense is not for all Latinists, but only for those that are expert in divinity² (saith the same author), which is so far from being the attainment of monastics and common priests, that many of the chief of their clergy cannot pretend to it. It was necessary for them to conclude (since they will have their own way, whatever the Scripture saith against it), that it is no sin for the clergy not to understand what they say when they say service, though they confess they can have no relish of what they understand not.³ As to the third, which they call spiritual attention, they cannot mind the things prayed for, who know not what they are, and apprehend nothing of the contents of their prayers. Nor can they mind the God that is to be prayed to, when they know not whether they pray to God or no; for they understand not to whom the prayer is directed, to God or to a creature, to an angel or a saint, to a man or a woman.

Now, seeing attention to what they do at their service is impossible to most and unnecessary to all, it may seem superfluous to shew that with them reverence and devotion is also unnecessary. (And what religious worship there can be without these, let those who have any tolerable notion of religion judge).

For reverence and devotion are included in attention, or necessarily depend on it, and unavoidably fall with it. No man will imagine that there can be any devotion or reverence toward God when he is not so much as minded, when he is not before their eyes, when the mind is voluntarily turned from him and wholly taken up with thoughts which are inconsistent with the observance of him. And this is the plain import of that non-attention which they allow in their service. When the mind departs, the heart follows it (since⁴ it moves by its conduct and acts, not otherwise), and when these are gone,⁵ the man is morally absent, and worships God no more, nor hath any more devotion or reverence for him (if these be so much as moral acts) than if he were not in the place where he is worshipped. And seeing (as⁶ them-

¹ Prima puta attentio ad verborum prolationem, infimus est attentionis gradus: quem habere non potest, nisi qui linguam norit.—*De Just. et Jur.* l. x. q. v. art. v. p. 340.

² Secundus autem gradus puta ad sensum attendere, non omnibus Latinis congruit, nisi Theologiæ peritis.—*Ibid.*

³ Indignum enim est, ut altissima tractet mysteria, et eorum ignarus existat: nullum enim gustum inde potest percipere.—*Tolet. ibid.* l. i. c. xciii.

⁴ Bellarm. de Baptism. l. i. c. xi. p. 244.

⁵ Opus ergo advertere, ut dicatur moraliter præsens esse rei quæ fit.—*Tol. ibid.* l. vi. c. vi.

⁶ Cum exterior cultus sit signum interioris cultus.—*Aquinas* ii. 2, q. xciv. art. ii. Ea quæ exterius aguntur sunt signa interioris reverentis.—*Angel. sum.* v. adora. n. iii. Sine quo (sc. submissionis affectu) nota exterior non esset adoratio et cultus.—*Vasquez de Adorat.* l. ii. disp. viii. c. xii. n. cccxi. Nec signum nisi ex affectu tali (interiori)

selves tell us) outward acts in worship are not considerable, but as signs of inward motions, all external shows of devotion or reverence, when there is none of these in the soul, will be but hypocritical significations, denoting that to be there which the Lord discerns is not there, and so tend to affront him, instead of approaching him with reverence, worship, or devotion. But there is no need of a proof where the thing is confessed; they tell us plainly that neither reverence nor devotion is necessary.

Reverence (saith De Graffis, in his time the grand penitentiary at Naples) consists in this, that the body be in a composed temper, otherwise it signifies an incomposed mind; they ought, therefore, reverently and humbly to pray, for such prayers penetrate the heavens. But this is only counsel and advice; it is not commanded, as he tells us immediately.¹ Such reverence, saith he, is not required by any precept; though the service be said irreverently, yet the command is satisfied.¹ Here is encouragement enough for irreverence, inward or outward. All the danger follows,² but possibly it may be a venial fault if the irreverence be great, according to Pope Innocent. And if great irreverence will in the pope's judgment prove but a small fault, they may venture on great as well as little freely, for neither pope nor penitentiary thinks any much concerned to avoid a venial sin. Sylvester tells us³ that irreverence is not always mortal; but will it ever be so, or when? It is not so when, instead of worshipping God,⁴ they take his name in vain, how severe soever the terms be in which the Lord hath forbidden this, and thereby signified the heinousness of it. Yea, that irreverence to God, which is injurious to his divine majesty and excellency, may not be big enough to be counted mortal;⁵ unless it be so outrageous as to destroy the majesty of God, or some of his perfections, it may be venial. The little account they make of reverence is the more considerable, because, as themselves describe it,⁶ it compriseth all love and observance of God.

For devotion, Aquinas tells us,⁷ as to the fruit of spiritual devotion, he is deprived of it who doth not attend to the things he prays for, or doth not understand; so that devotion is lost (by the oracle of their schools) on a double account, both when prayer is not attended, as it needs not be with them, and when it is not understood, as it cannot be. He that is negligent both as to attention and devotion offends venially. Thus Cardinal Cajetan, after he had told us that devotion consists in every holy affection.⁸ So that he who through negligence wants all holy affection (whatever is included in attention or devotion) incurs but a slight fault; and it may be not so much.

nascetur, adorationis opus esset, sed commentitium, seu irrisiois potius nota judicaretur.—*Idem* ibid. c. xv. n. cccxvi.

¹ Non tamen talis reverentia est de præcepto, ita ut si minus reverenter officium dicatur, tamen præcepto satisfiat.

² Verum possit esse peccatum veniale quando magna est irreverentia, juxta Innoc. in c. i. de Celebr. miss.—*Ibid.* l. ii. c. lii. n. x.

³ Nec valet dici quod est ibi irreverentia, quia ipsa semper non est mortale.—*Sum.* v. baptism. iii. n. vi.

⁴ Qui orat sine attentione, et qui laudes Deo canit, nihil de illo cogitans, in vanum nomen Dei assumit, at non propterea mortaliter peccat.—*Suar. de Juram.* l. iii. c. xvi.

⁵ Irreverentia quæ fit Deo non implendo promissionem juratam, non destruit aliquod attributum Dei in se, etiam in affectu hominis, ergo non est unde illa irreverentia ex suo genere tanta sit, ut minui non possit usque ad venialem culpam ex levitate materiæ.—*Ibid.* n. xvii.

⁶ Consistit reverentia: 1, in dilectionis affectu; 2, in obtemperacionis obedientia, &c.—*Angel. Sum.* v. reverentia.

⁷ Quantum ad fructum spiritualis devotionis, privatur qui non attendit ad ea quæ orat, seu non intelligit.—*Comment. in 1 Cor.* xiv. fol. c.

⁸ Qui vero negligenter se habet circa executionem attentionis et devotionis venialiter peccat.—*Sum.* v. Hor. Can.

There ought to be devotion (saith Cardinal Tolet), and he sets it out by love to God and desires of seeing him, but adds, if this be wanting without contempt, it is no great sin.¹ Whether he thought it a little one, he saith not; but if he had so hard thoughts of it, the Jesuit is more severe than those of other orders. Graffius, after he had described devotion, concludes,² He that wants devotion sins not, not so much as venially it seems. Lopez and Metina in him censures³ that opinion as false and cruel which will have actual devotion requisite for receiving of the eucharist, though that devotion be no more than an actual consideration that they are there to receive Christ. Indeed, they generally count devotion needless there, where, if ever, it would be counted requisite. To⁴ be destitute of it and attention too, at the eucharist, is either but a small fault or none at all. Sylvester saith inward devotion is not enjoined by the church,⁵ but as to outward devotion, he will not exempt it from the command; and what that is, he lets us understand by the undevoutness which is forbidden: when they make sport with one another for a great part of their worship, so as to scandalize others and disturb the priest.⁶ It seems they may be as devout as their church would have them when they play the wags one with another at divine service, so that their sport be but thus qualified; if it be not so uncivil as to offend the people, or so boisterous as to disorder the priest, or so long as to take up a considerable part of their worship, their church, who requires no inward devotion at all, will not burden them much, we see, with that which is outward. So little devotion serves their mass, their divine service requires no more. Devotion there, saith he, is not commanded.⁷ Others, amongst which the same author names Hostiensis, Antoninus, and Summa Rosellæ, hold that in the orders for divine service,⁸ the bare saying of it is commanded, but all that consists in devotion is no more than counsel (which by their principles may be neglected without sin). The ground of their persuasion is considerable; to enjoin devotion (say they)⁹ had been to lay a snare for men, and impose intolerable burdens on them; so that it seems the church had been wicked and unmerciful, if she had but obliged their clergy and religious to be devout in their worship. And by this reason, neither God nor man can make devotion a duty to any sort of Roman

¹ Debet esse devotio, ut animus noster inflammetur amore Dei, quem laudamus; et ardeat desiderio videndi quem fide cernentes preconis extollimus: quamvis si hæc desit absque contemptu, non sit peccatum mortale.—*Ibid.* l. ii. c. xiii.

² Qui autem hac (sc. devotione) caret, non peccat.—*Ibid.* n. xi.

³ Quarto animadverterit contra opinionem Cajet. asserentis ad dignam sumptionem hujus sacramenti requiri actualem devotionem, *h. e.* actualem considerationem qua considerat actu se suscipere Christum; ut ejus fructum percipiat, sine qua actuali devotione peccatum mortale esset Christi corpus sumpsisse: falsam esse et durissimam hanc opinionem.—*Lopez, Instruct.* par. i. c. xi. q. lxxx.

⁴ Facillimum est homini, ita distrahi, ut nullam actualem attentionem, vel devotionem habeat; aut omnino sine culpa, aut certe ex levi culpa, quæ non satis est ad impediendum fructum sacramenti.—*Suar. in Thom.* iii. tom. iii. disp. lxiii. sect. iii. Vide *Durand. Paludan. Antonin. Soto. Ledesma. Catharinum, ibid.* sect. ii.

⁵ Interior tamen devotio, quæ in attentione consistit, non cadit sub humano præcepto.—*Sum. v. Misg.* ii. n. vi.

⁶ Qua aliqui pro notabili parte missæ nugantur cum socio, scandalizantes alios, et sacerdotem vexantes.—*Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.* v. negligentia. Si ista negligentia esset circa omissionem horarum, esset mortalis: secus, si circa omissionem devotionis in dicendis horis, quia illa devotio non est sub præcepto.

⁸ Alii dicunt quod sub præcepto ibi cadit horas dicere: cætera vero, quæ in devotione consistunt, suadendo dicuntur.—*Ibid.* Hora. v. n. xiii.

⁹ Quem sensum primo videtur habuisse Host. Et sequitur eum tanquam benigniorem Archi. et Sum. Rosel. Quia ecclesia non injicit laqueum, nec homines alligare debet oneribus importabilibus.

catholics; hereafter we must not wonder if they neither enjoin nor observe it. And though their reason may be singular, yet the opinion is the common doctrine, since all are discharged from devotion or reverence, who are not obliged to attention. Such, therefore, and no other, is the worship which the church of Rome makes needful for the clergy and religious. Such as it can be, without attention, without holy fear or affection; it is not the thing they call it, it deserves not the name of worship, or the title of holy or religious; it must be a profane and irreligious exercise, it can be no better without reverence, and without devotion; it cannot but be without these, whilst it is without attention, which they oblige all to neglect, by declaring it needless. Durandus maintained that images¹ are not to be worshipped properly, but only abusively, that is, as they explain it, though worship be exhibited before, or about the image, yet the mind of the worshipper is far from it. This, his opinion, is now damned, as little less than heretical; being, in their account, no less than a denial that any worship is to be given to an image. Yet this abusive worship is all that they make necessary for the God of heaven; for requiring no attention of mind, no devotion of soul in their service, they allow both mind and heart to be far from him, while they do something before or about him which they call worship. So that what worship they count intolerably too little for a senseless image, not to say a detestable idol, they think enough in conscience for the true and living God. I have not observed that any idolaters in the world were ever so gross and stupid, as by their avowed doctrine thus to advance what they look upon as a mere image, and so to debase what they took to be the true God. However, hereby it appears, that they count no worship at all needful for God, since worship without the heart will, by their doctrine, serve the turn, which,² in reference to an image, is, with them, no worship at all. It is not true honour or worship, but fiction and mockery. This is their own character of such worship when images are concerned, and under it I leave their divine service.

Sect. 2. Let us in the next place view their mass. This is for the people,³ and is the only public worship enjoined them in any of their days for worship. They call it⁴ the chief part of their religion, and this summons us to expect that herein, if at all, they will shew themselves religious, and worship God indeed; however, they think not themselves obliged to it in their divine office. But all expectation hereof is quite blasted when they tell us,⁵ that less attention is required at the mass than at their canonical hours; yet so they commonly determine, and their reason is,⁶ because

¹ Quod est incidere in opinionem Durandi ab omnibus damnatum, dicentis, imaginem non proprie, sed abusive adorari, non enim alia ratione illam vocavit abusivam adorationem imaginis nisi quia licet fiat coram ipsa vel juxta ipsam, tamen animus adorantis, ut sic, longe est ab ipsa.—*Suar.* tom. iii. disp. lxxxi. sect. viii. p. 1075.

² Quamvis exterior actus rationem adorationis non habeat, nisi ut est ab interiori, seu ut manat a predicto affectu, nam si ab illo non oriatur; non est adoratio, sed irrisio potius seu fictio quædam.—*Idem.* tom. i. disp. li. sect. i. p. 757.

³ Sola missa communiter est in præcepto.—*Cajetan.* Sum. v. fest. Est communis sententia, vide *infra*.

⁴ Bellarm. l. i.; De Missa, c. i. p. 679.

⁵ Attentionem vero quæ necessaria est sub præcepto ad audiendam Missam, dicimus non esse tantam quanta est in officio Divino.—*De Graff.* *ibid.* l. ii. cap. xxxiv. n. 8. Neque in audienda missa requiritur tanta attentio sicut in recitatione horarum.—*Lopez.* *ibid.* c. lii. p. 271. Ut Soto et Navar etiam annotant, minor attentio in missa necessaria est, quam in horis canonicis recitandis.

⁶ Quia oratio est actio magis rationalis, quam illa moralis præsentia, quæ necessaria est ad implendum præceptum de audienda missa.—*Suar.* tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. iii. Ex quo fit majorem attentionem requiri ad horas quam ad missam.—*Ita Nugens,*

prayer is a more rational act than that moral presence required at mass. So that their hearing mass is a less rational act than that which is performed without understanding, and requires less attention of mind, than that to which none at all is actually needful. And we cannot yet apprehend how that can be divine worship, which is so far from being reasonable service, or how God can be thought to be worshipped, when the soul which is to worship him doth not take any notice of him. The servant of servants at Rome would not think himself honoured, if the holding out of his toe were not regarded by such as have access to him. But Roman catholics may, it seems, mind God less at their mass, than one that minds him not all, and yet worship him well enough after their mode.

Besides, all inward worship is clearly discharged, for when they teach that the mass is for the people, the only worship on the Lord's days, or any other day set apart for worship, they tell us expressly, no inward worship is the duty of those days, external worship alone is commanded.¹ So Aquinas, Cajetan,² so Navar, so de Graffis, so Lopez, Dominicus a Soto also, who asserts it with many reasons, amongst which this is one, because the church requires no other than this external worship, and if God had required more, the church had not been *fida divini juris interpres*, a faithful expounder of the divine law, which rather than they will yield they will admit anything, though it be that God should never have any true worship amongst them.

Particularly and expressly, they deny all acts of contrition for sin to be the duties of mass days. So Sylvester,³ Summa Rosellæ,⁴ Melchior Canus,⁵ and all the other authors last mentioned.⁶ Likewise, all acts of love to God,⁷ Bellarmine, and in him Aquinas,⁸ so Navar and Pope⁹ Adrian, de Graffis,¹⁰ and Soto,¹¹ who would maintain this with many arguments, one of the chief of them, he calls it *ingentissimum argumentum*, is,¹² that this would be to ensnare souls, and cast them into grievous straits, if so harsh a duty as an act of love to God, were enjoined so frequently. Another is,¹³ that all the commands of God, as to the substance of them, may be fully accomplished without love to God, and therefore this.

It is good divinity with them that we are not bound to worship God out of love. The mass, saith Navar,¹⁴ which we are commanded to hear on those days, and nothing else, may be heard well enough without any such act of

S. Antoninus. Navar Sylvester, Graffius, Sotus, Angelus, Barthol. ab Angelo, Henric. in (et cum) Bonacin. de Sacrament. disp. iv. q. ult. punct. xi. n. 20.

¹ Ex præcepto colendi Deum homo tenetur duntaxat cultum externum ei exhibere. — *Petr. a S. Joseph de præcept. i. art. v. Aquinas xxii. q. cxxii. art. iv.; Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 305; Navar. cap. xiii. n. ii.; Lopez, c. lii. p. 266; De Graff. l. ii. c. xxxiii. n. viii. ibid.; Covarravius ver. resol. l. iv. c. xix. n. vi.*

² Cum ergo ecclesia cultum hoc præcepto inclusum perinde suo statuto exprimeret — et hoc suo præcepto ad cultum nos tantum aritet, palam est jure divino non esse illic alium contentum; quoniam alias nisi illum explicaret, non fuisset fida juris Divini interpres. — *Soto de Just. et Jur. l. ii. q. iv. art. iv.*

³ Sum. v. Domin. n. viii.

⁴ V. Feriæ.

⁵ Prælect. de Pœnitent. pars. iv. p. 864.

⁶ Cajetan. ibid.; Soto. ibid.; Navar. c. xiii. n. xvii.; Lopez, c. lii. p. 271; De Graff. ibid.

⁷ De Cult. Sanctorum, l. iii. c. x. p. 1609.

⁸ Cap. xi. n. xix. &c. xxii. n. vii.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Esset enim hoc Christianorum animos irritare, et in arctissimas angustias conjicere: nempe quod tam crebro ad rem tam arduam teneremur. — *Ibid.*

¹³ Ejusmodi præcepta non obligant ad charitatis modum, sed possunt quantum ad substantiam operis, extra charitatem impleri. — *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Nam missa quam in illis diebus præcipimur audire, recte audiri potest, sine tali amore actu concepto, unde rari vel nulli se hujus omissionis accusant. — *Cap. xi. n. vii. ac Fest. Vide Suar. l. ii. c. xvi.*

love. So Bellarmine,¹ we are not bound on these days by any particular precept not to sin, or to have any act of contrition, or any act of love to God. What, not one act of love to God? No; he will prove it. One of his arguments is,² because the church hath determined the time and manner how divine law is to be observed in keeping this command, but the church nowhere requires inward acts; she thinks, it seems, that God may be served sufficiently with the mass, without any sense of sin or love to God. And thus all those other graces and affections that flow from repentance, or love, or necessarily depend thereon, as filial fear, spiritual desires, delight in God, &c., will be no duty on their mass days, their mass hath nothing to do with them. Confessions of sin there may be well enough without godly sorrow, and petitions without desires, and praises without complacency or ingenuous gratitude, because all is well enough without love to God, or grief for offending him; and that on all these days wherein they are obliged to hear mass.

If you would see anything of the worship of God in the mass, it is as if you look for the life and nature of a man in a picture; and such an one as will not so much as shew you his colour or figure, but very rudely.

The precept for observing mass days, as Sylvester tells us,³ requires not the end, that is, waiting upon God, nor what is necessarily requisite thereto, but the hearing of mass. Not waiting on God, but hearing mass! These are distinct things, and disjoined in the sense of the Roman doctors, the one is commanded, the other is not; so that they may duly hear mass all their lives, and yet not wait on God one moment: the former they must do, the latter they are not obliged to regard, nor anything that necessarily belongs to it. Navar⁴ asserts this, and would prove it by reason, and the authority of Aquinas, herein generally followed. In short, if there be any worship required in the mass, it is merely external; and that, disjoined from the inward service of the soul, is but a mere shew or visor of worship, as they themselves confess in their lightsomer intervals. Well, but is it worship in any sense? Is there anything religious required of the people herein? For this they tell us it is enough, if it be a human act, no more is enjoined,⁵ the precept obligeth not, but to hear, so that it may be a human act,⁶ saith Soto and others,⁷ and if it suffice that it be a human act, it needs not be religious. Let it be deliberate, that is enough to make it a human act; and then, though there be no religious motion or intention in it, the precept is fulfilled. Sylvester confirms us herein: the precept, saith he, is given unto men, and therefore the work must not be the issue only of the imagination, which is common to us with beasts, it must proceed from deliberation, which requires some attention.⁸ So that there is something more required of one

¹ Non tenemur in diebus festis ex præcepto peculiari, ad non peccandum sive ad actum contritionis, vel dilectionis Dei.—*Ibid.*

² Ecclesia determinavit tempus et modum observandi jus divinum de observatione præceptorum: at ecclesia nusquam præcipit actus illos interiores.—*Ibid.*

³ Non est simpliciter de fine, i. e. ipsa vacatione circa Deum, vel necessario requisitis ad illam: sed de abstinencia a servilibus, et auditione missæ.—*Dominic. v. n. viii.*

⁴ Quamvis finis hujus præcepti sit, ut homo Deo vacet, ipsoque fruatur, et in eo quiescat, ut docuit S. Thomas. Quando tamen finis præcepti est aliud a re præcepta, tunc non cadit sub præceptum, sicut idem. S. Thomas. Communiter receptus, c. xiii. n. ii. p. 198.

⁵ Neque tale præceptum obligat ad alium actum interiorem, quam ad illum qui propter exteriorem est necessarius, scil. vere audire missam ea attentione, ut sit actus humanus.—*Soto. ibid. p. li.*

⁶ Præceptum audiendi missam non obligat nisi taliter audire ut sit actus humanus.—*Idem. l. x. q. v. art. v. p. 341.*

⁷ Sat est, quod sit actus humanus—*Jac. de Graff. lib. ii. c. xxxiv. n. viii.* Satis est, sit actus humanus.—*Lopez, c. lii. p. 271.*

⁸ Præceptum datur hominibus, ideoque oportet ut non procedat opus ex sola imagina-

that goes to mass than of a beast ; but that is before he comes there ; if he advance but to it as a man, he may be excused even from human acts, when he is at it, he needs neither exercise his understanding nor his senses. He needs not understand it,¹ that it is far from being a duty, they have made it impossible ; it is no sin either for priests² or people not to know what they do, so reasonable is their service. The Latin makes it unintelligible enough, but if it were in a language less known, if in Mosarabic or Greek,³ those who are present without any but their mother tongue fulfil the precept. As Victorel tells us,⁴ after Soto and others, he need not see what is done,⁵ he may do all that is requisite at the mass blindfold ; he needs not hear it, as Cajetan and others tell us,⁶ and this is much, he is enjoined only to hear mass, and yet doth all that he is enjoined if he hear it not, if not one syllable of it reach his ears ; it seems, with them, to hear is not to hear. Just by the same figure that they say they worship God, when in truth they do not worship him at all.

He needs not be sensible of anything about it ; to hear mass, saith Tolet, is not to use any of his senses about what is done in the mass.⁷ And if this be their worshipping God, a man may worship him as much as the church of Rome requires, not only without reverence and devotion, without heart and affection, but without the use of sense or reason. A brute may do more at mass than they require their catholics to do. No wonder that church enjoins no attention, devotion, or reverence, nor counts them needful (as we have already manifested), for can there be any pretence to require these, when both sense and understanding are superseded ; or can there be anything that deserves the name of worship without these ?

They themselves cancel and overthrow all their own pleas and pretences for their offering God anything of worship in the mass. For, they say, he doth not worship there who is not present ; and they cannot deny that in God's account he is absent whose mind is not present. And yet they justify voluntary departures of mind and heart, when they would be worshipping ; and those who would not seem to do this do it really, when they conclude it no fault to employ themselves about other things when they are at mass.⁸ They allow them to say their hours (and so neglect the mass, out of a neglect of their divine office), or to recite what is enjoined them by way of penance (and so prefer a punishment before the chief part of their religion), or other voluntary performances (so they may do what they will rather than mind

tione, quæ communis nobis est cum bestiis, sed ex deliberatione quæ attentionem requirit, &c. v. hora. n. xiii. vid. Angelus v. hor. n. xxvii.

¹ Nemo teneatur ex præcepto audire, et minus intelligere verba sacerdotis, quia satis est vel ex longinquo missanti adesse.—*Navar.* c. xxi. n. viii.

² Clerici vel laici qui divinis intersunt, si non intelligunt quæ dicunt, non peccant.—*Jac. de Graff.* l. ii. c. li. n. xii.

³ Si audiret missam Mocaravem, compleret.—*Lopez.* c. xlii.

⁴ Qui Græcam missam audiret, satisfaceret præcepto, etiam si non intelligeret.—*Addit.* ad. l. vi. c. vii. Tol. instr. Vid. Bonacin de Sacram. d. iv. q. ult. punct. xi. n. xii. et ibi plures.

⁵ Non est videre ea quæ in missa aguntur.—*Tolet.* l. vi. c. vi.

⁶ Utrum autem audiat vel non, utrum sit missa propria vel non, sub præcepto non cadit.—*Cajet.* Sum. v. Fest. p. ccvii. ; *Navar.* c. xxi. n. viii. supra. *De Graff.* l. ii. c. xxxiv. n. viii. Satis est præsentem esse missæ, ad impletionem præcepti, licet non audiat sacerdotem ; secundum *Sotum.* *Lopez.* ibid. *Bonacin.* ibid. n. xx. ibi *S. Antonin.* *Nugnus.* *Navaf.* *Sylvest.* *Henrique Graff.* *Sot.* *Angelus.* *Barthol.* ab Angelo.

⁷ Secundum Antoninum, non est necesse sentire et distincte audire verba missæ, &c. *Sylvest.* v. miss. ii. n. vi. Audire Sacrum—non est uti aliquo sensu erga ea quæ in missa aguntur, l. vi. c. vi.

⁸ Sponte inter sacrum audiendum, vana cogitantem, præcepto satisfacere—affirmant *Sylvest.* *Jo. Medina.* *Aludanus.* *Azor.* in *Victorel.* addit. Tol. l. vi. c. vi.

what they are about).¹ They know they cannot do two things at once, especially in divine worship, which should take up the soul. Though in their worshipping, where the soul is not concerned, they may attend a hundred acts at once; as much as they are obliged to mind the mass, that is, actually not at all. They admit them not only to read or write what they please, but also to sleep part of the time, so that they take not too long a nap.² It should not last above a third part, or half the mass (for that is *pars notabilis*³); if it be but less than that, it passeth for nothing.⁴ Or if they be too brisk to sleep, they may entertain themselves with familiar chat.⁵ Medina concludes that he who is at mass may spend the whole time in discourse about other things,—merchant affairs or making bargains,—and yet fulfil the precept.⁶ They must, it seems, demean themselves at mass altogether as religiously as at the exchange, and no more is required. Suarez would have the discourse neither so long nor so serious, there should be some intermissions to attend. But what attention can he mean? He (with the rest) tells us that to the mass less attention is requisite than to their divine office; and to that office, he and they say, a virtual intention is sufficient, and this is the least of all that can be. So that to the mass less attention than the least of all will suffice; and this, to common apprehension, is none at all. Others of them (as we saw before) will have no attention of mind needful for their office; and so with them, none will serve the mass. Their catholics may have their choice here, and satisfy their devotion at mass either with the attention of this doctor and some other late authors, which is none at all; or (if this seem too much) with that of their ancients doctors, which is less than none. And what must they attend to who need neither hear, nor see, nor understand what is said or done? It would puzzle one as subtle as himself to tell one how he can attend to that which is neither offered to his senses nor his intellect. And therefore the Jesuit, though he seems more strict, yet herein is less rational than Medina, and not so consistent with himself or their common doctrine. Also he would not have the discourse at mass so grave and serious as that of merchants: it should be more light, more idle than that about trade and business.⁷ It seems the levity of the stage suits with the mass better than the seriousness

¹ Vera resolutio est—posse quem eodem tempore satisfacere præcepto de audienda missa, et de dicendis horis canonicis, aut aliis votis, juratis, vel in pœnitentiam injunctis, modo non adeo uni rei intendat, ut alteri necessariam attentionem adimat, quod fieri potest, cum nemo teneatur ex præcepto audire, et minus intelligere verba sacerdotis.—*Navar.* c. xxi. n. viii.

Vid. Adrian. de satisfact. q. vii.; Medina. tract. ii. de pœnit.; Cajetan. v. fest.; Soto. iv. dist. xiii. q. ii. art. i.; Lopez. c. lii. in Victorel. *ibid.*; besides the Jesuits, Tolet. Suarez. Sa. Azorins. Comitulus, &c.

So they may hear three masses at once, when said in one church at the same time, and thereby satisfy when their penance is three masses, as Bonacin. and in him Rodriquez, Graffius, Scortia, and others.—De sacrament, disp. iv. q. ult. p. xi. n. xiii.

² Peccat mortaliter—in aliqua ejus parte notabili colloquendo, pingendo, scribendo, dormiendo.—*Nav.* c. xxi. n. vi., parvitas in omni materia excusata a mortali, n. ii.

³ Secundum Archidiaconum, præceptum non observat, qui partem notabilem amittit, puta medietatem aut tertiam partem; secus qui modicam.—*Sylv.* v. miss. ii. n. i

⁴ Modicum enim pro nihilo reputatur.—*Cajet.* v. fest.

⁵ Nonnulla modica misceantur colloquia.—*Lopez.* c. lii. p. 271.

⁶ Medina docet, siquis missæ interest, semper tamen confabulatur, aut alia negotia, futura cum mercatoribus tractat, nihilominus implere præceptum.—*In Suar.* tom. iii. disp. xviii. sect. iii. Respondetur autem ex Cajerano, una cum Soto, quod sufficiat missæ esse præsentem, unde qui longe stat, eam non audiens, vel cum alio loquens, non propterea est præcepti transgressor.—*Corradus* in resp. quæst. 198.

⁷ Qui voluntarie confabulatur—non satisfacere, nisi vel confabulatio esset discontinua, partim scil. loquendo, partim attendendo, ut communiter fieri solet; vel non de re seria, sed levi, &c.—*Idem, ibid.*

of the exchange. Answerably, if their discourse be not decent, nor the subject of it very modest, the mass will comport with it, and the church's precept will bear it without a breach.¹ And no wonder, since it hath been the custom of that church (as many of their writers inform us²) to sing not only profane, but filthy, songs at high mass; and that to the organ, that the people might not only be refreshed by their own private immodest discourse, but edified more effectually this way by the louder voice of the church. And how, we learn by a grave cardinal (though little herein more rigid than others), who tells us that the hearers were thereby excited to what was profane and filthy, as experience witnessed.³ And still notwithstanding any pretence of reformation, tunes to the organ at divine service or mass, though lascivious and very profane, will pass for a small fault (in the judgment of those who seem most severe in the case) if either the matter be slight, or the intention good, or the actors inconsiderate.⁴ Here is provision enough, that the scenes in their mass may not be dull and heavy. Yet further, they may laugh and be pleasant, and when the music (which sounds not always) doth it not, they may make themselves merry in the height of their worship. But this with some caution: their talk and laughter may break out into such noise, that possibly it may prove a sin of irreverence.⁵ Here is some show of danger, but it will vanish presently; for if it should be a very loud extravagance, and the irreverence great, yet great irreverence may with them be but a small fault, and they have the authority of the pope to warrant this.⁶ Nor must this seem strange to us, since they will not have all contempt of God criminal; that which is material may be venial, and it is not formal, unless besides the contempt of God there be also an intention to contemn him.⁷ Such is the most solemn worship in the Roman church, and so is God worshipped amongst them; and that not by the unwarranted presumption of the profane multitude, but by the rules and conclusions of those who direct their worship and guide their consciences. Here we may see in the mass the religion of Roman Catholics; they call it the chiefest, the best part of their religion, that we may not look for anything better amongst them, nor anything religious, if it be not found here; yea, it is all (better or worse) that the people are obliged to in public (and in private their church doth not trouble them with any).⁸ He that views it well, and believes he hath a soul, and that there is a God, must have little or no regard of either

¹ Soto in iv. dist. xiii. q. ii. art. iii., dicit quod licet indecentia sint colloquia inter audiendam missam, non tamen propterea fit transgressor præcepti.—*Ibid.*

² Cornelius Agrippa, de vanit. scient. cap. xvii.; Cajetan. sum. v.; Organ. Soto. de just. et jur. l. x. q. v. art. ii. p. 336; Navar. cap. xiii. n. lxxxvii.; Lopez. cap. li. p. 263.

³ In cujus signum, audientes ex illo sono excitantur ad illa profana seu turpia, ut experientia testatur: ita quod non est inficiationi locus.—*Cajetan, ibid.*

⁴ Canticus—ratione soni quia est lascivus aut valde sæcularis—potest esse venialis culpa, vel ratione materiæ minimæ, vel ex bona intentione vel inadvertentia, ut Cajetanus dicit, in Suar. de horis can. l. iv. cap. xiii. n. xvii., materia parva—si organista loco *Kyrie Eleison*, cantilenam profanam organo canat.—*Villalobus*, in Dian. v. blasphem. n. iv.

⁵ Sed possent voces et risus in tantum prorumpere, quod esset peccatum irreverentiæ et scandali.—*Lopez*, c. lii. Soto in iv. dist. xiii. quæst. ii. art. i.

⁶ Jac. de Graff. l. ii. c. lii. supra.

⁷ Contemptus ille qui continetur in irreverentia Dei per se, et ut talis est, non semper est formalis sed materialis, qui non semper sufficit ad malitiam mortalem. Nos autem loquimur de contemptu formali, quo ipsa Dei irreverentia intenditur.—*Suar. de Juram*, l. iii. c. xii. n. iv. and vi; vid. *Cajetan*. Sum. v. contempt; vid. *Bonacin. de legibus*, disp. ii. q. iii. p. 5, n. x. l. xv.

⁸ In qua (sc. missa) præcipua pars religionis nostræ.—*Bellar. de miss.* lib. i. cap. i. p. 679.

if he do not bless himself from it, as a thing which hath nothing of religion but the name, and that merely usurped. A religion which needs nothing, by the doctrine of its chief professors, that is either godly, or so good as human; no regard of God at all, so much as in one thought of him; nor any act of reason, yea, or of sense, either about anything religious or divine, yet allows a free exercise of both about that which is profane and irreligious; he that counts this religion indeed, must stifle the common notions of religion and Christianity; and he that, understanding it, makes choice thereof, had need first be very indifferent, whether he have any religion or none. Had the ancient fathers talked after this senseless, lewd, extravagant rate concerning the worship of God, how would Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian have triumphed over them! Nay, they might justly have challenged them to have instanced in any one that bore the name of a philosopher, that ever treated of the worship of God with so little reverence and discretion. Had such loose and wild doctrines been broached by the first teachers of Christianity, the heathens needed not have raised so fierce a persecution against it, they might with ease have hissed it out of the world.

But this is not the worst: they encourage that in the mass which they cannot but condemn as wicked, and maintain that the precept for hearing mass may be satisfied by such wickedness. Melchior Canus to this objection (that the command of God or the church cannot be fulfilled by sin) answers according to the opinion commonly maintained amongst them, that he is no transgressor of the precept who to the act enjoined, and good in its kind, adds something sinful.¹ He supposeth that the act commanded by the church is some way good; but withal, that the precept may be satisfied, though it be done wickedly, and that by their common doctrine. Whether the circumstances may be venially or mortally wicked he saith not, but leaves us to understand it of either. Dominicus à Soto tells us expressly, that though what is added to the act² enjoined be a mortal wickedness, yet the precept may thereby be satisfied substantially. With these divines of greatest reputation amongst them, concurs Navarre,³ no less renowned (and none of them Jesuits); The opinion of Antoninus (which he is disproving) presupposeth, saith he, that by a sinful act, especially if it be a mortal sin, the command of the church cannot be fulfilled; but that this is false we have largely proved. He would have us know that he hath fully demonstrated that the precept for hearing mass may be entirely accomplished by deadly crimes. This is the judgment of the most eminent doctors amongst them, such as are not of the Society, and (if they will believe their famous bishop of the Canaries) the common doctrine in the Roman church, and by this the world may judge what a church it is, what her religion, what her worship, what her precepts for it are, when all that she requires for that worship, which is the principal part of her religion, may be satisfied by acts of wickedness, such as are mortal and damnable to the worshippers, and most (of all others) dishonourable to God, whom they pretend to worship. And let those that are seduced, or may be tempted by seducers, seriously consider whether they can wisely trust their souls to such a conduct, or be safe in such a com-

¹ Nos cum communi opinione in præsentia teneamus, non esse transgressorem præcepti, qui actui, bono ex genere suo, quem lex præcipiebat, apponit aliquam malam circumstantiam.—*Relect. de panis*, part iv. p. 936; vid. *Bonacinum de legibus*, disp. i. q. i. punct. ix. n. i.; ibi. *S. Thomas, Soto, Navar, Medina*, et plures alii.

² Quamvis simul habeat propositum aliud mortale, satisfaciæ præcepto quantum ad substantiam.—*Ibid.* l. x. q. v. a. 5.

³ Non tamen est tenendum illud Antonini—quia præsupponit, malo, præsertim mortali, non posse adimpleri præceptum, quod esse falsum, late probavimus, c. xxi. n. vii.

munion, where there is no more tenderness for the salvation of souls than to be satisfied with such a worshipping of God as will confessedly damn them.

Sect. 3. Thus much for the manner of their public worship, all of it, whoever amongst them it concerns, whereby it appears that they count it not necessary that God should have any real worship from them. This will be further manifest by what they teach concerning the end of it.

They maintain that it is lawful for their clergy and monastics too (who profess perfection) to serve God for their own ends, viz. to get preferment, or compass a dignity, or gain some worldly advantage, and so to prostitute the honour and worship of God to such low, earthly, sordid designs, as religious persons would never appear to own, but that irreligion is grown too monstrously big for its vizard. He that riseth to their morning service for this end, that he may have his daily dividend, if it be not principally for this, he sins not. So their *glossa celeberrima*, the two popes Urban and Cælestine, determine that it is lawful for their clergy to serve God in their churches for this design, and hope to get ecclesiastical dignity; in Navarre.¹ But then this great casuist (of so high esteem among them, that he was sent for from Spain to Rome, to give advice and direction to the old gentleman there, that cannot err) understands (after Aquinas and Jo. Major,² as he pretends) the principal end to be something else than others do. It is not that which so much moves the agent, as that without it he would not be drawn to act by any other end; and accordingly he will have the premised testimony to be understood.³ So that one of their perfectionists, who riseth to morning prayer for this end, that he may have his dividend, and would not stir⁴ out of his bed to attend the worship of God for God's sake, or any other end befitting a religious person, if the consideration of his daily allowance did not rouse him, yet he serves God so well herein as that he is sinless, and not so much as venially tainted. Likewise the clergy who address themselves to the worship of God, moved thereto more by hopes to gain preferment and dignity than any respect to God, yet they sin not; that is, they worship God well enough, though they respect themselves and their own ends more than him; or, which is all one, though they serve themselves rather than God, whom they are to worship. They are all concerned to maintain this; for he tells them, if such acts of virtue or worship were vicious,⁵ all their acts in a manner would be stark naught, since there are extremely few amongst them that are purely done for God. They are a church in the meantime that worthily profess godliness, since nothing is done, or needs be done by them, even in the worship of God, for him, so much as for themselves;

¹ Glossa illa celeberrima ait peccare quidem eum, qui surgit ad matutinas preces principaliter propter distributiones quotidianas, non autem illum, qui surgit principaliter ut Deo inserviat, et minus principaliter, et secundario, ut eas lucratur—Urbanus papa et Cælestinus determinarunt licere clericis servire Deo in ecclesiis ob spem ascendendi ad dignitates illarum. Imo, Gelasius dixit eos ad hunc ascensum spe majoris commodi compellendos—Glossa recepta dicit expresse per illum textum, licere clerico servire in ecclesia ad querendam aliquam dignitatem, modo principaliter ob id non serviat, &c., cap. xxiii. n. ci.

² Ut probavimus, non est bona definitio illa Bartoli, qua definit causam principalem esse causam qua cessante cessat effectus.—*Ibid.*

Ut aliquis finis sit principalis, non sufficit quod ille non fieret sine illo, sed oportet, quod pluri vel tanti æstimetur ac alius finis, propter quem ille fit.—*Ibid.* c. xvii. n. 209, &c. xx. n. xi. p. 459.

³ Per supra dictos textus et glossas, quæ habent locum etiam in his, qui non serviunt, ecclesiis vel praelatis, nisi sperarent beneficia, c. xxiii. n. ci.

⁴ Surgens ad matutinas ob distributiones, alias non surrecturus.—*Ibid.*

⁵ Alioquin enim omnes fere actus nostri essent vitiosi; quia paucissimi fiunt pure propter solum Deum, et solam virtutem, &c.—*Ibid.* p. 590.

and, indeed, Sylvester deals ingenuously when he tells us plainly, without the cover of any pitiful shift, that it is no sin to serve God principally for their own profit.¹

Moreover, and yet worse, they teach it is no sin to worship God for an end that is in itself a sin, if it be not principally intended. It is lawful by their doctrine to preach, to pray, say mass, &c., for praise of men (though Christ will have those that designed it, as Cajetan² notes, even when he is excusing this, to have no better reward), or for vain glory (though they reckon this amongst capital crimes³), only he must not make so wicked a thing his chief end, and then he is innocent enough, though sin against God be his design in worshipping him. It is no sin, yea, it is meritorious, to do these things, viz. to preach, and say mass, and to do other things of like nature principally for God, and secondarily for vain glory and praise of men, aptly directed as our end. Thus Navarre determines after their great saint and doctor, Aquinas.⁴ Now he had taught us before, that these acts of worship are but done secondarily (and so unlawfully) for these criminal ends, when they so much sway a man as that he would not worship God unless he were excited by them; and that vain glory is not his principal end, even when he is so much influenced thereby as that he would not pray or preach, &c. If this were not his motive, this in the judgment of others, as he acknowledgeth, is to make sin his principal end, and to advance wickedness above God, even when he pretends to worship him.⁵ But let us not interrupt this great doctor in his way, it is foul enough as himself makes it; for hereby a man may serve God, and that meritoriously (after the Roman mode), though he never would let him have an act of worship, if pride and vain glory did not set him a-work. He would never pray or preach, &c., if he were not more moved to it by sin, and out of regard to some wickedness, than out of respect to God.

Further yet, they hold it is but a venial fault to worship God principally for vain glory, and other designs of like quality.⁶ Aquinas, as he is represented by Sylvester, determining that it is no mortal sin to serve God principally for vain glory, if that be one's chief end actually only, and not both habitually and actually. Sylvester declares it as his own persuasion, that it is both against Aquinas and the truth to hold it is a mortal sin, when

¹ *Licetum est etiam aliquid operari principaliter propter propriam utilitatem.—Sum. v. charitas. n. 5.* And that of Navar is plain enough: *Diximus quod falsum est, esse mortale facere ordinata ad cultum principaliter ob bona temporalia, cap. xxiii. n. 14, p. 555, &c., xiii. n. 14.* Solet circa hanc voluntatem inquiri, an debeat esse honesta; et specialiter, an voluntas confitendi propter humanum motivum, scilicet inanem gloriam, vel inmodum temporale, sufficiat ad valorem sacramenti: nam in cæteris sacramentis certum est sufficere; in hoc—affirmant, *Soto. dist. xviii. q. 3. art. iii.; Navar, c. xxi. n. 40.* Negant enim illam voluntatem ex illo fine, esse peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum: quod non repugnat valori sacramenti. Quæ sententia, per se loquendo, vera mihi videtur.—*Suarez, tom. iv. disp. xx. sec. iii. n. 4. p. 273.*

² *Sum. v. prædicat. p. 480.*

³ *Aquinas. xxii. q. 132, art. i.; (in eo) Gregorius. xxxi; Moral. numerat inanem gloriam inter septem vitia capitalia.—Ibid. art. iv.*

⁴ *Nullum autem peccatum immo meritum est facere illa (viz. concionare, missam celebrare, precari et id genus alia) principaliter propter Deum, et secundario propter vanam gloriam, vel laudem humanam, in finem aptum relatum per ibi dicta post S. Thomam. c. xxiii. n. 13.*

⁵ *Ex quo infert quod mortale est prædicare aut missam celebrare, et hujusmodi, propter inanem gloriam, quod verum est solum ut dicit S. Thom. Si in ea ponatur ultimus finis, ita quod ipsa intenditur principaliter actu et habitu, secus si actu tantum, ut iste intendit.—Sum. v. vana gloria. n. 2.*

⁶ *Ex quibus patet, quod Sum. Ang. contra S. Thom. et veritatem dicit, quod est mortale, quando, ea quæ ordinata sunt ad Dei gloriam, facit ad gloriam suam, ut sacramenta et Scripturæ sacræ.—Ibid.*

those things which are ordained for the glory of God are used principally for a man's own glory. He instances in the sacraments, saying mass, the Scriptures, and preaching.

Cardinal Cajetan declares himself thus in one instance, which involves the rest :¹ It is but venial to preach for vain glory, or hopes of a gainful alms, signifying that he means such vain glory as Christ condemned in the pharisees, when he told them this was like to be ' their reward.'

Navarre² affirms, that to preach, or say mass, or pray, and such things as are instituted for the honour and worship of God and the salvation of souls, for vain glory principally, or more than principally, is but a venial fault; and that such as gainsay this (who are but two) have been confuted by others, and by himself after them. These are the chief of their doctors, whom the rest commonly follow (and none of them Jesuits), who unanimously assert this. Now it is not necessary with them for any man to avoid a venial sin, since by their doctrine a world of them can never damn a man; and therefore it is not necessary for any papist to worship God otherwise than principally for vain glory, or ends equally criminal, *i. e.* it is not needful for them to worship him at all; for no man can imagine that he is worshipped when he is in the highest degree dishonoured and affronted; and what greater affront can be put upon him than under a pretence of worship to debase the great God, and thrust him lower in our designs, not only than ourselves and earthly trifles, but lower than sin, the vilest thing on earth, yea, or in hell? and this is evidently done when vain-glory (a capital sin) hath the pre-eminence of God in addresses to him, and is regarded as principal; when the Lord of heaven and earth hath no regard at all, or only in a lower place. It is not worshipping of God, but a horrid impiety, for men to serve themselves instead of God, but more intolerably impious to worship sin; and that hath the worship and is honoured in the place of God which hath the highest advancement, and is principal in religious addresses; yet no better than this is all the worship which, by the Roman doctrine, is necessary from their catholics.

In short, whereas by their doctrine of non-attention, formerly examined, it is so evident that they discharge themselves from all real worship, as they have no colour to hide it, no shift to evade it, but a supposal of some previous attempt to serve God when they are addressing themselves to their service; this, their last reserve, they themselves ruin, by their doctrine concerning the end of worship; for they teach, besides what is premised, that a man who comes to mass or divine service, with a purpose not to worship God, but to serve his lusts, doth satisfy the precept. We are not obliged, saith Soto, to hear mass but only so that it may be a human act, which it may be, though there be a sinister intention in it;³ yea, though the

¹ Veniale autem si vane propter gloriam aut spem quæstuarie elemosynæ prædicaretur; receperunt enim mercedem suam.—*Sum. v. prædicat. p. 480.*

² Peccat, qui res principaliter institutas ob honorem Dei et cultum ejus, et salutem animarum, principaliter, vel æque principaliter ob vanam gloriam facit; quale est concionarum, missam celebrare, precari et id genus alia secundum Abulensem et Angelum, quod post alios efficaciter confutavimus, dicentes esse solum veniale, c. xxxiv. n. xiii. p. 554.

Dicendum est intentionem bonam simpliciter non esse de substantia orationis vocalis. Itaque si quis habet intentionem orandi, et ex illa proferet verba de se sufficientia ad orandum, et consentanea laudi, vel reverentiæ divinæ, licet hoc faciat ex intentione laudis humanæ, vel alicujus commodi temporalis in illud principaliter intuendo, vere orat, quamvis non bene orat. Hæc est communis sententia.—Talis oratio est sufficiens ad implendum præceptum ecclesiasticum recitandi horas, ut omnes fatentur.—*Suar. de Orat. l. iii. cap. iii. n. v.*

³ Præceptum audiendi missam non obligat, nisi taliter audire, ut sit actus humanus;

thing intended be a sin, and that highly criminal, for he adds :¹ If one attend prayer, though he do it for vain glory (that is a small matter to stick at), yea, though it be with a purpose mortally wicked, yet he fulfils the precept substantially. Such are the commands of the church of Rome for her most sacred worship. They may be fully satisfied by deadly wickedness ; there needs no purity of heart or hand for her devotions ; a design damnably evil will serve the turn. That of Antoninus, saith Navarre,² is not to be maintained, that he doth not satisfy the precept who comes to church principally to look on a handsome woman, or to talk with her, or for any other sinful thing. If a man, in going to mass, designs to satisfy his curiosity, or his lust, or anything else which is wicked, that church is so good-natured she will be satisfied with it, and think her precept for worship well observed, and you must believe (if you can) that she is a good Christian church that will have Christ worshipped at this rate. He adds reason for it.³ A man may come to church for a wicked end, and yet hear mass well enough there.

Bonacina⁴ instances in several sorts of wickedness, whereby the command for worship may be fulfilled. This is one amongst the rest : if a man go to church on purpose to gaze on or to lust after women lecherously, he satisfies the precept, and for the general rule vouches not only Sotus, Navarre, Medina, and others of greatest reputation in their church, but also their angelical Saint Thomas.

I need not censure these things. Let those that are impartial consider the premises, and see if this be not their sense, that the people in the papacy, by its order, do not, or are not obliged to give God any real worship in public, and by their leaders are taught and encouraged, instead of worship, to present him with gross wickedness. If the measures of religion may be best taken by its worship, what can any indifferent person judge of popery, where a service so palpably irreligious is the best and the most excellent worship they have ? If this were duly considered, I think it alone might be sufficient to reduce those that are deluded, and to secure those against temptations who are not yet ensnared.

Sect. 4. There is another public exercise which Christ makes as necessary as any evangelical service whatever, and that is, preaching and hearing the word of God. But the Romanists are not of his mind in this.⁵ The mass is commanded, but not preaching, saith Sylvester, and he one of the order of predicants. Accordingly hearing mass is commanded, but hearing sermons

qualis esse potest, etiamsi aliud simul adsit sinistrum propositum.—*De Just. et Jur.* l. x. q. v. art. v.

¹ Quod si quis attente oret, quamvis id faciat adjunctam habens vanam gloriam, imo quamvis simul habeat propositum aliud mortale, satisfaciatur præcepto, quantum ad substantiam ; ita ut non teneatur officium iterare.—*Ibid.*

² Non tamen est tenendum illud S. Antonini, scilicet, eum qui ecclesiam adit principaliter ad videndum, aut alloquendum fœminam pulchram, aut ob aliud quodvis illicitum, non satisfacere huic præcepto, cap. xxi. n. vii. ; with him concurs Medina. Addendum his est pravam intentionem adjunctam voluntati audiendi missam, non esse contrariam impletioni hujus præcepti. Itaque quamvis quis eat ad ecclesiam ex libidinosa intentione videndi fœminam, vel etiamsi officio missæ cum eadem intentione assistat, tamen si non excludat voluntatem implendi hoc præceptum, et sufficienter sit attentus, implet illud.—*Ita Medina in Suarez.* tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. iii.

³ Potest quis malo fine ecclesiam adire, et bene in ea missam audire.—*Ibid.* p. 469.

⁴ Qui ecclesiam adit causa videndi, vel etiam concupiscendi libidinose fœminas—satisfacit.—*De legib.* disp. i. q. i. p. 9, n. i.

⁵ Cum missa sit sub præcepto, non prædicatio.—*Sum.* v. domin. n. viii. Audire missam est in præcepto ; audire autem concionem non ita.—*Suar.* xlii. tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. i. vid. v. ii. defessa.

is only matter of advice (saith another¹), which may be neglected without imputation of sin, and if observed is an act of supererogation.

They conclude it no duty in such circumstances where it would be counted necessary, if ever; it is no duty on the Lord's day,² or any other time set apart for the public worship. Mass must be heard then, but no need to hear a sermon. If it were any man's duty in their account, it would be so in that case when one wants the knowledge which is necessary to salvation, and hath opportunity to get it by hearing; but even then they declare him not obliged. Sylvester propounds the case in these terms:³ Doth he sin mortally who is ignorant of those common things which are necessary to salvation, and may hear sermons, but doth not? He answers, He so sins who omits it out of contempt, or with notorious scandal, but not always when it is out of negligence; because, according to Aquinas,⁴ negligence is not mortal, unless something be omitted which is under precept, or with contempt; adding, such negligence may possibly be a mortal sin, but when it is so, it cannot be determined. It seems no man can tell when it will be a crime for a person damnably ignorant to neglect the means of instruction; but more briefly and positively he resolves it elsewhere, that he is not commanded to hear a sermon upon the Lord's-day; although he be ignorant of those things which are necessary to salvation, because he may otherwise satisfy the precept for learning.

Sect. 5. As to the sacraments, and the worship in them, the despatch may be quick. There are none considerable here but baptism and the eucharist, for their other five are not of divine appointment, nor the worship of God, but their own inventions; and therefore, how needful soever they count them, thereby they make no true worship necessary. But indeed none of them are in their own account necessary to salvation, save only penance, and that we shall meet with hereafter. What worship they shall have in the eucharist is sufficiently discovered by what they are satisfied with in the mass, where we have found them contented with none at all, or that which is worse than none. Neither do they account this sacrament simply necessary, for although it be required that they communicate once a year, yet that is but by human law or custom, as they teach. The sacrament of the eucharist, saith Canus, is not a sacrament of necessity.⁵

¹ Audire prædicationem in festis non est de præcepto simpliciter, patet per prædicta: ac etiam nullo jure cavetur, sed solum de missa.—*Sum. Rosell. Dominic.* n. iv.

² Jac. de Graff. l. ii. c. xxxiii. n. viii. xvi. Sotus et Covarruvias, Navar. c. xxi. n. i. Missa audienda diebus festis ex præcepto, non tamen concio, non preces fundendæ; non exercendus alius actus cultus divini, ex præcepto (excipe diem paschatis, quod sumenda est eucharistia).—*Victorel.* ibid. ad. l. iv. c. xxv. p. 693.

Dico nullum esse præceptum, quod obliget in rigore, ac per se, ad audiendam concionem in die festo. Ita supponunt ut clarum doctores omnes, et constat ex communi usu, et sensu fidelium. Item quia nullibi extat hoc præceptum, præterea est optimum argumentum, quia si fideles tenerentur audire concionem sacram, pastores ecclesiæ tenerentur providere, ut omnibus diebus dominicis et festis fieret concio in ecclesia. Pastores autem ad hoc non tenentur, nec de facto ita fit.—*Suar.* l. ii. de fest. c. xvi. n. vi.

³ Quæritur, utrum peccet mortaliter, qui ignorat communia necessaria ad salutem, et potest audire prædicationem, et non audit? Et dico quod sic, si hoc facit ex contemptu vel ex scandalo notabili: non autem semper si omittit ex negligentia, quia, secundum S. Thom. xxii. q. liv., negligentia non est mortale, nisi omittatur aliquid, quod sit sub præcepto, vel ratione contemptus, v. prædicat. n. vi., quando hoc sit, non potest sermone determinari.—*Ibid.*

⁴ Etiam si talis habeat ignorantiam necessariorum ad salutem, quia alias poterit implere præceptum de addiscendo, v. dominic. n. viii.

⁵ Sermo est de eucharistiæ sacramento, quod non est sacramentum necessitatis, pars v. relict. de pœnit. p. 892. Many of them count it not necessary by virtue of any divine precept, and so not requisite *jure divino*. Est prima opinio negans esse præceptum jure divino, quam tenuit Alexander Alensis, D. Thomas Carthusianus, Palacius,

For baptism, if they account any worship necessary, it must be either in respect of the administrator or the baptized; as to the former, none with them is needful. For by their doctrine it may be validly administered by any man or woman, or one that is both;¹ yea, or by a child, by those also that are strangers, or enemies to all Christian worship, by Jews, pagans, or infidels of any sort, by such as worship not the true God (as Sylvester tells us out of Aquinas, Paludanus, and their church's law); by such as believe that baptism is good for nought, and minister it in scorn; by such as believe that it is not a sacrament, that it hath no spiritual virtue, and intend not, while they baptize, to administer a sacrament, but only think to do as the church does, although they account that to be nothing at all; so Aquinas² and Pope Innocent saith it will be effectual, though the baptizer neither know nor believe what baptism is, but counts it a trifle; though he neither know what the church is, nor minds to do what the church doth, but means to do the contrary. No other worship is necessary upon the account of the ministers, but what might be expected from such as these. Nor any more upon the account of the persons baptized. For as to the adult (there being no pretence in reference to infants), they think it sufficiently administered by force to those who would not endure it, but for fear of death³ if they did not yield; to such as make all the resistance they can,⁴ and offer foul injury to the sacrament, and defile the water; to those who receive it, not for the purpose for which it is intended, but for quite⁵ other ends than ever it was designed for; yea, to those that are frantic, and never had the use of reason, or are⁶ stark mad, and that in the height of their madness; to those also⁷ that are fast asleep, if they had a mind to it when they were waking. Since they think it duly administered to such as these, they cannot count any worship necessary herein upon the account of the partakers, but what such as these now mentioned may offer.

Sect. 6. For fuller and more particular satisfaction, it is observable that they divide their sacraments into some for the dead and some for the living. Those for the dead are baptism and penance. As to these two, some count no disposition requisite⁸ but only a willingness to receive them. Others, who

Bonaventura, Gabriel. Sylvester, Ferrariensis, Cajetan. in Suarez, tom. iii. disp. lxi. sect. i. p. 879.

¹ Sum. v. baptism. iii. n. i. Secundum omnes doctores, precipue S. Thom et Pet. de Pal, omnis homo dare potest baptismum—si sit clericus aut laicus, vir aut mulier, aut uterque simul, i. e. Hermaphroditus.

Etiam si esset infidelis, i. e. Judæus aut paganus.

Dicit S. Tho. quod quamvis ille qui non credit baptismum esse sacramentum, aut habere aliquam spirituales virtutem, non intendat dum baptizat conferre sacramentum, tamen intendit facere quandoque quod facit ecclesia; etiam si illud reputet nihil esse.

² Ibid. n. ii. Innocentius dicit, quod baptismus habebit effectum, etiam si baptizans nec sciat nec credat, quid sit baptismus, sed hoc reputet trufam, et etiam si non sciat quid sit ecclesia, nec gerat in mente facere, quod facit ecclesia; immo si gereret contrarium, scil. non facere quod facit ecclesia, sed tamen facit et formam servat, &c.

³ Id. ibid. iv. n. x. Si consentit quis per minas vel pœnas habendo voluntatem coactam. coactione conditionali, eligendo scil. potius baptizari quam mori vel aliud pati, et n. iii. Si oporteat eos ligari.

⁴ Vel etiam si faciant injuriam sacramento, ut mingendo in aquam vel hujusmodi et. n. x. Si baptizetur infidelis non quia credat sed ut sanetur, vel carcat fœtore, aut vexatione diabolica—aut propter quæstum, ut faciunt crebro Judæi.

⁵ Si vero usum rationis nunquam habuit, baptizatur in intentione parentum, &c.

⁶ Si autem usum rationis habuit aliquando, sed non quando baptizatur, propter phrenesim vel amentiam vel dormitionem et hujusmodi, requiritur intentio quæ præfuerit, tempore usus rationis, n. iii.

⁷ Dicit de dormientibus quod ratione periculi baptizari possunt, si prius in iis apparuit voluntas baptismi: sicut de amentibus dictum est.

⁸ Scotus, quem sequitur Sylvester, sum. v. confess. i. n. xxiv.

would seem to be more severe, count attrition sufficient, which is a slender dislike of sin, not as it is an offence to God, but out of some other consideration, human, natural, or servile. And the lowest degree of this possible, and that despatched in a moment; and this moment need not be while they are at these sacraments, but either before or after.¹ Their penitents² may make their confession with laughter instead of grief, yet have as much grief at their sacrament of penance as they require; this is past doubt with them. So that it is their common doctrine that no good act, or motion at all, no, not so little and low as that of attrition, much less any ingenuous reverence or devotion, any act of grace or holy affection, is needful while they are at the sacrament, either of baptism or their penance.

The sacraments of the living are their other five: confirmation, orders, matrimony, extreme unction, and the eucharist. These, they say, were instituted for the increase of grace; this is their proper effect; and that they may have their effect, there is not requisite in the partakers any actual dispositions at all, not the least inward act or motion that is good; no, not so little as that of attrition, which, in their account, is of all others³ the least and lowest disposition. And well may they count it so, since the best sort of it, with them, is but the issue of servile fear, which, as such, is below the least degree of moral goodness; and so far from being supernaturally good, that it is morally evil, as we shall see hereafter. All that is needful is only that the partakers be in a state of grace (such as a priest may put a sinner into who is impenitent, and never truly contrite), though he shew it not by any act in the sacraments, where, if ever, it should appear. That the sacraments may confer an increase of grace, they only require an habitual disposition, *i. e.* that they be received in the state of grace;⁴ this is the judgment of Aquinas and Scotus, whom the rest generally follow. So that, to partake worthily of these sacraments, no actual disposition, no act of reverence or devotion, not any inward motion (such as should be in true worshippers), is more required or expected than in the senseless statues which they idolise. Their souls need act or move no more as worshippers of God herein, than if they were neither Christians nor men; than if they were so far from having grace, as to have no souls. Yea, these sacraments may be valid, and duly celebrated as their church requires they should be, while the partakers are not only void of all good motion towards God, but while their souls are in motion against him, and all that is divine and sacred. Their minds and hearts may, during the celebration, be taken up with acts, not only of folly and vanity, but of pride, or lusts, or revenge, or infidelity, or atheism, or what is most contrary to the most holy God and his worship,

¹ Suar. tom. iv. disp. xx. sect. iv. n. xxix., Sylvester, *ibid*.

² *Judicandum non erit dolore carere ob risum, potuit enim domi de illis dolere, et postea ad sacramentum accedens, actualem poenitentiam non adducere. At ad valorem et fructum percipiendum sacramenti confessionis non requiri actualem dolorem, sed virtualem sufficere veram esse sententiam quis dubitet?*—*Jo. Sanctius*, select. disp. xxxi. n. viii.

³ *Est minima et imperfectissima dispositio quæ in ordine supernaturali requiri potest.*

⁴ *Ut sacramenta conferant augmentum gratiæ solum requirunt habituales gratiæ dispositionem, id est, quod in statu gratiæ recipiantur. Hæc est sententia D. Thomæ. Scoti et aliorum in Suar. tom. iii. disp. vii. sect. iv.* All that is required to put them into this state, and free them from conscience of mortal sin (and so to give them all the disposition necessary for the eucharist, and so for the other sacraments) is their ritual confession: yet even this they may neglect lawfully, or without any great fault, as divers amongst them (and those Dominicans) determine. Cajetan. *sum. v. communio. Fumus v. Paludanus*, Sylvester in *Ledesma de eucharist. c. xi. Jo. de la Cruz de eucharist. q. v. concl. ii.*

and yet partake as well as the church requires.¹ For the precepts of their church, concerning the administering of the sacraments, and all other things by her enjoined, may be entirely satisfied by acts of wickedness; so notoriously holy is that church, by the report of their chief writers.

Sect. 7. If they count any of their sacraments more worthy of holier treatment than that now mentioned, it will be the eucharist; for this they count more worthy than the rest, and have it in such veneration, as not only to worship Christ in it, but to worship it even as Christ himself; and therefore here, if ever, they will judge it requisite to shew themselves worshippers indeed. Yet for all this, whatever worship of this sacrament they count needful, they conclude no true worship of Christ necessary; no, not so much as the least inward act of reverence, devotion, or honour; for this is their common doctrine,² that besides the disposition of habitual grace, there is no precept so rigorous as to require any actual disposition for the worthy receiving of this sacrament, so as that the omission of it can be a mortal sin. In this all their divines agree; so that any one may partake worthily of this sacrament, and be free of mortal guilt, without any actual reverence or devotion, any act of grace or holy affection, while he is communicating. This one maxim (wherein they all concur) quite stifles the spirit of Christianity, and bereaves it of its life and soul; it leaves nothing that can honour or please Christ, or be of any advantage to souls, needful in any Christian duty. For no good motion of mind or heart, being needful in the celebrating of this sacrament, which requires it more, they cannot imagine it necessary in any other duty of less consequence; and the want hereof being but a venial fault, there is no more necessity to have it, than there is to avoid a venial sin, which they make nothing of. In this very case, they hold that³ a venial sin, even in the act of communicating, will not hinder the effect of the sacrament. Yea, it may not be so much as a venial fault, if the vagaries of the mind, which exclude attention and reverence due to such a religious act,⁴ be natural. But will it not be more than so slight a fault, voluntarily to abandon every good motion in the celebrating of this sacrament? No;

¹ *Præceptum adimpleri potest per actum ex aliqua circumstantia malum; ita S. Thom. Medina, Navar, et alii in Bonac. supra.*

Nam alia præcepta sacramentorum tum in aliis materiis, impleri possunt per actum peccaminosum.—*Suar. ibid. disp. lxx. sect. iii., after Corduba, Soto, Covarruvius, whether it be less or more wicked is all one, disp. lxxxviii. sect. iii.*

² *Præter dispositionem gratiæ habitualis, nullam actualem requiri ex rigoroso præcepto ad dignam sumptionem hujus sacramenti, ita ut illius omissione peccatum mortale sit. In quo conveniunt omnes theologi. Et a fortiori patet ex eo, quod supra diximus, ad effectum hujus sacramenti nullam actualem dispositionem requiri.—Ibid. disp. lxvi. sect. i.*

Those who seem to require some actual devotion, yet count it but a venial fault to want it, Alexander, Antonin, Sylvester, Paludan, Cajetan, in Vasquez in iii. tom. iii. disp. ccvi. c. i. Not only attention and devotion are accounted needless for communicants, but sobriety, and the use of reason: for they teach, that not only young children, and such as are half fools; but also persons so frantic, as it will be necessary to have them bound, and those also who are possessed of the devil, and whom he has seized on for their enormous wickedness, may partake of this sacrament, and have it duly administered to them, and that even when they are blaspheming.—*Jo. Sanc. disp. xxxviii. Imo licet arreptus quis sit a dæmone ob mores depravatos, et quis viveret in lenocinio,—non minus talibus ministrare tenebitur parochus eucharistiam, n. vii. Præterea ministrare tenebitur parochus licet videat obsessum, sive insanum, blasphemantem, n. viii.*

³ *Peccatum veniale actu concomitans sumptionem hujus sacramenti, non impedit gratiæ et charitatis augmentum; ita de Thom. Alensis, Gabriel. Adrian, Soto, Ledesma, Victoria, Corduba, Concil. Trident., sess. xiii.; vii. Suar. ibid. disp. lxii. sect. iii.*

⁴ *Excusabitur tamen homo, ab hujusmodi culpa veniali, si fortasse ex naturali tantum distractione hujusmodi attentionem omittat.—Ibid. disp. lxvii. sect. i.*

to decline every good act of mind or heart, and that voluntarily, it can be no worse ;¹ if it be without contempt, it will be no mortal fault, and that also in the judgment of all their divines. But though there be not any good disposition in the soul towards Christ, in partaking of his supper, yet is it not necessary that vile and wicked dispositions should be excluded ? No ; there is no more need of this than the other. The mind and the heart may actually entertain such as are sinful, without any more danger than it rejects those that are good. It is but a slight fault² to communicate out of ostentation and vain glory, and so to nourish pride while he should be feeding upon Christ, and to design his own honour without any act of reverence for Christ ; he may let his thoughts run out upon vanity, or entertain his soul with vain delights, without the least motion of love, or delight, or desire for Christ, without the least act of faith in him ; and may be pleasing himself with sin, instead of grieving for it, when he hath the greatest advantage to look upon him whom he hath pierced. And all this he may do without any guilt that need be repented of or regarded. This is all the worship and honour that it is needful their souls should give to Christ, even in the sacrament of his body and blood ; who will have others cursed to hell, and burned beforehand, for not giving divine worship to a wafer. But this is not all ; their church will be satisfied with greater indignity offered to Christ than this ; for they teach, that those who communicate unworthily, to such a degree as they count sacrilege (and that so heinous, as they question whether it be not as tolerable to cast that which they count their God to be devoured by dogs, or throw it into the dirt to be trampled on ; and³ many of them are positive that it is greater wickedness than murder or adultery, or that uncleanness against nature which is most abominable),⁴ do fully satisfy the precept of the church for this communion. Thus Soto, Corduba, Covarruvius, and others, alleged by them. And this is all derived from their St Thomas, that maxim of his so generally received ;⁵ the law commanding an act enjoins the substance of it, but not the manner. By which we must understand, that the church would have the thing done, but regards not how

¹ Talis culpa (scil. voluntaria carentia actualis dispositionis) non est mortalis, secluso contemptu ; ex omnium sententia.—*Ibid.* disp. lxiii. sect. iii.

² Dicendum videtur, si peccatum veniale sit aliquando circumstantia ipsius actus communicandi, peccatum esse veniale sic communicare, v. g. si quis communicat propter ostentationem seu vanam gloriam ; vel certe si actu sit in ipso peccato veniali, ut in vana aliqua cogitatione aut delectatione, et ea ratione accedat distractus, et sine debita attentione et devotione.—*Ibid.* disp. lxvi. sect. i. Ostentation and vain glory are here counted venial faults, because they are directly opposite to the act of communicating : and so is outward irreverence, vain prating, and gestures, inconsistent with modesty, while they are at the sacrament, for the same reason. But other sins, not so opposite to the act, as studying a lie, or revenge, or detraction (or uncleanness, or any the like in venial degrees), while they are communicating (though the distraction there be voluntary, and all holy fervour be thereby hindered) are no faults at all in reference to the sacrament.—*Jo. Sanc.* disp. xxiii., alleging for it Scotus, Richardus de St. Vict. Maior, Adrian, Margarita Casuum, Soto, Marcella, Ledesma, Vivaldus, Coriolanus, and divers others, n. xx., xxi.

³ An hoc peccatum sit gravior homicidio—aut adulterio, vel omnibus peccatis contra naturam : quidam enim theologi ita existimant, ut Gabriel. Petr. Soto, Ledesma, Dominic. Soto.—*Suar. ibid.* sect. ii.

⁴ Dicendum est eum qui voluntarie suscipit sacramentum eucharistiæ, etiamsi indigne sumat, implere præceptum communicandi ; etiamsi alias peccet mortaliter per sacrilegium indignæ sumptionis. Ita tenet in specie Corduba, in genere Soto, Covarruvius, qui alios referunt.—*Ibid.* disp. lxx. sect. iii.

⁵ Ratio autem sumitur ex principio generali quod tradit D. Thom. i., ii. q. ci. art. ix., quia lex præcipiens actum, præcipit substantiam ejus, non autem modum. *Ibid.* vid. Bonacin. and in him, besides the principal of the Society (Azorius, Valencia, Suarez, Sanchez), Aquinas, Sotus, Navar, Medina. Qui vero indigne, et sine devotione communicat tempore paschatis, satisfacit præcepto de leg. d. i. q. i. p. 9, n. ii. et iii.

they do it, whether as Christians or as atheists. She is indifferent as to devotion or sacrilege in her catholics, having something else in design than to be concerned in the honouring of God, and the happiness of men, which so much depends upon the manner of worshipping. It is too plain to be denied, that such a treatment of holy things (to use their own words) is not at all for the worship of God, or the salvation of souls, but opposite to both; yet their church's precept is entirely thereby fulfilled. So that, if God have no worship, and men no salvation, yet the church is satisfied. This and other outward acts must be visibly done, that the world may not think but they have something like religion amongst them; but though, instead of the worship due to the divine majesty, they perform the acts of it in such a manner, as no less dishonours and provokes him, than the crying sins of murder or sodomy, their church hath full contentment; it is all she requires.

Thus we have surveyed the church service amongst the Romanists in the several parts of it, and cannot discern any real worship therein to which they are obliged; but rather that all such worship of God in public is, by their rules and orders, rendered either impossible or unnecessary.

Sect. 8. Let us inquire, in the next place, whether they count it needful that God should have any worship from them in private; and this we may discover by what they determine concerning meditation, reading the Scripture, and private prayer. For meditation, the casuists speak little of it, nothing at all (that I have met with) of its necessity; it is like they reserve it for their contemplative persons, as a degree of perfection to which others need not aspire.¹ The perfectionists themselves may waive it, but when they will be so over good as to supererogate, and do better than God commands them, if they judge it necessary at any time, sure it would be on those days when such acts are most proper and requisite.² But they conclude it no duty upon the Lord's day, or any other devoted by them, as they pretend, to the observance of God. For they generally agree that no inward worship is then required, and meditation is discharged by name;³ now if they need not think of God on his own day, or any other, wherein a particular observance of him is requisite, it is ground enough to conclude they do not count it needful to think of him at all. Who can imagine that they judge it necessary to think of God at any time, who count it needless to have God in their thoughts when they are at his worship?

Sect. 9. As for the reading the word of God in private, they are so far from esteeming this a duty, that they will scarce excuse it from a crime: all that can be obtained for it is only a toleration (as a thing that passeth under an ill character), and that but in some places, and there but for some persons, with more restriction and caution than the public stews are tolerated by their holy bishop in Rome. So much friends are they to the word of God, or so little do they judge it a friend to them. They are the best catholics in their account who do not desire to look into it, or to understand from God what he would have them to be; they think it advisable⁴ that no mortal should be acquainted with more of the Scriptures than is in the mass, where they can understand nothing, and need hear nothing of it at all.

¹ Si patres, theologi—meditationem laudant et consulunt, non tamen docent esse omnibus præceptam.

² Ecclesiastici, clerici, religiosi non tenentur ex vi sui status et juris divini, ad hunc meditando, recogitando, aut mentaliter orandi usum.—*Vid. Suar. de Orat. ment. l. ii. c. iv. n. vii.*; *Navar. Enchirid. de Orat. l. xx. n. lxi.*

³ Neque præcipitur cultus divinus internus qui in meditando et colendo Deo consistit.—*Navar. Manual. c. xlii. n. ii.* Non præcipitur cultus divinus interior, qui in meditatione interiori de Deo consistit.—*Lop z, c. xlii. p. 286.*

Consil. de Stabiliend. Rom. sede, p. 6.

Sect. 10. For private prayer, it is either vocal or mental.¹ That which they call vocal, they generally count not necessary by any law, either of God or nature, or the church; and so all praying with families is quite cashiered from the rank of Christian duties. There to call upon God's name together they are not concerned, though some think the heathen are. They count it not a duty to say so much as the² Lord's prayer (if they understand but otherwise what is to be prayed for). This is the common opinion in Suarez; nor do they think an³ *Ave Mary* (though these are the prayers most in request with them) more needful. They are not obliged to say it when the public sign is given at night for that purpose; nor need they use any vocal prayer at all, no, not so much as on the solemn days for worship.⁴

But is mental prayer a duty when the other is not used? So it seems; but the question (as in all affirmative precepts) is, when?⁵ Lessius thinks it should not be put off above a month or two; that would signify too much neglect of our salvation. It seems those that pray but once in two months do not much neglect it; but this Jesuit is too strait-laced. That opinion is probable enough, saith one of the greatest casuists of this age, which⁶ assigns three times for prayer, once when we come to the perfect use of reason (suppose⁷ when they think him capable of fasting, about twenty-one years of age); and again at the point of death, and in the interval, when we are obliged to love God (that is, once in five or once in seven years). But is not this Jesuit too severe also? It may be those of other orders will not oppress us so much, or wish us so unlike to atheists as to have us pray once in seven years. The Jesuits, though accounted most licentious, yet seldom exceed, and sometimes fall short herein of their other divines. Sylvester, a Dominican of greatest reputation amongst the casuists, thus determines the question after Aquinas.⁸ When one first comes to the use of reason, he should pray for God's assistance; (*videtur*) he is not peremptory that he must, and speaks but conditionally too; for he adds, If he be thus inspired, otherwise he is not determined to that time. When then?⁹ Why, the pro-

¹ Vide Suarez de Oration. l. iii. cap. vi. n. iii. 5, 8, ut ibi Medina. Ulderius dicit, ad orationem vocalem ex divino præcepto non tenetur; sed ex statuto ecclesiæ, quæ ministris suis missas, et horas canonicas indixit, vel etiam ex injunctioe confessoris, et hoc sequitur sum. confes. et Pisa in Sylv. Orat. v. n. viii. ut Angelus sum. Orat. v. n. xx.

² Videtur tamen sufficere si quis sciat—quod debemus a Deo petere omnia bona corporis et animæ, et hujusmodi, licet nesciat *pater noster*. Idem v. scientia. vide sum. Angel. v. scientia, et Suarez, ibid. n. viii.

³ Idem multo magis dicendum est de salutatione Angelica vel Salve Regina.—Idem ibid. n. xi.

⁴ Diebus autem festis neque est obligatio ad orationem vocalem, n. xiii.; nec in principio aliquarum actionum, n. xiv.; nec hora prandii, ne clericis quidem, n. xvi. Nec quando datur signum publicum, consuetudo recepta est ratione devotivis, non obligationis, ibid.

⁵ Addit Lessius obligari nos, ut non multo tempore abstinamus ab oratione: ut verbi gratia, ad mensem unum vel alterum: alioquin esset signum magnæ negligentiae propriæ salutis in Fill. t. xxiii. l. ii. n. xlv.

⁶ Videtur tamen satis probabilis ea sententia, quæ tria tempora assignat: primum est circa initium morale perfecti discursus, secundum articulos mortis: tertium aliquoties in vita: ut diximus de præcepto charitatis.—Idem. n. xlii. vide tr. xxii. c. ix. n. ccxc. et tr. vi. c. viii. n. ccviii. In universum intra annum non videtur obligare, quolibet septennio est probabile.

⁷ Communitur theologi tenent quod usque ad vigesimum; alii vigesimum primum, excusantur (a jejuniis).—Secundum alios ad xxv. annum, sum. Angeli. v. jejuniis, n. xv.

⁸ Quod tempus videtur determinatum, quantum ad instans quo quis incipit uti ratione, in quo tenetur se dirigere et ordinare in Deum: et, ut videtur, ejus auxilium precari, si hoc suæ menti inspiretur.—Sum. v. orat. n. viii.

⁹ Alias vero determinate non potest, sed divina providentia ad hoc movet, quando est necessarium.—Ibid.

vidence of God moves him to it when it is necessary. Thus he leaves it, and finds no other time, when a man is obliged to pray once for himself, but when he sees his soul in greatest danger,¹ which, it may be, he will never see. Their common doctrine is yet worse; thereby we are not bound to pray but in the article of necessity, and that is, when we are in such extremity as there is no other remedy for us:² if we judge that we can any way else obtain what we would have, we need not pray. The law of God or nature makes it not then our duty. They help us to understand this by two instances; the one to shew when it is requisite to pray for ourselves, the second when for others. When a man falls into most grievous temptations to impatience, or to lust, if there can be no other remedy against it but the grace of God, to be obtained by prayer, then it may be his duty.³ But it seems if he can rid himself of it any other way, or but think he can, then, though the temptation be never so violent or dangerous, he needs not pray. The other is, when a man at a distance sees two ready to fight a duel, and makes account there is no remedy but the help of God for parting them, then he is to seek it (which is not the case of one in a thousand), yet if perhaps he can any otherwise more help them than by praying, he may let it alone.⁴ So that private prayer needs not be their daily practice, nor used as a Christian exercise in ordinary, but in extremity only, and cases otherwise desperate, and as the last remedy, and when there is no other indeed, or in their apprehension;⁵ it will not be a duty, but in such circumstances as do very rarely, if ever, concur.⁶ They are not to use it as their common repast, but as physic; not for prevention neither, but when they are already surprised with extreme danger. And if such extremity occur not once in seven years, they need not pray for so many years; nay, perhaps it may not befall them, or they may not be apprehensive of it while they live, and then they need not pray at all. This is not my inference only; it is their own, and acknowledged to be the consequence of their common doctrine. Thereby there is no divine precept for prayer which can oblige any directly; only by accident it may happen sometimes to be a duty, but such an accident as few may meet with.⁷ It is said expressly that from

¹ Quum homo videt seipsum in gravi tentatione, et periculo animæ suæ.—*Ibid.*

² Idem dicendum est de illo qui preces ad Deum facere prætermisit eo tempore, in quo nullum aliud remedium suæ salutis aut proximi esse videbatur. Tunc enim lex divina naturalis ad id nos obligat, ut probavimus sequenti mentem Paludani et Sylvestri.

³ Ubi posuimus exemplum de illo qui in gravissimam tentationem impatientiæ aut libidinis injectus, judicat nullum aliud remedium ad victoriam superesse, præterquam speciale auxilium Dei oratione impetrandum.

⁴ Et de illo qui minus intuens duos in duello conserturos manus, existimat nullum aliud esse remedium nisi speciale auxilium Dei oratione impetrandum ad dirimendum illud duellum injustum, in his enim casibus id a Deo petere tenetur.—*Navar. cap. xiii. n. xviii.*

Lex naturalis quæ obligat aliquem preces ad Deum fundere, et tempore, in quo nullum aliud remedium suæ salutis aut proximi esse videtur, secundum Sylvestrum; eadem obligat ad idem positum in tentatione impatientiæ, aut libidinis, cui videtur nullum aliud suppetere remedium nisi oratio, &c.—*Lopez, c. lii. p. 272.*

Est communis sententia, quod obligat solum pro articulo necessitatis. Duplex autem necessitas communiter proponitur: prima est propria ipsius hominis, ut si aliqua tentatione vehementer pulsatur, quam sine auxilio divino vincere non potest.

⁵ Alia est necessitas proximi, ut si quis videat aliquos ad duellum properare, nec possit eos aliter impedire.—*D. Tho. Paludan. Sylvest. Navar. Abulens, vide Suar. l. i. de Orat. c. xxxvi.*

⁶ Nisi forte posset aliter melius, quam per orationem suffragari.—*Sylvest. ibid.*

⁷ One of their greatest divines having acknowledged this to be their common doctrine, thus argues: Hoc est obligare quasi per accidens propter necessitatem contingentem et extrinsecam—qui nunquam sentiret illam vehementem et urgentem tentationem, nec videret proximum in simili necessitate, nunquam teneretur orare.

thence it follows¹ that many may pass their whole lives without ever praying to God, and this without any great fault. It should be said, without the least fault; for where there is no obligation, there is no duty at all; and then no sin, great or little, in the want of performance.

This is some of their church's sense; but they speak it more fully who tell us that mental prayer is to be reckoned amongst *counsels*² (which none are obliged to observe), and this by the common consent of Aquinas and their other doctors. And accordingly, that there is³ no divine precept, or of natural law, of itself obliging to mental prayer, meditation (some peculiar engagements or occasions set apart, wherein mental prayer is not concerned); and this is counted so certain, that to teach the contrary is temerarious, because against the common use and sense of the whole church. So that they are not far from the sense of the church, who (without excepting public or private, mental or vocal), deny⁴ that there is any divine precept in special for prayer. And these are not only their modern divines, but some of the ancients also, particularly Alexander Alensis⁵ (the prime of all their school doctors), in strictness seems to deny that there is any proper command by divine law for prayer, taking it properly, but only in a most large sense, as any pious act or good desire may be called prayer. And those who would not seem to like this in general, yet allow it when they come to particulars, since they teach that the precept obligeth not at any such particular time or occasion, when it would oblige, if ever. There is no command, they tell us, which binds them to pray in private at any set time whatever.⁶ They are not obliged to pray when they first come to the use of reason,⁷ nor on common days afterwards; not the least prayer, not a *paternoster*, not once a-day, no, not at their meals;⁸ even their clergy need not do it; nor on holidays neither,⁹ no, not when they have quite neglected their service in public;¹⁰ nor on their fasts, though Scripture still joins these, as all Christians who minded religion were wont to do of old. Their fasts are no more religious for prayer or any holy exercise than the abstinence of their cattle; nor to prepare themselves for sacred or solemn employments, for their sacraments of penance, or else for the eucharist (though this would but trouble them once a-year);¹¹ not at the beginning of any service or undertaking whatever. To pray at such times and occasions is mere matter of counsel,¹² which none can be blamed for neglecting; nor when a man hath vowed and solemnly promised to God, and sworn too, that he will pray, even then, if it be but a little prayer,¹³ it

¹ Possent ergo multi totam vitam sine oratione transigere, absque gravi peccato.—*Suar.* l. i. de Orat. cap. xxx. n.

² Vide Jo. Sanc. disp. vii. n. x.

³ Nullum invenitur præceptum divinum, seu naturalis juris obligans per se ad mentaliter orandum, meditandum, seu recogitandum. Quod ita censeo verum, ut contrarium sine temeritate doceri non possit, quia est contra communem usum, et sensum totius ecclesiæ.—*Suar.* de Orat. l. ii. c. iv. n. v.

⁴ Quidam negant dari præceptum divinum speciale de oratione.—*Ibid.* t. c. xxviii. n. i.

⁵ Alex. Alensis in rigore videtur negare proprium præceptum jure divino datum de oratione proprie sumpta, sed solum largissime, prout pia operatio vel bonum desiderium dicitur oratio.—*Ibid.* l. xxviii. n. ii.

⁶ Idem *ibid.* t. i. c. xxx. n. iv.

⁷ *Ibid.* n. ix.

⁸ N. v. and vii.

⁹ L. iii. c. vi. n. xvi. n. xii.

¹⁰ Antoninus, Adrian, infra. Navar. cap. xxi. n. vii; Bonacina de Sacrament. d. iv. q. ult. p. ult. n. xvi.; ibi. Barthol. ab Angelo, et alii communiter. Qui non potest aut non vult, missam eo die (festo) audire, non tenetur recitare alias orationes.

¹¹ Nulla obligatio orandi in principio aliquarum actionum.—*Suar.* *ibid.* xiv.

¹² Hæc omnia esse consilia, n. xv. et xvi.

¹³ A mortali excusantur—qui precationem angelicam, et alia similia parva pollicentur, etiamsi juramento, aut voto id ipsum confirmassent.—*Navar.* c. xviii. n. vii. Secundum alios.

will be but a small fault to omit it for all this. In short, which compriseth all, there¹ can be no certain time assigned (unless the hour of death) in which, by any precept of religion, we are bound to worship God, or seek his help by an act of prayer, as in like case is said of an act of contrition and love to God. So Bonacina; no time for prayer certain, none determined; but, as they conjecture, perhaps it may be a duty, when they apprehend themselves under grievous and dangerous temptations, and judge there is no remedy but prayer. This, or none at all, is the time for it by their common doctrine; and this is in effect to say, it is a duty at no time, for no person. For those under temptation may not apprehend it dangerous, or a remedy needful, as all will be ready to do who either regard not temptations, or are pleased with them, or what they lead to. And neither these nor any else can judge there is no other remedy but prayer, if they believe their doctrine, which offers them divers other remedies, and those more relied on than this. To mention none else, almost any of their sacramentals (of which they have multitudes) will serve their turn, even a little salt,² conjured after the mode of holy church, may do it. Thus we see these catholics secured from all divine obligations to pray while they live. But they have another way to do it; for, if any apprehend themselves in dangerous temptations, and also that there is no other remedy against it but prayer, they determine³ that if such be ignorant that it is then a duty, or if they know it, but do not consider it, they are excused from sin, though they then neglect to pray. Now, the people may well be ignorant that they are in such case obliged, when their learned men scarce know it. And for those that do know it, the violence of the temptation (and the case supposeth it violent) may leave no place for consideration. However, no man considers this or other things unless he will, and so it will be no sin to neglect prayer at that time, when only they count it a duty, unless he list. Yea,⁴ though the ignorance or inconsiderateness be culpable, and through his own default, yet the neglect of the duty which is thereby occasioned they can excuse from sin. Besides, if⁵ they should both know and consider that prayer is then their duty, yet they teach that the omission of it is then no special sin, *i. e.* no other sin than that which they should seek to avoid by praying; whereby they plainly declare that there is in their account no special precept for prayer, no, not in that case wherein alone they would have it thought a duty; otherwise they would judge it a special sin then to neglect it.

Sect. 11. But though their catholics be thus sufficiently eased of all obligations to private prayer all their lives, by virtue of any divine command, it may be there is some precept in the church for it. Can she be content

¹ Non potest aliud certum tempus assignari in quo ex præcepto religionis teneamur Deum colere, et auxilium ab eo per actum orationis implorare, ut in simili dictum est de actu contritionis et charitatis.—*Bonacina*, tom. i. divin. offic. disp. i. q. ii. p. 1, n. xii.

² Exorciso te creatura salis, &c. I conjure thee, creature salt—that thou mayest be hallowed—to drive away all the temptations of the devil.

³ Quando tentationes ingruunt cum periculo succumbendi, tunc enim medium ad peccatorum veniam et auxilium impetrandum adhibendum est—quanquam a peccato multi excusantur, ignorantes, vel non advertentes ad hanc obligationem.—*Bonacina*, divin. offic. disp. i. q. ii. p. 1, n. xii.; *ibi*. Medina, Navar, Malderu, Sylvester, et alii.

⁴ Utrum excusetur a peccato, qui præceptum aliquod non implet ob inadvertentiam, vel ignorantiam, quæ ipsius culpa contigit?—Respondeo excusari a peccato.—*Idem de Peccato*, disp. ii. q. viii. p. 3. n. xxviii. *ibi*. Clavis Regia et alii.

⁵ Scientes vero et advertentes graviter peccant, utpote negligentes medium ad vincendas tentationes—omissio tamen orationis tunc temporis non habet malitiam distinctam ab eo peccato quod cavere tenemur.—*Idem*, de divin. offic. d. i. q. ii. p. i. xii.; *ibi*. (besides the chief of all the Jesuits), Medina, Sylvester, Navar, Malderus.

that they should live so much without God, or any acknowledgment of their dependence on him, more like atheists than Christians? Yes, there is not anything for private addresses to God amongst all her precepts; she is too indulgent to trouble them with any such thing; she requires not of them the least prayer, or such as are accounted best, not so much as a *Paternoster*: there is no ecclesiastical precept for this, to make it so much as a venial fault, not to use it, says Medina,¹ not a *Salve Regina*, no, nor an *Ave Mary*. They have indeed a special respect to this last, and prefer it ten to one before any other (though they might use this every minute, without ever praying once to God all their life). And Pope John XXII. ordained, that thrice every evening the bell should sound, that every one might say an *Ave Mary* thrice; and since it is grown a custom (and a church custom usually stands for a law with them), that not only at evening, but at noon and morning, too, a bell should sound for the same purpose; so that this, if any, is under injunction. There is a fair show for it, but it is no more than a show, for they assure us this is a voluntary devotion, and hath nothing of obligation in it.² Those that never use this and such prayers, it is, they say, a shrewd sign they do not live well; but the omission thereof is no special sin with respect unto any precept either of God or the church.

And is not this a very pious concession that they are pleased to grant, that for a man never to say his prayers, is a general bad sign that he does not live as he ought, though they will by no means allow it to be any special sin. Oh the piety and tenderness of this mother and head of all churches!

If, for all this, any of them should conceive themselves obliged to pray sometimes; or if, without such opinion, they should find some season for private prayer, though God (as they dream), and the church (as they know), hath prescribed none; as when a confessor enjoins it for penance; or out of voluntary devotion, when they have a mind to supererogate, and do better than God requires, upon which accounts some of them may be found now and then very busy with their beads; yet in these cases there is by their principles no more need to worship God in their private than in their public prayers, where (as we have shewed) they account no actual observance of God at all necessary. As for the prayers enjoined them by way of penance, these are not necessary for them, but as their punishment; and then they pray not, for that is an act of the soul, but this is a suffering of the outward man. The church as (they say) it cannot judge of inward acts, so it cannot order them to be penal. And the malefactors here being their own executioners, as there is no need, so there is no fear that they will punish their souls, but leave them untouched, unconcerned, whatever their lips, or fingers, or beads may suffer, by that grievous penalty of praying. But it were well if God did not suffer more by such abuse of his name and worship, than those malefactors, who count it a suffering to do anything like his service. And it sounds not well that prayer must pass for a punishment. It is, as Damascene defines it, and they after him, the ascent of the mind unto God.³ Now, is the approach of the soul to God a punishment? One would think the devils should think better of it; for the misery of hell

¹ Nullum esse de hac re præceptum etiam ecclesiasticum vel sub veniali.—*Medina de Orat.* q. x., in Suar de Orat. l. iii. c. vi. n. vii. Solum tradidit Christus formam, non vero dedit præceptum obligans ad exercitium, n. v.

² Consuetudo recepta est ratione devotionis, non obligationis—si hæc nunquam recitet, magnum indicium est, ipsum non recte vivere, etiamsi omissio illa speciale peccatum non sit.—*Idem. ibid.*

³ Oratio in genere sumpta est ascensus mentis ad Deum, et hoc essentialiter includit.—*Idem. ibid.* c. iv. n. iv.

is distance from God, without hopes of having access to him. But they can solve the difficulty well enough, for they mean not to do any such thing as praying in the case, but only to suffer some thing which they call so. Their care and pains is about their beads, not their souls; if they keep but count, and bring in the full tale which the confessor enjoins; though in as many crowns and rosaries as there are *Ave Marias* in each ten thousand times over, they have not one thought of God, nor the least motion of mind or heart towards him; yet they give full satisfaction, and undergo all they were adjudged to.

In their voluntary prayers there is less worship required than the other, if there can be less than none. For when they need not use such prayers unless they please, they may do it as they list;¹ it being no duty enjoined, the manner of the performance is arbitrary, and wholly at discretion. Hence those who think something (of some sort) of attention requisite in commanded prayers, count none at all necessary in these; no, not that which is superficial, not so little of that as they call virtual. So that, if herein they mind nothing at all, wherein worshippers at prayer are concerned, not so little as the bare words; yet they acquit themselves well enough, yea, if this neglect of all be wilful,² and the mind not only run of its own accord, but be sent away and employed about something else on set purpose, it will be at worst a slight fault.

Sect. 12. In this fashion they would have us suppose that God may be worshipped, when there is neither inward nor outward observance of him. Inward he hath none, when the mind is departed from him, and the heart with it. Outward he hath none, unless merely in show, when the mind directs it not to, and designs it not for him; which is never done, when he is not minded. In fine, by the doctrine of the Romanists (to say nothing of the idolatry or superstition of their service), it is unnecessary that God should have any real worship, either public or private; unless God can be said to be truly worshipped, without the love or fear of God, without acts of wisdom or affection, without reverence or devotion, without sincere or honest intentions; or with designs of wickedness; without knowing what they do, or heeding what they are about; without mind or heart, yea, or body either, unless in mere show; this is apparent by the premises. The people (as they think) worship God well enough at this rate; their leaders teach them no more is needful; their church, by confining their service to an unknown tongue, makes it necessary for their divines thus to teach, and unavoidable for the people to worship, no otherwise. Now, what a church is this, or of what religion, that makes the real worship of God, and of Jesus Christ, to be needless, and takes an effectual course that he shall have none? Let those who are of their communion, or tempted to it, consider it seriously, and in the fear of God. Is it the way to salvation to be without religion? Is there any religion, indeed, where it is made needless to worship God really, when worship is as essential to religion as a soul is to a man? They may, by joining with them, greaten a party, and promote the interest of a faction, which carries on other designs under religious pretences, without regard of God, as to his worship and honour, or to the souls of men, as to their happiness, and the true way to it; but if they follow the conduct of

¹ Orationes voluntariæ—cum penitus omitti possent, consequitur quod evagatio mentis tollens attentionem non inducit peccatum mortale.—*Graff.* part. i. l. ii. c. li. n. xi.

² Ubi autem libere et citra obligationem oratur, sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare distractio etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adsit, nunquam erit mortalis.—*Soto de Just.* l. x. q. v. art. v., in sin: *Graff.* p. 1. l. ii. c. li. n. xi.; *Gabriel.* ibi. *Angel.* v. hor. n. xxvii.; *Bonacin.* de diviu. offic. disp. i. q. iii. p. 2, sect. ii. n. vii., ibi. *Maldarus* et alii.

the Roman doctrine, and worship God no otherwise than these would have them; they may be of the Roman profession, and yet of no religion. If a man have a mind to trouble himself with none of the realities of Christianity, and yet to pass for religious enough, in the opinion of so much of the world as is papal, and will hang his soul upon so common reputation, popery is contrived to allure and gratify him; and he may safely venture on it, if damnation be not dangerous, or if he can escape it by an opinion or show of worshipping God, and being religious without morality.

CHAPTER II.

Christian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their doctrine.

Sect. 1. Knowledge is the foundation of almost all that is saving: of faith, holiness, obedience, worship. It is the groundwork, without which scarce a stone can be laid in the whole structure of salvation. No saving faith without it, Rom. x. 14. There can be no love to, or hope in, an unknown object. There can be no fear, no desire of what we know not. There can be no true worship of God, unless that of the Samaritans was such, 'who worshipped they knew not what.' There can be no obedience without knowing whom, what, why, and for what end we obey. In brief, without knowledge there is no eternal life, John xvii. 8; nothing but ruin and eternal destruction, Hosea iv. 6, 2 Thes. i.

Yet for all this, popery decries knowledge, as that which is unnecessary for the people, and extols the want of it, as that which is essential to their faith (Bellarmine saith, faith is better defined by ignorance);¹ as that which is the mother of their devotion; (so others declare it), as that which is the excellency of their obedience; none comparable to that which they call blind obedience, as Cardinal Cusanus tells us.²

It sufficeth the people to know that their church hath knowledge; and their sight is good enough, in that their teachers have eyes; so one of their authors: In matters of faith, the people ought not to see with their own eyes, but the eyes of their superiors.³ They need not know what they pray for, nor what they are to believe, nor what they are to do.

1. They need not know what they are to pray for, or to whom, or whether they pray or not; all is muffled up in an unknown language, and they are to venture at they know not what, nor how, nor whither. No wonder if they direct the Lord's prayer to saints, male or female;⁴ and say *Our Father* to the virgin mother, and, in like manner, direct *Ave Mariæ* to Christ, as if they took him to be a woman, or to be with child (and with himself too), to be the fruit of his own womb; or to be his own mother, which the words so applied signify. This ignorance is the dam of such devotion, such as is both horrid and blasphemous to the highest degree of horror; and yet their great clerks will countenance it. The wisdom of their church hath thought it fit, that they should not be so wise as to understand what they do, when they are serving God. The Council of Trent fulminates a curse against those

¹ Per hoc fides distinguitur contra scientiam, et melius per ignorantiam quam per notitiam definitur, l. i. de justit. c. vii. p. 706, sect. judicium.

² Consummata et perfectissima obedientia.—*Infra*.

³ Laicos, ad dogmata fidei quod attinet, non propriis sed prælatorum suorum oculis, videre oportet.

⁴ Vid. Navar. de Orat. c. x. n. xxxvi., et c. xviii. n. xxxii.; Spotsw. Hist. l. ii. p. 92 Molanus Theol. pract. tr. iii. c. ix. n. vi.

who hold that the mass ought to be celebrated in a known tongue; that is, they curse those who approve not that mode of service, which the apostle condemns as barbarous, 1 Cor. xiv., such as is not fit for God or man; they curse those who will not offer a blind sacrifice, or blindfolded.¹ As if one under the law ought not to have seen whether that which he offered were a hog or a sheep; whether he sacrificed a lamb, or cut off a dog's neck; whether he presented an oblation, or offered swine's blood. They think not only the people, but even the clergy unconcerned, to know what they say when they speak unto God. The clergy (saith Jacobus de Graffis), or the laity, when they are at divine service, if they understand not what they say, they sin not.² It is so far from being their duty to serve God as Christians, that they need not act as men in his service. If the words be but said, though with no more understanding than magpies are taught to sound them, it is as reasonable service as their church requires; what God requires of them is no matter.³ They expect not that any should understand their service but expert divines, as Soto tells us.⁴ Now it is a very small part of their clergy that pretends to be divines, and a small part of those few that are expert therein; it is an attainment which most of their bishops fall short of. Their common priests are sufficiently qualified with the art of reading, nor need they be masters of that neither; the mass-book is almost taught to read itself. For in the missals established by Pius the Fifth, and recognised by Clement the Eighth, every syllable is diversely marked, whether it is to be sounded long or short. What do we speak of clergy or priests? It is not necessary for their popes to be able to understand, or to read their common prayers; themselves spare not to divulge this. It is manifest, saith Alphonsus à Castro, that many popes are so illiterate, that they are utterly ignorant of the grammar.⁵ It seems he may be universal pastor, and the teacher of the whole world, who hath not learned his grammar; and the infallible guide of all mortals, who understands not his own language, wherein the articles of faith, their laws, ceremonies, and church service is delivered. And is it not very much that two things so different as ignorance and infallibility, should have the good hap to meet together in the same person?

Sect. 2. Secondly, they need not know what they are to believe; they tell us they are obliged, under pain of damnation, to believe whatever the visible church of Christ proposeth, as revealed by almighty God. Now, their church proposeth for points of faith so revealed, not only what they have in Scripture, but what they have by tradition, or by the custom of the church in former ages, or by the consent of the fathers, or by the decrees of councils, or by the determination of popes, *ex cathedra*, whereby points of faith become infinitely numerous, beyond all account which the learned amongst them can give, either to satisfy themselves or others; yet all must be believed, and that under pain of damnation, whenas it is but a very small part of them that can be commonly known. The articles of the creed called the apostles',

¹ *Omnis sermo qui non intelligitur barbarus judicatur.*—*Jerom.* in 1 Cor. xiv.

In Navar de horis.—*Canon.* cap. xiii. n. iv. They are directed to address themselves to God or the virgin Mary thus: Grant, O Lord, or Lady, what I ask, though I know not what.

² *Clerici aut laici qui divinis intersunt, si non intelligunt quæ dicunt, non peccant.* l. ii. c. li. n. xii. p. 291.

³ *Quid hoc sit intelligere debemus uti humana ratione, non quasi avium voce cantemus.* Nam et meruli, psittaci et corvi et picæ et hujusmodi volucres, sæpe ab hominibus docentur sonare quod nesciunt, scienter autem cantare non avi sed homini, divina voluntate concessum est.—*Augustin.* in Ps. xviii. exposit. secunda, p. 103, t. viii.

⁴ *Supra*, l. x. q. v. art. v.

⁵ *Cum constet plures papas adeo illiteratos esse ut grammaticam penitus ignorent,* l. i. advers. Hæres. cap. iv. ed. Paris, 1534.

are not the hundredth part of those points that must be believed by all that will not be damned ; and yet they generally conclude that it is not necessary for the people to know all of those few articles. How to believe the rest, and it may be five hundred times more, which they know nothing of, nor ever once came into their thoughts, they must make what shift they can.

However, they need not know all the articles of the small creed, as the chief of them teach. Not all, saith Aquinas,¹ but what is sufficient to direct to the last end ; not all, saith Scotus,² but the gross things, as that Christ was born and suffered, and others belonging to redemption ; not all, saith Sylvester,³ and many with him, but those particularly for which the church hath public solemnities ; not all, saith Bonaventure,⁴ but those which we have notice of by the church solemnities, or acts of the priests, and these in him are four, that of the nativity, passion, resurrection, and remission of sins, to which he adds another, which the sign of the cross teacheth, and wherein Angelus follows him ;⁵ so that the half and more needs not to be known, for they reckon fourteen in all.

Others there are who require not this little, nor think it needful to know these articles more than implicitly, that is, without understanding them ; so Gulielmus Parisiensis, and Altissiodorensis⁶ in Bannez. Summa Rosellæ, after others,⁷ holds it enough for the simple, and perhaps all discerning people, to believe that God is the rewarder of the good, and punisher of the evil. A compendious creed, truly, and that which will never trouble the conscience of a Turk or a heathen ; the knowledge and faith of a barbarous infidel is enough, it seems, to make a papal Christian. Accordingly, others teach, that such as are educated amongst catholics, and are ignorant of the Trinity, are excused from the explicit knowledge thereof, especially if they want a teacher. So Bartholomew, Medina, and Immanuel say, who gives this reason for it : We cannot say that an infinite number of Christians, otherwise good people, do perish, that scarce know anything aright of the mystery of the Trinity and incarnation ; yea, judge perversely of these points if you ask them.⁸ And yet, without the knowledge of the incarnation of Christ, there is no knowledge of the creed or of the gospel. Sancta Clara is of the same mind too, and quotes others for it.⁹

¹ Nec tamen necesse est chilibet explicite credere omnes articulos fidei, sed quantum sufficit ad dirigendum in ultimum finem, dist. xxv. q. ii. art. i., vid. Sylvest. v. fides.

² Maxime ad illa quæ sunt grossa ad capiendum, sicut quod Christus natus est et passus, et alia quæ pertinent ad redemptionem.—*Vid. Sta. Clara*, probl. xv. p. 94.

³ Ut quæ solemnizantur in ecclesia quantum ad omnes catholicos, v. fides. n. vi.

⁴ Quas cognoscere potest ex ipsis solemnitatibus, quas ecclesia celebrat, et actibus sacerdotum, iii. dist. xxv. n. xxvi.

⁵ De unitate et Trinitate quam ex signatione noscere possunt, cum dicunt in nomine Patris et Filii, &c. item de nativitate, passione et resurrectione quæ festa prædicant : et remissione peccatorum quam ex actu presbyterorum noscere possunt.—*Sum. v. fides. n. vii.*

⁶ If a man were demanded whether Christ were born of the Virgin, and whether there were one God and three persons, he might sufficiently answer, I know not ; but I believe as the church holds.—*Bann. in xxii. q. ii. art. viii. sect. dubitatur.*

⁷ Dicens quod simplicibus, et forte omnibus laicis discernentibus et adultis, sufficit credere Deum esse præmiatorem omnium bonorum, et malorum omnium punitorem. Alios autem articulos sufficit credere implicite, credendo scil. verum quicquid ecclesia catholica docet.—*Post. dic. l. i. in Sylv. v. fides n. vi.*

Baptista Trovamala herein followed Peter Casuille, and says this is ' fidei mensura ad quam quilibet tenetur, et quæ sufficit simplicibus et forte omnibus laicis.'—*Sum. Rosell. v. fides. n. i.*

⁸ Quid enim dicemus ne perire infinitam Christianorum, alioquin bonorum, multitudinem, qui de mysterio etiam Trinitatis, et incarnationis, vix quidquam norunt recte, immo perverse sentiunt, si interrogas ?—v. fides. n. 1. *Ita Ferr. Medina*, l. c. xiv. sect. ii.

⁹ Deus, natura, gratia.—*Problem. xv.*

So that by this doctrine a man needs not know the persons in the God-head, nor the incarnation of Christ, upon which his birth, life, death, resurrection, and intercession depends, which are the sum of the gospel; yea, he may not only be ignorant of these truths, the knowledge of which, if of any, is necessary to salvation, but he may have false and perverse apprehensions of them, and yet be secure from perishing. According to Soto and Medina,¹ he that is ignorant of the incarnation and Trinity, because he was educated in the mountains, without a preacher to instruct him, will be saved if he die in grace, which they suppose he may have without knowledge, for an implicit faith, that is, without knowledge, will then serve his turn. *Secundum doctores nobiles*, as noble doctors conclude, saith Lopez, so that they may have eternal life without knowing the true God, or Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. Ignorance hereof will be invincible, that is, both inculpable in itself, and sufficient to justify the criminal issues of it, if they want a teacher, that is, not only if it be not possible, but if it be difficult or inconvenient to have one.²

The cardinals of the Inquisition at Rome³ will have such confessors allowed, who hold that persons are capable of absolution, and so supposed to be in a state of salvation, how palpable soever their ignorance might be of the mysteries of faith; nay, though out of pure negligence they know nothing of the mystery of the blessed Trinity, or of the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Medina teacheth, that if one when he is dying acknowledge that he hath been very negligent to learn Christian doctrine, and would not hear it, and thereby wants the knowledge of the mystery of the incarnation and Trinity, and the articles of faith, yet to deny him absolution would be impious: so Lopez reports him,⁴ and himself says,⁵ such an one is to be absolved. Here is encouragement, more than enough, to live and die in gross ignorance, and those who have a mind to continue without the knowledge of God under the name of men, or of Christ, under the profession of Christians, have a general warrant by their doctrine to do it.

For the former sort of their divines, who seem to require a knowledge of some articles, do indeed make no more knowledge necessary than those who require it not. For when they explain themselves, commonly such a knowing is sufficient, as is without understanding, a dark conceit, that such things there be, though they apprehend not at all what they are. Such mysterious subtilties their doctors are pleased with, as they have a sort of faith without knowledge, or any thought of what they believe; so a knowledge without understanding.

Scotus⁶ thinks they have sufficient knowledge of the Trinity, three persons and one nature, who can neither apprehend what a person or a nature is.

¹ In 4 sentent., Sum. fol. lxxv. p. 2, quando quis laborat ignorantia invincibili fidei explicitæ incarnationis et Trinitatis, quia cum esset educatus in montibus, caruit prædicatore ipsum de ipsa instruentem secundum veram sententiam, cum sola fide implicita, hoc est sine explicita, salvabitur, si moriatur in gratia, ad quam assequendam secundum Doctores nobiles sic ignorantem explicitam satis est cum cæteris requisitis fides implicita. — Lopez, c. vii. p. 45.

² Vid. Sylv. ignorantia. n. 5 et. v. impossib. Impossibile dicitur, 1, quod simpliciter fieri non potest; 2, quod fieri potest sed cum difficultate. Juridice dicitur, 1, quod non potest fieri juste; 2, quod non potest fieri commode.

³ Addit. to provincial Letters, p. 100, &c., c. ii. n. xvii.

⁴ Instruct. c. vii. p. 45.

⁵ P. 50, Talis est absolvendus.

⁶ Qui non possit concipere quid est natura et quid persona, non est necesse quod habeat actum explicitum, de articulo pertinente ad essentiam, et personarum Trinitatem distincte, sicut habent clerici literati, sed sufficit talibus credere, sicut ecclesia, credit. — Vid. Sta. Cia. *ibid*.

Accordingly, Bonaventure saith,¹ the people may know the Trinity by crossing themselves, since they do it in the name of the Father, &c.; and by the festivals, they may know the rest which is necessary to be understood. And when it is argued, that there are few, but such as are expert in divinity, who know how to distinguish and number the articles of the creed; and therefore, if all were bound to know them distinctly and explicitly, *id est*, to know what they mean, few or none would be saved, which is an extreme cruel saying; he in his answer grants it all.²

Bellarmino³ seems to make some knowledge of the articles of the creed necessary, but what it is he signifies elsewhere, when he tells us that experience witnesseth that the greatest part of the faithful, and in a manner all the country people, are so far from understanding the mystery of the Trinity, and the incarnation, and other such points necessary to salvation, that they scarce apprehend anything besides the mere sound of the words, and yet are deservedly counted believers.

So cardinal Tolet requires in those that are to be absolved, a kind of acquaintance with some prime articles of faith, but signifies it will be sufficient if, hearing them rehearsed,⁴ they can tell us which is an article, and which not; and this they may do by the sound, though they understand nothing of the sense.⁵ De Graffis is confident, that a confessor may make an ignorant person understand all that is necessary to salvation by making the sign of the cross. And Angelus, who would have three or four articles of the creed to be known, yet concludes, if one can answer this or that article decently,⁶ *Quod sic*, it is so; it will be sufficient for him, though he know not the creed.

Sylvester pretends to make more knowledge requisite than Rosella, but yet he determines⁷ that mere want of knowledge is no sin; that it is not a sin to be ignorant of what he ought to know, but upon the account of negligence; that negligence to know things necessary to salvation may be a mortal sin sometimes, but when, it is hard to tell, yea, impossible. So that here is encouragement enough to continue carelessly in ignorance of things necessary to salvation, and to neglect saving knowledge; for when this is a mortal sin, no man can tell, and a venial fault no man needs avoid. In short, they not only justify simple ignorance, how gross soever, but that which has a worse character, *ignorantia prave dispositionis*: and count it no crime, not

¹ Possunt nosse ex ipso actu consignationis, consignant enim in nomine Patris, &c. Cognoscere possent ex ipsis solemnitatibus.—*Ibid.* n. xxvi.

² *Ibid.* n. xxvii.

³ Et sane ita esse, experientia testatur, cum maxima pars fidelium, vel propter ætatem puerilem, vel propter sexum muliebrem, vel propter ingenii habitudinem, vel propter imperitiam literarum, et scientiarum, quales sunt pene omnes rustici, non solum non intelligunt mysteria Trinitatis, et incarnationis, et similia necessaria ad salutem, sed vix quidquam animo concipiant, præter sonum verborum; et tamen inter fideles merito numerantur.—*De justif.* l. i. c. vii. p. 705.

⁴ Sciat respondere esse mandatum vel articulum, quæ sunt; non autem esse, quæ non sunt.—*Instruct.* l. iii. c. xvii.

⁵ Decis. p. 1, l. i. c. xxiv. n. iii. vid. infra.

⁶ Idem possit dici de aliquo qui nescit *Credo parvum*, tamen si interrogaretur Deus est unus? responderet, quod sic—et sic de cæteris responderet, quod sic. Quod sufficeret sibi, licet nesciret præfatum *Credo*.—*Sum. v. scientia.*

⁷ Privatio ipsa scientiæ secundum se non est peccatum v. ignorant. n. 8, est peccatum ratione negligentiae.—*Ibid.* Negligentia addiscendi necessaria ad salutem, quæ aliquando est mortale, licet hoc judicare sit difficile.—v. *Acedia.* n. iii. Non potest sermone determinari.—v. *Prædicat.* n. vii. supra.

Ipsamet ignorantia vincibilis non est formaliter peccatum nec commissionis, nec omissionis, &c.—*Bonacina*, de peccat. d. ii. q. viii. p. 3, n. xxxi. After Corduba and many others.

only to want the knowledge of the articles of faith, but, out of ignorance, to entertain opinions contrary thereto. He that believes an heresy, saith Navarre,¹ out of simplicity or ignorance, because he thinks the church holds it, and is ready to relinquish it when the truth shall be discovered regularly, he sins not mortally. And with Alphonsus à Castro, no kind of heresy is a sin, if it be out of ignorance and without pertinacy;² if their teachers instil such errors into the people, and they, through ignorance, receive impressions contrary to points of faith, and follow such guides blindfold, therein they sin not. Yea, I say more, saith Angelus,³ Sometimes such an error may be meritorious; for example, one hears a famous preacher or a bishop preach some error, and he simply believes it, with a mind to be obedient to the faith, but ready to be reduced, for things are to be judged of by the intention. But sometimes it may be a venial fault,⁴ as when an old woman believes the Trinity to be one woman; and because she thinks the church so holds, therefore believes it.

To recite the names of those who assert that the people, through ignorance, may safely follow their teachers in errors, would be tedious, they are so many. For shortness, let us take Sancta Clara's word, who tells us,⁵ It is now the common opinion of their schools and doctors, that people erring with their teachers or pastors, are wholly excused from all fault; yea, many times by so erring materially, for this Christian obedience which they owe their pastors, they merit. So that ignorance of points, whose belief is with them necessary to salvation, is so far from being a sin, that it can render heresy sinless, yea, make the entertaining of damnable errors to be a meritorious belief.

We cannot expect that knowledge should be accounted necessary, where the worst sort of ignorance hath such excess of honour and privilege. It is no more necessary, nor more of it, according to their principles, *necessitate præcepti*, by virtue of any command, than we have shewed out of their best writers. But then the *necessitas medii*, needfulness as a means or way to life, that is none at all; for as the same author tells us, and brings us abundant evidence of it, it is the common doctrine of their more grave divines,⁶ that men may now be saved; and the more common tenet of their schools,⁷ that they may be justified without the explicit belief, and so without the knowledge of Christ himself. So that those who hold the knowledge of Christ unnecessary to salvation are many, and their most grave divines; those that count it unnecessary to justification, are the greatest number of their doctors: put these both together, and there will be few left amongst them, and these little considerable in comparison, for number or gravity, but such as judge the knowledge of Christ needless to bring men into a saving

¹ Idem ibid. n. ix. Si præ simplicitate aut ignorantia id credit, quia sibi videtur ecclesia ita tenere, et est paratus errorem deponere quandocunque veritatem fuerit edoctus—nec peccat mortaliter regulariter l. xi. n. xxii. p. 141.

² Lib. i. adversa. Hæres. c. ix.

³ Immo plus dico, quod aliquando talis error possit esse meritorius, ut puta, aliquis audit aliquem prædicatorem famosum, vel episcopum prædicasse aliquem errorem, et simplex credit animo obediendi fidei, paratus tamen corrigi. Nam ex intentione opera judicantur cum voluntate.—*De sent. excom. sum. Angel. v. fides. n. vi.*

⁴ Aliquando cum peccato veniali, ut puta, vetula credit Trinitatem esse unam familiam: et quoniam credit ecclesiam sic tenere, sic credit.—*Id. ibid.*

⁵ Et videtur hodie communis sententia scholarum et doctorum, quod laici errantes cum suis doctoribus aut pastoribus omnino ob omni culpa excusentur, immo multoties sic materialiter errando, ob actum obedientiæ, quam pastoribus suis debent, merentur Problem. xv. p. 99.

⁶ Putem plane hanc esse sententiam doctoris, et communem.—*Ibid. p. 90.*

⁷ Et hæc est communio in scholis.—*Ibid. p. 89.*

state; for this, it will not be needful to be Christians, unless any can be Christians without the actual belief or knowledge of Christ.

Sect. 8. Thirdly, They need not know what they ought to do; they may be, without sin, ignorant of what the Lord hath made their duty. Adrian, Corduba, Herrera, determine, and it is the more common and received opinion, that men may be inculpably ignorant of the law of nature and the ten commandments, as Sancta Clara informs us.¹ But, then, since they need not know the rule, what have they to follow? Why, the direction of their teachers; and these they must follow blindfold, right or wrong. It is one of the qualifications required in the obedience of others, but especially of the religious, which they would have us think to be best of all, that it be blind;² nor should fear of going wrong move them to open or use their own eyes, for if they do wander out of the way of God after such guides, yet they are right, and do their duty. Those who managed the conference³ for the Romanists at Ratisbon, anno 1601, maintained that the people are so subjected to the government of their teachers, that if they err, the people may and ought to err with them. And they are not only excused from all faults, when they thus wander with their teachers, but their obedience to their pastors herein is many times meritorious. This is the judgment, not only of Valentia, Angles, Vasquez, but the common determination of their schools in Sancta Clara.⁴ It seems a man may deserve eternal life by leaving the way to it, and may come to heaven meritoriously by wandering from it. What a strange thing is it, that they will not let their catholics be certain of salvation, since they cannot miss it, no, not by going out of the way that leads to it! When they follow their guide into the ditch, yet they are safe; but that is a small matter: by being willing to be led by such as see not, or mind not the way, they merit, and spring up to heaven marvellously, even when they are falling from a precipice, and tumbling headlong after their leaders.

The same author tells us⁴ that some doctors ascribe so much to the instruction of pastors, who have care of the flock, that if they should teach that now and then God would have them to hate him, a simple parishioner is bound to believe them. All think not fit to give so broad instances; but whether all have not warrant to do it by their common tenet, let others judge.

However, if the people (content to trust, and not to see, what so much concerns them) suffer themselves to be deceived, they sin not, their ignorance will save them harmless.⁵ And what would any impostor desire more than to have those whom he hath a mind to abuse to the uttermost, possessed with such a confidence, that however they be deluded, it will not hurt them? Now what an admirable expedient is ignorance for the children of this kingdom, when by virtue of it the leaders may carry the people whither they list without suspicion, the people may follow in the dark without danger! No wonder if ignorance be nourished in them by all means, when they are not concerned to know whether that which they are led to be good or evil,

¹ Communior tamen et recepta sententia post Adrianum, et est nostri Cordubæ et Herræræ et aliorum communiter, quod potest dari ignorantia invincibilis respectu legis naturæ et decalogi.—*Probl. xvi. initio.*

² Obedientiam cæcam, promptam, fortem, esse par est, de his conditionibus in obedientia religiosa præsertim requisitis bene.—*P. L. Victorel. ibid. ad. l. viii. c. xiv. p. 11, 8.*

³ Hungerus, Velserus, Hannemannus, Oretzerus, Tannerus.

⁴ Vid. supra.

⁵ Immo aliqui doctores tantum tribuunt instructioni pastorum, quibus incumbit cura ovium, quod si docerent hic et nunc, Deum velle odio haberi, quod teneatur parochianus rudis eis credere.—*Ibid. Probl. xv. p. 97.*

just or unjust, against God, or for him; whatever it be, they ought to obey at a venture. They need not so much as know whether their leaders have power to require what they enjoin.¹

If they be in doubt whether that they are led to be against the law, yet on they must go, for they all agree here to drive them. *Secundum omnes*,² saith Sylvester, if he doubt of this, whether it be against the command of God, yet he is bound to obey, he may venture safely. It seems that is no danger which the apostle speaks of, 'He that doubteth is damned,' Rom. xiv. 23. They allege³ an express text for this in their law, which will carry it against the apostle.

And as that evil which God forbids may be done by him that doubts lest God hath condemned it, so⁴ that good which he hath enjoined (if salvation can be had without it) may be neglected when superiors will have it so; their canonical text saith it,⁵ which must be regarded whatever becomes of that other, 'Whether it be better to obey God or men, judge you,' Acts iv. 19.

Yea, if they be past doubt, that what is required is against God, if they think, if they believe it to be against his command, yet if they believe it but upon weak grounds,⁶ yea, or if upon probable grounds (if they be not more certain thereof than they ought to be of their salvation), they are to suppress their own judgment, and will be excused for the goodness of such obedience, i. e. for obeying men rather than God, and that against their own judgment.

Such art is used to persuade the people, that they need see nothing they are to do further than their leaders would have them; if they doubt or if they believe, if their eyes be opening or if they be opened, they must shut them close, and obey men blindly, without discerning what God forbids or requires. And it is not for nothing that they deprive them of their eyes, for thus they can make them grind. Such ignorance is the way to have them in more subjection, and that they account the most perfect obedience, which is next to brutish, without knowledge, and without judgment; that they need not have, and this they must not use. A judgment of discretion must by no means be left the people, that is a point they would maintain against us; but as to their own followers, they put it out of question beforehand, for by keeping them without knowledge, they leave them no judgment, but such as

¹ Non oportet quod sciat id ab eo juberi posse.—*Nav. l. xxiii. n. xxxvii.*

Affirmant in omni dubio parendum esse præposito. Bonavent. Paludan. Sylvest. Angelus, Sotus in Vasquez, in 1, 2 tom. i. disp. lxvi. l. ix.

² Secundum omnes si est de hoc dubius (illud esse contra legem Dei)—tenetur obedire.—*Sylvest. v. consc. n. iii.* Et generaliter ubi est dubius an debeat obedire necne, tenetur obedire.—*Idem. v. relig. vi. n. vi.* Quid si prælatus præcipiat aliquid quod conscientia subditi dicat esse contra legem Dei? Resp. secundum Bonaventuram quod tenetur eam deponere, nisi clarum sit illud fore contra legem Dei.—*Sum. Angel. v. Conscient. n. ii.* Quid debet facere inferior, quando dubius est, an quod ei præcipitur est peccatum? dico debet obedire. Ita tenet Sylvest. et habetur hoc expresse.

³ xxiii. q. 1. *Can. quid culpatur* ubi statuitur, cum non est certum, superiorum factum esse malum, esse obediendum: in dubiis enim debet inferior credere superiori.—*Tolet. Instr. l. viii. c. xv.*

⁴ Immo aliquando etiam bonum, sine quo potest esse salus, propter obedientiam debet omitti.—*Sylv. v. obedient. n. 2.*

⁵ 11. q. 8. quid ergo. *ibid.*

⁶ Si vero opinatur, ita quod nescit, nec dubitat, sed credit, distinguendum est: quia si credit ex levibus, tenetur tale iudicium deponere, &c., et obedire: et similiter si credit probabiliter, et excusatur propter obedientiæ bonum.—*Sylvest. v. consc. n. 3.*

Si non scit pro certo sed ex levi et temeraria credulitate, tunc ad consilium sui prælati, deponat. Si vero habeat credulitatem probabilem et discretam, quamvis non manifestam et evidentem: tunc propter obedientiam, faciat quod sibi præcipitur, quoniam tenetur in tali dubio, et propter bonum obedientiæ excusatur.—*Sum. Angel. v. consc. n. 2.*

one may pass on colours in the dark. Ribera expresseth their sense significantly,¹ All who are to obey, especially religious persons, ought to have no head of their own, i.e. they are to obey as if they were without eyes or brains. So he explains this worthy expression, *non suo sed rectoris sui consilio duci*. Let me but add the pregnant words of Cardinal Cusanus, which comprise all that I charge them with in this particular,² No man (saith he) can be deceived by an ill pastor; if thou say, Lord, I have obeyed thee in him whom thou hast set over me, this will be sufficient for thy salvation; for thou by obedience paid to a teacher whom the church tolerates, cannot be deceived, although he command what is unlawful. Wherefore the opinion of the pastor binds thee upon thy salvation for the good of obedience, although it be unjust; for it belongs not to thee to take notice whether it be unlawful or not, neither hast thou leave not to obey if it seem unlawful to thee, for that obedience which is irrational is the most complete and most perfect obedience, to wit, when one obeys without the use of reason, as a beast obeys his owner. A speech fit only for the mouth of the beast and the false prophet.

The sum of their doctrine concerning ignorance is little less than this: they need not be men as to their obedience; they need not be Christians as to the knowledge of Christ; they need scarce be either as to their worship.

Sec. 4. The ground of all this is, that they judge the knowledge of the Scriptures unnecessary, in a manner, to all sorts; yea, count it necessary to keep as many as they can possibly from acquaintance therewith. They are highly concerned for this, even as much as those who have villainous designs, and would accomplish them without observance and control, are concerned to shun the light. They know full well the Scripture condemns popery; we may well say they know it, when themselves confess³ that both their worship and their doctrine is contrary and repugnant to Scripture, and allege this as the reason why they would have as little of the Scripture, as can be, known to any. From their own mouths we have the reason why they would never have suffered the Bible to be exposed in a vulgar tongue, if it could have been avoided. The protestants' translations made that impossible, and the papists among them, who had a mind to look into the word of God, might have made use of these; if no other had been provided. To prevent which they were forced to translate it, and yet their own translations (which are so strange a disguise of Scripture) they dare not trust to the common view; they are in the index of forbidden books put out by Pius the Fourth, and an unpardonable sin they make it for any to read them, but such as can procure a licence for it from a bishop or inquisitor; that is, none but those who, they are confident, will not be moved by what they meet with there against popery. And yet (as if so great restraint were too much liberty for so dangerous a thing as the word of God), in the after edition of the index, by Clement the Eighth, he declares that no new faculty is granted to bishops or inquisitors to grant any licence for reading the Bible, since, by the mandate and usage of the church of Rome, and the universal inquisition, all power of granting such licences is

¹ Omnes qui parent, et præsertim religiosi homines, debent esse sine capite, *Comment in Amos*, p. 269.

² Nemo decipi potest etiam per malum præsentem: si dixeris, Domine, obedivi tibi in præposito, hoc tibi sufficiet ad salutem: tu enim per obedientiam quam facis præposito quem ecclesia tolerat, decipi nequis, etiamsi præceperit injusta: quare sententia pastoris ligat te pro tua salute propter bonum obedientiæ, etiamsi injusta fuerit: nam ad te non attinet cognoscere quod sententia sit injusta, nec conceditur tibi ut non obedias, si tibi injusta videatur: obedientia irrationalis est consummata obedientia et perfectissima, scilicet quando obeditur, sicut jumentum obedit domino suo. *Epist. 2 ad Bohemos et Excitat.* l. ii. et vi.

³ Consil. de stabilienda Rom. sede, p. 6.

taken away.¹ So far are they from thinking the knowledge of the Scriptures needful for the people, that they count it heresy to affirm the Scripture ought to be in a language which they know (how can it be less than heresy to think that needful to be known, though it be the revelation of God, which discovers popery to be an imposture?). It is a sin from which they shall never be absolved, if they read anything of the word of God in a language which they understand, without a licence from a bishop or inquisitor, by Pius his rule; and no bishop or inquisitor hath any power to grant any licence, by that of Pope Clement.

Knowledge of the Scripture is no more needful for monks than other people; it is equally necessary that they should be ignorant of the word of God; they are under the same restraint, and are no otherwise permitted to read or buy it.² Ignorance is proper for this kind of creature, they are for contemplation, not for knowledge.³ It seems they may employ their heads in contemplation of they know not what. To be sure they need neither sacred nor any kind of literature. A monk may be illiterate (say they) they have that privilege by their canon law, there quoted by Sylvester and others,⁴ and they generally make use of this indulgence; for their clergy, six parts of seven, need no more to be acquainted with the Scripture than the black art. The four first orders are sufficiently accomplished, if they are able to read⁵ (according to the Council of Trent); the two next should understand Latin, *i. e.* the words, but not the matter, yet no necessity of either; it is not of necessity to their sacrament of order⁶ that any below a bishop should have the use of reason when he enters into orders.

Yea, their priests need not have any knowledge of the Scriptures. It is no part of their qualification;⁷ nor doth their office, by the Roman constitution, require it; all that belongs commonly to a priest is only to say service and to say mass;⁸ there are infinite numbers made priests merely to read mass (as

¹ In indice recens edito jussu Clementis 8, circa prædictam quartam regulam—nullam per hanc impressionem et editionem de novo tribui facultatem episcopis vel inquisitoribus, aut regularium superioribus concedendi licentiam legendi biblia in vulgari lingua edita; cum hactenus mandato et usu S. R. E. et universalis inquisitionis, sublata eis fuerit facultas concedendi hujusmodi licentias in Azor. Instit. Mor. pars. i. l. viii. cap. xxvi.

² Regulares vero, non nisi facultate a prælatis suis habita ea legere aut emere possint. Index lib. prohibet. a Con. Trid. iv. regula. i. ita Pius iv. Sublata est regularium superioribus facultas concedendi licentiam.—*Ita Clemens. viii. id. ibid.*

³ Contemplatione magis indigent quam scientia.—*Sylv. v. Clericus. ii. n. 1. Graff. l. i. c. xv. n. 5.*

⁴ Potest monachus esse illiteratus, ut. not. per gloss. xvi. q. i. ca. legi versic. instructio. Graff. *ibid.* facit quod legitur xvi. q. i. ubi dicit Joann. quod sufficit monacho si sit bonus, licet sit illiteratus.—*Sylvest. ibid.*

⁵ Nam in minoribus constitutis, sufficit scire legere, et commodo pronunciare; et juxta Conc. Trid. Sess. xxiii. c. xi. Saltem Latinam linguam intelligere diacono, et subdiacono sufficit intelligere quæ Latine legit, licet mysteria non ita calleat, Tolet. Inst. l. i. c. xciii.

⁶ Ordines autem majores etiam presbyteratum posse conferri infantibus, est communis doctrina theologorum et canonistarum, S. Tho. Bonavent, Richard, &c.—*Idem. ibid. cap. lxi.*

S. Tho. tenet et probat quod in solo Episcopatu requiritur usus rationis in suscipiente de necessitate consecrationis Episcopalis.—*Sylv. v. ordo. iv. n. i. vid. Angel. v. ordo. iii. n. i.*

⁷ Ad Presbyteratum sufficit scire canones communes pœnitentiales et cætera de quibus dist. xxxviii. quæ ipsis. *Sylv. v. Cleric. ii. n. i. Graff. l. i. c. xv. n. 5.* Angelus reduces their canons to twenty (none of which have any ground in Scripture).—*Sum. v. confes. vi. n. v.*

⁸ Primum et secundum officium (viz. divinum officium et missam celebrare) commune est omnibus, reliqua vero, quæ ad praxim pertinent, non nisi iis, quibus ex munere particulari incumbunt.—*Tolet. ibid. l. i. c. iii.*

Polydore Virgil tells us);¹ and this they may do completely, though they cannot so much as read without a fescue, such as the missal hath ready for every syllable.²

But if the priest have a special cure, and so be a preacher or confessor, yet may he be both good enough without any acquaintance with the Scripture; he may preach the gospel after the Roman mode, without knowing the word of God; for with them it belongs both to deacons and monks to preach; yet those need not understand anything of Scripture, and these must not read it in a language they understand, without a licence.³

The priests in Scotland were accounted sufficiently qualified, who, it is said, did think the New Testament to have been composed by Martin Luther.⁴

The priests even in Italy, if they had more notice of the author, yet scarce more acquaintance with the contents of the New Testament; they never read it, and were much more ignorant thereof than the silly women amongst the Taborites, as Æneas Sylvius, afterward Pope Pius II., writes.⁵

Knowledge of the Scriptures was not counted necessary for their preachers, either regular or secular.⁶ The chief of their regulars were the Franciscans and Dominicans. In the rule of friar Francis, approved by several popes, the Minorites (one sort of preaching friars) are, amongst other vices, to avoid learning, if they were illiterate.

And those of the Dominicans (the order of friars prædicant) who were rude and illiterate, did preach notwithstanding.⁷

As for their other doctors or teachers, that which they are bound to know, is, the rudiments of faith (such as our children, who can scarce read, will give an account of.⁸

The papacy had no doctors or divines more eminent than those of the Sorbonne; yet they seem little beholding to the Scripture for their divinity. Robert Stevens in the last age, conversing with those doctors, would be asking in what part of the New Testament such or such a thing is written, but had such answers returned. They had read it in Jerome, or the Decrees, but what the New Testament was they knew not.⁹

For a confessor he is sufficiently qualified, according to Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Albertus, as Sylvester collects, if he have but read and understand (not the Bible), but Antoninus his book entituled *Defecerunt*, unless he be a mere natural or presumptuous fool; and neither will doubt of anything (when he knows nothing), nor inquire of others.¹⁰ So that he may be

¹ Sunt autem infiniti, qui tantum celebrandis missis, quas dicunt, operam dant, et ejus rei causa sacerdotes sunt, perinde quasi in ea omne consistat officium—*De invent. rer.* l. iv. c. vii.

² Sacerdos in quantum deputatus est ad officium divinum tenetur scire tantum de Grammatica, quod sciat verba congrue proferre, et accentuare, et quod intelligat saltem literaliter quæ legit.—*Graff.* pars. ii. t. i. c. xi. n. xix.

³ Angel. sum. v. prædic. Sylvest. sum. v. Diaconus, n. iii. ex Paludano. Gratian. in Navar. c. xxvii. n. 259.

⁴ Hist. of Ch. of Scot. l. ii. p. 75.

⁵ Pudeat Italiæ sacerdotes, quos ne semel quidem legisse constat novam legem: apud Thaboritas vix mulierculam invenias, quæ de novo et veteri testamento respondere nescit. Comment de dict. et fact. Alfonsi regis lib. ii. Apophtheg. xvii.

⁶ Et non curent nescientes literas, literas discere.

⁷ Illi rudes et illiterati prædicabant.—*Urspergens* in Cent. xiii. Magd. cap. vi.

⁸ Si vero sacerdos est doctor, tenetur scire saltem rudimenta fidei.—*Graff.* decis. pars. ii. l. i. c. xi. n. xix.

⁹ Se illud apud Hieronymum aut in decretis legisse; quid vero novum Testamentum esset, ignorare.—*Rob. Steph. Resp. ad Censur. Theol. Paris in Præfat.*

¹⁰ Secundum istos sufficientem credo, qui attente legit et intellexit *Defecerunt*: nisi

a complete confessor and guide of consciences, who knows nothing of Scripture, and little else, if he have but the wit to discern his own ignorance, and a will to learn of those that are wiser, when he can meet with them. Thus we see a Roman priest is furnished for all points of the office, common or special, without any acquaintance with the word of God.

As to bishops, they seem to agree, that some knowledge of the Scripture is requisite in them, and some venture to say a full and perfect knowledge of the Old and New Testament, signified by their mitres, the two horns whereof mystically demonstrate, that they understand the two Testaments both alike. And, indeed, since their prelates, secular and regular, have honour, power, and plenty by the papal contrivement, and hopes of more and greater than other professions can offer, their interest ties them so fast to it, that they may trust them (if any) with the sight of the word of God securely, and not fear that any discovery of popish corruptions, through such a medium, will make any impressions on them to their prejudice, or move them to believe, or act anything against that which is so much themselves; there is no such danger in admitting these to some acquaintance with Scripture, as others, who have no expectations from religion, but for their souls and eternity. Nevertheless, their rules which seem to make this knowledge necessary for bishops, are rather counsels than precepts, they are cautious, and will not press this too much (for conscience enlightened sometimes proves too hard for secular interest). And their prelates may be easily dispensed with, if they be ignorant of Scripture, or have little notice of it. It is one of Sylvester's and Angelus's questions, whether an ignorant bishop sin mortally, if in his ordination, being asked whether he understand the whole Bible, he should affirm he does?¹ This he so resolves after Richardus à Sancto Victore. If the bishop be so ignorant, that he knows not in general the commands of God, the articles of faith, what are virtues and vices, and which the sacraments, then he so sins, he lies perniciously: leaving us to judge that he doth not thus lie, when he solemnly affirms, that he hath as much knowledge of the Old and New Testament as the church of Rome requires in a bishop; if he do but know the creed, the ten commandments, which are virtues and vices, and which are sacraments, and have but some general perception of these. They will not have the bishops burdened with too much Scripture learning, since every child they confirm should have no less than this. This may pass for perfect knowledge of the Scripture, and of an episcopal pitch with those who count it no imperfection to be ignorant of that which, they say,² doth more hurt than good, for so they were wont to blaspheme the Scriptures, or the Holy Ghost, whose inspiration they are. The bishop of Dunkeld³ thought he had enough of it, when he said, I thank God I have lived well these many years, and never knew either the Old or New Testament. I content me with my portuis and pontifical (History of Church

sit aut naturaliter stultus, aut præsumptuosus, ut non sciat dubitare, vel nolit interrogare.—*Sylv. Sum. v. Confessor. iii. n. ii. vid. Tol. ibid. l. iii. c. xv.*

That which a Confessor is to know is, which sins are mortal, which venial. Now this they cannot learn from Scripture, as themselves go near to acknowledge (Valent. tom. ii. disp. vi. q. xviii.), and so no need of Scripture for them. *Vide Angel. sum. v. confess. iv. n. iii.; Sylvest. ibid.*

¹ Utrum peccet mortaliter Episcopus ignorans respondendo in ordinatione sua cum interrogatur utrum sciat novum et vetus Testamentum; quod scit. Resp. secundum Rich. quod sic. si est ita ignarus quod nesciat in generali, mandata Dei, articulos fidei, virtutes et vitia, etiam sacramenta, quoniam tunc mentitur pernitiose.—*Angel. sum. v. episc. n. xxvi.; Sylv. ibid. n. v.*

² In indice lib. prohibet. Regul. iv. Pil. iv.

³ Putant peccatum esse si scripturas legerint, et in lege Domini meditabundos, quasi

of Scotland, lib. ii. p. 66). The bishops in other countries thought themselves bound in conscience to be as ignorant of the Scriptures, when they counted it a sin to read them.

Yea, he that wants a sufficiency of this knowledge, though so very little or nothing be sufficient, may be dispensed with upon the account of some other quality. As for example, charity, they say, will make up want of knowledge in those who have not sufficient to make them capable of any place or dignity amongst them.¹ Yea, they may be dispensed with, though they have no better qualities than in Gerson's time, when he tells us, there were none anywhere that were good, or approveable for doctrine or practice, but all chosen were both carnal persons, and ignorant of spiritual things.²

So he in the fifteenth age; and about the same time Clemangis says there were scarce any advanced to the pontifical dignity, who had so much as superficially either read, or heard, or learned the Scriptures; or who had ever touched anything of the Bible, except the cover. 'Quotusquisque hodie est ad pontificale culmen evectus qui sacras vel perfunctorie literas legerit, audierit, didicerit; imo qui sacrum codicem nisi tegumento tenus unquam attigerit.'—*De corrupt. Eccl. Statu*.

In the age after, wherein the Council of Trent was held, we have (in Papyrius Masson de Episc. Urbis) the character of the Roman prelates, by Pasquil begging the next cardinal's cap, as being more capable thereof than the bishops then created.

Si imbellis sum atque rude marmor,
Complures quoque episcopos creari
Ipso me mage Saxeos videbis.

And the same age, in the Council of Trent, where (as they boast) was the flower of all the Roman prelates in Europe, very few of the bishops had knowledge in theology,³ as father Paul tells us, yet these had only decisive

garrulos inutilesque contemnunt. Espenceus in 1 Tim. digress. l. ii. c. ii. p. 180, et in Tit. c. i. p. 486. Edit. Paris an. 1619.

¹ Magnitudo charitatis supplet imperfectum scientiæ.—*Sylvest. sum. v.; Cleric. ii. n. i.*

² Nullibi episcopos bonos et opere et doctrina præditos eligi; sed homines carnales et spiritualium ignaros. Gerson declar. defect. Eccles.

³ The bishops, amongst whom very few had knowledge in theology. Hist. Council. Trent, lib. ii. p. 179. It is not strange they had no skill therein, for the Italian prelates, who carried all in that council, being many more than two to one, neither studied nor read the Scriptures, lest the word of God should seduce them from popery; nor was divinity their study, but the civil and canon law, as one of them informed Espenceus. Memini Episcopum Italum nobilem, nec vero imperitum, mihi dicere, contrarium suum a studio theologico deterri, et quodammodo abhorre, ne sic fiant heretici, quasi vero hæreses ex scripturarum studio nascentur.—*Quam igitur artem vestrates (aio) profitentur? juris (ait) utriusque, sed in primis canonici.*—In Tit. cap. i. p. 486.

Dudithius, an eminent bishop in that convention, calls the prelates who prevailed there, indoctos et stolidos, sed tamen impudentia et audacia utiles.—*Epist. ad Max. ii.*

Yea, the whole Sorbonne determines that it is not requisite to inquire concerning those who sit in council, utrum sint docti et utrum habeant scientiam sacrarum literarum. In Juel, Epist. de conc. Trid. sect. 22.

Duarenus, who writ while that council was sitting, lets us understand how ignorant all their bishops then (few only excepted) were of the Scriptures, not only in Italy, but other countries. Hoc seculo episcopatus et sacerdotia indoctissimis hominibus, et a religione alienis, deferri solent; hodie episcopi nostri (paucis exceptis) sacrarum literarum scientia cæteris ex populo longe inferiores sunt.—*De sac. Eccles. minist. et Benef. lib. i. cap. xi. in sin.*

Some thought it strange, that five cardinals and forty-eight bishops should so easily define the most principal and important points of religion never decided before. Neither was there amongst these prelates any one remarkable for learning; some of

voices in that council, and all was concluded by plurality of their votes ; when far the major part understood not the matters concluded, so that the articles of the Roman faith were voted blindfold. And yet all must be damned who believe not these points of faith, when those who made them so were ignorant of them, and knew not what they did when they decreed them. Such is the Roman charity and knowledge ; so burning and shining are their best lights, they will have all burned here, and in hell, too, for not believing that which the council (for the greater part of it) understood not.

But sure, the knowledge of the pope must be transcendent, especially as to the Scripture ; his place and office requires it, being accounted the head of the whole church (which ought to have good eyes), and teacher of Christians (as much or more than Peter was), and judge in all controversies which concern religion, and interpreter of all difficulties in Scripture, and a more lively oracle of God than the Scripture itself in the things of God. Yes, say they, the pope ought to have far more knowledge than any other, being the president of the whole Christian commonwealth,¹ so de Graffius. But, then, he adds, as to him the presumption of the law is enough for all this, and that presumes that all is in the cabinet of the pope's breast (as it may well be presumed, that a skill beyond that of all physicians is in a bold mountebank), although indeed what is quite contrary may prove true.² Accordingly the pope may be all that they style him, without the knowledge of a novice in the Scripture, without any such acquaintance with it, as to pretend to the name of a divine (though acquaintance with it be expected from none but divines), and many that have the name have little or nothing of the thing. The popes think not themselves concerned at all to trouble their heads with divinity. If he be but a canonist (as Peter no doubt was), he is the apostle's undoubted successor, though he be no more a divine than his chair is, or can make him, and why may not the chair inspire him with knowledge as much as holiness ?³ Pope Innocent the Tenth, in our days (since they have been more concerned for the reputation of the Vatican throne, than, as before, to let monsters of debauchery and ignorance ascend it), declared that he had never studied divinity, nor was it his profession.⁴ Pope Clement the Eighth began to study it when he was very old, and then not to much purpose it seems ; for he could not at last decide the question that he had studied, how much soever their church was concerned in it.

None can understand their church prayers but expert divines, as Soto tells us ;⁵ he means the matter of them indeed, but popes need not understand

them were lawyers, perhaps learned in that profession, but of little understanding in religion ; few divines, but of less than ordinary sufficiency.—*Hist. of Council of Trent*, l. ii. p. 163.

¹ Papa debet habere longè majorem scientiam aliis, cum sit præpositus curiæ toti Christianæ reipublicæ. Pro eo tamen sufficit præsumptio juris, quoad papa præsumitur habere omnia in scrinio pectoris.—*Graff.* l. i. c. xv. n. iii.

² Licet de facto quandoque possit contingere contrarium ; cum memoria hominis sit labilis. id. ibid.

Quum hoc tempore nullus sit Romæ, qui sacras literas didicerit, qua fronte aliquis eorum docere audebit, quod non didicerit ?—*Arnulph. in Concil. Rhem.*

³ The study of the laws, the canon law especially, is the nearest way (breve compendium) to the highest dignities in their church, even the popedom itself, scarce anything being left for divines but curacies. Theologis nihilo pene præter curata, quæ vocant sacerdotia, reliquo facto, as Espensæus informs us in Tit. c. i. p. 486. And the prelate or pope that hath studied the laws needs no divinity, because the law is learning enough ; immo jurium (aiunt isti) bonus interpres theologia non eget : cur ita ? quod in jure omnes disciplinæ includuntur.—*Idem. ibid.* p. 487.

⁴ S. Amour, part. iii. cap. 12.

⁵ Castrens. hæc. c. iv. edit. Paris, 1634.

the words neither ; for many of them do not who pass for lawful popes, and such can neither understand the subject nor the words of the Bible, for it is in Latin ; and, if Alphonsus deceives us not, many of them have not gone so far as their grammar ;¹ yea, very many of them have been so ignorant as they could not speak their own name in Latin. Yet such knowledge of Scripture is enough in the Roman account for the infallible interpreter of Scriptures, the supreme judge in all matters of faith, and the teacher of the universe. When we are ready to wonder at this, they stop us presently by telling us that God did make Balaam's ass speak.²

They seem to grant as much stupidity in a pope as can be imagined, but then the miracle of making an ass speak does partly answer that objection. Had the bishops of Rome anciently been such ignorant, dull creatures, as many of their later popes, and yet adored at that rate, the heathens might have had some colour for charging the Christians with worshipping an ass's head.

As for the people, they are so far from obliging them to get knowledge, that they either make it impossible for them to attain it, or encourage them never to look after it. They cannot attain it but either by reading or hearing. They must not read the Scriptures (as before), and they cannot, or need not, hear. If the priests be ignorant (as they are allowed to be),³ they are not able to instruct them ; if they be able, they need not preach ; that is *sub consilio* ; or the people need not hear, no, nor inquire of them in private ; no, not those that are most ignorant. The further they are from all knowledge, the more excusable, if they take no care nor pains about it. Sancta Clara makes this query :⁴ Are they not bound, at least to some diligence, to free themselves from this ignorance ? He answers, if it be one who hath no

¹ Adeoque plerique, literarum ignari sunt, ut vix sciant nomen suum Latine exprimere.—*Platina* in Jul. i. vid. in *Johann.* xxiv.

² Bosius de sign. l. xvi. c. ix.

³ The generals of the regulars and others declared to the faces of the bishops in the Council of Trent, that the bishops and curates had wholly abandoned the office of a pastor, so that for many hundred years the people remained without sermons in the church, and without the doctrine of divinity in the schools.—*Hist. of Council of Trent*, l. ii. p. 169.

And there also against the regulars and friars (the only preachers beside those who had abandoned the office) it was a general complaint, that though they were severely forbidden to preach and teach, yet they assumed the power. And so the flock remained without either shepherd or hireling, because those preachers knew neither the need nor the capacity of the people, and least of all the occasions to teach and edify them. Besides, the end of these preachers is not to edify, but to take alms, either for themselves or their cloisters, which, that they may obtain, they aim not to benefit the soul, but to delight the ear, and soothe men in their pleasures, that thereby they may draw more profit ; and the people, instead of learning the doctrine of Christ, learneth either novelty, or vanity at the least. That it is a clear case that they exhort the people to nothing but to give ;—*Ibid.*

How these things were reformed by that council, in the prelates, who would have the other severely forbidden to preach, appears by Espenæus. Quotusquisque prelatorum majorum minorumve populum suum docere videtur ? an illi ipsi decreti hujus auctores unquam docuerunt, quorum exemplo alii ad docendum aliaque munera sua facienda excitarentur ? Ludimusne in re adeo sacra ? an potius hac decretorum specie reformationem poscentibus illudimus ? Quid emendationis sperari potest a nobis, nostra tam recens edita non observantibus ?—In 1 Tim. l. ii. c. ii. p. 179.

⁴ Petes annon teneantur saltem ad faciendam diligentiam, ut ignorantia talium expungatur ? Ad quod dico, primo, quod si aliquis fuerit, qui nullam de his notitiam habeat, unde moveretur ad querendam de illis doctrinam, certum esse, nullam requiri industriam et sollicitudinem, saltem si nullatenus dubitavit : quia non tenetur ad id quod est impossibile, est autem impossibile, quod quis querat aliquid, quod nunquam ipsi in mentem venit.—*Ut recte Angles Probl.* xv. p. 95, vid. Bonacin. de peccat. d. ii. q. viii. p. iii. n. iii. &c.

knowledge of these things which may move him to seek instruction, it is certain that no diligence or care is required of him, especially if he do not at all doubt, *i. e.* if he be confident that he knows well enough, and his ignorance makes him so senseless that he discerns it not. His reason is, because he is not obliged to that which is impossible, and it is not possible that one should seek that which never came into his mind (as Angles also determines with him); so that if knowledge never came into his mind, there is no need that it ever should come there, and he is not bound to take the least care or pains to make way for it.

CHAPTER III.

Their doctrine makes it needless to love God.

Love of God, or, as they had rather call it, charity, is in their account, as they seem sometimes to express themselves, of greatest moment. Regeneration and spiritual life, they say, consists in it; without it no man is in the state of grace, or favour with God. This is the righteousness whereby they are justified, and their sins pardoned, *i. e.* abolished (for that is pardon with them), and their souls sanctified (for justification and sanctification is all one in their reckoning). This is it which is the life and spirit of all other graces and virtues, say they, without which the best of them are dead and unactive things, and deserve not the name of virtues.¹ And though they look not for heaven unless they deserve it by their own works, yet their works, they say, are of no worth without this;² yea, their indulgences will not avail anything without it.³ So far, therefore, as love to God is unnecessary, so far regeneration and spiritual life, a saving state and reconciliation with God, justification, pardon, all graces and virtues, all their own good works or their church's indulgences, are unnecessary; no further need of what either God or themselves have made necessary to salvation.

One would think, if they had any desire of heaven or fear of hell, or dread of their own purgatory, if they had any design for the salvation of souls, or any regard of what is saving, they should be tender in this point above all, and not abate any moment of its necessity. But what they do herein, let us see. Indeed, they make both the habitual and the actual love of God unnecessary. First, for habitual love, they teach, the Lord hath not at all commanded us to have the habit or principle of this love; he nowhere requires that we should love him habitually. Certainly, saith Bellarmine,⁴ the Lord hath not commanded that we should love him from an infused habit, for laws do not require habits. Add to him one of the most eminent amongst the Dominicans:⁵ there is no affirmative precept for habitual love to God, saith Melchior Canus. I need allege no more; I find none of them questions it.

Now, in that they do not make this love necessary as a duty, they cannot

¹ Nulla virtus nec ejus actus acceptatur sine charitate, quæ sola dividit inter filios regni et perditionis.—*Sta. Clar. probl.* xxxv. p. 244.

² Nam opera quantumcumque moraliter bona, si fiant extra charitatem, in statu peccati mortiferi, absque dubio pereunt, et mortua reputantur, quantum attinet ad gratiam et gloriam promerendam.—*Næv. c. i. n.* xxix.

³ Bellarm. de pœnitent. l. ii. c. xiv. p. 951.

⁴ Certe non præcipit ut diligamus ex habitu infuso—leges enim de actibus dantur, non de habitibus.—*De grat. et lib. arbitr.* l. vi. c. vii. p. 664.

⁵ De amicitia habituali Dei, nullum est præceptum affirmativum.—*Pars. iv. select. de pœnitent.* p. 870.

account it necessary as a means ; for they¹ hold that all means necessary to salvation are commanded. So that the habitual love of God, by their doctrine, is no way necessary.

And this they teach not only of the habit of love, but of all other graces. The precepts of the law are not for habits, saith Soto.² We are not, as he adds, to pay what we owe from a habit of justice or liberality.³ When we are enjoined to live soberly and righteously, we are not required to do so out of habit, but only to do it, saith Bellarmine ; and these instances they bring to shew that we are not obliged to do anything out of a habit or principle of love to God.

Sect. 2. Secondly, For actual love, how can they account the acts of it needful, when they make the habits or principle from whence the acts must flow to be unnecessary ? But let us view their doctrine about this more distinctly. The acts of love are either more foreign and remote, which they call *imperate*, or native and proper, which they call *elicit* acts.

For the former, all acts of religion and righteousness, that they may be truly Christians, such as the gospel requires in order to salvation ; that they may have a real tincture of divine and supernatural goodness, and be advanced above the pitch at which heathen or graceless persons may arrive, they must proceed from love to God, and be ordered and directed by it. This they sometimes not only confess, but assert ; and yet, notwithstanding, they teach⁴ that it is not needful to perform any such acts, or to observe any commands of God out of love to him.⁵ The commands of God, saith De Graffis, do not oblige us to perform them in love ; he clears his meaning by an instance : for he sins not, nor is punished of God, who gives due honour to his parents, although he have not the habit of piety (and so though he do it not out of such a principle), much less, adds he, doth the church oblige any one to observe the command in love ;⁶ for if the end of the precept be love, saith Canus, we are not forthwith bound to observe all the commands out of love. The reason is premised ; for in the opinion of Aquinas and the most grave authors, we are not bound to observe the end or

¹ Aquinas ii. 2, q. iii. art. cccxiii. Ea quæ sunt necessaria ad salutem cadere sub præcepto.—Canus, *ibid.* p. 857. Ea omnia quæ necessaria sunt necessitate medii, censentur necessaria necessitate præcepti, licet non quæcunque necessaria sunt necessitate præcepti, sint etiam necessaria necessitate medii.—Bellarm. *de pæn.* l. ii. c. viii. p. 985 ; Suarez. l. i. de Orat. c. xxix. n. ii., ex D. Thom. ii. 2, q. ii. art. v. et q. iii., art. ii. et iii. q. lxxviii. a. i.

² Præceptiones legis non sunt de habitibus—non enim jubemur persolvere debita ex habitu justitiæ, aut liberalitatis ; sed tantum persolvere ad justum.—Nat. et Grat. l. i. c. xxi. p. 57.

³ Cum præcipit Deus ut juste sobrique vivamus, non imperat ut ista faciamus ex habitu, sed tantum ut faciamus.—De grat. et lib. arb. l. vi. c. vii. p. 664.

⁴ Utrum tenemur conformare voluntatem in modo volendi cum Deo ? Resp. secundum Alexand. et Lombard in i. dist. xlvi., quod non absolute : quoniam si homo honorat patrem suum, non ex charitate, sed ex benevolentia, non peccat : sed tenetur conditionaliter scil. si vult mereri vitam æternam.—Angel. *sum.* v. voluntas n. vi.

⁵ Præcepta Dei non obligant, ut perficiantur in charitate : non enim peccat, nec a Deo punitur, qui debitum honorem impendit parentibus, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis, ergo multo minus ecclesia obligat quenquam, ut illud impleat in charitate.—Decis. Aur. pars. ii. l. iii. c. xvii. n. x. p. 176. Non tamen tenemur semper operari ex charitate, sed satis est operari ex aliqua honestate morali.—Suarez. l. i. de orat. c. xxx. n. iii.

⁶ Non enim si finis præcepti charitas est, tenemur protinus omnia præcepta legis implere ex charitate.—Ex D. Thomæ, et graviorum autorum sententia, ad finem legislatoris minime tenemur, sed ad media, quæ lex finis gratiâ consequendi præscribit. pars. iv. relect. de pæn. p. 871.

intention of the lawgiver, *i. e.* of Christ, but the means which the law prescribes in order to it. Soto discurseth this at large, and concludes : Love being considered as the universal condition and mode of acting all virtues, and performing all obedience, such a mode of acting out of love is not commanded, as when we are enjoined to honour parents, the precept binds us not to honour them out of love to God.¹ This he delivers as the doctrine of Aquinas, and finds but² one doctor amongst them of opinion that we are bound to do all out of love to God ; but³ condemns this as false and very near the Lutheran error condemned by the council of Trent, because then all acts done without grace would be sins. So we must believe (if we will not venture to fall under the condemnation of their council) that it is no sin not to obey God out of love to him ; that all acts of virtue and obedience whatsoever may be performed without sin, though they be done without love to God ; that any man baptized may be saved, though he never act out of love to God, no, not so much as once while he lives ; though he perform not one act of a true Christian while he is on earth. He can never perish for want of love to God in any, or all the acts of his life ; for he will never be damned but for sin, and to act without love to God is no sin. Thus their chief doctors determine, and this they must all do, in conformity to the decrees of their infallible council, and be deluded infallibly in a matter of no less consequence than the way to heaven, believing that they may arrive there without acts of love, filial obedience, or ingenuous observance of God in anything that he hath commanded, without ever acting as (and so without being at all) true Christians.

Sect. 8. But though they do not transgress other commands, when they observe them without love, yet they may violate that special command which requires inward acts of love, if at that time when this obligeth they do not act out of love. Some of them seem to say this, and we shall see what they make of it in the next place.

The nature and proper issue of love is its internal act, when the heart being possessed with a principle of divine love to God in Christ, actually loves him above all. If this actual love (the inward act of it) be not necessary, as there will be no need of the habit (that being but in order to acts), so there will be no place for the imperate acts ; for those who would have us sometimes observe other commands out of love, yet never think this requisite, but when the precept obligeth us to actual love.⁴

Now, whether there be any command for this act of love, or whether it oblige, or when, they are not agreed, only in the issue they conspire to make the commandment of no effect.

Some of them determine that the command to love God with all our mind is not obliging ; which is all one as if they should say, There is no command

¹ *Actus charitatis consideratur ut est universalis conditio, et modus omnium virtutum.—Modus talis charitatis non cadit sub præcepto ; quod est dicere in hoc præcepto, Honora patrem et matrem, non includitur ut sint parentes ex Dei charitate honorandi : sed quod exhibeatur eis exterior reverentia.—De just. et iur. l. ii. q. iii. art. x. p. 44.*

² *Dionysius Cisterciensis.*

³ *Hæc autem opinio non solum falsa, verum et errori quam proxima est Trid. Synodo Can. vii., adversus Lutheranos damnato, nempe cuncta opera, quæ extra Dei gratiam fiunt, esse peccata.—Ibid.*

⁴ *Neque hoc præceptum universum obligat ad suum ipsius modum, sed quando occurrit articulus interne diligendi.—Soto, ibid.*

Tenemur secundum Bonaventur.—pro loco et tempore, quum viz. tenemur exire in actum charitatis.—Angel. Sum. v. voluntas. n. vi. : et hoc si habemus charitatem ; si autem non habemus, non tenemur ad hoc, sed ad æquivalens : quoniam tenemur facere quod in nobis est, ut eam habeamus.—Ibid.

for it at all. Thus Stapleton, one of the greatest divines amongst them in his time, The precept of loving God with all our mind is doctrinal, and not binding.¹

To the same effect others conclude there is no special precept of love to God. So John Sanctus,² There is no special command in the law of God for this, but general, says he. By which he would have us understand, that there is no precept in particular for loving God, none besides those commands that require other things; which, if they be done, we are discharged from any act of love, or inward affection to him. Aquinas is vouched for this, and much alleged out of him,³ to shew he was of this persuasion. If there be any special precept for this affection to God, it is that which requires us to love him with all the heart, and soul, and strength; but this (as Cardinal Cajetan⁴ declares) does not oblige to the love of charity. And Bannez⁵ teaches, that for natural love there is no special command; and so amongst them they leave no such command for any sort of love to God at all. The command to love God with all our hearts, Maldonate⁶ will have to be a general, no special precept.

Others of them confess there is a special command obliging us to love God actually; but they put such a construction upon it, that it signifies little or nothing more than if there were no such thing. They say it is requisite that we should love God one time or other; but what time this is needful, you will never learn of them; what period one fixeth, another unfixeth; and while they find no certain time for it, in the end they leave no place for it.

They all agree in this, that we are not bound to love God always actually; for, say they, the precept for it is affirmative, and such precepts bind not at all times.

But since we are not obliged to love God at all times, at what determined time is this required of us? Are we to love him after we are fallen into sin; is that the article of necessity? No; Canus⁷ supposeth that this will be generally denied, that a man is obliged to love God soon after he hath sinned.

Are we to love him when he vouchsafes some special favour; when he discovers his infinite goodness and amiableness, and makes the most lovely representations of himself to us? One would think, then, if any time at all, we should be obliged to love him actually. No, saith the same bishop,⁸ and he no Jesuit or late casuist, he sins not mortally (*i. e.* he transgresseth no command of God) who loves him not, how much soever he discovers his divine goodness, and most enamouring loveliness, unless it be when it is

¹ Hoc præceptum diligendi Deum ex tota mente, doctrinale est, non obligatorium.—*De Justific.* l. vi. t. x.

² Disp. i. n. xxi.

³ II. ii. q. xlv. art. i. ad. iii., et art. iv. ad. ii., et art. vi. ad. ii., et 484, art. iii. ad. ii.

⁴ Comment. in Deut. xvi., in Catherin. adv. Cajet. p. 268.

⁵ Sanctus, *ibid.*

⁶ Respondeo illud non speciale sed generale præceptum esse.—*In Luc.* xvii. 10.

Dr Smith against Pet. Martyr so understands it. And Sancta Clara, quoting him, approves it as being agreeable to the sentiment of his great master.—*Scotus.* probl. xii. p. 68.

⁷ Pars. iv. relect. de pæniti. p. 863.

⁸ Nec peccat mortaliter, qui non diligit Deum, quantumcunque divina bonitas proponatur, omni dilectione dignissima, nisi necessitatis articulus intercedat. Idem de præcepto fidei et spei videre licet.—*Melch. Canus. ibid.*

Idem affirmat, unumquemque quoties insigne aliquod beneficium a Deo consequitur, teneri ad illud explendum, quod tamen nulla lege, neque ratione efficaci evinci posse videtur, et ita non est asserendum.—*Navar.* c. xi. n. vii.

necessary to love him. And when shall we ever meet with the time when it is necessary, if not in such circumstances as these? If it be not needful to love him, either when we disoblige him, or when he most obligeth us to acts of love; if neither when he is angry with us, nor when he is well pleased, when will, when can it ever be needful?

Let us see if any others amongst them can nick this article of time when this love will be necessary. Are we bound to put forth an act of love on holy days? So Scotus thought. The time, saith he, for observing this command is on holy days; then we are to recollect ourselves, and ascend in mind unto God. He would have had this love to be a holiday habit at least, if not fit for every day's wearing. But this is too much (say others), nor do they find any reason why this imagination should come in the subtle doctor's head; Canus saith,¹ without all doubt it is to be rejected, and so they do. Scotus herein is borne down by the full torrent of their doctors. I find none now that will have us obliged to love God so often.

But since they think it too much to love God every holiday, are we bound to love him upon his own day? No, not once a week neither;² for though the church oblige them to be present at his worship, to mind things above, to praise his infinite divinity, and to give thanks for his bounty towards them, yet in all this they are not bound to any act of love; and Soto gives this reason for it: The end of the commandment (which is love) is not commanded. The assertion is hardly so absurd as the reason given for it, that the end, which is the principal in moral actions, should not be commanded. This is to say, that the law does not require to be fulfilled; for love, which is 'the end of the commandment,' is by the apostle expressly said to be 'the fulfilling of the law.' But, notwithstanding all this, in this maxim (which is one of their chief engines, whereby they demolish Christianity in the practice of those who profess it; make void the commandments of God, depriving them of their life and spirit, and leave nothing of the whole body of religion but the mere superficies),³ their divines, he tells us, unanimously agree with Aquinas. So that, it seems, the worship of God may be sufficiently discharged without any love to him. We may serve him well enough (as far as the command for his service will have us) without any affection. In all acts of worship, there needs not any act of love (by their doctrine) in any part, or any of the times of worship, either their own holidays, or the Lord's. They have no more respect to his than theirs, nor for him in either, but serve them and him all alike, and think they hallow them, and honour him enough, without any motion of love in their hearts, when (if ever it were needful in their account) it should be most in motion. Cer-

¹ Libere possum sine omni dubitatione negare.—*Ibid.* p. 871.

Dura videtur Scoti sententia, a quo recedit Adrianus, nempe, nos, omnibus festis diebus teneri ad illud, quia nullus est textus, nec ulla ratio, quæ id necessario concludat, et ita non videtur asserendum.—*Nav.* c. xi. n. vii. Sententia negans necessitatem hujus actus in die festo, et vera et communis est: et sumitur ex D. Thom. ii. 2. q. cxxii. art. iv., quatenus ait per præceptum de observatione sabbati non fuisse mandatum cultum internum per orationem, vel devotionem internam, nam eadem est ratio de amore, ut Cajetan, Navar, Soto, et cæteri communiter.—*Suar.* l. ii. de fest. c. xvi. n. xiii.; Aquinas, ii. 2. q. cxxii. art. iv.; Bellarm. de cult. Storum. lib. iii. c. x. p. 1609; Graff. l. ii. c. xxxiii. n. viii.; Covarruvias, l. iv. varia. resol. c. xix. n. vi.; Soto, de just. et jure. l. ii. q. iv. art. iv.

² Quamvis finis ecclesiæ obligantis nos interesse sacris fuerit, ut superna animo meditantes, immortalī Deo, tum ob infinitam suam divinitatem, laudes dicamus, tum de sua in nos beneficentia habeamus gratias: tamen finis præcepti non cadit sub præcepto.—*Nat. et Gr.* l. i. c. xxii. p. 67.

³ Theologi consentienter agnoscunt cum S. Thoma.—*Ibid.* c. xxii. p. 54

tainly those that think not this love due to God in his worship, think it not due to him at all.

But if it be more than needs to love God¹ once a week, are they obliged at least to love him once a year, if not at ordinary times, yet upon extraordinary or special occasions, such as more particularly seem to call for some act of love; when they are to partake of some sacrament, when they come to the eucharist, or to the sacrament of penance (as they are to do once yearly by their church orders)? No; it is not then necessary neither.² It is false, saith Navarre, that we are bound to fulfil this command when we receive any sacrament; for it is enough that we be not in mortal sin, or that we probably believe so, although no such actual love be conceived in the heart. We are not bound to that love (saith he) when we minister, or receive the sacraments; because we are not then bound to have contrition. Those that make such hard shifts to discharge themselves from the obligation of loving God, whenever occasion is offered, will scarce think it needful to love him upon no occasion; and what occasion can we think of upon which it will be counted requisite, if not on these already specified? If not after sin, if not upon the receipt of mercy, if not on any day of worship, if not in any part of worship; if these be not occasions for it, who can hope they will ever meet with any? If an act of love be not requisite once a week, or once a year, on such an account as would make it so, if any imaginable could do it, it will not be a duty in any week, or any year, in a whole life; those that discharge themselves of it in such circumstances, do plainly enough discharge it for ever.

But since they would make a show of finding some time for it (though their determinations all along are pregnant with a denial of any), let us proceed with them a little further. If an act of love be not due to God once a year, yet may it be a duty once in four or five years? Soto and Ledesma, in Filliutius, ventured to think it may be requisite once in five years; and he gives this reason for it: Because the time is not determined, but left to the judgment of the wise; but (saith he) thus wise divines have thought.³

Thus love to God, the greatest duty that we owe the divine Majesty, and that which is the sum of all the rest, is left to men's arbitrement; and if two or three reputed wise shall judge that God is to have no love at all, or but one act of love in a whole life, that must be the rule; God and man must be determined by it. Man will owe no more, and the Lord must have no more. Those of their divines have had the repute of wise, who thought it enough to love God once in a lifetime, as well as such who conceive it probable that he should have an act of love once in five years, or once in seven, for thither it may be adjourned by our author's leave.⁴

The Jansenists charge this opinion upon the late Jesuits, and would have all the odium cast upon them; but they go about to lead us into a mistake,

¹ Vid. Suarez. tom. iii. disp. lxiii. sect. iii. p. 801, in 3 Thomæ.

² Eadem ratione teneremur implere hoc mandatum quotiescunque aliquod sacramentum recipimus—quod falsum est: satis enim est, ut non simus in mortali peccato, aut probabiliter id credamus, quamvis hujusmodi adeo excelsum amorem actualem animo non concipiamus.—*Navar*, c. xi. n. ix.

Non tamen ad id tenemur quoties administramus aut accipimus sacramenta—quia non tenemur tunc habere contritionem.—*Ibid.* n. viii.

³ Quia cum determinatum tempus non sit, relinquitur arbitrio sapientum. Sic autem sapientes theologi arbitrati sunt, ut Soto et Ledesma, &c. tr. xxii. l. ix. n. cexc.; aliqui putant satisfieri præcepto, si semel in anno eliciatur actus amoris Dei; alii si tertio quoque anno, alii si non differatur ultra quinquennium.—*Petr. a S. Joseph*, sum. de i. præcept. art. iv.

⁴ Tr. vi. n. ccviii.

if they would have us believe that these, and other horrid conceits concerning an actual love to God, are confined to that society; they are too common amongst those doctors who are of greatest repute, and judged free from extravagancies in their morality, and more tenacious of what they would have accounted the genuine doctrine of their church.

There were many in the time of the Council of Trent, when Jesuitism was but in its infancy, who held it enough to love God actually but once in a lifetime. One act of love,¹ once in a life, which some count enough, saith Soto; and these some, he tells us afterwards, were very many.

In the time of Francis de Victoria, who lived till the council of Trent had sat a year, this was the common doctrine, that a man is but obliged to love God once in his life. For upon the question, when the precept for love obligeth, he says, '*Nec videtur sufficiens solutio communis, quod tenetur semel in vita, Relect. part. iii. n. 11.*' The common answer, that one is bound to it once in a life seems not sufficient;—he speaks modestly, as one loath to dissent from the common doctrine.—That council (who, if it had been concerned for God and men's souls, as it was for other things, would have appeared in all its thunder against such an error) mends this, as it did other matters, by establishing a doctrine which makes it needless to love God so much as once in a life; of which hereafter.

But when is that once? They leave us at liberty for the time, so it be but before we die. Suarez was not alone in this: as he wants not followers, so he had many that went before him in this conclusion, and those not Jesuits only; for it is grounded upon the notion which the Romish doctors have of affirmative precepts, when the time for their accomplishment is not expressed. They teach, that such divine commands, divers of them are fulfilled, and have sufficient observance, if they be but obeyed, *semel in vita*, once in a lifetime. Those that are very cautious express it with a *saltem*, once at least in a whole life, intimating that though more may be better, yet once is as much as is precisely needful; and this they extend to such things as, by the Lord's constitution, are means necessary to salvation.² There are precepts, saith Canus, without determination of time, which oblige us to observe them some times, at least once in our life, such as are the means necessary to salvation. But in what part of our life must it be, that the Lord must have this act of love from us, which is enough once in the whole? Why, since neither the Scripture nor the church, say they, hath determined the time, there is no reason for one time more than another; it is left to a man's own discretion,³ to love God when he thinks fit, let him do it before he die, and he may take his own time; so some leave it.

But Vasquez would not leave it at such uncertainty, so he fixeth the period, and that is the period of a man's life; he determines, the time for

¹ *Semel in vita, quod quidam satis arbitrantur.—De Nat. et Grat. l. i. c. xxii. p. 58.*

² *Alia vero præcepta sunt sine determinatione temporis, quæ videlicet nos obligant, ut aliquando impleantur, saltem semel in vita, ut sunt media ad salutem necessaria, pars. iv. relect. de pœnit. p. 968.*

³ *Sed quæras tandem, quodnam sit tempus illud quo divina charitas obligat ante mortem ad habendam Dei dilectionem: hoc est enim, quod oppositum sentientes maxime movet; et nos etiam plurimum torquet, quia non possumus tempus hoc in particulari certo et definite designare—Illud vero tempus, si non sit positiva lege præscriptum, prudenti arbitrio ipsius hominis, vel alterius, qui (ejus conscientia cognita) possit auxilium præstare, committendum est.*

Neque aliquam regulam certiorē, aut magis particularem assignare possum, tam in hoc præcepto, quam in aliis affirmativis, præsertim circa actus, quia ad Deum ordinantur, sola ac nuda ratione naturali perspectis.—Suarez, tom. iv. disp. xv. sect. vi. n. xx.

loving God is when a man is at the point of death.¹ Nor is this the doctrine of a Jesuit only; for before his time, and before the Society was founded, it was the common opinion of the Romish doctors; so Dominicus Soto informs us,² very many hold that the time for the observing of this command is at the point of death, that is (as he explains it) when there is not any time left for deserving aught of God. Now every act of love being meritorious with them, either they contradict themselves, or by this opinion they are not bound to love God actually, till there be no time left for any acts of love. We are not by this doctrine obliged to love God, till we can live no longer, and are past acting at all.

But are we then bound to love him, is it then necessary? May not a man be saved, who hath continued without love to God all his life, if he love him not actually, neither, when he is a-dying? For this, observe what Aquinas tells us,³ that we do not break this command, but fulfil it, so as to be free from all mortal guilt, if we do nothing against the love of God, that is, if we run not into mortal sin, and so hate him; as a soldier satisfies his captain's command, who, though he get not the victory, yet doth nothing against military discipline; or as Bonaventure explains it,⁴ *per exclusionem affectus contrarii*, by the exclusion of the contrary affection, as if it were sufficient that he do not hate him.

Marsilius⁵ (of great renown for learning amongst their divines), will have that which the command for love enjoins, to be the keeping of grace and friendship with God, and the recovering of it when lost. So that it doth not oblige to actual love, but only to the avoiding of habitual enmity and hatred of God.

But what if we hate God, and persist therein; is it not absolutely necessary that he should beware of that? It seems not; for saith one of their doctors, there is no precept that a sinner should not persevere in enmity against God; there is no negative command which forbids him to persist in such hatred. It may be you do not read this (no more than I could) without some horror and trembling; and I confess, when I found Reginaldus quoted for this, I was ready to think it was but the extravagancy of some

¹ Merito ergo diximus esse præceptum dilectionis, et solum extrema necessitate obligare, sicut præceptum contritionis, sed non quemcunque, sed tantum existentem in mortali, non suppletent suam justificationem per sacramentum.—In 3 Th. tom. iii. q. xc. art. i. dub. iv. n. xl. So that the command to love God does not oblige any but at the point of death, nor any then who are justified, nor any other in the state of sin, unless they cannot have the sacrament.

² Plerique aiunt, tempus hujus præcepti, illud maxime esse, quod est articulus mortis.—*Ibid.* Quando jam nullum superest tempus bene merendi de Deo.—*Ibid.*

Besides these many in Soto, others determine with Vasquez, that love to God is never a duty but at the point of death. So Jo. Sanctius; Hæc videtur verior sententia, disp. i. n. xxi., et Antonin. Dian. alii velint solum obligare in articulo mortis.—*Verb. Charitas.* And before them, others in Bonacina, alii dicunt obligare solum tempore mortis, i. præcept. d. iii. q. iv. p. 2, n. i. And we must take it to be the opinion of all, who hold that this precept obliges not, but when we are bound to an act of contrition; and they commonly maintain that none are obliged to this before the approach of death, nor any that are in the state of grace then; no, nor any that are in mortal sin, if they will use those other expedients which their general council or other doctors have devised, to discharge them from the obligation of a duty, to which not only the gospel but the law of nature binds all rational creatures eternally.

³ Qui in vita hoc præceptum non implet (viz. perfecte). Nihil contra divinum dilectionem agens, non peccat mortaliter, xxii. q. xlv. art. vi. ad ii.

⁴ In iii. dist. xxvii. n. lviii.

⁵ Marsilius vir profecto inter theologos egregie doctus, l. ii. q. xviii., tenet, lege hac dilectionis obligari homines, servare gratiam et amicitiam Dei, et perditam recuperare.—*Soto de Nat. et Grat.* l. i. c. xxii. p. 57.

singularly bold Jesuit; but upon further inquiry, I find it asserted by such whose writings have the greatest approbation of the Romish church. Melchior Canus, a Dominican, a bishop, cried up as a most elegant, judicious, and cautious writer too, and inferior to none of that order, their angelical doctor only excepted, clearly delivers this doctrine,¹ we are not bound by any negative precept that we should not be enemies of God, in respect of guilt. He adds, for as there is no affirmative precept requiring habitual friendship with God, so for habitual enmity against God in respect of guilt, there is no negative precept that forbids it. So that to persist in enmity and hatred against God, by their approved doctrine, is no sin, it is against no command.

We need not allege the words of any other, since this is the plain and necessary consequent of their common doctrine; and we must take it to be the judgment of all, who hold that it is no sin to delay contrition (*i. e.* repentance and turning to God) in which both their ancienter school doctors and modern divines agree. For while it is no duty to turn to God, habitual enmity and hatred of him will be no sin. Now, contrition (and so conversion to God) they say may be deferred till death. Indeed, by their doctrine it will never be a duty; for even at death, the last attrition, with their sacrament of confession, is all that is needful.

Sect. 4. However, they make it unnecessary to love God either living or dying. For though they pretend that there is a time, some or other, when the precept for it is obliging, and make a show as if then unavoidably, he that will be saved must have an act of love for God in his heart; yet whenever that time comes, in life or death, to which their several fancies have determined it, they discover to them many ways whereby the precept may be satisfied, without any act of love that it requires; and those which have a mind to be deceived with hopes of heaven, without ever loving God while they live, may have their choice which way they will be deluded, for they present them with variety. First, a natural love will serve the turn, such as a graceless man may have. For Aquinas determines after others, that he that hath no love to God may observe the precept of loving him actually, by disposing himself to receive this grace;² and whereas some think that this great precept of loving God, since Adam's sin, cannot be fulfilled but in the state of grace, Navar asserts the contrary, both upon reason and authority, because a man by his natural power, remaining also in mortal sin, may and doth conceive God to be amiable above all, and the last end of all, and consequently can love him as such; as also, because there may be a love for God above all, without grace, as Cajetan proves; moreover, because St Thomas affirms that one may, without grace, fulfil the command of loving God, as to the substance of the act, though not as to the meriting of blessedness.

Elsewhere he affirms³ that all the ten commandments, and all other precepts, may be fulfilled by him who is in mortal sin as to the substance of the act, so as to avoid all sin that would be incurred if they were not fulfilled;

¹ At ne simus inimici Dei secundum reatum, nullo negativo præcepto sumus astricti. Sicut enim de amicitia habituali nullum præceptum affirmativum est, sic de inimicitia, quæ secundum reatum est, quasi habitualis, nullum est negativum.—*Par. iv. relect. de pœnit. p. 870.*

² Non est impossibile hoc præceptum observare, quod est de actu charitatis: quia homo potest se disponere ad charitatem habendam, et quando habuerit eam, potest ea uti, l. ii. q. c. art. x. corp.

³ Contra quod tamen facit, quod homo sola virtute naturali, etiam existens in peccato mortali, potest concipere, imo concipit, partim Deum esse super omnia diligibilem, et finem omnium ultimum, et consequenter eum ut talem diligere potest. Deinde quod datur dilectio Dei super omnia, sine gratia, ut probat Cajetanus. Præ-

and this, according to the judgment of Aquinas,¹ commonly followed, and the sense of the Council of Trent.² They assign, we see, two ways whereby the divine precept may be fulfilled. One as to the substance of the act, so as sin is avoided, and the other as to the end of the lawgiver, so as to deserve heaven. And they teach that any precept may be accomplished the former way by such as are destitute of grace. Now to observe the command of loving God, so far as not to sin against it, is all that is required, if Bellarmine's arguing be good. If I sin not, saith he, when I love God, without³ degree of love (in the judgment of St Thomas), certainly I am not bound in strictness to love him more; therefore, if I add another degree, I love him more than I am bound to do.⁴ So that an unsanctified man, loving God in such a degree as not to sin against the precept of love, hath all the affection for God that it requires; and none will be obliged to any love but such as is natural, and may be found in a graceless heart.

Secondly, An inferior degree of love will satisfy the command, such as is far short of what it enjoins. He is no transgressor (saith the oracle of their schools) who attains not the intermediate degrees towards perfection, if he reach but the very lowest of all.⁵ To keep the divine precepts (saith Bellarmine), any degree of love whatsoever is sufficient.⁶ Any act of love (saith Bannes), how remiss soever, is sufficient to fulfil all the commands of God; neither is there any certain intenseness requisite that one in this life may accomplish the precept of love to God.⁷ The Lord requires that we love him with all our hearts, i. e. with all the affection our hearts can contain; they say that any, the smallest degree, will suffice. He enjoins us to love him with all our might, i. e. as much as we can. They say it is enough to love him as little as we can; we need not love him as much as we might if we would; no more is commanded but as little as possible. The lowest degree of all will serve; and if we advance but another step, we supererogate, and God is beholden to us for more than is due.

Their gross mistake about the perfection of obedience in this life entangles them in a necessity to maintain this and other impious absurdities. For if every just person perfectly observes the law, the least degree must be sufficient for such an observance; and when this command, declared with such circumstance, of loving God with all our hearts, mind, and strength, doth

terea, quod ipsemet S. Thomas affirmat posse quem sine gratia implere præceptum diligendi Deum quoad substantiam actus, licet non quoad meritum beatitudinis, cap. xi. n. vii; v. Soto de just. et jur. l. ii. q. iii. art. x. p. 44, col. ii.

¹ Universa ista x. præcepta et alia omnia, possunt impleri ab illo, qui est in peccato mortali, quoad substantiam actus et præcepti, et effectum evitandi novum peccatum, quod incurreret si non adimpleret illud, juxta definitionem Aquinatis communiter recepti quod Conc. Tridentinum sensit, &c.—*Ibid* n. xvii.

² Deum ab homine posse diligi super omnia, viribus propriis, sine auxilio gratiæ (dicunt), Scotus, Cajetan, Nominales, Petr. Alliaco, Ocham, Almain, Major, Durandus, apud Vasq. in i. ii. disp. cxciv. cap. i.

³ Qu. 'with one'?—Ed.

⁴ Si non pecco, ex sententia S. Thomæ, si amem Deum, nisi uno gradu amoris, certe non teneor in rigore amplius amare:—ergo si addam alterum gradum amoris, amo plus quam teneor.—*De Monach*. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 1162.

⁵ Non est transgressor præcepti, qui non attingit ad medios perfectionis gradus, dummodo attingat ad infimum, 2. ii. q. clxxxiv. art. iii. ad secundum.

⁶ Sufficit autem quilibet charitatis gradus ut quis servet verbum, i. e. præcepta domini.—*De Purgat*, l. ii. c. iii. p. 1881.

⁷ Quolibet actum charitatis quantumlibet remissum, sufficere ad implendum omnia præcepta: neque ullam determinatam intensionem requiri, ut aliquis in hac vita adimpleat præceptum dilectionis Dei, in 2. ii. q. xlv. art. v.

Dilectionis mandatum in quolibet gradu intensionis impleatur. For this Jo. San. alleges Aquinas, and near twenty more of their divines, besides Jesuits, disp. i. n. xxi.

especially puzzle them, they are concerned either to deny its obligation, as some of them do, or to interpret it so as to make it signify that which is next to nothing, as others. All of them are obliged to deface it one way or other, that it may not appear to confound them.

But to go on. If we are not bound to love God save in the lowest degree, yet that degree sure should exceed our affection to all other things. No, not so neither; for they tell us commonly we are not obliged to love God more intensely than other things. So Cardinal Tolet.¹ Yea, saith he, sometimes we more fervently love things sensible and the creatures. Navarre,² after Aquinas, and their divines, ancient and modern, concur herein.

It is true, they say, God should be loved appreciatively (as to valuation, and in esteem) above all; but then by *all* they understand, not simply all things, but the worst things of all. In those, the worst of evils, he is to have the pre-eminence; but the creatures are not such evils, and they may be preferred before God in most cases. By their doctrine we may prefer the judgment of others, or our own, before the advice of God in all matters of mere counsel, and to this they have reduced the greatest part of Christian duties; and we may follow our own wills, or the will of others, rather than God's continually, and make this the constant practice of our lives in all those innumerable evils which they count venial. And so in the most instances by far we may love and esteem ourselves and others more than God, and yet love him enough, and not transgress the precept. We need not love him more than all creatures; we may love any creature more than him, even in way of valuation; only he is to have this honour, and this will be enough, to love him more than deadly crimes, such as declare open hostility against God. This is all the import of that great precept which concerns us in this life, as it is expressed after Aquinas by Soto and others.³

Yea, to admit mortal sin, and so to love the creature more than God, in that respect in which alone they say he is more to be loved, is not against this precept. So Navar informs us.⁴ Indirectly, saith he, to love the creature more than God is not against this command (of love), because whoever sins mortally, indirectly loves something more than God; yet such a delinquent doth not therefore sin against the precept, because directly he doth nothing against it, nor acts what in itself, and in its own nature, separates from God, but by accident, according to Aquinas and Scotus. So that

¹ Quantum ad intensionem vero non tenemur sub præcepto illum plus diligere: imo aliquando ferventius amamus res sensibiles et creaturas.—*Instr.* l. iv. c. ix. p. 614.

² Cap. xi. n. vi., et cap. i. n. iv. p. 57; Gabriel, Major, Jo. Medina, Domin. Soto, Navar, Sylvester, Paludanus, in Vasquez, in i., ii. tom. i. disp. cxxxiv. cap. iii. n. xiii.

³ Nihil divinæ amicitiae contrarium admittat, juxta evangelicam vocem, *ex toto corde*, &c., contrarium inquam: quoniam venialia non obstant dilectioni Dei super omnia.—*De Nat. et Grat.* l. i. c. xxii. p. 56.

Ex toto corde, idem sit quod nihil charitati adversum mentis assensu concipere.—*Idem de Just. et Jur.* l. vii. q. v. art. i. p. 244.

Ut transgressionis delictum quis evitet, satis est ut nihil contrarium charitati ejusque præceptis committat.—*Idem*, *ibid.* p. 242.

Non tamen peccamus, dummodo nihil divinæ dilectioni contrarium agamus.—*Sylvest.* v. charitas. n. iii. Vid. Bonaventur, iii. dist. xxvii. n. lviii.; Graff. l. i. c. iii. n. ix.; Sta. Clar. probl. xii. p. 67.

⁴ Admonemus item indirecte diligere creaturam amplius quam Deum non esse contra hoc præceptum, quoniam quicumque peccat mortaliter, indirecte plus diligit aliud quam Deum—attamen hujusmodi delinquens, non ideo peccat contra istud præceptum, quoniam directe non facit contra ipsum, neque aliquid operatur, quod secundum se et suam naturam separet a Deo, sed secundum accidens.—*Juxta S. Thom. et Scotum*, cap. xi. n. xix.

to love the creature more than God, and to shew it in a way which themselves say is most repugnant to the love of God, is no transgression of this command. To say he doth nothing against it directly is no salvo, when that he doth is all which they count (if they count anything) inconsistent with the love commanded. He tells us further,¹ and Lopez after him, that absolutely to love God, but so much, or not so much as other things, without making any comparison, is not evil. So that if God have some affection from us, though we love him less than other things, it is no sin, no transgression of the precept; and if this be not transgressed in the instant when it calls for performance, it is fulfilled.

Thirdly, It will suffice, if nothing be done against love, as we heard before out of Aquinas. So that when the precept of love obligeth, if we then do nothing contrary to that love, we may be excused from the act itself, or from acting anything out of love. For that which they count contrary to it may be avoided out of fear, or other considerations foreign to love; and so the command may be satisfied at the instant, when (if ever) it requires actual love, without any act either of love or from it.

Fourthly, External acts may satisfy. The precept of love, saith Soto,² doth not oblige precisely to inward affection, but certainly to some outward act; so elsewhere he explains this loving God above all, by doing his commandments.³ To the same purpose Maldonate and others.⁴ Now if the precept of love may be fulfilled by external acts, or by endeavours to observe the other commands of God, then it requires not the exercise of the inward act of love to him, and so there will be no command for that at all, nor will it be a duty; and all these other commands may be satisfied without any act of love to God in the heart, and we shall love him enough, though we never conceive any actual love for him in our souls.

Fifthly, It will satisfy the precept if a man believe that he loves God above all, though indeed he do not. So Lopez.⁵ It is enough to avoid the sin of neglecting this precept, for one to believe probably that he fulfils it at the time when its obligation occurs. Navarre had concluded this before him.⁶ He that believes God, probably believing that he is in the state of grace, and that his love is a love of God above all, although in truth it is no such thing, nor he in such a state; nevertheless, the precept is fulfilled by him, so far, that he is not then guilty of sin for omitting the observance of it. He adds this reason for it: Because, without special revelation, no

¹ Licet diligere Deum comparative minus quam illum, vel æque ac illum, sit malum: diligere tamen eum absolute, æque vel minus, absque ulla comparatione, non est malum, c. xi. n. x., et n. xviii., et cap. i. viii. Ut facile colligat quis ex dicto Conc. Trident.

Lopez, cap. x. p. 217.

² Præceptum dilectionis non præcise ad internum affectum obligat, sed certe ad externum opus.—*De just. et jur.* l. ii. q. iii. art. x. p. 44. Col. ii. Cum vero dicitur, Diliges, non tam exigitur delectio affectus, quam charitas operis.—*Molanus. Theol. pract. Tract.* iii. c. xvi. n. v.

³ Diligere Deum super omnia, est omnia in ipsum referre, puta, omnia præcepta ejus facere.—*De nat. et grat.* l. i. c. xxii. p. 57.

⁴ In Luc. xvii. 10, p. 485.

⁵ Vide S. Clara. Probl. xii. p. 68.

So Bannes concludes that the precept for love is fulfilled by receiving the eucharist once a year. Abesque scrupulo credi potest, quod qui digne sumit eucharistiam semel in anno, adimplet simul speciale præceptum charitatis, in xxii. q. xlv. art. Yet (as we saw before) it is their common doctrine, that the eucharist may be worthily received without any act of love, or other grace, or any actual disposition that is gracious.

⁶ Satis est ad evitandum peccatum omissionis hujus præcepti, probabiliter quis credat, se illud implere tempore, quo occurrit ejus obligatio, cap. xl. p. 217.

man can know when he is in the state of grace, as the Council of Trent determines; and so unless we maintain this, we cannot know when we fulfil the precept.¹ Thus, though his determination seem strange and desperate, yet the ground he proceeds on is a principle of their faith, and obligeth all to be of his persuasion who submit to that council. He declares himself further to this purpose: He sins mortally who loves not God at that time when he is bound to do it, under the pain of mortal sin, that is, when there is danger of death, or necessity of receiving or administering a sacrament, unless he probably believe that he hath grace or charity;² for then he would have us believe it is not sin, as his limitation shews. Here we have the times specified wherein the precept of loving God obligeth, and these are but two, and the latter of them himself expungeth, concluding it false that we are bound to love God at a sacrament.³ So that a man is never bound to love God but when he apprehends death approaching; no, nor at the point of death neither, if then he probably believe that he hath grace and charity, though he have it not; for such a presumption will excuse him from sin if he love not God (as all his life before, so) even when he is dying. Thus is the case resolved according to their common principles, by the most learned and the most pious of their casuists, as Bellarmine honours him, though he was none of the Society.⁴

Sixthly, Attrition, with the sacrament of penance, will excuse any from loving God actually, living or dying, and will secure him from perishing eternally, though he never entertain an act of love for God in life or death. The doctrine of their church obligeth them all to believe this, and if any of their doctors seem to say otherwise, they contradict either that or themselves. For their church requires nothing precisely to put a man into the state of grace and salvation, living or dying, (how long soever he hath persisted in enmity against God, how highly soever he hath expressed his hatred of him), but only a due partaking of the sacrament of penance; and he is sufficiently qualified for such a participation if he be but attrite, that is, as they explain it, if he have but some remorse for sin out of servile fear, not out of love to God (for that fear as servile is contrary to the love of God⁵), so that for this (which they count sufficient to secure his eternal state), even at last gasp, he needs not any act of love to God. And this is not only the opinion of particular doctors, but (as I shall shew hereafter) the doctrine of the council of Trent,⁶ and so not only probable with them, but certain.

If a man at the point of death, who never had an act of love for God in all his life, do then ask his confessor whether such an act be needful for him before he die; if the priest tell him it is not necessary, he may safely give up the ghost, and die as he lived, without any actual affection for God; for

¹ Addo, eum qui diligit Deum, probabiliter credens se esse in statu gratiæ, subindeque suum amorem esse amorem Dei super omne aliud, quamvis in rei veritate non sit hujusmodi, neque sit in eodem statu; nihilominus tamen adimplere hoc præceptum, quoad effectum evitandi novum peccatum quod admitteretur ob omissionem implementi ejus, quoniam sine speciali revelatione scire non potest quis, quando est in statu gratiæ; ut definit Conc. Trident. Et ita nisi hoc teneamus, nequiremus scire quando hoc præceptum impleverimus. Cap. xi. n. x.

² Peccat mortaliter, qui eo tempore Deum amare negligit, quo sub peccati mortalis reatu tenetur, veluti quando mortis periculum, vel necessitas recipiendi vel administrandi aliquod sacramentum se obtulit, nisi probabiliter crederet se gratiam vel charitatem habere.—*Ibid.* ibid. n. xx.

³ *Ibid.* n. viii. et ix. supra.

⁴ Martinus, Aspilcaeta, Navarrus, vir doctissimus, et Piissimus. De script. Eccles. p. 318.

⁵ In quantum servilis est contrariatur charitati. So Aquinas. ii. 2, q. xix. art. 4.

⁶ Sess. xiv. c. iv.

though he be deluded by his confessor, yet consulting him he has done his endeavour, and so his¹ ignorance, they say, is invincible, and will excuse him. And the priest must tell him that it is more than needs, if he believe the council of Trent, since there it is declared that the sacrament, with attrition (though this include something repugnant to such love), is enough to justify, and pass any into a state of grace, and consequently is sufficient for salvation. And thus they argue,² grace is a sufficient cause of glory; hence whatever it is, without which grace may obtained, that is not necessary to salvation; by which account no act of love (nor of any other grace) will be needful for them, that they may be saved.

Thus, in fine, here is a religion which pretends to be Christian, but excuseth and disengageth all that profess it from the love of Christ; a doctrine which bereaves religion of that which themselves count its life, and quite stifles all the spirits of Christianity, chops off all Christian virtues, all gracious acts and qualities in this one neck, and leaves nothing but a ghastly carcase. For obliging them to neglect love as needless, it makes the rest impossible; without it, there can be no saving faith, no godly sorrow, no filial fear, no delight in God, no desire to enjoy him, no genuine gratitude. When the life of a true Christian should be made up of these, they leave it not possible for him to have one act of true Christian virtue, for without love, they say themselves, there cannot be any one true virtue. Here is a way to heaven for those that never loved God in life or death, a path that pretends to heaven, but lies quite cross to the way of Christ, and leads directly to outer darkness; a doctrine that encourageth them to live in hatred of God all their days, and in the end sends them out of the world under the dreadful sentence of the apostle, 1 Cor. xvi. 22, 'If any man love not the Lord Jesus, let him be Anathema, maranatha.' To conclude this head, it is a doctrine which is damning, not only meritoriously, but effectually, and will certainly ruin eternally all that believe and practise it, and hath in it the mortal poison and malignity of a hundred such speculative opinions as pass for heresies.

And beside the danger and horrible impiety of this doctrine, it is ridiculous to the very highest degree; for can anything be more senseless, than to ask how often a man ought to love his best friend and benefactor? whether once in his life be not enough in all conscience? nay, whether it be not very fair not to hate him? And, indeed, they state the business all along in such a manner, and manage it with such nicety and caution, not as if they were afraid lest men should love God too little, but as if all the danger lay on the other hand; and their great care were that nobody should love him too much, or love him at all. I do not believe that things so palpably impious and ridiculous were ever so solemnly debated by men of any religion whatsoever.

CHAPTER IV.

There is no necessity of saving or justifying faith by the Romish doctrine.

Sect. 1. That no man can be justified or saved without faith is so evident in Scripture, that none but an infidel can question it. The Romanists do not express any doubt of it, and yet they make no other faith necessary than that which is neither justifying nor saving. They have two sorts of faith,

¹ Sum. Rosel. v. ignorant. n. i. Bonacin. de peccat. disp. iii. q. viii. punct. iii. n. 16. Sta. Clara. Problem. xv. p. 87. Doctores communiter.

² Dicendum quod gratia est sufficiens causa gloriæ, unde omne illud sine quo obtineri potest gratia, non est de necessitate salutis.—*Aquinas* in iv. dist. ix. art. i.

one for the unlearned and ignorant, which they call *implicit*; the other for the learned and more knowing, which they say should be *explicit*.

The former, as they describe it, is an assent to some general, including many particulars, with a mind to believe nothing contrary thereunto. The general is this, that whatever the Roman church (which cannot err) believes, is true; the particulars included are they know not what, for they are supposed ignorant. Now this, we say, is no Christian faith, and make it apparent that it is no such thing. For, first, it is no belief of any one particular or article of the Christian faith. It is only a belief of a general, which is no truth at all, much less Christian (that the church of Rome cannot err, or believe anything but what is true), when the ignorant person neither knows what this church is, nor what she believes, nor why he should give her such credit. So that the *act* is a blind conceit, unworthy of a man, or a Christian; and the *object* a general error.

And then as to the particulars which are necessary for Christians to believe, this implicit faith doth not actually believe any of them at all; if it did, it would not be what it is, implicit. It apprehends them not, and therefore cannot believe them; for, as themselves acknowledge,¹ that cannot be believed which is not known. To render this clear to us, they thus explain it. When² a man is asked whether Christ were born of the Virgin Mary, and whether there be one God and three persons, and he answers that he knows not, but believes touching these things as the church holds, this is to believe implicitly; so that a man may have this faith completely, and yet not believe an article of the creed; and if this be Christian faith, a man may have it who believes nothing of Christ. They are believers, at this rate, who have a mind to hold what the church doth concerning Christ or the creed, though they never know what that is. They know not what the church holds, unless the church's knowing be their knowledge; and so believe nothing, unless the church's believing be their faith; and so have no faith to save them, unless it be saving faith to believe by an attorney.

Secondly, As this faith may be without the knowledge and belief of any of the particular articles which are necessary to be believed by Christians, so (which is yet more strange) it may be with the belief of what is opposite and repugnant to the Christian faith. This they acknowledge, and clear it to us by instances. A man may be disposed to believe what the church holds, and yet may believe that God the Father and God the Son are not equal, but one greater and elder than the other, or that the persons in the Trinity are locally distant. Such is the virtue of implicit faith, saith Alstentaig,³ that, if he who hath it believes these errors, or any like them, he would be no heretic; he would not sin, provided he doth not maintain his error pertinaciously, and that he believes because he thinks the Church believes it. Or such a catholic may believe⁴ that the three persons in the Godhead are one woman; it would be but a small fault with Angelus to believe this,

¹ Neque enim credi potest quod non cognoscitur.—*Fill. tr. xxii. n. xxxix.*

² Bannes. xxii. q. ii. art. viii. sect. *dubitat* secundo. Sum. Rosel. verb. fides. n. i.

³ In tantum valet fides implicita, quod si quis habens eam falso opinaretur, ratione naturali motus, Patrem majorem, vel priorem Filio: vel tres personas localiter distare, aut simile quid, non sit hæreticus, non peccet: dummodo hunc errorem pertinaciter non defendat, et hoc ipsum credat, quia credat ecclesiam sic credere. Verb. Credere.—*Sum. Rosel. v. fides. n. ii.* After Pope Innocent and Hostiensis.

⁴ Ut puta vetula credit Trinitatem esse unam fæminam, et quoniam credit ecclesiam sic tenere, sic credit: et tamen non est hæretica: quia conditionaliter credit, si ecclesia sic tenet et credit.—*Verb. fides. n. vi.*

thinking the church believes the same. Or he may believe that Christ is not true God and man, and yet not be condemned for it, if the pope believed it too.¹ If trusting a priest (who tells him the church holds it) he believes anything against the articles of faith, he is excused, saith Sancta Clara, after Scotus and Gabriel and others.² Though he expressly disbelieve any article of faith, yet he may be said to believe it implicitly.³ So that he may believe that the creed or the gospel is not to be believed, he may count it a fable (as Pope Leo called it) and yet be a Christian as to his belief, if this be the Christian faith. He may be expressly an heretic or a monstrous misbeliever, and yet implicitly be a faithful Roman catholic.

Thirdly, Such a faith as this Jews and Turks and Pagans have, even the worst of these, who do but acknowledge a God of truth; for they believe what this God reveals is true, and this generally involves all the particulars of the Christian belief, so that if the belief of such a general, without other faith as to the particulars, may be sufficient for papists, such infidels may pass for as true believers, as Roman catholics. Yea, the faith of such catholics will be so much worse than that of these infidels, as it is better to believe God's veracity and revelation than to believe the infallibility of the Roman church, or the truth of all therein believed.

Indeed, such a faith was not counted sufficient for Christians, till Christians were thought to be something like asses. Aquinas inquires whether all be alike obliged to have an explicit faith. He answers negatively, and the ground of his conclusion is Job i. 14, 'The oxen were ploughing, and the asses were feeding beside them;' from whence he argues gravely⁴ that the people, who are signified by asses, are to lie down in the faith of their superiors, who are signified by the oxen, as Gregory expounds it. But what if the oxen go astray; what must become of the asses then? Why, they may follow them without hurt, believing that they are right when they are in a wrong way (for they must not have their names for nothing). So he resolves this difficulty. Human knowledge is not the rule of faith, but divine truth,⁵ from which, if some of the superiors (the oxen) make defection, that hurts not the faith of the simple (the asses), who believe them to have the right faith. After these two saints, their best pope and their angelical doctor, that we may see we owe not this rare notion (where their whole church is so subtilly divided into oxen and asses) to any lower than the most eminent amongst them, Cardinal Bellarmine,⁶ their great champion, makes use of the same exposition of that text to maintain the sufficiency of such a faith.

Stapleton would have us believe that they admit not of this implicit faith, save in points of less moment; but herein he misrepresents them, and would delude us; for it is the common doctrine of the Romanists, that an implicit faith in Christ (such as pagans may have, and for which none

¹ Siquis non crederet Christum esse verum Deum et hominem, et idem sentiret papa, eum non iri damnatum. Cardin. St Angeli. ad legatos Bohem. an. 1447.

² Rusticus et imperitus qui suo parcho fidem habens, credit aliquid contra articulos fidei, excusatur a peccato.—*Probl.* xv. p. 98.

³ Licet alicui articulo fidei discredat explicite, credit tamen implicite eidem in generali fide, &c., ibid.—*Corduba*.

⁴ Quia videlicet minores qui significantur per asinos, debent in credendis adhærere majoribus, qui per boves significantur, ut Gregorius exponit in ii. moral.—*Aquinas*. ii. 2. q. ii. art. vi.

⁵ Humana cognitio non sit regula fidei, sed veritas divina; a qua sic aliqui majorum deficiunt, non præjudicat fidei simplicium, qui eos rectam fidem habere credunt.—*Aquinas*. *ibid.* ad tertium.

⁶ De justific. l. i. c. vii. p. 706.

should have the name of Christians) is sufficient under the gospel to pass any into a justifying or saving state.¹

This is it which our divines commonly teach, saith Vega,² when they say the faith of one mediator, either explicit or implicit, is enough for justification. And Sancta Clara,³ with others, tell us this is the more common tenet in their schools; and whereas they make some difference between justification and salvation in this point, Bannes helps to remove it. It is neither heresy, saith he, nor error, nor rashness, nor scandal, to assert that a man may also in the same manner be saved, because justification, being the last disposition to glory, it is very probable that he which is justified by an implicit faith, may also, by the same faith, without alteration, be saved.⁴

It is true, they say there is a precept for a more express faith, though no more than this implicit belief in Christ be needful, *necessitate medii*. But they have so many ways to exempt infidels (even under the profession of Christians) from its obligation, that few in comparison will be culpable for not observing it. By their doctors they are excused, if they⁵ be dull or gross-witted. If they be ignorant or impotent,⁶ or if their priest or their parents mislead them,⁷ or if the object of faith be not duly proposed,⁸ if by slight reasons or by impious persons (then it would be imprudence to believe); or if they do not doubt of their faith,⁹ or if their teachers be fallacious or erroneous, or if the proposal¹⁰ be not enforced with reasons, with holiness of life, with the confutation of the contrary, and with some wonders; in short, if they have not had sufficient instruction (in this all agree). And this alone will excuse a great part of their church, who, for want of such instruction, are acknowledged by themselves to be infidels. Thus Navarre delivers it. In the whole Christian commonwealth¹¹ (he means the Roman church), there is so great neglect as to this, that ye may find many everywhere who believe no more of these things (i. e. of Christ and the most necessary articles of the Christian faith) in particular and explicitly, than some heathen philosophers who have only the natural knowledge of the one true God.

¹ For this are alleged, Altisiodorensis, Gulielmus Parisiensis, Richardus de Media Villa, Scotus, Bradwardin, Gabriel, Baptista Tronamala, Vega, Medina, Corduba, Faber, Petigianis, Herrera, &c. Victoria, Soto, Canus, Bannes, Alvarez, in Sta Clara. Probl. xv. et in Bannes in xxii. q. ii. art. viii.

² Vega pro Conc. Trident. l. vi. c. xv. p. 92.

³ Probl. xv. p. 89, Et hæc est communio in Scholis, ut declarat et sequitur Herrera, &c. So Bartholom. de Ledesma sum. de sacram. pœnit. cum ad primam justificationem fides explicita Christi non requiratur, ut supponimus, tanquam magis probabile, et commune in scholis, &c.

⁴ In xxii. q. ii. art. viii. dub. ult.

Dicendum quod gratia est sufficiens causa gloriæ, unde omne illud sine quo obtineri potest gratia, non est de necessitate salutis.—*Aquinas*. in iv. dist. ix. art. i. vide; *Soto*, in iv. dist. v. q. unica. art. ii. dub. ult.

⁵ Fill. tr. xxii. n. xl. et n. lv.

⁶ Dico secundo obligationem prædictam esse sub peccato mortali, nisi ignorantia aut impotentia excuset. Communis doctorum.

⁷ Probabilis est (ignorantia) quando quis habet fundamentum probabile; ut dum rusticus credit aliquid, ductus testimonio sui parochi aut parentum—sic doctores Communiter.—*Sancta Clara*. *ibid.* p. 87.

⁸ Quando articuli fidei non modo debito proponuntur; aut rationibus frivolis, vel ab hominibus impiis: tunc enim credere esset actus imprudentiæ, secundum D. Thom. xxii. q. i. art. iv. ad secundum.—*Idem*. *ibid.* vid. plures in Jo. Sanc. d. xix. n. et. iv.

⁹ Id. *ibid.* p. 95.

¹⁰ Aragon. in xxii. q. xi. art. ii. dub. ult. *ibid.* p. 101.

¹¹ In universa Christiana republica, circa hæc tanta est concordia, ut multos passim invenias nihil magis in particulari et explicite de hisce rebus credere quam ethnicum quendam philosophum, sola unius veri Dei naturali cognitione præditum. Cap. xi. n. xxii. p. 142.

But if the precept could reach any through all these securities (which we cannot easily imagine), yet there is one way to clear them all of it, so that they may live and die infidels, without danger from any command requiring faith in Christ; for he that hath not that express faith which is commanded in the gospel, but only what is requisite *necessitate medii*, is living or dying, if he be sorry for his negligence, and purpose to amend (which may be in their sense without true repentance), capable of absolution without any instruction from his confessor.¹ And by virtue of that he may live in a justified state, or if he die, he passeth out of the world as a very good Christian, though he believe in Christ no more than a heathen.

Sect. 2. Pass we to their other sort of faith, which they call *explicit*. It is, as they define it, an actual assent to the particulars which the church propounds as revealed by God. This, with them, is justifying faith, requisite in the learned and more intelligent amongst them. As to the object of it, if we view it well, it looks untowardly for a thing by which a sinner is to be justified. For it is prodigiously extended, and takes in things uncertain, false, impossible, impertinent, and ridiculous, as points that must certainly be believed unto justification; for their church propounds as things revealed by God (and so objects of justifying faith) not only what is delivered in Scripture, but unwritten traditions concerning matters of faith and manners, and these, if they will be justified, they must believe, though they know not what they are, nor where to find them, but in the church's unerring fancy. She propounds also the unanimous consent of the fathers in several points; and though this never was, or is impossible to be known, yet it must be believed by those that mean to be justified. She propounds the decrees of councils to be believed as divine truths, when it is acknowledged that the design in councils for many hundred years was not to discover truth, but to promote the Roman greatness.² She propounds also the determinations of popes: these must be believed as infallible, when ordinarily they were neither persons of common truth or honesty; and we must be justified by believing the dictates of atheists or heretics,³ of conjurors⁴ or incarnate devils,⁵ of vicious beasts and wicked monsters;⁶ for those who cry up his holiness have adorned him also now and then with these other sacred titles.

I know not whether these things are more ridiculous or more horrid; however, letting them pass as they are, let us take their faith at best, and make it better than they will have it. Suppose it rested in the Scriptures, and had nothing for its object but revelation, such as is truly divine, yet even so, they give such report of it as will scarce suffer us to think that they can expect to be justified by it. Considered in itself, they count it not worthy the name of a virtue.⁷ They call it a dead, idle thing;⁸ and though they

¹ Imo in rigore, non tenetur confessarius, etiamsi sanus sit pœnitens, eum instruere ante absolutionem; dummodo enim debeat de preterita negligentia, et proponat emendationem in futurum, capax est absolutionis, sola fide explicita circa mysteria necessario credenda ex medio.—*Fill.* tr. xxviii. n. lviii. vide *Jo. Sanc.* d. ix. n. xviii.

² Omnia concilia post Chalcedonense potissimum instituta fuerunt, non ut ærneretur veritas, sed ut roboraretur, defenderetur, atque augetur semper ecclesiæ Romanæ potestas, et ecclesiasticorum libertas.—*Æneas Sylvius.* l. ii. de gest. conc. Basil.

³ Canus. loc. Theol. l. vi. p. 248, 844.

⁴ Sylvest. ii. Platin. Chron. Martini Poloni. Hildeband. Binno Cardin.

⁵ Fœx vitiorum et Diabolus incarnatus; Constan. concil. Sess. xi. art. v.; Benedict. ix. vid. Baron. an. 1084, n. iii.

⁶ Sunt qui scribunt hunc sceleratissimum hominem, seu monstrum potius.—*Platina.* vita. John xiii.

⁷ Dominic. a Soto. de natur. et grat. lib. xxi. c. vii. d. lxxix. et lxxxi.

⁸ Concil. Trident. Sess. vi. c. vii.

would have it to be an infused habit, and the gift of God (because the Scripture so calls that which is justifying faith indeed), yet they say¹ a mere human quality, acquired without any supernatural assistance, may perform its proper act and office by actual assent to the whole Christian doctrine. They confess it is commonly found in the worst of men (*in perditissimis hominibus*), such as are neither acted nor possessed by the Spirit of God; such as live and die in mortal wickedness,² and are damned for it; yea, some of them confess that it is in the devils. This faith, saith Cardinal Contarenus,³ is not it by which we believe that there is a God, or by which we believe that the things are true which God speaks; for this also is in the devils and the most wicked men. Yet at other times this is with them, the Christian, the catholic faith, as if it were enough to make them true⁴ Christians and catholics; but sure they will not seek for their Christianity and catholicity in a room lower than purgatory. However, instead of a faith which the Scripture calls for as saving and justifying, they commend to Christians a faith which hath no connection at all, necessary or probable, with salvation or justification. All they have to say is, that it must necessarily be joined with love; but when they have said this, they undo it, and all by making love itself unnecessary, as we saw before.

Sect. 8. In fine, they seem little concerned for faith, who hath it or hath it not, or how little it be, or how seldom acted. It is not⁵ necessary that the pope himself should have this faith (though the devils want it not), yea, or any other virtue, for all his 'holiness:' the body may do well enough, though the head of it be an infidel. They are obliged to maintain this, because their popes often have been no better. And the body may shift pretty well without it too. This may be the true catholic church made up of the whole company of believers, when not one amongst them all hath faith; for time was, say they,⁶ when none at all had faith, but only one woman, and it may be so again.

As for the exercise of it, Hurtado thinks an act of faith may be requisite once in a year;⁷ but the Jesuit may seem to deal unmercifully with them, putting them to believe some of their creed once in twelve months. Those of other orders would not have them so much oppressed, once in twelve years will be enough; Bonacina⁸ saith four or five moments in a whole life may suffice for this, and specifies them; but because this may seem too hard, he signifieth withal how they may be eased in a manner of them all. For once (though that be at the point of death) an⁹ implicit act may serve; at another time or two, the precept for faith doth not of itself oblige to the act, only¹⁰ it is requisite by accident; and so the neglect of it, then, will be no special sin, nor need be confessed; at another time (or more if there

¹ Scotus in iii. dist. xxiii. ait. fide humana (quam ipse appellat acquisitam), hominem posse assentire toti prædicationi Christianæ. Imo ita inquit, credimus auctoritati ecclesiæ (quam ipse putat humanam et institutione parentum).—Cui sententia adhuc explicatius subscribit Durandus q. i. in ii. sent. d. xxviii. dicens fidem infusam non esse necessariam, nisi ut facilius credamus.—*Soto. ibid.* l. ii. c. viii. p. 81.

² Bellarm. de baptism. l. i. c. xiv.

³ Fides hæc non est ea tantum qua credimus Deum esse, et qua credimus vera esse quæ dicit Deus, hæc et enim est etiam in dæmonibus et perditissimis hominibus.—*Confut. artic. Lutheri.* art. i.

⁴ Concil. Trident. Sess. vi. c. xxviii.

⁵ Non enim fides interior Romani pontificis ecclesiæ est necessaria.—*Canus*; loc. Theol. lib. vi. c. ult. p. 344.

⁶ Abbas in Sylvest. sum. v. concil. n. iii.

⁷ Existimant aliqui preceptum eliciendæ fidei obligare singulis annis—verum hoc communiter negatur.—*Petr. a S. Joseph.* sum de i. præcept. art. i. p. 6.

⁸ Tom. ii. in . præcept. disp. iii. q. ii. punct. ii. ⁹ N. xii. ¹⁰ N. ix. and xi.

were occasion), ignorance, or want of consideration, may¹ excuse them (for these two, though they ruin the greatest part of the world eternally, yet are the greatest security of Roman catholics; and not only exempt them from that which is most the duty of Christians, but will not suffer them to sin, at least mortally, do what they can). So that, after all, one act of their faith once in a lifetime will be enough. I think it sufficient (saith he after many others) for those that are rude, to give an explicit assent once to the articles necessary to salvation, while they are propounded by their confessor, or some other.² But how must the confessor propound these articles to them, so as they may pass this one act of faith upon them once for all? Why, the best way,³ he tells us, is by a mode of forming the sign of the cross, as it is described for this purpose by Graffius, Bellarmine, and other great divines. I had the curiosity to see how a confessor can make the most ignorant persons true believers by the sign of the cross, and so effectually, as they never need more believe than once while they live, and found it lying thus:⁴ Let the confessor teach him to form the sign of the cross with three fingers, to signify the mystery of the most sacred Trinity. But first, it must be drawn from the top of the head, or front, to the navel, to shew that the Son of God descended from the highest heavens into the bowels of his mother; then draw the cross line from the left arm to the right, so the cause of the incarnation is expressed; he came from heaven to earth, that we, who were to be placed amongst the goats at his left, might be removed to his right hand amongst the sheep. This is the admirable expedient. The grave Benedictine reflecting on it was put into a transport; for he adds, Behold what great mysteries of faith mother church has taught us by one mode of forming a cross, so that a rude person needs know nothing besides this, even this alone may be sufficient for his salvation!⁵ Here is a compendious way indeed to salvation, and all the knowledge and faith needful for it. He that can be satisfied with it (and give himself up to absurd and ridiculous delusions, against all the evidence of God's word), may in few minutes, with once making the sign of the cross, get all the faith requisite for a Roman catholic; and when by such admirable conduct of the cross he hath but once believed, he need never more trouble himself with faith while he lives.⁶ The precept for faith (saith another) obligeth not, but perhaps once in a life; and it is delivered as the judgment of Aragon Torres, and other their chief divines, that of itself it binds not, but when one comes to the use of reason, or if it be not then performed, afterwards; but after one act of faith once put forth, the obligation to exercise more acts do rarely, or may be never, occur. Such is their faith, and thus you must conceive, if you can, how they live by it.

¹ N. viii.

² Existimo tamen sufficere, ut isti rudes semel assensum explicite præbuerint articulis ad salutem necessariis, dum sibi proponebantur a confessario, vel ab alio.—*Ibid.* n. xiv. ibi. Malderus et alii. Peter a S. Joseph reduces all the moments and occasions where an act of faith may be thought requisite to six heads, and then declares upon each severally, either that the precept doth not of itself oblige, or that they may be excused from sin in neglecting it at any of them.—Sum in i. precept. art. i. pp. 3–6.

³ Bonacin. *ibid.* n. xvi.

⁴ Graff. *decis. part. i. l. i. c. xxiv. n. iii.*

⁵ Ecce quanta nobis fidei nostræ mysteria unica formandæ crucis ratione mater ecclesia docuit, ut si nihil præterea sciret rudis homo, vel hoc solum ad salutem illi sufficere queat.—*Ibid.*

Præceptum fidei non obligat per se, nisi semel forte in vita. Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. xli. n. xxxii. Advertant præceptum fidei non obligare per se, nisi tempore usus rationis advenientis, vel postea si tunc non est impletum taliter, quod post semel elicitum actum fidei raro vel fortasse nunquam occurrat, dicta obligatio exercendi actus fidei, sic expresse Suarez, Aragon, &c.—*Ibid.*

They can make a life of faith of one act alone in a whole life. No wonder they presume that they can so perfectly fulfil the whole law, yea, and pay God much more than his due, when they make the greatest commands (the sum of the law and gospel) to amount to little or nothing, and instead of a hundred, set down, not fifty, but a fraction, or a cypher; when, in the case before us, they take no more notice of the faith which the gospel calls for, yea, make bold in a manner wholly to neglect that of their own making.

CHAPTER V.

There is no necessity of true repentance for Romanists by their doctrine.

Sect. 1. If anything be absolutely and indispensably necessary to salvation, it is repentance. Christ himself declares it, Luke xiii. 3. The doctrine of repentance from dead works is a fundamental, and so made expressly by the apostle, Heb. vi. 1; so that without the belief and practice of it, no sinner can possibly be saved, nor have any hopes of it, but such as are delusions. Thus necessary hath the Lord made it, and yet by the Roman doctrine, it is more than needs for any sort of sins.

As to original sin (the corruption of our natures), those of them who hold there is any such thing within us, yet declare that if it be any sin at all, it is the least of all sins. Andradius, employed by the council of Trent to write, tells us that their divines so determine. Bellarmine saith,¹ that amongst all sins it is the least voluntary, and on that account is less than any venial sin; and it must be little indeed, that is less than any venial, for that, as another cardinal² tells us, passeth for nothing. And that which hath so little, or nothing of sin in it, needs no repentance. So Soto³ concludes, a man that hath no guilt but that of original sin, hath no need of any repentance. Thus they represent original sin as it is in them before baptism, but after they are baptized, they all agree that it is no sin at all. The council of Trent hath determined it (and so it is now with them an article of faith,⁴ that in baptism, not only the guilt of original sin is remitted, but whatever of it hath anything of the true and proper nature of sin, is totally taken away; and they curse⁵ those who hold that it is only pardoned or impaired, and not all the sin of it quite abolished by baptism. They say they are become innocent, pure, harmless, spotless,⁶ without the least speck of original sin, and so without any need of repentance upon that account.⁷ They are so far from being actually obliged to repent of any natural corruption, that they cannot be obliged to it, God himself cannot bind any one to repent of it. So that if there be in our natures any defectiveness as to the image of

¹ After Aquinas, iii. q. i. art. iv. de amiss. grat. l. i. c. x. p. 226. Inter omnia peccata minimum habet de voluntario, et ideo minus grave est, in ratione voluntarii, quam quodlibet veniale.

² Modicum pro nihilo habetur, Cajetan. Sum. v. fest. (et sæpius alibi) secundum quoque commune est, modicum pro nihilo reputari, p. 310.

³ Haud tamen huic homini, ulla est penitentia necessaria.—*De Nat. et Grat.* l. ii. c. xii. p. 92.

Contritio cum sit dolor, voluntatis duriem ex peccato contractam comminuens, non proprie est de peccato originali, Aquin. supplem. q. ii. art. ii.; Sylvest. v. contritio. n. iv.; Graff. l. i. c. iv. n. ii.

⁴ In Baptismate, non modo remitti reatum originalis peccati, sed totum id auferri, quod veram ac propriam rationem peccati habet, Sess. v. c. iv.

⁵ Ibid. ca. iv.

⁶ Innocentes, puri, immaculati.

⁷ Tantum abest obligari quempiam ad originalis culpæ penitentiam, ut neque possit. *Soto ibid.*

God, any averseness to God and that which is good, any propenseness to evil, we are not to take notice of it, or grieve for it as a sin; for however the apostle frequently calls it so, it is none; no more to be repented of than an innocent, harmless thing. Thus original sin is quite discharged from any concern in our repentance.

Sect. 2. There are other evils which make up the far greatest part of actual sins, which by their doctrine are but venial. Of this quality are not only those which they count small in their own nature, and those which are small in respect of the matter of them, but likewise all (how heinous soever as to the nature of them, how great soever as to the matter of them) that are acted without perfect deliberation, and are not completely voluntary. And by favour of their describing this third sort of minute evils, the most enormous wickedness that can be acted against God or man, may come under the notion of venial faults (of which hereafter). Blasphemy, perjury, adultery, murder, &c., when without perfect deliberation, will be no worse.

However, these with them are light faults, and lightly cancelled (as they tell us) by the bishop's blessing, by holy water, by knocking the breast, by saying a *paternoster*, by extreme unction (so our Rhemists, Aquinas adds¹), by the eucharist, by any of the seven sacraments,² by any sacramental unction, by prayer in a holy place; yea, or by but entering into a consecrated church.

So that by these and other such means, *et si aliqua alia sunt hujusmodi* (saith Aquinas), pardon of venial sins may be obtained; yea, any one of them will quite³ abolish the fault, if not the whole penalty, particularly holy water, which (as Canus teacheth⁴) takes away the punishment of sin, and also the faults that are venial. No wonder if they determine that the sacrament of penance is not needful for these, not so much as their ritual repentance, and that there is no necessity they should be so much as confessed, nor any remorse or grief required for them,⁵ nor that they should be relinquished so much as in their resolution only.⁶ Contrition is so far from being requisite for venial sins, that with them attrition is not needful, for that is a displicence arising from shame or fear; but these sins are (in their account) neither shameful⁷ (it is no crime, they say, to glory in them) nor dangerous; no man can be condemned for them.⁸

¹ In Mat. x. 12.

² Tertius, q. lxxxvii. art. iii. Taceri citra culpam, multisque aliis remediis expiari possunt, Conc. Trident. Sess. iv. can. v.

³ Vide Aquinas ibid. tertium.

⁴ Peccatorum penas solvit, culpas etiam veniales, De Sacrament, pars. i. p. 752, vid. p. 751.

⁵ Concil. Trident. Sess. iv. Can. v.

Ad venialia in confessione explicanda teneri, qui solis venialibus urgetur—negat communis opinio cum D. Thoma. Scoto. Durando. Major. Victorell. ad Tol. l. vi. c. xi.

Utrum peccata venialia necessario sint confitenda? Resp. secundum Scotum, quod non; etiam si nullum habet mortale: quoniam per peccatum veniale etiam in proposito, homo non potest damnari nec periclitari, et penitentia est secunda tabula pro periclitantibus, igitur non obligatur ad eam nisi habens mortale. Immo dicit Petrus de Palude in iii. quod nec etiam papa possit ad hoc obligare.—Angel. sum. v. Confess. n. xxv.

Cum dolor de venialibus non sit necessarius, ne confessio quidem venialium necessaria est. Canus. pars. vi. relect. de penitent. p. 955. Secundum S. Thom. in iv. dist. xvii. homo tenetur habere istum dolorem (contritionis) de peccato actuali, non de originali—et de mortali non de veniali, quia cum ejus complacentia mori potest, ac salvari, Sylvest. v. contrit. n. iv. vid. Navar. c. i. n. xxiv.

⁶ Non est necessarium habere propositum nunquam peccandi venialiter, Navar. c. i. n. x.

⁷ Conc. Trid. Sess. xiv. 4.

⁸ Vid. Suarez, tom. iv. disp. xx. sect. vi. n. iii.

Thus their doctrine giveth them all abundant encouragement to live and die impenitently in these sins, in all of them; for all of them in the world, if found in one man together, amount not to so much as one mortal sin.¹ All the penitence for these that is required by the precisest of them, is no more than one act of charity contains, *i. e.* such a virtual dislike as a man may have of that which he was never actually displeased at, no, nor so much as thought of.²

It may seem strange (the operation of the spirit of delusion not considered) how such a conceit could ever possess the fancies of rational persons, and of some acquaintance with the Scriptures; that their sacramentals (holy water, and the like trifles) should have the virtue to procure pardon of sins, even without repentance. Aquinas would have us satisfied with this, that they do not remit sins of themselves, but are said to do it, because they may excite that fervour by which they are remitted;³ but this fervour is not repentance, and whatever it be, it ought to be excited, that it may remit sin, since this admirable virtue is ascribed to it on that account. No, say his followers, we must understand him so, that it is not always requisite it should be excited, but that these sacramentals are instituted for this end. Wherefore to receive them as accommodated by the church to this effect is an act of repentance, and procures remission of venial sins; although there be no way any excitement of devotion, nor any remembering of these sins, nor any dislike of them; for if this were required, truly they would not be sacramentals, since this dislike alone would be sufficient; so de Graffius after Soto.⁴ Here is pardon of sin by an excitement of fervour, though it be not excited; that must be the *implicit* repentance, sufficient for the pardon of venial sins; and the *explicit* very like it, an act of repentance (such as is receiving of holy water), without any remembering the sins to be repented of, or any dislike of them. They had need believe that these sins are no transgressions of the law, since they expect to be secured from its penalty by that which is no repentance.

Sect. 8. Hereby it is too manifest that they make repentance needless, both in reference to original sin, and likewise to all those which they count venial. If they will have it needful for any sin at all, it must be for those they call mortal; but then these are but few in comparison. They have reduced them to seven, and none pass for deadly but such as quite extinguish spiritual life, and kill the soul immediately.⁵

Well, but is repentance necessary for these? As to this, divers of great eminency amongst them conclude that there is no divine precept for repentance.⁶ God hath not commanded any to repent. Now if he command it

¹ Etiam si omnia venialia peccata simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale peccatum.—*Bellarmin.* de amiss. grat. l. i. c. xiii. p. 91.

² Aquinas iii. q. lxxxvii. art. i. c.

³ Ideo ista dicuntur specialiter dimittere, non quia remittunt per se, sed quia sunt excitativa fervoris per quem fit remissio.—*D. Th.* in iv. art. ad ii. dum.

⁴ Sed adverte quod responsio D. Thom. quod ideo ista dimitunt venialia, quia excitant fervorem, intelligenda est, non quod semper requiratur illa excitatio, sed quod de se hæc sacramentalia ad hoc sint instituta. Quare illa suscipere, tanquam ad illum effectum ab ecclesia accommodata censetur actus penitentiae, et acquirit remissionem venialium, etiam si nullatenus excitetur ad devotionem, nec memoriam habeat venialium, vel displicentiam, nam si illa requireretur, profecto sacramentalia non essent, cum sola displicentia sufficeret. Sotus dist. xv. q. ii. art. i. modo tunc non habeat complacentiam, Graff. t. i. c. xvi. n. ix. p. 13. Victoria, Canus, Major, Cajetan. Ledesmi et alii in Suarez. tom. iv. disp. xii. sect. ii.

⁵ The particular sins contained under these seven capitals (as their offspring), the people need not trouble themselves about them; for common confessors are not obliged to know whether they are mortal or no.—*Angel.* sum. v. Confess. iv. n. iii.

⁶ Sunt enim theologi et fuerunt, quorum opinione de actu penitentiae speciali præ-

not, it is not necessary; and if it be not a necessary duty, it is no mean necessary to salvation. For, as themselves tells us, though all that is commanded be not necessary to salvation, yet all that is necessary to salvation is commanded.¹ That there is no special precept which requires repentance, was the opinion of their famous Franciscus de Victoria (in his time the great master of divinity in Spain), and of other divines, both before and after him, as Melchior Canus (sometimes his scholar) tells us. And when that of Christ, Luke xiii., 'Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish,' is objected, they answer the meaning is, They shall perish for preceding sins, not for impenitence. By their doctrine there is no danger that any should perish for that, though persisted in unto death; and they had some reason to allege Aquinas (the angel of their schools) as of their judgment herein; for he saith plainly, that impenitency continued in till death is no special sin, but a circumstance of sin.² By this doctrine it is no sin, no transgression of any divine precept to be impenitent, or to persevere therein to the end.

Those who will be concluded by the council of Trent must believe that there is no divine precept which requires contrition or true repentance precisely, but only disjunctively, either that or what is there declared to be sufficient without it. And they must take it for certain that it is not a medium necessary to salvation, since that council has determined that something else will suffice for pardon without it, and so they declare it expressly.³

Sect. 4. But let us take notice of those who seem more severe. Many there be who think that repentance is under a divine command, yet these in the issue make it no more necessary than the other, who find no precept for it. For they determine that we are not obliged to repent presently, that it may be deferred till the approach or danger of death; and, in fine, that it is needless, even when a man is dying.

For the first, they teach that a sinner is not bound to repent presently, it is lawful to defer it. So their doctors of all sorts, so all the faithful (say they), so the whole church. That a man is not bound to repent presently is a conclusion, saith Soto, established by the practice and the usage of the church.⁴ Canus tells us it is his own, and the common opinion, that a man is not obliged to repent forthwith; and this, he saith, is confirmed by best reason, viz. the consent of all the faithful, both priests and people; and adds, that to make the precept so rigid as to require present repentance, hath no probable reason, no, nor any authority.⁵

ceptum nullum est; hanc vero sententiam in primis suadent testimonio D. Thomæ, &c. —Canus, pars. iv. relect. de pœnit. p. 856.

¹ Aquinas et Bellarmin. supra. Media necessaria ad salutem sunt nobis divino jure precepta quod tradit, D. Tho. ii. q. ii. art. v. &c., et est quasi axioma communiter receptum.—Suar. l. i. De Orat. c. xxix. n. ii.

In hac controversia Præceptor meus olim. F. Franciscus Victoria, vir nostra ætate literis ingenio, religioneque clarissimus.—*Ibid.* Fuere Catholici quidam, ut refert Jo. Medina et Vega. et quidem ex schola, D. Tho. ex quibus fuit Victoria, qui dicebant pœnitentiam non esse in præcepto ullo, idque ex D. Thom. videbantur probare, et meo judicio satis efficaciter.—*Vasq.* in 3 hom. tom. iii. q. lxxxvi. art. ii. dub. ii. n. i.

² Permanere in peccato usque ad mortem, non est speciale peccatum, sed quædam peccati circumstantia, xxii. q. xiv. art. ii. Corp. et tamen si esset de pœnitentia speciale præceptum, omissio illius specialis culpa sine dubio esset, as they argue in Canus.—*Ibid.*

³ Contritio proprie accepta, in lege nova, non est necessaria simpliciter necessitate mediæ ad justificationem et salutem, Bonacin. de Sacram. disp. v. q. v. p. 2, n. i.—*Ibid.* Petigianus, et alii.

⁴ Non illico ut homo se reum sentit culpæ, pœnitentiæ lege pœnitere constringitur. Hæc profecto conclusio more et usu ecclesiæ satis videtur constabilita.—Soto in iv. dist. xvii. q. ii. art. vi.

⁵ Ut mea fert et communis opinio, non protinus tenetur homo pœnitentiam agere.

Now this doctrine concerning repentance, in this first step of it, where it appears more modest and innocent than in its further advance, is yet very horrid and desperate. For it is all one as if they had said, that they may, notwithstanding any command of God, continue (for some time at least) in their hatred of God, and state of enmity against him, since that is confessedly the temper and state of the impenitent. Besides, it emboldens sinners, and giveth them confidence to leave their souls at a desperate venture, presuming they may repent time enough hereafter, when they can have no assurance of any time at all for the future. And it is the more dangerous, because their doctrine takes away all apprehension of danger, leaving them no fear, either of penalty or sin, in putting off repentance; no danger of suffering by present neglects or delays, for they are told that they may repent when they please. The Lord, saith one part of their divines, is every moment ready to help them to repentance;¹ or, say the rest, he will help them to it (if they please) in the article of necessity, whenever the precept makes it their duty.² And what should hinder them, upon such encouragement, to defer it, even to the point of death? They need not fear that they shall perish, nor need they fear they shall sin by thus putting it off. Some of their doctors make it no sin at all, others as good as none. Bellarmine determines that it is not a sin, but only a circumstance of sin, when the command doth not oblige; and that it doth not presently, but only at a certain season.³ Medina affirms that, without all doubt, it is lawful.⁴ Soto saith it is but a venial sin.⁵ Canus takes a course to reconcile them, he concludes it is no sin at all not to repent presently, and that is but a venial sin to will (or resolve) not to repent.⁶ Now if it be no sin at all, there is no danger at all; if it be but a

Atque hæc assertio non alia ratione potiore ostendi possit, quam quod fidelium omnium consensus facile admittit, &c., nec aut pœnitentes in confessione hujus criminis se accusant, aut sacerdotes id curant—Cum nulla idonea ratio sit, nullave autoritas qua præceptum adeo durum asseratur, &c.—*Melch. Canus.* pars. iv. relect. de pœnit. pp. 862, 863.

Licet toto temper, quo quis agnoscat se lethali peccato mortuum, de bono consilio debeat curare, ut a tam gravi morbo resurgat, periculumque mortis subitæ atque æternæ effugiat, juxta illud, Ne tardes converti ad Dominum, et ne differas die in diem.—*Eccî. v.* Non tamen ad id tenetur præcepto, ad novum peccatum mortiferum obligante; nisi ea temporis parte, qua memoriæ occurrit quoad usum—secundum communem opinionem. Imo neque tunc, ob ea per quæ id affirmavit Adrianus, et ob ea, quæ nos addimus.—*Navar.* cap. i. n. 27 et n. 29.

Alensis, Bonaventura, Durandus, Aquinas, Adrianus, Angelus, Medina Viguierius, &c., vid. in Suarez. iv. disp. xv. sect. v. n. ii. Præceptum non obligat ad agendam pœnitentiam statim, etiamsi opportunitas occurrat, seu licet facile fieri possit.—Vid. Vasq. in iii. Th. ibid. dub. v. n. ix. Est verissima opinio præceptum contritionis non obligare statim. Alexand. S. Thom. Angelus. Jo. Medina, Sotus, Durand. Canus, Navar. Paludan. Adrian. Viguierius, merito ergo omnes in hoc conveniunt.

¹ Vega in Conc. Trid. lib. xiii. cap. xi. Molina. concord. grat. et lib. arb. q. xiv. art. xiii. disp. x. Valent. tom. ii. disp. viii. q. iii. Semper quoad se habet opportunitatem, quia semper est in suo arbitrio positum conteri. Filiuc. tr. vi. c. viii. n. 202. Cum quilibet possit ope divina (quæ nunquam [deest] facienti quod in se est) suorum peccatorum pœnitere, et eorum veniam consequi.—*Nav.* cap. xxiv. n. 12.

² Cum non potest sine conversione vitare peccatum. Bellarm. de grat. l. ii. c. v. et c. viii. Becan. de auxil. grat. cap. vi. Alvarez. de auxil. grat. l. xi. disp. cxii. n. v. concl. ii.

³ Neque enim præceptum de pœnitentia agenda quovis tempore obligat, cum sit affirmativum, sed solum certis temporibus, ut cum versamur in periculo mortis, cum ad confessionem est accedendum (but for this, he says, irritation will suffice, l. ii. c. xviii. p. 974), cum Deus peculiari inspiratione ad pœnitentiam nos invitat. At extra ejusmodi tempora impenitentia non tam peccatum novum, quam peccati patrati circumstantia est.—*De Pœnit.* l. ii. c. ix. p. 958.

⁴ Non est dubium, quin id licitum sit.—*De Pœnit.* tr. i. q. vi. p. 18.

⁵ In. iv. dist. xvii. q. ii. art. vi. Relect. de Pœnit. pars. iv. p. 866.

⁶ Ibid. p. 863, supra.

venial sin, there is very little or none to be regarded, no necessity upon any account to repent of it; and he saith the people never confess this in order to repentance, the priests never require it nor regard it; by the consent of all, we are not obliged to it.

Now, that which a man is not bound to repent of, he may still continue in, and so he may still continue resolved to put off repentance; yes, so he may safely, say they, till the article of necessity.

Sect. 5. But when is that? Let us next inquire after it, and in the pursuit thereof we shall discover the second point I charge them with, That a man, by their doctrine, needs not repent all his days, till he be in danger of death.

This is their common doctrine: since the command to repent is affirmative,¹ it doth not oblige, but in time of necessity, even as other affirmative precepts do. All the question will be, When is this time of necessity, when it will be necessary to repent without longer delay? Now their doctors are agreed in no other article of time, except it be the point of death, or when a man's life is apparently in danger. There is no other time in a man's whole life, wherein it is likely that repentance should be requisite, but they deny it to be then necessary, and offer arguments to prove that it is not needful in any other, however probable seasons. Let me shew this in some instances.

Is it necessary to repent at solemn times of worship, when we address ourselves in a more particular manner to a holy God? No, say they,² generally; and Canus³ giveth this reason for it: Though acts of religion be then required, yet repentance is not an act of religion, but of revenge.

Is it needful on days of fasting? It may seem so, because the main and proper end of fasts is the exercises of repentance and humiliation. No, say they, it is not needful then; for if this were the intention of God, or the church, in enjoining fasts, yet the intention of the lawgiver doth not bind us. No exercise of repentance is with them requisite on their fasts, but what they may perform in a dream;⁴ for if they sleep the whole fasting day, yet they fulfil the precept for fasting.⁵ To their fasts they require nothing but abstinence from some sort of meat, not any religious act at all; and if with them the precept for the mass, or prayer, could not be fully accomplished without some penitent sense of sin, as it may, yet neither the mass nor prayer, public or private, is requisite to their fasts. Yea, in extraordinary times for prayer, upon occasion of some great calamity befallen them for their sins, they think not contrition for sin needful. The people know not there is then any necessity thereof; their confessors and preachers are never wont to mind them of this as a thing necessary;⁶ and therefore Lopez saith, he

¹ Quantum autem ad vitandum novum peccatum transgressionis præcepti de contritione, tempus est determinatum ad articulum necessitatis: sicut in aliis affirmativis præceptis contingit.—*Cajetan*, Sum. v. contrit. p. 104. Canus, *ibid.* p. 863.

² Aquinas, ii. 2, q. cxxii. art. iv.

Cajetan, *ibid.* p. 185; Soto de just. et jur. l. ii. q. iv. art. iv. supra Bellarm. de cult. Storum. l. iii. c. x. supra. Sylvest. sum. v. Domin. n. viii. Graff. lib. i. cap. v. n. xxiv. Navar. cap. xiii. n. xvii. Sum. Rosellæ, v. feriæ n. ii.—*Lopez*, cap. xii. p. 85.

³ In diebus festis non obligari homines ad agendam pœnitentiam aut divino præcepto aut humano, præceptum enim de colendo Deo, quo festis diebus astringimur, opera religionis præscribit: at pœnitentia religionis opus non est, sed vindicationis, Canus, *ibid.* p. 864. Ita *Cajetan*. Soto, Navar, Armilla, Rosell. et. alii communiter, Suar. l. ii. de fest. c. xvi. n. xiv.

⁴ Ex. D. Thomæ et graviorum autorum sententia ad finem legislatoris minime tene-mur.—*Canus*, *ibid.* p. 871.

⁵ Si aliquis dormiret per totum diem qua observari præcipitur jejunium, præceptum jejunii impletur.—*Jo. Sanc.* disp. li. n. ii.

⁶ Vid. Bonacin. de Sacram. d. v. q. v. p. 2, n. vi.

Quia non constat privatis hominibus tempore urgentis necessitatis oraturis pro populi

would not condemn any private person that neglects it in these circumstances, and so concludes he after others. As for their common fasts, these (no more than their festivals) require not abstinence from acts of wickedness, much less repentance for them.

Is it necessary, when sins are brought to our remembrance, and when our minds dictate to us, that they are to be hated and repented of? It seems then needful, if ever, seeing a practical judgment obligeth even in things lawful, though they be not otherwise necessary.¹ No, not then; a man is not bound to repent when his sins are offered to his mind, either speculatively or practically.² One would think, if a sinner needs not repent, when he is mindful of his sins, it could never be needful, since he can never repent but when he is mindful of them.

Is it necessary, when a sinner comes to their sacraments, particularly to that of penance?³ This must be the time for it (as we may well conceive), if there be any time for it at all, in the Romish church. Then a sinner is to survey his life, to find out his sins, and as a penitent to make particular confession of them, and is to have pardon of his sin, as one that only repents; being absolved by a judicial sentence, as valid as if Christ himself did pass it immediately.⁴ If repentance be not needful, when a sinner is to have pardon, then the Lord never required it, nor can it ever be made necessary by man.

This notwithstanding, repentance, they say, is not necessary, no, not for the sacrament of penance. Attrition will serve for that, which is but a slender⁵ dislike of sin, because it is hurtful to a man's self, without respect to God, as it is offensive to him.⁶ This, though short of true repentance, is sufficient to qualify a man for the sacrament of penance, by the doctrine of

necessitate, quod contritio de suis peccatis sit remedium solitum ab ipsis adhiberi, et quia ignorant id remedii esse necessarium, neque de hoc tanquam de re necessaria solent admoneri a confessoribus vel prædicatoribus: ideo peccatorem privatum tempore calamitatis magnæ, qua premitur respublica, orantem Deum pro reipublicæ liberatione sine prævia contritione, ad peccatum mortale non ideo damnarem, &c., Lopez, cap. xvi. p. 97.

¹ Ex hoc autem quod peccata memoriæ occurrunt, sicut non tenetur ad tunc confitendum, ita nec ad tunc conterendum.—*Cajetan*, sum. v. contrit. p. 105. Non autem quandocunque occurrit memoriæ peccatum tenetur conteri—nec etiam si practice occurrunt memoriæ peccata extra tempus præcepti, quia tunc secundum Sotum, neque displicere, sed neutro modo se habere, non est contemptus. Lopez, cap. xii. p. 85.—Vid. *Navar.* (after *Adrian*) cap. i. n. xxvii.

² Non tenetur homo pœnitentiam agere, quoties peccata memoriæ occurrerint, sive speculative sive practice occurrerint.—*Canus*, ibid. p. 863.

³ Non tamen ad id tenemur quoties ministramus, vel accipimus sacramenta—quia non tenemur tunc habere contritionem. *Navar.* cap. xi. n. viii. Vid. Lopez, cap. x. p. 70.

Their common doctrine, as we saw before, requires nothing but attrition for baptism and penance, no actual disposition at all for their other five sacraments.

Baptizans autem in necessitate non tenetur ad hoc (viz. contritionem). *Sylvest. v. Baptism.* iii. n. vi. neque Baptizandus vid. Soto de Nat. et grat. l. ii. c. xv. p. 101.

Si attritus suscipit Sacramentum Pœnitentiæ et Eucharistiæ, satisfacit præcepto ecclesiæ.—*Cajetan*, sum. v. contrit. p. 104. Sacramentum Baptismi et penitentiæ, licite sumi possunt ab his qui habent conscientiam peccati mortalis, modo habeant attritionem qua tollitur obex et complacentia in peccatum commissum.—*Canus*, ibid. pars. vi. p. 932.

⁴ Neque aliter est accipienda vox sacerdotis peccata condonantis quam vox Christi, qui ait paralytico, Mat. vii. Confide fili, remittuntur tibi peccata.—*Catechism, Trident. de Pœnit.*

⁵ Aquinas asserit attritionem esse displicentiam imperfectam.—*Can.* ibid. p. 935.

⁶ Attritio est dolor peccatorum, non qua ratione sunt offensæ Dei, sed quatenus nobis nocua. Nimirum quia sunt causa pœnæ aut in hoc, aut in futuro sæculo.—*Soto de Nat. et Grat.* l. ii. c. xiv. p. 99.

their church.¹ For they hold the sacrament is not only duly administered, but effectual for all its ends and purposes, when there is no obstacle in the receiver;² the obstacle in this case is complacency in mortal sins,³ the complacency is gone, when sin is disliked or displeasing out of any respect,⁴ and so the obstacle is removed by the dislike of sin, which is in attrition.

Thus comes attrition to be sufficient, and true repentance not needful, no, not for the sacrament of repentance.⁵

This is not only concluded by the generality of their doctors, but by the council of Trent. And by these particulars we may discern, that repentance with them is not necessary, at any season of a man's life, and when it would be counted so, if they did judge it needful at all, before the approach of death.

Sect. 6. But, indeed, there needs no induction of particulars to prove this, for they declare plainly, that by the command of God, it is not necessary to repent till one be at the point of death. This is said to be the judgment of Aquinas, Soto, Navarre, Durandus, Medina, Cajetan, and others, in Suarez. The ground of it is, because the reasons brought to prove that it doth not oblige presently, prove it as much of any other certain time in our life, except that only when a man is dying.⁶

It is to the same effect that others say, the precept does but oblige in danger of death or perpetual madness. So Bonacina, and in him (besides Jesuits) Medina, Sotus, Angles, Zerola Pitigianus, Sayrus, Molfesius, and others, *De Sacram.* *ibid.* n. 5. So that, while a man is like to live, and be sober, he need not repent; but if he be in danger to die, or run mad, he should be so wise as to repent first; but how he shall know when he is like to run mad, or that his madness will be perpetual, is a hard question; and till he can resolve it, they will go near to excuse him. And if he can have a confessor, though he be at the point of death and distraction too, he need not trouble himself with repenting, that proviso they still add (*saltem quando non adest copia confessarii, cui fiat confessio cum attritione*); this, indeed, is it, that their confessors serve for to save sinners the labour of going to heaven, by turning them out of the only way to it.

However, by this it appears, that any papist hath warranty, by their doctrine, to live impenitently, till he be in danger to live no longer. He need not grieve for offending God till he be dying, nor resolve upon that account

¹ Concil. Trident. sess. xiv. cap. iv.; vid. Cajetan, Navar, Canum, Lopez, supra Bellarm. de penit. l. ii. c. ult. p. 974. Sacramenta novæ legis conferunt gratiam attritionis.—*Canus de Sacramentis*, pars. v. p. 797.

² Concil. Trident. sess. vii. c. vi. Sacramentum gratiam confert omni adulto offerenti se, non ponendo obicem.—*Cajetan*, sum. v. absolut. p. 12; *Canus*, pars. iii. Relect. de penit. p. 844; *Angel.* sum. v. confess. vii. Secundum Scotum et S. Thom. si præcedens dolor non sufficisset ad contritionem, &c.

³ *Idem.* *ibid.* p. 982, supra.

⁴ Complacentia vero satis tollitur per quemcunque dolorem.—*Soto de Nat. et Grat.* l. ii. c. xv. p. 101.

⁵ That which we, with the Scripture, call true repentance, they call contrition; as for attrition, it is so far from being true repentance, that with the council of Trent they all acknowledge it is not of itself sufficient for pardon. Attritio—quamvis sine penitentia sacramento per se ad justificationem peccatorem perducere nequeat.—*Concil. Trid.* sess. xiv. c. iv.

⁶ In qua re est multorum opinio hoc præceptum (penitentia) per se et natura sua, tantum obligare pro articulo mortis, ita sentit D. Thomas et Durandus—et eodem modo sumitur hæc opinio ex Cajetano, Medina, Soto, Navar, &c. Et fundamentum—quia supposito, quod præceptum non statim obliget ante articulum mortis; nulla est major ratio designandi unum tempus, quam aliud: imo neque est ratio designandi aliquod, quia in nullo est vera necessitas: præceptum autem affirmativum tantum obligat pro articulo necessitatis.—*Suarez*, tom. iv. disp. xv. sect. vi. n. ii.

to forsake any sin, till there be reason to think that he can live no longer to commit it.

What a temptation is here for all wicked persons to turn papists, if they could but prevail with themselves to believe in this particular as the church believes, against all that God hath declared concerning repentance ! And since men easily believe what they desire should be true, though against the word of truth, how strange would it be if the world did not 'wonder after the beast'?

Sect. 7. But though they excuse a sinner from repenting all his life before, yet when he comes to die, do they not then make it needful ? They make some show of it, indeed, but it is a mere delusive show ; and they are therein as false to their own pretensions, as they are to the souls of sinners. For at the approach of death (as at any period before, wherein some of them seem to make repentance necessary, yet), even then they abuse them with conceits, that something else will serve without it. The expedients which they have provided thus to delude perishing souls all their lives, and even when they are passing into eternity, are many and various ; that those who do not like to be ruined one way may be taken with another ; and so, that repenting, which alone can secure them, may be declined by all.

First, Repentance without any sensible sorrow for sin, will serve the turn. This is the way of Scotus, and Vega, and others. A will not to have sinned, though it be without any grief for sin, or without any actual consideration that he hath sinned, is sufficient for pardon.¹ Such an act of the will is the essence of that contrition which procures forgiveness, as not only Scotus, but Paludanus, Cajetan, Soto, Victoria, and Navarre in Lopez.²

Sorrow is not essential to repentance, but an effect ; and such a one as is contingent and separable, and doth not necessarily follow it.³ Correspondent to this is their doctrine, who teach, that a virtual repentance is sufficient,⁴ any act whatever, which may be counted penitence virtually, though it be no such thing actually, or formally, is enough by their common doctrine ; any love to God above all is such a virtual repentance,⁵ though without any remembrance of sin ;⁶ this is not only the opinion of Medina, but that which is commonly received. Any kind of love will serve for this, though it be but natural, and such as may be had without the grace of God, as Navarre expresseth it.⁷ And the limitation which he would seem to add, that such a virtual repentance is but sufficient when there is no time for a formal repenting, is excluded by their common doctrine ; for he, and others with him, generally teach, that there is no space of time requisite for this, but it may be sufficiently despatched in a moment.⁸

And some of their chief divines hold that, a sinner being pardoned upon

¹ In Navar, cap. i. n. iii.

² Ex mente Navarri, Soti, Paludani, Scoti est, quod contritio quoad suam essentiam est iste actus, Nollem peccasse.—Lopez, cap. x. p. lxxviii. et cap. vi. p. xxxviii. ; vid. D. Thom. Paludan, Soto, Navar, Ledesma, Cajetan, Concil. Trident, and others in Jo. Sanc. disp. i. n. viii.

³ Per supradicta constat (contritionem) non esse dolorem essentialiter ; sed causam ex qua, et aliis ad id necessariis, nascitur dolor, si aliunde non impediatur.—Nav. ibid, n. xiv.

⁴ Sufficit actus qui licet non sit pœnitentia talis formaliter, est tamen virtualiter secundum Scotum communiter receptum.—Ibid. n. v.

⁵ N. xxx.

⁶ Imo quilibet amor Dei, quo plus quam omnia alia diligitur, videtur virtualis peccatorum pœnitentia, secundum communem quam sequitur. Jo. Medina, ibid. n. v.

⁷ Cap. xi. n. vii. p. 138, supra.

⁸ Cap. i. n. xxxviii. Pœnitudo momentanea—ad remissionem peccati juxta communem sufficiat.

this virtual penitence, if he remember his sins afterwards, is not bound to repent of then. So Corduba, Sotus, Vega, Bonacin. *ibid.* d. v. q. v. p. 2, n. i.

Thus we have repentance sufficient to salvation in the Roman church without any sorrow, without any sense or remembrance of sin. And how can they count any more sorrow for sin necessary, who hold that no prudent person doth confess his sins to a priest, but he detests them formally or virtually,¹ and so some way sufficiently; when it is known to be their common practice to confess sins, without any sorrow or detestation thereof? Yea, even in the hour of death, asking God forgiveness, without any remembrance of sin or actual repentance, is enough for pardon. So Joseph the Minorite teacheth, favouring their conceit (as Lopez observes) who think it repentance enough, to beat their breasts, and say, 'Lord, have mercy.'² Nor doth such pernicious presumption find encouragement only in the Minorites' divinity. Pope Clement the Eighth contributes more to it when, in his indulgences sent to Poland, he promiseth pardon to any one whoever that is dying, if he have but the name *Jesus* once in his thoughts, though he cannot express it.

As there can be no true repentance without sorrow for sin, so neither without resolution to forsake it; and yet they teach, repentance may be as well without this as the other. A virtual resolution may serve, *i. e.* such a purpose to abandon sin, as he may have who never thought of leaving it.³ Navarre tells us that the sufficiency of such a purpose is learnedly and magnificently asserted by Vega.⁴ He himself explains it and defends it, without any limitation, but that, the vanity whereof appears before;⁵ and tells us the council of Trent requires not a formal purpose, but thinks that sufficient which is only virtual.⁶ And their divines whom they call Nominals, deny that any purpose to forsake sin is necessary to repentance, as Soto informs us.⁷ So that by the doctrine of all sorts of divines

¹ Nullus est adeo imprudens qui tempore confessionis peccata sua non detestatur formaliter vel virtualiter.—*Major et Victoria in Lopez*, c. xvii. p. 100.

² Sufficere ad contritionem, tusionem pectoris, aut prolationem *Miserere mei*—cap. xiii. p. 90. Instante mortis, præ angustia tollente recordationem peccatorum, si quis toto corde petat veniam, sine actuali pœnitentia, per orationem justificabitur.

³ Non est necessarium ad remissionem peccatorum formale propositum vitandi peccatum.—*Vega. Concil. Trident.* l. xiii. cap. xxi.

⁴ Cap. i. n. vi. Sicut actus, qui est pœnitentia virtualis, sufficit, ita eadem ratione sufficere videtur, quod eam comitetur id, quod est propositum virtuale confitendi, satisfaciendi, et amplius non peccandi, n. xi.

⁵ N. xii.; vid. Suarez, tom. iv. disp. xx. sect. iv.

⁶ Graves doctores existimant sufficere virtuale propositum, ita Major, Almain, Vega, Medina, Petrus, Soto, Navar, Adrian.—*Idem. ibid.* disp. iv. p. 3, n. ii.

⁷ Ex nominalibus quidam addubitant, nam in ratione contritionis necessarium sit propositum cavendi a vitiis in futurum. Atque id negant Soto de natur. et gr. l. ii. c. xiv. p. 99; vid. Canum, Cordubam qui refert Durandum, Paludanum, Capreolum et Antoninum, pro tali sententia in Suarez, tom. iv. disp. xx. sect. ii. n. vi. Non esse necessariam detestationem efficacem cum absoluto dolore et proposito non peccandi, sed displicentiam quamcunque, cum velleitate non peccandi, sufficere ad valorem sacramenti, tenet Cajetan, Victoria, Canus, Ledesma, Sicut Paludanus, Sylvester.—*Ibid.* sect. iv. Aquinas, Capreolus, Thom. Hurtado.—*Tom.* ii. tr. ult. n. 501.

Neque oportet, ut confessor sibi persuadeat, et judicet etiam probabiliter, ita esse futurum ut pœnitens a peccando abstineat, sed satis est, ut existimet tunc habere tale propositum, quamvis post breve tempus illud sit mutaturus. Ita docent omnes auctores.—*Idem.* disp. xxxii. sect. ii. n. ii. p. 426.

Sotus in iv. dist. xiv. q. ult. art. iii., and Sylvester after him, sum. v. confessio, n. xxiv., hold that neither sorrow for sin, nor resolution against it (no, not so little as they ascribe to attrition) is needful; but that a willingness to partake of their sacrament is sufficient for justification by it.

amongst them, a repenting, which wants the essentials of true repentance, will suffice in life or death.

Secondly, A repentance or sorrow for sin which is merely natural is counted sufficient. The apostle to true repentance requires godly sorrow, 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10, but they, many of them, think it not requisite that it should be godly, no, not in respect of its original. That will serve which is not from God, but from nature. Scotus, a leader of one mighty squadron of their school doctors, determines, that such a sorrow may be had by the power of nature as will in congruity merit pardon of sin.¹ And Adrian, Durandus, with all the Nominals in a manner, take that to be his judgment, and are of the same persuasion themselves. The Franciscans maintained it in the council of Trent.² Aquinas, whom the rest of their school divines generally follow, was of that opinion too.³ And the chief of the Dominicans, his modern followers (even those of them who are loath their angelical doctor should appear to be so much a Pelagian), do hold, that such a sorrow as is merely from nature (without either habitual grace or special assistance) is enough to justify him who through ignorance thinks it enough. So Canus and Soto in Lopez,⁴ from whence Lopez infers, that in their account such remorse for sin, as requires special assistance, is not necessary to the justification of a sinner; but that may suffice which is had from the power of nature, though the ground of it be but outward disgrace.⁵ Thus if we will believe the Roman doctors, Thomists or Scotists (the Jesuits, who serve themselves of both as they see occasion, I need not mention, since of their concurrence herein there is no question), a sinner may be saved by such a sort of repentance as is not the gift of God, but the pure issue of corrupt nature.

Thirdly, A slight and inconsiderable sorrow (such as falls short of what the Scripture calls for) will suffice instead of true repentance. One act of grief, they tell us, is enough for the sins of a whole life, one only, there needs not two. So Soto,⁶ Bellarmine,⁷ &c. One act will serve for all sins in general and together; remembered or not remembered, in which sense

¹ *Expresse ipse (Scotus) in iv. dist. xiv. q. ii. ait., quod ex puris naturalibus, cum communi influentia, potest esse attritio, quæ sit meritum de congruo ad deletionem peccati mortalis—adeo pro constanti ubique habet, quod naturaliter possumus disponi de congruo ad justificationem: quam solam dispositionem ipse docet. Atqui Adrianus, Durandus, et ferme Nominales, et ita illum sentire indubie putant, et sentiunt ipsi.—Soto, ibid. l. ii. c. iv. p. 68.*

² *That a man by natural power only may feel a sorrow for sin, which is a disposition, and merit of congruity to abolish it.—Hist. of Coun. of Trent. l. ii. p. 198.*

³ *Ibid. et Soto, ibid. l. i. c. ii. Aquinas opinionem communem insequutus affirmasset, tum quod homo ex naturalibus posset se disponere ad gratiam, tum quod dispositio illa esset meritum de congruo, p. 66.*

⁴ *Quæstio oritur, an cum attritione orat solum ex viribus naturæ simul cum sacramento in re, possit penitens justificari. Et quidem quæstio est, quæ nobis Thomistis facit negotium, propterea quod Scotus et Canus clarissimi Thomistæ, videntur hic affirmativam tenere, cap. viii. p. 53.*

⁵ *P. 55.*

⁶ *S. Thom. Nugnus, Navar, Victoria, Sotus, Pitigianus, Zerola, Cajet., Palatius, Canus, in Bonacina.—Ibid. d. v. q. v. p. 5, n. i*

⁷ *Satis est si penitens peccatis omnibus memoratis, unam detestationem applicet.—In Lopez, c. vi. p. 39.*

⁸ *Neque illud exigitur ut tot sint actus contritionis, quot sint peccata—est concedendum hominem unica actione peccata omnia, quæ memoriæ forte occurrunt, detestari, atque ob ea commissa dolere: alioquin enim falsum esset, quod paulo ante demonstravimus, in momento posse hominem converti, et justificari.—De Penit., l. ii. c. xi. p. 944.*

they say general repentance will suffice.¹ Their sense de Graffis thus reports : A particular repentance is not required, but one general will serve, extending itself, at least virtually, to all mortal sins, both which he remembers, and remembers not; with a will to abstain from all; this is enough for remission of sins.²

Further, this one act of grief needs be but very little and slender; the very least remorse, in the lowest degree that can be, will serve.

When they require no sensible sorrow at all to repentance, but only a dislike of the will, or a will not to have sinned, the least and weakest motion of the will that way (against past sins) will suffice.

To the perfection of repentance, a certain slender inward grief is requisite, saith Maldonate;³ one act of contrition, though it be remiss, is enough, saith Tolet. These two are Jesuits, but speak more modestly than others of their doctors. Let us hear Canus: We need not grieve for sin as much as we can; such an endeavour is not required in any other precept for love, faith, hope, or righteousness.⁴ Yea, they would be foolish precepts, if they enjoined a certain degree. But if we need not grieve so much as we can, how then? Why, as little as can be; or if that will not satisfy, as little as we will. *Quantumcunque sit remissa*, saith Navarre.⁵ Penitence, be it never so little, it is sufficient for the washing away of all crimes, according to the common sense of the doctors, *quantumvis remissa*, be it as little as you will, says Lopez after Aquinas.⁶ No certain degree, none that can be assigned, above the least of all, is requisite in Bellarmine, Victoria, &c.⁷ But should there not be a degree, more than the least, for the more grievous sins? No, no more for them than the less. In honesty we may grieve more for the greater, to comply with the advice of God, but there is no necessity for it; it is only matter of counsel, and so left to our pleasure.⁸ But must we not grieve for sin, as those who conceive it to be hateful above all, and most to be avoided? No, not that neither.⁹ Lopez tells us, that neither council nor Scripture have declared it necessary to grieve for sin, as that which is

¹ Cajetan, sum. v. contrit. p. 103, 104; Soto, dist. xvii. q. ii. art. iii.; Tol. l. iii. c. xv. p. 516.

² Non requiri singularem sed quod sufficiat una generalis, quæ saltem virtualiter se extendat ad omnia peccata mortalia, &c., l. i. c. v. n. v.

Satis est ut concipiat generalem ejusmodi pænitudinem quæ virtute se extendat ad omnia mortifica. Navar, c. i. n. xxii., quod tenendum est cum Jo. Majore et Cardinale S. Sixti, alii communiter—*In Bonacin*, ibid. punct. vi.

³ Ad perfectionem pænitentis requiritur tenuis quidam dolor internus, sum. q. xvi. art. i. Contritio una licet remissa, l. iii. c. v.

⁴ Præceptum de actu fidei et de actu spei homo implet, etiamsi non agat ex toto conatu; ergo et præceptum de charitate et contritione: non ergo contritio totum animi conatum exigit—quod autem nullum ejusmodi esset præceptum, patet, esset enim stultum præceptum, quod semper invincibiliter ignoratur.—*Relect. de Pænit.* pars. iii. p. 841.

⁵ Quantumcunque sit remissa—satis est ad crimina diluenda, cap. i. n. xxxi. Secundum mentem communem doctorum.

⁶ Secundum, S. Thom. quæcunque contritio vera, quantumvis remissa, etiam in instanti concepta, satis est ad remittenda omnia mortalia, cap. xv. p. 94.

De Pænit. l. ii. c. xi. p. 948; Contrit. n. cvi.

⁷ Dicendum est ad rationem contritionis nullam definitam intensionem requiri, sed sufficere substantiam actus, in quocunque gradu fiat.—*Suarez*, tom. iv. disp. iv. sect. iv. Ita expresse, Gabriel, Soto, Medina, Vega, Navarra.—*Ibid.* n. ix.

Vid. plures in Bonacin, ibid. punct. vii. n. iii.

⁸ Licet de graviore peccato gravior requiratur pænitentia sive pænitudo, hoc tamen intelligendum est de consilio et honestate, non autem de necessitate.—*Navar*, c. i. n. xxxi.

⁹ Detestari peccatum supra omne malum pænæ, non necessarium.—*Cajetan*, Navar, Vega, in *Suarez*, ibid. disp. iii. sect. ix. n. viii.

most hateful, and (which is more than all) that the council of Trent requires it not.¹ Navarre had said as much before him, only the former thinks it may be requisite that the penitent do not expressly or positively form in his mind a resolution not to grieve for sin above all that is hateful.² Thus is repentance reduced in a manner to nothing. In respect of appreciation, it is too much to grieve for sin, as that which is most odious; in respect of intensity, it is enough to grieve less for it than other grievances; the least degree of all is sufficient, and that which is next to nothing may serve.

Moreover, this one act, so extremely little, may be despatched in a moment.³ The least degree of it is enough, but the least continuance is too much; all the repentance that is a sinner's duty may be perfectly finished in the twinkling of an eye; an indivisible instant can serve all the exigencies of it, and it may be as soon over as a man can say *Peccavi*. It is such an act as vanishes so soon as ever it appears, and is come and gone before there is time to observe it; they allow not the least space, the least particle of time to be necessary for it. And it is so in faith, hope, love, and other virtues; no man ever required any space of time for this; so Bellarmine,⁴ Canus de Graffis;⁵ so Navarre,⁶ so all in a manner; for he tells us it is the common sense of their divines.⁷ The least penitence that may be, in the shortest time that can be, yea, in that which is less than any particle of time, even in an instant, is enough to blot out all crimes. And Scotus, for saying that penitence despatched in a moment is not sufficient for pardon, had like to have suffered shrewdly, every one almost being ready to fall foul upon him; but his followers have compounded for him, and brought him off with a distinction, which makes him say as the rest do, whether he thought so or no.⁸ And now it passeth currently, that all the sorrow which any need have for all his sins may be over in less than a minute, and may be begun, perfected, and ended in less time than you can pronounce the least syllable of *miserere*, and this they restrain not to extraordinary cases, but conclude it as common to all. Finally,

This one little act, so suddenly despatched, need never return: do it but once, and no need to do it again. The act, though next to nothing in degree, though nothing at all as to continuance, is not necessarily to be repeated, or the defect of it to be supplied by another act, though there be time and occasion for it; all exercise of repentance for sin, supposed to be thus pardoned, upon any occasion, is altogether unnecessary. Having passed one act of grief, so extremely slender and so suddenly over, he needs never trouble himself with it further. There is no command⁹ that can oblige us to

¹ Nullum concilium, nec sancti, nec scriptura sacra, id supra omne odibile, dolorem necessarium esse expressere, c. xv. p. 92.

² Cap. i. n. xxv.

³ Sufficit, si fiat in instanti.—*Bonacin*, ibid. punct. viii. ibi. Nugnus, Molfesius, et alii.

⁴ Non requiritur certus gradus intensiois, neque mora ulla temporis ad veram contritionem—quis unquam in præceptis fidei, spei, dilectionis, aliarumque virtutum istas mensuras excogitavit, &c.—*De Pœnit.* l. ii. c. xi. p. 943.

⁵ Canus. pars. iii. : Relect. de Pœnit, p. 842.

⁶ Graff. l. i. c. v. n. vii.

⁷ Secundum mentem communem doctorum, quam explicat, Jo. Major, pœnitudo circumamicta debitis circumstantiis et supradictis, quantumcunque remissa, et brevissimo tempore, etiam in instanti concepta, satis est ad crimina diluenda, cap. i. n. xxxi. et n. xxii. et n. xxxviii.

⁸ Vid. Lopez, cap. xv. p. 94, alii Scotistæ videntur Scotum salvare ejus sensum et mentem interpretando—nam culpam posse remitti per contritionem etiam remissam, et habitam in instanti, non dubitavit, &c.

⁹ Non est præceptum quod nos obligat ad eam habendam bis speciatim de eodem.

have it twice for the same sin. Such is the repentance which, in the church of Rome, is counted sufficient for salvation even in ordinary cases; how agreeable it is to that which the Scripture makes necessary, let others judge; to me it seems calculated for the humours of those who would be saved with a conceit of repenting, without troubling themselves with the thing; yet this is not the worst. For,

Fourthly, When they have commended to sinners a sort of repentance which is not sufficient to save them, they take it for granted that it is insufficient, and yet maintain that it is enough, if the sinner do but think so, yea, or do not think the contrary. He that thinks he is contrite, saith Soto, when he is not,¹ though his inward remorse be not sufficient, yet because he means honestly, he shall receive justifying grace by the sacrament. Navarre tells us that Soto herein followed Aquinas commonly received, and he,² after Franciscus Victoria, judgeth it to be the plain sense of the council of Trent;³ Corduba, Canus, and de Graffis,⁴ with others, concur herein. As for the followers of Scotus, amongst them it is taught, that whosoever thinks he is contrite, hath really obtained pardon; and therefore none, who make account they bring contrition to the sacrament, do by it receive the first grace, because they are possessed of it already, by thinking so well of themselves,⁵ as Soto reports them. Add but Cardinal Tolet (that we may see how all orders conspire herein⁶), those who come with remorse (which they think to be contrition) receive the first grace. He thus explains it: Sometimes a man hath some grief for sin which is not sufficient for pardon; but the sacrament being added, he is pardoned.

Thus, all sorts agree in this conceit, which I know not whether it be more ridiculous or pernicious, that a man's thinking he hath true repentance, when he hath it not, is enough (at least with the sacrament of absolution) to save him. Let any man but delude himself, or be deluded by others, with a false conceit that he truly repents, when he doth not; and any priest can let him, in his impenitence, into heaven; if the best of the Roman guides may be believed, or those impostors regarded, who hereby make it plain (if they did it no other way), that they are given up to strong delusions.

Fifthly, If a man want that penitent sorrow which is sufficient, yet if he signify that he would have it, or that he is sorry that he hath it not, it is as effectual as if he had it. The penitent is to be asked (saith Paludanus) whether he repent; and if he do not grieve sufficiently, whether this do not

—*Navar*, c. i. n. xxviii.; vid. *Sylvest. sum.* v. contrit. n. iv. He is not obliged afterwards when he remembers his sins, Aquinas, Navar, Sayrus, Angles, Pitigianus, Mollesius, &c.—*Bonacin*, *ibid.* punct. ii. n. ix.

¹ Tum enim licet attritio interna non sufficit, tamen quia ille bona fide accedit, recipiet gratiam per sacramentum.—*De Nat. et Grat.* l. ii. c. xv. p. 101.

² Cap. i. n. xlii. et n. xxxv.

Quando non habet signa sufficientia doloris, potest et debet interrogare pœnitentem, an ex animo detestetur peccatum, cui affirmanti credere tenetur. Et hoc idem dicendum est de proposito in futurum—Ita docent omnes authores.—*Suar.* tom. iv. disp. xxxii. sect. ii. n. ii.

³ Victoria, Soto, Ledesma, Vega, Corduba; in Suarez, l. iv. disp. xx. sect. i. n. vii.

⁴ Quando saltem concipitur ob amorem Dei—cum credulitate quod habeat sufficientem dolorem, licet revera illum non habeat, l. i. c. ii. n. viii. et n. vi.

⁵ Neque vero ignoro nominalium quorundam opinionem docentium, quod quicumque existimat se esse contritum, revera obtinuisse jam veniam, atque adeo quod nullus cogitans contritionem se adferre ad sacramentum, per ipsum recipit primam gratiam: quin vero jam recepit per suam bonam illam cogitantiam.—*Ibid.* p. 102.

⁶ Aliquando homo dolet de peccato, dolore qui per se non sufficeret delere peccatum, et tamen accedente sacramento deletur.—*Just.* l. ii. c. xvi. p. 460.

displease him, and whether he would not grieve sufficiently;¹ and this (saith he) is sufficient, which Sylvester would have well observed, because one so disposed may be absolved (*i. e.* though he want that repentance which is sufficient, yet he hath enough to put him into a saving state); and this, he tells us, is not only the sense of Peter Paludanus, but of Aquinas and Bonaventure, and all their divines. Navarre saith as much, approving it as the opinion of all their doctors.² And yet this willingness, which they will have to supply the want of sufficient repentance, is but a conditional velleity, such as, Lopez observes,³ may stand with an absolute unwillingness to repent sufficiently; such a will as a whore may have to leave the stews when she hath an absolute purpose to stay there; and yet he himself⁴ will have such a velleity with attrition (which is far from true repentance) to be sufficient in the want of it. And this leads us further;—

Sixthly, Attrition, though known by the sinner to be short of true repentance, is sufficient without it, to pass him into a saving state, if the sacrament be added. Betwixt contrition (which with them is true or complete repentance) and this attrition, the distance is great; they give an account of it in many particulars.⁵ *That* is a grief for offending God, *this* for temporal or eternal punishment, as the greatest evil; *that* proceeds from filial, *this* from slavish fear; *that* cannot be had without supernatural assistance, *this* may be had by the power of nature, say many of them; *that* is an act formed by grace and love, *this* an act unformed, destitute of grace and love; *that* can pass one into the state of grace, with a desire only of the sacrament, *this* cannot, without an actual partaking of it; so, in fine, *that* is complete repentance, *this* but a defective remorse,⁶ such as was in Antiochus and Judas. Attrition, we see by their own account, is very far from true repentance, yet being held sufficient for a saving state without it, if the sacrament be added, by virtue hereof, repentance is most evidently rendered needless. And such attrition they think sufficient for this purpose, as either ariseth from the turpitude of sin, as it is disagreeable to reason, or from fear of hell, or apprehensions of temporal punishments and damage, as loss of health, credit, estate, &c. The council of Trent admits of any of these. For attrition, by their declaration,⁷ is either⁸ that which proceeds from consideration of the

¹ Secundum Pet. de. Pal. a pœnitente requirendum est, si pœnitet: et si non sufficienter dolet, an hoc sibi displicet, et vellet sufficienter dolere. Et hoc, inquit, sufficit, quod valde nota, quia sic dispositus est contritus vel saltem attritus, ut possit absolvi—et est mens S. Thom. S. Bonavent et omnium Theologorum.—*Sum. v. contrit. n. ii.*

² Cap. i. n. xviii. et cap. x. n. iv.

³ Secundum doctores et ipsum Navarrum pœnitentia de præteritis habetur per istum conditionalem actum, Nolle peccasse, sed cum istis conditionalibus nolleitatibus aut velleitatibus, stare potest propositum absolutum de sibi contrario. Ut cum nolleitate qua ingruente procella mercator nolle projicere merces suas in mare secundum Aristot. stat absolutum propositum eas projiciendi. Et cum velleitate quam meretrix in lupanari tenet inde exeundi, stare potest absoluta voluntas ibi manendi. Cap. xv. p. 91.

⁴ Non sufficit cum sacramento pœnitentiæ ad salutem, nisi saltem attritio adsit, ibid.—*Vide Suarez.*

⁵ Vide Soto in iv. sent. dist. xvii. p. ii. art. iii.; Graff. l. i. c. ii. n. iii.

⁶ Idem ibid. C. Judas. C. Scelerator; de pœn. dist. iii.

⁷ Quinimo minime malum est pœnitere solum metu pœnæ, infamiæ vel alterius mali: modo voluntatem peccandi excludat, luculenter declarat, Concil. Trident. Sess. xiv. c. iv.; Navar. cap. i. n. viii.; Vega lib. xiii. in Trident. c. xiv. Concedit detestationem ob metum aliarum pœnarum, esse attritionem, et contineri sub primo membro: nam Concilium utrumque conjunxit, scil. ex metu gehennæ et pœnarum, in Suar. tom. iv. disp. v. sect. ii. n. xv. vide Bonacin. ibid. punct. iii. n. iii.; Zerola. Chamerota, Pitigianus, et alii. ibid.

⁸ Illam vero contritionem imperfectam, quæ attritio dicitur: quoniam vel ex turpi-

turpitude of sin, or fear of hell, or other punishment. And such attrition is, with the sacrament, sufficient for pardon, as is determined by that council in these words: Hereby he makes his way to righteousness; and although without the sacrament, it [attrition] cannot by itself bring a sinner to justification, yet it disposeth him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance.¹ So that, by their doctrine, attrition so disposeth a sinner for justification, that their sacrament being added, it actually justifies, *i. e.* puts a sinner into a state of grace and salvation. From this sentence of the council, as Bellarmine tells us,² the truth of what their divines hold is conspicuous, *viz.* that attrition, arising out of fear, is a disposition to justification, and the sacrament being added, doth truly justify. How generally they hold (with some difference of notion) the sufficiency of attrition with their sacrament, we may see in such as give an account of their opinions distinctly (not taking any of the Society into the reckoning): it will be enough but to name some of them, since their suffrages, after the determination of a council, are less needful. Some are for attrition improved,³ as Henricus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Petrus, Soto; some for attrition mistaken for contrition,⁴ as Victoria, Soto, Ledesma, Vega, Corduba; some for attrition known to be so,⁵ as Aquinas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Durandus, Adrian, Antoninus, Sylvestre, Canus; and some⁶ for the opinion of attrition without the reality. But this is enough to shew that, by the doctrine of their church, attrition with the sacrament is sufficient to put a sinner into a saving state at any time, living or dying. Thus is true repentance reduced to attrition, and this made enough to qualify an impenitent sinner for pardon, so as he cannot fail of it; and yet attrition, of what kind soever, can scarce pass for a good quality. That sort of it which is rational (a dislike of sin, because it [is] disagreeable to reason), is not so good in their account as that which is servile; because, as such,⁷ it is but a mere natural act, and hath no respect to God, and so hath nothing in it which looks like godly sorrow. As for that which is servile (a dislike of sin only, or principally, for fear of punishment temporal or eternal), this is so far from being spiritually good, that it is morally evil; so bad it is, by the authority and reason of their own divines. Thus Gregory, Almain, and Adrian conclude,⁸ that it is evil to act out of fear of punishment, as the next end or motive. It is no better by the reasoning of others, who would have us think better of it; a sinner thereby prefers himself before God; and that sure is a sin (in any, unless they will except 'his holiness') not any repenting of sin; for he that dislikes sin for punishment principally, or as the greatest evil, regards more (as themselves argue) that which is evil

tudinis peccati consideratione, vel ex gehennæ et pœnarum metu communiter concipitur, Sess. xiv. cap. iv.

¹ Quo pœnitens adjunct viam sibi ad justitiam parat, et quamvis sine pœnitentiæ sacramento per se ad justificationem peccatorem perducere nequeat: tamen eum ad Dei gratiam in sacramento pœnitentiæ impetrandam disponit.—*Ibid.*

² Et de eo loquuntur theologi, cum dicunt, attritionem ex timore conceptam, dispositionem esse ad justificationem, et sacramento accedente, revera justificare, ut perspicuum est ex concilio Tridentino, Sess. xiv. c. iv. de pœnit. l. ii. c. xviii. p. 972.

³ Vide Suarez. tom. iv. disp. xx. sect. i. n. v.

⁴ N. vii.

⁵ N. ix.

⁶ Soto, Canus, Vega, n.

⁷ Detestatio peccati quia est contra rationem non est sufficiens, quia non respicit Deum ipsum, nec peccatum, ut est offensæ ejus—tum quia ex vi illius motivi non est supernaturalis.—*Idem. ibid.* disp. iv. sect. ii. n. xi. Primum itaque genus imperfectæ displicentiæ est, cum quis dolet de peccato propter humana naturaliaque motiva, ut quia turpe est et contra rationem.—*Canus, Relect. de pœnit. pars. iii. p. 836.*

⁸ Nonnulli catholici—operari ex timore tanquam ex fine proximo, judicant esse malum, ut Gregorius, Almain, Adrian, Suar. *ibid.* disp. v. sect. ii. n. iii. p. 65. Vide Angel. Sum. v. Timor.

to himself, than that which is evil to God, and so placeth the ultimate end in himself, not in God.¹

Sect. 8. Having thus reduced repentance to a thing no better than we see attrition is, as though it were yet too good and too much, they bring attrition down to nothing. It is but as they describe it, a dislike of sin, not as that is offensive to God, but out of other respects, wherein self-love is most concerned, and slavish fear is most operative.² The least dislike of this nature will serve, and in the lowest degree that can be:³ nor need this continue any longer than the least moment.

And it will be sufficient, say some, though it be but merely natural,⁴ excited by some natural or human motive, without the grace of God, or his divine assistance; so Canus and Soto. Or it will serve if there be but a dislike that this dislike of sin is wanting;⁵ so Paludanus, Navarre, and others. Or it will be enough if there be a willingness to have it in those who have it not,⁶ according to the doctrine of their holy men, Aquinas and Richardus especially; or a man's thinking, probably, that he hath it when he hath it not,⁷ will serve the turn, so Canus and Vega; or if he neither have it in reality nor in conceit, it will suffice, if he be but willing to partake of the sacrament;⁸ for so, they tell us, he is virtually willing to be attrite, and this qualifies him for pardon, though he neither actually hath attrition, nor desires it; so Scotus, and Sylvester after him. Thus after attrition hath swallowed up true repentance, yet it still becomes more lank by their handling, and, in fine, shrinks quite away. But whether it be little or nothing, it will serve to justify them, yea, and that too without their ritual penance; other sacraments or rites, with this, will do it. They advance the sufficiency of attrition, for all the purposes of true repentance, even without their penance. This, with the eucharist, will serve; not (say they) that there is need of true contrition, a conceit that he hath it, with this and the eucharist,⁹ will pro-

¹ Si pœna timeatur tanquam maximum, supremum, pessimumque malum, tunc est pravus timor, nam per illum. prefert homo malum suum, malo Dei: unde in se, non in Deo, constituit finem ultimum.—*Idem.* disp. i. de spe. sect. iv. n. vi.; *Valent.* tom. iii. disp. ii. q. ii. punct. iii.

² Aquinas ii. 2. q. xix. art. vi.

³ Nulla intentio vel duratio est de ratione contritionis (Gabriel, Soto, Medina, Vega, Navar.) et idem est de attritione propter easdem rationes.—*Suar.* ibid. disp. v. sect. i. n. vi.

⁴ Ad effectum hujus sacramenti sufficere attritionem naturalem, i. e. solis viribus naturæ elicitam: sive illa sit concepta ex motivo æterno et honesto, ut est fugere pœnas inferni, vel turpitudinem peccati, sive ex motivo temporali et indifferente, ut est vitare infamiam, vel aliud temporale detrimentum.—*Soto et Canus,* ibid. disp. xx. sect. ii. n. vii.

⁵ Satis est, ut quidam dicunt, quod pœnitens displicentiam habeat, quod de peccato non dolet.—*Ibid.* sect. i. n. ii.

⁶ Sufficit, si quis vellet habere displicentiam, et Dei gratiam cavendi in posterum: quia talis est attritio virtualiter, secundum doctrinam sanctorum, maxime, S. Thom. et Rich.—*Sylvest.* Sum. v. Confess. i. n. xxiv.

⁷ Aliqui sentiunt ad hunc effectum non esse necessariam veram attritionem, in re existentem, sed inculpabiliter et probabiliter putatam sufficere, quod sensit Canus et Vega. l. xiii. c. xxxiv.—*Suar.* ibid. sect. ii. n. ii. et alii in Bonacin, ibid. q. v. p. iii. n. vi.

⁸ Imo dicitur fortius secundum Scotum, quod sufficit, quem velle talem displicentiam non solum formaliter, sed etiam virtualiter, eam volendo in sua causa, i. e. in sacramento pœnitentiæ justificante, quia in iv. dist. xiv. q. ult. in art. ii. tenet, quod ad consequendam gratiam per hoc sacramentum, non requiritur attritio: sed sufficit voluntas suscipiendi hoc sacramentum, &c.—*Sylvest.* ibid.

⁹ Imo aliqui Doctores asserunt hoc valere (viz. attritionem putatam) etiamsi omnia sit vera attritio ob negligentiam in præparatione facienda.—*Bonacin.* ubi supra de pœnit. d. v. q. v. sect. i. p. 3. n. vi.

⁹ Aquinas xiii. q. lxxix. art. i. ii. in Tol. l. vi. c. xvi. Halensis in Victorell, ibid.

cure him pardon. This, with extreme unction, will serve, as Sylvester¹ tells us; yea, this may be enough without any sacrament at all, as if a man in mortal sin, and so (with them) not in the state of grace, be killed, because he is a Christian, while he is asleep. If he was attrite, and willing to suffer before, by virtue hereof his sins are pardoned; so Cajetan, Sotus, and Lopez² after them.

In short, the mass may serve their turn; for divers of them hold that this being offered for such as are attrite, by virtue thereof (*ex opere operato*) immediately, and without more ado, they have pardon of mortal sins and habitual grace; so Catharinus (in Canus, loc. Theol. l. xii. c. xiii. p. 698) and others.

Here is competent provision made that sinners may perish securely, and never look after true repentance, living or dying. There is but one thing which may seem to give some check to this great encouragement. These administrations, whereby they will have the impenitent saved, depend upon a priest; and the sinner may be in such circumstances (though this be very rare) wherein a priest cannot be had; and then, if he should chance to die without contrition, he will perish. But this need not disturb any in their course of impenitence; for in case of necessity, where a priest cannot be had, another may serve in his stead; though he be a laic, confession may be made to him, and God will supply the want of a priest; so Aquinas (in iv. dist. xvii. q. iii. art. iii.); or he may have the eucharist administered to him without a priest; and it is their common doctrine that the eucharist justifies one that is in mortal sin if he be attrite, and thinks but himself contrite; yea, he may administer it to himself with the same effect in case of necessity. Divers of all sorts amongst them are of this opinion. The authority of Aquinas is alleged for it (iii. q. lxxxii. art. iii.), and Cajetan in Mat. xxvi. The example of the Queen of Scots (commonly produced), who, having the sacrament by her, administered it to herself, is highly approved by all.

Thus far Satan has prevailed with them to promote the damnation of sinners, by hardening them in impenitence, even when the interest of their priests seems a little concerned. But what if a catholic sinner, relying upon such impostors, still neglect true repentance, and death to surprise him so suddenly as to render these other devices impracticable; is not his case then desperate? No; he may have as good hopes of salvation as other catholics have, a probable ground for his hope (and none must have any certainty). Such a ground is the judgment of their angelical doctor, who declares that if one sick desires penance, and before the priest comes he dies, or is speechless, the priest may look on him as if he had confessed, and may absolve him, being dead (Opusc. lxiii. de offic. Sacerd.). Accordingly Clemens VIII. absolved one whom he saw falling from St Peter's church in Rome (Molfes. t. i. tr. 7. c. v. n. xlvi.); so that any may be absolved, i.e. pardoned and sanctified (for the sense of the priest's *absolve* is, I give thee grace which pardons thy sins, *Impendo tibi gratiam remissivam peccatorum; ut communiter doctores*; in Jo. Sanc. disp. xxvii. n. xviii.) even after they are dead, if they did but desire confession before. Now, those amongst themselves who do not desire confession while they live, are such only as will not have salvation if they might upon the most trivial terms, and so none need fear damnation, how impenitent Soto d. xii. q. i. art. iv. dicit hanc esse D. Thomæ sententiam, et omnium. Suarez says, omnes theologi ita docent, tom. iii. disp. lxiii. sect. ii.

¹ Sum. v. Sacram. n. iv. Navar. juxta opinionem, S. Thom. communiter receptam c. xxiii. n. xiii. this may (as they say of all their sacraments) ex attrito facere contritum, infundendo gratiam primam, ut communiter tenent omnes, in Jo. Sanc. d. xxvii. n. viii.

² Cap. xii. p. 83. Et hoc videtur sentire D. Thom.

soever otherwise they live and die, but such as are worse than any devil now in hell. And who can accuse them as too rigid, if they make true repentance unavoidably necessary for such as these, since this doctrine makes it needful for none besides ?

All these ways any man may be saved without true repentance, if he will believe the Roman doctors (though, if we believe Christ, he shall certainly perish that repents not, whatever course he takes besides). Any of these are probable, and may be by their principles (having grave doctors, more than enough, to authorize them) safely followed ; but that of the council's prescribing is infallible, and will not fail to secure those who practise it, if anything in their church may have credit, nor can fail to ruin those who follow it if the word of God may be trusted. Thus, while they would increase their party by having it thought that in their way scarce any Roman catholic will be damned, they take the course (in this as in other particulars) that none who will follow them can be saved, unless salvation be for the impenitent.

Sect. 9. By this it is also manifest that the charge brought against them in the three last articles for making saving faith, love to God, and true repentance, needless in life or death, is not founded only upon the opinion of their private doctors, or the greatest part of them, but hath that which they count the surest ground of all, the determination of a general council confirmed by the pope. For if attrition be sufficient, as that council declares, then true repentance is not necessary. If grief for sin, out of slavish fear or shame only, without any love to God, be enough, then love to God is needless ; and if love be not needful, then faith, which works by love, and is the only saving faith, is needless, till there be no time for it to work.

But is it credible that they who sometimes seem to lay so great stress upon these graces, as necessary to salvation, should contradict not only the Scriptures, but themselves, and make them needless, not only all a man's life before, but even when he is dying ? Sure, they must have some device to supply, in pretence at least, the want of these, if not before, yet at the point of death, and will substitute something in their stead of supposed equivalence to them. Indeed, they are fruitful in inventions tending to ruin souls and subvert the doctrine of salvation ; and one particularly they have in this case, and that is, what we before mentioned, their sacrament of penance. When a man is near death, if he be attrite and confess his mortal sins to a priest, and be absolved, by virtue thereof he hath remission of sins, and together therewith infusion of grace, particularly of faith, hope, and charity. Thus they come to have grace in a moment who lived graceless all their days before, and had died so if such a rite had not been provided for their relief. By virtue of this sacrament, love is planted in their heart, and their faith in God ; and sorrow for sin is formed by love, and becomes saving, so that if they die presently in that state, their salvation is secured. But what if they live, must not these habits be afterwards exercised ? must not there be some act of contrition in those who never had any before ? No ; by their doctrine there is no necessity for it, though there be no true actual repentance without it. The question is in one of their greatest divines, Whether in the law of grace, after justification obtained by the sacrament of penance with attrition alone, there remain any obligation to have contrition ?¹ And it is resolved that there is no such obligation, and that this is the judgment of all

¹ An etiam in lege gratiæ, post obtentam justificationem per sacramentum penitentiae cum sola attritione, maneat hæc obligatio habendi contritionem ? Dicendum est, per se loquendo, non manere in lege nova obligationem hanc post prædictam justificationem. Ita sentiunt omnes, qui putant sacramentum penitentiae justificare cum sola attritione cognita.—*Suarez*, tom. iv. disp. xv. sect. iv. n. xiii. et xiiii.

those who hold that the sacrament of penance doth justify with attrition alone, known to be so; and these are the most for number, and the most considerable for authority in their church and schools, Aquinas and Scotus both, whom the rest most commonly follow, concurring in it, besides their great council.¹

Sect. 10. This, then, is the doctrine of their church, introduced there instead of that of the gospel. The habits must serve to save them without their acts, and the sacrament of penance will help those that are attrite to those habits. Here is all the hopes they have for sinners whom they have encouraged to continue all their days without repentance, saving faith, or love to God, even to the very article of death. If this sacrament do not perform all this for them, they will not deny but they are certainly damned. But what ground have they for this, upon which their everlasting estate depends? None at all but their own opinion, and the opinion of such men as themselves, without any support from the word of God. If their own word will secure them for eternity, they are safe enough; otherwise, trusting to this, they are lost for ever; the whole weight of their salvation hangs upon a spider's web, spun out of their own conceits. For this sacrament of penance, upon which all depends, is a mere invention of their own; there is no divine institution for it, it was never authorised by God, he never promised anything to it, or any part of it upon their terms, much less any such thing as they expect.

And who but they who are under the power of strong delusions would trust to anything for salvation without a word from him who is the absolute disposer of grace, and the sovereign Lord of life and death? Some of themselves acknowledge that their sacrament of penance² was never instituted by Christ. And many³ of them hold that the material parts of it have no

¹ Aquinas, Scotus, Paludanus, Capreolus, Durandus, Adrian, Antoninus, Sylvester, Canus, *ibid.* disp. xx. sect. i. n. ix. Corduba, Vega, Soto in Vasquez. (Corduba docet, quod qui justificatus est Sacramento penitentiae, cum contritione tantum existimata, non tenetur eorundem peccatorum contritionem veram habere; et eam aperte colligere licet ex Soto. Et ita Vega) in iii. Thom. q. 86. a. ii. d. xi. n. xi.

² Glossa quam nonnulli Canonistae secuti sunt. Erasmus, B. Rhenanus, Bonaventura, Alexander Alensis, Hugo Victor, Jansenius, in Suarez, tom. iv. disp. xvii. sect. i. n. ix.

³ The essentials of this pretended sacrament are with them its matter and form. The matter of it consists in contrition, confession, and satisfaction; each of these are acknowledged by their own authors to be unnecessary any way, or at least by Christ's institution. Contrition, and therewith true repentance, is dismissed as unnecessary to this rite, not only by their other doctors, but by the council of Trent, and another thing assumed instead of it, as we saw before. Satisfaction is as unnecessary in their account. There is no need either that the priest should enjoin it (D. Thomas, Petrus Paludanus, Petrus Soto, Victoria, Ledesma, Cajetan, Navar, *ibid.* disp. xxxviii. sect. iii. n. ii. et iv.) or that the confitent should submit to it. Scotus, Gabriel, Medina, Sylvester, Amilla, Navar, Hostiensis, Panormitan, Cajetan, *ibid.* dist. xxxviii. sect. vii. n. i. Thus all material in it is reduced to confession, and so the rite has almost lost its name, being now commonly styled the sacrament of confession. Yet confession is acknowledged not to be of divine institution by all their canonists. *Sunt inter catholicos qui putant nullum esse divinum praeceptum de confessione, ut omnes decretorum interpretes, et inter scholasticos, Scotus, Maldonat.* Sum. q. xviii. art. iv, and their best divines deny the necessity of it as to this rite. *Hunc modum Secretæ confessionis non esse de necessitate hujus sacramenti. Ita docent frequentius scholastici.* Alensis, D. Thomas, Major, Richardus de Sancto Victore, Paludanus, Soto, Adrian, Richardus, Medina, Pet. Soto, Vega, Castro, Cajetan (*Christum non instituisse auricularem confessionem*), Canus. *Et nunc censeo hanc doctrinam certam ex concilio Tridentino, viz. neque in institutione posuit Christus Dominus modum secretæ confessionis.* Suar. *ibid.* disp. xxi. sect. ii. n. ix. p. 290.

Yea, the form of it (their mode of absolution) is denied by their divines, who hold that the priests cannot forgive sins properly as to the fault and eternal punishment.

such institution. Now, to trust to any device of man for spiritual effects of so high a nature is impious folly; but to lay their salvation on it is prodigious madness. They may with as much reason expect the infusion of grace from the sprinkling of holy water, or the cleansing of a soul at death from the guilt and stain of sin by a priest's spittle; the Lord hath given them no more ground to expect any more from the one than from the other.

But I need not insist upon anything which they may have the confidence to deny. It will be plain enough by what they cannot but acknowledge, that neither pardon nor grace can be expected from their sacrament of penance as ordered by them. For they assert that pardon and grace are always inseparably conferred together, so that he hath no infused grace that hath not pardon.¹ And it cannot be denied but that pardon can never be had without true repentance; in Scripture nothing is more evident; he therefore that comes to the sacrament of penance with attrition only, and so without true repentance, he gets thereby nothing at all; neither pardon, which cannot be had without repentance, nor infused grace, which is never had without pardon; neither love, nor faith working by love, nor godly sorrow, nothing that is saving, unless he can have it without God, or against what he hath expressly declared. So that if he comes to their sacrament in a damnable condition, he certainly dies so, for any relief that rite will afford him. And therefore their doctrine, which encourageth sinners to live all their life without saving faith, or love, or repentance, in confidence that this rite will help them to these graces when they are dying, is a damning imposture; and their sacrament of penance, a most pernicious trap to draw sinners (as they set and bait it) out of the way of salvation whilst they live, and to plunge them into hell when they die, without any apprehension of their danger till there be no way to escape it.

Sect. 11. Hereby they manifestly declare themselves to be enemies to Christianity and the souls of men. For what more effectual course could they take to destroy these, and root out that, than by concluding it certain (as certain as they would have a decree of the council of Trent accounted), that though sinners neglect the great duties and acts of Christians, and live in any wickedness opposite to the rule of Christ, yet the church hath a device to save them, and by it they may be sure to escape hell without true repentance! What is this but to declare that the most damnable neglects and practices shall never damn them? Though they never repent thereof, the church hath a trick to secure them notwithstanding. What is this but to proclaim that the laws of God and the rules of the gospel are unnecessary impositions, without the observance whereof salvation may be had? The knowledge of Christ, explicit faith in him, actual love of him (which comprise all the rest), as they teach, are not necessary as means, salvation may be had without them. And as for a necessity hereof by virtue of any precept, that is not considerable, but in reference to the danger of not observing the precept; and there is no danger in this, though the neglect hereof were

Qui negant potestatem clavium extendi ad remissionem culparum mortalium. So Magister sentent. Hugo, et Richardus de Sancto Victore, Alensis et Bonaventura, Gabriel, Major, Supplementum Gabr. Medina, Adrian, Petr. Soto, Altisiodorensis, Abulensis. — *Ibid.* disp. xx. sect. i. n. iiii.

¹ Unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hæc omnia simul infusa accepit homo per Jesum Christum cui inseritur, fidem, spem, charitatem. Concil. Trident. Sess. vi. c. vii. Gratia non præcedit sed simul infunditur cum remissione peccatorum. Bellarm. de penitent. l. c. p. 954.

Sperare a Deo remissionem peccatorum sine penitentia—modus præsumptionis conjunctus cum hæresi. Pet. S. Joseph. Dei l præcept. art iv. Aquinas, Arragon, Bannes, Malderus, et alii in et cum Bonacin. in l præcept. q. iiii. p. 1, n. 4.

in their account a mortal sin, no more than in venials (or no sins at all), if it will not damn those who never truly repent of it. So that plainly by excusing sinners from repentance, they make all sins safe and all duties needless; and give men assurance that they may live and die impenitently, in the neglect of all, even the most important duties, and in the practice of any, the worst, wickedness, and yet be saved. There never was any heresy broached in the world more monstrous and pernicious than this which the council of Trent hath brought forth; it hath all the damnable wickedness, both as to judgment and practice, that ever was or can be on earth, in the bowels of it. It promotes the birth, the growth, the continuance thereof; for it promiseth safety to impenitency therein, yea, salvation too, by a knack of a very easy use and new invention. It hath in it the venom of all damning opinions, practices, and neglects; for that which makes them all deadly is impenitency; nor would they without this be finally and unavoidably destructive. But this would have impenitency itself swallowed.

CHAPTER VI.

Their doctrine leaves no necessity of holiness of life, and the exercise of Christian virtues.

Sect. 1. Holiness of life is needless by the popish doctrine; though the Lord hath made this every way necessary, both as a duty which he indispensably requires, and as a means without which he ordinarily will save no man. It is declared necessary both ways at once, Heb. xii. 14. The papists indeed boast much of it, and seem sometimes to lay great stress on it, as if they would have it to be a character of the true church; concluding theirs is the only true church, because there is no holiness to be found in the world but amongst them only. Thus they pretend it to be of greatest consequence; but this is but to serve another turn, the design is not for holiness of life, for their doctors count that more than needs. And really they are extreme good husbands here, and make a little holiness go a great way; for it is enough to denominate the universal church holy, if there be but one holy person in it. So Costerus: How many soever of its members be dead and impious, so long as there is any one man that retains holiness, the church must be called holy.¹ And then to make this one man holy, one act of virtue is enough, and that a very slender one too; for, saith Bannes, any one act of charity, how weak soever it be, is enough to fulfil all the commandments of God.² Now, he is doubtless a holy man who fulfils all those commandments. Further, this one act he need but do once, and that not all his life; he may defer it till he die, if he have no mind to trouble himself with it in any part of his life before, as we have already shewed. Yea, and he may be excused from it when he is a-dying too, as well as whilst he lives, if he can but get a priest to absolve him; and the priest must absolve him, if the dying man give but any sign which may be interpreted a desire of it.³

¹ *Tametsi ejus plurima membra sint emortua et impia, non amittit tamen sancti nomen, quamdiu vel unus pietatem ex animo colens, retinet sanctitatem.* Enchirid. liii. c. viii. Possibile est, quod tota fides remaneret in uno solo: et verum esset dicere, quod fides non deficit in ecclesia.—*Abbas in Sylvest.* v. Concil. n. iii.

² Quilibet actus charitatis, quantumlibet remissus, sufficit ad implendum omnia precepta. In ii. 2, x. q. xlv. a. v.

³ Vide above forty doctors for this in Jo. Sanc. disp. xlv. n. xxxiv. Sacramenta baptismi et absolutionis posse conferri, etiam iis qui in periculo vitæ sunt, licet ipi vi morbi oppressi non habeant usum rationis aut sensuum: modo constet eos antea

And their sacrament he must have, and be absolved absolutely, when speechless and senseless, if any can but witness that he desired confession, Antonin. iii. part. tit. 10, cap. ii.; Sylvest. v. confess. iii. n. 16; Paludan. dist. xxi. q. 2. a. 2. concl. 2. Yea, if he did not desire it, nor ever give any sign of repentance, he may be conditionally absolved, Rituale Pauli. 5. And though he have lived wickedly without restraint all his days, if at last gasp he be attrite, and have but (though it never appear) the virtue of Judas (only hoping better, *i. e.* presuming more, than he did), by virtue of such absolution he will be as certainly saved as other good catholics; though the other unfortunate wretch, for want of a priest (as virtuous as himself), to absolve and give him hope, was unhappily damned.

See here a most compendious way to be holy! Who can imagine any other but that such principles as these make holiness of life extremely needful? But, more particularly, we may discover how necessary they judge it, by what they determine concerning the necessity of exercising Christian virtues, and the forsaking of sin. There is no need of either of these by their doctrine.

Sect. 2. It is not necessary to live in the exercise of such virtues (though one would think that religion could not be Christian which obligeth not the professors of it to Christian virtues, and excuseth them from the most proper character of true Christianity), yet those who have the confidence to account themselves the only true Christians do this. For they teach that the acts of these virtues are required by affirmative precepts, and such commandments oblige not at all times; no, nor always when there is occasion and opportunity for the exercise of them, but only in the article of necessity; and when this is, it is not certain, there is no determination of it, it must be left to discreet men to judge; and being left to men, either they find no time for it at all, or none that will signify it needful to live in the exercise of such virtues. To exert an act of virtue once a year, or once in many years, or once in a whole life, or at the hour of death, is far enough from the daily exercise of Christian virtues, or an intimation that it is needful in their account who so determine. But indeed their church is more indulgent, and assures them all (that have no more regard for their souls than to believe it), that at the hour of death one act of slavish fear (though themselves count not that so much as a moral virtue¹), with confession, will excuse the neglect of every Christian virtue all their lives, and make their way at last into heaven, though they never had one act of virtue, any one character of a Christian, all their days. A pleasant doctrine indeed, and greedily to be swallowed by those that have an antipathy to a holy life, if the gospel and the doctrine of Christ concerning hell and heaven and the way to it could be counted but fables.

Sect. 3. They reckon but three theological or divine virtues; all the other they call moral, of which the divine are the foundation, and so all the rest must stand or fall with them.² Now, two of these three they make needless desiderasse ejusmodi sacramenta—*Bellarmin.* de effect. Sacrament. l. ii. c. viii. p. 121. Actus charitatis semper requiritur ad justificationem, seclusis tamen sacramentis: sacramenta autem in non ponente obicem, eundem habent effectum, quem habet charitas et contritio sine sacramento. Canus, Relect de pœnit. pars. iii. p. 844. Thus, though an act of charity or repentance be requisite always where the sacraments cannot be had, yet the sacraments in him that gives no obstruction (as he does not who has neither the use of sense or reason) have the same effect that love to God or repentance would have, without the sacrament, *i. e.* the sacrament will justify and save them who have no act of love to God, or true repentance.

¹ Aquinas, ii. 2, q. xix.

² Virtutes theologicæ quæ sunt circa ultimum finem—sunt causæ omnium aliarum virtutum.—*Aquinas*, ii. 2, q. clxi. art. iv. ad primum.

(as is before declared), and without these two, hope, which is the third, is so far from being needful, that it is not possible to have it, as themselves acknowledge.¹ A lively hope with them is needless till they be dying, and then it can but be like the giving up of the ghost.² For to all that follow their doctrine, and look after no more than that makes necessary, their hopes at last can be no better, no other, than the expectation of such a pardon of sin, as a priest can give to an impenitent person, one to whom the Lord did never give hopes of pardon. And this is a hope than which despair itself is more hopeful; for this leaves no sense of danger (which despair retains), and so leaves no desire nor endeavour to avoid it, even when they are sinking into bottomless misery. Hope is no more needful with them than a house is to him who thinks himself concerned to dig up the foundation of it, and counts it enough that he hath a castle in the air. And when they have left nothing that can be a real ground of hope, they found it upon that which is worse than nothing, their own merits; that which is inconsistent with the free grace of God and the merits of Christ, without which sinners are hopeless.³ It is a conjecture, founded upon a delusion, upon merit, which no man can have, and themselves say none of them know they have, and so upon they know not what. Oh wretched hopes, that have not so much for their foundation as the sand, that have nothing to bear them up but a proud and groundless fancy, that we might count ridiculous, if it were not too horrid to be the matter of sport. Can they blame those who doubt whether they will be saved, when they themselves have no better hopes of their own salvation?

How much they are concerned for hope they declare, when they tell us that the precept for hope does but of itself oblige, when the soul is tortured with the more grievous assaults of despair.⁴ It seems, unless they be violently tempted to despair, they need not hope. This rarely falls out as to any, and is scarce the case of one in a thousand, so that there is not one of a thousand in popery who need have any hope in God, or of mercy from him. No, not any at all, as others teach; for the command for hope is satisfied both by grief for sin, and also by a purpose against it (Dian. after others, v. Spes.) So that either of these, or both at least, will supersede all acts of hope for ever, and make them needless. And indeed he that considers what sorrow and purposes they count sufficient, may believe them when they teach that these leave them without hope.

Sect. 4. The next in excellency to the divine graces, by their account,⁵ is humility, and for this their doctrine makes excellent provision, as a virtue most necessary, by quite sweeping away the true ground of it. It leaves them without sense of any sinfulness, weaknesses, or unworthiness, to make or keep them humble. Being baptized, by virtue thereof all the sinfulness of their natures is not only pardoned or weakened, but quite washed away

¹ Fides et spes—sine caritate, proprie loquendo, virtutes non sunt, nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet, ut non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene.—*Aquinas*, i. 2, q. lxxv. art. iv.

² Tempus quo obligant præcepta fidei et spei esse idem, quod tempus caritatis.—*Full.* tr. xxii. n. cxciii.

³ Actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo, qui quidem actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quæ quis habet, quod non potest esse sine caritate.—*Aquin.* i. ii. q. lxxv. art. iv. c. Propria certitudo spei est ex meritis. Certitudo quæ non est præsumptio, ex meritis est, et meritis se comitatur.—*Alex. Alensis*. q. lxxv. in iii.

⁴ Quando graviores desperationis impetus animum vexant. Victorel. ad Tol. l. iv. c. vii., and Bonacin. (with others) in i. præcep. d. iii. q. iii. p. 2, n. ii.

⁵ Post virtutes theologicas—humilitas est virtutum excellentissima, et potissima.—*Aquinas*, ii. 2, clxi. art. v.

and utterly abolished. So that they are pure, immaculate, innocent, even as our first parents were in the state of innocency; not anything left in the least that can be truly counted sin.¹ So that it would be very absurd and irrational for them to be humble under the sense of any remaining sinfulness, since they believe really there is none. But if they sin mortally afterwards (for venial sins they make no account of, and think that the Lord herein is such an one as themselves), they may be presently restored again by their sacrament of absolution to a perfect righteousness, without the least mixture or alloy of what is faulty; a perfection short of heaven, because not so firm and fixed, but not wanting a hair of what is due, having not only all the parts, but every degree of what is required for their present state.² And by the power hereof they can fully and perfectly fulfil the whole law in every precept, without any culpable defect; they can fulfil it very easily, *facili et parvo negotio*.³ Yea, they can do much more than the law requires, or the Lord hath made their duty;⁴ so far are they bereaved of all sense of any weakness that might humble them. And their righteousness is not only spotless, but meritorious; there is such a transcendent worth and sufficiency in it, as they improve it, that they need not, at least after they are justified, ask anything of God but what they fully deserve at his hands. All that God doth for them is but the paying of his debts; his bounty is prevented, his grace is quite excluded; it is not in his power to bestow any free gift; all is due to the meritorious excellency of their performances beforehand. They can merit the first grace⁵ in congruity,⁶ the second grace by way of condignity; and heaven and glory is as due to them as a penny for a pennyworth, or hell is due to proud, presumptuous sinners. God would be unjust, and not pay what he oweth them on their own just account, if he should not let them have all the glory of heaven and eternity. They can merit the pardon of mortal sins before they have grace;⁷ pardon of venial sins before or after; they can merit the continuance of grace while they have it, and the restoring of it when they have lost it.⁸ They can merit not only for themselves, but for others; and deserve for them not only pardon, but grace;⁹ such grace as will enable them to set up and merit heaven for themselves. They can merit not only habitual grace for them,¹⁰ but the divine assistance, whereby the Lord works it. They can merit for them not only while alive, but when they are dead, and by their merits bring them out of those torments which are equivalent to the pains of hell, but only for the continuance, which their deserts hinder from being everlasting.

Here is a doctrine as proper to nourish humility as poison is to make a

¹ Concil. Trident. Sess. c. supra.

² Soto de Natur. et Grat. l. iii. c. iv. p. 184; Bellarm. de purgat. l. ii. c. iii. p. 1381, de justificat. l. ii. cap. x. p. 794.

³ Idem. cap. i.

⁴ Possumus facere plus quam debemus, si consideremus legem nobis a Deo impositam, et proinde possumus facere plus quam debemus.—Idem de Monach. l. ii. c. xiii.

⁵ Vid. Soto ibid. l. ii. c. iii. p. 65 et 66; Bellarm. l. ii. de pœnit. c. xii. p. 945; Sancta Clara. Deus. Nat. Gr. Probl. xxi. p. 125.

⁶ Conc. Trident. Sess. vi. ca. xxxii. and ca. xvi.

⁷ Potest homo nondum reconciliatus per opera penitentiae impetrare et mereri de congruo gratiam justificationis.—Bellarm. de just. l. v.

⁸ Reparationem post lapsum et perseverantiam usque in finem, non cadere sub meritum de condigno, sed solum de congruo.—Idem, ibid. cap. xxii. tit.

⁹ Sicut certum est non posse unum alteri ex condigno gratiam mereri, ita non dubium est, posse id ex congruo fieri.—Idem, ibid. cap. xxi.

¹⁰ De congruo potest unus alteri mereri primam gratiam, non solum sanctificantem, sed etiam primum auxilium supernaturale, et alia dona. S. Thom. i. 2, q. cxiv. art. vii.; vid Fill. tr. xxi. n. cccxcviii.

man fat and healthful ; however, this, as that, is apt to swell them big, and mount them upon the heights of boasting and glorying. It is far below persons of such dignity to receive eternal life at God's hands as a poor man receiveth an alms :¹ *absit*, far be it from them ; it moves their indignation to think of it, that they should expect eternal glory for God's sake. They will not so disparage themselves as to have it in such a beggarly way ; they will have it for their own sake, as that which they fully deserve, or else be without it. They will have it in a way more glorious, becoming persons of such transcendent worth, as conquerors and triumphers,² as a laurel which they have sweat for, and is due to their merit. The Lord must treat them as persons of such high quality, and in a way that suits their honour. Now it is much more honourable, saith Bellarmine, to have a thing by his own merit than another's gift (though God be the giver).³ And the Lord (adds he), to honour them, would have them get heaven by their own deserts. Oh humble doctrine, and that which is as like the gospel as the apostle St Paul was to the king of pride. Can they think humility needful, who, plucking away the true grounds of it, instead thereof instil those principles, than which hell can scarce hatch any prouder ?

Sect. 5. As for those virtues which concern men, they are all comprised in love, that love which affects others as capable of eternal happiness, and so desires it for them. Thus they describe Christian love (as for human or natural, we are not here concerned in it), and tell us it is this the Scripture speaks of, John xv. and Col. iii., and cannot deny but it is called for in the New Testament most frequently, and with greatest importunity ; and yet their doctrine makes it needless. We are not bound, saith Sylvester,⁴ to be moved with love towards any men whatsoever, but only in preparation of mind, if necessity occur. This seems to dissolve the obligation of this great command, and turn it into a mere counsel ; for in these very terms they describe a counsel to us,⁵ and thereby distinguish it from an obliging precept. But are we bound to love our brother when there is necessity ? No, not when he is in such necessity as is extreme, and consequently never ; for though it be requisite that we help him in that condition, yet we sin not if we do not help him out of Christian love ; it is enough to avoid sin if we relieve him out of natural affection. Thus Navarre.⁶ And this holds not only in the external necessities of others, but also in those that are spiritual ; only he saith that it very rarely falls out that one can relieve spiritual necessities without this Christian love ; but he tells us also,⁷ that a Christian is rarely in such necessity. So that though it cannot be done without Christian love but very seldom, that will not make such love a duty at any time, because the external act needs not be done but seldom. Yea, if the external act also, whereby we should relieve the soul of our brother, be neglected, it is with

¹ *Absit ut justī vitam æternam expectent, sicut pauper elemosynam.*

² *Tanquam palmam suis sudoribus debitam.*

³ *Magis honorificum est habere aliquid ex merito, quam ex donatione.*

⁴ *Motu dilectionis—nec tenemur moveri ad quoslibet homines, nisi secundum preparationem animi, si necessitas occurreret—Sylvest. v. charitas. n. iii. ; Sum Rosel. v. charitas. n. v., both of them in the words of Aquinas.*

⁵ *Præceptum differt etiam a consilio—quia consilium non est de necessitate ad salutem, nisi secundum preparationem animi, si oporteret (S. Tho.) i. 2. q. cviii.—Idem. ibid. v. præceptum. n. i. Gratian et Aquinas in Navar. cap. xx. n. xxi.*

⁶ *Putamus nos peccatum eum, qui hunc amorem charitativum non conciperet erga eum, qui eam pateretur extremam necessitatem vitæ corporeæ, si modo alio, amore naturali, inferiore divino, ei opitularetur.—Navar. cap. xiv. n. ix. ; Lopez. cap. liii. p. 274.*

⁷ *Cap. xxiv. n. ix. Raro tamen ejusmodi necessitatem patitur Christianus, quum per contritionem absque alia ope salvari possit.*

them no great matter. For as Cajetan determines¹ that weakness of mind, which withholds us from those things which are profitable to our neighbour, especially for the salvation of souls, though it be grievous, it is but a venial fault. In short, whatever be the circumstances of our brother, yet we may be excused from loving him indeed, if we do but think we do it. For Navarre² and others tell us that he who honestly thinks himself to be in the state of grace when he is not, may satisfy this command for Christian love by some other kind of affection, so that it is enough to think that we have this love when we have it not; and this is confirmed by a reason *a fortiori*,³ because it is so in our obligation to love God. Thus one dangerous error is grounded upon another, and by such arts we are discharged from all Christian affection to God or men. But we need not stay longer here. All necessity of this love they quite take away, by making it needless to love God, the connection between these being indissoluble by their own account.⁴

If any will not rely upon consequences, Cajetan tells them,⁵ that the command to love our neighbour as ourself, obliges not to a love of charity, *i. e.* that special love which was always thought, till the Roman doctors taught otherwise, to be the great duty required of all Christians by the gospel. By the doctrine of Aquinas,⁶ the precept requires no special act of love to our brethren, no formal⁷ or internal act at all, nor any exterior that will signify more than the want of hatred. This is the common doctrine amongst his devoutest followers, the Dominicans.⁸ Others express it thus: ⁹ There is no affirmative precept for love to our neighbour, no time for it; it is enough that we do nothing against him. Thus, so great a part of the whole sum of the law and the prophets, and all the rules of the gospel, leading us to brotherly love and the special expressions of it, are snapped off short; and we reach all that they oblige us to do, by doing nothing. We love them well enough, though we neither will nor do them good, if only we do them no mischief; or do no more for them than may be done without inward affection, or any Christian charity.

Sect. 6. It would be tedious to pursue this in all particular virtues. The generals which they acknowledge will serve for the rest. They confess¹⁰

¹ Pusillanimitas quando retrahit ex aliis utilibus proximo, et præcipue salutis animarum; licet veniale sit, grave tamen est.—Sum. v. pusillan. p. 485.

² Lopez, cap. liii. p. 275. Satisfacit præcepto de diligendo proximum, qui extra statum gratiæ, putans se verisimiliter in eo statu gratiæ esse.

³ Videtur nobis non peccare neve illum, qui bona fide credens se esse in statu gratiæ, cum tamen non sit, adimplet præceptum de diligendo Deum ex charitate, quando ad id est obligatus; ita a fortiori satisfacere videtur præcepto de diligendo proximo ex charitate, qui extra statum gratiæ, illud implet, putans verisimiliter se in eo esse.—Navar. *ibid.*

⁴ Amor supernaturalis et divinus seu charitativus, vel charitas infusa, qua proximum amamus, est ejusdem generis et naturæ, cujus est amor Dei charitativus, seu charitas; secundum S. Thom. Nam licet objectum materiale amoris charitativi proximi sit idem proximus, objectum tamen formale, sive ratio vel causa amoris, est ipsa divina et infinita bonitas, quæ nihil aliud est quam ipse Deus—ut idem S. Thom. explicatus ibi a Cajetano.—*Idem, ibid* n. vi. Charitas est dilectio qua diligitur Deus propter se, et proximus propter Deum, vel in Deo.—*Pet. Lombard*, dist. xxvii. Dilectio proximi nihil aliud est quam quidam Dei amor.—*Soto de Just.* l. vii. q. v. a. i. p. 242; vid. Suar. tom. iii. disp. lxxxi. sect. viii. p. 1078.

⁵ Catherin. annot. adv. Cajet, p. 268.

⁶ II. ii. q. xv. a. viii.; Quodl. iv. art. xxiv. ad. i.

⁷ Suar. de Charitate, disp. v. sect. iv. n. iv.; Jo. Sanc. disp. i. n. xxi.

⁸ Vid. Acacium de Velasco in Guinen. p. 139.

⁹ Vid. Vasquez in 3 tom. iii. q. xc. art. i. dub. xl., dilectionis proximi ex charitate, cujus præcepti affirmative ego nullum tempus video. Satis est nihil contra ipsum facere.—*Vid. Jo. Sanc.* disp. i. n. xxi.

¹⁰ Cognitio apprehensiva præexigitur quidem ad fidem.—*Bella'm.*

that knowledge must go before faith, and that faith¹ is the foundation of charity, and that charity, or love to God, which hath its rise and being from faith,² is the form and root of all virtues. They all agree in it, nor is it only evident by their own confession, but also by the nature of the things themselves, that other virtues depend upon knowledge, faith, and love, for their being or exercise. For example, without love to God proceeding from faith, there can be no delight in God, nor desires to enjoy him. Delight and desire are but love in several postures; desire is love in its motion, and delight is love in its rest. There can be no delight³ in enjoying that which we love not, nor can the enjoyment of it be desirable; so, also, there can be no filial fear without love, for love is essential to it, and thereby it is distinguished from that which is slavish. Ingenuous fear springs from love,⁴ and is nourished by it, and increaseth or declines with it; it cannot be, nor act, but when and where love is, and is acted. So that together with love, the fear of God and the acts of it are cashiered; even all due reverence of him, and care not to offend him.

It is their common doctrine,¹ that there is no special command, either for servile or filial fear of God; so that the want of it need neither be confessed nor repented of.²

So likewise there can be no hatred of sin, or sorrow for it, as it is an offence or dishonour to God,⁶ nor any true virtue at all without love, nor love without faith, nor faith without knowledge. Now, these radical graces being rendered needless by their doctrine, as I have declared before, they hereby stub up all the rest by the roots, so that neither sprig nor bud thereof can be expected. To tell us, after this, that they count any exercise of Christian virtue needful, is as if a man should take the spring out of his watch, and then persuade us seriously that he counts it very necessary it should still go, and the wheels be always in regular motion.

Sect. 7. But let us stay here a little longer, and observe how their principles, concerning love particularly, disengage all from any exercise of virtue, and every act that is truly Christian. They take notice in virtue of a goodness that is merely moral, such as may be found in heathens; and of a goodness that is divine and supernatural, such as ought to be in Christians. This latter, they tell us, is derived from their end, when in the exercise of them they are referred to God as our supernatural end, and acted for his sake,⁷ with an intent to please him. They declare, further,⁸ that they cannot be thus referred to God without affection for him, nor done with a design to please him, unless they be done out of love to him; and so must be at least

¹ Fides est fundamentum spei et charitatis.—*Idem*. Fides generat spem et spes charitatem.—*Aquinas*. i. 2, q. lxxv. art. iv.

² Caritas est forma et radix omnium virtutum.—*Aquinas*, *ibid.* q. lxxii. art. iv.

³ Spirituale gaudium quod de Deo habetur ex charitatis dilectione oritur.—*Aquin.* ii. 2, q. xxviii. art. i.

⁴ Timor castus sive amicalis quo timemus ne sponsus tardet, ne discedat, ne offendamus, ne eo careamus, timor iste de amore venit.—*Mag. sentent.* iii. dist. xxxiv. Timor ex amore generatur.—*Bonavent.* iii. dist. xxxiv. n. lxxxiii. Quanto aliquis plus habet de spiritu amoris, tanto plus habet de spiritu timoris.—*Idem*, *ibid.* n. lxxxvii.; *vid.* *Aquin.* ii. 2, q. xix.

⁵ Licet nonnulli existiment dari speciale præceptum horum timorum, ita ut eorum defectu speciale peccatum committatur; oppositum tamen docetur communiter, longaque est probabilis.—*Pet. S. Joseph.* de i. præcepto, p. 55.

⁶ Nulla virtus est vera virtus sine charitate.—*Aquinas*.

⁷ *Vid.* Navar, cap. xiv. n. vii.

⁸ Convenit inter omnes, ut opus referri debeat in Deum, ut finem supernaturalem, si futurum sit meritorium vitæ æternæ, at opera virtutum cæterarum non referuntur in Deum, ut finem supernaturalem, nisi a charitate imperentur et dirigantur, &c.—*Bellarmin.* de *Justific.* l. v. cap. xv. p. 958.

imperate acts of love, that they may be Christian acts, and anything better than nature in the heathen might reach. And yet they conclude, as appears before by variety of testimonies, that we are not obliged to observe any command, or act any other virtue out of love to God. They find no time at all,¹ when we are obliged to this, unless it be when we are bound to have an inward act of love to God; but when this is, they never agree, except in this, that it may be never. For those who seem to say that it should be sometimes, though but seldom, or but once for all, in other words signify it need not be at all, since they assign something else which may serve instead of it, whenever it may be thought requisite. Thus, according to their rule in indefinite precepts, their wise men have determined, if their school doctors, or casuists, or their council of Trent, will pass for wise. Now, being thus discharged from doing anything out of love, they are thereby exempted from all Christian acts, and any other Christianity, as to the exercise of virtue, than honest heathenism. It is true, they hold they cannot be saved without meritorious acts, and cannot well think them meritorious if they be no better than merely heathenish: they should, one would think, have some Christian character upon them, and this of love particularly,² that they may merit salvation; and if they disengage their catholics from this, they make it not needful for them to be saved. But I cannot help that, seeing they will have it so.

If they think there is no necessity their catholics should be Christians, as they do when they make no act truly Christian needful for them, they conclude it is not necessary for them to be saved, unless they believe that such as are no Christians can be heirs of salvation. Their church, pope, or council, or whoever it is, must provide them some other heaven, since that which is prepared for Christians they need not; no one step of the way to it being needful for them. All the necessity laid upon them by the popish profession is not for salvation, but for something else; they must be Roman catholics, but they need not be true Christians; they must be the pope's subjects, but they need not be Christ's disciples; and this, and the rest, because they need not learn of him one Christian act while they live.

Sect. 8. Moreover, all exercise of virtues, opposite to acts in their account but venially evil, is with them unnecessary. And this goeth near, not only to discharge all acts of virtue which are required of Christians, but such also as were found even in pagans. This is grounded upon their doctrine concerning venial sins; these with them are not necessarily to be avoided, being either not prohibited by any command, as most of them hold, or by no command necessary to be observed, as some of them had rather express it, and therefore no need that the virtuous acts opposite to them should be practised. Upon this account no exercise of virtue will be necessary but what is consistent with the vicious acts contrary thereunto, in any degrees of wickedness which they think venial; no acts of temperance, sincerity, righteousness, truth, or faithfulness, chastity, liberality, &c., will be needful, but what is consistent with all the intemperance, hypocrisy, unrighteousness, perfidiousness, &c., which by their doctrine is venial. So he may be temperate who still loads his stomach till he vomits, and is daily half drunk; he may be sincere enough, though he always design to seem better than he is, or good when he is not; he may be a man of truth and Roman faithfulness, though his constant practice be telling lies, or breaking promises, or swearing falsely, so all be but in venial measures; he may be just enough,

¹ Non obligat pro semper, sed certis opportunisque temporibus; extra quæ ideo tempora, non est cur obligemur, cætera ex charitate præstare.—*Soto de Just. l. ii. q. iii. art. x.*

² Vid. Bellarm. supra.

though in all his dealings he be continually wronging others in lesser matters. He may be chaste enough, though he be unclean in thought, word, and deed, venially; and he may be liberal enough, though he constantly practise all the covetousness which is opposite to every degree of liberality, so it be no worse. He may be religious enough, though his soul never actually worship God, and devout enough without any inward devotion, and reverent enough though greatly irreverent, even in the worship of God, and though at other times he be still profaning the name of God with vain oaths and divers sorts of blasphemies; holy enough also, though he never have one act of inward holiness, no, not on those days which either God or themselves have made holy; and, in short, he may be godly enough, though he never love nor fear God till he die! Some of these particulars are plain by the premises; the rest will appear so when we present their account of venial sins. So that, though a man were so far from expressing any Christian virtue, that he should be instead thereof continually acting the contrary sins in all degrees not mortal, yet he would not be condemned; for by their doctrine,¹ all the venial sins in the world that a person can be guilty of, though every hour, every minute of a whole life, how long soever, should bring forth one or other of them, cannot possibly damn him. And since whosoever shall not be condemned will be saved, which themselves also maintain, consequently he that, after baptism, acts not one virtue divine or moral, whose whole life hath nothing of a Christian in it, but less and worse than a pagan, will yet be saved. Thus may they be deluded who trust their souls in this infallible church; they may be true catholics, though they be not Christians, so much as to one religious act, and may pass currently to heaven though they never move one foot in the way. Such a thing we must take Christianity to be, and with so ghastly and frightful a face will it look upon the world. If popery have not thus far abandoned it, and obtruded upon us a changeling, instead of what Christ left us, there will be no lineament of virtue in the visage of it, not one of necessity; nor needs there be more in the lives of those who would be counted the only true professors and faithful embracers of it.

Sect. 9. They have other ways to make the exercises of Christian virtues unnecessary. They do it especially by turning the commands of God into counsels. Of those things that are required in Scripture, some, they say, the Lord only adviseth and commends, others he commands and enjoins: those which he adviseth, they call evangelical counsels, the other are divine precepts. Now, the precepts, they say, are necessary to be observed, sometimes at least; the counsels are not needful to be observed at all, any man may be saved without complying with them, they are matters of supererogation, more than we need to do. So that all those virtues which they make but matter of counsel, are unnecessary, the acts and exercise of them more than needs. And those which they make so expressly, are not small nor inconsiderable in themselves, and in consequence little less than all. Many of those admirable rules which Christ giveth us in his sermon on the mount, wherein the singular and divine excellency of that religion to which he calls the world is so very conspicuous, they will not have to be laws obliging all Christians, but dissolve the obligation of them by declaring them mere counsels, though they were ratified by our great Lawgiver with those univer-

¹ Etiamsi omnia peccata venialia, simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale.—*Bellarmin. de Amiss. Grat.* l. i. c. xiii. p. 91. Non est meæ mentis hic asserere, quod veniale possit fieri mortale per multiplicationem actuum venialium, etiamsi in infinitum multiplicarentur.—*Lopez*, cap. ii. p. 12.

sal sanctions: Mat. vii. 21, 'Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he which doth the will of my Father which is in heaven.' And ver. 26, 'Every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man who built his house upon the sand.' Maldonate giveth that as the account why he is said, chap. v. 2, then to 'open his mouth,' because he¹ never before propounded that sublime doctrine of evangelical perfection. Of this nature, in their account,² is trusting in God, such as frees us from sollicitousness about the things of this life, chap. vi. 31, 34; sincerity of intention in doing good, such as is enjoined, ver. 1; patient digesting of injury, such as is commanded, ver. 89; relieving others freely, such as is required, ver. 42; innocent communication, such as is specified, ver. 87; avoiding occasions of sin, such as are meant, vers. 20, 30; exemplary walking, intended³ ver. 14; poverty of spirit, ver. 8; spiritual mourning, ver. 4; Christian meekness, ver. 5. The three last, saith Soto,⁴ are *trinum consiliorum votum*. We must take them to be peculiar concerns of votaries. Righteousness, likewise,⁵ as to earnest desires after it, ver. 6; mercifulness,⁶ ver. 7; purity of heart,⁷ ver. 8, as it is the height of charity; peacefulness⁸ also, ver. 9; love to enemies, ver. 44, more pressed by Christ than the rest, vers. 45-48; and before popery, taken to be the proper character of Christians, but with them it is no duty,⁹ nor anything of like nature: as that, Prov. xxv. 'If thy enemy hunger, feed him,' &c. Yea,¹⁰ acts of mercy are no more our duty, for these are another instance of the same author immediately adding, *et reliqua præcepta misericordiae*; not only that, Prov. iii. 4, 'Honour the Lord with thy substance,' but all the rest in Scripture of like nature. So likewise, not only magnificence and magnanimity,¹¹ but humility also,¹² with sincerity of conversation, and Christian simplicity or plain dealing. If these be not enough, all good works are in danger to become no duties. Dominicus à Soto tells us,¹³ there are three kinds of good works to which all Christian offices are reduced: one respects a man's self, the quelling of his own

¹ Quod nunquam ante, sublimem illam de evangelica perfectione doctrinam proposuisset.—*Comment. in Mat. p. 99.*

² Vid. Joh. de Combis. in compend. theol. l. v. cap. lxx.; Ludolph. de vita Christi, par. ii. cap. xii.; Angel. Sum. v. et v. præcept. n. xvii.; Sylvest. Sum. v. præceptum, n. ii.; Soto de Just. l. ii. q. ix. art. iii.; Navar. c. xxiv. n. v.; Soto de Nat. et Grat. l. iii. c. ii. p. 126; Jo. Sanc. disp. vii. n. x.

³ Unde statim Christus in solenni illa legis promulgatione, ante necessaria præcepta proposuit perfectorum consilia; Beati pauperes spiritu—beati qui lugent, et his similia. Et ideo subdit, Vos estis lux mundi: quasi quibus competit non solum justitiam vulgariter colere, sed egregie usum etiam rerum licitum abjicere.—*Idem, ibid.*

⁴ Quod si trinum hoc consiliorum votum, quod uno hoc loco stabilitur, &c.—*Idem, de Just. et Jur. l. vii. q. v. art. i. p. 248.*

⁵ *Idem, ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Quæ ad cumulatiorem virtutum perfectionem ornatumque attinent, sub forma consilii admonet, qualia sunt illa quæ pertinent ad inimicorum dilectionem, Prov. xxv. Si esurierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum.

¹⁰ Et reliqua præcepta misericordiae, ut cap. iii.; *idem, ibid. l. ii. q. iii. art. ii. p. 37.*

¹¹ De magnificentia et de magnanimitate, non fuerunt danda præcepta, sed magis consilia—*Aquinas, ii. 2, q. cxi. art. ii. ad primum.*

¹² Dico virtutes evangelicas dici illas, quæ colliguntur ex consiliis evangelicis traditis a Christo Domino—ducentes hominem ad perfectionem supra communem bonitatem—potissimum sex: 1, Paupertas spiritus; 2, Castitas virginum; 3, Obedientia, præsertim religiosa; 4, Humilitas, qua ita animi nostri comprimitur elatio, ut ad altiora non se erigat; 5, Pænitentia, qua pro commissis culpis Deo satisfacimus; 6, Simplicitas, quæ posita est in quadam facilitate et sinceritate morum, juxta rationis præscriptum.—*Full. tr. xxi. n. cxciv. cxcv.*

¹³ Vanam gloriam a tribus operum generibus expulsi, ad quæ cuncta officia reducuntur—ex his enim tribus, eo quod opera sunt supererogationis, solent homines mundi auram ambire. *Ibid. l. ii. q. ix. art. ii. p. 66.*

pleasures, signified by fasting; the other respects the love of our neighbours, of which kind is alms-deeds; the third respects God and divine worship, denoted by prayer; and all these three with him are works of supererogation. When they come to an account in particulars, they vary not: as to what concerns ourselves,¹ to abstain from our lawful pleasures, even when they may be an impediment to holiness, is but advice, we need not follow it. Also, to avoid worldly cares, to be content with food and raiment, not to be eager after superfluities, not to be too solicitous for the body, not to affect dignities, are but matter of counsel by their common doctrine, in *Jo. Sanc. disp.* 7. n. 10.

As for the concerns of God,² no inward worship in public is under command, nor any outward, but the mass; and for the hearing of that, no divine precept. No more are we obliged to worship in private;³ meditation is reckoned among counsels of perfection.⁴ Vocal prayer is not enjoined by God, and so all public prayer in Christian families and assemblies are under no divine injunction. Mental prayer may be a duty,⁵ when it is our duty to love God; but when that will be is not⁶ well known. So mental prayer will be a duty, nobody well knows when. But this is a Jesuit, who minces the matter too precisely. In the judgment of Aquinas,⁷ and the generality of their doctors, mental prayer is under counsel only. And it is the more considerable, because they tell us that in mental prayer all the internal acts of religion are comprehended; so that hereby the very soul of religion is dismissed, as a thing of no necessity among Roman catholics. And since in all worship, public or private, they will have spiritual attention and devotion to be but matter of counsel (without which all that they call worship is but a cipher, or a blot rather), they leave no worship of God at all necessary. Cardinal Tolet gravely distinguisheth⁸ of a sanctifying the Lord's day and all other holy days, for which presence at mass and abstain-

¹ *Licetis voluptatibus abstinere ad consilium continentiae attinet.—Idem, ibid. art. iii. p. 67. Consilia vero ea rescindunt, quae etsi licita sint, nec charitati prorsus inimica, tamen nonnulla sunt ad culmen progredientibus obstacula, l. vii. q. v. art. i. p. 242.*

² *Ex præcepto colendi Deum homo tenetur duntaxat cultum externum ei exhibere.—S. Joseph. Sum. de i. præcept. art. v.*

Attentio ad Deum non est necessaria. This is commonly asserted, even when it is acknowledged that all inward worship is included in it. Sub hac autem attentione ad Deum includitur omnis interior reverentia et cultus. omnis oratio et petitio, ut eleganter describit. Gregorius x. in c. Decret. de immunitat. Eccl. in vi.; Suarez, tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. iii. p. 1146. Solus exterior cultus cadit sub hoc præcepto—sola missa communiter est in præcepto. Utrum autem audiatur (missa) vel non—sub præcepto non cadit.—*Cajetan, Sum. v. fest.*

³ *Meditatio Scripturarum—perfectionis instrumentum.—Soto, ibid.*

⁴ *Uldericus. Sum. confess. et Pisan. et alii in Sylvest.—v. Orat. n. viii. supra.*

⁵ *Supra.*

⁶ *De præcepto diligendi Deum et aliorum, nempe fidei et spei—non satis certo constat quando obligent, et quando violentur.—Fill. tr. xxii. n. cxcxvii.*

⁷ *Ut orent mentaliter—solum sub consilio—ut tenet D. Thom. ii. 2. q. xxxfi. et communiter, doctores, Jo. Sanc. ibid. Oratio mentalis, in qua omnes actus interni religionis comprehenduntur.—Suar. de Orat. l. ii. c. vii. n. x.*

⁸ *Adverte, festum posse sanctificari, et posse bene sanctificari. Ad sanctificandum duo sunt necessaria—id est, sacrum audire—et abstinere ab opere servile et prohibito, l. iv. c. xxiv. p. 685. ad bene autem sanctificandum, ultra hoc, aliud est necessarium, puta, ut qui est in mortali, tunc conteratur, et ad Dominum converti studeat: qui vero est in gratia, divinæ vacet contemplationi, et bonis operibus, uterque autem a novo peccato absteineat. Adverte tamen, quod homo tenetur sub mortali ad sanctificandum festum, sed non tenetur sub mortali ad bene sanctificandum.*

Ita solum obligor ad illa duo in festo præstanda, non ad finem, quamvis consilium sit optimum, omnia ista exequi in die festo, vid. Soto, Navar. Cajetan. qui nobiscum sentiunt—*Ibid. p. 687.*

ing from servile work is sufficient, and of a sanctifying them well, to which it is necessary that he who is in mortal sin should be contrite, and turn to God; and he that is in grace should give himself to divine contemplation and good works, and both of them should abstain from new sin; yet observe, saith he, that a man is bound under mortal sin to sanctify the day, but not to sanctify it well; and after concludes: So I am only obliged to these two things, viz., presence at mass, and avoiding servile works; but not to the end, to wit, sanctifying it well, although it be very good counsel to perform all the other upon this day. Thus with him it is no necessary duty to which any are obliged on Lord's days, or any other days for worship, to repent of sin and turn to God, to meditate on divine things, and do good works, and abstain from any wickedness. All these, it seems, are only matters of counsel; and herein, he saith, Soto, Navarre, and Cajetan concur with him. And if they be only counsels on all these days, the world will scarce find a day when they will be duties. However, with them, to *do* a thing is commanded, to *do it well* is not necessary. On all the days which either God or themselves would have kept holy, it is mere counsel either to do that which is good or to think of it, either to be sorry for past wickedness, or not to commit more. And since it is no more on the holiest, it may seem not so much as a counsel on profane and common days. The means of honouring God being thus by them made unnecessary, no wonder if they discharge us from the due use of them.¹ Pious sedulity (diligence for heaven and our souls) is but matter of counsel; we need not trouble ourselves with it. No more scarce with anything else, for² the shunning of idleness is but counsel, yea, and such as doth not oblige the monks themselves, though they will have none else obliged by counsels. In reference to them, Soto says, the avoiding of idleness is not commanded.

Acts which concern others are either those of righteousness or charity; for the former, how favourable they are we saw before; they³ discharge us from such desires thereof as Christ encourageth to the uttermost, Mat. v. 6; the latter they make corporal or spiritual. That mercy or charity which affords outward relief, even their religious⁴ are not obliged to; nor need others exercise it by giving anything,⁵ no, not to those that are in greatest necessity, how much soever themselves have, how extremely soever others want. Spiritual relief, in affording of which the exercise of mercy consists, they give an account of in many particulars, viz. advising those that want counsel, teaching the ignorant, comforting the dejected, correcting offenders, remitting offences, bearing those that are burdensome, and praying for others. Now, all these (and as many more belonging to the other branch)⁶

¹ Pia sedulitas inter consilia recenset Hunnæus in Catechism. ad finem Sum. Aquin.

² Evitatio otii non est in præcepto.—Soto, ibid. l. vii. q. v. art. ii. p. 243. ad fin.

³ Quæcunque vultis ut faciant vobis, &c., Scil. necessario, aliter consilium est, Angel. Sum.—v. *Præceptum*, n. xvii.

⁴ Eleemosynas erogare non est in religiosis virtus.—Soto, ibid.

⁵ In quibus vero duobus non est de præcepto subvenire donando; sed satis est subvenire commodando vel mutuando.—Navar. cap. xxiv. n. v. Non semper est necesse donare, sed tunc solum, cum egenti neque per mutuum, neque per venditionem, neque alia ratione succurri potest—quamvis hæc doctrina vera sit, et non solum a S. Thoma. in ii. 2, q. xxxii. art. vi. sed etiam ab aliis Theologis communiter tradi solet.—Bellarm. *de bon. Operib.* l. iii. c. viii.

Consule, castiga, remitte, solare, fer, ora.

⁶ Misericordia seu eleemosyna sive sit spiritualis, quæ melior est corporali, sive sit corporalis, est de consilio; vel saltem non de præcepto obligante ad mortale, exceptis duobus casibus.—Idem, ibid. Subvenire necessitatibus proximorum corporalibus, sicut propriis necessitatibus, pertinet ad consilium.—Vid Aquin. Quodl. iv. art. xxiv. ad. i. Misericors cor proximi necessitatibus communibus præstare, infelicesque eventus eorum condolare—consilium.—In *Jo Sanc.* disp. i. n. i.

are no necessary duties, or, which is all one in effect, under no precept obliging to mortal guilt, except in two cases only, saith Navarre, and those two concern only corporal relief; so that all the other duties, which we owe to the souls of men, are left arbitrary, as mere matters of advice without exception.¹ That of the apostle, 1 Peter ii. 18, for subjection to governors, is with them a counsel; no more is that rule of Christ for church discipline and government, Mat. xviii. 15-17, 'If thy brother shall trespass against thee,' &c.

Mortification can scarce with them be so much as a counsel, for their doctrine will have nothing in us to be mortified; that which is to be so treated is sin in us, but they maintain that in a just man there is no sin after baptism. Carnal concupiscence itself is sinless; it is natural to us, and so innocent.² That which is in us by nature, they say, is neither worthy of praise or dispraise; hence they conclude, he is blind who will say concupiscence is a sin. They grant it induceth us to sin, but it is no more sin upon that account than hearing, seeing, or other of our senses; than gold, or honour, or beauty, or anything else that may draw us to evil; and so, plainly, we are no more bound to mortify it (if sin only is to be mortified) than we are obliged to ruin our senses, to destroy gold, or to spoil the beauty of a handsome woman. And the same must be said of other vicious habits contracted by a continued practice of sin; for though they call these vices, yet vices with them are no sins, no more than virtues are duties.³ The law of God is not concerned in any habits; as it commands not those that are good, so it forbids not those that are vicious, and no reason to mortify that which is not condemned by the law. However, they retain the word, but little else we meet with in them about this great concern of a Christian, and a very odd object they find for it, instead of that which the Scripture assigns. It is the natural body that is to be afflicted and macerated, not the 'body of sin;' and so they are not concerned to get the work of the devil destroyed; it is the work of God that must be mortified. They may be excused if they make not this so much as a counsel. But they say the maceration of the body is in order to the bridling of concupiscence. It seems, as innocent as it is, it may need a curb, yet they take care to leave it loose enough, for those severities which should hamper it, they say, are not commanded. Afflicting of the body is under no precept,⁴ saith Soto and Sylvester. Having told us out of Aquinas that a vow is properly of a work of supererogation, acceptable to God, he adds, the maceration of the body, as such, for the bridling of concupiscence, falls under vows.⁵ And so, how unruly soever the flesh is, they may choose whether they will use the bridle or no; yea, if the priest should be so rigid as to enjoin severities of this tendency, the sinner needs not submit to them.

Nor will they have us more engaged against the world than against the

¹ Glossa in loc.

² Concupiscentia carnis naturalis nobis est—Igitur cum ea quæ nobis insunt a natura, nec laude digna sint nec vituperio, quis vel cæcus, dixerit concupiscentiam illam esse peccatum? nisi forsan materialiter ante baptismum. Ut superius explicatum est. Revera qua ratione id dixeris, sequenter compulsus confiteberis, et visum, et auditum, et reliquos sensus qui nobis post peccatum Adæ instrumenta sunt delinquendi, delicta et ipsos esse. Quin vero et aurum et honores, et muliebre formam, et quicquid nos pellicit, pellitve ad malum.—Soto, de nat. et grat. l. i. c. xii. p. 24.

³ De habitu constat non esse peccatum: How they would prove it, see in Suar. l. iiii. de Juram. c. vi. n. i. Non sufficit habitualis affectus seu dispositio ad peccandum, sed requiritur actualis affectus seu dispositio, ut peccatum reipsa contrahatur.—Bonacina, de peccat. disp. ii. q. iii. p. v. n. iiii. alii. communiter.

⁴ Afflictio corporis non est in præcepto, de just. et. jur. l. vii. q. v. art. ii. Mortificationis operibus sædulo esse addictos, consilium, in Jo. Sanc. disp. i. n. i.

⁵ Sum. v. Votum. i. n. iv.

flesh. All the evils of the world are by the apostle reduced to three heads, 1 John ii. 16; but the oracle of their schools tells us that to relinquish these three wholly,¹ as far as we can, belongs to evangelical counsels. Soto herein follows him, and tells us² that Christ left this unto every one under counsel. So to be crucified to the world, and to get the world crucified to us, Gal. vi., is matter of advice with him; nor are we obliged thereto in reference to those things,³ or lusts, which very much endanger our souls.

Self-denial also hath the same measures from them. Bellarmine, by those words of Christ to the young man, Mat. xix. 21, 'Follow me,' understands self-denial, explaining it by Mat. xvi., 'If any man will come after me, let him deny himself.' It is nothing else, saith he, but to renounce one's own judgment and affections, and to accommodate himself to the judgment and will of others. This the young man should have done, but it was not his duty; it was only a counsel of perfection, as he and all of them conclude, to subject himself thus to the will and judgment of Christ. He distinguisheth indeed, and will have submission to the will and judgment of Christ in things necessary to salvation, to be a common duty enjoined, Mat. xvi. and Luke ix.; but such a subjection of our wills and judgments to Christ, in things not of themselves necessary to salvation, to be only a counsel,⁴ it is advice for those alone that would be perfect. This is bad enough, for thus it will not be a duty to subject ourselves to Christ in most things, or to deny ourselves in anything which is not in their sense a deadly evil. But Soto, than whom there was no divine more considerable in the council of Trent, advanceth farther, and concludes that self-denial, not only which is required, Mat. xix., Luke xviii., but that also commanded, Luke ix., Mat. xvi. (which the cardinal understood to be a subjecting of our wills and judgments to Christ in things necessary to salvation), is but a counsel; and tells us⁵ for a man to deny himself is by vow to give up his liberty to another's will; and so Christ nowhere enjoins other self-denial than what their perfectionists voluntarily oblige themselves unto by vow, and the main duty of Christians is confined to cloisters, that self-resignation wherewith Christ should be honoured being transferred to an abbot.

There is one thing more remains which Christ requires of those who will be his disciples, that is, Christians (and but one where he gives us the sum of all), and that is suffering for him. It would be strange if, when they have eased themselves of the rest, they should leave their catholics obliged to this. The device of evangelical counsels had not been so useful a tool, though it freed them from the rest of Christ's yoke, if it would not have served to cast off the heaviest part of it; but hereby they can cast off sufferings greater or

¹ Hæc autem tria totaliter derelinquere secundum quod possibile est, pertinet ad consilia evangelica.—*Aquinas*, l. ii. q. cviii. art. iv. Corp.

² Temporalium tria sunt genera, scil. concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitæ—animos vero ab illis prorsus evellere, non est cunctis, immo neque multis in hoc sæculo possibile. Quare sub consilio Christus id cuique reliquit, ut qui capere possit, caperet.—*Ibid.* l. ii. q. ix. art. iii. p. 67, vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. vii. n. x.

Huc enim (viz. ad votum religionis) attinet Paulinum illud verbum ad Gal. vi. Mihi absit gloriari nisi in cruce Domini, &c., per quem mihi mundus crucifixus est, et ego mundo.—*Ibid.* l. vii. q. v. art. i. p. 242.

³ Non possunt non multa alendæ charitati creare pericula.—*Ibid.*

⁴ Solis iis consulitur qui volunt esse perfecti, de qua agitur, Matth. xix. Luc. xviii.—*De Monach.* l. ii. c. ix. p. 1151.

⁵ Luc. ix.—Idem est se hominem ipsum abnegare, quod propriam libertatem alterius arbitrio voti nexu subdere.—*Ibid.* p. 248. Abnegare seipsum, est propriam voluntatem, per quam homo est homo, abnegare: quod revera, nisi obligatorio voto alteri eam tradas, ut in tua non supersit facultate eandem rursus tibi usurpare, fieri non potest.—*Ibid.* art. iv. p. 247.

less. Martyrdom they reserve for those who receive the truth in love ; for themselves it is only a counsel,¹ when it serves for nothing more than the glory of God and the advancing of the faith ; and this according to the judgment of Aquinas. If it be no more than an opportunity of manifesting the divine glory and edifying the church, it is a work of supererogation, and of no necessity, saith another. Parting with other things for Christ is no more a duty ;² to 'forsake brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for Christ's sake,' Mat. xix. 29, is not a duty of any Christian, but only such as profess perfection. Such forsaking all for Christ, to follow him, is more than needs ; it was so in the apostles.³ In short, taking up the cross is more than is commanded, when it is joined by Christ with self-denial, and following him, as the best character of his disciples, Luke ix. They take it to be but matter of counsel, and so quit themselves of the full character of Christians at once.⁴

If there be any virtue left, requisite for the practice of a Christian, which this engine hath not yet demolished and brought to discretion, by working it otherwise, it will make clear work. The least degree of virtue, they say, is all that is necessary ;⁵ none can be assigned above the lowest (in faith, hope, love, repentance, or other virtues) which is enjoined. Now that which is lowest of all is next to nothing, and that which is no more can act no further ; so that all exercise of virtue which their doctrine makes needful, is either nothing or next to it. All growth in grace with them is needless,⁶ for the first degree they attain is not only a sufficiency, but all the perfection that is necessary ;⁷ what is more may be profitable, but not simply needful. The first and least degree of virtue in every kind satisfies the precept, and that being satisfied, requires no more. So all other degrees will be but under counsel ; it will be no duty to look after more than the least, nor will the grossest negligence as to endeavours for more be any sin.

And since increase of virtue is by the exercise of it, where the increase is not necessary the exercise is needless. Further, no act of virtue in any degree is requisite, but only in the article of necessity ; for then only affirmative precepts oblige ; at all other times they bind no more than mere counsels, nor then neither, unless it can be known when this article occurs. And how shall it be known ? The Scriptures have not declared it, they say, nor counsels neither. Why, they have a rule in the case.⁸ Things not deter-

¹ Est autem solum in consilio, quando ex eo nihil amplius quam Dei gloria, vel fidei exaltatio consequitur ; secundum mentem ejusdem doctoria.—*Navar.* c. xii. n. xl. ; *Lopez.* c. xli. p. 224. Si adest solum opportunitas manifestandi Divinam gloriam et ædificandi ecclesiam, martyrium est supererogationis, et non necessitatis. Angel. sum. v. charit. n. v. Sylvest. sum. v. Martyr. Secundum Bonavent. et S. Thom. Sum. Rosel. v. charitas. n. x.

² Mat. xix. Omnis qui reliquerit Domum vel fratres, &c. Vide quam cunctis rebus eum denudet, qui optaverit esse perfectus.—*Soto, ibid.* art. ii. p. 244. Religio—nihil aliud significat, quam quod Christus evangelicum adolescentulum docuit : Si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende, &c. Et sequere me.

³ Et quod subinde Petrus subjunxit : ecce nos reliquimus omnia, et secuti sumus te.—*Ibid.* art. iii.

⁴ De voto obedientiæ intelligit. Luc. ix. Si quis vult post me venire, abneget semeipsum, et tollat crucem suam quotidie, et sequatur me.—*Ibid.* art. i. p. 243, vide art. iv. p. 247.

⁵ Bellarm. de pæniti. l. ii. c. xi. supra.

⁶ Nisi forte in religioso, qui tenetur habere propositum proficiendi : quia nullibi est præceptum, ut istam curam habeamus, sed consulitur tantum.—*Sylvest.* v. peccat. n. iv. &c.

⁷ Perfectio una necessaria ad esse, altera necessaria ad bene esse, quæ consistit in consiliis.—*Bellarmino de Monach.* l. ii. c. xii. p. 1158.

⁸ Quæ indefinita relinquuntur a lege, arbitrio boni viri sunt definienda.—*Navar.*

mined are left to the arbitrement of an honest man ; and so it is left to every man's will who can suppose himself honest. If he never find time for any act of virtue, he will not be obliged to any ; or if he will be so cautious to consult their divines in the case, some of them declare that such a virtuous act is rarely needful, nor can they certainly tell when ; others conclude there is no necessity of it at all. Now he may follow which please him best, even those, if he list, which discharge him from all obligations to the acts in question ; and this he may do safely, not only by their doctrine of probability, but by the determination of their oracle. The council of Trent will secure him, though he never perform one act of virtue all his life, nor repent thereof at his death, by a fine device, which is neither repentance, nor a virtue ; of which before.

Besides, all acts which have more than moral goodness seem by their doctrine to be under counsel, and all acts supernatural and truly Christian more than needs. They are not truly Christian unless they be done out of respect to God, with an intent to please and honour him, as the apostle requires, 1 Cor. x. 30. But this rule, as Soto tells us,¹ taken in that sense which is nearest to the letter, that all be actually referred to God, is but a counsel. But may not a virtual intent to glorify God be necessary, though an actual respect thereto be but advice ? No, not that neither ; for without such a virtual reference, the acts we speak of may be morally good (as they say they were in those that knew not God), and so no sin. Now in any degree above this (viz. wherein they are more than not sins, or anything better than merely inculpable),² they are works of supererogation, if their great cardinal be not mistaken.

There is yet another maxim pregnant for this purpose. The mode of virtue falls not under the precept ;³ that is, we are not enjoined to act in a virtuous manner, or as becomes virtuous persons, viz. out of a virtuous habit or principle. Aquinas, who delivers and maintains this maxim, explains it by this instance : He is neither punished by God nor men as a transgressor of the precept, who pays his parents due honour, though not out of a habit of piety.⁴ Such honour, though it be no act of that virtue (piety they call it) from whence proceeds what we owe to parents, doth satisfy the precept, so that the person is free both from sin and the punishment. Accordingly Soto : We are not commanded to pay what we owe out of the habit of righteousness or liberality, but only to pay it to the full.⁵ By this one instance he would have us judge of all other precepts concerning virtues. The habits, *i. e.* the virtues, need not be exercised. Let the thing be done, and it is all the command of God requires, though it be not done out of a virtuous principle, nor be any act or exercise of it. So Bellarmine : When God commands that we live righteously and soberly, he commands not that we do this from a habit, but only that we do it.⁶ The external acts which pious, sober, and righteous persons do are requisite ; but the exercise of any virtues therein, whether they concern God, others, or ourselves, is not com-

¹ Potest tamen accipi in sensu, ut sit consilium : et hic videtur propinquior literæ, scilicet sive comeditis sive bibitis, &c., omnia actu referatis in Deum.—*De nat. et grat.* l. i. c. xxiii. p. 60.

² Si addam alterum gradum (viz. præter eum quo non pecco) eo modo facio actum supererogationis et consilii.—*De Monach.* l. ii. c. xiii. p. 1162.

³ Modus virtutis non cadit sub præcepto neque legis divinæ neque legis humanæ.

⁴ Neque enim ab homine neque a Deo punitur tanquam præcepti transgressor, qui debitum parentibus honorem impendit, quamvis non habeat habitum pietatis, i. ii. q. c. art. ix. c.

⁵ *De nat. et grat. lib. i. c. xxii. p. 57, supra.*

⁶ *De grat. et liber. arbit. l. vi. c. vii. p. 664, supra.*

manded.¹ The habit is that which they count the virtue. Since, therefore, they say that nothing need be done out of habit, they thereby declare that no exercise of virtue is enjoined; nothing that we do need be the act or issue of a virtuous principle; this will be but matter of counsel, and not under any obliging command. Indeed, they make the exercise of virtue universally needless, since they declare it not requisite in all those cases where, if in any at all, it would be needful; they find no necessity for it, either in worship or common conversation; all may be done very well, without any act of grace or virtue. They may pray effectually; they may celebrate or hear mass meritoriously (and these are the sum of all their ordinary worship); they may partake worthily of all their sacraments; they may obtain all the effects of sacraments or sacramentals (these are evident by the premises); they may satisfy all the commands of God, and precepts of their church, so as to free both from sin and punishment, in the judgment of Aquinas and his followers; yea, they may merit too, not only other things, but grace and glory. This is the point more stuck at than the rest, but the² gravest of their authors maintain that it is sufficient for merit that a man be in the state of grace, though he do not act it; and this state consists but in that imaginary grace to which a priest can help an impenitent sinner. It will be hard to divine for what ends the exercise of virtue can be by them counted needful, since without it all the ends specified may be accomplished, the chief not excepted. However, here is enough to enter the exercise of virtue amongst mere counsels.

If we should take into this account all these rules in Scripture, the transgression of which is by their doctrine but venial, as Scotus, Gabriel, and others would have us (*Scotus et Gabriel, asserunt peccata mortalia esse contra præcepta; venialia vero contra consilia*, Vasq. in i. 2, tom. i. disp. 148, c. iv. n. 7), the number of counsels would swell infinitely, and all conscience of the exercise of virtue would be in a manner stifled under that notion; but of venials hereafter. They have, without this, yet another expedient ready to do them universal and effectual service this way; for by their principles any one may turn what divine precept soever pinches him into a counsel, and make no more conscience of it, if he have but some doctor's opinion for it; *Ad præceptum non teneris, si te non teneri probabilis Doctorum est sententia*, Medina, Soto, in Victorell. ad Sa. v. dubium, n. 2. Yea, though he have but the opinion of some one doctor, that is enough to secure him, as Angelus, Sylvester, Navarre, Sairus, Victorel (*ibid.* and in Jo. Sanct d. xlv. n. lxi.), and above twenty of their authors conclude (*vid. infra*). So far is it from being the singular conceit of some Jesuits; yea, though that doctor therein be opposed by all others.—*Idem, ibid.* after Lorca, Villalobos, and many more.

Not to be tedious; where Christ intimates, Mat. v. 19, that some of the commands are greater, and some less, the great commands some of their writers will have to be evangelical counsels, because they are better, more meritorious, and tend to greater perfection;³ others will have the less commands to be such counsels, because they are not necessary to be observed. Now betwixt these two, both the great commands and the less will be dissolved into counsels, and what then becomes of the exercise of Christian virtues? If this be but matter of counsel, there is no necessity that any should thus trouble themselves about it. For this is the difference, saith Aquinas,

¹ Per virtutum intelligimus habitum bonum.—*Nav. c. xxiii. n. i.*

² Non desunt gravissimi authores, qui sentiant, omne opus bonum hominis justī, et habitu charitatis præditi, vitæ æternæ meritum esse.—*Bellarmin. de Justis. l. v. c. xv. p. 957.*

³ Ad meritum imperium charitatis non est necessarium proprie et in rigore, sufficit enim, ut ab habente charitatem proficiatur.—*Vid. Suar. tom. iv. disp. xxxvii. sect. iii. n. iii.*

⁴ Vide Soto.—*Ibid. l. iii. c. ii.*

betwixt a precept and a counsel:¹ a precept imports necessity; counsels are left to the free choice of him to whom they are given, so that he may mind or not mind them, as he lists. If he observe them not, there is no fear of penalty, either eternal or temporal.² There is no punishment, saith Bellarmine, if a counsel be not observed.³ They all maintain this. Not one of their divines will yield that God may punish any one for acting against his counsel, though of the highest importance. And no wonder, for by their doctrine he no way sins mortally or venially that doth not observe it. Though it may seem strange that it should be no sin to neglect counsels given us from heaven, and not to follow the advice of the all-wise God, yet it is past all doubt by their principles. A neglect of counsel is no sin at all.⁴ It is not only no sin to neglect these counsels at other times, but also when God calls us to comply therewith by divine inspirations and motions of his Spirit; to disobey these calls, and resist these inspirations, is no fault at all. Cardinal Tolet is rejected as too rigid for counting it so bad as a venial fault, not to yield to these divine inspirations (Jo. Sanc. disp. vii. n. iv.). So that if the great God calls to us, either by his Spirit or by his word, or both together as our counsellors, we need not regard it; we may resist both, and yet be innocent. Herein others concur. Aquinas himself counts it no sin to neglect counsels, even against conscience dictating that it is good to follow them (2 sentent, dist. xxxix. q. iii. art. iii. ad. vi.). They may refuse the observance of them with some contempt; a presumptive contempt (*i. e.* a continued neglect thereof) passeth without control as innocent. A negative contempt hereof is justified as either a small fault or none at all.⁵ And some of them exclude not a positive contempt of these counsels of perfection, but allow a contemptuous neglect of them as sinless. So Angelus, after their law and gloss, and their Saint Antoninus.⁶ They may glory in their neglect of these divine counsels, and make their boast thereof. This will be but a slight fault at most; for they may glory in anything but mortal crimes, and this is not so much as venial. It will be no worse if they not only neglect,⁷ but abandon them with some abhorrence too. They may bind themselves by oath not to observe them; it will be but a small fault at worst to swear, and call God to witness that they will not follow his counsels. So they commonly determine;⁸ and if they be true to their oath, it will be no

¹ Præceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione ponitur ejus, cui datur, i. 2, q. cviii. art. iv.

² Consilium si non servetur, nullam habet penam.—*De Monach.* lib. ii. c. vii.

³ Operari vero contra consilium, licet altissimum, peccatum non est: nullus enim Theologorum concedit fractionem consilii puniendum fore a Deo.—*Jo. Sanc. disp.* vii. n. v.

⁴ Intermittere consilium, nullum peccatum est.—*Vega. de Justific.* l. xiv. c. xii. Nec ullæ (leges) divinæ consultoriæ etiam ad veniale obligant; *Navar.* c. xxiii. n. xlix. &c., xxi. n. xliii. Inobedientia aut est contra consilium, et tunc si sit consilium perfectionis, non est peccatum, Sylvest. v. inobedient. n. ii. Ut enim optime ait Suarez, operari contra consilium, nulla nec minima Christi offensio est.—*Jo. Sanc. ibid.*

⁵ Contemptus negativus est peccatum mortale, si Dei lex quam violat, est præceptiva: aut veniale, vel nullum, si est consultoria tantum.—*Sylvester*, v. contempt. n. iii.

⁶ Si vero non condemnit auctoris potestatem, sed observantiam consilii seu exhortationis: et sic solum peccat venialiter, si consilium est reverentiæ—si vero est consilium perfectionis, nec etiam venialiter peccat; et tunc est perfectionis quum licite potest dimittere, Sic Archi. vi. dis. et sic intellige Gloss. et jura quæ alligat.—*Sum.* v. contempt. n. i. omittere rem levem ex contemptu formali non est mortale.—*Vide plures in Dian.* p. 3, tr. 6, ref. 72.

⁷ Et ex hoc patet, quid dicendum de eo qui attediatus abominatur divinæ et spiritalia: quoniam nisi sint necessaria ad salutem, et ea demittat, vel deliberate disponat dimittere, non peccat mortaliter.—*Angel. Sum.* v. accidia. n. i.

⁸ Non est peccatum mortale per se loquendo jurare aliquid contrariam consilii, Glossa, Tabien, Cajetan, Navar, c. xii. n. xvi. Antoninus, Soto, et alii in Suarez, de Juram, l. iii. c. xviii. n. vi.—*Graff.* l. ii. c. xv. n. vi. et c. xviii. n. xi.

fault at all.¹ So that if we be loath to believe that they abandon holiness in the exercise of Christian virtues, as a thing superfluous, and more than needs under this notion of counsels, to put us out of doubt they are ready to swear it, and their doctors assure them they may do it safely.

Sect. 10. But if all this were otherwise, and any exercise of virtue were needful by their doctrine, yet would there be no necessity of it, but only during the pope's pleasure. For by their principles, if the pope should determine that any virtue were a vice, all Romanists are bound in conscience to conform to his judgment, and virtue must be avoided as if it were a vice indeed. Bellarmine, their chief champion (who is wont with so much confidence to deny, or with so great artifice to hide or disguise anything in popery, which may render his party either odious or ridiculous), delivers himself plainly to this purpose. If the pope, saith he, should mistake in commending vices, and forbidding virtues, the church would be bound to believe those vices to be good, and those virtues to be evil, unless she would sin against conscience.² The cardinal would have us think, that he proceeds herein upon an improbable supposition, and that the pope cannot thus mistake, as to commend vices, or forbid virtues; but the world knows, that this is so far from being impossible, that he hath already actually done it, and this in such instances as may well persuade us, that it is not only possible, but likely, that there is not any virtue, but (if occasion serve, and his interest requires it), he may forbid it, and declare it a sin, yea, and bind the church in conscience to avoid it, as if it were a vice.

He may do it with as much demonstration of reason, holiness, and infallibility, in any case, as he hath already done it in too many.³ Since, then, that church hath so far subjected all the conscience and reason they have unto him, as they cannot without sin but believe him, if he should determine that light is darkness, and good is evil, he may take away all conscience of virtue, and the exercise of it, whenever he pleaseth; there will be no need of any act of virtue for any papist, if he list but out of his chair to say so; they cannot, without sinning against conscience, practise any, if he do but the same thing in the rest as he hath done in a great many already.

This is enough to shew how needless they count the exercise of Christian virtues, and so how unnecessary they make all holiness of life; but it will be yet more evident, if their doctrine allow them to live in a course of sin, and make it not necessary to forsake wickedness, and abandon such evil ways as are condemned by the holy God. For continuance in sin is as inconsistent with holiness of life, as it is with hopes of salvation; and this is as clear in Scripture as if it were described with a sunbeam, 1 John iii. 8, Acts iii. 26, 2 Tim. ii. 19, Gal. v. 16, and 19, 20, 21, 1 Cor. vi. 11, 9, &c. Notwithstanding, by their doctrine it is not necessary to forsake sin; this will be manifest, if we take notice, that there are many sins that they count virtues, and so not to be avoided; and many which they call sins, but think it not necessary for the salvation of any man to abandon them; and many sins also, which they have made to be no sins at all.

¹ Hujusmodi juramenta sine peccato observare possint.—*Navar, ibid.*

² Si autem Papa erraret præcipiendo vitia, vel prohibendo virtutes, teneretur ecclesia credere vitia esse bona, et virtutes malas, nisi vellet contra conscientiam peccare.—*De Rom. Pontif. lib. iv. cap. v. p. 721, sect. secunda.*

³ He may bind the catholic church in conscience to believe a lie, and to call good evil, and evil good. This is to speak home: and now let Bellarmine say a worse thing of antichrist if he can, and shew us what the gates of hell can be imagined to design or attempt more destructive to the Christian church and religion, than what he supposes the pope to have full power and authority from Christ to do.

CHAPTER VII.

Many heinous crimes are virtues, or necessary duties, by the Roman doctrine.

There are many horrid sins which they have transformed into virtues, or count high strains of piety and devotion ; and thereby are so far from being concerned to forsake them, as they are obliged to live in the practice of them. I might instance in blasphemy, idolatry, perjury, robbery, murder, &c.

Their blasphemies, in ascribing the peculiar excellencies of the divine majesty and the prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ to the blessed virgin, and other creatures, and to their popes (though divers of them, as themselves acknowledge, were monsters and incarnate devils), have been sufficiently discovered by others, and therefore, designing brevity, I here waive them.

For the same reason, I will not insist upon their idolatry in invoking saints, adoring the host, and worshipping images ; only as to this last, let me observe what is less taken notice of, that their own doctrine, before opened, quite shuts out the best, and only considerable, plea they make use of, to excuse themselves from this crime. It is their common doctrine, that the same worship is to be given to the image and the exemplar, *id est*, the worship of God to the images of the Trinity, the worship of Christ to a crucifix, or a cross, or the image of the cross. They also define idolatry to be, a giving the worship of God to any thing else besides God. Who would imagine but they had hereby fastened the charge of idolatry upon themselves unavoidably ? Yet they make account to escape by pleading that the worship they give to images is transient, not terminative, *id est*, it stays not in the image, but passes from it to the exemplar, the mind of the worshipper directing it to God. There is no need to ask what ground they have to imagine, that their giving the worship of God to an image transitively, is not idolatry ; it is enough that they acknowledge it to be idolatry, if it be not transient, since whatever they pretend when they are pinched, yet they count it not requisite that their worship should pass from the image unto God, but think it safe to let it stop where it first fell, and terminate in the image. For they confess it passeth not to God without an act of the mind directing it to him. This is not, nor can be, when in the worship God is not minded ; and they generally agree (as was shewed before) that they need not mind God in their worship. So the result of their own doctrine is, that they need be no better than idolaters. I know not what they will say here, unless, as Cajetan, that a virtual termination will suffice, *id est*, when they have an intention to terminate their worship on God, without doing it actually, and indeed. But if no more be necessary, the worship need not pass to God really, but may rest in the image, and actually terminate there ; and so they will be real and actual idolaters, whatever their intention be. Yea, as to that, by their doctrine it is not needful to intend to worship God, as we saw before. Answerably in their prayers to saints, before their relics, or before an image (which is their usual practice) ; since, by their common doctrine, the person prayed to, whether God or a creature, need not be minded, the address may be actual to the image, and to that only ; the mind not transferring the prayer, so much as by one thought, towards the saint, it will terminate in the image, if anywhere, and be as senseless idolatry as the most stupid amongst the heathen were guilty of. Thus, what they say,

many of them do ; by their common doctrine all may do, viz., apply themselves to a senseless image, as though it heard their prayers, and searched their hearts, and were no less than God.¹

Sect. 2. There is another branch of this crime which I shall stay a little on, viz., their worshipping of relics. Herein they are so liberal as to give religious worship to such things which they do but fancy to be relics ; yea, such as it is absurd and ridiculous to imagine they are relics. For who can imagine (at least when he is waking) how they could catch or keep St Peter's shadow, or bottle up Joseph's cough, his toilsome breathing, when he was at his carpenter's work ? Yet both these, with others of like quality, are among the relics which they count worthy of such worship. The shadow of St Peter, says one, is not the greatest among relics, and therefore, if that be adored, why are not the rest to be honoured and worshipped ?² Bellarmine asks, What relic can be imagined to be meaner than the shadow of Peter ?³ Possibly he might be resolved, near Blois, in France, where Joseph's cough is honoured and worshipped as a relic. Baronius ascribes much to the shadow of Peter, for he makes it the ground, not only of their worship of images, but also of the honour and power of the popes.⁴ Who can doubt hereafter, but that the weightiest things in popery have a substantial foundation ? They worship their relics, not only when they are whole and sound, but when they are corrupted and reduced to dust, or nothing else of them left but the vermin bred in them. Not only the ashes, but the vermin too, may be worshipped, though some stick at the latter. Henricus, one of their school doctors, concludes, that the relics in the form of dust and ashes may and ought to be adored, but not under the form of vermin, and gives some reason for it ; but their great Vasquez rejects this scruple, and the ground of it, as vain and frivolous, and concludes they may be worshipped as well when they are vermin as when they are ashes. A man, saith he, may with right intention, and sincere faith, apprehend a saint, and worship him in worms.⁵ If the question had been of the little worms in the ulcer of St Harry of Denmark,⁶ for which he had such saint-like love, as when they crept out of his knee, to put them in again, that they might be nourished where they were bred ; or of the lice of St Francis,⁷ for which he had such a holy tenderness (it is recorded as an argument of his holiness), that when they were shaken off, he gathered them up, and put them in his bosom. I suppose Henricus himself could scarce have denied but those sacred creepers (having so near relation to, and being sanctified by such extraordinary contact of so great saints) might have been adored.

It cannot be denied but they are liable to gross mistakes about the object of their worship here ; and some of them acknowledge, that the people herein are deluded with great and detestable impostures.⁸ What if the tooth which they worship for St Christopher's (as big as a man's fist),⁹ should prove the tooth of a beast ? or the hair, which they worship as part of St Peter's beard, should be the excrement of some malefactor ? or the shift which they

¹ Sunt bene multi rudiores qui imagines colunt non ut signa, sed perinde quasi ipsæ sensum habeant, magisque eis fidunt quam Christo.—*Polyd. Virgil de invent. rer.* l. vi. c. xiii.

² Umbra vero non est maxima inter alias reliquias, &c.—*Vasquez de adorat.* l. iii. disp. iii. c. ii. n. viii.

³ Quæ reliquiæ viliores umbra (Petri) cogitari possint ? de imagin. cap. iii. p. 1494.

⁴ An. xxxiv. in Spondan. n. lxxvii.

⁵ Recta intentione et sincera fide, possit quis in verminibus sanctum apprehendere, et venerari.—*Ibid.* cap. ult. n. cxiii. cxiv.

⁶ Engl. Martyrol. Jan. 16.

⁷ Canus. Loc. Th. lib. xi. c. vi.

⁸ Ingentes et detestandæ imposturæ pateferent.—*Cassand.* Consult. c. de reliquiis.

⁹ L. vives in August. de civit. Dei, l. xv. c. ix ; Dens molaris pugno major.

worship as the virgin Mary's, should be the covering of some harlot? or the dust or the vermin which they worship as the remains of some saints, should have been in their original no more holy than a brute or a damned sinner? As great mistakes as these about their relics, the world has discovered, and themselves have been convinced of. Valla, a person of great learning and eminency amongst them, says plainly, There are ten thousand such things (counterfeit relics) in Rome itself.¹ And if the seat of infallibility be so well stored with cheats, what shall we think of other places? They say, indeed, they have the attestation of visions, revelations, miracles to ensure them; but these they have, and produce as well for those that are confessed to be counterfeits, as for them which they take to be true. So that they are proved beyond all question to be all alike: the true ones, as very counterfeit as any, and the counterfeit as true as the best. Now, may they with safety venture to worship them for all this? Yes, their devotion is maintained to be not only safe, but meritorious, however they be deluded about the object of it. They may worship at all adventure, what they take to be a relic, though indeed it be no such thing; and yet be so far from idolatry or any sin, that they deserve highly at God's hand by so doing. If any man think, says one, that to be a relic of a saint, which indeed is not so, he is not frustrate of the merit of his devotion.² Yea, a man may merit by a mistaken belief, though he should worship the devil, says another.³ So that they have not only a fair excuse, but great encouragement, to venture, though they may happen to worship the devil himself, and not only some limb of him, instead of Christ, or his saints, or their remains. When the Lord declares, Deut. xxxii., 'that his wrath should burn to the bottom of hell,' for that the Israelites 'worshipped devils instead of God,' they might, if Baronius had been their advocate, have come off well enough with his plea, *fides purgat facinus*. The Israelites believed as firmly as the Roman catholics (only they were mistaken), that they did not worship devils, but that which was a proper object of worship; therefore, they were so far from the bottom of hell, or any danger of it, that hereby they might merit heaven and glory.

Let me add, that the miscarriages in their mass furnishes them with many sacred relics, and their orders about the disasters there create for them divers objects of worship, and help them to many right worshipful things of the vilest vermin, and that which is more loathsome. If the body or blood of Christ (so they will have it to be) fall to the ground, it must be licked up; the ground is to be scraped, and the scrapings, reduced to ashes, are to have place among the relics. If the blood be spilt upon the altar-cloths, those cloths are to be washed, and the sacred wash is to be enshrined. If a fly or a spider fall into the blood, it is to be taken out and burnt, and the ashes put into the holy shrine. But if the blood of Christ be poisoned, it is to be kept in a clean vessel among the relics; and so poison becomes a very worshipful thing. If a mouse, or a spider, or a worm, eat the body of Christ (I must desire pardon for mentioning such horrid things), these vermin, in their ashes, are to have the same preferment, and be put into shrines for relics. If a priest or other person do vomit up the host, even that (if no man's stomach will serve him devoutly to lick it up), being turned into ashes, is to be honoured among the relics. All these and more particulars are ordained and provided for in the cautions of the mass; and thereby we

¹ Decem millia talium rerum Romæ sunt.—*De Constant. donat.*

² Si quis putans aliquam esse particulam sancti, quæ non est, merito suæ devotionis non caret.—*Vasq. ibid. cap. ult. n. cxiv.*

³ Holcot infra.

see what order is taken by holy church, that dirty water, the scrapings of the ground, venomous or loathsome vermin, yea, the vomit of a weak or gluttonous stomach, casting up that which they call Jesus Christ, may be enshrined among the relics which they adore. They tender worship to all, under the altar promiscuously; yea, their very prayers are so directed thereto, that you cannot discern whether it be more to the relics or the persons they relate to; for example, when they say, Oh you that are seated under the altar, intercede ye to God for us.¹ For they may as well believe that these relics can intercede, as that Christ, or the glorified saints, are seated under their altar.

Sect. 8. Some of them would have us believe that they give not divine honour to relics, but a sort of religious worship, which they call *δουλεία*; but the Scripture (and secular authors too,² as is acknowledged) make no difference between the terms of their distinction, but appropriate both to God. And the people make no difference in their practice, as is confessed, but worship saints (and so their relics), even as they worship God. And their teachers and learned writers encourage them to give that to relics, which is divine worship indeed, viz. to put their trust in them, to swear by them, to bring them oblations, to burn incense, and pray to them. So they are taught to give them the thing which is confessed to be divine worship, only they will not give it the name (for though they be real idolaters, yet it is not convenient to be called so). Nor is this all: there are a world of relics, to which they will have thing and name given, even *λατρεία*, expressly; for it is their common doctrine, that the relics of Christ are to have the same worship with Christ himself.³ And under the notion of these relics, they take in (as of the saints also) not only the parts of his body, but all that belonged to him, yea, that touched him, or was touched by him. Accordingly Aquinas (whose doctrine is highly approved, not only by all the Jesuits, but in a manner by all their universities⁴) teaches that not only the cross is to have divine worship, because it touched Christ, but all things else that belonged to Christ, by virtue of this contact;⁵ and Damascene (whom he quotes) will have all things near to Christ, *τὰ ἀνακείμενα*, worshipped on that account.⁶ It is true they distinguish here; some things touched him innocently, others injuriously. Waldensis seemed loath to grant these latter should be worshipped, lest he should be brought to adore the lips that betrayed him, or the hands that buffeted him; but he is run down by the stream, both of their doctrine and practice, for the things which they worship especially, and will have worshipped as Christ himself, are the instruments of his sufferings. The knife wherewith he was circumcised, the pillar at which he was scourged, the cord wherewith he was bound; the twenty-eight steps of white marble, up which he was led, in his passion, to Pilate's house; the purple robe, and the white one too, which he wore in derision; the keys and stones of the sepulchre, the sponge, the reed, the vinegar, the crown of thorns, the lance, the nails, and (which may serve for

¹ Pontific. Roman. Sect. de consecr. eccles.

² Secundum profanos authores idem significant.—*Bellarmin.* de sanct. l. i. c. xiv. p. 1463.

³ De fide esse adorandum (signum crucis) adoratione latræ, sicut adorantur spinæ, lancie, clavi, præsepe et aliæ reliquiæ quæ Christum tetigerant—ita S. Thom., et alii communiter.—*Bonacin.* tom. ii. disp. iii. q. i. punct. iii. n. vi.

⁴ Possevin. Biblioth. Select. l. i. c. x.

⁵ Crux Christi—propter membrorum Christi contactum, latræ adoranda est—Dicendum quod, quantum ad rationem contactus membrorum Christi, adoramus non solum crucem sed etiam omnia quæ sunt Christi, par. iii. q. xxv. art. iv.

⁶ πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὸν Χριστὸν ἀνακείμενα προσκυνοῦμεν.—*Orthod.* fid. l. i. c. xii.

all) the cross, which is, never the less for the loss of so many pieces, as are ten thousand times more than the whole. All these (and who can tell how many more ?), though they ministered to his pain, or reproach in his passion, have divine worship. But the things which they will have worshipped for the innocent contact might suffice, being numerous beyond account. To waive the rest, Damascene (whom Aquinas follows) of this sort reckons not only his clothes, and tabernacles, the cave, the manger, and sepulchre, but also Golgotha, and Sion, and the like,¹ wherein may be included Galilee, Samaria, Judea, and Egypt, the earth where he trod in every place being (if not deified, yet) sanctified by such contact. There is a divine virtue therein, says Baronius,² and they were wont to bring earth from those parts for the working of miracles. And amongst the relics at Venice they had a stone translated from Chio thither, whereon, it is said, he sat at Tyre.³ The water also of the River Jordan, at least after it comes to the place where he was baptized, and there that was taken up, they say, which is enshrined at Cassino.⁴ And why not the air too, when it comes to any place, wherever it touched him ? And so every element might furnish them with objects of divine worship ; and they might have no need to content themselves with such petty idols as the heathen had, but have them in such extent and largeness as is proportionable to the vast improvement of this kind of devotion in the church of Rome.

Moreover, by virtue of this contact, not only things, but persons, are capable of divine worship, and such as touched Christ may be thus worshipped. The blessed virgin in the first place. Cajetan declares that, in secret, where it can be done without scandal and danger, she may have divine worship on that account ; and tells us this is the sense of Aquinas.⁵ Later writers determine that she may be so worshipped as Christ himself, either upon the account of contact or consanguinity. Upon the same ground Simeon may have divine honour, for he once embraced Christ ; and Joseph, his foster father, for he had him oftener in his arms, which their church has taken notice of in a prayer on his holiday. The apostles, and seventy disciples did probably sometimes touch him, and so, by the same reason, may have the same worship with their Lord ;⁶ and no wonder, seeing they tell us the lips of Judas, for but touching him with a treacherous kiss, may be thus worshipped ;⁷ the woman also with the bloody issue, and those many of the multitude that pressed him, Luke viii. 45. Mary Magdalene especially, she has double honour, seeing they worship more bodies than one for hers. But this is common, and they had need of a prodigious faith to believe (if any of them believe) that the things they worship are not counterfeit ; since the most of them may be convicted of imposture, even by their own practice and approved writings. They must either believe themselves deluded, or believe that one person had more bodies, and one body more heads than one, yea, more than two or three. Many of their most eminent saints are thus turned into monsters, but I instance only in those who may challenge divine worship upon the common ground of contact. John, who touched Christ when he baptized him, had three or four heads, if he had as many as they

¹ Golgotha, Zion, et similia.—*Ibid.*

² Vid. Spondan. An. xxxiv. n. xli.

³ Platin vit. Cælestin. ii.

⁴ Cent. xi. p. 305, Chronic. Cassinen. 161.

⁵ Cajetan, Cessante (scandalo et periculo) fatetur, posse B. Virginem adorari ad ratione latriæ, ratione solius contactus. Alii vero recentiores Theologi, non solum ratione contactus existimant, adorari posse adoratione latriæ, sed etiam ratione maternitatis, propter sanguinis conjunctionem.—*Vasq.* *ibid.* l. i. disp. viii. c. i. n. cxv, cxvi.

⁶ Sicut B. Joseph unigenitum tuum—suis manibus reverenter tractare meruit et portare.

⁷ Idem. *ibid.* l. iii. disp. ii. c. vi. n. lxxvi. vid. infra.

worship ; for they worship his head in so many several places, and when they have it whole in some shrines, yet they will have several pieces of it in others.¹ So that Herod had not beheaded him when one head was quite cut off ; and when the damsel had it in a charger, it might be still on his shoulders. Longinus also, who, they say, pierced Christ's side, and had his eyes cured with a touch of his blood, must have four bodies, for in so many very distant places they worship it ; and yet this their saint had never one body, nor being in the world.² As for St Christopher (who must needs touch Christ too, if, as they say, he carried him over an arm of the sea on his shoulders), there was no need to make him so many bodies, since they have made him one as big as many, and worship for him an effigies more like a mountain than a man.³ I need not mention those many thousand besides, who had an occasion to touch Christ for the space of three and thirty years, while he was on earth ; the meanest of these might have divine worship, by that doctrine which makes contact a sufficient ground for it. Nor must this seem strange, since the very ass he rode on, when it could be done without scandal, might upon this account be religiously adored.⁴ Yet all these are not all that may have the honour of Christ, if we follow their doctrine whither it leads us. Hereby not only these persons, but their relics too, are capable of divine worship ; for they commonly teach that the relics may have the same worship with the persons whose remains they are.⁵ Those are in the right, says one of their most absolute divines, Doctor Stapleton, who confer the like honour on the relics, as on the saints, since from both they hope to receive the like advantage.⁶ Thus they have huge shoals of objects fit for divine worship : those multitudes of relics which pass for the blessed virgin's, and all accounted to be the apostles', and the other persons fore-mentioned. They say they have the blessed virgin's hair in several places, which is no such wonder, since a monk could shew some of the hairs, which fell from a seraphim, when he came to imprint the five wounds in Friar Francis his body !⁷ Her milk too kept from souring, by a continued miracle, sixteen hundred years, and so much of it as if, with their St Catherine, she had had nothing but milk in her veins.⁸ Nor is this so wonderful, seeing an image of hers could let forth of its breast such a liquor in great plenty.⁹ Her nails, too, or rather the parings of them (worthy enough of divine worship), for the nails themselves she could not spare at her assumption. That one story has prevented a hundred other fables. If they had not believed the assumption of her body, it is like we had heard of as many bodies of hers, in several places, as Geryon had, twice or thrice over, and more heads than they were wont to shew of St Barbara. Her wedding ring,¹⁰ too (though

¹ Vid. Falk on Math. xiv. 2.

² Vid. Bolland. act. Sanct. ad Jan. xiii. p. 912. Jacobus de voragine, cap. xcv.

³ Erasmus Colloq. Naufrag. et peregrin. Monti justo par.

⁴ Vasq. ubi supra. Those that stick at this believe there is in the ass a sufficient ground for divine worship, only they say it is not decent. Respondeo cum Suarez contactum Christi esse causam sufficientem adorationis, aliquando tamen non expedire, vel non decere, ut omnia quæ Christum tetigerunt adorentur. Propterea asina, quæ Christum detulit non esset adoranda, quia non decet — Bonacin. ibid.

⁵ Eadem adoratio tribui potest reliquiis, quæ tribuitur personæ cujus sunt reliquæ. — Idem, ibid. punct. iv. n. iv.

⁶ Promptuar. part. i. p. 292.

⁷ Vid. Vergerius annot. in catalog. hæret. p. 17.

⁸ Quid dicturus si videat hodie passim ad quæstum ostentari lac Mariæ, quod honore propemodum æquat corpori Christi consecrato ? — Erasm. Annot. in Math. xxiii.

⁹ M. Paris. in auno. 1099.

¹⁰ Vid. Rivet. Apol. pro Virg. M. l. ii. c. ix. p. 281.

they used none in her country), and her attire *cap-a-pie*, from her veil even to her petticoat¹ and shift too. Whether she wore any or no is not material; the 'archbishop of Chartres² wore it, and was thereby inspired with such courage in a battle against Rollo, that the dagger wherewith St Michael combated the dragon (if he had borrowed it of his neighbours in Normandy) could not have performed braver exploits, nor made greater slaughter, than his grace did; though some will ascribe less to his prowess, because being harnessed with such a shift of mail he might think himself invulnerable. Her slipper also, and shoe; yea, the figure also of the sole of her shoe is to be adored.³ Yet this is at a pretty distance from Christ (though its prime virtue be from contact), and derives from him, like the feathers of the hen which were of the brood of the cock that crowed when Peter denied him. They have Simeon's arm (mentioned in the Gospel) at Aken,⁴ which hinders not but they may have it at Hartsburg and other places too. They have not only Joseph's hem, but his breeches;⁵ and I hope kept less nastily than Thomas Becket kept his, which yet were worshipful, vermin and all, and that not *per accidens* (it may be), since it is one commendation of his saintship⁶ that his breeches ran quick. They have some remains of all the apostles, though nobody could tell them where divers of their bodies were interred, but things of this nature they still have by revelation. And how can such as these want revelations, who, in pilgrimage to holy relics, declared that a goose carried before them was the Holy Ghost.⁷ They have Peter's keys, his sword, his staff, his coat, his garment besides, and his girdle; part of his body is at Constantinople, half of it at Rome in one place, and yet the whole in another.⁸ They have martyred him over again (or some other bodies for his), and torn him into more pieces than their St Hippolytus was torn with horses. They have his head (or some of it) in seven several places in Rome; only they want his brains, which were reserved in another place, and worshipped (or a pumice-stone instead thereof). And there may be some mystery in that; for they speak of some time, under Peter's successors, when their church should have *caput sine cerebro*.⁹ Setting that aside, we may be sure they have missed nothing that belonged to St Peter, since they could catch his shadow, and hold it as fast as they do his keys. And why might not this be done as well as the monk could bring with him from Palestine the sound of the bells that hung in Solomon's temple.¹⁰ I have not yet in their sacred lists discerned the lips of Judas, but they have his lantern, which shewed him the way to apprehend his Master, and thereby perhaps in time they may discover the other. They want nothing for this but some of the oil of the candle of the sepulchre, which can light itself, and this the monks at Casino can help them to.¹¹ If they have not the ass upon which Christ rode to Jerusalem, they missed it narrowly when they caught the palm¹² he then had in his hand (whether he had any or no); and a worshipful relic of the ass some shew; it is said¹³ his tail is enshrined in Liguria. And who can think but that may be as proper an object of adoration as the bay wherewith Friar Francis his ass was saddled. And every hair in that tail may make a complete relic, as worshipful as the

¹ Erasmus, *ibid*.

² Vid. Rivet, *ibid*. p. 295.

³ Erasmus, Annot. in Math. xxiii.

⁴ Aventinus, lib. v.

⁵ *Ibid*. p. 515.

⁶ Chronic. Cassinon. lib. iii. cap. xxxviii. in Cent. Magd. xi. p. 305.

⁷ *Ibid*. lib. iv. cap. xxiv.

⁸ Vid. D. Hall; No peace, sect. xxi.

⁹ Gaguinus. l. v. de gestis Franc.

¹⁰ Ranulphus. l. v. c. xxvi.

¹¹ Engl. Festival in S. Thom. Episc. Cant.

¹² Vid. Reinold. de Idolatr. p. 59.

¹³ Vid. Vergerium ubi supra.

whole ; for by their divinity,¹ the virtue of the whole is in every part. If it were but well distributed, this one might serve to furnish a hundred shrines, and entertain the devotion of as many votaries and pilgrims as come to worship at Loretto.

But I need not insist on such relics as are to have divine worship by consequence ; those which they say expressly should be so worshipped are enough, and as many as they please to imagine. For though they have no good ground to believe that they have any one true relic of Christ, or the least part of one, yet imagination is enough with them, both to give them being, and to multiply them *in infinitum*, and to warrant their worship of each of them as of Christ himself ; even such imaginations as interfere and confute one another, and are each of them confuted by such miracles as are the ground of the whole imposture. The foreskin of Christ is more religiously worshipped among them than Christ himself ; as Erasmus observed.² It is kept and exposed in at least four several countries,³ and miracles brought to confirm the truth of its being there ; and yet while it is seen and adored in so many places on earth, some of their chief writers say it is nowhere on earth, but in heaven ; and must be so, otherwise the glorified body of Christ would be imperfect, and not entire. His shirt, and besides that (though he had no other shirt) his coat, which the soldiers disposed of at his death, was not found till the year 593 ;⁴ yet they had it elsewhere, and greatly worshipped it long before in a city of Galatia, says Gregory of Tours.⁵ It is much that they should have it before it was found, and something strange too, that as it was without seam so it should be without rent, though afterwards they found it in several places at once, many hundred miles distant. They have it in Germany, and they have it in France, and they may have it in all parts of the world at once, as certainly as they have it there ; but whether they have it or no, that which they take to be it must have the same worship and honour with Christ. And we must not think it strange that it should be in so many places, since they say it grew on his back,⁶ and so not unlikely might multiply itself since. About the blood of Christ there is no less imposture, and as great idolatry. They pretend to have much of it in parcels ; that which Nicodemus saved in his glove, that which Longinus brought in a vessel to Mantua, that which Joseph of Arimathea brought into England in two silver vessels, that which is kept at Venice with the earth it fell on, that which is shewed at the holy chapel in Paris, that which is adored at Rome on Easter day, that which may be seen in every country where popery hath left people no eyes. Yet the angel of their schools⁷ (whose doctrine they say was approved by a miracle, and which they must not question if they believe their portess) is positive that all the blood of Christ that was shed before was in his body at his resurrection, and so ascended with him into heaven ; and that the blood which is shewed in churches for relics did not flow from Christ's side, but miraculously from a certain wounded image of Christ. So that the blood which

¹ Eandem virtutem in exigua parte reliquiarum, quæ in toto sit corpore, experimento probatum.—*Baronius*. an. lv.

² Alibi Christi præputium, cum sit res incerta, religiosius adorant, quam totum Christum. Annot. in Math. xxiii.

³ Vid. Rivet. *ibid.* l. i. c. xvii. p. 132, &c.

⁴ Baronius. an. 593.

⁵ Vid. Spondan. an. 593, n. xi.

⁶ Ludolphus de vita Jesu. part ii. cap. lxiii. p. 221.

⁷ Sanguis autem ille, qui in quibusdam ecclesiis pro reliquiis conservatur, non fluxit de latere Christi, sed miraculose dicitur effluxisse de quadam imagine Christi percussa. iii. q. liv. art. ii. ad iii. An autem extet aliqua portio sanguinis—dissentio est inter Doctores ; aliqui enim negant.—*Bonacin.* ubi supra punct. iii. n. vi.

they worship as God is no better than that which an image can bleed ; and this will scarce prove so good in England as the blood of Hales, which (how much soever worshipped) was discovered to be but the blood of a drake.

They have the reed, the sponge, the crown of thorns, in so many places as gives them reason enough to believe they have them in none, and yet they worship these in all. We must imagine (to have such things go down smoothly) that they grow more than any thorn hedge does, not only in length but in number. And something towards this, Gregory of Tours¹ writes of those thorns : they are green still, and though the leaves wither sometimes, yet they revive again, and flourish. But the old bishop had not the good hap to see this, he had it only by rumour ; and such rumours their annalist is wont to make much of ; for it is not amiss to abuse others into a belief of that which they cannot believe themselves. The lance which pierced Christ's side was got into the West before it had left the East (its proper place). Otto the Great presented Athelstane, king of England, with it and other rarities, in the tenth age.² Yet the dominical spear (the same, we may suppose, though some question it) was the same age in the possession of Rudolphus, Duke of Burgundy,³ of which Harry emperor of Germany was so covetous, that he threatened the Duke to destroy his country with fire and sword if he would not give it him ; and, in fine, gave him a good part of his country for it. Much worship it had, and brave feats it played then, and I know not how long before, for Charles the Great, they say, had it too ;⁴ yet for all this it was still in Asia (if anywhere), and not found there till two hundred years after, for the Latins having taken Antioch,⁵ were blessed with the revelation of it in St Peter's church (for holy relics was the adventure which those knights errant sought, and they were concerned in point of honour either to find or make some). But this was confirmed by miracle, else it had not been worth a rush. Peter, the finder of it, to prove the truth thereof,⁶ walked through a mighty fire with the lance in his hand. It is like this champion had something of the metal of that hermit's⁷ marvellous pot, in which, though it was of wood, he boiled his meat constantly, how hot soever the fire was, without burning ; but that of the pot it seems was better tempered, for that endured many years, do the fire what it could, but the man could not long survive that hot brunt, dying shortly after. The nails where-with Christ was fastened to the cross were three or four at most.⁸ Baronius dare not say they were four, though he does not always speak with the least in this matter of miracles. These, as the rumour was, being sent by Helena to Constantine, lost quite the form of nails, being used for the making of a bridle and a helmet for the emperor. In this, Theodoret,⁹ Sozomen,¹⁰ and Socrates¹¹ agree, but they tell us not how the nails which pierced Christ were known from those which fastened the two thieves to the other crosses. If they had foreseen that such things should have been worshipped equally with Christ himself, they would have thought this necessary, or rather to

¹ Vid. Spondan. an. xxxiv. n. xxvii.

² Ranulphus, lib. vi. cap. vi.

³ Luitprandus, l. iv. c. xii. Otho Frisingensis, l. ix. c. viii. in Cent. Magd. x. p. 336. Vide et Spondan. an. 929, n. ii.

⁴ Spondan. ibid.

⁵ Baron. an. 1099. Bellarm. de imagin, l. ii. c. xxvii. out of Guliel. Tyrius, Paulus, Æmilius, Dodechinus, &c.

⁶ M. Paris, in an. 1099.

⁷ Gregor. Turonens. de glor. confess. c. xcvi.

⁸ Sententiam de tribus tantummodo clavis Christi recentior probavit usus. Spondan. an. xxxiv. n. xxxv.

⁹ Lib. i. c. xviii.

¹⁰ L. ii. c. i.

¹¹ L. i. c. xiii. *καλινὺς τε καὶ περιεφάλας πύξας.*

have said nothing at all without better ground, lest the nails of the thieves might have divine worship for those of Christ's. Gregory of Tours, who will have a fourth nail,¹ says one was thrown into the Adriatic Sea, where it seems it spawned, and from thence came the multitude of nails which were shewed and adored for the true one. (This is as satisfactory as the shuffling account which their great annalist gives thereof.) If Constantine had lived in times of popery, his horse had been in danger of divine worship for his bridle's sake, and his helmet could scarce have defended itself from being made an idol; but seeing his religion was of another strain than that now in request with Romanists, it is well if he escape reproach for converting that, the counterfeit of which they think worthy of the worship of God, to a profane use. However, they would not long endure such abuse, for upon a time one of them (whether reassuming its old form or no, I know not) skipped out of the bridle (or helmet, as you please, into Constantine's sword hilt, and that from thence, sword and all, into these western parts; and that we may not question this, it was given by Otho the Great to our Athelstane.² But this was nothing to the spear which Count Sampson gave to Rudolph of Burgundy, and which Harry the emperor (or king, as Baronius calls him) forced from Rudolphus; for there were I know not how many of these nails artificially fastened to the spear, say some;³ others will have it wholly made of them,⁴ and then these nails had need be twenty times more than ever touched the cross, or else they must be such as were fit only for the use of their giant Christopher, whose saintship they make full twelve ells high.⁵ For all this they had still many of these nails at their shrines and altars. To waive the rest, the bishop of Metes, officiating at Tryers⁶ for Poppo, who was turned pilgrim, slyly filches away from the altar one of those sacred nails, conveying another very like it into the place; and he had carried it clearly, but that, as ill luck was, the holy nail fell a bleeding (and it is like the nail had more tenderness than the consciences of those who coined such stories). However, this holy bishop, who had so dear a love for relics, must not suffer under the bad character of a thief, much less as sacrilegious, for stealing of relics was then the practice of the best (and no wonder if theft got reputation, when cheats were in so much request). Besides, there was something more than ordinary in the case, for such thieves, with the receivers, cheated themselves most of all, and those that were robbed made account (as they had reason) that they lost nothing, but worshipped what was gone, as still in their possession. So they at St Dennis believe that they have still the body, as well as the name of St Dennis the Areopagite, though Pope Leo the Ninth declared by an authentic bull, that it was stolen from thence, and carried to Ratisbon in Germany.⁷ And no wonder if the French will not be baffled out of their faith by the pope; for is it likely that he who carried his head in his arms (after it was smitten off)⁸ for two or three miles together, and would not die till he came to the place where his body should rest, would not keep it from being carried from that place, signalised with such a miracle? And the remains of St Bennet's body were stolen from Cassino in Naples, and carried, as they say, to Fleury in France, and the monks there offer proof of it by miracles;⁹ and yet those at Cassino believe they have it, and accordingly

¹ De gloriâ Martyr. cap. vi.² Ranulphus, l. vi. c. vi.³ Otho Frisinges. l. ix. c. viii.⁴ Sigebert et alii in Spondan, an. 929, n. ii. Lancea ex Christi clavis confecta.⁵ Baptista Mantuan. fast. lib. vii.⁶ Catalog. Trevirens. in Cent. Magd. xxi. p. 308.⁷ Baronius, an. 1052.⁸ Breviar. Sarum. et brevium Roman. nov. Lesson. vi.⁹ Sigebert, an. 753. Vincentius, lib. xxiii. c. clv.

worship it still, confirming themselves and others in that confidence of miracles too.¹ Whereby the world may judge of their miracles, for since God works none upon such occasions, to be sure, not for the confirming of contradictions, these must be the fictions of cheating knaves, or the feats and illusions of Satan. And some of themselves² confess that multitudes of them are no better as to their original. Indeed, they make such use of their miracles, that it is enough to blast the credit of a thing to have a miracle alleged by them for it, since it is their common practice to confirm one lie with another, and the confirmation is more intolerable than the first fiction, because they will have the divine power interposed, thereby to delude the world.

Not to digress further, they tell us of the oil, or liquor which drops from the knots of the true cross.³ No wonder if this be thought worthy of no less worship than the rest, since they ascribe to it a divine power. Besides many marvellous feats, it can cast out devils; for it must be of no less virtue than the oil of the sepulchre of St Martin, which, duly administered to a man possessed, gave him such a purge that he squirted out a foul fiend behind, and voided the devil for a stool.⁴ In short, that the cross itself should have divine worship is their common doctrine.⁵ This at first was no more than one man might well bear, but by the good housewifery of that church (who scruples no cheats in this sacred traffic) it is retailed out for worship in so many pieces, that together would sink a ship of a good burden;⁶ so that there are many, many cart loads of Roman gods, which are really no better than common chips. In all this there is not any one bit, which they can upon good ground believe to be part of the true cross. They cannot be more confident of any than that piece which, with Pilate's inscription on it, they say is reserved and worshipped at Rome; but that is detected to be a counterfeit by Baronius his own words;⁷ for he says, that on the true cross the Latin inscription was first (and so the Greek next, and the Hebrew last), and confirms it by no less authority than that of a pope, Nicholas I.; whereas in that piece at Rome, the Hebrew is first, and the Latin last. By this we may judge of the stories concerning the invention of the cross by Helena. This now mentioned was a considerable piece of the discovery; nor would the cardinal himself have us believe, that what is said to be sent to Constantinople, or reserved at Jerusalem, were more real parts of the true cross than that at Rome. However, true or false, here is enough, one would think, to glut the most ravenous devotion of any Egyptian. But when they will have this worship given to the images of the cross,⁸ in any matter whatsoever, or immaterial either, they give warranty to turn all things in the world into idols, any sticks or straws, yea, a man's own fingers laid across may be worshipped by him; or let him but move one finger across in water, or

Vide Spondan. an. 1088, n. 1.

² Aliquando maximam deceptionem fieri in ecclesia per miracula ficta a sacerdotibus, Nic. Lyran. in cap. xiv. Daniel, Cassander, consult. c. de reliquiis infra. Vincentius, l. xxv. cap. xxi. dicit fuisse quosdam qui quæstus gratia per magiam hæc miracula fieri aperte contestati sunt.

³ Spondan, an. 598, n. iv. et an. 633, n. i.

⁴ Gregor. Turon. de glor. Confess. cap. ix. Dæmonem per fluxum ventris egressit.

⁵ Aquinas iii. q. xxv. art. iv. Asserimus cum sententia communiori et in Scholis magis trita, crucem colendam esse latria, hoc est cultu divino, &c.—Gretser .l. i. c. xlix. Et de fide. Bonacin. supra.

⁶ Fragmentula ligni crucis tam multa, ut si in acervum redigantur, vix vel navis oneraria vehat. Erasm Annot. in Math. c. xxiii.

⁷ Baron. an. xvi. n. viii.

⁸ Vide Gretser ubi supra.

Utraque crux adoratur adoratione latriæ.—Bonacin. *ibid*.

oil, or the air, anywhere, and instantly he has of his own creating what he may worship as God.

For those relics to which they give divine worship under another name, they are yet more numerous. So that, upon the whole, if the Philistines had worshipped not only the god of flies,¹ but the flies themselves too, they would scarce have outvied these in numbers. The idolatrous Israelites, who worshipped the host of heaven, had a fair company of idols; but the Egyptians might have more, who could sow gods in their gardens, and make them spring up on their backsides; but both put together would come short of the Romanists herein, both for number and quality, though they of Egypt became the scorn of the world for the vileness of what they religiously worshipped. How they came by so many, when for three hundred years after Christ we hear of none, we have an account from their own authors. Out of covetousness, says they learned and ingenious Cassander, false relics were daily forged, feigned miracles were published, superstition thereby nourished, and sometimes, by the illusion of the devil, new relics were revived.² So that, in brief, to use the language of their own author, the devil helped their church to some of them, and covetous knaves to others. This stuff might be had cheap, and sold very dear; this encouraged many to take up the trade, and monks are noted as prime merchants for this traffic. They were such who, in Austin's time,³ being employed, as he says, by Satan (whose factors they were, and for whom the trade was driven), sold the members of martyrs, or what they pretended to be so. He was of the same profession⁴ who declared he came out of Spain into France with relics, which, being looked into, proved to be roots of trees, the teeth of moles, the bones of mice, and the claws and fat of bears. And they were monks who, as the same author tells us, were found at Rome, near Paul's church, digging up bodies, and confessed their design was to make relics of them. As for him whom Glaber speaks of,⁵ who furnished France with innumerable relics, it may seem strange that he should be counted a cheat when he was thus trading in another country, since his stuff had the very same mark which makes their other relics current as good ware, unquestionably good, and than which their best have no better; for he wrought wonders (or the devil for him), and by one carcase, which he feigned to be a martyr's,⁶ he freed many that were sick from variety of diseases; but I suppose he was not free of the company, and they like not interlopers. The court of Rome can furnish altars with holy relics out of common graves, and none must count them cheats for it. And if this huckster had but procured a commission from thence, he might have transubstantiated the bones in any churchyard, yea, those of a sheep or a hog either, into the bones of martyrs or apostles, as well as others. By this we may judge what their relics are, the best of them mere cheats; and consequently, how criminal it will be to give them worship, the highest of all;⁷ and yet they are so far from abandoning this, that it is in a manner the sum of their religion.

¹ בעל זבוב rendered by LXX. *Baal μύις*.

² Avaritiæ causa ad simplicem populum illiciendum falsæ reliquiæ supponebantur, et ficta prædicabantur miracula—nonnunquam autem astu et illusionem Dæmonis hominum superstitione abutentis, per insomnia et visa novæ reliquiæ revelabantur, et ejusdem operatione miracula edi videbantur.—*Consult. c. de reliquiis.*

³ Augustin. de opere Monach. c. xxviii. Tam multos hypocrisis sub habitu monachorum usquequaque dispersit Satan—alii membra martyrum, si tamen martyrum, venditant.

⁴ Gregor. Turon. hist. Franc. l. ix. c. vi.

⁵ Vid. Spondan. an. 1027, n. iii.

⁶ Multos infirmos variis morbis liberasse.—*Ibid.*

⁷ In bonis quoque viris, pio zelo præditis, summa quasi religionis in hujusmodi reliquiis &c.—*Cassander, consult. c. de reliquiis.*

And so it is expressed by some of their own communion. The whole of religion is almost brought to this, to wit, their religious treatment of relics, through the covetousness of priests, and the hypocrisy of monks, fed by the foolishness of the people.¹ Thus their great Erasmus, in his Annotations, approved by Pope Leo X. his brief.²

Sect. 4. Let us see, in the next place, if perjury may not prove as blameless and as necessary. Breach of oaths is no less with them than a virtue, or a necessary duty in many cases (of which a further account hereafter). Let me now instance but in one. Suppose a prince that has protestant subjects should, for their satisfaction, give them the security of his most solemn oath, that they should not suffer for their conscience either in life, estate, or liberty; that religion does oblige the prince to break all such oaths, or to count himself no ways obliged by them, because they are against the laws of the church, against that particularly of the general council of Lateran under Pope Innocent III., which forbids all favour to be shewed to heretics, under the severest penalties, and decrees that favourers of heretics are under excommunication. So that in this case it must be the prince's duty to be perjured, and to break his oath made in favour of his heretical subjects, and that by the sacred decree of the church. He must forswear himself, if he will not be excommunicated, and consequently deposed, and thereby exposed to the violence of every hand; yea, he puts himself into the state of damnation, and sins mortally, if he be true to his oath. So Pope Martin V. declared in writing to Alexander, Duke of Lithuania:³ Know, says he, that thou sinnest mortally if thou keep thy oath with heretics. Hereby it appears that no papists, princes or subjects, can possibly give any security which may be trusted, that protestants shall enjoy anything which is in their power to deprive them of; for the greatest securities that can be given in this case are engagements of faith and truth, God being invoked for confirmation in solemn oaths. But by the principles of their religion they are so far loosed from all such bonds that they are not at all to be trusted by any but credulous fools, unless it can be supposed that they will act as other men than papists, and condemn all the authority of that church, which leaves no hope of salvation but in obedience to it; for another general council, that of Constance, has determined that no faith is to be kept with heretics. In the nineteenth session of that assembly, it was decreed that no safe conduct given by emperor, king, or secular prince to heretics, or any defamed⁴ for heretics, though with a design to reduce them, by what engagements soever they have obliged themselves, shall hinder those heretics from being prosecuted, unless they recant,⁵ though they come to the place of judgment relying upon such security, and would not have come otherwise. And it is declared further, that one thus bound by promise was not hereby in the least obliged. And what they decreed and declared they immediately practised; for the emperor Sigismund, having given safe conduct to John Huss, and so engaged the public faith and his own honour that he should come and go safe to and from the council; and Pope John XXII., then present in the council, having given his promise and engaged his faith (if he had any) for his safety, yet the honour and faith of the emperor was borne down by the principles of

¹ *Huc fere summa religionis vocatur avaritia sacerdotum, et monachorum quorundam hypocrisi, quos alit populi stultitia.* in Mat. xxiii.

² Hist. of Conc. of Trent, p. 473.

³ Scito te mortaliter peccare, si servabis fidem datam hæreticis.—*Apud Cochlaeum.* v. hist. Hussitarum.

⁴ Quocunque vinculo se astrinxerint concessio.

⁵ Etiam si salvo conductu confissi, ad locum venerint judicii, alias non venturi, nec sic promittentem—ex hoc in aliquo remansisse obligatum.—*In Crab.* tom. ii. p. 1111.

their church, and the pope (as soon as the poor man was drawn into danger past escaping) made nothing of his promise, pretending, when he was urged with it, that he was overruled; and so, notwithstanding all the security an emperor and a pope had given him, he was first miserably imprisoned, and after cruelly burnt to ashes. Hereby the world, protestants especially, have this plain and useful admonition, that they must trust to nothing among papists (those that will be true to that church), but what will keep them out of their power. The principles of their religion (for such are determinations of general councils) bind them to observe no faith, or truth, or common honesty with those whom they count heretics, no, not when life is concerned. Their religion obliges them to violate the most sacred oaths and the most solemn engagements of faith and truth, rather than an heretic shall be safe in any of his concerns where they can reach him. It is a virtue, a duty in that religion to snap asunder all securities (by which the world and human society hath hitherto been preserved) to ruin a heretic; no fear of perjury or any other perfidiousness must be a hindrance in the case. Nor is perjury so necessary or innocent only when it is mischievous to us, but when it does mischief to themselves, and the world also. The practice of their popes for many ages may satisfy us herein, and to those who are acquainted with history, which gives an account thereof, it is no improbable observation that the bloody wars and massacres that have been for many hundred years in those places which the papal influence could reach, cannot be imputed to anything more, for the most part, than the perjuries of the popes themselves, and of those whom they involved in that guilt by discharging them from the obligation of their oaths.

Sect. 5. And this brings me to some other crimes forementioned, robberies and murders, which the wonderful power of papal holiness hath transformed into Christian and virtuous acts. By the doctrine of their church, to deprive those whom they count heretics of their estate and lives is a virtue, and a meritorious act. There is too good evidence for this. A decree of Pope Innocent III., recorded in the tomes of their councils, by their own writers, as an authentic act of the general council of Lateran under that pope, and inserted by Gregory IX. into the decretals, which is the law of their church, and part of that which passes with them for divine law. There is, there can be, no act of their church more authoritative and obliging than such a decree as this. There, first of all,¹ heretics are excommunicated and condemned; and then it is decreed that the estates of those condemned are confiscated. But that is not all; the secular princes or lords are to be compelled (if they will not do it otherwise), and bound with a solemn oath, to endeavour to the utmost of their power utterly to destroy them all. They are to labour in good earnest with all their might to root them all out.² And, further, if any temporal lord proceed not to such ruining execution within a year,³ the pope is to absolve those that are under him from their allegiance; the land is to be seized on by catholics, who, having exterminated the heretics, are to possess it without control. Here it is plain that, by the highest authority the Roman church pretends to (that which is no less with them than divine), the papists

¹ Cap. iii. Concil. Later. sub Innocent. iii. in Crab. tom. ii. p. 947, 948. Excommunicamus et anathematizamus omnem hæresim—condemnantes universos hæreticos quibuscunque nominibus censeantur—itaque bona damnatorum, si laici fuerint, confiscantur.

² Quod de terris sue jurisdictionis subjectis, universos hæreticos ab ecclesia denotatos, bona fide pro viribus exterminare studeant.

³ Ut tunc ipse vasallos ab ejus fidelitate denunciaret absolutos, et terram exponat catholicis occupandam, qui eam, exterminatis hæreticis, sine ulla contradictione possideant.

are bound to destroy all whom they count heretics, and to take possession of their estates. And this barbarous decree (which has so much force with them,¹ as the word of God with any) was put in execution in the days of that very pope; for he employed armies against the Albigenses (the predecessors of the protestants in France), who destroyed above two hundred thousand in the space of some months.² It was executed in the age before this in France,³ where so many thousands were treacherously and cruelly murdered, that the channels run down with blood into the river; and this magnified as a glorious action, honoured with a triumph at Rome, and the unparalleled butchers rewarded with his holiness's blessing. We have known it executed in our days upon some hundred thousands of the protestants in Ireland, where that bloody tragedy was acted by the pope's excitement and concurrence, just according to the tenor of that decree, the Irish papists endeavouring, with all their might, utterly to destroy all the protestants, that their estates and the whole land might be in the possession of Roman Catholics. And in all countries about us, wherever they have been powerful enough, or but thought themselves so, they have effected or attempted it. Such outrages were and are to be committed by warrant of the Romish doctrine. They are bound to act thus by all the authority of that church, which not only enjoins this by her decrees, but gives all encouragement thereto; such robberies and butcheries are virtuous, yea, meritorious acts. Those that will engage therein to the utmost (as their church requires) are assured by the pope, of these indulgences and privileges, which were granted to the adventurers for the recovery of the holy land, and these are expressed, in an appendix to that council, to be full pardon of all their sins here, and a greater measure of glory hereafter.⁴ At no less rate do they value the blood, and utter destruction of such as we (whom they count heretics); with such, and no less hopes, do they engage all papists, to endeavour, as far as possible, our utter extermination. It is true, there are good-natured persons amongst them, as there are amongst other sorts of men, and such as have a great aversion to such barbarous cruelty, but their religion tempts them to it, not only with hopes of heretics' estates, but of the greatest rewards that can be propounded; yea, and forces them to it, even beyond their inclination, with threatenings of the most dreadful import, expressed in that decree, which signifies also, that they must act at this rate of inhumanity if they will be counted Christians,⁵ and must not expect to pass for faithful Romanists, unless they will act as monsters. But if it be their duty, as they are Roman catholics, and they bound in conscience, as far as their religion, and all the power of it, can bind them, to destroy the protestants amongst whom they live, and seize upon what they have, why do they not fall to work, and make an end of us, that all may be their own? How is it that they live quietly and peaceably in this, and some other places? To satisfy us here, they use plain dealing (though we must not always expect it), and tell us in express terms they do it not, merely because they have not power to do it. Though the church have made it their duty to destroy protestants, yet when they are not strong enough to do it, and where the attempting of it, because they are a weaker party, would endanger them, there they are excused, they may wait the happy hour till they have suffi-

¹ Conciliorum decreta sunt Spiritus Sancti oracula.—*Staplet. Relect.* contr. vi. p. iii.

² Vid. Jo. Paul, Perin. de Albigen.

³ Thuanus, Hist. l. liii.

⁴ Qui ad hæreticorum exterminium se accinxerint, illa gaudeant indulgentia, illoque privilegio sint muniti, quod accedentibus in terræ sanctæ subsidium conceditur, p. 948, ibid p. 967.

⁵ Etiam sicut reputari cupiunt et haberi fideles, p. 948.

cient power, to shew their obedience to the church in executing her exterminating decrees, without apparent hazard of their own interest. So Bannes, a Dominican, determines that catholics in England and Saxony are excused from rising up against their protestant princes with their subjects, because they commonly are not powerful enough, and the attempt in such circumstances would expose them to great danger.¹ Bellarmine speaks it as plainly; if it were possible to root out the heretics, without doubt they are to be destroyed, root and branch; but if it cannot be done, because they are stronger than we, and there be danger if they should oppose us, that we should be worsted, then we are to be quiet.² So that the reason why protestants in such places are not presently ruined, is because the papists are not there strong enough; we and others have the privilege to live, because they are not yet able to kill us, and to seize on what we have. When they have once power enough (or but think they have it), let us look to ourselves; for if papists have any conscience, that anything in their religion can touch, they must then destroy us utterly, and leave us neither liberty, estate, nor being, unless they will resist conscience, and rebel against the authority of that church which they count most sacred and sovereign; or, which is all one in their catholic sense, they must either exterminate us, or be damned themselves. And to deal thus with us would be so far from being a sin, that by their most infallible doctrine (the decrees of popes and councils) it would be an act highly meritorious, though in the common sense of mankind it be robbery and murder. They may become the best catholics, by abandoning justice, mercy, and humanity itself, and procure pardon of all other sins, by the most detestable injustice and cruelty, and obtain higher degrees of glory by such crimes, as (to use their own expression) deserves all the fires of heaven, and earth, and hell. If Satan could inspire all other sects with this catholic doctrine, it would be an expedient to satiate his enmity to mankind; this would turn the world into a shambles, and no sort of men should escape unbutchered, but such who could find no party able to force them to the slaughterhouse, yet this is the way to heaven, and transcendent glory, for those who will follow the Roman conduct, and believe what passes for most infallible amongst them!

Sect. 6. There is another crime which passes for an eminent virtue with them, and is so esteemed and practised, that is, sorcery and conjuring. In the books of devotion published for the use of their exorcists, there are such horrid practices in and upon the devil as fully answers the titles of the books, one of which is called *Horrible Conjuraton*, and another *Devilish Exorcisms*. He that has not seen them can scarce believe that such things should be practised by any that bear the name of Christians; nor can they be heard without conceiving a horror at them. But they have been mentioned by others, I will only insist on that which may seem more innocent, but has indeed too much of sorcery and enchantment, and that is their sacramentals, with things of like nature and supposed virtue. Of this quality is their consecrated water, salt, oil, bread, waxen tapers, branches of trees, roses, bells, medals, and *Agnus Deis*. To such things as these they ascribe marvellous and supernatural effects, a virtue to save and sanctify souls, to blot out sins, to expel devils, to cure diseases, to secure women in travail, to preserve from

¹ Sequitur primo excusandos esse Anglicanos et Saxonicos fideles, qui non se eximunt a potestate superiorum, nec bellum contra eos gerunt; quoniam communiter non habent facultatem ad hæc belligerenda contra principes, et imminent illis gravia pericula. In ii. 2 Thom. q. xii. art. ii.

² Hæretici—siquidem potest fieri, sunt proculdubio extirpandi, si autem non possunt quia sunt fortiores nobis, et periculum est, ne si eos bello aggrediamur, plures ex nobis cadant quam ex illis; tunc quiescendum est.—*De Laicis*. lib. iii. cap. xxii. p. 1319.

burning and drowning. Pope Alexander, in the decrees which they ascribe to him, asserts that water, mixed with salt and consecrated, does sanctify the people,¹ purify the unclean, break the snares of the devil, and bring health to body and soul. The form of exorcising salt, which we have in their authorised books, tells us it is exorcised, that it may be to all that take it both health to body and soul.² The exorcised water is to chase away all the power of the devil and root him out.³ The virtues of an *Agnus Dei* are described by Urban V. in verse, wherewith he sent some of them to the Greek emperor. If you will believe a pope, who may be infallible in rhyme as well as in prose,⁴ it drives away lightning, and all malignancy, delivers pregnant women, destroys the force of fire, secures from drowning, and, which is more, destroys sin, even as the blood of Christ does. Bellarmine says⁵ they are of power for the blotting out of venial sins, for the chasing away devils, for the curing of diseases; others⁶ ascribe to them a power to excite gracious motions, even *ex opere operato*. Now, it is acknowledged, that the natural power of these things cannot reach such effects, and that there is no virtue in or of themselves to produce them, no more than there is in such things by which magicians and conjurors work their strange feats; nor has the Lord instituted them, or anywhere promised to empower them, for such purposes, no more than he has promised to make the charm of any sorcerer effectual for marvellous operations. Bellarmine confesseth⁷ that such things have their force not by any promise of God expressed. And Suarez⁸ says the effect thereof is not founded in any special promise of God, because, as he had said, it does not appear there is any such promise. And they confess there is a tacit invocation of the devil in using things for effects, to which they have no power, natural or divine. There is such an invocation of the devil, says Cajetan,⁹ when one uses any thing or word as having power for such an effect, for which it appears not to have any virtue, either natural or divine, for then he tacitly consents to the aid of the devil. And so Sylvester¹⁰ after Aquinas; If the things made use of for such effects appear to have no power to produce them, it follows that they are not used for this purpose as causes, but as signs or sacramentals, and consequently they belong to some compact with the devil; and this, even the Jesuits will acknowledge. Thus cardinal Tolet,¹¹ It is to be generally observed that there is a tacit invocation of the devil when a man attempts to do anything by that which neither of itself nor by divine power produces such effects. And Filliucius, declaring the several ways whereby a magical operation may be discerned, most of which are applicable to their sacramentals, gives this as the reason of them all:¹² because when the effect cannot be expected from the power of such causes, since they have it not, neither from God, who has not instituted them, it follows that it must be expected from the devil, who is therein tacitly invoked. They take it for evident, that the efficacy of such

¹ De consecr. D. iii. cap. aqua.

² In salutem credentium, ut sit omnibus sumentibus sanitas animæ et corporis.

³ Ad effugandam omnem potestatem inimici.

⁴ — Omne malignum

Peccatum frangit ut Christi sanguis, &c. Angel. i. lib. Cærem. c. ult.

⁵ De cultu sanct. l. iii. c. vii. p. 1694.

⁶ Tribuitur Thomæ, Cajetan, Soto in Suar. tom. iii. disp. xv. sect. iv.

⁷ Vim habent ejusmodi res non ex pacto Dei expresso.—*Ibid.*

⁸ Non est fundatus in speciali aliqua Dei promissione, quia ut dixi, de tali promissione non constat.—*Ibid.* p. 187.

Sum. verb. divinitio.

¹⁰ Sum. v. superstitio. n. x.

¹¹ Instruct. sacerdot. liv. c. xiv. p. 684.

¹² Tract. xxiv. cap. vii. n. clxx. p. 82.

things is not from God if he did not institute them ; not from God, says Filliucius, since he was not the instituter.¹ So Sylvester² will have the magical signs referred to diabolical compact, because, having no such power of themselves, they are not of divine institution, plainly signifying that if their sacramentals were not instituted of God, they could be no better than what he refers to the devil. Now, what evidence is there that their sacramentals are of divine institution, and appointed by God for such purposes ? They say so, and that is all, and so may the magicians say, if they please, and prove it as well too ; for from the word of God, the only proof in this case, neither of them have a syllable. The author and original of this strange power may hereby be discerned, and the means they use to derive it helps the discovery. They have it, they say, by virtue of their exorcisms, but if they can consecrate or exorcise a thing into a power which is above itself, and yet comes not from God, their consecrations hereby will prove no better than conjuring. And, indeed, he that reads but their consecrations may have cause to think they are no other ; for instance, their form of consecrating salt in these words : I conjure thee, creature of salt, by the living God, the true God, the holy God, that thou mayest be made a conjured salt, for the salvation of believers.³ And the like conjuring they use for the making of holy water and other things. There is a charm in Alexander Trallianus, a magical doctor, which is exactly like these, in what the form of an enchantment requires, to convey a virtue into an herb for the cure of a disease : I exorcise, or conjure thee, by the great Jah and Sabaoth, the God that founded the earth, &c. ; take the spirit of thy mother-earth and its virtue, and dry up the flux of feet and hands.⁴ He that will count this a charm, will have no reason to deny but the papists' form of consecration is an enchantment ; and indeed the common notion of enchantment is applicable hereto. They define it to be the conveying of a marvellous power into a thing by virtue of the words of an enchanter. Now, it is a marvellous power which they will have conveyed by their consecration, since it is a power above the natural capacity of the things, and such as enables them for spiritual and supernatural effects ; and they think it conveyed by virtue of the words of the consecrator, as in the other case by the words of the magician, for as soon as the words are pronounced, they believe the things so consecrated are endowed with the power. They will say, indeed, that they expect the power from God, and use his name accordingly in their consecrations ; and so might enchanters and magicians say, with the like reason, for they were wont to use the name of God in their charms and incantations, as Origen assures us. Many, says he,⁵ of the Egyptians, when they are conjuring devils, insert in their incantations ' the God of Abraham ; ' and he says, not only the Jewish exorcists did invoke the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,⁶ but almost all others who meddled with conjuration and magic. Oh, but this virtue comes from the church's prayers, says Bellarmine ! By these prayers, I suppose he means their forms of consecration ; yet in them there is no praying, but rather plain conjuring, for the words are

¹ Nec a Deo, qui eorum institutor non. est.—*Ibid.*

² Si qua sunt supervacua, cum non sunt divinitus instituta, sicut sunt sacramentalia, et consequenter pertinent ad pacta quædam significationum cum dæmonibus.—*Ibid.*

³ Exorcizo te creatura salis per Deum verum, &c.

⁴ ἐρεῖξω εἰ ἔνομα μέγα Ἰαὼὶ Σαβωὸθ, &c.

Vid. annot in Orig. p. 17.

⁵ πολλοὶ τῶν ἰσχυμένων δαιμονίους χρεῖνται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τῷ, Ο ΘΕΟΣ ΑΒΡΑΑΜ.—*Contr. Celsum.* lib. i. p. 17.

⁶ ἀλλὰ γὰρ σχίδον καὶ πάντας τοὺς τι τῶν ἰσχυῶν καὶ μαγικῶν πραγματευομένους. lib. iv. p. 184.

all of them directed to the things consecrated, and not at all to God, as is evident to any that reads them. And if they should use some prayers besides the forms of consecration, a magician may do so too besides his charm, and yet be no less an enchanter. Origen tells us that some invocation of God and use of his name is often found in conjuring books.¹ And what would it mend the matter for either of them to pray to God to bless an enchantment, or make his conjuring effectual? If the Ephesian magicians should have invocated God at the recital of their *γράμματα*;² or the conjurors among Jews or Gentiles, in the use of their suffumigations and other magical tricks;³ or the Simonians for their *agogima*.⁴ or Eleazer in the application of his ring and root;⁵ the practice had been no better on this account, it would be still, at least, a tacit invocation of the devil, from whom alone such virtue must be expected, as is neither in the nature of the thing nor from God's appointment; yea, it would have been worse to make so bold with God as to invoke him for the service of the devil. But, indeed, popish prayers themselves, as they use them, are as like charms as they can look. In their prayers there are barbarous, *i. e.* unintelligible words (like those of the magician in 2. Pausanias), which the people, or priests many times, understand no more than the hard words in the charms of conjurors were understood:⁶ such as *Jah, Zebaoth, Elohim, Sadai*, or those which Cato says were used in a charm,⁷ for curing members out of joint; or the name Abraham, which though the conjurors in other countries used, yet they knew not what it meant, says Origen.⁸ They are tied to the same syllables, as conjurors are in their charms, and that they may not vary, must, as the Persian magician,⁹ read all out of a book, yea, though they have it by heart. It is not requisite by their doctrine, as we saw before, to mind the God of heaven in their prayers more than the prince of darkness. The mere muttering of the words they count effectual, as in charms and enchantments, yet they have no promise from God, that the bare recital of their forms, without any inward devotion or attention, shall prevail, more than a magician has, that such a pronouncing of the words he uses in conjuring will be prevalent; or more, that the words of a prayer which one carries in his pocket,¹⁰ another charm in use among the papists, will be effectual. So that Salmeron had more reason than he expressed, to say that their prayers were like the words of a charmer. They had need first excuse their prayers from this crime, before this will serve to excuse their sacramentals.

Sect. 7. There is another crime, no less heinous than the former, and yet in their account it is a necessary duty and a most excellent service, and that is, the destroying of Christ, which by their doctrine and laws of their church they are to do daily in the mass. To clear this, take notice of these severals: they teach that Christ is really in the mass, not only as he is God (and so everywhere), but as he is man, soul and body, flesh and blood, and there

¹ Ευρίσκονται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μαγικοῖς συγγράμμασι πολλὰ χεὺς ἡ τοιαύτη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπίκλησις, καὶ παραλήψεις τοῦ Θεοῦ ὀνόματος.—*Ibid.*

² Clemens Alexandr. Strom. l. i. c. xviii.

³ Συμμίμασι καὶ καταδίσμοις χρῶνται.—*Just. Martyr. dial. ad Tryph.* p. 91. Edit Steph.
⁴ Exorcismus et incantationibus utuntur. Amatoria quoque et Agogima apud eos studioso exercentur.—*Irenæus.* l. i. xx. p. lxxvi.

⁵ δακτύλιος, ἔχων ὑπὸ τῇ σφραγίδι ῥίζας.—*Joseph. Antiq.* l. viii. c. ii. p. 257.

⁶ βάρβαρα καὶ οὐδαμῶς συντά.—*Lib. i. Eliacor.*

⁷ Cato de re rustica luxata membra hac cantione sana fieri tradit; Danata daries dardaries astararies, &c.—*Polyd. Virgil. de Prodigis,* lib. i.

⁸ οὐκ ἰσιστάμενοι δι' τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἀβραάμ.—*Ibid.* lib. i. p. 17.

⁹ Ἰσάδι ἰσιλογίμενος ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου. Pausan. *ibid.* Vid. Soto de Justir. lib. x. q. v. art. iii.

¹⁰ Vid. Horæ B. Virg. Paris edit. an. 1526, p. 63.

not only mystically in signs and representations, or spiritually in virtue and efficacy, but as to the very substance of his body, some say corporeally, others after the manner of a spirit; but all say the true substance of his flesh and blood is as really on the altar as his body was on the cross when nailed to it; yea, that it is there visibly, and may be (though it be not ordinarily) seen. 2. They hold that Christ is truly and properly sacrificed in the mass, and his body and blood there offered, as much as any bullock or lamb was sacrificed under the law. The council of Trent declares that the sacrifice in the mass, and that offered on the cross, is the very same for substance, and differs only in the manner of offering;¹ and denounces a curse against any that shall say that this is not a true and proper sacrifice, or that Christ in these words, *Do THIS*, did not command the disciples, and priests after them, to sacrifice the body and blood of Christ.² 3. They maintain that in every true and proper sacrifice, that which is sacrificed is really destroyed. So Bellarmine: To a true sacrifice it is required that what is offered to God in sacrifice should be plainly destroyed.³ And if it be a live thing that is offered, that it may be a true and real sacrifice, it must of necessity be slain and deprived of life. A true and real sacrifice, says he, requires the true and real killing of it, since in the killing of it the essence of the sacrifice consists. Hence it clearly follows, and it is their own inference, that Christ being truly and properly sacrificed in the mass, he is there really consumed, killed, or destroyed; he is as really consumed in the mass as incense when it was burnt for an oblation. The body of Christ, says the cardinal, for the honour of God, is laid upon the table that it may be consumed.⁴ He is as really destroyed as the whole burnt offering was destroyed when it was totally burnt. The consumption of the sacrament, says the same author, as it is done by a sacrificing priest, is an essential part of the sacrifice; for it is a real destruction of the sacrifice, and is counted correspondent to the burning of the holocaust.⁵ He is as really killed in the mass, by their doctrine, as a bullock that was slain for a sacrifice. If in the mass, says he, there be not a true and real killing and slaying of Christ, it is not a true and real sacrifice; adding this reason, because the essence of a sacrifice consists in the killing of it.⁶ So also Doctor Allen says, Christ is killed there indeed, and sacrificed to God.⁷ And Vega, Christ is as truly slain and offered in the sacrament of the eucharist, as he is truly in the sacrament;⁸ and they think him to be as truly there as they believe him to be in heaven. Aquinas⁹ favours this opinion, and Gabriel insinuates it; Soto, Ledesma, Canus, and the modern Thomists do plainly deliver it, besides Bellarmine and other Jesuits. Canus says they believe that to the perfect sacrificing of an animal

¹ Sess. vi. cap. ii.

² Can. i. et ii.

³ Et omnia omnino, quæ in Scriptura dicuntur sacrificia, necessario destruenda erant; si vivientia per occisionem, &c.—*De Miss.* lib. i. c. ii. p. 685. Ad verum sacrificium requiritur, ut id quod offertur Deo in sacrificium, plane destruat. —*Ibid.* p. 688. vid. lib. i. cap. xxvii. p. 760.

⁴ Christi corpus ad Dei honorem super mensam ponitur ut consumatur.

⁵ Consumptio quæ fit a sacerdote sacrificante—proprie combustioni holocausti respondere censetur.—*Ibid.* p. 759.

⁶ Vel in missa fit vera, et realis Christi mactatio et occisio vel non. Si non fit, non est verum et reale sacrificium: sacrificium enim verum et reale, veram et realem occisionem exigit, quando in occisione ponitur essentia sacrificii.—*Ibid.* p. 760, sect. denique.

⁷ De Euchar. Sacrific. c. xc. xi. xii.

⁸ De miss. Thes. xxii. xxiii.

⁹ In Suarez. tom. iii. in iii. Thom. disp. lxxv. sect. v. Ratio præcipua hujus sententiæ est quia de essentia sacrificii est, et præsertim holocausti, ut tota victima consumatur—nam hoc sacrificium est holocaustum, in quo victima debet perfecte consumi, &c.

it ought to be destroyed and slain, if it be truly sacrificed.¹ He says also, that the body of Christ, in the mass, is a living and breathing body, even the very same that is in heaven, and that it is truly sacrificed. What, then, can follow from hence, but that the living and breathing body of Christ in the mass is truly killed? This is not denied, only they say it is an unbloody death. And this indeed is their doctrine, Christ is put to death in the mass as he was upon the cross. It is the same death for the substance that he dies by the priest, as he died by the Jews and Romans, only with some difference in the manner of it: it was a bloody death on the cross, it is an unbloody death in the mass, but he is put to death in both. And why should they say it is an unbloody death that he suffers by the priest, since they profess that his blood is there shed and poured forth, the very same blood that was shed on the cross?² This may seem strange, and they cross themselves here sometimes; but nothing must seem strange in the mass, for it is such a heap of absurdities and contradictions as ever entered into the fancy of any men waking and in their wits; nor could have entered into theirs, if the spirit of delusion and the dream of infallibility had not distracted them. However, this they do, and must hold, whatever come of it, that Christ is killed or destroyed in the mass. They are as much concerned to do it as all their religion comes to; for if Christ be not really destroyed in their mass, they have no true and proper sacrifice; and they tell us (to prove us altogether irreligious), where there is no proper sacrifice there can be no religion.³ Hereby it is very manifest that the office of their sacrificing priest is daily to offer deadly violence to Christ; that Christ in their mass is every day slain or consumed, and that the highest devotion of the Romish church is the destruction of Christ. It is true, Christ is above their reach; whatever they fancy, they cannot offer him this violence, or destroy him as they do his members; but they really design to destroy him when they would make a sacrifice of him. And they verily believe they do it, and they do all which they count requisite in order to it; and therefore they are destroyers of Christ by their own rule: to will to do it is the same wickedness with the doing of it.⁴ The horridness of this will be more apparent if we take notice wherefore they will thus use Christ. Their church does it for the honour of the saints and of his mother. In that part of the mass which is called the offertory, they say, We offer thee this oblation in honour of the blessed Mary, for ever a virgin, and of all the apostles, and of all the saints, that it may be for their honour.⁵ So that they sacrifice the Son to honour the mother, and destroy the Lord in honour of his servants. If one under the law had but offered a pigeon, or the meanest sacrifice, in honour of Abraham or Moses, it would have been counted a crime worthy of the worst of deaths, for this had been an advancing them into the place of God; and yet to sacrifice the Son of God, that is, to destroy him in honour of a saint of the pope's making, is a meritorious act. Further, the priest will not venture on such a fact for nothing; he has no reason to destroy Christ, more than Judas had to betray him, without some valuable consideration. He is to sacrifice Christ for the living and the dead: for those that are dead, if they have bequeathed anything to the church for this purpose, or if their friends hire him to do it; for the living, those that are frugal, may be secretly men-

¹ Loc. Theol. lib. xii. p. 675, 676.

² The blood is shed in the mass, but it is shed unbloodily.—*Hart in Rainold Confer.* p. 618.

³ Nulla unquam fuit religio. sine externo sacrificio.

⁴ Voluntas faciendi, et ipsum factum, sunt ejusdem malitiæ.

⁵ Ut illis proficiat ad honorem.

tioned in the *momento* of a common mass for a piece of money, but if any will go to the price of a particular mass, the priest is ready to sacrifice and destroy Christ on purpose for them in particular.¹ In fine, they do not offer this to Christ for spiritual respects only, but for temporal and worldly advantages, and such often as are of no great moment.² Christ is to be destroyed for the health and safety of any body that is catholic; yea, for the curing of a diseased horse, or the recovery of a sick pig, or the preserving of their fruit from frost or a blast. They think it not amiss for such matters as these to make a sacrifice of Christ, and to destroy him; it is done amongst them many thousand times daily. And though the apostle seems to make it a horrid crime for one to 'crucify again the Son of God,' yet for them to do that daily which, for the substance of the thing, is as destructive to Christ as the first crucifying was, is the principal part and office, and the most eminent and meritorious act of their religion.

These and such like are the prime virtues of the Romanists, most needful to be observed and practised; and if things of such a quality be so far from being relinquished, where shall we find anything which God hath made a sin that can be thought worthy to be forsaken? But I have stayed long enough here; let me proceed to the next head propounded, to satisfy us that they count it needless to forsake sin.

CHAPTER VIII.

Crimes exceeding great and many are but slight and venial faults by the Popish Doctrine.

SECT. 1. There are innumerable evils which they call sins, yet they count it not necessary in point of salvation for any to forsake them; but give all encouragement to live and die therein, as sins for which they can never be condemned. Such are those which they count venial. Let me shew you what sins they are which they reckon to be of such a quality; and thereby it will be discerned how far their doctrine gives warranty to sins of all sorts, and to continue in the violation of all the commands of God. And this I shall do out of their own authors, such as are unexceptionable, declining the Jesuits; and thereby it will be more manifest how little reason there is to excuse the practical doctrine received in their church, by charging their impious and licentious principles upon the Society.

To hate God,³ if it be out of inadvertency, and not with deliberation, is no mortal sin: and this they say of actual hatred; for habitual enmity against God is, with them, no sin at all. Acts of infidelity, when they are led thereto by fear,⁴ or worshipping an idol (such as not only we, but themselves, count idols), are no worse than venial.⁵ Unbelief, and perplexing distrustfulness of God about the things of this life, is as innocent. To present the body only before God, in all religious exercises, in prayer, the sacraments, yea, the eucharist itself, without any actual disposition suitable to the nature of the duties, without any good motion in mind or heart; without any inward attention, reverence, or devotion; without any act of faith, fear, love, desire, or any other grace or holy affection, though the want of these be voluntary, is but a venial fault. It is no worse, not only to make

¹ Pro incolumitate, says the Missal. Pro bonis temporalibus, says Innocent. III.

² Pro qualibet necessitate, says Lindanus.

³ Navar. Manual. cap. xi. n. xviii.

⁴ Angel. Sum. verb. fides, n. ix.

⁵ Idem. verb. sollicitud.

base and earthly things the end why we worship God, but to make that which is a sin our design in any part of his service, yea, to propose it as the chief and principal end why we worship him; though this be no less than to prefer sin, and the pleasure of the devil, before God and his honour.¹ To make use of a witch to dissolve some witchcraft, is scarce so much as a venial sin. And so to use the devil's assistance instead of God's, and employ others disposed thereto to act as witches, and to practise with the prince of darkness by a deputy in diabolical arts, is not unlawful. To deal with the devil for to get some knowledge by him, or obtain other things of him by such converse, is but a venial fault. For example, if an exorcist require the devil to satisfy him in some curious questions (such as tend nothing to the expelling of him); if he believe him not, but does it out of lightness and curiosity, he offends but venially.² To use adjurations to God, or man, or angels, or devils, or irrational creatures lightly, without reverence to the name of God, or any necessity, is but a slight fault.³

Sect. 2. By virtue of their doctrine concerning venial sins, they have formed rules to encourage men in the practice and constant use of all sorts of profane and wicked oaths. They⁴ acknowledge that the oath is sinful, unless it be made in truth, and judgment, and righteousness; when that which is sworn is not true, or not just and righteous, or not with reverence and discretion; yet they teach it is but a venial fault to swear without⁵ reverence or discretion, or without righteousness also, if that be not much. So that, though swearing be an act, as they tell us, of God's worship, wherein divine honour is given to him whom we swear by, yet this may be done without reverence and discretion (as the rest of their worship is), and God may be solemnly called to witness that the man intends to sin against him, if it be not much; and this without any great fault.⁶ A habit of swearing thus, or worse, is no sin, for habits of what wickedness soever are not forbidden. To use this habit frequently, so as to swear customarily, almost at every word (*tertio quoque verbo*), unless he regard not at all whether he swear true or false, yea, though he regard not that as much as he ought, is no more a fault.⁷ So to swear⁸ out of lightness and vanity, upon any the slightest occa-

¹ Si est aliquis dispositus actualiter facere aliquod maleficium ut aliud destruat, possum illo uti ad bonum meum.—*Petr. Aureolus*, in iv. dist. xxxiv. q. ii.; *Angelus*, Sum. v. superstit. n. xiii.

² Si autem exorcizator imperet dæmoni, ut dicat curiosa, et nihil ad expulsionem facientia, non quia illi credat, sed quadam levitate et curiositate ductus; est peccatum grave, licet illud non videatur mortale.—*Sylvest.* sum. v. adjurat. n. iii.; *Graff.* l. ii. c. vii. n. iv.; *Sotus*, de Just. et Jur. l. viii. q. iii. art. ii.; *Cajetan.* et *Navar.* in *Suar.* l. iv. de adjurat. cap. ii. n. ix.

³ Si (adjuratio) fiat ad Deum, vel homines, vel angelos, vel dæmones, aut irratio, nabilia leviter, i. e. sine reverentia divini nominis, aut necessitate—modo septimo videtur veniale, sicut et juratio levis.—*Sylvest.* ibid. n. v.

⁴ Vid. *Bonaventur.* iii. dist. xix. art. ii.; *Angelus*, sum. v. jurament. iii. n. viii.

⁵ Veniale est regulariter dum deest judicium, vel reverentia.—*Lopez*, cap. xlii. p. 225. Veniale vero cum non deest nisi judicium, sive reverentia, vel justitia levis.—*Navar.*, cap. xii. n. iii. Juramentum assertorium cui deest tantum justitia, quatenus contra religionem est, regulariter est veniale.—Est assertio communis et facilis.—*Suar. de Juram.* l. iii. c. xii. n. vii.

⁶ Malus jurandi habitus non est mortale peccatum, quia non est actus.—*Victorel.* ad *Tol.* l. iv. c. xxii. p. 681. Præcepta non dantur de habitibus.—*Aquinas*, xxii. q. xxxi. art. iv.; vid. *Suarez de Juram.* l. iii. c. vi. n. i.

⁷ Utrum jurans sine judicio discretionis peccat mortaliter, sicut faciunt illi qui in quolibet verbo jurant?—Si jurat verum, sic non erit mortale peccatum.—*Angel.* Sum. v. juram. iii. n. x. *Lopez*, et in eo *Jo. de la Pinna* et *Metina*, cap. xlii. p. 226, 227; *Cajetan.*, Sum. v. præcept. p. 475.

⁸ Qui in re levissima, atque inani jurant, sive etiam frequenter, et absque necessaria causa, sicut ementes et vendentes sæpe facere novimus, peccant quidem, sed venialiter

sion, without any advantage or the least necessity, is as innocent a practice, according to all their doctors. And the common practice of their catholics is correspondent to these conscientious rules. You can scarce find any one, (says Soto¹) who will either begin or end the least discourse without an oath; for they use oaths for ornaments of speech at every word. But should they not at least endeavour to leave this custom of swearing? No, never to endeavour; it is but a small fault. Although (says one of their most approved casuists) he sins venially who swears true without any necessity, and so the custom of swearing be evil and pernicious, yet he sins not mortally who labours not to break off that custom, because it is but an occasion of falling into venial faults. Hereby they have encouragement, not only to accustom themselves to this impious practice, wherein so much profaneness, irreverence, and contempt of God is expressed, but also never to give it over, yea, never to endeavour it. And the reason whereby they warrant this, reaches all the wickedness which by those conscientious divines is counted venial; they may commit it customarily, continually, and need never go about to do better; all will be but a fault so small as is next to nothing. They need not regard in what terms their oaths are dressed. They may swear [by the] body or blood of God, by Cajetan's leave;² yea, though they swear by such parts of Christ's body, or such members of the saints, or the virgin mother, as are not to be named (*per inhonesta membra*³), it is but venial, if without contempt and scandal, which will make an act, in itself lawful, to be criminal. And though they seem to give caution that what is sworn be not false, since this cannot be excused by any artifice from being damnable, yet they try what may be done to make this go down as easily as the rest. If the thing sworn be false, and he knows it, yet swears it by his faith, or troth, or this fire, such perjury is venial, *non peccant mortaliter cum perjurant* (Angel. after Aureolus v. perjurium). To swear that which is false in jest is a harmless venial, by the gloss upon their law.⁴ Commonly to swear that which is false, without considering whether it be false or no, or whether he swear or not, is as harmless.⁵ This is the judgment of Aquinas and their common doctrine: so that if a man heed not what he does, he may do what he will, and, as it were, wink a damnable crime into a slight fault. By this expedient he may swear false as commonly as true without any considerable hurt. This is enough, one would think, to render their worse sort of swear-

tantum, si veritas non defuerit—Graff. l. ii. cap. xv. n. v.; Sotus, ibid. l. viii. q. i. art. iii.; Sylvest. ibid. v. juram. ii. n. viii., secundum omnes doctores.

Juramentum assertorium cui inest veritas sufficienter cogitata et cognita, solúmque illi deest necessitas vel utilitas, nunquam est in individuo peccatum mortale, dummodo absit contemptus. Assertio est communis omnium theologorum et summistarum.—Suar. l. iii. de juram. c. xii. n. iii.

¹ De Justit. et Jur. ibid. p. 270.

Non tamen peccat mortaliter, qui non conatur ejusmodi consuetudinem evitare, eo quod ipsa non est occasio nisi labendi in venialia.—*Pet. a S. Joseph*, de ii. præcept. art. i. p. 85, approved by the doctors of Paris.

² Dicere ad sanguinem Dei, vel ad corpus Dei, sive invocando sive resonando in rixa aut turbatione,—peccatum est grave, non tamen mortale, quia non contra, sed præter Deum est.—*Sum. v. blasphem. p. 49.*

³ Qui per Christi inhonesta membra jurat, si contemptus desit et scandalum, venialiter tantummodo peccare credendus est.—*Graff. l. ii. c. xiv. n. x.; Sylvest. Sum. ibid. n. x.*

⁴ Gofredus asserit perjurium jocosum esse peccatum veniale: et Angelus v. Perjur. non esse amplius quàm veniale jurare falsum jocandi gratiâ.—*Solennis, gloss. cap. veniens de jure jur. et gloss. in c. unum. nunc.*

⁵ Communiter jurare falsum, non considerando an illud sit falsum, vel an juret, non est amplius quàm veniale; secundum S. Thom. et communem opinionem.—*Navar, c. xii. n. vi.; Lopez, c. xlii. p. 226; Graff. lib. ii. c. xvi. n. vii.*

Scotus, iii. dist. xxxix. art. i. dicit communiter concedi, quòd unicum perjurium leve, non est peccatum mortale.—*In Suar. l. iii. de juram. cap. iv. n. i.*

ing, perjury itself, practicable in ordinary, with ease and safety. Yet, as an overplus, they add, he that swears what is false through gross or careless ignorance, thinking it to be true, though if he use due diligence, he sins not at all; yet if he used some diligence, but not enough, he offends no more than venially, if Aquinas or the common doctrine may be credited; for this is it, saith Navarre.¹ And that, which way soever a man turn himself, he may have liberty to be perjured, they teach that he that swears the truth, believing it to be false, and takes notice that he swears, but minds not what he swears, sins not mortally; or if he neither regard the one nor the other, but does both without consideration, it is only a little fault,² unless this inconsiderateness was wilful and out of contempt, for then perhaps it may be worse upon the account of contempt; probable error will excuse perjury from mortal guilt, as if one appeals, thinking there is reasonable cause for it, though he has sworn before not to appeal. So Panormitan. and Angel. Sum. v. Perjur.

He that hears a thing from a person of credit, may swear it is true, only not in court, unless he express his reason (Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. iv. q. i. punct. iii. n. vii). But as if it were not sufficient for a man to swear false himself, they conclude he may without harm draw others to do it also; for, 1, they say he may induce others to swear, when he is not satisfied whether they will swear true or false; that is the opinion of Aquinas and their common doctrine.³ Further, he that knows another will swear false, may yet put him upon it, if he be a public person; that is also the opinion of Aquinas, and commonly embraced by their doctors;⁴ yea, moreover, any one whosoever may put him to swear whom he fears, or knows will forswear himself, if he be disposed to swear.⁵ Let us see in the next place, whether they may not be as perfidious in promissory oaths, as they may be false in others, and upon as easy terms: in all cases, good, or bad, or indifferent. He that swears he will not go to or pass by such or such a place, though he do it for no end that is honest or profitable,⁶ sins not mortally if he go contrary to his oath. He that swears he will do a thing lawful, and does it not, sins but venially if it was a small matter;⁷ this is the common opinion which

¹ Qui per ignorantiam quam crassam vel supinam vocant, jurat falsum, credens se jurare verum, quamvis si debitam adhibet diligentiam, nihil peccat, si tamen aliquam adhibet, sed non quantum debet, non amplius quam venialiter delinquit, secundum eodem, c. xii. n. vii. (Aquinas, Soto et alii in Suar. ibid. c. v. n. iii.)

² Qui jurat veritatem credens esse falsum quod jurat; si quod jurat advertit, non advertendo se jurare illud, vel contra advertit se jurare, non advertendo quid jurat, non peccat mortaliter. Si autem neque hoc neque illud advertit, immo utrumque sine deliberatione et consideratione facit, peccat quidem, sed tantum veniale leve.—*Idem*, ibid. n. vii.

³ In Suarez. Jurement. l. i. c. xiv. n. ix.

⁴ Ibid. n. x. et xi.; Richard de St. Victor. in Angel. sum. v. juram. iii. n. xi.

⁵ Non credo tamen mortaliter peccare eum qui dat juramentum, etiam ut persona privata, illi, quem scit falsum; quum ille est jam dispositus jurare.—*Angel*. ibid. *Graff*. ibid. c. xvi. n. x.; Turrecremata in cap. quamvis. xxii. q. i. p. 161.

⁶ Non peccaret mortaliter contra faciendo, quia juramentum esset vanum, juxta Cajetanum et mentem St. Antonini.—*Nav*. c. xii. n. xii.; *Graff*. l. ii. c. xv. n. vii. et c. xviii. n. iii.

⁷ Ubi minimum est quod promittitur, tunc non observare, non erit saltem mortale peccatum—*Idem* quando id quod jurat est indifferens, ut notat D. Ant. de Butrio. *idem*, ibid. S. Antonius, Sylvest. Sotus, Corduba, alii in Suar. ibid. c. xvi. n. iv., et in *Navar*. ibid. n. x. Tenendum videtur cum communi, peccare quidem venialiter, qui juramentum de re parva et levi non implet, non autem mortaliter, quod ipsum de voto rei levis dicemus. Cum parva res est pars minima materiæ juramenti, non implere potest esse veniale—ut qui promisit non ludere, et parum temporis in parva quantitate ludit.—*Cajetan*, *Covarruv*, *Corduba*, *Philarchus* in *Suar*. l. iii. c. xvi.

Quando est tota materia, est veniale. Antonin. Silv. Angel. de Butrio, *Graff*. Soto, *Navar*. Job. Andr. Hostiensis, Panormit. Aureolus.—*Ibid*.

Navarre attempts to prove with several reasons. As if a woman swears she will give her children apples to quiet them, and gives them none; or swears to chastise them, and does it not (which are Cajetan's instances, though he vary from the rest in the general conclusion); or if a man swear he will say an *Ave-Mary*, and says it not;¹ or swears to say a *Pater-Noster*, or to give a small matter, and gives it not;² or not to take place of his friend, and yet does it; or to game no more, and plays a little: in such cases any breach of promises, confirmed by oaths, is but a small fault; and consequently it will be no worse in all matters, not only small but great, for the obligation of an oath rises not from the quantity of the matter sworn, but from the concern and interest of God in an oath, he being invocated therein as witness. Now this is always the same, whether the matter be less or more; and so if they be not obliged to keep oaths in less matters, neither are they bound in greater. But by their rules of conscience they are set at liberty to break all. He that swears to give a whore one hundred crowns for the act of fornication, is only bound to give her that part of it which persons of his condition are wont to give such women, because a prodigal engagement confirmed by oath obliges only to that proportion in which there is no profuseness (Bannes et alii in *Diana*, v. promiss.). If a man swear to be true to a whore, and she to be faithful to him, so as to entertain no other, the oath doth not oblige either of them to such honesty (Idem, v. juram. n. x). Whether the matter be small or great, when one is drawn by fear, or brought by law to swear, if he break his oath that is promissory, he sins but venially (Pet. Aureolus, Joh. Andreas, et multi alii; et placet Angel. sum. v. Perjur. n. vii.). He that swears he will not observe some evangelical counsel³ (that which is not only lawful, but excellently good, and better in their account than what the law of God requires), offends but venially; so their authors generally.⁴ And yet to these counsels they have reduced a great part, almost all, which God has made our duty, as we shewed before; so that a man may call God to witness, that he is resolved not to do what he has made his duty. As for one to bind himself by oath that he will not lend to his neighbour, nor be surety for any, nor give alms to any in great necessity, nor do any of those important things, which they count works of supererogation, is but a small venial.⁵ Such oaths, they say, do give obstruction to the Spirit of God, yet they may be kept without sin. He that swears he will return to prison and does not, is no more guilty, if he was not duly imprisoned.⁶ He that swears he will commit any sin if it be but a venial, offends but venially; this is the common doctrine, well declared by Cajetan and Navarre, as he tells us.⁷ As if a man should swear that he would never use to speak without an

¹ Idem. *ibid.* c. xviii. n. vii.

² Graff. *ibid.* n. xiv. et n. xvii.

³ Qui jurat se non facturum aliquid ad quod non tenetur, est tamen secundum se melius facere quam non facere; si forsan erit aliquid ad consilia evangelica pertinens; neque S. Thom. neque S. Antoninus dicunt hoc esse mortale. Cajetanus, Jo. Tabienna, et glossa communiter recepta, tenent non esse lethale.—*Nav. ibid.* c. xii. n. xvi.

⁴ Cajetan. sum. v. perjurium, p. 464, perjurium secundum quid incurritur. Graff. *ibid.* c. xv. n. vi. qui jurat eleemosynam non dare, vel aliud supererogationis opus non facere, venialiter tantummodo peccat: et c. xviii. n. xi. *Nav. ibid.* vid. plures in Suar. *ibid.* cap. xviii.

⁵ Docuit S. Thom. hujusmodi juramentis Spiritui sancto apponi obstaculum.—*Idem, Navar. ibid.*

⁶ Qui juravit redire ad carceres, si carcer est injuriosus, non tenetur redire—est verum quando vult evadere illud quod indebite sustinet, et sic ut evadat jurat, non intendens se obligare. Angel. sum. v. juram. v. n. xxxvii.; *Nav. ibid.* c. xii. n. xviii.; Graff. *ibid.* c. xviii. n. xxv. secundum glossam communiter approbatam.—*Sylv. sum.* v. juram. iv. n. xxvi.

⁷ Cum jurat quis, se facturum aliquid quod solum est illicitum venialiter; non

oath, or never avoid any of those horrid acts which they mince into venials. To call God to witness that he purposes thus to dishonour him, is, it seems, no great contempt of him, or else a great contempt of God with them is but a trifle. This is to threaten God to his face, and call upon him to take notice of it, that they will do these evils against him. Soto and others say, it is such a threatening of God when they swear to commit mortal sin, and no difference can possibly be here discerned, but that the one is a threatening God with a greater evil, the other with a less; however, this is their common doctrine, *Assertio posita communis est*. They give as much liberty for fraudulent oaths, whereby God and man are abused; to swear with equivocation or mental restriction, so as those to whom oath is made are deluded, is with them, in many cases, not so bad as a venial evil, of which in due place. To take an oath outwardly,¹ without an intent to swear, is but a small fault, though it seem a mocking of the divine Majesty, and is cross to the end of an oath, if it be unduly required. So they determine also in case one swear without an intention to oblige himself. Angelus inquires, whether he sins who takes an oath with a mind not to be obliged; he tells us² Panormitan affirms, that if he be a perfectionist (*id est*, a votary) who so swears, he sins venially, otherwise not; but himself says, Whether he be perfect or imperfect, he sins not so much as venially, and proves it by their law. He takes an oath, which in its own nature obligeth, without an intention to be obliged; he calls God to witness when he is deluding men; he abuses the name and authority of God for a cheat; and yet offends but venially, whoever he be, says one; and sins not at all, says another, but then he explains it: Understand this when in swearing, he had a mind to use an oath for reverence to God, but not for obliging himself.³ So that must be for reverence to God which mocks him, and he must be invoked in a way that is most obliging, without any intent to be obliged. And further, to prevent falseness (where there is nothing but fraud), he must swear with a mental reservation. For example, I promise thee an hundred (pound), with this inward reserve not expressed: If I be bound to pay it; for such concealments, says he, are lawful, and quotes their church law for it, as allowing that, which all other laws of God or honest men condemn.⁴ It is plain by the premises that their doctrine encourages the Roman catholics to venture upon all sorts of oaths, in many cases, whether they be rash, or injurious, or fraudulent, or false, as slight and trivial faults. No more do they make of perjury, though it be frequent and customary. If more evidence be

enim erit tunc amplius; quam veniale secundum communem sententiam a Cajetano optime et a nobis explicatum. Navar. *ibid.* n. iii. Cajetan, sensible that this is capable of great aggravations, mentions some, but concludes: Though it seem, and be a grievous sin, yet it is but a venial. Unde grave videtur et est hoc peccatum, non tamen mortale.—*Sum.* v. perjur. p. 464.

¹ Sotus in Suar. *ibid.* c. xvii. n. vi. quando juramentum injuste exigitur, vel quoties voluntarie, et sine obligatione, et sine alio nocumento vel injuria tertii, non esse mortale, Soto tenet, et multi sequuntur.

Juramentum simulatum, etiamsi promissorium sit, intrinsece non continet perjurium, non grave peccatum; si absque injustitia et ex honesta causa fiat. Conclusio est communis. Angelus, Navar. Lud. Lopez. in Suar. *ibid.* n. xii.

² Dicit Panormitan. quod, si est homo perfectus, peccavit venialiter; sed ego dico, quod nec perfectus nec imperfectus peccaverit etiam venialiter.—*Sum.* v. jurament. v. n. ix.

³ Intellige hoc quum jurando habet animum solum inducendi juramentum ad reverentiam Dei, non ad obligationem suam.—*Ibid.*

⁴ Et in mente habuit aliquam circumstantiam debitam qua verum jurabat; puta, Promitto quod dabo tibi centum, cum ista subauditione, scilicet. Si sum tibi obligatus ex debito: licet hoc non exprimat ut hujusmodi, quoniam sic utitur simulatione licita quod licet. ut in c. utilem xxii. q. ii. *ibid.*

desired, take notice only of the determination of Dominicus Soto (a grave and learned doctor, and one who was a principal divine in the council of Trent). He having premised something concerning the heinousness of perjury, that the Lord forbids it, with a particular emphasis more than other sins; that it is a greater crime than murder, and is most grievously punished both by God and man;¹ *his tamen non obstantibus*, all this notwithstanding, he lays down two conclusions, in which he maintains perjuries of all sorts, *id est*, both in promissory and assertory oaths, to be no worse than venial:²

1. Every assertory oath, though it be vain and unlawful, and in a sort perjury, is not a mortal sin, but oftentimes venial.
2. There are many promissory perjuries (*promissoria perjuria*) which are no greater faults than venial, and reduces these perjuries to four general heads (under which many thousands of particular cases may be obtained), and all must pass for venial. Then, for customariness of such perjuries, how commonly, how often soever a man is guilty thereof, that makes them not mortal; he speaks of some mentioned by Scotus, who thought that a light perjury was no worse than venial, but if it were customary, it would be mortal; but he confutes this opinion by a principle generally received,³ that a multiplication of the same acts, do not change the nature thereof, that is, ten thousand venial acts do not make one mortal sin; and concludes,⁴ if the perjury be but venial (as it may be by his determinations now mentioned in many thousand instances), how habitual and customary soever it be, it is not thereby mortal; so that if a man, how talkative soever, should never speak while he lives but with an oath, or such perjury as he here excuses, yet all the perjuries of a whole life would not be a mortal sin.

Sect. 8. They determine in their schools,⁵ that of all sins those are the greatest and most heinous, that are against the theological virtues and religion. Of those against religion (which are counted sacrilege), there are three degrees; and in the highest of all (containing crimes against the deity and being of God), as the most grievous, they place perjury, blasphemy, and the sins against the Holy Ghost (and those in the same rank with these), yet for practice how little they make of perjury we have seen. Blasphemy meets with the same measures; they teach it may be but a venial fault in any of those cases wherein they describe it: whether by denying God's infinite perfections, his wisdom, goodness, justice, providence, &c.; or by charging what is reproachful to him, as injustice, partiality, impotency, cruelty, ignorance, &c.; or by ascribing his incommunicable excellencies to others, as calling a friend our God; or attributing the divine perfections to the devil; or else, by way of detestation, decrying, renouncing, cursing God, with imprecations against his blessedness or being; or else by way of derision, &c. Now it will be but a venial fault to blaspheme the divine Majesty in such a manner, (1) when it

¹ De just. et jur. l. viii. q. ii. art. iii. p. 269.

² Non omne juramentum assertorium, licet sit vanum atque illicitum, et subinde quodammodo perjurium, est peccatum mortale: sed crebro veniale. Plura sunt promissoria perjuria quæ non sunt gravioris culpæ quam venialis.—*Ibid.*

³ Cum frequentatio actuum non sit distincta ab ipsis actibus, non est per se peccatum ultra numerum multiplicatarum actionum: consuetudo speciem juramenti nec mutat nec aggravat.—*Ibid.* p. 270, col. ii.

⁴ Si perjurium fuerit leve ut veniale—quantumcunque fiat ex habitu et consuetudine non efficitur mortale.—*Ibid.*

Juramentum prolatum sine advertentia formali—non est in se novum et proprium et speciale mortale peccatum, propter solam pejerandi consuetudinem, etiam non retractatum. D. Thom. Bonavent. Duraud. Major, Scotus, Sylvest.—*Navar. in Suar.* l. iii. de jurament. c. vii. n. iii.

⁵ Vide Suarez, tom. iii. disp. lxi. sect. ii.

is out of lightness of mind;¹ or (2) when it is sudden from passion; so Sylvester² after Aquinas. And Navarre³ after Angelus adds, that it is not material though the passion be without just cause, or in gaming, or from drunkenness, or any unlawful employment, such passion and excess will be so far from being great sins, that they will lessen the greatest. Or (3) when it is from wicked custom, with contempt of one's own salvation;⁴ when one is so habituated in the practice of reproaching God, that blasphemies break from him without observance or consideration. So Cajetan and Sotus, and Navarre after Sylvester. Thus, by their rules, the more a man sins in the most horrid instances, the less will his sin be. To blaspheme God customarily, may be a slight fault, when to do it rarely will be a most deadly crime. Here is a course described, to make such blaspheming of God, as a soul that has any sense of his majesty, can neither think nor speak of without horror, to be familiar and practicable without danger. Let him, then, blaspheme God at first out of levity or passion, he may do it thus customarily with safety; and the oftener he does it, the more he secures himself; for when he hath so perfected this habit of wickedness by custom, that blasphemies will issue from him without his notice or observance, he may, when he is not heated by passion, reproach God at every word while he lives, and breathe out his soul with blasphemies when he dies, and yet be saved, for all this will amount to no more than such faults as never endanger the soul of a Roman catholic. There needs no more to make mortal sins venial but to get the perfect habit of them; that is, if a man be but wicked enough, there is no great danger.

Sect. 4. For the sanctifying the Lord's day, or any other which they count holy, all that is necessary is the worship of the mass only, with abstaining from servile works; this is enough on any festival for the avoiding of mortal sin.⁵ It is their common doctrine, and there is not anything wherein they more generally agree. So it is to be observed, that the total sum of all the holiness which is necessary for these catholics, even at those times when it should appear, if ever, and all which they are obliged to exercise, consists in their being at mass, and avoiding servile work. What holy attendance at the mass they count necessary, we saw before; they may spend the time in sleeping, or talking, or laughing, or scoffing: only with some little intermissions, that

¹ Blasphemia, si ex levitate animi, esset tantum veniale. If a man blaspheme God, so it be in jest, that makes it so small a matter that it may pass for venial.—*Vid. Bonacin. tom. ii. p. 211.*

² Cum quis subito ex passione in verba contumeliosa prorumperet quorum significationem non considerat, et tunc est veniale.—*Sum. v. Blasphem. n. iv.; Aquinas, xxii. q. xiii. a. ii.; Lopez c. xv. p. 262.*

³ Neque quidquam ad rem facit, an subitanea illa ira ex injusta causa originem habeat, vel ex ludo, ebrietate, vel aliqua occupatione circa rem illicitam; secundum Angelum. Cap. xii. n. lxxxiv.

⁴ Si blasphemia procedat ex quadam consuetudine depravata, cum contemptu salutis animæ: si inconsideratio sola fuit causa prolationis blasphemiarum, taliter quod si adverteret non proferret, non erit mortale tunc secundum Cajetanum; ita est, et in hoc consentit Sotus, Lopez, ibid. Neque satis est ad peccandum mortaliter quod talis inconsideratio, ex depravata quadam consuetudine, cum propriæ salutis contemptu, vel ex culpa lata procedat, juxta Sylvestrum, dummodo illa inconsideratio prolationis talis blasphemiarum causam dederit.—*Navar. ibid.; Cajetan. sum. v. blasphem; Graf. l. ii. c. xix.* This caution rejected as impertinent.—*Suar. l. iii. de Juram. n. vii. c. vii.*

⁵ Licet cum abstinencia a servilibus, solius missæ cultus sufficiat in festo ad evitandum mortale peccatum.—*Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 316.* Regula generalis est, hoc præceptum colendi Deum in die festo, quatenus affirmativum est, non obligare ad exercendum intra illum diem alium actum divini cultus, sive internum sive externum, præter missam. Assertio est communis. Ratio, unica est, quia ecclesia nihil aliud præcipit.—*Suar. l. ii. de festis, c. xvi. n. i.*

they may stand at the gospel, and kneel at the consecration, and bow at the elevation ; but therein no inward act being necessary, all the holiness requisite lies in their legs, which should be ordered as the priest gives the signal ;¹ yet even this they are not obliged to, who neither hear nor see what is done ; and it is not needful, at the mass, for any of the people so much as to use their senses. When the mass (which may begin at break of day, or before) is despatched in such a holy manner, with such attendance as would scarce be counted civil, at least sufficient, at a stage-play, they may spend the rest of the day according to this beginning.² Those (says Cajetan) who, after mass, vainly consume the rest of those days in sports, in jesting, in idle vagaries, in hunting, in seeing shows or plays, and anything of this nature,³ by such acts, because they are not servile works (upon which account, they say, that no other acts of wickedness are a profaning of these days, or a breach of that precept), they incur no mortal sin. But then he (who is more precise herein than the generality of their divines) brings an after reckoning. Yet, says he, hereby, because they neglect that divine worship for which these days were instituted, they sin greatly.⁴ How can that be, since he said immediately before, that they sin not mortally ? Why, there is a latitude in their venial faults, some are great and some less ; and so with him, to neglect all worship but the mass is a great sin of the little size. He gives the reason, because hereby they give not to God the things that are God's, and as much as in them lies make the festivals of Christians ridiculous, according to that Lam. i. 7. So that, by him, those who, after morning service, spend this day in such pastimes, they rob God of his due, and they render Christians, in their pretences to the sanctifying of the Lord's day or others, ridiculous to the world ; and yet this is but a venial sin ; or at worst, but a great little fault, not so great as any man need fear ; no, not he who is most afraid of damnation. Navarre adds another reason why it should be a sin, though but a venial, to consume these days but in recreations ; because in such employments many mortal sins occur, according to Antoninus, who says, The blindness of Christians is to be lamented with the tears of all men, who more grievously offend God, on the days appointed for his worship, than the whole week besides.⁵ Notwithstanding this is their way of sanctifying the Lord's day, and all other times for devotion of their own ; with profane and irreligious divertisements, such as render their pretences to religion ridiculous (as the cardinal notes), accompanied with such debaucheries, as make their holy days the profanest of all others. It is but a venial fault at most (for many count it not so much), to consume

¹ Vide Bellarm. de miss. l. c. p. 837.

² Secundum Paludanum semper licet missam facere, ita ut finis missæ incidat in initium auroræ.—*Vid. infra.*

³ Qui festos dies post missam vane consumunt ludendo, jocando, otioseque vagando, aut venando, spectaculis intendendo, et hujusmodi, licet ex ipsis operibus, utpote non servilibus, mortale non incurrant, Sum. v. fest. de actibus corporalibus musicæ—ut agitationibus corporum, quæ in saltationibus, choreis et tripudiis fiunt. *Vid. Angel. Sylvest. Rosall. Abulens. Suarez, l. ii. de fest. c. xxvii. n. iv.* Aliqui addunt, si totus dies festus, etiam audita missa, in his actibus consumatur, graviter peccare, quia festa Christiana ridiculo exponuntur—non intelligunt autem esse mortale, sed vepiale, ut disserte declarant—non refert quod intentio est vana, vel turpis, vel principalis.—*Ibid.*

⁴ Ex omissione tamen divini cultus ad quem festa instituta sunt graviter peccant : quia non reddunt quæ sunt Dei Deo ; et quia quantum in se est, ridiculo exponunt Christiana festa : juxta illud, Viderunt eam hostes, et deriserunt sabbata ejus.—*Ibid. Armill. v. fest. n. xxiii.*

⁵ Quia in hujusmodi occupationibus, multa occurrunt peccata mortalia, secundum S. Antoninum ; ubi ait omnium lachrymis defendam esse Christianorum cæcitatem, qui gravius Deum offendunt diebus festis ejusdem divino cultui dedicatis, quam tota hebdomada ad vitam parandam instituta. Cap. xiii. n. xv.

the whole day herein without any other religious act, or exercise of any sort whatever. They need hear no sermons, nor attend their vespers, nor use any prayers, public or private, nor read the Scriptures, nor sing the praises of God, nor meditate on him; nor have any one act of love, or contrition, nor any other act of inward worship at all, nor of outward either, but only part of the mass.¹ This will serve for all, so highly divine and religious a service it is; though they declare themselves not obliged therein, either to mind God or divine things. Yea, though they hear mass (when nothing else is needful for the sanctifying of the day) out of contempt for the day; yet the precept is satisfied. But if they be not at mass on those days (though presence at mass may make all other holy duties unnecessary in other cases, yet) should they not make up that defect with some other prayers or religious exercise, lest God should have no service at all, nor show of it, in public or private, on those days which alone are set apart for that purpose? No; if they neglect mass, either upon reasonable or damnable occasions (to wit, if they spend the time when they should be at it, in any other wickedness), yet are they not obliged to prayer, or any other act of worship, on those days afterwards.² This is the doctrine, not only of their famous Navarre, but of Pope Adrian, and their St Antoninus, with others. Yea, after all other holy exercises are cashiered as needless on any of their holy times, the mass itself may be dismissed too for company. And because all their religion necessary for the people consists in this, at all times, when anything religious is by their doctrine needful for them, it will not be amiss to observe how easily they may be excused from this. Thereby we may discern of what moment it is in their account to have nothing at all of religion amongst them. Cardinal Cajetan will satisfy us herein: he determines that it is no mortal sin to neglect the mass on a reasonable occasion, though it be but such an occasion as is not urgent.³ Yea, he says, it is but a venial fault to omit it, upon no sufficient reason, and universally it is no great fault to neglect it, if a man thinks really he may be excused from hearing it, or if, besides his intention, out of some negligence it be omitted.⁴ Yea, they may be excused by custom; for so, he says, maids are excused from hearing mass till they be married (and their mothers, too, who are obliged to stay at home with them), because so is the custom.⁵ If so were the custom, it seems, all the rest might be excused. So many ways, at least, may these catholics be

¹ Vid. supra cap. i. et Suarez. l. ii. de fest. c. xvi. et Victorell. infra.

Qui audit missam in contemptum diei festi—satisfacit præcepto.—*Bonacin.* tom. ii. disp. i. q. i. punct. ix. n. i.

² Qui absque excusatione, ut peccando mortaliter, omisit sacrum, non tenetur eodem die aliis actibus colere et orare Deum; ergo multo minus tenebitur qui excusatur: est ergo optimum consilium, nullum tamen est latum ea de re præceptum, et latius docent, Navar. cum Antonino, Adriano, et aliis.—*Suarez.* tom. disp. lxxviii. sect. vi. p. ult.

³ Quia sola missa communiter est in præcepto, ideo sine rationabili causa, omittere missam in festo, peccatum mortale reputatur. Et hic esto prudens, admittendo pro rationabili causa omne motivum rationi humanæ consentaneum, etiamsi non fuerit urgens.—*Ibid.* p. 304, Angelus v. Feria, n. xlii.; Citans Richardum, quodl. i. q. xix. Negat omissionem missæ in die festo esse peccatum mortale, nisi ex contemptu formali vel virtuali fiat, quod etiam affirmavit Sum. Rosellæ. v. miss. et Turrecremata, Suar. *ibid.* sect. i. initio. Sequitur posse pontificem in hoc præcepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, cum ecclesiasticum sit. Only to dispense with one, that he should not all his life hear mass, when no reasonable occasion hinders him, is not expedient.—*Idem*, *ibid.* in fine, vid. *Bonacin.* infra.

⁴ Quamvis si minus sufficiens sit ratio, peccetur venialiter. Et universaliter sic est, quando quis bona fide putat se excusari ab auditione missæ, et ideo omittit illam.—*Cajetan.* *ibid.* Et simile est, si præter intentionem ex aliqua negligentia missa omittitur.—*Ibid.*

⁵ Hinc enim excusantur puellæ, non euntes ad missam, quia sic est consuetum.—*Ibid.* p. 305.

excused from all their religion; by custom, or necessity, or opinion, or (which alone may suffice) by an insufficient reason; it will be but a venial fault at most, together with all religious exercises, to omit the mass too; and that at those times when alone (if ever) they are obliged to them. Such being their doctrine, we need not wonder if religion be starved to death among them; the life of it cannot be sustained (no more than God can be honoured by mankind) without some acts of worship and religious exercises in ordinary practice. Their teachers assure them that they are not ordinarily obliged to any of these on common days; and to none of them all, but the mass, on their days of worship; nor to any religious attendance on God or their souls, in that; nor to any attendance on it at all, but what they may decline, without mortal sin. If the life of religion be preserved amongst any, without its necessary supports and proper nourishment, it must be by a miracle; but they seem so far from regarding the life or the power of it (on which the honour of God and the salvation of souls depends), that they are not concerned for the carcase of it, in exterior acts; no, not that of the mass (when they have reduced all to that), further than the fear of a venial sin will oblige, ten millions of which cannot, as they teach, damn a man. As for servile works, abstaining from which they make the negative part of this precept, the avoiding of these is but that we may with more leisure attend on divine worship; it cannot be expected they will much insist on the means, when they have so overturned the end. In short, they determine that they who do any servile or forbidden works on the Lord's day, if they do it not with a design to profane it, offend but venially.¹ Thus, if they never all their life perform one religious act which God has commanded, on his own day or others, they scarce sin venially; or, if they neglect that, which themselves have made the religious duty of these days, they may do it without greater fault or danger. And for the negative part, if they consume these days in servile works (without an intention needlessly perverse), or, which is worse, in profane divertisements; yea, or in acting the most enormous wickedness (as we shall see in its place); yet by their doctrine they do nothing against this precept, or nothing which any of them need regard. Thus their doctrine of venial sins is improved to possess them with a conceit, that they may make what breaches they will upon the commandments of God, without doing anything at all (or anything dangerously) against them, and so to render all sorts of ungodliness practicable with safety. We have seen it in instances against precepts of the first table; let us see if those who make so bold with God, in the duties which more immediately concern himself, will be more tender as to those which respect man.

Sect. 5. The duties which children owe their parents (to instance, for brevity, only in those which the Lord hath made the exemplar of the other, and by which we may pass a judgment on the rest), they reduce to these three: reverence, love, and obedience. In reference to the first, they conclude that those who have no more respect for their parents, than to count it a disgrace and a shame to be their children, if it be for the inconveniences of a sinister opinion, or such like cause, sin not mortally; and the fault may be less still, if the parents consent to it expressly, or tacitly, to avoid some inconvenience.² It seems the command calls for no such reve-

¹ Sive id quod committitur, sit opus servile, sive ab ecclesia prohibitum, si vero nec intentio fuit violandi festum—non incurritur peccatum mortale.—*Cajetan. ibid.* p. 310.

² Filius qui—sibi dedecori et contumeliæ futurum esse existimaret se pro filio illorum haberi—si absque contemptu id facit, ad vitandum aliquod incommodum sinistræ opinionis, vel ob aliam hujusmodi causam, non peccaret mortaliter, maxime si parentes tacite vel expresse in eo consentirent.—*Navar.* c. xiv. n. xii.; *Graff.* l. ii. c. li. n. xii.; *Lopez.* c. liv. p. 279.

rence from children; but they may be ashamed of their parents if they be poor and low in the world. Children may curse their parents, if they do it but with their lips, and this whether they be alive or dead, the offence is but venial.¹ And, indeed, they allow parents to give their children occasion enough to curse them, when they will not have them obliged, under mortal sin, to teach them any more than the sign of the cross, the small creed, and *paternoster*;² nor teach them these in a language they understand.³ However, parents may come even with their children, and if they love and reverence their father and mother, so much as to curse them, their parents may curse them again, upon as easy terms, only they should not desire mischief to them in their hearts, though their words express that desire.⁴ When parents curse their children, having no inward desire of their mischief, it is never a mortal sin, says Soto⁵ (and it may seem strange, considering the account of it immediately added): Although it be indeed a wicked custom, and not at all for correction; besides, that the heat of cursing often raises anger into hatred, and so alters the mind, that they often desire that all the mischief imprecated may befall them; besides, the appellation of the devil can scarce be excused from a mortal evil, for it is a kind of blasphemy and scandal to wish eternal death to any. Yet all this, it seems, may be excused from deadly sin, though not very easily.

For love, they may rejoice at the death of their father, because of some outward advantage they gain thereby;⁶ they may accuse their parents of heresy, though the effect of that will be a cruel death to those who gave them life.⁷ As to obedience; in things that pertain not to paternal government, it is no mortal sin to disobey them.⁸ In any things whatsoever it is but a venial fault to disobey them, out of negligence or sensuality;⁹ and so there is room enough for a continued disobedience while they live. In matters of great importance, where, if ever, disobedience would be mortal, they exempt it from such guilt. They may enter into a monastery before they are at age, though their parents charge them not to do it;¹⁰ they may dispose of themselves in marriage without their parents' consent, because, according to Aquinas, in the choice of their condition they are not subject to their parents, and their parents' concurrence herein is for decency, not out of necessity.¹¹ Not only in

¹ Filius qui ex animo maledicit, sive vivis, sive jam sæculo defunctis, si tamen ore tenus tantum maledicit, non amplius quam venialiter offendit.—*Navar, ibid.*

² Sylvest. Sum. v. scientia; Graff. l. ii. c. lviii. n. xiv. Ea quæ parentes tenentur facere sub peccato mortali, ut filii addiscant, est signum crucis, et Credo parvum, et Paternoster.

³ Navar, cap. xi. n. xxii.

⁴ Idem. cap. xxiii. n. cxvii.

⁵ Cum parentes filiis maledicunt, nullum intus habentes mali desiderium, nunquam est peccatum mortale: quamvis consuetudo profecto pessima est.—*De Just. et Jur. l. v. q. xii. art. i.; Graff. l. ii. c. lviii. n. xx.*

⁶ Navar, c. xv. n. x.

⁷ Si filius scit patrem esse hæreticum, et non solum sibi ipsi, sed et aliis prava sua doctrina nocere potest, debet eum accusare. Alexand. Alensis. secundum eum Graff. l. ii. cap. lv. n. viii., quamvis tenetur filius ad denuntiandam hæresim patris, et ad testificandum de illa.—*Nav. c. xxv. n. l.*

⁸ Idem. *ibid.* c. xiv. n. xii.

⁹ Circa rem familiarem—in necessariis ad salutem, sicut sunt spectantia ad bonos mores—est veniale non obedire ex negligentia vel sensualitate.—*Sylvest. Sum. v. filius n. xxv.*

¹⁰ Quæritur, utrum intrare possint pueri vel puellæ in anno pubertatis? Et dico quod sic, etiam parentibus prohibentibus.—*Sylv. v. relig. i. n. xii.*

¹¹ Utrum filius potest nubere sine licentia patris? Resp. quod sic, tam masculus quam femina: quamvis non expediat.—*Angel. sum. v. filius n. xxiv.*

In electione statû filius vel filia, non subijcitur parentibus, secundum S. Thom. xxii. q. civ. art. v. In Tabienna. v. filius n. xiv.; vid. Aquin. iii. q. xlv. art. v. addit.

things of great consequence as to this life, but in matters necessary to their salvation, it is but a venial fault if they disobey them; so it be not out of contempt, that is, out of obstinacy and pertinaciousness. Thus Sylvester and others.¹ De Graffis is more particular herein: a son should not be disobedient to his father in things which belong to the family, and his salvation, as in avoiding pernicious company, and unlawful games, and whores; he should not disobey him herein out of contempt, by which (says he) I understand obstinacy and pertinaciousness, so that not to be obedient (herein) out of inconsiderateness, or negligence, or sensuality, would be venial.² They encourage a maid not only to dispose of herself in marriage without consent of parents, but also to give up herself to uncleanness. If she willingly be deflowered, they conclude it is no injury to her nor to her future husband, nor to her parents. Their reason is, because she has the disposing of her own body, and so may use it freely, for the satisfying of lust, though not lawfully;³ yet lawfully too so far that they will have this lewdness to be no wrong at all to the parties most concerned, herself or others. If she be unchaste herein, yet not unrighteous, she owes not so much obedience to her parents as to keep herself honest; nor have they authority to oblige her not to be a whore, no more than not to be a nun. By this we may take an estimate of the honour which other superiors must expect, by their rules of morality. I must not descend to other particulars, fearing tediousness.

Sect. 6. They hold that he breaks not the sixth (in their account the fifth) commandment, who desires, or procures, or does any mischief to another's soul.⁴ It seems it is no murder to kill the soul. It is a rule with them, that sins in heart, word, and deed are of the same kind.⁵ So they yield to Christ in this, that anger and hatred may be a kind of murder; yet they think fit to exempt these, for the most part, from mortal guilt. When there has been such hatred and enmity betwixt two, as neither of them will be induced to speak to the other, yet both are to be absolved (says de Graffis) when there is such indignation that will admit of no affability or converse.⁶ It is a fault, says Cajetan, for the inordinancy of the passion, yet commonly venial.⁷ They would reconcile us to anger when both the measure and the effects of it seem intolerable, when it is so extravagant as that it both burns excessively within, and flames out no less in external significations of its excess, yet such an excess is a small fault.⁸ It will be as harmless, though it be revengeful too,

Aquinas. Puella sicut potest monasterium ingredi absque parentum consensu, cum sit persona libera, sic et nubere, vid Gratian. Petr. Lombard. et alios in Espencæo de Clandest. matrim, c. ix. et x.

¹ Sum. v. filius n. xxv.

² Inobedientiæ crimen filius incurrit in iis quæ pertinent ad res familiares, et ad salutem animæ, ut fugere noxia sodalium contubernia, ludos prohibitos, et meretrices, modo non obediat ex contemptu. Per contemptum hic intelligo, obstinationem et pertinaciam animi; unde non obedire ex inadvertentia, aut negligentia, vel sensualitate, esset veniale.—*Sylv.* v. fil. q. xxii.; *Nav.* c. xiv. n. xii.; *Graft.* l. ii. c. lv. n. xv.

³ *Pet. a S. Joseph*, de vi. præcepto art. i. (et alii). Cum illa habeat dominium in suum corpus, non parentes, vel futurus sponsus; ideoque illa possit libere, licet non licite, eo uti ad explendam libidinem.

⁴ Non autem (infringit illud) qui vult, procurat aut operatur detrimentum animæ ut ipsamet concilium sensit.—*Nav.* c. xv. n. i.

⁵ Aquinas, i. 2, q. lxxii. art. vii.

⁶ *Graft.* l. ii. cap. lxxi. n. vi.

⁷ Peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem: et communiter veniale.—*Sum.* v. indignatio.

⁸ Quando est inordinata quantum ad modum irascendi, non habet ex suo genere, rationem peccati mortalis.—*Sylvest.* v. ira. n. iv. Potest à recta ratione ita discordare quantum ad modum irascendi puta, quia nimis ardentem intus quis irascitur, aut secundum exteriores motus nimis excandescit. Et sic si excessivus modus sit nudus, peccatum est veniale.—*Cajetan*, Sum. v. ira.

if it seek not a great revenge; yea, a man as innocently seeks and takes the greatest revenge, if he do it inconsiderately.¹ This they deny not when they tell us withal that the passion may be but venial when it makes a person inconsiderate; so that a man may destroy all that he is angry at if his passion be but quick, and great enough. To desire that he whom we count our enemy were killed, or to rejoice that he is murdered, if it be for some good that ensues upon it, is no crime.² No more it seems than it is for the cannibals to delight to have others killed; it is for the good they reap thereby, they have the advantage to feed on them. They will scarce be able to persuade one that it is unlawful to act what he may lawfully desire; yet they count it no sin to desire the death not only of those that are mischievous, and do or may do them hurt, but of such as are innocent; nor only of strangers, or of such they count enemies, but even of their nearest relations. A woman may desire the death of her daughters because they are unhand-some or poor, so that she cannot marry them according to her mind; and the reason (which must clear this from guilt) is, because this is not a hatred of enmity to their persons, but only a hatred of abomination as to their unhand-someness and poverty. Thus she may hate her own children to any degree of abhorrence, so far as to will them the grandest evil in this world, death itself, because they are not rich; or because they are not comely; she may kill them, so far as her mind and heart can do it, upon this account, and sacrifice them inwardly to her covetousness, or ambition, or curiosity, and this very innocently. An affecting to kill one's enemy without consent is but a venial fault with Cajetan.³ If he actually kill him, so it be done indeliberately, he does no great harm. The rule received by them without exception will warrant it, surprise and inconsiderateness excuses from mortal sin.⁴ Thus, if a man kills any he meets with, without any deliberation at all, through natural hastiness, drink, or passion, it is no mortal sin; yea, it may be done as easily, with some deliberation, if that be not full and perfect; and there are so many things which they tell us of to hinder it from being full, that killing of others may be a common practice, with little or no fault. But when it is more voluntary, there are more cases, wherein they make murder no sin at all, than so much as a venial fault, of which in its proper place.

Sect. 7. Proceed we to the next command. Some of their doctors have determined that fornication is not intrinsically evil, nor forbidden because it is evil, but only evil because it is forbidden. So Martinus à Magistris, and after him Durandus, held that fornication is not condemned by the law of nature as a sin deserving eternal death, but is only prohibited by a positive law,⁵ *Dent. xxiii., Eph. v.*, and so it will be no worse, nor deserve any more than a venial fault, since a positive law neither adds to the penalty nor makes it a greater evil, but only declares the native evil of it more expressly. Not only fornication, but also adultery, even in the clergy, has passed amongst them as a lesser sin, and is so expressed in the pontifical law. For

¹ Posset est veniale, propter imperfectionem actus, quia scilicet prævenit deliberationem: vel est de aliquo modico, ex S. Thom.—*Sylv. v. ira n. iv.*

² Licet mihi optare, ad bonum, mortem alicujus. Idem v. maledicit; Mortem alicui optare possumus, licet nobis constet viam perditionis ingressum ire. Soto, de Just. et Jur. l. v. q. xii. art. i.; Navar. c. xxi. n. xxv.; Lopez, cap. lxiv. p. 321, 322. (Bonacín. t. ii. de leg. disp. iii. q. iv. p. ult. n. vii.)

³ Affectus ad occidendum inimicum absque consensu rationis, Sum. v. Votum.

⁴ Inferre notabile damnum in proximi personam—subrepto et inconsideratio ejus quod aggredebatur ipsam excusare possit à mortali.—*Navar. c. xv. n. viii.*

⁵ Afirmat Martinus—quod fornicatio non est sua natura mala, et ideo prohibita, imo vero ob id tantum est mala, quia prohibita, nempe lege veteri—et eidem applaudit Durandus, iv. dist. xxxiii. q. 2.—*Soto de Just. et Jur. l. v. q. iii. art. iii.*

some crimes clergymen were to be deposed, for others the bishop might dispense with them, to wit, when they were lesser faults. Amongst these lesser, Pope Alexander III. reckons adulteries; but for adulteries, says he, and other lesser crimes, the bishop, after they have done penance, may dispense with the clergy.¹ They teach that for a whore, though she be a married woman, or a nun, to seek or receive a reward for prostituting herself, is but a venial fault, if any, only they differ how she should have it. Some say as a gift or gratuity,² but others as a hire, legally due in justice;³ by which it is evident that either they must think such uncleanness not to be intrinsically evil, or else that it is as warrantable to seek and receive rewards for other such acts of wickedness (as for slandering, robbing, assassinating men, or firing houses, &c.). The use of matrimony before the marriage be solemnised, if it be without contempt, is no mortal sin, says Cajetan,⁴ because neither the violation of rules nor of custom, through the weakness of passion, can be mortal. Others concur with him herein. Nor do Antoninus and John Tabienna much mend the matter, who will have the first act to be a sin, but none of the rest after. He or she who first contracts marriage with one privately, and after with another publicly, sins not mortally, if they lie with the former without scandal, but is bound to live with the latter, the church commanding it, if there be no danger of coming together.⁵ As though they could cohabit together as man and wife without such danger! This is in effect to determine they may lie with both, and they that have a mind to it may have warranty from the master of sentences⁶ for the latter, and from the master of the sacred palaces,⁷ and others, for the former. A woman whose chastity is attempted with some force,⁸ though she cry not out, though she call not for help when it may be had, though she make no resistance at all with any part of her, though she do not so much as any way move to hinder it, yea, though she take natural pleasure in the act, yet if her will do not deliberately consent (though they say in any court she could not in such circumstances but be presumed to consent), she sins not mortally; thus Soto with others. They confess that a woman can scarce ever do this and be honest, and yet give this encouragement to all to do it.⁹ Here is a way to have all women corrupted that are but attempted with eagerness, if the rules of those who have the guidance of their practice and consciences be but complied

¹ Decretal l. ii. tit. i. c. iv. de adulteriis vero et aliis criminibus, quæ sunt minora, potest episcopus post peractum pœnitentiam cum clericis dispensare. Alexander III. Salernitano Archiepiscopo respondens de adulteriis ut aliis criminibus minoribus, episcopo cum clericis pœnitentibus dispensandi jus fecit.—*Espencæus*, de digam. l. ii. c. vii. p. 714.

² Medina, Navar. c. xvii. n. xxxix.

³ Cajetan. Soto de Just. l. iv. q. vii. a. i. Graff. l. ii. c. cxxiii. n. ii.

⁴ Si tamen desit contemptus, non est peccatum mortale consummare matrimonium ante benedictionem: quia nec statuti nec consuetudinis violatio ex infirmitate passionum, infert peccatum mortale.—*Cajet. Sum. v. Matrimon. Angelus, v. debitum. Sylvest. (after Aquinas and others) v. debet, sect. xi.*

Navar. cap. xvi. n. xxxviii. pro Cajetano videtur textus Conc. Trident.

⁵ Non tamen peccaret qui absque scandalo eam (rem) haberet (cum priori), tenetur autem posteriori convivere, ecclesia id jubente, si absque periculo habendi rem cum ea vel eo, id facere potest.—*Idem, ibid. n. xxxix.*

⁶ In iv. dist. n. xxviii.

⁷ Sum. v. debitum. n. xiv.

⁸ Neque clamore se defendere—suis propriis membris se defendere sed immota manens nihil agat—etiãmsi de actu ipso delectationem aliquam percipiat, modo neque in ipsum actum, neque delectationem voluntate deliberata consentiret. Nam talis delectatio non esset voluntaria sed naturalis—quamvis quoad forum exterius presumereetur consensisse. Soto, de Just. et Jur. lib. v. q. i. art. v. p. 141; Navar. cap. xvi. n. i.: Graff. l. ii. c. lxxvii. n. x.; Vega in Jo. Sanc. disp. x. n. xvii.

⁹ Credo paucas honestas repertum iri, quæ aliquo modo non resistant, saltem sine clamore, &c.—*Ibid.*

with. Impetuous lust may make the essay upon any without fear of so much as a check or any resistance, and those who are engaged by the laws of nature, God, and man, to make opposition, may innocently give place to it without struggling; yea, they may be chaste enough though they yield to such lust with pleasure, so it be no more than sensual, and these delights be not jumbled together in practice, which in the doctrine of their teachers is sufficiently distinguished and parted for them. They bid fair also to make that uncleanness to which persons are drawn by the power of courtship and insinuation pass as innocent; for they say that is no sin which is involuntary, and that is not voluntary to which we are necessitated; and Cajetan¹ tells us (in a case much akin to this) that our passions, excited by exterior persuasion, do, as it were, offer us violence; after he had informed us that what whores extort by flatteries more than their hire is an involuntary gift, the mind being this way necessitated; and sure flatteries in reference to the act, as well as the reward, may as much necessitate, and make the one as involuntary as the other; further, if man or woman need neither force nor importunity, but be ready to commit uncleanness without more ado, one may without sin invite them to it. Self-pollution is no mortal sin in any that desire it may befall them in their sleep for the ease of nature;² nor is it a sin to be pleased with it when it is past for a good end,³ and so Aquinas, Paludanus, and the common doctrine; nor to be pleased with it as future, if the pleasure do not cause it, nor to be pleased with it when it befalls them awake,⁴ if the pleasure be but sensual, and not rational. Under the favour of this distinction they may act uncleanness, either natural or against nature, and that with delight too; for though the lower faculties take pleasure therein, yet if the superior either check it, or run not into a full compliance therewith, they are safe. They encourage them to venture upon, and continue in, such occasions of uncleanness, as those who think it needful to avoid the acts cannot but judge necessary to be abandoned. They that eat hot meats, such as provoke and cause uncleanness, or otherwise eat excessively, if they do it not with such an intention, but to satisfy their gluttony, or for other cause, yea, though they doubt uncleanness will be the issue of it, offend but venially.⁵ Carnal touches,⁶ used for sensual pleasure, without designing the act of uncleanness or the delight of it (though it be confessed that of all other occasions this leads most directly and most

¹ *Passiones nostræ ab extrinseco suasore illatæ quasi vim faciunt—meretricum blandæ valde extortiones supra debitam mercedem—omnis similis actio causans involuntariam dationem rei suæ quia non minus necessitatur ex hujusmodi humanus animus, &c.—Sum. v. restitut. p. 509.*

Ex sententia Cajetani (et Navarri) sequitur licitum esse invitare ad fornicationem. cum qui paratus est alios fornicari; in Vasq. opusc. moral. dub. iii. p. 24.

² Antoninus, Sylvester, Cajetan. in Navar. in Lopez. c. lxxiv. p. 252, tenent quod ita licet cupere et ita complacere.—Vid. Navar. cap. xvi. n. vii.

³ Ibid. S. Thomas, Paludanus ut communes asserunt non esse peccatum complacere sibi de præterita pollutione ob sanctum finem. Vid. Sylvest. v. pollutio; Post-placencia non faciat præteritam pollutionem esse peccatum.

⁴ Non est autem peccatum mortale, pollutio illa, quæ incipit evenire alicui, dum dormit, et finitur postquam est expectatus, si voluntas superior, sive rationalis deliberata, in illam non consentiat, quamvis sensualitas ea delectetur, &c.—Navar. ibid. n. viii. et Cardin. Turrecremata.

⁵ Non esse peccatum mortale, comedere nimis, aut calida edulia, ob quod pollutio evenit, dummodo non comedat ea eo fine, sed solum ut suæ gulæ satisfaciatur.—Navar. c. xvi. n. viii. Si non intenditur, sed quid tale fiat propter gulositatem aut aliam causam, cum dubio tamen secuturæ pollutionis, esset veniale. Sylv. v. Pollut. Lopez. cap. lxxiv. p. 354.

⁶ Martinus de Magistris, Gabriel, Javellus, Navar, Soto, Nider, Antoninus, et alii in Sanch, l. ix. de matr. disp. xlv. n. vi. et Bonacin. tom. i. p. 318.

dangerously to the consummation of the act), yet are they but venial faults with many of their writers. To go to the place or company where is danger of sinning mortally, by reason of the sights, persuasions, opportunities, or anything of this nature, though it be done without any cogent necessity, is not a mortal sin with them; and the reason is, because it rests in the man's free will not to sin mortally, though such occasions of sinning be offered.¹ Filthy discourse, when it is out of lightness and curiosity, without any other ill design, or when it is merely for the pleasure taken in the obscene talk, without any further intention, is no worse than a venial fault.² The filthiness which the apostle forbids, Eph. v. 4, Bellarmine,³ understanding thereby filthy words, will have it be but a venial; and the same he determines not only of filthy talking, but scurrility; and Cardinal Cajetan⁴ before him, says, in its own nature it is not a mortal sin, though he describes it to be shameless mirth; and Alensis⁵ refers it to lascivious affection; and in Angelus⁶, it is a provoking others to laughter either by idle or obscene words. A woman sins not mortally, who, being moved with the affection of a little vain-glory, without any other deadly intention, does paint or adorn herself, although she believe that some who see her in such a dress will be inflamed with mortal lust, when it is certain also, that without any disparagement or inconvenience, she might abstain from such a garb; yea, though she so trick up herself, that some may be induced to love her honestly but carnally, or with a dishonest affection either, only not beyond the bounds of venial uncleanness.⁷ This being their doctrine, no wonder if Christian purity be abandoned in their practice. Navarre⁸ tells us there is such a deluge of unbridled luxury amongst them who are so near a kin, that he dares not express it; and amongst the married and unmarried, amongst virgins consecrated and unconsecrated, that divine and immense goodness may send upon them a horrible deluge of all calamities, not only corporal, but spiritual. And because it is not lawful for one to take the profession of a nun if she have committed uncleanness before, he says that there are few grown up that without caution can be lawfully consecrated for virgins.⁹

¹ Ire ad locum sive ad societatem, ubi est periculum peccandi mortaliter, propter aspectum, persuasiones, commoditates, aut aliquid hujusmodi, non est ex suo genere peccatum mortale, licet sine urgente necessitate fiat, ad peccatum incautelæ spectet. Hæc est Cajetani, et probatur, quia in suæ libertatis arbitrio restat non peccare mortaliter, etiam præsentibus talibus occasionibus.—*Lopez. cap. xx. p. 112.*

² Antoninus de Graff. Cajetan. et alii in Sanch. *ibid. n. xxxix.* Cajetan. Navar. Graff. Rebellen (in) Bonacin. tom. i. p. 318, n. xviii.

³ De Amis. Grat. l. i. cap. ix. p. 78. Docere volebat tria posteriora (turpia verba, stultiloquia et scurrilitatem) debere quidem esse aliena ab ore sanctificato fidelium, non tamen ex genere suo talia esse, quæ excludant ab hæreditate Christi et Dei.

⁴ Scurrilitas qua homo ad risum provocat inverecunde—non est mortalis ex suo genere.—*Sum. v. Scurril.*

⁵ Secundum Halensem refertur ad lasciviam affectionis.—*Angelus. Sum. v. Scurril.*

⁶ Non peccat mortaliter ab hoc solo mulier, quæ vanæ gloriæ et venialis desiderio tacta, absque alio fine mortali se fucat et ornat, licet credat aliquos, qui ipsam sic fucata et ornatam videbunt, in ejus concupiscentiam mortalem exarsuros. Attamen certum est, eam absque incommodo verecundiæ, et dedecore suo, posse ab hujusmodi ornatu temperare.—*Navar. cap. xiv. n. xxvii.*

⁷ Non autem (peccat mortaliter) si facit illud, ut ametur honeste, licet carnaliter—imo neque si id facit quo ametur inhoneste, sed non mortaliter, ad luxuriam videlicet tantum venialem.—*Idem c. xvi. n. xiv.*

⁸ Cap. xvi. n. iii.—Diluvium tam effrenatæ luxuriæ, etiam inter cognatos adeo propinquos et affines, ut non andeamus exprimere, et inter conjugatas et virginis tam sacratas quam non sacratas, &c.

⁹ Ob quod forsitan paucæ grandiorum sine cautela licite consecrari possunt—*Ibid.*

not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their good works, and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest sacrilege) in their best acts, arrogating that to them which is Christ's peculiar satisfaction and merit. And then, that the charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stolen, is the common opinion.¹ Also, one may steal money from another, rather than he shall venture it in gaming;² for it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another, and that not only in other sins (as friar Joseph would limit it), but such as are intrinsically evil;³ for example, if one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful, a holy act, to beseech and persuade him to commit fornication. Or nearer the matter in hand, if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty, and so persuade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to persuade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a woman, if her husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them to provide for the future.⁴ If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his wife may spend more of his estate than he would do if he were sober or present (Bonacin. *ibid.*). Finally, they all agree, that to steal anything, of what value soever, inconsiderately, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a venial trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore it, by their principles, I understand not; since they hold that no man is bound to make restitution but for a mortal offence.⁵ If in a matter that is weighty, the fault be venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as a small fault, not to make restitution, how much soever be stolen inconsiderately.⁶ By these and such like rules, they have opened a way to make thievery, small or great, practicable, without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars, and those who count good books their treasure, are by their doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, that to take away heretical books from such as have not licence to read them, is no theft (Bonacin. *de restit.* disp. ii. q. viii. punct. i. n. i.); so that it will be no fault at all to rob one of the best part of his library, how valuable soever.

They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to cheating, and like unconscionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things; but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general rule, a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for.⁷ Hence Syl-

c. xvii. n. cxviii. If a man be in mortal sin, his wife may take of his goods privily, and give them away in alms for his conversion.—Bonacin. *de restit.* disp. ii. q. x. punct. ii. n. ix.

¹ In Navar. *ibid.*

² Antoninus quem sequitur Nav. *ibid.* n. v. p. 282.

³ Licet inducere ad minus malum, paratum jam ad majus malum; ut si quis proponit interficere, aut adulterari quis, licet ei persuadere percutere aut fornicari, contra fratrem Josephum, qui limitat hanc sententiam ad peccata quæ non sunt intrinseca mala; sed censeo sententiam hanc generaliter esse tenendam, prout eam tenet Navarrus, et Cajetanus, Lopez, pars. i. cap. lviii. p. 297; Adrianus, Cajetan. Sotus, quos sequitur Navar. cap. xiv. n. xl.

Luxurioso sancte consulitur ut non adulteretur, sed fornicetur. Cajetan. *sum. v. Tyrannis. Medina, Sotus, Adrian existimant*—non tantum licere suadere minus furtum latroni, sed etiam ipsum comitari, imo etiam adjuvare. in Vasq. *opusc. Moral.* p. 24, dub. ii.—Bonacin. *de rest.* disp. i. q. ii. punct. vii. n. ix.

⁴ Sylvest. v. furtum. n. xv.; Navar. cap. xvii. n. cliv.; Graff. l. ii. c. xcii. n. xxvi.

⁵ Adrian. iv. de restit. *sam.* ad viii.; Sylvest. v. culpa. q. iv. in Fill. *tr.* xxxii. n. xxxii.

⁶ Sylvest. et alii *ibid.*

⁷ Justum præteritum reputatur quod absque fraude extorqueri potest.—*Itù, Bannes, Medina, Arragon, Villalobos, Bonacina*, et alii in Dian. i. p. tr. viii. res. lv.

vester concludes it lawful for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can;¹ which, unlimited, gives liberty to all to prey upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value,² though he knows it, and the owner understands it not, for a small matter; nor needs he declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth, since that may be inquired of others.³ They conclude, that false measures and weights may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damnified, and the custom itself to be a corruption; yet they are excused who use them, if they do it for their own security, or for moderate gain, as if in case they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no customers.⁴ So, by their rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea, or the substance of the commodity. Instances hereof we have in Soto. Corn or wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the merchant may sell it by false measure, thereby to get his price.⁵ If a man have very good wine, but people, if they did not take it for Rhenish, would not give so good a price for it, he may sell it at the rate they would give for Rhenish, though it be not.⁶ So he may mix his wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price;⁷ as, for example, in case wine were so dear, that scarce any would buy it at the price it is worth, he may mix it with water, and sell it at the rate they will give.⁸ So cloth or silks may be sold for that of such a country which is most esteemed, though it be of another.⁹ These conclusions, he says, are collected out of Aquinas; and to complete these cheats, he tells us,¹⁰ that if perhaps the seller should lie too, in these cases (for example, if he should affirm that to be Rhenish wine which is not, or that to be pure which is adulterated, or that to be full measure which is short of it, &c.) it would not be a mortal sin. And Sylvester determines, that a man with perjuries and lies, denying the badness of his commodities, or making them better than they are, the lies, if they do not much damnify the buyer, are but venial.¹¹ They allow persons also to deceive those who entrust them to dispose of their estates or goods; as, if one be employed to sell what is another's at a certain price, if he sell it for more, he may keep the overplus to himself; yea, say some,¹² though he had a reward for his pains in selling, yet he may retain to himself the overplus of what is sold.¹³

¹ *Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest—et secundum hoc licet cuilibet carius vendere, aut vilius emere quantum potest.—Sum. v. Emptio. n. x.*

² *Vid. Cajetan.—Sum. v. Emptio. p. 138.*

³ *Emptor non tenetur ei explicite affirmare quantum valet: quum habeat alios, unde possit inquirere et scire.—Ibid.*

⁴ *Tabernarii dantes vini mensuram diminutam secundum Arc. non excusantur: quia decipiunt et damnificant emptores, non obstante contraria consuetudine, quæ est corruptela: nisi hoc faciant ad suam indemnitatem, vel lucrum moderatum: puta, quia si darent plenas, oporteret pretium augere, ut consequenter nullos aut paucos invenirent emptores.—Sylv. Sum. ibid. n. xx.; Vid. Soto, de just. et jur. lib. vi. q. iii. art. ii.*

⁵ *Soto, ibid. p. 198.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Eadem ratione, et aqua possit vinum diluere.—Idem, ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Idem, ibid.*

¹⁰ *Forsan venditoris mendacium in talibus casibus, si aliqui prædicto modo servetur justitia, non est perniciosum.—Idem, ibid. p. 199, quem sequitur in his omnibus, Tol. instr. l. viii. c. xlix.*

¹¹ *Sum. ibid. n. xxii.*

¹² *Si accipit certo pretio vendendum, retinere potest id quo plaris illud venderit, nisi excesserit pretium rigorosum.—Navar. c. xxiii. n. xcvi.*

¹³ *Angel. Sum. in Sylv. ibid. n. xxv.*

Further, Panormitan¹ takes notice, that their canon law allows of deceit, if it be not extended beyond half the worth of the thing bargained for (that is, if a man be not cozened of above fifty per cent. in a bargain). But then, to save the reputation of the law (which he, like a true canonist, says was formed by the instinct of the Holy Ghost), he will have it understood of deceit in the thing, not of fraud in the persons, and others after him; but Sylvester, who sees no ground for that, uses another shift: he says it may be understood, either of deceit in the thing or fraud in the persons, which their law tolerates, but approves not.² Cajetan grants so great deceit is lawful by human constitution; but says, it is condemned by the law of God.³ And so we leave this shameful deceit, lawful by the pope's decrees, but damnable by God's word.

Sect. 9. Let us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in popery, or those that profess it; and whether their rules tend not to leave neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness and lying in words and deeds. A lie, as they define it, is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others.⁴ Now they teach that to deliver what is false,⁵ if not on purpose, though it be without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such as needs not be regarded, unless where it is in testimony or upon oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by), because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then a perfect lie, with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent, if it be for pleasure or in sport,—*ridentem dicere falsum quis vetat?*—to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury to please himself or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell lies when he list, out of mere pleasure to be telling lies;⁶ yea, or out of malice,⁷ (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, they have warrant enough for the most complete and perfect lies, when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others,⁸ how much soever truth be injured, or others deceived thereby. So that their true catholics need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words, when the excluding of it from both will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know that, in these cases, they are never to be trusted, either in matters of conversation or religion. This being their principle,⁹

¹ Dicit etiam Panormitan quod jura Canonica permittentia deceptionem usque ad dimidium, intelligi debent quando venit deceptio re ipsa, in Sylv. *ibid.* n. ix.

² Ego dico quod loquitur in foro contentioso, sive deceptio sit ex re, sive ex dolo: non quia illum approbat, sed quia tolerat.—*Ibid.*

³ Jure humano dicitur licitum decipere citra dimidium justii pretii: sed lex domini immaculata est, &c.—*Sum.* v. emptore.

⁴ Aquinas, ii. 2, q. cx. art. i.

⁵ Si dicatur falsum sed desit voluntas dicendi falsum—non est mendacium proprie aut perfecte, et si diligentia esset adhibita, non esset peccatum, et si non sit adhibita, est veniale, ii. 2, q. ii. c. homines in Sylv.—*Sum.* v. mendacium. n. i.

⁶ Quod sit sola mentiendi libidine quod procedit ex habitu: nam mendax ex eo quod talis est secundum habitum ipso mendacio gaudet, iv. Ethic.—reducitur ad jocum, cum sit delectabile mentiendi. Idem *ibid.* nec mendacium erat mortale ut in jocoso et officioso, *ibid.* n. iii.

⁷ Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus esse veniale peccatum ex malitia: ut si quis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione hujus mali, quod est vane mentiri, et non propter aliud.—*Cajetan.* *Sum.* v. malitia.

⁸ Officiosum (mendacium) quod sine alicujus injuria dicitur, ut alicui prosit, et hoc etiam est veniale.—*Cajet. ibid.* v. Mendac.

⁹ Lex de non mentiendo jocose aut officiose sine damno alterius—(ejus) transgressio est solum venialis, secundum omnes Catholicos.—*Navar.* c. xxiii. n. v.

received by all catholics, and universally acknowledged, we need not wonder that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to shew false relics, to divulge false visions and revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious writings, to corrupt the monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them, to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth. For all this falseness is officious; it serves the interest of the church; it is to commend her doctrine, and to maintain her authority over men's consciences, and it does the world no hurt; for it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her doctrine, and subject themselves to her authority. Now if the rest of mankind, Jews, Turks, heathens, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for truth than these catholics; if upon their supposition (that their way was the best) they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsify any records against them, who sees not that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledge of it? Yet this practice with the Romanists (so great friends are they to truth) is but a venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a great piece of piety to make lies for their religion, as some of themselves do acknowledge it has been accounted.¹ To proceed, there are five or six several sorts of lies (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth) which they may make their practice without danger.² It is the pernicious lie only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is against justice; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless, withal, it be against justice; and a lie (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself,³ and in its own nature, be more than venial, but only by accident, when it so falls out that it does mischief. And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies. There will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature, and by accident they may do hurt alike. However, considering that truth and their religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that these have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious lies need be shunned, yet not all of this sort neither; they give liberty to tell mischievous lies, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals; or though ye do the greatest mischief that can be done,⁴ yet, if you did not intend it to be great, or if you should not or did not observe and consider that it would be so, in such cases even pernicious lies will be harmless venials. They may, by their rules, lie to the prejudice of others in soul, body, or estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but *when* it will be great, their casuists cannot well determine. This is not confined to a point; there is a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left

¹ Fuerunt qui magnæ pietatis loco ducerent mendaciola pro religione confingere. Ludovicus Vives, et Espensæus.—*Com. in Tim.* l. i. c. xi. p. 156.

² Sylvest. *ibid.* n. v.

³ Mendacium si aliâ non habet maculam quam falsitatis, non est genere suo mortale; patet, quia neque est contra religionem (Romanam) neque contra justitiam.—*Soto. ibid.* l. v. q. vii. art. iv. p. 168.

⁴ Mortalis autem est omnis, et sola illa, quæ fit animo notabiliter nocendi in bonis spiritualibus aut temporariis, quamvis non noceat, et illa quæ fit nocendo notabiliter, aut dando causam ita nocendi sine tali animo, advertendo tamen, aut advertere debendo per illam notabiliter nocere, aut causam notabilis nocimenti dando, alias non, quamvis injuria gravissima sit juxta mentem. S. Thom. declaratam utroque per Cajetan.—*Navar. c. xviii. n. i.*

to discretion; and if he do much mischief instead of little, the liar cannot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? And how can they think that any injury done by lying can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with lies in point of religion? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying; so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce.¹ To use lies, says de Graffius, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal; but he is confuted by the common judgment of their doctors, who hold that a venial, how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal. We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once; this they may do daily and continually, and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernicious lie, which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.

Others teach that lying is venial in trading: for example, if one affirm falsely that his wine is so many years old, or of such a country, which, if the buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided, all circumstances considered, it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less (*Bonacin. de contract. disp. iii., q. i., punct. ii., sect. ii., n. vii.*); or if the sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the buyer to a rigorous price; by thus lying, for the most part, they sin but venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution; because such lies are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of buyers, who affirm (falsely) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offered them for less, that they may get it at the lowest rate (*Idem ibid., disp. iii., q. i., punct. iv., n. xxxi.*) after others; yea, if they not only lie, but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great damage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in common conversation, or in commerce, yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in judgment and courts of judicature, since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in judgment is destructive of human society, and tends to throw the world into confusion. Notwithstanding, they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases; I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lie in court, if the end of it be but delight,² is harmless; also, witnesses may lie there seriously, if they do it not as witnesses, and in matters judicial;³ and the judge too,⁴ if he lie not as a judge. Further, they may bear false witness in favour of another;⁵ a false testimony for

¹ Mendacis uti eo fine in venditione, ut pervenire possit ad justum pretium, vel ipsis uti tantum ad decipiendum in modico, peccatum veniale est, quamvis illis assidue utatur: licet Hostiensis dicat esse mortale, si assidue fiat, quod falsum est, quia veniale de se, quantumcunque multiplicetur et continuetur, nunquam fit mortale, ut doctores notant, &c.—*Goff. l. ii. c. cxviii. n. x.*

Excusari tamen à mortali eum qui utitur amphibologia in contractu cum juramento, &c.—*Idem. tom. ii. disp. iv. q. i. punct. xii. n. vii. ubi Sayrus et alii.*

² Durandus et Sylvester.—*Ibid. n. v.*

³ Navar. secundum Cajetanum, cap. xviii. n. iii.

⁴ Mortalia sunt iudicis ut sic mendacia, reliqua sunt per accidens et ideo venialia.—*Cajetan. Sum. v. Mendac.*

⁵ Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi, non est mortale: neque adeo quando

my neighbour is not mortal with them ; and the reason is, because the precept forbids false witness *against* another, not *for* him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lie is venial, whether it be for or against another. So Navarre,¹ and in him Ledesma (whom he calls the glory of the Dominican order), with Soto (of the same order and no less renown), maintain that no lie is mortal in any court exterior (that of the judge) or interior (that of the confessor), which is but venial out of court ; so that if the lie be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a witness in a trial before a judge in the face of the country. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the liar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A lie, says Sylvester,² in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal, because it subverts the truth of judgment, which tends to the ruin of the universe. But then he adds, this is to be limited to things in which the liar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no, not in courts ; and in all these, by their common doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only), either they may lie plainly, or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of judgment) secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Antonius Corduba determines, that a person otherwise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which confessed might endanger him, he and the witnesses too, if they cannot otherwise evade (by saying, I know not, or I remember not),³ may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, to *discover it unto thee*, and says, such interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words in usual form ;⁴ so that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navarre holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case, denying that to be done which was done, secretly meaning, *in such a month* ; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and Lopez⁵ after him. Sylvester⁶ concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the accused not subject to the judge, in this case mentioned, or any

dicitur, ut idem impediatur injuriam facere: quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum Præceptum, Ex. xx. sub illa forma constituitur; Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium.—Soto, ibid. l. v. q. vii, art. iv.

Victoriæ visum est non esse damnandum de mortali falsitate—qui ut suum tueatur innocentiam, utitur testibus se ultro offerentibus ad testificandum. falsum jurando. —Vide Lopez. pars. ii. c. xliv. p. 264.

¹ Concludendo nullum mendacium esse mortale, eo solo, quod, in judicio exteriori, vel interiori dicatur, quod extra illud dictam tale non esset.—Navar. cap. xviii. n. iii. Censeo in judicio mendacium circa rem ad id pertinentem levissimam tamen contingens, non esse mortale crimen quod—ostendunt. Domin. a Soto, Covarruvius, Navar. Graff. l. i. c. xiv. n. vi. et l. ii. c. cxliii. n. vii.

² Mendacium de his quæ ad judicium pertinent est perniciosum et mortale : quia subvertit veritatem judicii, quod tendit in perniciem universitatis, quod limitatur quantum ad ea, in quibus qui mentitur, tenetur dicere veritatem, non aliter.—*Ibid.* n. iii.

³ Liceret sibi et testibus injustè interrogatis sic respondere, (quando tunc respondere *Nescio, Non recordor* non prodesset), Non furatus sum, intelligendo, ad jure revelandum tibi.—alias tenemur per verba, et modos assuetos, licet æquivocos, injuste interroganti respondere.—Lopez. cap. li. p. 264.

⁴ Angel. Sum. v. Confess. n. i.

⁵ Intelligendo intrase quod isto vel illo mense non fuerit res furatus—Navarri opinio testimoniiis Gabriel Adriani, Paludens et Vincent. Justiniani, rata habetur.—*Ibid.*

⁶ Quum juridice non procedat, vel quia accusatus non est ei subjectus simpliciter vel in hoc casu, aut quacunque alia causa, tunc licet mendacium sic illicitum, non est tamen mortale. Immò non erit etiam veniale, si respondendo cauteloze, et ut aiunt Sophistice, dicat aliquid falsum, apud sensum judicis, et apud suum verum ; quia eo casu

other cause whatsoever, though a lie be not lawful, yet it is not mortal; yea, it will not be so much as venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the judge's sense,¹ and true in his own, since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense; and alleges Henricus de Gandavo, with his reason for it. Soto allows him to use equivocation. Cajetan permits him to deny his complices though he had them. If the judge demand of a priest upon oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession?² Aquinas, and all the doctors conclude that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, because he knows it not *as a man*; and according to Vervellus, if he cannot otherwise decline the judge, he may answer he knows nothing, with this inward reserve, *as a man*; and in this Richard. de Sancto Victore, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Panormitan agree; yet Angelus thinks, when he swears he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, *to discover it*, because it cannot be denied, but that he knows it *as a man*;³ but this, says Sylvester, is said against the judgment of all his doctors, and against the canon law, understood according to their common doctrine, because the priest is there said to know it *as God*. This needs no aggravation; a priest rather than speak the truth (though the discovery of it may be necessary to secure a prince or a nation from ruin),⁴ may with mental reservation delude authority and blaspheme God, and lie and swear falsely in open court; and be justified in all, by the authority of the chief saints and doctors that church has had, and such as she gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.

But, though truth suffer so much by them in civil things, it may be she may find sanctuary in their divine offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations; no, even there she is prostituted before their altars, in their pulpits, and at their penitential tribunals; their liturgies have been stuffed with fables, and lies made both the ground and part of their public devotion; their own writers⁵ take notice of plain lies recited in their daily prayers.⁶ And what store of them there were in the whole, we may guess by a part. Peter Abbot of Cluny⁷ declares, that in a church-hymn in praise of Saint Bennet, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all, yet he found cum non sit ejus subditas, non tenetur dicere veritatem ad ejus intentionem. Rationem dictorum assignat.—*Hen. de Gan. Sylv. Sum. v. accusatio. n. x.*

¹ Licet ei uti æquivocatione, Soto de just. l. v. q. vi. art. ii. Adrian dicit, talem reum posse dicere Non feci, et Cajetan. Opusc. xvi. q. v. Dicit posse respondere se non habuisse complices, quamvis habuerit, in Tol. Instr. l. v. c. lviij.

Non tenetur respondere etiamsi jurasset dicere veritatem, secundum Henr. de Gand. —sed dicetne mendacium? Resp. quod non, sed utetur aliis verbis duplicibus et simulatis.—*Angel. Sum. v. Confess. n. i.*

² Quid si judex instat, vel exigit juramentum à sacerdote an per confessionem sciatur aliquid de tali facto? Et dico quod secundum S. Tho. et omnes doctores, sacerdos si ab eo quæretur, de aliquo absente, an aliquid sciatur quod audivit in confessione, jurare potest, se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo—secundum Verrec, si alio modo iniquum judicem declinare non potest: respondere potest se nihil scire, quia subintelligitur ut homo—et consentit Rieh. Bonav. Scot. et Pan. Sylvest. v. confessio iii. n. vi.

³ Quod ejus dictum est contra omnem doctrinam suorum doctorum et contra C. Si sacerdos. intellectum juxta communem doctrinam: quia ibi dicitur sacerdos hoc scire ut Deus.

⁴ Certum est obligationem hujus precepti tantam esse, ut in nullo casu, et propter nullum finem, etiam pro tuenda tota republica ab ingenti malo temporali aut spiritali, violare illud liceat. Ita docent theologi omnes contra unum Altsiod; tenet D. Tho. S. Bonav. Richard. Scotus, Durand. Palud. Major. Capreol. Gabriel. Alensis. Adrian. Medina. Viguer. Sylv. et alii summistæ, omnes Pet. Soto, Domin. Soto, Navar. Covarruv. Simanca. Cajetan. Ledesma. in *Suar. tom. xxxiv. disp. xxxiii. sect. i. n. ii.*

⁵ Vid. Espenc. com. in 2 Tom. c. iv. digr. xxi.

⁶ Nuper Raphael. Volateranus, ausus est scribere dolendum, aperta in horis Canonicis legi mendacia.—*Ibid. p. 424.*

⁷ Nosti quantum me pigeant falsa in Ecclesia Dei cantica, quantum nugæ canoræ

twenty-four lies at least. Some reformation hereof was thought requisite, for shame of the world ; but though the old sore smelt noisomely even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any ; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, lest nothing at all of the old service should be left. Melchior Canus (a bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of Trent, where he sat) acknowledged, some years after, that there are things read in their church-service that are uncertain, counterfeit, frivolous, and false too ; but yet he thought it not advisable to have this thoroughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account, want prudence ; they cure a sore nail, but mischief the head ; they bring in grave stories instead of what were false, but they change the church-service so far from what it was, that scarce any show of the old religion seems left in the daily prayers, whereby he lets us understand what their old religion or religious service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lies or forgeries were left therein. Another learned bishop of their church, who survived the Trent Council, and all the orders there made for reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there, but of something worse too, in these words : If the Bishop of Lyons,¹ says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their missals and antiphonaries, were now alive, and did behold them, oh, with what terms would he set them out ? for our prayers are defiled with most filthy corruptions ; but the rest will admit of no reformation through the fault of the bishops. He signifies that there was something worse in their service-books than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff which that ancient bishop, Agobardus, corrected in the old missals and antiphonaries ; declaring expressly that their prayers now were polluted with most filthy corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them in the pulpit, though that (where it bears any sway at all) is its throne. A preacher may lie, by Cajetan's leave,² if he does it not as a preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty, and lying when he is preaching, will be but venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lie in the pulpit if he can do it wittily, he may mix his sermons with false stories,³ (if they be facetious) to please his auditory, that is commonly a venial.⁴ He

mihi odibiles, inter quas, nam plurimæ sunt—mendacia ad minus xxiv. canticum id, citato percurrans animo, reperi.—*Ibid.* p. 423.

In res sacras hanc quoque mentiendi licentiam irrepisse, seu potius aperte invectam esse.—*Ludovic. Vives*, l. ii. de corruptis artibus, *Esper.* in 1 Tim. digr. l. i. c. xi. p. 166.

Quæ in Ecclesia legi solent—quanquam nonnulla ex his incerta sunt, apocrypha, levia, falsa.—*Loc. Theol.* l. xi. c. v. p. 911.

In his prudentia desideratur. Quidam namque dum redivium curant, capiti incommodant, videlicet historias graves pro apocryphis reddunt quidem, sed divinum Ecclesie officium usque eo præter solitum immutant, ut vix ulla antiquæ religionis forma in quotidianis precibus relicta esse videatur.—*Ibid.* p. 910.

¹ Episcopus ille Lugdunensis quia dixit se in missalibus et antiphonariis superflua, levia, falsa, ridicula, blasphemæ phantastica multa correxisse ; si nunc viveret et ea conspiceret, Deu immortalem ! quo ea nomine depingeret ? sunt (enim) preces (nostre) turpissimis mendis consparcatæ : com. in Tim. i. l. i. p. 157.—*Esper.* in the words of Lindanus.

² Sum. v. mendacium, p. 437, Omne mendacium predicatoris contra veritatem spectantem ad predicatoris officium (est mortale)—quoniam hæc tantum sunt predicatoris ut sic—mendacia reliqua sunt per accidens, et ideo venialia : nisi ratione scandali aliud occurrat censendum.

³ Quæritur utrum sit peccatum mortale predicatori mentiri in ambone ? et dico quod non, in eis quæ non spectant ad doctrinam, puta, sidicat aliqua jocosa.—*Sylv.* v. Mendac. n. iv. ; *Graf.* l. ii. cap. cxliii. n. v. ; *S. Thom.* in opus. iv. precept. viii.

⁴ Immiscere predicationi facetas fabellas delectandi gratia quod B. Ambrosius reprehendit, quia non debent, in tam gravi actione de rebus tam arduis qualia sunt

may tell a tale in his sermon,¹ or anything ridiculous, if he do it with some wit, this is commonly no worse than venial; no, nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lie too, as a serious divine, and instil false doctrine into the people, without any fault but what is venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so Summa Angelica, and Rosella, with others, conclude.² They limit it, indeed, to matters under counsel, but this does not much straiten them, for practical divinity being the most proper subject for sermons, and virtues, with Christian duties (and the opposite sins), being, by their common doctrine, in a manner all reduced to counsels, some way or other (as we have shewed before); they have liberty enough left them to do nothing else but lie instead of preaching. But in any matters of divinity whatsoever, speculative or practical, enjoined or but advised, they may lie at as easy a rate, if it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger and design of doing signal mischief.³ Their practice publicly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some show of modesty and caution. Sylvester takes notice of those who held it was no mortal sin to lie in the pulpit,⁴ and acted accordingly, and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lies as the people would smell out. But this cautiousness was not always thought needful; he that reads the legends, which served the people heretofore for sermons, will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false, as may fully convince him that the spirit which acted them was seven times worse than that which inspired Ahab's prophets; and where they are now disused, it is not with any acknowledgment that such notorious lies were not fit to be preached, but for shame of that part of the world which they could no longer delude and abuse. And, even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their priests since, have this testimony from one of their own doctors: The law, says he, is perished from priests; for history they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lies; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of devils.⁵ That such doctrine should have some confirmation is no more than needs; they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) Espencæus calls, devilish prodigies. And false relics, or miracles, they allow to be shewed or published;⁶ it is not a mortal sin with them, divina verba, immisceri jocosa et ridicula. Communiter tamen est hoc veniale.—*Cajetan.* sum. v. predicat. p. 481.

¹ Qui concioni fabulam et facetias, aut aliquid ridiculum miscet, peccat quidem juxta S. Antoninum et Cajetanum, sed communiter non plusquam venialiter, juxta eundem. imo non semper venialiter, ut cum ad hilaritatem honestam breviter dicuntur, ut tradit Augustin. *Triumphus.*—*Navar.* c. xxv. n. cxlii.

² In pertinentibus ad doctrinam tenent. Sum. Angel. et Rosell. quod non sit mortale, nisi ratione scandalii vel contemptus doctrine annexi: vel nisi in his quæ sunt de necessitate faciendæ, intellige etiam omittendæ, secus si ex consilio.—*Sylvest.* v. Mendac. n. iv.

³ Peccat qui mentitur in materia fidei, sacræ scripturæ vel morum—quod limitat Cajetanus, non procedere quando id fit per solum multiloquium, vel alias sine animo et periculo nocendi notabiliter.—*Navar.* c. xviii. n. iv.

⁴ Credunt non esse mortale mentiri in ambone, nisi ut illi dicunt, predicant maximas falsitates, quæ deinde à sæcularibus deprehenduntur.—*Ibid.*

⁵ Verum lex perit à sacerdotibus; recitant pro historia fabulas, pro seriis joca, pro veritate mendacium,—pro virtute Dei fictitia miracula, ne dicam portentia Dæmoniorum.—*Espencæus*, Serm. i. De officio pastorum.

After he hath premised something of the preaching and writing of false miracles, he adds: At facilis Angeræ stabulum, quam talibus fabellis multorum tum libros, tum conciones repurges, in 2 Tim. c. iv. digr. xxi. p. 424.

⁶ Peccat qui utitur falsis reliquiis aut veris, causa turpis quæstus. *Navar.* cap. xvii. n. clxix.; Graff. l. ii. c. cxxxiv. n. xxx. Idem dic de illo, qui utitur falsis reliquiis, si causa turpis quæstus fiat, id est, eo fine aliquod accipiendi pro ostensione earum.

unless it be done for filthy lucre, and it is not filthy lucre, if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain.¹

And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation that they will be restrained from lying, unless in their sacrament of penance, that is, in their account, the holiest rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech. Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect. One would think, in this act, at least, they should count themselves obliged to be far from such a crime as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears that truth can in no wise be fastened to any part of their religion, they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them where they will not find a place for lying and deceit, and that wherever they have liberty of speech they must have leave to lie. It is the common doctrine that they may lie in confession,² which yet they say is directed principally to God, and they look upon the confessor's chair as the divine tribunal. The confitent may deny that ever he committed those venial sins which he is guilty of,³ or affirm he is guilty when he is not,⁴ or he may deny either venial or mortal sin to his confessor, if he be not sufficient.⁵ Or he may deny that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed, if he has confessed them to another.⁶ And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him, and looks upon him as God and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before). To this purpose, when their purpose is too shameful to be made known to a sober priest, a person may have two confessors;⁷ one a lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins, denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their confessors with plain lies, so likewise with equivocations. Joh. Sanchez (no Jesuit) offers us several instances (Select. Disp. ix.) He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it, if he think his confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the confessor would not absolve him if he con-

¹ Navar. *ibid.*

² Angelus, v. Confess. Sylvest. v. Confess. i. n. ix. Nav. c. xxi. n. xxxvii. Graff. l. i. c. xiv. n. vi. Covarruvius. Pet. Soto in Victorell. p. 530. Bannes, Salonijs, &c. in Fill. tr. iv. n. xlv. alii in Suar. tom. iv. disp. xxii. sect. x.

Circa eas circumstantias, quæ nullo modo pertinent ad materiam confessionis—non est peccatum mortale miscere aliquod mendacium, sive affirmando sive negando; sed est veniale gravius quam esset simile mendacium extra illum actum. In hoc conveniunt omnes doctores citandi (viz. Richardus Paludan. Bonavent. Cajetan. Ledesma, Armilla, Angelus, Sylvest. Soto, Navar. Pet. Soto).—*Idem. ibid.* iii. et vi.

³ Navar. *ibid.* n. xxxvii. Soto in opusc. de secret memb. ii. vii. Sylvest. *ibid.* Est certum mentiri in materia non necessaria negando factum, non esse peccatum mortale, in quo etiam omnes conveniunt quos statim referemus (viz. jam laudati).—*Suar. ibid.* n. iv.

⁴ Mendacium affirmativum de peccato veniali—non esse peccatum mortale per se loquendo, hoc est secluso scandalo et contemptu, tenet Angelus, Sylvest. Soto, Petrus, Soto, Navar.—*Idem. ibid.* n. vii.

⁵ Sylvest. *ibid.* vel affirmando.—*Idem in Suar. ibid.* n. x.

⁶ Non peccare mortaliter, ut diximus, confitentem negantem se admisisse peccatum mortale, alias legitime confessum.—*Navar. ibid.* n. xxxviii.

⁷ Unde sequitur non peccare mortaliter eos, qui ne suam existimationem honestam amittant, confessorio cuidem familiari suo confitentur omnia peccata sua, etiam obscena, et postea alteri probo et gravi solum leviora, quod de se non est malum, et si finis venialis fuerit, peccatum veniale erit, et si mortalis, mortale, et si bonus, qualis frequenter est, sanctus et probus, immo interdum necessarius. *Idem ibid.* n. xl.; vid. Sylvest. *ibid.* n. viii.; Bonacina (et in eo Victoria cum alijs), tom. i. disp. v. q. vi. sect. ii. punct. ii.

fessed it, may with equivocation deny it is his custom ; to this sense, I have no such custom, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present, n. vii. ; yea he may deny it, though he believe the priest would absolve him, n. viii. Also he that is in the next occasion to sin, which he cannot avoid without great inconvenience or scandal, may, using equivocation, deny it, n. ix. Or if the penitent be known to the confessor, who well understands that he has a sister with whom he commits uncleanness, not removed out of his house, and so will not believe but he is in such occasion to sin, he may feign himself to be another, changing his voice, habit, name, country, and the like, without plain lying, yet using equivocation (n. x. after Navarre) ; yea, though he be a religious person he may do thus, and deny his order with equivocation (*Ibid.*). And as the penitents may thus delude their confessors, so they may have their satisfaction on them, and delude them likewise ; pretending to absolve them when they neither do it nor intend it (*Idem.* disp. xxxv. n. i., n. vii. and viii. ; *Antonin. Dian. resol.* v. equiv.). Let the world judge where we may be assured of truth and honesty in Romanists, that walk by these rules (which the holiest of their doctors give them), since they think not themselves obliged thereto in any of the cases specified. If by their doctrine they may without danger be false to private persons, to magistrates, to their priests, to their God, where can they have credit ? If they may practise lying and deceit in common conversation, in commerce, in doctrine, in worship, in courts of justice, and before that which they count God's tribunal, where may they be trusted ?

Sect. 10. They give as much liberty to violate faith as truth, and no less encouragement to perfidiousness and breach of promises ; either where faith is engaged mutually, as in compacts and agreements, or singly, as in solicitations. They distinguish perfidiousness as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a pleasant perfidiousness, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious. To be perfidious merely for delight is venial ; to deal perfidiously, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless ; and they have ways enow to make that which is pernicious pass for innocent. Cajetan gives this reason why the two former sorts of perfidiousness are but venial : because from a simple promise no duty ariseth but that natural duty of not telling a lie ; for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved ; and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity ; and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind.¹ One would think those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and human society, should for this reason rather judge both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter. To make a promise without an intent to be obliged, is but venial,² if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it intends not to perform, though he make others believe so, nor to be obliged to it by that which should engage any one who has faith and honesty ; and yet offends but venially. If all men should take the liberty which this rule gives Roman catholics,³ human society would disband ; all confidence on

¹ Perfidia quidem jocosa et officiosa venialis ; quoniam ex simplici promissione non nascitur majus debitum, quam sit naturale debitum non mentiendi : nam utrumque debitum est debitum morale, sine quo morum honestas salvare nequit : et ad eandem virtutem reduci creditur, scil. ad virtutem veracitatis : et utrumque ad alterum est, pro convictu, utilitate et conversatione humana.—*Sum. v. perfidia.* p. 460.

² Navar. c. xviii. n. vi. ; Sylvester, v. pact. iv. ; Angelus, *Sum. v. pactum.*

³ Nisi fide stet republica, opibus non stabit.—*Liv.* iii. doc. l. i. Fides hæc non solum ad justitiam attinet, verum est ipsissimum justitiæ fundamentum.—*Cicer.* i. de off.

promises and assurances vanisheth, thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which Navarre, after many others, determines elsewhere, does it more fully. He that promiseth anything outwardly without any intention to promise, if he be asked whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise that was obliging, and he may swear it too.¹ He may promise, and yet not intend to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lie; and swear that he did it not when he did it, and so be perjured innocently, because he promised as a perfidious knave. Sylvester inquires, whether one by a promise alone or a compact be obliged in conscience? He answers he is bound, under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters;² signifying that in other matters it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And Navarre expresses their common opinion when he tells us, that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be venial.³ But why should perfidiousness be a crime in great things and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice; great wrong is done, and so by accident perfidiousness becomes criminal;⁴ from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of injustice, is no crime; a man may be as treacherous and faithless as he will, if he be not withal unjust too, there is no danger. And so the world must believe that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness; as if those who may by their rules without scruple be false and faithless, will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin, though they confirm the promise with an oath or a vow.⁵ Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an oath be added not to revoke it, yet it obliges not, but may be revoked without mortal sin. (*Panormitan. Jason. Rebullus et alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. iii., q. xii., punct. ii., n. i. and iii.*) Yea, if it be made in the form of a vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God, too, it does not oblige him (*Idem. ibid., n. ii.*). And how can it be expected they should be faithful as to any engagement to man, who think they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concerned, either as a witness (in oaths) or as a party (in vows)? Well, but when the matter is of great importance may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact, may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent venial? Yes, they have ways enough ready to make this current at so easy a rate. The worst perfidiousness in the world may be excused from mortal

Periret convictus humanas et fides, si sibi persuaderent hominus, in promissis frangere fidem, et verba dare non esse genere suo plusquam veniale.—*Lopez. p. ii. c. xxx.*

¹ Qui promisit exterius aliquid absque intentione promittendi, si interrogatur, an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo, se non promississe promissione obligante, et sic etiam jurare. Vid. Navar. in c. *humanæ aures* xxii. q. v. q. i. et ii. pro hac doctrina adducit S. Thom. Scotum, Paludan. Ricard. de Sancto Victore. Major. Adrian et alios.

² Quæritur utrum ex sola promissione sive ex pacto, quis obligetur in conscientia: et dico quod sic, sub peccato mortali, in rebus scilicet alicujus importantiæ.—*Ibid.*

³ Nec violatio promissæ rei exiguæ erit mortalis, quamvis venialis sit. c. xviii. n. vii. Soto, Canus, Victoria, Sylvester, in Lopez. pars ii. c. xxx.

⁴ Quando non per se est perfidus, non incurrit mortale, nisi per accidens, hoc est, propter notabile nocumentum seu scandalum.—*Cajetan. v. perfidia.*

⁵ A mortali excusantur qui—parva pollicentur (et non implent) etiamsi juramento, aut voto id ipsum confirmassent, secundum eos quos sequimur (viz. Antonin. Sylvest. Soto).—*Navar. c. xviii. n. vii. c. xii. n. x.*

guilt, according to Cajetan, through ignorance of the fact, or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him to whom he is engaged (the good nature of one party concerned may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause which he thinks reasonable.¹ He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth and faith, not only when there is some reasonable cause, but when there is any that seems but so to him, when anything will seem so to him who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to license a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us a man is not obliged to perform promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby, yea, or if he had a mind to dissemble (to feign that he is engaged when he did not mean it); for, says he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command which of itself would oblige him; as for example, if he had promised clothes to his father, and he is now starving for cold.² In such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster if he had not done the thing though he had never promised it! He tells us elsewhere, that a promise does oblige when it is made to a city, or an university, the clergy, the church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like; but if there be no cause it does not bind, though it be made to those fore-mentioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides those, though there be cause for it.³ Others⁴ maintain that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus, and Rosella, with others. So that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly done, and may be always); though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under venial guilt. (*Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid., n. xii.*) Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no otherwise, may break any promise without any more than venial guilt, whether the matter be small or great which is promised (*Ibid., n. xii.*). Lopez, that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite that he who makes it should have a mind to be so bound by it; and so in promising (as he says), unless there be an oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual, they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal

¹ Excusatur à mortali—ex parte formæ, hoc est quia non per se, seu ex intentione peccatum illud fit—sed ex oblivione, aut ignorantia facti, aut ex fiducia quam accipit de eo cui promissit, aut ex causa quæ sibi videtur rationalis.—*Sum. v. perfidia.*

² Est theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum se obligandi; secus si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fingendi: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex præcepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestia, et frigoribus alget.—*Ibid. n. iv.* Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur sub pœna mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quæ ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligandi se.—*Angel. Sum. v. pactum. n. iv.*

³ Utrum autem quis obligatur ex pollicitatione? et dico quod sic, quando pollicetur civitati, universitati, clero, ecclesiæ, vel pauperibus alicujus loci, et ex causa: puta, ad honorem Dei et hujusmodi: secus si fiat prædictis sine causa: vel aliis à prædictis etiam cum causa: quia non obligatur, nisi prætextu promissionis aliquid cæperit.—*Ibid. v. pollicitatio.* Ità et eisdem verbis.—*Angelus. Sum. v. pollicitatio.*

⁴ In Sylvest. *ibid. v. pactum. n. iv.*, Promissio sive pactum obligat in conscientia—hoc autem *Sum. Ang. et Rosell.* et est limitatio *Coll. quem sequitur Panor.* quando ex-

sin; and by this, says he, a multitude of scruples is removed.¹ And he says true, for hereby a man may without any scruple break any promises that are not under his hand or oath.² But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his oath or writing? Why, then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that he who promises in word, without mind or intention to oblige himself, is not bound in conscience to perform it;³ and this is their common doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed are more than sufficient to excuse men from all faith and honesty in contracts and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiousness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruin human society; and to render Roman catholics less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than sober heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity than those which bid defiance to it.

Sect. 11. Hitherto, thus much of deceit and lies, in word and promises, &c. Hypocrisy is a lie indeed; both are equally sinful. Aquinas,⁴ after some of the ancients, asserts that it is all alike to lie in deeds as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signify and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cozen another, so he be but cheated, as it is all one whether you kill a man with a sword or an axe, as they express it; and both by their doctrine are made venial. Sylvester inquires whether to make a false show of sanctity be a sin?⁵ He answers that if it be for the honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin; but if it be to palliate his own wickedness, and that he may be accounted good, then it is a sin, because it is a false ostentation of sanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him is no sin; either both must be acquitted, or neither. So Cajetan⁶ will have it to be evil, though the end be good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common doctrine, that bare hypocrisy, when one feigns he is good and is not, or better than he is, is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lie,⁷ and be designed to deceive

¹ Ut sit vera requiritur primo quod adsit animus in promittente, dum promittit, obligandi se ad mortale. Et sic inter promittendum, nisi adhibuerit iuramentum promissionis confirmatorium, vel scripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non se censeant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur scrupulorum multitudo.—*Pars. ii. cap. xxx. p. 175.*

² Promissio obligat nisi non habuisti animum te obligandi, sed solum proposuisti facere.—*Navar. Garzias in Sa. v. promiss.* Vix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, nisi juret aut faciat instrumentum.—*Idem, ibid.*

³ Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo et intentione se obligandi caret, non fit reus in conscientia obligationis promissi.—*Idem, ibid. p. 176.*

Secundum communiter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promissione obligatur, nisi qui habuit animum obligandi se.—*Angel. Sum. v. pactum. n. iv.*

⁴ Paria esse factis aut verbis mentiri, vid. Navar, cap. xviii. n. viii.

Non solum in verbo, sed etiam in facto, mendacium consistit, cum in utroque sit eadem intentio fallendi, uterque æqualiter peccat, quia verbum et factum assumuntur ut instrumentum fallendi: nec refert quantum ad peccatum, verbo, nutu, vel facto mentiri; sicut nec quantum ad homicidium, uti gladio vel securi.—*Sylvest. Sum. v. mendacium, n. v.*

⁵ Sum. v. simulatio n. iv. Ut pallietur iniquitas, et ipse bonus putetur, quod est peccatum—ad honorem Dei, et proximorum ædificationem—et hoc non est peccatum.

⁶ Si finis ille sit bonus (puta, ad ædificationem aliorum) nihilominus peccatum est, quia non sunt facienda mala ut bona eveniant.—*Sum. v. hypocrisis. p. 340.*

⁷ Solummodo intendit simulare se bonum seu meliorem quam sit, et hoc hypocrisis si nuda sit, licet non sit peccatum mortale, est tamen peccatum, quia mendacii vim habet.—*Cajetan, ibid. Sylvest, ibid. Navar. c. xviii. n. viii.*

others,¹ otherwise it would not be so bad as a venial.² Although he delight in thus playing the hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving show for an evil end,³ to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God), such vain glorious hypocrisy will be no worse; for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled, yet the double sin is but a single venial. And if he do those works which are naturally ordained for the service of God with an intention not to serve him,⁴ but for glory from men, it is but such hypocrisy, and that with some extenuation; it is not so bad explicitly, seeing the intention to deceive is but implicit. They have a reverence for hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great saints from their holy hypocrisy. It is amongst the commendations of Saint Dominic himself. Vincentius, Bishop of Beauvois, in his praises, spends one chapter upon this subject, *de sancta ejus hypocrisi*, shewing that it was not only the practice of their saint, but that he commended the holy thing to his brethren, the friars predicant. Hypocrisy being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest saints, no wonder if they be so far from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. A religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits (so Rosella v. Hypocr. n. i.) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shows of sanctity or mortification amongst them, since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious even for their religious to deceive others, with hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the Romanists are concerned to speak favourably of hypocrisy, and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their dealings with men, and make no more than exterior shows of piety (if so much) needful in the worship of God, and yet would be accounted the best or only true Christians on earth; if they should condemn hypocrisy as a mortal sin, that religion and righteousness, which their church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves as damnably criminal.

Sect. 12. Disgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the canon law such are called murders; yet) is allowed under the notion of a venial in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto may satisfy his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. It is a maxim with them that the quality of sins in words is regulated by the

¹ *Facere opera quibus bonus appareat, cum non sit, sine intentione ostendendi se bonum, non est etiam veniale, juxta mentem omnium.—Idem, ibid.*

² *Alias erit veniale, puta, cum in ipsa fictione delectetur,—magis vanus videtur quam malus.—Sylvest. ibid.*

³ *Si autem finis ille sit vana gloria, non tamen ita quod in ea ponatur ultimus finis, peccatum est veniale quidem sed duplicatum.—Cajetan, ibid.*

⁴ *Qui opera ad Dei servitium naturaliter ordinata (ut sunt jejunium, oratio, eleemosyna) facit ex intentione non serviendi Deo, sed ob gloriam humanam, hypocrisis peccatum incurrit formaliter, implicite tamen.—Cajetan, ibid. p. 341.*

Nonnunquam etiam fratres suos admonuisse, ut aliquam ostenderent virtutis apparentiam in abstinentiis, vigiliis, verborum ac gestorum disciplina, quum apud sæculares essent; et sic eos sancta quadam hypocrisi, ad fidei reverentiam, et virtutis amorem propensius invitarent.—*Specul. histor. l. xix. c. cv.*

intention.¹ It is this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality (which Cajetan often inculcates); and without that they are no sins, or but venial. Hence he tells us that the contempt of our neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him; for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that backbites, that he may backbite; and no man is formally contumelious but he that speaks reproachfully that he may reproach.² So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally and in deed. Accordingly he tells us that materially (*i. e.* without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is venial.³ It is true, some of them say words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withal they allow of such reproaches as venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but venial. All agree in this, says Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit and small judgment, to call him a fool, or an hermaphrodite, or a bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French disease is but venial, because that is no great disgrace. (Pet. Navar. Sairus, et alii communiter in Bonacin. *ibid.* n. ix.)⁴ Also to charge him falsely with any wickedness which they count venial.⁵ Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsely as a blasphemer, a thief, a liar, a perjured person, a cheat, &c., since they count these in many degrees venial; and if they be consistent with the honour and reputation of Roman catholics, yet others, either Christian or heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to revile one in such terms as may signify either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful, or anything whatsoever which may denote either the natural inclination and first motions or the outward acts, this is not mortal, because the hearers are to put the better construction on it.⁶ And here is liberty enough to calumniate in such terms as may ruin any person's reputation, upon a presumption that all who hear the slander will be always so wise and good as any rarely are. Or if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but venially, be-

¹ Aquinas, et Alexander Alensis, in Sylv. Sum. v. contumel. n. ii.

² Hinc patet quod contemptus proximi est peccatum mortale formaliter loquendo, hoc est ex intentione contemnendi. Nullus enim formaliter contemnit proximum, nisi qui spernit proximum ut spernat proximum: sicut nullus detrahit formaliter, nisi qui detrahit ut detrahat, &c.—Cajetan, Sum. v. contemptus.

³ Materialiter (hoc est non ex intentione dehonoriandi) possunt verba contumeliosa etiam absque ullo peccato dici.—*Ibid.* v. contumelia, Soto de Just. l. v. q. x. art. ii.

⁴ Lib. xi. c. vi. n. iv.

⁵ Detegere falso defectus naturales, puta quod est luscus, claudus, mancus, gibbosus, ignarus, et alia hujusmodi, quæ non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale.—Navar, cap. xviii. n. xxiii. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. ii. q. iv. punct. ii.

⁶ Imponere vel detegere veniale, non est de se mortale.—*Idem*, Navar, *ibid.* n. xxiv. Sylvest. Sum. v. detractio n. ii., non esse mortale in his quæ sunt modicæ importantiæ, ut venialia quæ communiter non infament secundum Antoninum, et Angelum, Sum. v. detract. n. ii.; Pet. Navar, Arragon. in Bonacin. *ibid.* n. vi. et alii communiter.

⁷ Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quæ et pro mortali et pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus, superbus, avarus, iracundus, vel hujusmodi, quæ sumi possunt et pro naturali inclinatione et motu primo, non peccat mortaliter; quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpretari.—Sylvest. secundum Antoninum, *ibid.*; Angelus, *ibid.*; Graff. l. ii. cap. cxxxvii. n. xxvi; Pet. Navar, Sairus, Arragon, et alii communiter in Bonacin. *ibid.*

cause you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already;¹ as if, when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds and despatch him, when life and fame are of like account; or you may charge those falsely for committing a crime when they did it not, if it hath been their practice before;² or you may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known;³ as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stolen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a heretic you may charge him with anything, since with them nothing is worse than what they count heresy. Or you may accuse others of any wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of, as some young men of fornication, and others of adulteries.⁴ Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation, for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men; or you may do it in jest, with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly;⁵ then it is a virtue with those who learn their divinity of Aristotle rather than the apostle, and think if a man hath wit he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do it out of levity or pleasure in tattling, unless the words be so exasperating as to occasion some other deadly evil;⁶ or it may be done by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them as reported by others;⁷ or when the defamer is not believed, or gives no just cause of belief;⁸ or for correction, for they may defame others to amend them and reform them by making them worse than they are.⁹ Or through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferior rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever;¹⁰ or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others, to defame them is absolutely lawful, *eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet Adrianus in Soto, ibid. q. x. art. ii.* Or (to add no more) if one accuse others whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true, they may charge him with false crimes; this will be no worse than a venial fault (*Bannes, xxii. q. lxx. art. iii. p. ii.*) Thus, as in other cases, so

¹ Si ille cui dicit habebat eum pro scelerato: quia jam infamatus erat apud eum de aliis, et si non de isto.—*Angelus, ibid.* Idem est in mortalibus notoriis, secundum Archiepiscopum, quia non læditur fama jam læsa.—*Sylvest. ibid.*

² Mentitus est meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale.—*Graff. ibid. n. xxii.* secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suam existimationem illa non esset infamia.—*Ibid.*

³ Idem esset in criminibus mortalibus etiam occultis, si sunt minora notoriis, sicut non est infamia notorio homicidæ et furi, quod sit fornicatus.—*Sylvest. ibid.*

⁴ Si sunt personæ quarum famam simplex fornicatio in nullo lædit, ut juvenes sæculares—quod simile est de adulterio apud multos.—*Graff. ibid. (juxta Cajetanum) n. xxviii.*

⁵ Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. iv. Ethic. c. viii., eatenus est virtutis Eutrapeliæ, quatenus intra limites moderatæ facetiæ continetur: quando scil. urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest.—*Soto de Just. l. v. q. ix. art. ii. p. 172.*

⁶ Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa, si propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum veniale.—*Idem, ibid. q. x. art. ii.; Cajetan, Sum. v. contumel.*

⁷ Idem esse (veniale) secundum Scotum, quum ex loquacitate dicuntur infamatoria recitative.—*Sylvest. ibid. Cajetan. in xxii. q. lxxiii, art. ii.*

⁸ Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita fides.—*Graff. ibid. n. xxiii.*

⁹ Nec qui per fraternam correctionem aliquem infamavit, et ad majorem emendam, &c.—*Idem, ibid. n. xxiv.; Soto, ibid. q. ix. art. ii.*

¹⁰ Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelæ defectus, plurimum, consuevit esse veniale, ut sæpe inter mulierculas contingit, et homines infimæ classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspargunt, ut in buccam veniunt.—*Soto, ibid. Graff. ibid. n. ix.*

when anything is said or writ to the disparagement of their church or themselves, how justly and truly soever; if they fix upon the authors the most odious imputations that can be invented (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastened upon Luther and Calvin), and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein, yet they incur no fault thereby that a good catholic need fear or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuits, but the common doctrine of Aquinas his disciples, as Ledesma, a Dominican, assures us; and so we may spare those more than twenty doctors, which, Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their church, than such persons will be trusted in a court which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxim they have as good as set themselves upon a pillory, and done that justice to the world as to fix this inscription upon their own foreheads, We are they who declare it no crime to calumniate most odiously and falsely whoever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our church. These are some of their methods for destroying the honour and reputation of others, without any fault which they regard; they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself,¹ not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted; thus to impair or utterly ruin his own credit, is but regularly a venial fault, according to Adrian and Setus and others; for prodigality is but a venial, and this is but to be prodigal of one's credit.

Sect. 18. Flattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practise under the notion of a venial. To praise one for the virtue which he has not, or the good that he does not, is little or no fault.² To extol the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent; yea, when a man is to be praised for a good work, though you know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his soul, yet you should not desist, but may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruin, because (says Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by divine mercy.³ To applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless, when it is out of a design to please the sinner without ruining him, or to gain some advantage by such flattery;⁴ so that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will

¹ Detegere propria peccata vera et secreta, et imponere sibi falsa, suo genere et regulariter non est nisi veniale; quamvis per illud notabiliter fama lædatur, aut omnino amittatur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, et multo ante Adrianus sensit. Navar. cap. xviii. n. xxvii. et xxiv. et xxviii. Prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. et detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas famæ.—*Ibid.*

² Est adulatio prima, quando quis adulatur, vel attribuit alicui bonum virtutis, quod ille non habet. Secunda quando nimium vel ultra debitum extollit bonum, quod habet, et utrumque istorum est veniale.—*Graff. decis. pars. ii. l. iii. c. iii. n. v.*

³ Quum aliquis debet ex officio aliquem de bono aliquo opere laudare, etiamsi si sciat laudatum in superbiam mortalem se elaturum, non tenetur propterea desistere à debito officio: potest tamen et debet deponere hujusmodi scientiam de futura ruina illius, quia duodecim horæ sunt diei, et potest in instanti homo illuminari, et mutari à divina misericordia.—*Cajet. Sum. v. adulatio.*

⁴ Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquam utilitatem consequendam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet.—*Cajetan, ibid. Graff. p. 1, l. ii. cap. cxxxviii. n. i., clxi.; Aquinas ii. 2, q. cxv. art. ii.; Sylv. v. adulat. n. iv.*

they scarce count it a fault. There is no more hurt in giving flatterers reward and encouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be a mortal sin?¹ and in him Aquinas answers No, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a god, or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress is praised for faithfulness to her husband, that scandal may be avoided and others deluded by a good opinion of her.² And so we may understand how the praises of the church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others, he may curse them at as easy a rate, for it is but a venial fault to curse in words³ (if not from the heart) any thing, any person, one's own father not excepted; to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to wish God's curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the devil might have them.⁴ And when he is at it he may curse the devil too. It is no sin at all if it be for his fault, and gives the devil but his due.⁵ Cursing may be one's usual practice as innocently.⁶ It is scarce so bad as a venial, when cursing is used for honest recreation.⁷ And he may curse the irrational creatures or the elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man, in these cases it is only a venial fault.⁸

Sect. 14. I have been long in viewing their account of venial sins; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification, will excuse me. They venture hard to leave in a manner no mortal sin, and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest by what they determine concerning those few sins which they style mortal or capital; they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly venial; in others of them they state the mortalness so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness which is not rare and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the mortalness, and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.

¹ *Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortale? et dicit S. Thom. ii. 2. q. clxviii. quod non: nisi nimis appetitus vanæ gloriæ—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei et non hominis laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis et cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quale adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis veniale, &c.—Sum. v. adulatio. n. vi.*

² *Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quæ de fidelitate laudatur, quum eo intaitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent, scandalum evitetur.—Graff. l. ii. cap. cxxviii. n. ii.; Navar. cap. xxiii. n. xiii.*

³ *Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parentes filiis, et coloni, et muliones bobus, et mulis.—Idem, ibid. n. cxvii.*

⁴ *Vid. Soto de Just. l. v. q. xii. art. ii.; Navar. ibid.*

⁵ *Peccat qui maledicit diabolo ratione suæ naturæ, quia illa bona est, et a Deo facta; secus si ratione suæ culpæ, et tradit S. Thom. modo nec plus nec aliter quam meretur.—Idem, ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. maledictio.*

⁶ *Quum malo usu hujusmodi profert et est veniale peccatum.—Cajetan. ibid.*

⁷ *Contingit tamen inquit (S. Tho.) quod aliquando sit veniale—vel propter affectum proferentis, dum ex levi motu vel ludo—taliter verba profert, quia peccata verborum ex affectu pensantur.—Sylvester. v. maledict. n. iii. Sit veniale—quod ex levi motu seu lusu.—Soto, ibid. Aliquando etiam culpa veniali carere possit, ut si fiat joco et ludo, vel causa recreationis honestæ.*

⁸ *Si poenitens dicat se maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa, interrogare debet confessarius maledixeritne ore tantum, vel ore et animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum.—Graff. l. ii. c. lxxii. n. iii.; Navar. ibid. n. cxvii.*

Covetousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious; yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice, it is shrunk into a harmless venial. Covetousness, says Cajetan, simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not *against*, but *besides* charity.¹ To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either as it is opposed to liberality or to justice; as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine it is but a venial fault; so the same cardinal, As it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a venial sin.² Thus Navarre,³ and Sotus,⁴ and all after Aquinas.⁵ So that by their doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly, so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life, yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice, which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a venial fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice,⁶ it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods, or detains what he has unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins, yet it will stand there as a cipher, and signify no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as hell or the grave, and penurious as the worst of misers can be, yet if he be not withal a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there is no guilt upon him that he need regard. In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime.⁷ They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing. Injustice added to an act, otherwise lawful, will make it criminal, and this vice will be no crime upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? They would seem to say so sometimes, but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable. I have shewed before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming⁸ they encourage under the favour of venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is venial,⁹ though it be not only of an ordinate, but of an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end be lucre, and so that which is only for recreation be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular doctors, but seems to be the persuasion of them all; for, says Navarre, we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the con-

¹ Simpliciter et absolute non est peccatum mortale ex suo genere, quia non est contra, sed præter charitatem.—*Sum. v. Avaritia.*

² Ut contrariatur liberalitati, et sic significat inordinatum appetitum pecuniæ: et sic communitur est peccatum veniale.—*Ibid.*

³ Cap. xxiii. n. lxx.

⁴ De Just. l. iv. q. v. art. ii. p. 112.

⁵ 22 q. cxviii. art. iv.

⁶ Qu. 'justice'?—*Ed.*

⁷ Ut opponitur justitiæ, et sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiendi seu retinendi alienum, et est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, fures, latrones, negotiatores fraudulentos, &c., avaros dicimus.—*Cajetan. ibid.*

⁸ Qu. 'gaining'?—*Ed.*

⁹ Multi ludo, qui recreationis causa licitus et sanctus est, abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale.—*Cajetan. sum. v.; Ludere. p. 410; Navar. cap. xx. n. iii.; Lopez. pars. ii. c. xxxi. p. 183.*

fessors absolve them, though they signify no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it.¹ And such gaming is allowed, even that which they call diabolical,² in any place, though in their account sacred;³ at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted which will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the mass; or in any person, even their cloistered pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their prayers. Lopez inquires (*an licitum sit ludere preces sacras*) if it be lawful to play at prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navarre seems to approve it, part ii. c. xxxii.; so does Bonacina after Navarre, Rebellus, and others, De restit. disp. ii. q. iii., punct. i. n. viii., and not only at *Ave Marys*, but other prayers also, and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, *Ibid.* To say nothing that their clergy and monks may be spectators of games, and shows that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it, and yet offend but venially.⁴ They teach further, that it is not needful to restore what is wickedly gained.⁵ Sylvester, after others, says, that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain) is not necessarily to be restored, it is but matter of counsel.⁶ But he that hath lost much at unlawful games may take another course for his satisfaction; for pope Adrian and others allow him to steal it from him that has won it, *Vid. Lopez, ibid.* Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay what he loses; or if he have bound himself by oath to pay it, not only the pope, but any bishop may release him from the obligation of his oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navarre, Corduba, Sotus, Penna., et alii in Bonacina, *ibid.*, punct. iii. n. ii. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received anything for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a judge for passing an unjust sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of woman for prostituting themselves, or an assassin for murdering, or a rogue for firing houses or towns, all are comprised in this conclusion, that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any.⁷ Only (for the encouragement of covetous-

¹ In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videmus magnam pecuniarum summam, et maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, et a confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi, absolvi; quod facere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccarent.—*Navar. ibid.* n. xi.

² Quæritur utrum et quomodo ludus diabolicus alearis sit peccatum? et dico quod hic ludus non est peccatum, vel est veniale quum luditur aliquid modicum, &c.—*Sylvester. sum.* v. ludus. n. iv.

³ *Navar. ibid.* n. iii.

⁴ Peccat clericus vel monachus qui ludum mortaliter malam spectat, si multo tempore spectat, secus si parvo.—*Navar. ibid.* n. xiv.

⁵ Nullus tenetur cum famæ periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia.—*Cajetan. v. restit. Navar.* c. xix. n. xc. (Tol. l. v. c. xxvii.). This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commodum non potest.—*Cap. xvii. n. lvi.*

⁶ Non tamen necessario tale turpe lucrum est restituendum; secundum Rodofred, sed de consilio solum.—*Sum v. Emptio*, n. x.; *Vid. Lopez. ibid.*

⁷ Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ita ut ab utraque parte admittitur turpitudine, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angelus, Sylvester, (in) Navar, c. xvii. n. xxxvi. et n. xxx. Sensit Thom. et Cajetan, quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis (et idem dicet de datis et acceptis ob alia quæcunque crimina), quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus *Vid. Vasq. opusc. moral.* p. 134, dub. ix. n. lxxxiv.

ness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored; but if the wickedness be done, the villanous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the judge that receives a bribe for a false sentence, if he pass a just one, he is obliged to restore, but not if he make an unjust award.¹ And a witness, if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it, but not for a false deposition.² He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him, but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a fact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, *Idem ibid.* n. v.; *Pet. Navar. et alii*. So an astrologer, who takes money for telling things which he cannot know but by the help of the devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the devil's assistance therein, because that diligence and pains (with the devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the devil, is bound to restore, *Pet. Navar. et alii cum Bonacin. ibid.* n. x. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice or without it, though they say what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor; yet it is a rule with them that restitution to the poor, in this, and other cases, is only a counsel, not a command,³ so that he who is hired to do villany may restore what he received to the poor, if he will, but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villany, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour,⁴ but also hardness of heart against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in their distress (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent as its cause, no worse than venial, unless when one is obliged under pain of mortal guilt to afford relief.⁵ And when is that? Only in extreme necessity,⁶ when the starving man may sell his own child to get bread;⁷ or when it will be lawful to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing;⁸ or when he may be compelled by law to part with something;⁹ then his heart must relent so far as to let go what he cannot keep; but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life need be embittered with one act of charity; he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange or to lend; yea, he may be excused from either giving or lending,¹⁰ if it be but likely that any other may do it.¹¹ In fine, this

¹ Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, et recte judicavit, &c., datori. et non pauperibus restituendum est; ut doctissimus Medina, efficaciter probat.—*Navar. ibid.* n. xxx. p. 295, et c. xxv. n. xlv.

² Peccat qui mercedem accipit, ut verum testetur, cum obligatione restituendi ei qui dedit; et qui accipit, ut falsum testetur, sine tamen necessitate restituendi. Vid. *Bonacin. de restit.* disp. i. q. iii. punct. ii. n. vi. et punct. iii. n. viii.

³ Est regula Vervecelli, recepta à S. Antonino, Angel. Sylvest. et ab aliis plurimis, quod restitutio, quæ non est facienda alicui certæ personæ, sed pauperibus, non debetur ex præcepto, sed solum ex consilio.—*Navar. ibid.* c. xvii. n. xxx.

⁴ Cajetan. sum. v. inquietudo.

⁵ Per duritiam cordis, et inquietudinem mentis peccant qui non subveniunt pauperi, quoties tenentur de precepto obligante ad mortale—alias enim hæc venialia tantum sunt.—*Navar. c. xxiii. n. lxxvi.*

⁶ *Idem.* cap. xxiv. n. v.

⁷ Vid. supra.

⁸ *Idem ibid.* n. xcv.

⁹ *Idem.* c. xxiii. n. xcv.

¹⁰ Glossa communiter recepta.—*Ibid.* n. lxxiv.

¹¹ *Idem.* c. xxiv. n. v.

unmercifulness, which admits no compassion for the distress of others, is scarce ever mortal, unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confess it as a sin.¹ How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and liberality, become those who cry up themselves as the sole assertors of the necessity of good works?

But that they may not be partial, they shew themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extreme: pure prodigality is no mortal sin, because it is a less fault than covetousness, contrary to liberality, which is manifestly of itself no mortal sin; and the reason of both is, neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it; so Cajetan and others.² So Navarre: prodigality (including both that of a man's credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin;³ and this after Aquinas.⁴

Sect. 15. Pride is another capital crime; they style it the queen of mortal sins;⁵ but then they will have it advanced so high before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it. And so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, and such as is rarely found, must pass for venial. In Aquinas it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him and his will; not upon other accounts (to wit, desire of pleasure or profit, &c.), but out of contempt;⁶ so Cajetan also, and others after him.⁷ Navarre says they make it an actual contempt of being subject to God; and adds, thanks be to God, this is but found in few Christians, though all are truly proud.⁸ So that mortal pride, by that account which the oracle of their school and his followers give of it, is rarely to be found in the Christian world. It is questionable whether Scotus did count that pride mortal which Aquinas judged to be so; he says, few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it.⁹ However, Cajetan ventures to tell us what pride is venial, and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: He that shews himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the apostle says, What hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received? whereby glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it. Likewise when one is so affected as to be secure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is lost, or wonders that he is

¹ Quia hæc fere nunquam sunt mortalia nisi conjungantur aliis actibus mortalibus, non sunt necessario confitenda, quia satis est confiteri illa mortalia, quæ per predictam duritiam et inquietudinem admittuntur.—*Idem*, c. xxiii. n. lxxvi.

² Prodigalitas non est mortale peccatum si pura est: quia minus peccatum est, quam avaritia liberalitati contraria; quum si pura est, constat non esse mortalem. Et utriusque ratio est quia neutra, agit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi, sed præter illam.—*Cajetan*. Sum. v. Prodigal.

³ Cap. xviii. n. xxviii.

⁴ xxii. q. cxx art. ii. et iii.

⁵ Ipsa vitiorum regina, superbia.—*Gregor*. moral. xxxi.; Aquinas, ii. 2, q. clix. art. viii.

⁶ Ex parte aversionis superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis homo à Deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter desiderium cujuscumque alterius boni. Sed superbia habet aversionem à Deo ex hoc ipso quod non vult Deo et ejus regulæ subjici—cujus natus est Dei contemptus.—*Aquin*. xxii. q. cxlii. n. vi.

⁷ Sum. v. superbia, vid. Sylvest. v. superbia.

⁸ Requiritur uterque Thomas communiter recepti ad ejus essentiam actualem contemptum subjiciendi se Deo et legi ejus—cum id (Gratia Deo) pauci Christiani faciant et vere omnes aliquo modo superbiamus, c. xxiii n. v. certe paucissimi Christiani, &c. n. vi.

⁹ Quilibet tenetur vitare omne peccatum mortale, tamen non tenetur scire in quo gradu superbia est peccatum mortale, quia nec multi experti sciunt.—*Scotus*, in St. Clar. Probl. xv. p. xciv.

not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride, because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spy in his mind or fancy the defects of others, or to excuse his own naughtiness and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride, when he will have himself to be great as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the heavenly country, for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming or scarce awake, has a fourth kind of pride; for he presumes he is a heavenly citizen, a friend of God, a son, a member, when such negligence and carelessness are no evidence of his favours, the love of God, where it is, producing (those) great things. And likewise in reference to his neighbour's crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience, not enduring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, do shew that the man thinks better of himself than he is, &c.¹ So great a litter of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then strokes all gently over, calling them venials. These, says he, and many others, are a sort of imperfect pride, and are commonly venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others.² Yet (that we may be the more amazed to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins, he adds, hinder spiritual life exceedingly, being of the stock of pride, when it is written that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full height, Aquinas out of Gregory,³ and others after both,⁴ give an account of it in some particulars. The prime are these: When one thinks that good he has is from himself; when he thinks that what he has from God is for his merits; and when he boasts that he hath what he has not.⁵ If their great Azpilcueta could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and con-dignity before him, either his sight failed him, or his church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, where this is part of a creed.⁶ To make up one article of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only church. Seriously, finding so many of their authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their doctors, but the most infallible of their bishops, I have wondered why they did not either make that none of their faith or this no such sin. What *salvo* they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not; but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that sounds like the worst of pride), they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is, says Cajetan,⁷ frequently venial, when without

¹ Sum. v. superbia.

² Sunt autem hæc et multa alia, quæ imperfectæ sunt superbiæ, communiter venialia peccata propter imperfectionem actus, dum per modum passionum occurrunt absque injuria Dei et proximorum. Impediunt autem hujusmodi peccata valde vitam spirituales: utpote ex genere superbiæ existentia: quum scriptum sit, Superbia Deus resistit.—*Ibid.* p. 548.

³ xxii. q. cxlii. art. iv.

⁴ Angelus, v. superb.; Sylvest. v. superb.; Navar. c. cxiii. n. vii. alii communiter.

⁵ Secundum hoc sumuntur duæ primæ superbiæ species, scilicet cum quis à semetipso habere æstimat quod à Deo habet, vel cum propriis meritis sibi datum desuper credit.—Sic est tertia species superbiæ, cum scilicet aliquis jactat se habere quod non habet.—*Aquinas*, *ibid.*

⁶ Credere id (viz. predicta) in genere est actus—infidelitatis.—*Navar.* *ibid.* n. viii. In universali dicere—bonum aliquod habere à se et non à Deo, vel suis meritis, hoc pertinet ad infidelitatem, et est mortale peccatum infidelitatis.—*Angel.* Sum v. superbia.

⁷ Est autem frequenter venialis arrogantia dum absque prejudicio proximi æstimat

prejudice of others a man values himself as having more knowlege, or goodness, or authority than he hath; and again, It is a sin, but it is not mortal, unless when it usurps against God; as the king of Tyre, when he said, I am God (now none are observed to do this except the pope, who has the law in his own hand), or against others by tyranny (which is so odious as all disclaim it; and affecting it is no worse than affecting to kill men without consent, which with him is not deadly¹), or unless it be made one's ultimate end (which none will own). Accordingly, Angelus determines that arrogancy is commonly a venial fault, unless upon the account of something else that is mortal, as when it arises from mortal pride; but that (as he and others define it we heard before) is scarce to be found amongst Christians.²

Sect. 16. Ambition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the church too has reason to judge it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins may be imputed to it; but the church of Rome and her champions are concerned not to think so ill of it, *stilo curiæ*, in the sense of the court it may pass for venial. Angelus inquires whether ambition be a mortal sin? He answers negatively, it is not so simply, but may be so in respect of its end, and so may anything in itself lawful be, if its end be criminal; or it may be so, if the thing affected be a crime, but that is accidental, and still ambitiousness, the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds if the honour and power affected be lawful. Thus Cajetan, he will yield it more than venial,⁴ when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a god; accordingly, it is resolved by Sylvester,⁵ with Navarre, regularly an inordinate appetite or greediness of honour exceeds not the bounds of a venial fault.⁶ Indeed, if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable, two cardinal virtues had been concerned, and, which is more, the Vatican throne, both in its foundation and supports.

Sect. 17. Vain glory is another capital crime in their account, and pregnant with many others. They define it to be an inordinate affecting of human glory, and yet determine, that an inordinate affecting of praise, or favour, or honour, or reverence, or glory, is but regularly a venial sin;⁷ only it may happen to be mortal in some case, as when one would inordinately have glory from others for a deadly end, or for a mortal sin, or that which he makes his last end; in all other cases this capital evil is but a slight fault. According to their common doctrine, Cajetan will have it to be mortal then only when one glories in mortal sin⁸ (but to glory in venials they count it a small fault), or sets his ultimate end in vain glory. Angelus⁹ collects out of

quis se plus scientiæ, aut bonitatis aut authoritatis habere, quam habet. Sum. v. arrogantia. Peccatum est quia contra rectam rationem est. Sed mortale non est nisi vel id quod sibi usurpat, sit contra divinam reverentiam: ut Rex Tyri, Ego Deus Sum. aut contra proximum: ut tyrannis, vel finis ultimus in hujusmodi elatione ponatur.—*Ibid.*

¹ *Ibid.* v. vovendi condit.

² Utrum sit mortale peccatum? Resp. quod sic, quum ex tali superbia vel contentione fit quæ sit mortalis—alias communiter peccatum veniale erit.—Sum. v. arrogantia.

³ Utrum ambitio sit peccatum mortale? Resp. quod non simpliciter sed pro ratione finis—vel secundo ratione rei quæ appetitur.—Sum. v. ambitio.

⁴ Non est autem mortale peccatum, nisi vel ex parte rei in quæ appetitur honor: puta, si quis vult honorari ob crimen aliquod; vel ex parte finis—quia vult haberi ut Deus.—Cajetan. v. ambit.

⁵ Sum. v. Superbia. n. vii.

⁶ Quamvis regulariter, appetitus inordinatus honoris, non excedat metas culpæ venialis, cap. xxiii. n. xv.

⁷ Appetitus eorum etiam inordinatus regulariter est venialis, &c.—*Idem ibid.* n. ix.

⁸ Solum peccat mortaliter, qui gloriatur de aliquo quod est peccatum mortale: secundo qui ponit suum finem ultimum in gloria humana.—Sum. v. glor. van.

⁹ Colligo ex Alex. in ii. 2, et Thom. ii. 2, q. cxxiii. et Henr. de Gandavo in quod

Alexander and Aquinas, that vain glory of itself imports not anything contrary to the love of God or man. Aquinas himself says, that if love of human glory, though vain, be not perfectly repugnant to charity, it is not mortal.¹ And Sylvester delivers this as the sense of their oracle, that the desire of vain glory in its own nature is not mortal.² Angelus concludes, that this may be a man's end in all things but the Scripture and the sacraments;³ but this limitation is too strict in the judgment of their doctors which are of greatest repute: for they determine, that he who does those things which are principally instituted for the honour and worship of God, and the salvation of souls, for vain glory as his chief end; as for example, he that in preaching, or praying, or celebrating, makes vain glory his principal end, and aims at nothing higher, sins but venially.⁴ Angelus had made it worse, but others had confuted him effectually, and Navarre after them. Aquinas, the angel of their schools, was, it seems, of this persuasion, that vain glory may be actually our principal end in worshipping God, without any mortal sin: for Sylvester tells us, that Angelus did contradict, not only the truth, but St Thomas, in saying it is a mortal evil, when those things which were ordained for the glory of God, are done principally for a man's own glory, as the sacraments and the Scripture.⁵ And they are highly concerned to maintain this, for, says he, if this were a mortal sin, the whole clergy in a manner were in an ill condition;⁶ he means they were in a state of damnation: so that it was high time for the Roman doctors to form a divinity of new maxims, since those of Scripture and antiquity left them in a damnable condition. One would think, that to count it but a *peccadillo*, to make vain glory the cause or motive without which a man would not preach, or pray, or perform any worship, should be a prodigious thing for any that calls himself a Christian; but he that will allow it, under no greater censure than that of a petty fault, to be the principal end of worship, and the great concern of salvation, advances it higher.⁷ He that takes a church living or spiritual benefice, principally for honour or temporal profit, offends but venially, unless he be unworthy because of his ignorance or other defect.⁸ So that in their church, for any or all of them, from the pope to the meanest officer, to make honour and profit their chief end in taking the charge of souls,

1. i. q. xxiv. Quod vana gloria de se non dicit aliquid quod sit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi.—*Sum. v. van. glor. n. i.*

² Inanis gloria non est mortale peccatum, nisi charitati perfecte adversatur.—*Aquinas, ii. 2, q. cxxxii. art. iii.*

³ Intendit ergo S. Tho. quod appetitus vanæ gloriæ ex suo genere non sit mortale.—*Sum. v. van. gl. n. ii.*

⁴ Si aliquid aliud quod non pertinet ad divinam scripturam vel sacramenta propter gloriam faceret, peccaret venialiter.—*Sum. ibid.*

⁵ Navar. cap. xxiii. n. xiii. supra. Quamvis eximius vir ille Angelus teneat, concionari, missam celebrare et alia principaliter divino cultui dedicata facere propter honorem aut inanem gloriam, esse mortale, contrarium tamen tenendum est, ut latissime demonstravimus. Idem c. xxi. n. xl. vide Soto, in Suarez. supra.

⁶ Contra S. Tho. et veritatem dicit quod est mortale quando ea quæ ordinata sunt ad gloriam Dei quis principaliter facit ad gloriam suam, ut sacramenta et Scripturæ sacræ.—*Sum. v. van. glor. n. iv.*

⁷ Alias si is qui gloriatur de sacris vestibus, aut cantu divinorum, vel conditione theologica, actualiter nullum alium finem intendens, peccaret mortaliter, totus pæne clerus esset in malo statu.

⁸ Vid. Navar. c. xx. n. xi. et c. xxi. n. xl. et c. xxxiii. n. ci.

⁹ Peccat qui accipit beneficium ecclesiasticum spirituale principaliter propter honorem aut utilitatem temporariam; secundum S. Antonin. Quod limito procedere in eo qui est eo indignus ob ignorantiam, vel alium defectum. Nam supra diximus, quod falsum est esse mortale facere ordinata ad cultum divinum principaliter ob bona temporalia.—*Idem, c. xxiii. n. xv.*

or other place or employment, which concern the worship of God, or the the salvation of the people, is so slight a thing as needs never trouble them ; ten thousand faults of this nature, ten thousand times over, would never hazard their souls. These two last conclusions will help us to discern of what complexion popery is, upon what it is founded, for what ends they may think it safe to maintain it, and persist in it, without or against any conscientious or spiritual consideration : and why they may make religion all along serve a worldly interest and truckle under it. There is no danger in all this ; it is a harmless venial by their doctrine, to thrust the great God and his glory into an inferior place, below their honour and profit, even in those things which they say were principally instituted for his sovereign honour ; this is a fault with them next to nothing. If they should, in the worship of God, aim at him in the first place, and at their own glory and profit in the next, there might be some danger lest they should too much oblige him : for thus to join God and their carnal interest together, as their end in any religious concern, is a meritorious act, according to Aquinas.¹ Further,² vainglorious boasting, though it be with irreverence to God, and injury and scandal to others, if that be not much, is only venial, according to Aquinas and Alensis. And a man may vaingloriously praise himself for something that is good, though it be false, or something that is evil, if it be not deadly,³ and yet offend but venially, when he does no great mischief to others.

Sect. 18. Aversion to, or grief at, spiritual and divine things, is another capital crime in their reckoning, which is called *acedia*. The object is God, as to man's friendship and communion with him, and the spiritual acts and duties requisite thereto ; the act they express by sloth, and loathness to meddle with these things, coldness, tepidness about them, not caring for them, nauseating and accounting them a grievance. This some of them do not deny to be a mortal sin, but they will have it mortal only upon such strange terms, that any one may have a great aversion for God, and the things of God, without danger of deadly guilt ; for they define it by an aggrievedness at what is spiritual and divine, *quatenus est divinum*, as it is divine, and not otherwise ;⁴ not because it is laborious or troublesome to the flesh, or any impediment to its pleasures, which are Aquinas's words ;⁵ but under that formality, in that it is divine, as his followers understand it.⁶ So that the greatest disaffection to spiritual things, if it be because they are unsuitable to corrupt nature, not agreeable to the flesh, its ease and pleasure (which is the common and ordinary cause of it), if it be not on an account that rarely falls out, as they acknowledge, and which a man can scarce ever deliberately be subject to ;⁷ it brings him not under this

¹ Nullum autem peccatum, immo meritum est, facere illa principaliter propter Deum, vel quia honesta sunt et sancta, et secundario propter gloriam, vel laudem humanam in finem aptum relatum.—*Idem*. *ibid.* post Sanctum Thomam.

² Peccat qui per jactantiam se aut suos laudat cum irreverentia notabili Dei, aut cum injuria vel scandalo proximi notabili : alias enim solum est veniale juxta S. Tho. receptum. Alexand. Alens.—*Idem*. *ibid.* n. xvi.

³ *Idem* *ibid.* n. xiii. Cajetan. sum. v. jactantia, Angel. sum. v. van. glor. n. i.

⁴ Definiri potest, esse vitium inclinans ad tristandum de bono spirituali divino, quatenus est divinum ; secundum mentem utriusque Thomæ ii. 2, q. xxxv. art. ii. Navar. cap. xxiii. n. cxxiv. Tristitia de bono spirituali in quantum est divinum.—*Sylvest.* sum. v. *Acedia*. n. i.

⁵ Non prout est laboriosum vel molestum corpori aut delectationis ejus impeditivum. xxii. q. xxxv. art. ii.

⁶ Navar. *ibid.* Sylvest. *ibid.*

⁷ Peccatum est valde grave, genereque suo mortale, cum deliberato, et advertente animo admittitur, quod raro videtur contingere.—*Navar.* *ibid.*

guilt. So Cajetan tells us, If a man, not as to his affection, but in effect, be grieved at this, viz., that he is to be a citizen with the saints, and one of God's family, because he little cares for the happiness of this divine friendship, neglecting to attain it, because he gives up himself to other delights, he is not guilty of this sin.¹ Angelus, that he may discover when this disaffection to spiritual and divine things is mortal, and when venial, tells us, that when it consists in the omission of things not necessary to salvation, it is venial;² that is, it is little or no fault, if all the duties of real worship, all the acts of grace and Christian virtues, are omitted; for we cannot yet discern that they account any of these necessary to salvation, and by the premises it appears they do not. It is venial, says Sylvester, when a man counts the doing of it grievous, but yet omits not what he is bound to.³ Angelus expresseth it more significantly: By this it appears, says he, what is to be said of him who counts grievous, and abominates divine and spiritual things, since unless they be necessary to salvation, and he declines them, or is deliberately disposed to decline them, he sins not mortally.⁴ So that spiritual and divine things (all that they account not necessary; that is, all in a manner which is requisite for a Christian) may be abhorred, without any mortal guilt; and herein the two sums agree well enough, though they seem to be at some odds. It is false, says Sylvester (not limiting it to things necessary) that abominating of spiritual things is always a mortal sin.⁵ Accordingly he determines, that rancour against those who would induce us to spiritual things (that is, would draw us to God, or the things of God), is a venial fault.⁶ It is no mortal sin (say others) to conceive an indignation and loathing of those who persuade to what is spiritual (so as not to endure to hear or see them), whether preachers or others. We see by this (as by other instances) that sins so stated, as they are scarce ever practicable, they can be content to have them counted mortal; but common provocations, and such of which there is most danger, must pass for venials; yea, there are some amongst them who will have this capital crime, though it have such a deadly aspect, both in itself and in its effects, to be no mortal sin.—*Laisius Turrian. ibid. sect. iii. n. ii.*

Sect. 19. Anger stands in their general account as another capital crime. I have touched it before; but here let us see how criminal they make it, when in particulars they bring up their reckoning. It is considered in respect of the mode or degree, and the tendency or effects of it. As to the degree of it, how high soever it rise, to what excess soever it transport one,

¹ Si vero de hoc (ut sit civis sanctorum et domesticus Dei, &c.) non tristatur secundum affectum, sed secundum effectum, quia parum de hujusmodi amicitie bono curat; negligens adipisci illam, quia vacat delectabilibus humanis, peccatum Acedie non incurrit.—*Cajet. sum. v. Acedia.*

² Aut (consistit) in omissione eorum quæ non sunt necessaria; et sic est veniale peccatum.—*Sum. v. Acedia. n. i.*

Si omittit ea quæ sunt de necessitate salutis, peccat mortaliter: si vero alias debita, peccat venialiter.—*Cajetan. sum. v. Inconst.*

³ Est autem veniale, quando homo quidem in operando attædiatur, sed tamen ea ad quæ tenetur, non omittit.—*Ibid. n. ii.*

⁴ Et ex hoc patet quid dicendum de eo qui attædiatus abominatur divina et spiritualia: quia nisi sint necessaria ad salutem, et ea dimittat, vel deliberate disponat dimittere, non peccat mortaliter.—*Sum. ibid.*

⁵ Falsum est, quod dicta abominatio (spiritualium) semper sit peccatum mortale.—*Sum v. malitia.*

⁶ Rancor i.e. displicentia hominum inducentium ad spiritualia et est veniale.—*v. Acedia, n. iv.*

Neque mortaliter peccat, qui fastidiam, indignationem, et quandam aversionem concipit in eos, qui spiritualia consulunt, ut in concionatores, aut alios.—*Bonacin. i. præcept. d. iii. q. iv. p. ult. sect. i. n. vi.*

inwardly or outwardly, it is not in its own nature mortal, unless it be so vehement as to bear down both love to God and man,¹ and leave the passionate person neither, which yet it will not do, though it sally out furiously into curses or blasphemies against God or man, if this be but merely verbal, as we saw before.² The tendency of it, that which it leads to, is revenge; and as to that, it will be venial if the revenge be but little, or it may be great when it can be taken legally; or it may be great and illegal too, if the passion be but quick and great enough. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do, and be innocent, if the passion prevent deliberation when it comes, and hinder it while it stays; both it, and the effects of it, how horrid soever, will be venial.³ So that, if one be angry enough, he may blaspheme God, renounce Christ, perjure himself, kill or burn whom or what he will, with little or no fault. Thus, by their doctrine, this capital crime seems more like a virtue than a vice, since the greater is the better; or at least the less it has to do with reason, the more excusable and venial. Other extravagant passions meet with as favourable measures. Indignation, which makes a man disdain others, as unworthy of his conversation or affable treatment, it is commonly venial.⁴ Audaciousness, in itself, is no worse; nor excessive wrath and immoderate fear, because they are not contrary to charity, but exorbitant from the right measures of reason.⁵ So intimidity or foolhardiness is venial, when it proceeds from tolerable foolishness; but the folly may be so great, that the fault will be none.⁶ Also incontinent desires, or lusts; love likewise, whether of the flesh or the world.⁷ Of the former, thus Angelus: Immoderate self-love, when one excessively seeks the delight of the body and ease of the flesh, it proceeds from luxury, yet it is commonly venial, when it causes not other mortal acts or neglects.⁸ As for love of the world, to love it for necessity, is no sin, and to love to stay a long time in the world, for the pleasures of it, is but a venial fault.⁹

Envy is another capital crime, and in general they inveigh against it, as a devilish wickedness;¹⁰ yet when they come to give particular rules for con-

¹ Attenditur ordo rationis in ira—ut scil. motus iræ non immoderate ferveat interiorius vel exteriorius, qui ordo si prætermittatur non erit sine peccato—sed non erit mortale ex genere suo: sed possit esse mortale peccatum, puta si ex vehementia iræ excidat à dilectione Dei vel proximi. Angel. Sum. v. ira. n. i.; Sylvest. ibid. n. iv. Cajetan. Sum. v. ira.

² Navar. c. xxiii. n. cxvii. et alii supra.

³ Passiones nisi ad deliberatum consensum vindictæ inducant, veniales sunt.—Cajetan. v. rixa. Possit esse veniale propter imperfectionem actus, quia prævenit deliberationem. Sylv. v. ira, n. iv. Angelus, ibid.

⁴ Indignatio (qua ex ira afficitur homo proximo tanquam indigno sua affabilitate, conversatione et hujusmodi), peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem; et communiter veniale.—Cajetan. sum. v. Indignatio; Sylv. v. Indignatio; Angel. sum. v. diligere. n. ii.

⁵ Audacia si pura est, communiter est peccatum veniale: sicut immoderata iracundia, et immoderatus timor; quia non contrariantur charitati, sed a recta exorbitant rationis regula.—Cajetan. v. audacia.

⁶ Veniale autem peccatum hoc est, quando ex stultitia excusabili procedit—tantaque possit esse stoliditas, quod nullum esset peccatum.

⁷ Idem, ibid. v. Incontinentia.

⁸ Amor sui est, quum quis nimis diligit seipsum, quærendo delectationes corporis nimis, et quietem carnis, et procedit ex luxuria, quod est peccatum mortale solum, si propter eum non implet præcepta aut facit contra: aliter communiter est veniale.—Sum. v. Amor sui.

⁹ Diligitur ad necessitatem, et sic non est peccatum—est etiam diligere mundum, i.e. longo tempore velle stare in mundo propter delicias, et sic est veniale peccatum.—Idem, ibid. v. diligere. n. iii.

¹⁰ Soto de Just. et Jur. l. iv. ar. p. 176.

science and practice, they leave room enough for the entertainment of it in the hearts and lives of their catholics. The general notion of it is an excessive grief at the good of others, but all are acquitted from mortal quiet¹ who grieve at others' good, because it may be prejudicial to themselves, or because they want it. So far a man may envy all in the world who have more worth, honour, or power, or prosperity than himself. This may be good or evil, but evil in no other degree, than the desire of temporals,² which, when it is excessive, is of itself, by their doctrine, but venial. Or they may grieve at others' good, because they think those who have it unworthy of it.³ Grief or indignation at the outward happiness of others, upon this account solely, is of itself a venial fault with Aquinas and Cajetan. But why evil at all? The reason is because, since that which is grieved at is neither an evil of sin or punishment, it seems in a manner to reprove God, and to grieve, as though there were injustice in the dispenser of these things. All the envy in the world may find shelter and security in these decisions, as a harmless venial. If this last-mentioned be not envy, what is? why, a grief at the good of others, as it lessens and obscures our proper worth or excellency. But he that thinks others more unworthy, and himself far better, will think it a lessening and obscuring his own worth to have it so overlooked, and that which they distinguish and mince in speculation, will go down together in practice. However, two limitations they add, which will commonly excuse envy: it must be betwixt equals,⁴ and so grief at the prosperity of inferiors, or superiors at least, will be acquitted; also, if it be for little things,⁵ it is venial. Now all temporals are little things to him who has the eternal in his prospect; so way is made to acquit all envy for outward prosperity, which yet they make the only object of envy.⁶ And if envy, upon a small ground, may be excused as a little fault, envy upon a great occasion will be excusable, as less; except when they derive the sinfulness of an act from its exorbitancy as to reason; that will be less sinful which is more unreasonable. They might as well have concluded directly, and without circumlocution, as Lorca the Dominican doth, that envy is no more a mortal sin than vain-glory or covetousness, which they count venial, unless heightened with some such circumstance as will make an act otherwise good to be a deadly evil.⁷

Sect. 20. Intemperance, which they call *Gula*, comprising both gluttony and drunkenness, may well pass for a cardinal crime, yet both together, by an after reckoning, make but a poor venial.⁸ They define it an inordinate appetite of eating and drinking, viz., to excess, not for necessity, but for pleasure. This, when it is excessive every way, in the charge, the time, the quality, the pleasure, the quantity, is not in its own nature a mortal sin,

¹ Qu. "guilt?"—Ed.

² Si vero sit circa temporalia, potest esse cum peccato vel sine, eo modo, quo et appetitus temporalium.—*Sylv. sum. v. Invidia.* Ut si mediocris homo tristetur quia non est rex, quia non est papa: et hoc veniale est ex se.—*Vid. Cajetan. v. Invid.*

³ Idem, *ibid. n. ii.* Quia indignus est tali bono, hujusmodi indignatio, ut dicit S. Thom. et Cajetan, mala est et ex se veniale; nam cum id, de quo dolet, nec sit malum culpæ, nec pænæ, videtur quodammodo arguere Deum, et dolere, quasi injustitia sit ex parte datoris. In Tol. l. viii. c. lxx.

⁴ Invidia quia homo tristatur de prosperitate alterius similis seu æqualis.—*Cajetan. sum. v. Invid.*

⁵ Nec etiam (est mortale) si bonum de quo dolet, sit quid minimum.—*Sylv. ibid. n. ii.; Cajetan. ibid.*

Possunt magna videri non aspicientibus æterna.—*Idem, ibid.*

⁶ Cajetan. *ibid.*

⁷ Vid. Bonacin. i. præcept. d. iii. q. iv. p. ult. sect. ii. n. iii.

⁸ In general with them, all sins against temperance and modesty are regularly venial.—*Vid. Nav.*

according to the doctrine of Aquinas, though it be a capital vice, and the cause of many other.¹ But then it may be deadly by accident, if it be grievously hurtful to the body;² so it becomes those to determine, who are more tender of the concerns of the body than of the soul. Yet that we may understand how the pleasure of sensuality may be preferred before either soul or body, they tell us, that if the damage done to the body by intemperance be not grievous, or if it prove so great, yet if the glutton do not observe it, or if the great prejudice done to his health be not so frequent that he is bound to observe it, it will be venial still.³ But Cajetan troubles us not with this respect to health, but concludes it may be venial (and of a large size sometimes), not only when it brings upon us other inconveniences, but other sins, and particularly when it is prejudicial to health.⁴ He has but one case wherein it will be more than venial; then only is it mortal, says he, when this pleasure in eating is a man's chief end, and his belly his god;⁵ that is, when for the pleasure of it, he not only transgresses all rules of temperance, but has no regard of any command of God, or the church, as if a man will steal to play the glutton, &c. It seems this sensual lust will never be criminal, unless one be so much at its devotion, as to condemn God,⁶ and make nothing of any other wickedness to gratify it. And though there be no danger here, but when one makes his belly his god, yet there is no great danger of that, since a man may be a perfect epicure, like the rich glutton in the Gospel, and yet escape. When one, says Angelus, for delight of his appetite, resolves to give up his whole life to such (gluttonous) pleasures as Dives, &c., this is near to mortal sin.⁷ It seems, then, it is not deadly, but only near it; though it brought the epicure not only near hell, but into the torment of its flames. Yea, further, if intemperance proceed to beastliness, and pollute not only the soul but the body loathsomely, if the glutton load himself with more than he can bear, and so burden nature, that it is forced to ease itself in nasty ways, this will be no more a fault. Intemperance, says Navarre, is regularly venial, though without any profit, and out of design, one stuff himself so full with meat and drink, even to vomiting.⁸ If he eat so much till he vomit, on purpose that he may be at it again the sooner, and so may be still gormandising, it is no worse. Uncleanliness, says Angelus, which is the issue of intemperance, when one pro-

¹ Dico secundum S. Thom. (2, ii. q. cxlviii. art. i.) et secundum mentem ejus in multis locis, quod (Gula) non est mortale ex suo genere, licet sit vitium capitale, id est. ex quo vitia multa nascuntur.—*Sylv.* v. Gula. n. ii.

² Quando quis scienter comedit vel bibit, in grave corporis nocumentum, secundum S. Thom. *Idem. ibid.*

³ Si hoc (grave nocumentum) fiat inadvertenter, non est mortale, nisi adeo frequenter fiat, quod tenetur advertere, sicut de ebrietate dictum est. Similiter nec si nocumentum sit modicum.—*Idem. ibid.*

⁴ Frequenter autem est veniale, et quandoque valde grave, ut cum delectatio cibi allicit ad comedendum usque ad vomitum, aut alia inconvenientia, et similiter cum inducit ad alia peccata: puta ad nimium sumptum, vel ad nocendum propriæ sanitati, et ad quæcunque alia peccata.—*Cajetan.* v. Gula.

⁵ Tunc solum est mortale, quando delectationem cibi habet quis pro ultimo fine, juxta illud: Quorum Deus venter est: hoc autem cognoscitur ex hoc, quod homo ob delectationem in comedendo, non curat transgredi præceptum Dei aut ecclesiæ ut ai propter hoc furetur, &c.—*Idem. ibid. vid. Sylv. ibid. Angelus.* v. Gula. n. ii. Paratus facere quæcunque ut eam consequatur.

⁶ Sylvest. *ibid.*

⁷ Quum propter talem delectationem appetitus, ducit totam vitam hujusmodi delectationibus deputare, sicut Dives, qui epulabatur quotidie. Et hoc est multum vicinum mortali.—*Sum. ibid.* n. ii.

⁸ Gula regulariter est venialis, etiamsi absque utilitate usque ad vomitum, etiam intentum sese quis cibo et potu ingurgitet, ut sentit Cajetan. cap. xxiii. n. cxix.

vokes himself to vomit, that he may eat the oftener, or when he eats so much that he must of necessity vomit, is commonly a venial fault.¹ Cajetan more fully: Uncleanliness is used for the sin of voiding excrements excessively, as of meat by vomiting, and the like, proceeding from intemperance; it is frequently a venial sin, since it is neither against the love of God nor man; yet it is filthy, since it brings with it even bodily nastiness.² So that intemperance, even when it bewrays itself, and vents its filth by all the passages that oppressed nature can find in the glutton's body, is but a small fault. To be half drunk is no mortal sin. So Lopez,³ after Aquinas;⁴ herein they all agree, says a learned cardinal;⁵ take their sense in the words of Cajetan.⁶ Drunkenness not complete (when one by drinking wine is made too merry, or is disturbed in his fancy, so that the house seems to whirl round, or the like effect of intoxication befalls him, but he does not quite lose the use of reason), without doubt is a great sin (but not big enough to be feared), unless it be done for medicine; because it is excessive drinking in quantity or quality, when fallen into it knowingly or negligently; but it is worse when it is out of design (when one drinks too much, with an intention thus to disorder himself), because then it is almost mortal (there is no danger in all this, since he adds) but yet it is not mortal, since it reaches not the complete notion of drunkenness, and is without signal damage to reason. So that if a man be not dead drunk, and utterly deprived of the use of reason, he falls short of that perfection which is requisite to make this a deadly evil. In fine, however the Scripture, ancient Christians, and all that are sober, brand drunkenness as a most deadly vice, yet the Roman doctors have discovered two admirable virtues in it; one is that the full dose (perfect drunkenness), will make the highest impieties, the greatest outrages and villanies, to be no sins at all. So Angelus,⁷ who proves it by the canon law. So likewise Rosella, after others. Those of their writers which seem most cautious,⁸ except culpable drunkenness, as to this only, when such out-

¹ Immunditia est filia gulæ, quum quis provocat se ad vomitum, ut sæpius comedere possit: vel tantum comedit quod necesse habet evomere, communiter est veniale peccatum.—*Sum. v. Immunditia.*

² Usurpatur pro peccato inordinatæ emissionis superfluum, ut cibi per vomitum, et similibus ex gula procedentibus, et sic ponitur filia gulæ; frequenter est peccatum veniale, utpote nec contra Dei nec proximi dilectionem: turpe tamen, utpote etiam corporalem immunditiam inferens.—*Sum. v. Immunditia.*

³ Quando aliquis bene potatus, ita bene confortatus est capite quod rationis incompos non est factus, et tamen sibi videtur quod domus moveatur, hæc semiplena ebrietas, sicut non est mortalis, licet sit grave peccatum, quia secundum mentem.

⁴ D. Tho. et. Cajet. *ibid.* Ratio non obumbratur, cap. ii. n. xi. xxii. q. cl. art. i. and v.

⁵ Quando ebrietas non est perfecta, sed imperfecta, quæ turbat aliquo modo rationem, sed non omnino, tunc est grave veniale. In his omnes conveniunt.—*Tol. Instr. l. viii. c. lxi.*

⁶ Ebrietas non plena (quando aliquis potu vini redditur nimis lætus, aut turbatur in phantasia, dum videtur ei quod domus gyretur, aut hujusmodi aliquid incurrit: non tamen perdit usum rationis) peccatum proculdubio grave est, nisi causa medicinæ fiat: quia immoderatus est potus secundum quantitatem vel qualitatem, et hoc si advertenter aut negligenter accidit. Pejus tamen, si ex intentione: est enim tunc prope mortale: non tamen est mortale, quia nec attingit ad completam ebrietatis rationem; nec notabile damnum rationis eligitur.—*Sum. v. Ebrietas.*

⁷ Quoad culpam excusatur a toto quod fecit in ebrietate, ex quo est sine usu totali rationis.—*Sum v. Ebrietas. n. iii.*

⁸ In Sylvest. v. Ebriat. n. v. Tol. l. v. c. x. Rosella, v. Ebriat. n. ii.

Actus vel omissiones contra præcepta contingentes tempore somni, vel ebrietatis, etiam si fuerint voluntarii in causa, non denominari tunc peccata, sed tantum effectus peccati præcedentis; ut late defendit Vasquez, referens pro ea sententia, Paludan. Major, Gabriel, et Adrian. Sura. de Juram. l. iii. e. vii. n. vii.

rages are the usual effects of it.¹ So that unless both drunkenness, and the criminal issues of it, be customary, this will not be sin, or imputable to the drunkard. Hereby they furnish the Christian world with a new argument to prove Mahomet a false prophet, seeing he was so greatly mistaken in making his law so severe against wine, which, in its greatest abuse, is of such sovereign efficacy as to drown so much mortal sin, and to make all crimes whatever lose their deadly quality. But that impostor's head was not so intoxicated but he might discern that such who are guilty in the cause, are chargeable in the effects; nor was he so much a prophet as to foresee, that in after times, anything under the disguise of divinity should stumble at this. The other virtue of this sin is, that the moiety of it (half drunkenness) will make any the most horrid crimes to be but small faults. Weakness of judgment, says one, such as they who are half asleep, or half drunk, though it be enough to make a sin venial, yet not mortal.² When those, says another, that are half asleep, or half drunk, perpetrate any wicked thing whatever, since they are plainly under weakness of judgment, they are acquitted of mortal guilt.³ So that if any one will but make himself half drunk every morning early (and it will be no worse than a venial to do it purposely), he may, whatever wickedness he acts, be free from mortal sin all his life; and thus, he that lives all his days like a devil, may escape hell notwithstanding, and be saved by being daily half drunk.

There are multitudes of particular sins which they comprise under these seven capitals, and call them their daughters, after Gregory and Aquinas; but they need not be taken notice of as mortal by common confessors, much less by their confitents, for such confessors need not know whether they are mortal or no,⁴ as Angolus tells us after Henricus; and so must absolve sinners, though they never resolve, or think of leaving their sins.

Sect. 21. By the premises we may see what, and how many, sins may pass for venial in the church of Rome, and they have presumed to make them so without evidence from Scripture, as even a Jesuit will acknowledge.⁵ The maxims they proceed on therein (though eternal life or death depend on it) are purely their own conceits; no wonder if they leave them at great uncertainty. Many sins are believed to be venials which are mortal, says Bonaventure, and it is most difficult to discern them.⁶ So that they have no sufficient direction from any rule, no, not their own; but they are encouraged to venture upon all this wickedness in the dark and blindfold. The instances I have given may serve for a test; there is a world more, nor have I picked out all the worst; more time and diligence may

¹ An actus mali, quos ebrius facit in ebrietate existens, sint peccata, si fornicetur, si occidat, &c. ad hoc respondent, S. Tho. ii. ii. q. cl. art. iv. Cajetan. Sylvest. et responsio in his consistit—quando culpabilis fuit ebrietas—quando non erat solitudo talia mala facere, nec timebantur, tunc non sunt nova peccata, in Tol. l. viii. c. lxi.

² Parvitas iudicii, qualem habent semi-dormientes et semi-ebrii vel adeo turbati, licet sufficiat ad veniale, non tamen ad mortale.—*Navar. prælud. ix. n. xii.*

³ Quando semi-dormientes, vel semi-ebrii quidvis patravissent, cum parvitate iudicii aperte laborent, et lethali culpa redduntur immunes. Graff. l. i. cap. xiv. n. iv.; Bonacin. de Matrim. q. iv. punct. vii. n. vi. ubi.; Navar. Cajetan. et alii. Communiter.

⁴ Alia sunt peccata, quæ sunt filia peccatorum capitalium, et de talibus non-ordinarius non tenetur scire, utrum sint mortalia vel non. Sed curatus ordinarius, ut episcopus, archiepiscopus et cæteri alii superiores tenentur scire.—*Sum. v. confessio. iv. n. iii.*

⁵ Ex Scripturis divinis quamvis de multis peccatis constat, quod sunt mortalia, tamen vix de ullis expresse satis videtur constare, quod sint tantum venialia.—*Greg. de Valent. tom. ii. disp. vi. q. xviii.*

⁶ Multa enim creduntur esse venialia, quæ mortalia sunt, et difficillimum est in talibus discernere, ii. dist. xxiv. n. liii.

discover more as bad or worse. But by these we may discern, that whatever the Lord hath forbidden in his law, they have ways to reduce it to the rank of venials; for the whole matter of the divine law is, in itself, either of less or greater weight: if it be small, or they please to count it so, they conclude presently, upon that account, it is not mortal. Whatever appears not to be a grand enormity, whether it be against God, others, or ourselves, must be venial, according to that of Richard de Sancto Victore. Mortal sin cannot be committed by any, but by a grand corrupting of himself, or contempt of God, or grievous mischief of others; all the rest are venial.¹ Whatever is not, in their apprehension, grand and grievous, is next to nothing. Yea, one member of the three is, in a manner, wholly shrivelled away into venials. A man can scarce do anything against himself which will be big enough to make a mortal sin of.² Indeed, it may seem no more than requisite to make it no crime for a man to damn himself, when they animate him to venture on so many damnable things, as if they were nothing. Thus they serve whatever the great God hath forbidden, which they have the confidence to count small; but if they cannot choose but think it great, they have other expedients to level it (according to the exigence of men's lusts), and diminish it into a venial. To make it more, they require so very much, that a sinner may make shift enough to be without some of it, and so escape the mortalness (as they will have him dream) though he practise the wickedness. That any sin may be mortal, there must be *judicium integrum*, an entire judgment,³ not distracted, not weakened, not disturbed, as they prove out of their canon law. Also, there must be perfect deliberation;⁴ it is venial (how grievous soever otherwise) where there is not perfect deliberation. If, by any means, deliberation not only in itself, but in its perfection, be either prevented, and the thing be done before the mind take due cognizance of it, or hindered while it is under debate, it cannot be mortal. And that deliberation may be perfect, there must be a sufficient presenting of the evil in its object and its circumstances.⁵ If the mind only consider the advantage or pleasure, and not the sinfulness and danger, it is but a semi-deliberation, and not full enough to make a sin mortal. Besides, it will require time to perfect it,⁶ and here they may favour the sinner as much as they please, by determining what time is sufficient for human frailty; but if he be in haste, and do not stay this time, because he is so forward to sin, he will but sin venially. Finally, there must be full consent

¹ Mortale non potest a quoquam committi sine grandi corruptione sui, aut contemptu Dei, aut gravi læsione proximi; et reliqua omnia esse venialia.—Vid. *St. Clar. Probl. xiv. p. 83.*

² Quando sunt contra bonum proprium tantum, sunt magna ex parte venialia.

³ Ad constituendum peccatum mortale judicium integrum requiritur, Navar. cap. xvi. n. viii. Ad constituendum peccatum mortale integrum judicium requiri debet, cap. i. de delict. puer. Graff. l. i. c. xiv. n. iv. Requiritur plena advertentia, et non sufficit semiplena, qualis in semiebriis, semidormientibus, et eis qui alio distrahuntur; ut Cajetan, Navar. et alii communiter cum Bonacin de Matr. q. iv. punct. vii. n. vi. p. 313.

⁴ Vid. *St. Clar. Probl. xiv. p. 79*, et Tol. l. iv. c. xii., Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. mores. p. 112.

⁵ Veniale ex imperfectione operis, licet in re gravi, ubi deest perfecta deliberatio, vel presentatio sufficiens malitiæ in objecto, &c.—*St. Clar. ibid.*

⁶ Per sufficientem deliberationem intelligit (Bonaventura) tempus sufficiens ad deliberandum postquam ratio advertit.—*Sylvest. v. Consens. n. i.* Intelligitur si advertentia sit satis deliberata. Nam si est motus surreptitius, adeo ut sit subita deliberatio, non autem plena, poterit esse veniale (perjurium): scilicet si tempus non suppetebat ad plene deliberandum.—*Soto de Just. lib. viii. q. ii. art. p. 271.* Sufficiens advertentia et deliberatio non habetur sine discursu: discursus autem in tempore fit.—*Suar. de Vol. l. i. c. ix.*

of will. If the inferior and sensual part take never so much complacency in a wicked thing, yet so long as the superior takes no notice of it, there is no harm ; it is certainly no more than a venial.¹ Or if the superior part takes cognizance of it, and be some way inclined to the wickedness, yet that may not make it criminal, for every inclination is not sufficient for this purpose, but full consent of will, such as is perfectly deliberate ; neither is a tacit and constructive consent sufficient.² A neglect to repel or suppress the delight in sin, with some reluctance of reason, is with Bonaventure constructive consent, which, in the opinion of many doctors, is no mortal sin.³ Now if there be not a concurrence of all these, the horridlest crime that can be perpetrated will be a venial. If a man should blaspheme God, or curse Christ, or renounce the faith, or murder his own father, or ravish his own child or mother, or fire cities and countries, yet if he did it not with such perfection of judgment, deliberation, and consent as is expressed, it would be a petty fault. And he may be easily furnished with many things, which will any of them so weaken this as not to hurt him. Ignorance, drowsiness, disorder by drink, inconsiderateness, negligence, forgetfulness, precipitancy, natural or accidental, levity, passion, custom or habit, and the like, will serve to excuse any wickedness from mortal guilt. Let me but add one more (which serves to make clear work) : the opinion of their doctors, one or more, will make any crime not to be mortal to him that follows it. Any person upon this ground may venture upon the most deadly sin as if it were venial. It will be no more dangerous, for he is to be absolved, by their doctrine, though he declares that he will not forsake such a sin. The confessor ought to absolve him, though in his own opinion, and the judgment of other divines also, it be a mortal crime.⁴ This is their common doctrine, delivered by multitudes of their writers ;⁵ so that hereby a fair way is opened to leave no mortal sin in the world, at least in the consciences of all that will regard their doctors. In the mean time, the far greatest part of sins the world is guilty of are, by this and their other maxims, become peccadilloes, and they bid fair for all. The principles, by virtue of which they have done so much already, a little improved (though extended no further than they will reach), would go near to leave no deadly sin at all. To be sure, he that will regulate himself by their maxims, may act any wickedness in the world

¹ Contingit igitur delectari ad apprehensionem delectabilis, ante adversionem delectationis, et hoc est sensualitatis, et absque dubio est veniale peccatum.—*Bonaventura*, ii. dist. xxiv. n. lxxiv.

² Vid. Bonavent. ibid. n. lxiv.

³ Negligentia repellendi complacentiam, cum displicentia rationis de ea, secundum Bonaventur. est consensus interpretativus : quod non est mortale peccatum secundum multos magistros.—*Sylv.* v. Consensus. n. i. Necessaria est positiva complacentia—et non sufficit consensus interpretativus. Cajetan. et alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. viii. ; vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. xxi. n. iii. et ibi. ; Adrian. Cajetan. Armilla. Navar. D. Thom. D. Bonavent. et xxx. alii.

⁴ Si penitens nollet agnoscere tale quod peccatum, nihilominus absolvat eam, &c., quia ex quo ille credit opinionem quam sequitur esse veram, innixus autoritate probabili, non videtur peccare mortaliter : et sic debet absolvi.—*Sylvest.* secundum Gofredum. v. Confess. iii. n. xi. Si diversitas esset inter doctores, et penitens ex aliqua rationabili causa vult adherere uni opinioni, non est sibi denegenda absolutio : sed sue conscientie relinquenda. Caveat igitur confessor, ne sit præceptum in dando sententiam de mortali, ubi sunt variae opiniones doctorum.—*Angel.* Sum. v. Confess. iv. n. iii. et xiii.

⁵ Gofredus, Antoninus, Rosella, Armilla, Angelus, Sylvest. Conradus, Ledesma, Soto, Medina, Navar, in cap. xxiii. n. xxxi. et in Suarez. tom. iv. disp. xxxii. sect. v. et Victorel, l. iii. c. xx.

Near fifty of their authors are produced for this by Jo. Sancius, disp. xxxiii. n. liv. pp. 228, 224.—Vid *Bonacin*, et in eo alios, tom. i. disp. v. q. vii. punct. iv. n. xxvi.

without fear of deadly guilt. And hereby it appears plainly how very need-
less holiness of life is in that church (which pretends to a monopoly of all
the holiness on earth), since by their doctrine they may not only neglect
acts of piety, righteousness, and common honesty, but may live securely in
practices opposite to, and inconsistent therewith. They may continue in
customary blaspheming of God, in common swearing and perjuries, in per-
fidiousness to God and men; in a neglect of all that is acceptable in divine
worship; in a total profanation of all time which is indeed, or in their ac-
count, holy; in impiousness and disobedience to parents or superiors; in
divers degrees of uncleanness and murder; in variety of cheats and stealing;
in unfaithfulness as to breach of promise and compacts; in all falseness and
lying, everywhere, and upon all occasions; in slandering or detraction, in
covetousness or prodigality, which they will; in unmercifulness and out-
rageous passions; in pride and ambition; in vain glory and hypocrisy; in
flattery or cunning; in gluttony and drunkenness, &c.; in sins against God
and man, against godliness, righteousness, mercy, charity,—in any of these,
a little modified in all of them, and many more than I can reckon. They
may persist in them impenitently to the death, and yet (if impostors may be
trusted rather than the word of God) not fall short of salvation; their doc-
trine gives them encouragement to live in them without conscience, and die
in them without repentance. It takes off the motives which might work
upon either fear or love (the main principles of such motions in us) to for-
sake them. They are taught by their best authors that these sins may
stand well with their love to God; that they do not so much as impair the
habit of charity;¹ that they do not hinder the increase of grace, or the
effects of their sacraments;² that they do not stain the soul;³ that they
hazard not God's favour thereby; that they displease not God, that
they are not against his will;⁴ that they are consistent with a perfect
fulfilling of the law;⁵ that they have not perfectly the nature of sin;⁶
that they are not against the law, but only beside it;⁷ or if they be against
it in any respect, as some of them think,⁸ yet against no precept, the ob-
servance of which is necessary for salvation, or not against the end of the
law,⁹ which is charity; that they are but as specks or motes,¹⁰ we may look
on them as nothing,¹¹ that without the interposal of mercy they are such in
their own nature,¹² as ought to be passed by, they deserve pardon.¹³ They do

¹ Ex consensu omnium neque tollunt neque minuunt habitum charitatis.—*Bellarmin.*
de Amis. grat. l. i. c. xlii. p. 91.

² Actuale peccatum veniale non esse obicem in eucharistia (docet) D. Thomas,
unde à fortiori idem diceret de cæteris sacramentis quæ minus digna sunt; de Bap-
tismo affirmat Scotus,—frequentiores Theologi.—*Suar.* tom. iii. disp. vii. p. 182.

³ Aquinas proprie loquendo peccatum veniale non causat maculam in anima, i. 2,
q. lxxxix. art. i.

⁴ Bonavent. ii. dist. xlii.; Soto de nat. et gr. l. i. c. iv. p. 182.

⁵ Neque obstant quominus just, perfecti etiam dicantur.—*Soto, ibid.*

⁶ Non habet perfectam rationem peccati.—*Aquinas* i. 2, q. lxxxviii. art. i. ad primum.

⁷ Non est contra legem sed præter legem.—Idem, *ibid.* Lombard ii. Sentent.
dist. xxxv. Bonaventur. ii. dist. xliii. Scotus a quo vocatur consilium, quod in-
fringitur per peccatum veniale, in St. Clar. *ibid.* p. 79. Bellarm. de Justific. l. iv.
c. xiv.

⁸ Durandus, Major, Vega, Rada, Herrera. ⁹ Estius, Becanu.

¹⁰ Isti ergo vitiorum atque lapsuum quotidiani nævuli, licet Christiani hominis vitam
quasi pulvisculo aspergant, haudquaquam tamen defædant tarpiter.—*Lindanus.*

¹¹ Modicum pro nihilo censetur.—*Cajetan.*

¹² Bellarm. De Amis. grat. l. i. c. xiv. p. 95.

¹³ Veniale ex se venia dignum, Aquinas i. 2, q. lxxxviii. art. i. Veniale dicitur quod
est venia dignum, Bellarm. *ibid.* p. 81.—*Cajetan.*

Estius, ii. sent. dist. xlii. sect. vi.

not (as they teach) deserve eternal punishment, and the Lord (as they blaspheme) would be unjust,¹ if he should condemn any for them. So that not only as long as God is merciful, but while he is just, the practice of these sins is safe. Neither love to God, nor fear of his displeasure, nor dread of hell, nor desire of heaven, nor a design for perfection, need move them to abandon any one of these sins. They need not fear, how much soever they multiply or abound in them; if they should commit millions of them in a day, and continue the practice all the days of a long life, this would not damn them; for all the venial sins in the world, if they meet in one man, would not amount to so much as one damning sin.² They may commit them not only out of ignorance or infirmity, but with a high hand out of contempt.³ They may praise themselves or others for them,⁴ they may boast of and glory in them,⁵ they may perpetrate them out of malice.⁶ They may be so far from resolving to leave them, as it will be but a small fault, to bind themselves by oath to commit them,⁷ and call God to witness, that they will thus sin against him. They may die with resolution to continue therein,⁸ if they might live; yea, they may breathe out their souls with delight and complacency in these sins, and yet be saved.⁹ To conclude, mark how they may act and multiply, and persist in them, and then view the nature and quality and number of them, or guess thereof by the severals premised; and then suppose a man living after the rules of these conscientious doctors and casuists, and taking but part of that liberty which the Roman divinity allows, such a man would pass for a good catholic with them, and be holy enough, according to the holiness left among them, and made necessary by them; yet, even by the rules of heathen morality, he would appear little better than a monster. So faithfully do they retain, and so much do they regard the rules of Christ in forming the maxims of their new divinity, that sober heathenism would be ashamed thereof; and so like is practical popery to true Christianity, in that wherein the reality and triumphant splendour of it consists, innocency and purity! If an atheist had a mind to render the Christian name odious, and to represent Christianity with a black and detestable visage to the sober part of the world; if he had a design to make men believe that Christ was a minister of unright-

¹ Negamus—posse Deum juste punire peccatum quodlibet, etiam veniale, poena omnium gravissima, quæ est mors æterna.—*Bellarmin. ibid.* p. 92, et de Purgat. l. i. c. vii. p. 1359.

² Etiam si omnia peccata venialia simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam efficerent id, quod facit unum lethale.—*Bellarmin. ibid.* p. 91.

³ Non quasi ipse contemptus et vilipensio venialium sit mortale—quia nullibi est præceptum ut istam curam habeamus, sed consulerit tantum, Sylvest. v. peccat. n. iv. Peccare venialiter ex contemptu infra limites venialis, non est peccatum mortale.—Cajetan. Sum. v. contemptus, Lopez. cap. i. p. 8, Metina, *ibid.*, Graff. l. i. c. xiv. n. viii. *ibid.*, Aquinas ii. 2, q. cvii. art. iii.

⁴ Navar. cap. xxii. n. xiii. et xvi.

⁵ Secus etiam si gloriaretur de re peccati venialis solum, quoniam sic non esset mortalis vana gloria, Angel. Sum. v. van. gl. n. i., Cajetan. Sum. v. glor. vana. Est mortale cum—laudent alios et jactant de peccatis mortalibus quæ fecerunt, secus esset de veniali, quoniam non est contra Deum.—*Angel. v. Jactantia*, n. i.

⁶ Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus, esse veniale peccatum ex malitia: ut si quis vana mendacia eligat dicere ex intentione hujus mali, quod est vane mentiri, et non propter aliud.—*Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia*.

⁷ Juramentum de peccato veniali peccatum est, si tamen fiat cum proposito implendi illud, non est mortale, Cajetan, Soto, Antoninus, Sylvest. Tabien. Navar. in Suar. de Juram. l. iii. c. xix. n. iii.

⁸ Potest quis dum moritur, habere voluntatem permanendi in peccato veniali.—*Bellarmin. de Purgat.* l. i. c. vii. p. 1359.

⁹ Potest quis mori in complacentia peccati.—*Idem. ibid.* cap. x. p. 1370.

Cum venialis complacentia potest mori ac salvari.—*Sylvest. Sum. v. Contritio.* n. iii.

eousness, and the gospel a licentious doctrine, tending to debauch mankind, he would need no more, but persuade them that the maxims of the Roman divines were conformed to the rules of the gospel; but then, if he should attempt to prove this conformity, he might as easily demonstrate that darkness is light, or the Alcoran the Christian gospel.

CHAPTER IX.

Many enormous crimes are no sins at all in the Roman account.

Sect. 1. I proceed to those sins which they will have to be no sins, but need not stay long here, having given a large account of those which they make venial; since betwixt these, and no sins, there is little difference in their doctrine, and none in their practice. I need not stay to shew how it is no sin with them to vilify the Scriptures (the written word of God), or to rob him of the sole glory of his mediation, and to give much thereof to others, in all its parts and specialities, merit, satisfaction, intercession; or to put their trust in others besides God, for things which he alone can give, and for which he only is to be relied on, and this not only in saints and angels, but their images, and their imaginary relics. And how it is no sin in their account to abide in ignorance, unbelief, impenitency, or to live without the love and fear of God, and the exercising of other graces; by what is already premised this is sufficiently manifested.

To resist the inspirations of God,¹ drawing us to the observance of his commands, or withdrawing us from wickedness, is no special sin, *i. e.* we contract no other kind of guilt thereby, than if we had sinned without any such inspirations to withhold us from it. Thus it will be no fault at all to quench the motions of God's Spirit, inducing us to turn to him, to love him, to repent, &c., or dissuading us from blasphemy, perjury, adultery, murder, or any other crime.² And yet if a man be ready to commit any wickedness, it will be no sin for another to invite him to do it. Thus far men may promote all sin in others, and resist the Spirit of God, moving against it. As for evil spirits, they conclude it no sin, for good men, by special instinct or revelation, to make use of the ministry of devils;³ they tell us that to apply themselves to devils to know,⁴ or obtain any thing of them, is to have some familiarity and society with those damned spirits (unless it be the better to expel them out of the possessed), yet they teach it is no sin to inquire of the devil in a possessed person, what his name is, and wherefore he vexes that person, and what devils are his associates, and the like. But he must not believe the devil, though he tell him (for this would be as bad as necromancy);⁵ yet if he believe him not, none can tell how the devils answer-

¹ Si tamen contingat speciales inspirationes dari a Deo, quando se offert occasio frangendi aliquod præceptum, et homo resistens inspirationibus præceptum transgrediatur; nullo modo speciale peccatum committit, quia resistit inspirationi.—*Jo. Sanc. select. disp. vii. n. xi. p. 36.*

² Ex sententia Cajetani et Navar. in Vasquez, Opusc. moral. dub. iii. p. 24.

³ Sylvest. Sum. v. adjurat. n. ii.

⁴ Si quis eos adjuret—ad aliquid ab iis sciendum, aut ad aliquod obsequium per eos consequendum, est illicitum 1. quia hoc pertinet ad quandam societatem, vel familiaritatem cum ipsis.—*Sylvest. Sum. v. adjura. n. ii.* Licite adjuramus in omnibus ut de corpore expellatur, utputa, quod suum nomen fateatur—similiter ut dicat causam vexandi hominem—licet non credamus, &c.

⁵ Quod si ei crederet, ut necromantici, credo esse mortale, quia pertinet ad amicitiam.—*Ibid. n. iii.*

ing him in those inquiries can contribute any thing to his expulsion. They declare also, that it is lawful to use adjurations to the devils who possess no person, not to assist those that do, or to apply themselves to the great devils, to cast out the less.¹

Sect. 2. So far we see (and further) they may deal with the devil; how they may deal with God we saw before. Though the whole body of popery be corrupt, yet there is nothing more leprous than their worship. They think it not needful that it should be conformed to the divine rule in any thing, either as to the end, or manner, or matter, or object, yet it is transcendently good in their own eyes, no sin in it, even when there is nothing else. For what sordid and wicked ends they think it fit to worship God, we have discovered already, and also in what an irreligious manner. To this latter, let me add, what I meet with in Angelus, when he is inquiring, whether attention or devotion be necessary in their divine service (a strange question it might seem among any called Christians, if their divine service were the worship of God), he tells us their gloss maintains that it is sufficient to say it (their service) with the mouth, though not with the heart, and that many other canonists agree therein.² Thus it seems they understand the pope's law for divine worship; so as to approve that in plain terms which Christ expressly, and the prophets before him, condemns; so as to declare to the world, that the church of Rome makes no other worship necessary, than what Christ hath openly branded as vain, false, and hypocritical, Isa. xxix. 14, and Mat. xv. 7-9.

The sense of their divines agrees so well with the canonists, and as little with Christ (though it be expressed in other terms), that the contradiction to him is not so open though it be as full. Angelus himself,³ and Sylvester after him, with others, determine that wandering in one that observes it, when it is but as to the inward act, though it be temerarious and grievous, is not mortal unless it be out of contempt,⁴ the plain English of which is this: the departing of the mind and heart from God in worship, willingly and wittingly, how great soever it be, is a small fault, if any, unless to this neglect of God a greater contempt be added, whereas the contempt of God herein is very great. His reason is that which others give, because the church is not to judge of mere inward acts;⁵ and therefore, if a minister of the church, when he is at service, mind something else, he seems to be no transgressor of the precept by that act.⁶

He tells us out of Aquinas (what we saw the rest of them do before) that they need not continue actually attentive in worship, but only virtually,

¹ Hac etiam ratione non solum licet adjurare dæmones non obsidentes, ne adjuvent obsidentes: sed etiam superiores, ut expellant inferiores.—*Id. ibid.*

² Quoad attentionem vel devotionem, Quæritur utrum peccent mortaliter non dicentes officium devote et studiose? Resp. Glossa tenet, quod sufficit dicere ore, licet non corde, et cum ea concurrunt multi Canonistæ in c. dolentes.—*Angel. Sum. v. horæ. n. xxvii.*

Similiter non peccat mortaliter qui verba quidem dicit, sed ad illa non attendit: quoniam cum præceptum de dicendo horas sit de jure positivo, non refertur nisi ad ea, quæ sub judicio humano cadere possunt: et ista sunt quæ exercentur per actus exteriores, non autem interiores. Et hoc idem videtur voluisse Sootus in iv.—*Hostiensis etiam. —Idem. Pet. de Palud. Sum. Rosel. v. Horæ.*

³ Verb. Horæ. n. xxvii. supra.

⁴ Evagatio autem advertentis secundum actum interiorem solum, licet sit temeraria et gravis forte, non tamen est mortale. nisi propter contemptum.—*Sylv. v. hora. n. xlii.; Rosella. v. horæ; secundum Petr. Paludan.*

⁵ Quia ecclesia non habet judicare de actibus interioribus mere.—*Uterque. ibid.*

⁶ Propter quod minister ecclesiæ, licet dicendo officium aliud cogitet; non videtur transgressor præcepti ex natura facti.—*Angelus, ibid. Rosella. ibid.*

id est, if they intend to perform service when they are going about it, that will make them pass for attentive enough all the while, though their minds be carried away after other things when they are at it, and never heed the worship in hand.¹ This is the common sense of their authors, as if they should gravely tell us that a man who goes into company with some intent (actual or virtual) to be sober, but presently falls to his cups, is overcome and continues drunk divers hours, yet he may be said to be sober all the while he is drunk, by virtue of his first intention. And so we should wrong the Romanists if we did not think they would have as much of true worship and religion in their service as that man has of sobriety all the time he is dead drunk.

Sect. 8. But there is not any more horrid abuse of divine worship than that which they are guilty of in reference to its object; for besides what they determine concerning divine worship to be given to other things besides God, it is no sin with them to worship the utensils of their worship, the vessels, books, tables, linen, and priestly vestments, being once dedicated to divine service, and made holy by the charm of a consecration. Antonius Corduba says they are to be worshipped for themselves,² and in the judgment of Clychtovius they are to have a worship distinct from his worship, to whose honour they are dedicated.³ Vasquez will have them worshipped relatively (as images, to whom he gives divine adoration) with respect to him in whose service they are used.⁴

It is no sin to worship the word *Jesus*, whether it be pronounced or written, and some will have honour given to the word for itself; so Corduba and others.⁵ Some will have the word worshipped together with him that it signifies, as the image and the exemplar are both worshipped together, so that they will have the word *Jesus* to be worshipped as the image of *Jesus*.⁶

It is no sin to worship the accidents of bread and wine in the eucharist, where the object worshipped is not only Christ there, nor is it the substance of bread and wine (for they say there is no substance left), but that which they worship is the colour, figure, or taste of the elements. The colour, when there is nothing that is coloured; the tartness, when there is nothing that is tart; the roundness, when there is nothing that is round. To these wonderful (not to say monstrous) accidents, some will have a single worship due,⁷ but that, the very same worship that is due to Christ, and besides that divine adoration, which is common to them with Christ, will have also a proper worship given without reference to Christ; but all of them agree

¹ Tunc videtur manere secundum virtutem, quum accedit ad orationem cum intentione aliquid impetrandi, vel Deo debitum obsequium reddendi: etiamsi in prosecutione mens ad alia rapiatur.—*Idem. ibid.*

Adverte tamen quod intentio debita et actualis, si adsit in principio vocalis orationis, licet postea mens evagetur (nisi talis evagatio interrumpat primam intentionem per contrariam intentionem) sic est meritoria et impetrativa oratio vocalis sine attentione, per virtutem primæ intentionis.—*Idem. v. oratio, n. x.; Rosella, v. hora; Scotus, ibid.*

² Vasquez de adoratione l. ii. disp. viii. c. x. n. cccxlii. Posse secundum se, cultum deferri rebus sacris, sic docet Antonius de Corduba, et alii recentiores.

³ Vasis et aliis rebus sacris inanimis concedit cultum aliquem, distinctum a cultu illius, in ejus honorem dicatæ sunt.—*Idem, ibid. c. ii. n. cccix.*

⁴ *Ibid. c. x. n. cccxlv.*

⁵ Ipsi etiam voci secundum se, censet honorem aliquem tribui.—*Ibid. n. cccxlii.*

⁶ Simul—cum Christo quem significat vox illa.—*Ibid. n. cccxliii.* Idem quod de imagine, de voce quoque *Jesus* et aliis rebus inanimis, manifeste sequitur, et quamvis diceremus, quia imagines exemplaribus substituuntur, ideo cum ipsis adorari; quis audeat asserere, vocem *Jesus* aut scriptam aut prolatam, in locum significati non subrogari? &c.—*Ibid. n. cccxlv.*

⁷ Alii vero recentiores—eodem modo de speciebus sacramentalibus atque de imaginibus docent: nempe eas adorari posse eodem motu, et adoratione patriæ cum Christo

that they are to be adored with divine worship, and some say that this adoration is terminated on them, as the worship of the exemplar upon the image.¹ They will not only have the manger wherein Christ lay, and the thorns wherewith he was crowned, and the spear that wounded him, to be worshipped, but the picture of these when they are but painted;² they are to have the same worship which the true cross has, that is, divine adoration; and so are natural thorns or a common manger or spear to be worshipped, when they are made use of to adorn the cross or to set off the passion of Christ, as they are wont theatrically to represent it.

It is no sin to worship anything that Christ touched, or that touched him, how injuriously soever. Therefore, they teach that the ass upon which Christ rode is to be worshipped. Hereby it appears, says Vasquez, how rightly the ass upon which Christ did ride may be worshipped,³ and that the very lips of Judas (that traitor and devil as Christ calls him) for kissing Christ, when he betrayed him, for that very act wherein he shewed himself a traitor and devil, are to be worshipped.⁴ If they had but that traitor's lips they would reverently and devoutly kiss, that is, adore them; and it is strange if they have them not among their sacred relics, since they say they have the foreskin of Christ cut off at his circumcision,⁵ and his very countenance impressed by him upon a white cloth,⁶ for one would think these as hard to come by; however, in diverse places they worship something at a venture which they count so.

It is no sin to worship the imaginary blood which flows from a crucifix or image of Christ, when it is wounded, for they, being given up to believe the most ridiculous lies, do believe that such blood hath issued from a mere picture or image,⁷ they keep it as a most sacred relic,⁸ and it is to be worshipped with the same worship they give to Christ himself.⁹

sub ipsis contento: posse etiam secundum se, propria adoratione coli, quæ non referatur in Christum ibi contentum sicut in terminum proximum adorationis: sed tanquam in motivum remotum, sicut de imaginibus, et de nomine *Jesu*, docuerunt.—*Idem, ibid. c. ii. n. cccix.*

¹ Eandem adorationem qua Christum ibi colimus, ad eas terminari, dicendum est (ut docet Claudus Cello. vi.) Sed per accidens, sicut adoratio exemplaris in imaginem quoque terminatur. Id expresse tradit Algelus. l. ii., de *Euch. c. iii.*—*Idem, ibid.*

² Si autem pingeretur sacrum præsepium, vel lancea, vel spinea corona, vel aliquod simile, non minus quam ipsa crux in veneratione esse debere. Id vero quod de pictura vel sculptura dicimus, de iisdem rebus naturalibus dicendum esset, si in ornamentum crucis, et monumentum passionis, vel alterius mysterii, publice ponerentur, &c.—*Idem, ibid. l. iii. c. vi. disp. ii. n. lxxiii.*

³ Inde etiam constat, quo pacto recte possit asinus, cui Christus insedit, adorari.—*Ibid. n. lxxvi.*

⁴ Nil tamen obest, quominus aliquis sincera fide, et recta intentione, affectum et animum solum in Christum intendens, labia Judæ, et alia quæ injuste Christum tetigerant, reverenter osculetur.—*Ibid.*

⁵ Ex dictis inferitur Christi præputium et sanguinem relictum in terris, sive sit sub forma sanguinis, sive sub alia, non secundum se, hyperdulia, sed ex affectu latræ circa Christum eodem motu adorationis cum ipso, sicut alias ejus reliquias, adorandum esse, ut notavit Corduba et Sylvest.—*Idem, ibid. disp. iv. n. cxxv.*

⁶ Antiqua etiam traditione constat vultum sanctum Domini, tempore passionis suæ in linteo expressum fuisse. Qualis Romæ—et in Hispania ostenditur.—Taurius vero magna cum veneratione servatur, et nec minori religione colitur sindon, qua Christus in sepulchro fuit involutus: cui impressam reliquit sui corporis figuram.—*Idem, ibid. l. ii. disp. iii. c. i. n. xxix.*

⁷ Vid. Aquinas iii. q. liv. art. ii.

⁸ One at Berytus, in Syria, pierced by a Jew, related in a book ascribed to Athanasius falsely (as Bellarmine confesses, de script. Eccles. p. 78), of which our author, l. ii. disp. iii. c. i. n. xxix.

⁹ Idem dicendum de sanguine, qui ex aliqua imaginé Christi fluxit, nisi quod ille non ratione contactus, sed representationis tantum adorandus est.—*Idem, ibid. l. iii. disp. iv. c. ii. n. cxxv.*

It is no sin to give divine worship to any man, not only the saints in heaven or holy persons on earth, but any men whatever in the world (the wickedest not excepted), may, together with God, have divine worship, as the image has with the exemplar, since every man is the living image of God.¹ This is not only the doctrine of Vasquez, but of Alensis, of Waldensis, and of Cardinal Cajetan, only in the practice of this there must be caution; for Albertus Magnus and Aquinas say there is danger lest a man being of more excellency than an image, divine worship should be given him, not for God's sake but his own dignity, but where this danger is not, they would not deny but any man may be so worshipped, even with divine worship; so that if Paul and Barnabas, with the Lycaonians,² Acts xiv., had but proceeded with the caution of these doctors, and taken care that those people should so worship them only for God's sake, they might lawfully have admitted the worship offered them, though they (not learned in this kind of doctrine) chose rather to be stoned than so honoured.

It is lawful to worship not only rational creatures, but anything else in the whole world, whether living or lifeless.³ Any beast or creeping thing may be worshipped as the image of God, which they hold is to be honoured with divine worship; so that not only the planets, stars, the queen, and the host of heaven may be thus adored (for which the Lord condemns Israel and Judah as idolaters), but the vilest creature that lives on earth, a fly, or a frog, or a serpent, or a toad may be thus worshipped; yea, meaner creatures than any that have life, any inanimate thing whatsoever, though it be but a wisp of straw. That is our author's own instance: whereas, says he, the Wickliffites object that Christians who worship images may as well worship a wisp of straw (*modulum straminis*).⁴ The same Leontius (upon whose authority he grounds all) would as freely grant this of a bit of straw, as he does it of everything else in the world, so far is it from being counted absurd; yea, they may worship not only vile, but sordid things; and not only God, but angels and saints in them, *quævis alia res mundi*; anything whatever in the world, whether lifeless, unreasonable, or rational, may rightly have divine worship with God.⁵ And this is not only the judgment of their famous Vasquez, but of Cardinal Cajetan, and in consequence, of them all; for those great wits well discerned that the adoration of other things, approved and practised by the Romanists, could never be defended, without extending their principles to such a latitude. Thus it is manifest that whatsoever the apostate Israelites adored, or the Egyptians worshipped, or the Laplanders do worship, or the grossest and the most ridiculous idola-

¹ De homine, qui est viva Dei similitudo et imago, nec aliqua institutione in cultum Dei dedicata, docent Alexander, Waldensis et Cajetan, eum posse esse adorationis materiam, sicut de imagine picta dixerunt: hoc est, in illo et per illum ita Deum adorari posse, ut ipse etiam homo, eodem motu, et signo submissionis colatur, sicut imago cum exemplari: atque, idem de angelo dicere debent.—*Ibid.* disp. i. c. i. n. iv., et cap. iii. n. xvii.

² Ubi periculum non esset, non negarent adorari posse sicut imaginem pictam.—*Ibid.*

³ Quævis etiam alia res mundi sive inanima, et irrationalis, sive rationalis, ex natura rei et secluso periculo, rite cum Deo, sicut imago ipsius adorari potest. Hanc opinionem tradit Cajetan 2, ii. q. ciii. art. iii. ad dub. iv. Id docuit Leontius.—*Ibid.* c. ii. n. v.

⁴ Frustra igitur Wielifatus objiciebant Christianis imagines colentibus, ipsos quoque modulum straminis adorare posse—idem enim Leontius, de modulo straminis, quod de quacunque re mundi, libenter fateretur; tantum abest, ut absurdum judicari debeat.—*Ibid.* n. x.

⁵ In brutis animantibus et rebus sordidis, Deo exhibere notam submissionis, primo aspectu indecens apparet: id tamen non obest, quominus suapte natura in qualibet re mundi Deum ipsum adorare liceat: imo et sanctos homines seu angelos, si eos cum rebus illis cogitatione nostra possimus conjungere.—*Ibid.* n. xi.

ters in the world, ever made an idol, all that, with much more and worse, may lawfully be worshipped by popish principles; there never was any idolatry so absurd or horrid in the world but may have patronage or excuse by this doctrine.

And now heaven and earth being furnished with their idols, one would think they need go no further, but be satisfied, without seeking hell for any, yet there is an inquiry which reaches that too. It is a question amongst them, if the devil should appear in a beam of light, or the form of a crucifix, whether that apparition may be worshipped? ¹ Antisidorensis, Alexander, Aquinas, Marsilius, Adrian, and others, will not allow it should be worshipped, unless conditionally, and with a condition expressed; but Vasques is for adoration hereof absolutely, no condition expressed; ² and he has those who are otherwise minded at a great advantage, because they conclude for worship absolutely in a parallel case; for they will have a consecrated host to be worshipped without condition, though the devil were in it, or lurked under it; and if they think he would be worshipped in the former without the interposal of a condition, he will be worshipped in the latter, where they will have no condition to exclude it. I conclude this with what Holcott determines: a man may merit by a mistaken belief, although it so fall out that he worship the devil. ³

These decisions were necessary to justify their devout persons who have met with such adventures. A great part of popery is grounded upon visions and apparitions. These were much affected and admired by their reputed holy men, and women too, who were admired and adored for them. Satan, in the darkness (wherein this mystery did best thrive), had the advantage to put store of cheats upon them. Many monks and hermits (says à Lapide) were deceived by him. Particularly, among the rest, Valens the monk was thus deluded, the devil frequently appearing to him as an angel. In fine, Satan in an apparition feigned himself to be Christ, and the monk went, and for Christ worshipped the devil (Idem in 2 Cor. xi. 15). They are concerned to plead for that worship, which had the same original with much of their religion.

Sect. 4. For oaths or perjury, I will only instance in those which are fraudulent. First, they determine that he who takes an oath, and intends not to swear, the oath binds not, it is no sin to go against it. ⁴

Secondly, when a man intends to swear, but intends not to be obliged by

¹ An sit peccatum adorare radium luminis, vel speciem crucifixi, sub qua Dæmon delitescit.—*Ibid.* disp. i. c. v. n. xxx.; vid. Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. iii. q. i. punct. iv. n. v.

² Quare nec conditionem expresse addere oportet, ut recte et legitime adoratio fiat; et multo minus ea exprimenda est, quando Eucharistiam adoramus; ut optime tradunt Alexand. S. Thom. Bonaventura: qui cum dicant, necessariam esse expressam conditionem, quando adoratur Christus in specie crucifixi, ubi Dæmon delitescit: affirmant tamen, eam non esse necessariam, ut adoretur in hostia consecrata. Idem sensit Gabriel. Quinimo, ut Cajetan, Hosseianus et Claudius Sainotes, docent, male faceret qui adderet conditionem, ut securus adoraret.—*Ibid.* n. xxxiv.

³ Hominem posse mereri per fidem erroneam, etai contingat ut adoret diabolum.—*Refert. Humphred de vita Juel.* p. 120.

⁴ Quid ergo si quis exterius juret proferendo verba, et tangendo evangelia, intus tamen non habeat jurandi animum? Respondetur in illo casu, non esse verum sed fictum juramentum. Sed nunquid in conscientia qui sic jurat, tenebitur adimplere? Respondetur minime quidem, &c.—*Soto de Just. et Jur.* l. viii. q. i. art. vii. p. 262; *Graf. decis. aur.* l. ii. c. xvii. n. v. Ut obligationem inducat necessarium est, ut ab intentione jurandi procedat, hoc certum est apud omnes.—*D. Thom., Cajetan, Soto, Covarruvias, Panormitan, Glossa in Suar.* l. ii. de Jurament. c. vii. n. ii. Necessarium est ut intentio jurandi sit sufficienter libera. Communis est.—*Idem, ibid.* n. iii.

swearing, there he is not obliged, but may lawfully break it, as the ancients casuists and school-doctors generally determine.¹

There is real evidence for the practice of this from the conclave; for, as their excellent historian tells us, in the vacancies of the see, the cardinals use to compose certain capitulations to reform the papal government, which all swear to perform if they be assumed to the popedom, though it appear by all precedent examples that every one sweareth with a mind not to keep them in case he shall be pope; for so soon as he is elected, he saith, he could not bind himself, and that he is at liberty by gaining the papacy.² This was remarkably exemplified in Paul IV., who, resolving to break one of the capitulations he was sworn to a little before, and some of the cardinals being ready to put him in mind of his oath, he declared in consistory, that it is an article of faith that the pope cannot be bound, and much less can bind himself, that to say otherwise was a manifest heresy,³ and threatened the inquisition to any that hold it. It seems it is damnable error, deserving something like a hell upon earth, to believe that his holiness intends to be honest whatever he swear. It is true, every one has not the privilege of a pope to have it counted heresy for any to believe that he can be bound to keep any oaths, or ever to intend it; but all have this liberty by their doctrine, that they may take oaths without any intention to keep them, and are not bound to keep them if they do not intend it.

Thirdly, to elude an oath, and deceive those who give it, or are concerned in it, by equivocation, or other artifice of words, yea, or by mental reservation, is no sin, and that in many cases.⁴ As when a man has no mind to swear, and thinks he is not bound to do it; when he is drawn to it by force, or induced by fear, or brought to it by importunity; or when the judge is incompetent (as they count all that are heretics or excommunicate, and that have not lawful jurisdiction), or if the judges are competent, yet when they proceed not juridically.⁵ In these and other cases, either for avoiding harm or inconvenience,⁶ or when it may be for their advantage in any respect, they think it lawful to use these methods of deceit in swearing. Indeed, the

¹ Tenet S. Bonaventura quod universaliter non obligat juramentum, si jurans animum se obligandi non habuit. Sylvest. jurament. iv. n. xix. vid. plures ibid. n. vii. et n. xvii. Nec qui sic jurat, peccat.—Angelus v. juram. v. n. ix. et Sylvest. v. juram. iv. n. vii. Qui jurat cum intentione non se obligandi, non obligatur ex vi juramenti. Ita—D. Thom. Bonavent. Scotus. Gabriel. Richard. Sylvest. Angelus Medina. Gutierrez. Navar. Gloss. Felinus. Abbas. Jo. Andr. in Snar. l. ii. de juram. c. vii. n. ix. Hos et alios vid. in Bonacina. tom. ii. disp. iv. q. i. punct. vii. n. iii.

² Hist. of Council. of Tr. l. i. p. 71.

³ Ibid. l. v. p. 396.

⁴ Si iudex juramentum exigens talis (competens) non fuerit, vel esto quod sit competens, interrogat tamen contra juris ordinem, vel est alius homo privatus, qui per metum aut importunitatem juramentum extorquet, tunc jurare poterit quod secundum suam mentem est verum, falsum autem, secundum mentem alterius, cui exhibet juramentum. Sicuti fecisse B. Franciscum ferunt, qui rogatus quia perrexisset quidam homicida, respondit, non transiisse illac, intelligens, per illas manicas.—Cum Adriano; Qui sic inique interrogatur, potest optime respondere, quod nescit, intelligendo, non eo modo se scire, quo illud dicere teneatur.—Navar. cap. xii. n. viii.

⁵ Vid Navar. c. xviii. n. lvi.

⁶ Qui alio sensu jurat quam alter intelligat, non peccat, modo justam habeat causam ita jurandi—justa autem causa utendi his verbis (amphibologicis) est necessitas aut utilitas corporis, aut honoris, aut rerum familiarium—Ex quo sequitur, non esse illicitum uti verbis amphibologicis, addendo restrictionem aliquam in mente retentam, quoties aliquid incommodi, vel injuriæ nobis impendit loquendo ad mentem interrogantis, adest enim justa causa ita loquendi.—Bonacin. tom. ii. dis. iv. quest. i. punct. xii. n. iii. iv.

Ejusmodi autem æquivocationibus uti, addito etiam juramento absque causa, non est peccatum mortale, modo ne id fiat in fraudem tertii, aut in judicio, dum iudex juridice interrogat.—Ibid. vid. Dian. v. æquivoc.

reason they give to justify the practice in these cases, will make it as lawful in any other; for they say what is so sworn is true in their own sense, though not in the sense of the hearers, and so they will have it in strictness to be neither lie nor perjury, nor any mortal sin, even when there is no honest nor reasonable occasion for swearing or promising in this fraudulent manner.

And that you may perceive the Jesuits are not the prime masters of these arts, I shall instance in other authors who were either before them, or not addicted to the Society.

For equivocations, or other sleight of words in swearing, they are justified by multitudes of their writers,¹ viz., Sairus after Aquinas, and their Gloss, Paludanus, Gabriel, Johannes Major, Adrian, Hen. Gandavensis, Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, &c. The instances which Soto gives may serve for a test; as for example, when one instead of saying *I swear*, uses a word which signifies another thing, but so pronounces it as the difference is not discerned;² or if the word God in the language wherein the oath is taken may signify some other thing, he that swears may mean something else by it, when he that gives the oath understands the God of heaven;³ or if the oath be formed in this order, *I swear to you to pay so much money*, he that swears may mean not to pay him but some other, when he to whom the oath is made, understands it intended for himself.⁴ Such an oath, says Soto, is true, just, prudent, because then simulation is profitable,⁵ having said before that it is lawful, with such fraud to deceive one who forces him to swear, since he who puts him to swear hath no right to do it;⁶ and these fore-mentioned are the very same instances which Sanchez uses⁷, by which we see the Jesuit was not the inventor hereof, but learned them of a Dominican.

Of mental reservations, justified by their chief authors, who were no Jesuits, instances might be given in abundance;⁸ for example, if a man will have his wife swear that she is not an adulteress, though she be guilty, she may deny it with an oath, and swear what is false in his sense, if it be true

Videtur esse communis sententia juramentum simulatum, id est, cum justa et prudenti amphibologia factum, non obligare. D. Tho. Cajetan. Soto. Abbas. Tabiena. Covarruvias. Navar. in Suar. l. ii. de juram. cap. viii. n. ii. Juramentum autem dolosum cum injustitia obligare—sed tantum secundum proprium sensum.—Scotus, Bonavent. Richard. Gabriel. Sylvest. Angelus. Antoninus.—*Ibid.* n. v.

¹ Licet jurare cum equivocatione. D. Tho. Scotus. Paludanus, Richard. Major. Adrian. Navar. Covarruvias. Sylvest. Gloss. *Ibid.* l. iii. cap. ix.

² Si injurius ille nequam sic rogaret, juras mihi tantam numerare pecuniam? et alter responderet, sic uro (absque *J.*) non esset peccatum mortale, sed simplex mendacium: quia forte tunc nihil ureret.—Soto, *ibid.* p. 268.

³ Item si Dei nomen, lingua illa qua fit juratio, diversum quoque aliud habuisset significatum, liceret, illud intelligendo, dicere, Testis mihi est Deus, quamvis alter Deum cœli intelligeret.—*Ibid.*

⁴ Aut si altero interrogante, juras mihi numerare pecuniam? alter responderet, Tibi juro numerare, non esset sensus, numerare tibi, hoc est solvere aut tradere, sed tibi juro apud me pecuniam recensere, quandoquidem *numerare* utrumque significat.

⁵ Quare tale juramentum esset verum, justum et prudens, quoniam tunc simulatio (quoniam absque falsitate fieret) utilis esset.

⁶ Quando vero vi illata petitur, licitum est ea fraude petentem deludere.—*Ibid.* Similis est equivocatio quam in verbo *est* ponit Glossa in cap. neque ii. 2, q. ii. et quam in nomine *sororis* notavit Glossa in c. ult. ii. 2, q. ii.

⁷ Opp. Mar. l. iii. c. ii. n. 87.

⁸ Navar. Sylvest. Angelus. Lud. Lopez. Tabien, Armilla, &c. And among those who seem to dislike it. Soto fatetur licitum esse alicui jurare, se nescire quod revelare non potest, aut non tenetur; subintelligendo, nescio ut tibi dicam—quando judex non potest legitime interrogare de occultis, recte illi responderi, Non feci, subintelligendo publice, &c. Et ita etiam concessit aperte Cajetan. et Adrian. in Suar.—*Ibid.* cap. x. n. art. iii.

in her own, by the addition of some secret reserve.¹ If a man swear to give another a hundred crowns with this inward reserve, *If he owe it him*, he sins not, though he swears false in the sense of him who is to have the money.² A woman who, because of some secret impediment, will not live with her husband, and is excommunicated for it, she at the point of death, that she may be absolved, being put to swear, that if she recover, she will live with him, may swear it absolutely in show, with this conditional reserve, *If she may do it without sin*; yet if she do it not, she is not forsworn; so Sylvester and Navarre, according to the determination of Aquinas and Jo. Major.³ He that in the time of pestilence comes to a town where the officers, before they admit him, will have him swear that he came from no infected place, though it be not true he may swear it, if he think himself have got no infection.⁴ If you have not a mind, or are not bound to give or lend anything in your possession which another desires, you may lawfully swear that you have it not, with this inward reserve, that you have it not, *to give or lend*.⁵ If a man threaten to kill a confessor, if he will not tell him, whether his wife hath confessed her adultery to him, though she have confessed it to him, yet the priest may absolutely say and swear that she has not, with this reserve, *So that he should be bound to tell it*.⁶ He that is examined upon oath concerning crimes that he knows, and swears to declare all he knows, may, concerning some that are not known to others, though they be to him,

¹ Sylvest. sum. v. jurament. iii. n. ii. Navar. cap. xii. n. xviii. Quia id injuste agit, potest illa jurare, quod secundum suam intentionem verum est, falsum autem juxta mariti mentem. Et Angelus v. juram. iv. n. i. Nam cum talis inique a tali confessionem exigat, poterit jurare secundum suam intentionem, quod verum est: licet secundum intellectum audientis sit falsum, secundum Rodo. quem sequitur Astensis.

² Si in aliquo sensu intendebat facere, quod jurabat, licet non in sensu ejus, cui jurabat: ut quia juravit dare centum, subaudiendo in animo suo, si debuero: tunc non peccat: quia non tenetur jurare secundum intentionem ejus, cum non sit snus judex: sed utitur simulatione licita quæ licet: ut in c. utilem ii. 2, q. ii. Sylvest. ibid. iv. n. vii. Navar. c. xii. n. xiv. Neque peccaret jurando, neque etiam non implendo amplius quam ipse intellexit: quoniam non tenetur aliquis jurare secundum intentionem illius qui perperam ipsum ad jurandum cogit.

³ Aquinas et Jo. Major. in Navar. c. xii. n. ix. Sylvest. ibid. iii. n. ii. Angelus. Sum. v. juram. iv. n. i. Quum quis ex juramento exigat ab aliquo quod ipse non potest sine peccato implere; potest habere intentionem, cum jurat illud facere, scil. Quantum poterit sine peccato. Sic et Sylvester. Sic secundum Rich. de St. Victore obstetrices non peccabant, licet non respondissent ad intentionem Pharaonis, quia non fuit ei data auctoritas ad aliquid agendum contra Deum. Secundum Innocent. in c. Veniens de curia. in juramento determinato super aliquo singulari, sic interpretatur in foro animæ, secundum intentionem jurantis.—*Angel. ibid.*

⁴ Sylvest. v. juram. iii. n. ii.; Navar. c. xii. n. xix; Bonacin. ubi supra.

⁵ An qui jurat se non habere rem aliquam ab alio petitam, ut ab ea danda vel accommodanda se excuset, peccet? Responderi enim debet, peccare si mens ejus verbis consonat: sed non, si non tenetur ad dandam vel accommodandam, neque respondendum juxta mentem petentis, et ea mente juret, quod non habet illam, ad eam illi dandam aut accommodandam.—Navar. c. xii. n. xviii.; Bonacin. ibid.; idem c. viii. n. xix.; Lopez. cap. xxxvii. p. 211.

⁶ And this they maintain not only in this case, but as to all sins confessed. Quod si judex instat vel exigit juramentum a sacerdote, an per confessionem sciatur aliquid de tali facto? Dico quod secundum S. Thom. et omnes doctores, sacerdos si ab eo queratur de aliquo absente, an aliquid sciatur, quod audit in confessione: jurare potest se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo, &c. Sylvest. v. confess. iii. n. vi. Sic Angelus. v. confess. viii. n. iv. secundum Scotum et Richardum, &c. —Graff. l. i. c. xxxiii. n. ii. For the seal of confession must not be violated; no, not to secure the soul of the penitent, or the life of a king, or a whole commonwealth from temporal or spiritual destruction. Vid. ibid. n. iv. et viginti auctores contra unum Altisiodorensem in Suarez. tom. iv. disp. xxxiii. sect. i.

swear without perjury that he knows them not, with this secret reserve, he knows not to discover them.¹

If one promise to another, or contract with a woman outwardly, without an intention of promising, and is demanded of a judge upon oath whether he promised or contracted, he may plainly deny it, because he may have this sense, I promised not with a promise obliging me; and he has just cause so to answer, because since he cannot otherwise prove his want of intention, he will be condemned to pay what he owes not, or to cohabit with her whom he truly contracted not.² A witness, either when he is not interrogated juridically, or when he has good occasion not to bear witness in judgment, as if he fear great damage to himself thereby, may answer, that he knows not, or saw it not, or the like, with a mental reservation;³ he that out of necessity, or for any profit, offers himself to swear of his own accord, may therein use such fallacy.⁴ He that hath good occasion to hide his goods, lest they should be seized by his creditors, being for his livelihood, and to keep him from beggary, may swear that he has not hid any, understanding not any that he could not hide, or any that he is bound to discover. The same may the witnesses swear for him (viz., that he hid none), knowing that he hid them lawfully;⁵ such fallacious oaths may be used also in contracts and bargaining. Those who cannot otherwise get a just price of the buyer, may swear in a sense that he perceives not, that the commodity cost them so much.⁶

Here are a few instances, but they have rules (some of them are premised) which license it in cases innumerable, so that it may be a common practice, and they may use it upon any occasion which they think reasonable.

These things considered, with others authorised among them, I cannot devise what course can be taken to bind those who follow their doctrine, or to get from them the least security by an oath. They have declared that if you put an oath upon them which they think ought not to be imposed, they may lawfully deceive you if they can, and put a cheat upon you even in a solemn oath. Contrive then what oath you will for your security, they will take it so far as you can judge, as much as any man in the world takes an oath; yet if they did not intend to swear (which none can tell but themselves) by taking this oath, they have not sworn, they are not obliged. Or if they had a mind to swear as well as to make you think so, yet if they did not intend to oblige themselves thereby, their conscience by their principles is free, the oath does not touch them; or if they have a mind to be obliged by that oath, yet need they not bind themselves to that it was designed for, but to quite another thing, for they may swear in a sense vastly distant from what you intend or imagine; and thus they are taught to do, and it is practicable, either by the sly and undiscerned change of one letter in a word, as they may pronounce it, which will turn the sense as far from yours, as burning is from swearing, which is plain in a former instance. Or else by the ambiguousness of some word in the oath, affording another sense than you are aware of, they may fix upon that and leave yours to yourself, and so

¹ *Quamvis juret se dicturum, quod scit, vere respondere potest se illa nescire absque perjurii metu, intelligendo intra se, illud se non ita scire ut detegere teneatur.*—*Navar. c. xviii. n. xvi. cap. xvii. n. cxvi.*

² So *Navar.* in cap. *humano aures. ii. 2, q. v. q. i. et ii.* alleging for this doctrine. *Aquinas. Scotus. Paludanus. Richard. Major. Adrian. and others.*—*Vid. Suar. l. iii. de Joram. cap. ix. n. v.*

³ *Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. iv. q. i. punct. xii. Clavis Regia. Navar. et alii.*—*Ibid.*

⁴ *Idem ibid.*

⁵ *Idem ibid. et alii.*

⁶ *Idem ibid. Sayrus. Rebells et alii.*

bind themselves to nothing you are concerned for, when you think you have them fast bound to all; or if such care be taken that in the oath there be no ambiguous terms which may give them the advantage to delude you by a sense foreign to your intendment; yet, do what you can, they may put such a sense upon it by a mental restriction; for thereby adding something reserved in their mind, to what is expressed in the oath, the sense is quite changed, and the thing they swear is nothing at all of what you would have sworn.

Yea, or if they swear that they will observe the contents of your oath, according to the plain and natural meaning of the words, without any equivocating or mental restriction; yet at the same time they may mean, without any mental restriction that they will tell you of, and so delude you with a mental reservation when they are swearing against it. Nor is this an imaginary supposition of a thing that they never practised; for thus their priests and others have taken the oath of allegiance, and by this art eluded it;¹ and so they are instructed, and may do still, and defeat any oath that can be devised. Yea, by their doctrine they may do it lawfully, and without sin; for in all this juggling they teach that they do not swear false, but by the artifice specified, it is true in their own sense, though not in theirs who give the oath. Indeed this is a cheat (where God is called to witness), nor do they deny it. But they say such deceit is lawful, as in many other cases, so always when the judge is incompetent. And that is our case in England; we have none from the throne to the lowest bench that, in their account, have any jurisdiction;² we have none that have power to put an oath on them; they may choose whether they will swear or no, or whether they will cheat them all in swearing. No oath which can be given them can oblige them, but in their own sense, how distant soever from the true sense of the oath or of the imposor of it. This our Roman Catholics were assured of long since, by instructions sent them from Rome in Queen Elizabeth's time.³ So that they need make no conscience (if they will follow the best guides of their consciences) to practise all their contrivance upon us in oaths (much more in promises, contracts, &c.), even such as the light of nature has ever condemned in the world, as not only impious in point of religion, but destructive to human society, and those which tend to subvert the main grounds and foundations of it. We can never oblige them by oath at any time but when they please, nor any further than they list. We can never tell when they swear, though they take oaths, nor when they are obliged, though they swear. We cannot possibly know when we may be sure of them; when we think them fast, by all the rules that men of conscience and common honesty proceed by, yet they can juggle themselves loose by the Roman rules at pleasure, and make sport with God and man, even in oaths where God himself is a witness, and the greatest of men concerned as parties.

Sect. 5. There needs no other demonstration of the irreligion of the

¹ Quando quis inique interrogat, excludendo omnem æquivocationem, posse interrogatum uti æquivocatione, apponendo aliquam particulam in mente, &c. Idem dio de teste. Bonacina. tom. ii. disp. iv. q. i. punct. xii. et ibi plures. Quoties gravis causa occurrit, ob quam licet uti verbis ambiguis, vel mentali restrictione, ejusmodi usum esse licitum, et si interrogans urgeat, ut sine amphibologia, aut restrictione loquaris. Pet. a S. Joseph de ii. precept. art. i.

² Judex hæreticus aut schismaticus amittit omnem jurisdictionem. Vide Conc. Lateran. sub Innocent. III. in Crab. supra.

³ Juramentum exactum a judice non competente (quales nunc omnes sunt in Anglia) in jurisdictione ecclesiastica, non obligat nisi secundum intentionem jurantis. In Abb. de mendac. o. p. 40.

Roman church, and its utter regardlessness of God and the souls of men, than their doctrine concerning the observance of the Lord's day, and all other which they pretend to be set apart for holy employment. If any man would understand what religion is left among them, he may see it there in short, and needs look no further, since there he may be satisfied that they have no design for the honour of God or the salvation of souls. For when they have discharged the people from all duties of religion at any other determinate times,¹ and reserved all which they make necessary for them to holy days; yet even on these days, by their doctrine, nothing is made their duty to which any regard of God or of their souls is needful. All that they are obliged to is only to be present at mass,² no other act or duty of religion or worship is necessary; no internal act at all,³ nor any external,⁴ either public or private, but only the mass. And that may be so external, that neither God nor any divine thing need to be minded in it. For this I have produced evidence enough already, let me only add this; they are wont to speak of a three-fold attending at mass (as before was shewed at their divine service). One, to what is said and done by the priest, as sacred; a second, to the meaning of what is said or done; and the third, to God and divine things. Now the first of these, they say, is enough, though it be the worst of all;⁵ therefore the second (to regard the meaning

¹ Vide supra. cap. i.

² Sola missa communiter est in præcepto.—*Cajetan. sum. v. fest. p. 304.* Missa audienda diebus festis ex præcepto, non tamen concio, non preces fundendæ; non exercendus alius actus cultus divini ex præcepto (excoipe diem paschatis, quo sumenda est Eucharistia) Victorel. addit ad Tol. l. iv. c. xxv.

³ Aquinas. ii. 2, q. cxxii. art. iv.—*Cajetan. Sum. v. fest. p. 305; Soto. de justit. et iur. l. ii. q. iv. art. iv; Navar. c. xiii. n. ii. &c.*

No act of love, Bellarm. de cult. Sanct. l. ii. c. x.; Nav. c. xi. n. vii.; Soto, ibid. Or contrition; Soto, ibid.; Sylv. Sum. v. Dominic. n. viii.; Canus. relect. de pœnit. pars. iv. p. 864. Or sincerity; no need to have that devotion in the heart which they outwardly make show of. No necessity of a good end in their worshipping. For that they commonly maintain after Aquinas, that the end of the command for worship is not under command.—*Vid. supra.*

⁴ Not hearing sermons. Sylv. sum. v. Dominic. n. viii. Victorel. supra. Nor other prayers, private, Sylv. ibid.; Navar. c. xxi. n. vi.; vide Suar. de fest. l. ii. c. xvi. n. iv. or public. Vesperas cæteraque divina officia, diebus festis, non audire, non est peccatum mortale, neque veniale; nisi ratione voti aut juramenti.—*Graf. l. ii. c. xxxiv. n. xii.* Nemo jure communi regulariter tenetur audire de præcepto alia divina officia, etiam vespæras.—*Navar. c. xxi. n. i.* They are not obliged to any prayers but those in the mass, which indeed are not theirs; nor need they concur in them otherwise than by a virtual wish that the priest may be heard; Satis est vel ex longuiquo missanti adesse, et surgendo, genua flectendo, vel alias actualiter vel virtualiter exoptare, ut sacerdos, qui pro omnibus loquitur, orat et sacrificat, a Deo exaudiat.—*Idem, ibid. n. viii.*

This is all the praying of the people (when they have reduced all their religious acts to this) in popery. All that the church makes necessary, or leaves possible to them in public, which yet is no praying, otherwise than one while he is at Paris, may be said to be praying at Rome, because he virtually wishes success to a priest saying mass there; or than one in their purgatory may be said to be praying at the same time in heaven, because he would have the supposed intercession of the saints there to be successful.

⁵ Hæc satis est, licet omnium imperfectissima, Fill. tr. v. n. 214. Suarez, having premised that he believes there is no dissention or difficulty amongst them concerning attention at the time of mass, reckons after Aquinas the three sorts of attention, and adds of the first: Hæc attentio est infima omnium, tamen sufficiens: quia illa satls est, ut illa misse auditio seu præsentia sit humana, moralis, et ex objecto religiosa, tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. iii. This being sufficient, the second and third are more than needs; and yet in the third (this excluded as needless) he acknowledges all inward reverence and worship is included. Sub hac autem attentione ad Deum omnis interior reverentia et cultus, omnis oratio et petitio includitur, ut eleganter describit Gregorius x. in c. decet.—*Ibid.*

of what is said or done); and the third (to mind God or divine things) is more than needs. So that plainly all that is required of a papist, by their doctrine, in order to the honour of God and the salvation of his soul, on any of those days when these ought to be most minded, is only being present at mass, without understanding what is said or done, and without minding God or anything divine. Such is their worship of God and care of souls in the church of Rome; this is the sum of their religion, when it appears set forth to greatest advantage, in its solemn exercises; he that understands it, and can be in love with it, must be under the power of some other consideration than that of God and his soul.

Having seen how these days are sanctified, or profaned rather, by their worship, we might view what observance they have in reference to servile works. And here they have little but what may be done without sin; and indeed, as they order the matter, it may seem less sin to follow the works of their callings than to forbear them, since their abstinence from them is not that they may better attend the worship of God (for they think it not needful to worship him, unless he can be said to be worshipped when he is not heeded), but that they may be idle, or worse employed than in their daily business. However, whether it be to indulge their ease, or serve their lusts, or to make show of some rest (though far enough from a holy rest), they will have some works forborne; but herein they will be regulated by custom, not the divine law.¹ Paludanus and others will have them excused who use manual labours on these days, if they omit not the mass.² And Sylvester says, this is reasonable, because custom, the interpreter of laws, will have it so. This may so far regulate them, that every province and city must observe those days, and those alone, in that manner, and so far only as custom requires.³ Yea, it must so far prevail, that if it were the custom to observe these days no longer than till noon, or only till mass were ended (which may be dispatched in half an hour, and that before sunrise), the rest may be spent in servile works.⁴ They account it worse to spend these days in servile labour than profane divertisements; for this, with them, is only a venial fault, or none,⁵ but that may be a mortal sin; yet they declare there is no sin in the worst but what custom makes (they are like to make conscience of it, when their own wills and practices are their rule). This, as many other, by their doctrine, which makes void the commands of God at pleasure, is but a sin at discretion; they may make it none when they please, and render all days alike, as easily as they can bring up a custom, such a one to which nature is forward.⁶

¹ Dicendum consuetudine fieri posse, ut aliquæ personæ licite possint in Die festo aliqua opera servilia, vel aliter in festo prohibita, exercere.—*Antoninus, Sylvester, Caietan. Soto, Tabiena, Armilla, Navar, in Suar. l. ii. de fest. c. xxxiii. n. xii.*

² Per (Dominicum) intelligitur generaliter omnis Dies festus de præcepto, secundum Pet. de Palude, quod sentire videtur etiam Jo. Andr. et doctores dicentes aliquos in Diebus festis excusari, nisi missam omittant. Et est rationabile; quia consuetudo legum interpres, ita habet.—*Sum. v. missa. ii. n. i.*

³ Unaquæque provincia, aut civitas, observare tenetur illa, eo modo, et tantum, quæ, quomodo, et quantum consuetudo ipsius præcepit observari.—*Navar. c. xiii. n. v.* Si usus haberet, ut solum serventur usque ad meridiem, vel usque ad solemniam missarum peracta, postea possent opera servilia fieri.—*Idem, ibid.*

⁴ Gabriel cum Scoto dicunt, licitum esse inchoare missam, una hora et quarta parte alterius ante ortum solis.—Non erit peccatum hora et dimidia ante ortum solis sacrificare: imo addit Paludanus, et clarius Victoria, posse licite inchoari missam dimidia hora ante crepusculum, ita ut finis missæ sit sub initium crepusculi, plus minusve. Et hoc est in praxi servandum.—*Suarez, tom. iii. disp. lxxx. sect. iv.* So mass may be ended not only before sun-rise, but about break of day, above an hour before the sun is up.

⁵ Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. v. p. 277, n. xxv. p. 274, n. iii.

⁶ Observatio Diei Dominicæ non est de jure Divino, sed Canonico, ut aiunt communi

But no wonder they think not these sacred days violated by working, since they teach they are not profaned by any acts of wickedness. Their divines generally agree herein.¹ Contrition for sins, and the avoiding of other sins, is not enjoined, says Cajetan.² The day is not profaned by fornication, says Soto;³ nor by lying, murder, or blaspheming, says Bellarmine;⁴ nor by any wickedness whatsoever is holy time profaned, but only by those opposite thereto, viz. not hearing mass, and bodily labours. So that the days may be sanctified well enough, according to the holiness of that church, if after an irreligious presence at mass for half an hour (the precept for which may be satisfied without minding God or abstaining from wickedness while they are at it), the rest thereof be spent in beastly drunkenness or gluttony, in perjuries, blasphemies, or cursing God or man, in murders, whoring, sodomy, or bestiality, or the most enormous debauches. And though they are not bound, as they teach, to be at the pains of one good act of mind or heart in serving God at the only time set apart for his service, Scotus is almost worried by the herd of their divines for seeming to think that a good act of mind towards God was enjoined on these days;⁵ yet they may spend their bodies, and toil themselves more in the service of their lusts, without profaning them, than in servile works. The reason why they hold that no excess of wickedness does profane these days, is because wicked acts are not servile works.⁶ It seems slavery to Satan, and the service of the vilest lusts, is not servile; whatsoever Christ or the apostle thought thereof, John viii. 34, Rom. vi. 16, that is consistent enough with the liberty and honour of such Christians as they are. However, hereby it is manifest that their religious observation of all holy times (and so all the religiousness which that church requires of her catholics) is consistent with the lowliest acts of ungodliness and debauchery.

In fine, God can have no honour from men, nor they salvation from him, without religion; this cannot be kept up in the world without the solemn exercises of it; these cannot (or will not) be performed without time for that end; therefore hath the Lord appointed time to be set apart for these purposes; the church of Rome hath reduced all religious exercises, at the times appointed by God or themselves, to the people's hearing of mass, and there will not have the precept oblige them to any real religiousness, not so much

ter doctores—et consequenter posse consuetudine, vel humana potestate abrogari.—*Bonacin*, tom. ii. disp. v. n. iv. p. 272, Sairus et alii ibi.

¹ Cajetan, Soto, Sylvester, Victoria, Navar, Covarruvius et alii, quos refert et sequitur Suarez, de fest. l. c. xviii. n. iii., inter quos etiam recenset S. Thom. vid. *Belarm.* de cultu sanct. l. iii. c. x.; *Graf.* l. ii. c. xxxiii. n. viii.

² Non continetur sub hoc præcepto contritio peccatorum, nec vitatio aliorum peccatorum.—*Sum.* v. fest. p. 305.

³ Non quod per fornicationem videatur festum.—*De Just. et Jur.* l. ii. q. iv. art. iv.

⁴ Non enim violatur tempus sacrum per quæcunque peccata, sed solum per ea, quæ opponuntur ipsi tempori sacro, qualia sunt non audire sacrum, et operari corporaliter.—*Ibid.* l. iii. c. x. p. 1610.

Secunda opinio asserit—peccatum etiam mortale in Die festo commissum, non habere ex illa temporis circumstantia specialem malitiam, quæ in confessione necessario aperienda sit: illam docent Cajetan, Corduba, Soto, Victoria, Almayn, Sylvester, Armilla, Tabiena, Angl., Navar, Covarruvias, Gutier; pro hac etiam sententia potest referri. D. Thomas in iv. dist. xxxii. art. v. q. i.; *Suarez*, l. ii. de festis. cap. xviii. n. iii.; vid. *Bonacin*, tom. ii. disp. v. p. 274.

⁵ Scotus sentire videtur hoc nos præcepto juberi, diebus festis bonum habere mentis actum circa Deum.—*Soto de Just. et Jur.* l. ii. q. iv. art. iv. p. 51.

⁶ Nec valet dicere inter ista servilia computari peccatum: quia hoc falsum est.—*Sylv. Sum.* v. Dominic. n. viii. Nisi esset opus servile in festis prohibitum, quale non est peccatum juxta S. Thomam. in iii. sent. dist. xxxvii. art. v. q. ii.; *Navar.* c. vi. n. x. Probatur a Cajetano et cæteris—quia opus peccati ut sic non est servile.—*Suar. ibid.* u. vi.

as to a thought of God or any thing divine, yea, or the forbearance of wicked thoughts and acts while they are at mass. Thus far is religion (upon which the interest of God and man so much depends) sunk among them. And it must of necessity sink (all but the shadow or froth) in any part of the world where these principles prevail. But though they declare them not obliged to serve God any better at this, or at any other time, yet they maintain for them as much liberty to serve the devil and their lusts on these holy times as any other. Let all concerned judge of the Roman religion and holiness hereby; if there were nothing else by which the measures thereof could be taken, this would suffice.

Sect. 6. In the next place, in reference to heretics, to go no further (for that is far enough, since in their charity the far greatest part of Christians are no better), all relatives are discharged of their respective duties enjoined them by the laws of God or man. Their decretals (the law of their church, which presumes to over-rule all other law, natural, divine, or civil) deprives heretics immediately of all due fidelity, right, duty, observance, which any whosoever do owe them.¹ They lose all which they have by civil right.² Subjects owe no allegiance or duty at all to princes or magistrates.³ Children owe no duty to their parents;⁴ they have (by their law) no power over them, and this from the first day of their heresy. Wives owe not conjugal duty to their husbands;⁵ and if they knew they were not papists when contracted, they lose their dowry.⁶ Servants are freed from all fidelity to, and observance of, their masters.⁷ Yea, debtors are freed from paying what they owe to heretics, though bound thereunto either by penalty or oath.⁸ They hereby oblige their followers to make nothing of such duties, without the observance of which mankind would become worse than brutes.

But this may seem a smaller matter to them; they go higher, and allow any one to kill a heretic, as though murder were no sin; they may be killed with impunity, says De Graffiiis,⁹ and proves it out of their church laws. Pope Urban II. declared that they are not guilty of murder who kill any that are excommunicate.¹⁰ Now all heretics are excommunicate by the Council of

¹ Ipso jure privatos esse hæreticos omni debito fidelitatis, domini, obligationis, et obsequii, quo illis quicunque tenebantur astricti.—*Decretal. Gregor. ix. l. v. c. ult. de hæret.*

² Amittunt omnia quæ juris civilis sunt. *Graff. l. ii. c. xi. n. xii.* Privantur jure domini naturalis, æconomici et civilis. *vid. Ovandus in iv. dist. xiii. p. 347.*

³ Eorum vasalli absoluti sunt a debito fidelitatis et totius obsequii—et idem de vasallis dominorum, qui contra hæreticos sunt negligentes. *Sylvest. v. hæreses i. n. xiv. Angelus v. hæret. n. xv.*

⁴ Perdunt patriam potestatem, quia non habent filios in potestate.—*Graff. ibid.* Filii hæreticorum ipso facto quo sententiatum est contra eorum parentes de hæresi, efficiuntur sui juris, et effecti intelliguntur a die commissi criminis.—*Angel. ibid. n. x.; Sylvest. ibid.*

⁵ Viro debitum reddere non tenetur. *Simanca. Instit. Cathol. c. xlv. n. xxvii.*

⁶ Uxores scienter cum hæreticis contrahentes perdunt ipso facto dotem.—*Sylvest. ibid.; Angelus. ibid. n. xi.*

⁷ Et quicunque alii aliqua obligatione adstricti: ut famuli, liberti, et hujusmodi. ipso facto liberantur. Ut dicatur et notatur in c. fi. eo. ti. *Angelus. ibid. n. xv. Sylvest. ibid.*

⁸ Omnes hæreticos obligatos ex juramento, fidelitate obsequii, pactione vel promissione, liberri, ita habetur c. ultimo de Hæret. Propterea si aliquis promississet hæreticis solvere sub pœna vel juramento certo die, non tenetur, ut notat Glossa *ibid.* Ego teneo quod eo ipso quod est manifestum in hæresin incidisse tales absoluti sunt, quantumcunque sententia non feratur contra eos. *Angel. ibid. n. xv.; Sylvest. ibid. n. xiv.; Armilla. v. hæres. n. xi.; Ovandus in iv. dist. xii. propos. xxx. p. 348.*

⁹ Possunt etiam impune occidi. *Facit. Gloss. sing. in Capital. fœlic, &c.—Graff. l. ii. c. xi. n. xii.*

¹⁰ Nos enim eos homicidas arbitramur, quos adversus excommunicatos, zelo matris

Lateran, under Innocent III. ; and the sentence which lies dormant there is roused once a year ; the pope in person denouncing it in a solemn manner, and very gravely, with a peacock-tail on either side his head. We in England particularly are under excommunication to this day, and Cardinal Barbarin thought fit, not long since, to give special notice of it in a letter to some of the Irish. They forget not how obnoxious we are ; and we may remember how much we are obliged by them, that any of us are suffered to live, when they may kill us without murder.

Sect. 7. But we may the better bear with them in this, because they seem not very tender of killing one another. A man is not to be punished who kills his wife, taken in adultery, and the adulterer together with her. He may kill his own daughter in like case, or his sister, yea, or his own mother, if his father give order for it ;¹ and he may do it as safely though these his female relatives be quick with child. For the child in the womb (say they) being the same morally with the mother, he that may kill the mother may kill the child too. Thus a private person may be judge in his own cause, and proceed to mortal execution without trial, and sacrifice the guilty and innocent both at once, to his own or another's passion, and destroy together the body and soul of his nearest relations, and all this with impunity. They deliver it for certain, that a mother in danger may lawfully use a medicine which tends directly to her cure, though it be probable that it will make her miscarry. And because she may take such a course to secure her life or recover her health, they conclude it lawful to do this to preserve her state or reputation.² So that, if a maid or married woman have prostituted herself to another's lust, she may procure abortion, when otherwise the crime might be discovered, and her life or credit in hazard.³ Thus neither families, nor parishes, nor monasteries need be pestered with natural children, how many soever be got ; the shame of their birth, and the pain too, may be prevented, and the trouble and expense of their education avoided, by a receipt approved by the Roman doctors, if it be but taken in time. As for the censures of their church in this case, or worse, there is no fear, for even a nun got with child may procure abortion, and not be excommunicate⁴ (so much more favourable is new Rome to her vestals than the old was, though their crimes be doubled) ; any who are so disposed, have encouragement enough to venture upon both. For as to the murder, they are secured from the laws of God by this doctrine, which makes it no sin ; from the laws of the church by her natural indulgence ; and may be from those of the state, by their own private conduct. And as to the whoredom, they may be quitted upon as easy terms as they would wish. For the priest, if he get the child, is empowered to absolve the mother, and he need not be so strict as to enjoin for penance the avoiding of the sin ; yet for all this, they seem so tender (which

catholicæ ecclesiæ ardentes, aliquos eorum trucidasse contigerit.—Refert ex Ivo et laudat Baronius. an. 1059, n. xi.

Omnis hæreticus, sive occultus sive manifestus, est ipso jure excommunicatus.—Rosel. v. hæret. n. xiv. Quoting their law for it.

¹ Pet. a S. Joseph. de v. præcepto, art. vi. pp. 258, 259.

² Videtur etiam satis certum, &c. Idem ibid. art. ii. p. 218, vid. Corduba. Pet. Navar. Arragon. Lopez in Fill. tr. xxix. n. civ.

³ Liceret etiam procurare abortum nondum animatum cum ad famam et statum conservandum opus erit. Basil. de Leon, de matrim. l. x. c. xiii. n. ii. Liceret etiam fœminæ nuptæ, aut virginis fornicanti idem efficere, quando nullo alio quæsito medio sibi consulere possint, ne crimine detecto, famæ vitæque jacturam facerent.—Pet. Navar. l. ii. ; de Restit. c. iii. diff. ii. n. cxxx.

⁴ Secundum Sylvestrum, monialis sollicitans abortum non est excommunicata, quia non injuriam sibi sed proli facit. Lopez. cap. lxiv. p. 322, vide Nalcum in Bonacin. de restit. d. ii. q. ult. p. 7, n. vi.

may amuse us) of unborn infants in other cases, that they will have it lawful to cut up the mother quick, and she obliged to suffer, yea procure it, that the child in her womb may not perish unbaptized.¹ Thus their doctrine will have them more regard the reputation of a whore than the life of an honest woman; yea the child may perish without regard of its wanting baptism, when the credit of a strumpet is concerned; but a chaste woman must be killed in the other case, that the infant in her womb may have it. Yet one would think the issue of whoredom in as much danger for want of baptism as the fruit of lawful matrimony.

They teach further, that a man may kill another, either to secure his own person, or his goods, or his reputation. In defence of his person, they hold it lawful to slay any one; a servant may kill his master assaulting him unjustly, or a monk his abbot, or a subject his prince, or a child his own father.² This is their common doctrine, and thereby there is warranty for it, not only to secure one's life, but to avoid a wound or a blow.³ Any one may do this at any time, even a priest while he is celebrating, may kill one that invades him,⁴ and when he has shed his blood, may go on with his other sacrifice, which will be unbloody notwithstanding. If he that assails him be frantic, or in drink, yea, or asleep,⁵ and has no sense that he offers any wrong, he may innocently kill him for all that, whoever he be, if he cannot otherwise avoid the injury; yea, though the aggressor have had the highest provocations, by intolerable reproaches, or the loss of his estate, or the defiling of his bed;⁶ yet in this case, he that has given the occasion, and done the wrong, may kill the sufferer; the thief may lawfully slay him whom he has robbed, and the adulterer may kill the husband after he has abused the wife, or deflowered his sister, or buggared his child. He may not only kill the aggressor, but an innocent person also, to escape himself.⁷ As if he cannot be secured from Peter, without killing Paul, he may be the death of them both; or state it thus (and they cannot stick at it), if he cannot escape his father without killing his mother, he may slay both father and mother at once. Thus they may deprive any of life, not only when they are actually assaulted, but before any blow is given. When a man perceives one coming towards him with his weapon ready, and fears he is not able to deal with him, he may shoot him dead at a distance.⁸ Nor need he be hindered by the consideration that killing him in such circumstances (since he is in mortal sin), will be the destruction both of body and soul together. Soto objects this to himself, but abates nothing of his conclusion notwithstanding. Yea, he answers, that to hold it not lawful to kill in this case (with the destruction of the slain man's soul too), is both to pervert the law of nature, and to render

¹ Aliqui affirmant non tantum id licere, sed etiam matrem teneri talem sectionem procurare, et ferre, ne illius infans sine baptismo intereat.—*Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid.* p. 220.

² Bonacin *ibid.* punct. viii. n. iv. ubi Sylvester, Julius Clarus. et alii communiter.

³ Si non possum effugere quin me percutias, nisi te interficiam, licite te interficio.—*Angel. Sum. v. defens. n. iv.*; ibi Bartolus, Florianus, Navar. cap. xv. n. iv.; Lopez, part i. c. lxii.; *Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid.* p. 221; Bonacin. *ibid.* n. iii. et alii communiter.

⁴ *Angel. Sum. v. homicid. iii. n. ii.*; Sylvest. v. homicid. i. n. xiii.; Graff. l. ii. c. lxiv. n. viii.

⁵ Bonacin. *ibid.* n. v. ibi Bartolus, Gomez. et alii.

⁶ *Pet. a S. Joseph. ibid.* p. 222 et 230.; Bonacin. *ibid.* n. iii.; ubi *Pet. Navar. Sotus, Julius Clarus, Rodriguez.*

⁷ *Petrus a S. Joseph. de v. præcept. art. ii. p. 223*; *Pet. Navar. de restit. l. i. c. iii. n. cxlvii.*; Bonacin. *ibid.* punct. vii. n. i. ubi Julius Clarus. Corduba. Cajetan. et alii.

⁸ Graff. l. ii. c. lxiv. n. iv.; Soto de Just. et jure. l. v. q. i. art. viii. p. 143.

the sweet and easy yoke of Christ intolerable.¹ They give further instances wherein they will have it no sin to kill a person that has not yet touched them; it is sufficient, in their account, if they know that he is prepared for it, yea, or does but design it. In case one be shut up in a house or a city, so that he cannot get out, and knows there is one in the town that designs upon his life, and waits but an opportunity to execute it, he may prevent the designer, and fall upon him unawares, and kill him.² They declare it lawful for a man to kill his wife taken in adultery; but then they allow the adulteress to be beforehand with her husband, and kill him first if she can: she may despatch him with the poison prepared for her, or stab him with the weapon he has ready, and so secure her adultery by murder, and yet be innocent.³

They maintain it is lawful to kill others to secure their goods; so it is no sin with them to take away the life of him that would take away part of their goods by night or day;⁴ yea, if he that steals makes no resistance or defence, but flies, he may be pursued and slain, to recover what he has taken. And although the goods may be recovered otherwise, and in a legal way, yet if it be not certain that he may get them with the greatest ease, but doubtful that it may give him some trouble, he may use his liberty, and send him to hell to save himself a little trouble.⁵ But of what value must the goods be (that we may discern at what rate they set the life and soul of a man)? It must not (says Soto) be a vile thing; it should not be so little worth as two or three ducats.⁶ So that it seems, if what is stolen be of the value of about twenty shillings, a man may be killed for it, and his body and soul destroyed together; and since a crown or a shilling may be more to some than twenty to others, those who follow him might well infer from hence, that a man's life might be taken away for a crown or less; yea for an apple, since to some persons, that may be of more value than the sums mentioned. Accordingly, they conclude expressly, that he who takes a thing, the owner or keeper of it seeing, and offering to hinder him, may be lawfully slain for it, though it be but of the value of one crown or less either,⁷ because thereby he offers an affront. That is another ground of their lawful murder. A man, they avow, may kill others for his honour or reputation;⁸ for though it be so slight a thing, that it will be scarce a fault in a man to throw it away himself (as we heard before), yet they will have him maintain it at the expense of the blood and life of others, and his own too. For example, if he sees one approach to assault him, though he might avoid the danger by retiring, yet he may kill him rather than so avoid it;⁹ because it would be a disparagement to him to fly, and so rather than suffer the least, in the repute of the injudicious rabble, he may be the death of any person, and be a man of blood, that he may be the master of such honour, as a truly generous spirit must despise. They advance further yet: if one should offer to give a person a

¹ Ibid.

² Graff. l. ii. c. lxiv. n. v.

³ Navar. c. xv. n. iii.; Lopez. c. lxii. p. 311; Bonacin. de restit. d. ii. q. ult. p. 9. n. ii.; ubi, Julius Clarus, Bannes, Rodriguez, Corduba et alii.

⁴ Soto. *ibid.*; Graff. *ibid.* n. xvii.; Lopez. cap. lxii.; Navar. c. xv. n. ii.; ibi Cajetan. Antoninus, Sylvester.

⁵ Non licet furem occidere—si spes esset certissima quod facillimo negotio recuperari posset—ubi autem res esset dubia, posset liberum esse domino jure uti suo.—Soto. *ibid.*

⁶ Ibid. p. 144.

⁷ Etiam si res sit valoris unius aurei aut minoris—videtur posse occidi.—Bonacin. de restit. d. ii. q. ult. p. 10, n. i.

⁸ Comuniter omnes docent. Vid. Victorel. add. Tol. l. v. c. vi. Famam suam—negligere et prodigere potest sine peccato. Pet. S. Joseph, de. viii. præcept. art. ii.; vid. Navar. c. xviii. n. xxvii.

⁹ Soto, *ibid.*

blow with a cudgel, or a light switch;¹ he that is offered such an affront may lawfully kill him for it, especially in Spain, where this is counted a great injury, says Soto. And elsewhere, a box on the ear may be resented as such an injury. Accordingly, others determine that he who gives it may lawfully be slain for it, yea, or he that does but offer it.² If he be any person of any moment that is thus attempted, he need not stay till he feel it, but may prevent it by killing him that offers it, if there be no other honourable way to avoid it. He need not fly to avoid it, if that would be a disgrace, for he is not obliged to suffer such an inconvenience, though by retiring he might save both his own life and the aggressor's, says Bonacina after others. In this manner, when one smites them on the cheek, do they turn the other; and thus do they comply exactly with Christ's advice, by stabbing him to the heart, who smites their cheek, or does but offer at it!

The same they determine of ill language; that is with them a sufficient ground to kill men. In the judgment of all, says Navarre, it is lawful to kill him that gives reproachful words, when there is no other way to avoid the injury,³ and the words being once past, there is no preventing them. Thus, killing men may be as common as provoking language, when such language, by their doctrine, may be as common as any they speak. They teach that it is but a venial fault, ten thousand of which he may commit every day or every hour without endangering his soul, to give one the lie, to call him a fool, a bastard, &c.⁴ And then they declare it lawful to slay men for such words, as if it were their design to have it thought tolerable for men to do nothing else but kill one another; and shedding man's blood were no more to be avoided than such faults as they encourage the continual practice of. They proceed further yet, and conclude it lawful to kill one, not only for contumelious words, but for mere signs of such import, when an ill word is not spoken, suppose such motion of the tongue, or lips, or nose, or fingers, as are accounted an affront.⁵ This is after the Roman mode to imitate Christ, and comply with the apostles' rule in laying down their lives for their brethren, when they take away their lives for a foul word or an untoward gesture. But what if one who gives such a blow, or such language, or the like affront, should run for it when he has done, is it lawful to pursue him to force satisfaction from him, though it be by the loss of his life? Yes, say they, the person affronted may pursue him, and strike him till he have reparation of his honour, though it be by killing him.⁶

They speak favourably of duels. Cajetan says, princes may permit them lawfully among their subjects, as the stewards are permitted upon reasonable considerations;⁷ so that it seems they may farm out this liberty, as the

¹ Si quis quempiam aggredieretur, ut eum fusta levissime percuteret, posset id alter etiam hostem interimendo repellere. Ibid. Victoria. Navar. et Sylvester in Fill. tr. xxix. n. 1.

² Ad vitandum vulnus vel alapam—potest occidere. Navar. c. xv. n. iv.; Lopez. p. i. c. lxii. p. 816.; Bonacin. ibid. n. vi et alii.

³ Ex omnium sententia licet contumeliosum occidere, cum aliud non manet remedium eam injuriam arcendi. de restit. l. c. ii. iii. n. ccclxxvi. vid. Bonacin. et apud eum plures infra.

⁴ Vid. Navar. c. xviii. n. xxiii. xxiv.

⁵ Posse occidi qui afficit contumeliis atrocibus sive per verba sive per signa. Bonacin de restit. disp. ii. q. ult. p. 10, n. vii. ibi. Gomez. Rodriguez, Lopez, Pet. Navar. Julius Clarus et alii.

⁶ Possit eum persequi, et percutere tantum, quantum ad sui honoris defensionem opus esset—etiam occidendo. M. Navar. c. xv. n. iv.; Pet. Navarra. ibid. n. ccclxxx.; Rodriguez, Lopez. et alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. viii. plurimi apud Henriquez. Sum. l. xiv. c. x.

⁷ Sum v. duellum.

pope does the other. Bannes determines that an innocent person may either accept or offer combat, not only to secure his life or estate, but his reputation, when he cannot otherwise do it. Such a person, when one goes about to accuse him falsely before a judge, and he is like thereby to be defamed, may challenge him and kill him lawfully.¹ This he reports as Cajetan's opinion, and counts it more than probable. But there is no need of duels in the case; they discover a way to despatch men more effectually with less notice and less hazard to the murderers, allowing them to kill any privily to secure their repute. The same Dominican, in the case mentioned, concludes, that if the accuser, being admonished, will not desist, the aggrieved person, in defence of his concerns, may kill him.² Not only judicial accusations, but more private aspersions, are counted a sufficient ground to kill men. He who, by whispers and detraction, endeavours to wrong and bespot another, if the infamy and disgrace cannot otherwise be avoided, it will be lawful to slay him.³ So Pet. Navarre, who gives reasons why he thinks it more advisable to kill a defamer privily than in a duel; nor need he stay till he be actually aspersed, but when one threatens, or signifies he will do it, he may lawfully prevent it by killing him. Forty-nine doctors are produced in favour of this. Prado, an eminent Dominican, says it is the common doctrine of Aquinas his followers.⁴

These are some of the maxims which serve so much to furnish those who design upon men's lives with lawful occasion to murder, and tend so plainly to fill all places with blood and slaughters, without leaving any man security of his life, that even some Jesuits, though they deny not that they may be probable in speculation, yet seem shy to allow their common practice. But this is rejected by others, and so the Jesuits' cautiousness and moderation counted unreasonable, seeing that in matters of morality,⁵ what is speculatively probable, *i. e.* safe and lawful, in point of conscience, must, as such, be admitted in practice.⁶ Indeed, though there be no charge more odious upon the Society than their doctrine of murder, yet, so far as I can discern, they are outdone here by others, both in numbers and extravagancy. However, the maxims, to diminish the horror of which the Jesuits seem solicitous, are now the common doctrine in that church; the divinity of her schools and doctors generally being advanced to such a pitch as to bid defiance to common humanity. And if the civil laws did give as much liberty to murder as their rules for conscience do, desolation would soon be brought upon the face of the earth.

Sect. 8. For uncleanness, they are very favourable to it, they seem to condemn the consummation of the act, but scarce anything else, and not that neither in every kind. They give up the outworks which should secure them from this sin; they admit its approaches, they encourage sinners to venture upon the occasions, even such as have very often ensnared them in this wickedness. Any confitent, they teach, ought to be absolved, though he do not purpose to avoid any occasions which lead to it, unless they be such as he does or ought to believe, he can seldom or never use without per-

¹ In. ii. 2, q. lxiv. art. vii dub. iv. concl. ii.

² Ibid.

³ Qui murmuracione et detractiōne injuriam maculamque inferre constatur, licebit, si aliter infamiam et dedecus fugere non potest, occidere. De restit. l. ii. c. iii. n. cccxxvi. Calumniatorem occulte occidere licet. Duvallius Doctor Sorbonicus de Charit. q. xvii. a. i. Sayrus. Cas. Consc. c. xvii. n. xxii. xxiii.

⁴ Theol. Moral. tom. ii. c. x. q. iv. n. xiv.

⁵ Opinio speculative probabilis, est practice probabilis. Serra, Leander, Spinola, Jo. Henriquez, Narbona, Aversa, Machado, in Diana, part x. tr. xi. Resol. xlvii.

⁶ Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. xlv. n. lxiii. et disp. liv. n. xi.

pretrating the deadly act.¹ So that, though he very frequently fall thereby into uncleanness, yet unless he believe they will, *quasi semper*, in a manner always overthrow him, he may make bold with them.² To go into place or company, where the sight of any, their persuasions or opportunities, expose him to the danger of sinning, though he do it without necessity, is of itself no great fault, says Cajetan;³ and if he find, that he can for some time withstand the temptation, and do not in a manner presently fall, *statim aut quasi statim*, though he find himself weak, yet he may venture on them without any necessary occasion, as the cardinal leaves us to conclude from what he there adds. A confessor does well who absolves those who will not express any purpose to avoid converse with such women, by which he hath very often sinned every way, both by desire, words, shameful touches, yea, and the very act of uncleanness; because this is such an occasion as is not deadly in itself, nor does make them, *fere semper*, commit deadly sin.⁴ Those women or servants who have committed lewdness with their masters or others in the house, yea, though they be their kinsmen, may be absolved, though they still live together, if they cannot leave them without great inconvenience or damage;⁵ provided if they be truly sorry for what is past,⁶ and intend to sin no more, and think they shall not; yea, though after this they fall many times into the same wickedness,⁷ of fornication, adultery, or incest, and do not avoid the occasion, yet still they may be absolved. And this liberty is not restrained to houses where they live together,⁸ he extends it to other houses also. He that hath secretly committed filthiness diverse ways, with a friend or a kinswoman in another house, may be absolved, though he do not intend to forsake that house.⁹ Or if the occasions he meets with in private houses do not satisfy him, he may venture into the common stews, but then it ought to be with a good intent. A man may go to a common whore, with confidence that he may convert her, though there be

¹ Quæ credit, vel credere debet, confessarius vel penitens, nunquam vel raro usurum ea, sine peccato mortali.—*Navar.* c. iii. n. xiv.

² Non vitare hujusmodi occasionem est peccatum mortale, at talis est occasio, qua credit se fere semper ad sic peccandum impulsus iri.—*Ibid.*

³ Eundo ad locum sive societatem ubi est periculum peccandi mortaliter propter aspectum, persuasiones, opportunitates aut aliquid hujusmodi. Et hoc quidem si sine vegente necessitate sit, ad incantelæ peccatum spectat.—Si experientia teste didicit se non subsistere in hujusmodi, sed statim aut quasi statim cadere, nulla necessitate vincatur, ut illuc eat, aut ibi moretur.—*Sum.* v. peric. peccandi.

⁴ Recte faciunt confessarii absolvendo multos adolescentes, qui versantur inter mulieres, emendo, vendendo, laborando et conversando absque cohabitatione in eadem domo: licet non proponant perpetuo abstinere ab occasione peccandi, quam id illis præbet, quamvis sæpius peccent voluntate, verbo, aut tactibus impudicis, et etiam copula, quia occasio quæ ex hoc præbetur ad peccandum, non est ex se peccatum mortiferum, neque hujusmodi, ut fere semper faciat mortaliter peccare eos qui ea utuntur.—*Navar. ibid.* n. xvii.

⁵ Possunt absolvi, sine separatione, cognatæ, ancillæ, ac famulæ, quæ rem habuerunt cum suis consanguineis dominis vel his in quorum domo degunt, concurrentibus quatuor predictis: quorum quartum scil. causa notabilis, est quod non possunt sine magno incommodo, et detrimento separari, n. xxi. i.

⁶ 1. Vera pœnitudo præteritorum. 2. Verum propositum non peccandi. 3. Credulitas quod Deo juvante non peccabit. n. xv.

⁷ An possint absolvi prædictæ iterum absque separatione si reciderint? Videtur nobis posse, concurrentibus prædictis quatuor. Et idem dicendum arbitror de tertia et quarta vice, quia non solum semel aut bis, vel septies, sed etiam septuagies sexties est parcendum.—*Ibid.* n. xxi.

⁸ Those that keep concubines may be rightly absolved upon the same terms, without parting from them, n. xix.

⁹ Idem dicendum est de illo, qui occulte rem, aut impudicos tactus habet cum aliqua consanguinea, aut alia sibi amica in alia domo agente; scil. eum absolvi posse, sine proposito nunquam ingrediendi eam, n. xxii.

danger, and it is probable that he will commit filthiness with her.¹ And so any, their religious brothers or fathers not excepted, may seek the conversation of common whores, though they see imminent danger that they shall make no better use of the strumpets than those who come to them with the worst design.

They are as indulgent to unclean thoughts, as to lewd and ensnaring company. To entertain filthy thoughts,² to delight in those thoughts, and to consent to that delight,³ is either no sin, or but venial; says Sylvester and others. They distinguish betwixt the unclean act and the thought of it. Cajetan, though he would not have the act to be the object of delight, yet he allows any to take pleasure, not only in the thought, but in the special manner of the act.⁴ If a man do not observe what he is delighting in, while he is pleasing himself with such thoughts; yea, if he do not fully consider it, though he entertain himself with this mental pleasure a whole day together, it will not be sinful delight.⁵ Lust, with a perfect inadvertency,⁶ will not be mortal; when the delight of it so invades the mind, says Lopez,⁷ nor needs he resist such delight, or repel these thoughts,⁸ if he believe they will not engage him further, or if he thinks that by resistance they will grow upon him; or if it would hinder him from some necessary, or profitable, or honest employment, such as the study or reading of filthy things, which provoke such delight, is in their account.⁹ They are no more rigorous as to obscene words, filthy songs, lascivious writings and discourses. They sin not, says Navarre, whether they be men or women, who see, or read, or hear, or speak any filthy things, men to women, or women to men, such as provoke to uncleanness, if it be upon an honest occasion;¹⁰ now, it must needs be an

¹ Si quis certus esset de convertenda muliere prostituta, si accederit ad persuadendum illi viam salutis, potest, inquit, accedere, etiamsi ex tali accessu, imminet sibi probabile periculum peccandi cum illa.—*Soto*, in *Lopez*. cap. liii. p. 275. Prudentis charitatis fervor nonnunquam hominem animat, ut ad convertendas perditas mulieres, cum aliquo suo periculo earum colloquium adeat.—*Soto de Just.* l. v. q. i. art. vi. Vide plurimos sequentes D. Thomam dicentem, quod exponens se periculo peccandi, causa urgente, non peccat, Navar. Cordub. Cajetan. Armill. Castro. &c. in Jo. Sauc. disp. x. n. viii.

² Si quis de modis et inventionibus fornicandi speculetur, sola quadam novitate, et curiositate intelligendi hos modos adductus, non erit mortale.—*Lopez*. c. lxxiv. p. 355.

³ Non tamen est peccatum mortale consentire in delectationem cogitationis, quæ est de peccato mortali, sed est veniale quando cogitatio est inutilis: vel nullum, puta cum quis utiliter cogitat. Sum. v. delect. n. ii.; *Lopez*. *ibid*.

⁴ Si delectatio sit de miris et similibus modis, non est delectatio morosa: quam modi isti sint admirabiles, et naturaliter delectabiles cogitanti animæ.—*Sum.* v. delect. morosa.

Sicut nec est (mortale) delectari in modo operandi scelus aliquod: licet non in ipso scelesto opere, ut in modis occupandi regnum—sicut etiam in speculatione variorum modorum coituum, dum absit periculum consentiendi.—*Lopez*. c. lxxv.

⁵ Si circa id non adverteret, quamvis diem integrum delectatio perduraret, non peccaret mortaliter. Neque satis est advertere nisi integre advertat secundum Cajetanum. Navar. c. ii. n. xii.; Cajetan. Sum. v. delectat. p. 112; Graff. l. ii. c. lxxvii. n. ii.

Si vero advertere incipit, et prævalente impetu concitata passionis non plene advertit: sed antequam plene advertit delectatio facit suum cursum, peccatum non mortale sed veniale intervenit.—*Cajetan. ibid*. Non sit signum sufficiens ad probandum consensum tacitum, sola perseverentia delectationis post advertentiam.—*Ibid*.

⁶ Qu. 'imperfect advertency?'—Ed.

⁷ Ad mortale requiritur advertentia plena, quia non satis est imperfecta, quæ ex prævalente impetu passionis solet causari, libido cum tali inadvertentia imperfecta non erit mortalis, quando sic ejus complacentia impetit mentem.—Cap. lxxxv. p. 359.

⁸ Navar. cap. xi. n. xii.; *Lopez*. ex mente Cajetani et Metinæ. *ibid*.; Graff. l. ii. c. lxxvii. n. iii., iv., v.; Cajetan. *ibid*. p. 113.

⁹ Non esset culpa—si delectationem illam omisisset expellere, ne suam occupationem honestam et necessariam, aut utilem derelinqueret, quale est studium et lectio rerum impudicarum, ad hujusmodi delectationes provocantium.—*Navar. ibid*.

¹⁰ Qui ad prædicandum, &c., aut alloquendum fœminas ex causa honesta cum sint ipsi

honest occasion when this is done, while they are at church for divine service; and there they have used it. Church music is now so licentious, says one, that filthy ditties are sung to the organ, and keep time even with the canon of the mass,¹ the most sacred part of that which they count most sacred; and Cajetan informs us, that in their church this is the practice everywhere, to sing to the organ amorous and filthy songs;² and that such cleanly stuff is in the person of the church offered to God,³ instead of responses and divine praises, and that experience witnesses that the hearers are thereby excited to profane and filthy things.⁴ He allows not this indeed, but in some, and with limitation, laying the blame of the rest upon the pastors of their church, who seek not, as he says, the things of Christ;⁵ and would have us believe the church approves it not, when yet he allows it to be the common practice everywhere.⁶ It seems, she does but tolerate filthiness in the church, as she does in the stews, that she may be holy uniformly everywhere. However, if any one should, out of simplicity, think it lawful to mix profane and filthy songs with divine worship for recreation sake, because he sees that this custom hath commonly prevailed, Navarre would excuse him from mortal sin, as Lopez tells us.⁷

And so will Lopez excuse him too, provided the songs mixed with divine service be not too grossly filthy, and excessively lascivious.⁸

And so he may well excuse those who sing obscene or lascivious songs in the church, but not in divine service, as he seems to do those who sing to one another filthy rhymes on the evening of the nativity, when they are asking benedictions.⁹ It seems that is the usual way to get their church blessings; but the custom of that church needs no timorous advocate; this can plead for itself, and is wont to stand as good as any law whatever, that of God not excepted.¹⁰

Their sacrament of penance also is an honest occasion; and there in confessions, as one of their bishops informs us, the priests inquire after such obscene and shameful things (instilling thereby into their ears unheard of filthiness and lasciviousness) as cannot without the blushing of the confitents of either sex, and without provoking the wanton appetite of the confessor, be well expressed in any words.¹¹

virī, vel contra viros, cum sint ipsæ fœminæ, vident, legunt, audiunt, aut dicunt aliqua turpia, aut talia, quæ illam provocant. Ii enim quamvis possint, non sunt tamen obligati ad omitendum id quod faciunt, quo pollutionis eventum impediunt.—*Idem*, c. xvi. n. vii.

¹ Hodie vero tanta est musicæ licentia ut etiam una cum missæ ipsius canone obscenæ cantionculæ, etiam in organis pares vices habeant.—*Corn. Agripp. de Vanit. Scient.* c. xvii.

² Turpes et amatorias cantilenas.

³ Loco antiphonarum et divinæ laudis offeruntur, ex ipsius ecclesiæ persona, prophana hæc a falsariis ministris.—*Sum. v. Organ.* p. 453.

⁴ Audientes ex illo sono excitantur ad illa prophana seu turpia, ut experientia testatur, ita quod non est locus inficiationi.—*Ibid.* 454.

⁵ Quia ecclesiastici pastores non quæsierunt quæ Jesu Christi sunt.

⁶ Ubique sic vident fieri.

⁷ Si aliquis rustica simplicitate putaret licere divino cultui recreandi animi gratia, miscere cantilenas profanas et turpes, quia videt communiter in his usum invaluisse: excusaretur a mortali; ita Navarrus, cujus sententiam esse veram judico, si loquatur de simplicibus rusticis, &c.—*Cap. li. p. 263.*

⁸ Dummodo tales cantus non sint adeo patenter turpes, et nimis lascivi.—*Pars. ii. cap. xxxi. p. 188.*

⁹ Addit vero Navarrus, non esse lethale crimen, sic extra divinum officium cantare in ecclesia cantilenam turpem et lascivam, videtur quæ excusare contra Sotum rithmos turpes sibi occinentes in nocte nativitatibus Domini, tempore quo petunt benedictiones, licet non aperte eos excuset.—*Ibid.* p. 264.

¹⁰ The custom of the church is of equal authority, and to be received with the same pious affection with the Scripture.—*Counc. Basil. resp. Synod. tom. iv. Surg.*

¹¹ Quibusdam interrogationum formulis, circa scrupulo as peccatorum differentias, ob-

Further, they allow persons to entertain themselves with pleasure conditionally, upon supposal that they were married together, if the act be not respected as present.¹ They grant liberty to make use of such things as provoke lust. He may be absolved who, by eating of hot meats, hath fallen into grievous temptations of the flesh, and has been drawn to consent to pollution or fornication, though he hath no purpose to avoid such provoking meats, this being done with the provisoes before mentioned.² They are no more severe against immodest touches or shameful sights. To suffer touches from one who is thought to do it out of honest love or custom, is no great fault;³ but if it proceed from lust, in order to the act of uncleanness or impure delights, she sins if she avoids them not; and this holds if she can avoid them without scandal (say they) which signifies they account it no sin to yield to this impure treatment, since none are obliged to give way to sin for the avoiding of scandal. He that by ensnaring sights, viewing another's nakedness, &c., hath been often drawn to sin, may be absolved, though he do not propose to avoid such temptations, with the forementioned cautions.⁴

Men and women viewing one another's nakedness (*pudenda vel partes vicinas*) may be excused, if it be but for curiosity, and a short time, without danger of great commotion.⁵

The beholding of filthy sights, for natural or sensual pleasure, when there is no danger of passing into unclean thoughts (*id est*, passing through the mire when there is no danger of being dirtied), is no crime.⁶ Those who, upon pretence of spiritual mortification, make women strip themselves naked, to discipline them, sin mortally, if lust were the principal cause of it, says Sylvester,⁷ leaving us to think, that if lust be but a less principal motive to do it, it is but a small fault or none. In fine, they account it no crime to offer no hearty opposition unto temptation. He (says De Graffis) who coldly resists temptation, so that it returns upon him, and invades his soul a second and a third time, because he resists so coldly, sins not mortally, if there be no danger of consenting;⁸ as if there could be no danger to consent when there is little or no mind to resist.

scæna et impudica quædam exquirunt, quæ sine utriusque sexus interrogati (cujus auribus inaudita turpitudines et lasciviæ instillantur) rubore, et interrogantis inhonesti appetitus titillatione, vix ullis verbis, aut ne vix quidem, enuntiari possint.—Pontius. Tyardeus. Episc. Cabilon. p. 35.

¹ Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. p. 116; Metina et Victoria in Lopez. c. lxxv. pp. 356, 357.

² Absolvi potest ille, qui ob esum rerum calidaram incidit in adeo graves carnis tentationes, ut eum aliquando impulerint ad consentiendum pollutioni vel fornicationi, sine proposito nunquam in posterum sic edendi. Concurrentibus quatuor prædictis.—Navar. c. iii. n. xxv.

³ Non peccat mortaliter, quæ patitur tactus vel oscula ab eo, quem credit moveri honesto amore, secus vero si ab eo quem credit moveri libidinoso amore ad actum venereum, vel delectationem morosam. Quod procedit, quando potest vitare sine scandalo eorum, qui de libidine non suspicantur. Graff. l. ii. c. lxxiv. n. xi.; Lopez. cap. lxxv. p. 360. Neque pati tactus impudicos licitum est fæminæ, quando sine scandalo potest eos vitare.

⁴ Idem dicendum est (i. e. absolvi potest) de persona, qui—quia videt lavantes fæminas in flumine, aut viros natantes, aut ex aspectu pedum, crurum, pectorum, &c., aut aliorum ejus generis, sæpe peccavit. Navar. *ibid.* n. xxvii.

⁵ Bonacin. tom. i. pp. 8, 9.

⁶ Cajetan. Navar. Medina. in Fill. tr. xxx. n. ccxv. Videre fæminas aut viros—ad solam delectationem carnalem, quæ ex visione insurgit, solum est veniale, ut notat Cajetan. Idemque dicendum de auditu et locutione rerum venerearum, si delectatio non transit ad res ipsas in Tol. l. v. c. xiv.

⁷ Quid de his qui sub specie spiritualis mortificationis faciunt mulieres coram se nudare ut disciplinas inferant? Et dico quod non est dubium, eos peccare mortaliter, si libido sit principaliter in causa.—Sum. v. delect. n. vii.

⁸ Non peccat mortaliter is qui tam tepide resistit tentationi, ut secundo et tertio

They teach that a man, suspecting his wife is an adulteress, may with a good intent offer her the occasion to commit adultery without sin. Also that a servant is excused (when declining it would be a great inconvenience) if he accompany his master when he goes a-whoring; because here is a just occasion, and the action is of itself honest.¹ And a maid too, if she go along with a whore to the house of her lover, to act filthiness with him, or opens the door for him on such occasion. And so is a servant likewise to be excused, when he is sent to bring a whore to his master's lodging, or carries presents, or an epistle, or a message, or writes letters, when the contents are to have a whore come to him, at such a time; or any such (with them) indifferent thing, unless there be an express desire of the filthy act.²

Such encouragement they give to use the preparatives, and play with the incentives, and dally with the temptations to lust and actual uncleanness. For the act itself, how little they make of self-pollution we have seen before, they conclude that single pollution (though a sin against nature) is of itself no sin at all,³ and so they may desire it beforehand,⁴ or delight in it when it is past,⁵ for an honest end, and use the incentives, if it be but for gluttony. Moreover, whoredom itself has excessive favour and encouragement from this holy church. This is too plain by their authors, and their practice, to be denied; and too heinous to be excused by any but those who have a mind to have mortal sins to pass for small, or no faults. It seems it is no sin to build stews for the entertainment of common whores, and the best accommodation of them for their trade of uncleanness. Pope Sixtus did it, as Cornelius Agrippa tells us,⁶ and they were so multiplied long since, that as one of their doctors observes, under Christ's vicars, and Peter's successors, *urbs est jam tota lupanar*, now the whole city is one whorehouse.⁷ It is no sin to farm out whoredom, and to take so much a-head of the strumpets weekly for their practice.⁸ The pope's holiness hath done it long at Rome, and does it to this day; and the whores daily commit lewdness, not only for themselves, but for the pope, their benefactor's, advantage, who is to share in their gain: they drive this trade for him. And the number of his farmers was so great long since, that they brought him in yearly an *intrado* of above twenty thousand ducats, a great sum then, and probably very much improved since. Such an abominable tribute, nature, even corrupted, blushes at; but that *Holiness* at Rome thinks it no shame to maintain his honour and state, as Christ's vicar, by the hire of whores. Evagrius extolling Anastasius the emperor for abolishing such a detestable practice,

regrediatur ad pulsandam mentem, eo quod solum tepide resistit, secluso periculo consentiendi.—Sylv. v. delect.; Graff. l. ii. c. lxxvii. n. ix.

¹ Jo. Sanc. diss. xxxv. n. xii.

² Bonacin. tom. i. p. 828, ibi. M. Navar. P. Navar. Zerola.

³ Non est in se peccatum, secundum omnes.—Navar. c. xvi. n. vii.

⁴ Cajetanus. Sylvester. et alii ibid.

⁵ Aquinas, Paludanus et communis. ibid. Si autem placeat, ut est exoneratio naturæ, non creditur peccatum—appetere pollutionem in somnis sine omni delectatione propter alleviationem naturæ, non est peccatum: sed dare operam, utendo calidis, vel alio modo, esset mortali peccatum, si propter hoc facit. Secus si faceret propter gulositatem, dubitando nihilominus de ea, quia sic esset veniale peccatum.—Angel. Sum. v. pollut. n. ii.

⁶ Recentioribus temporibus Sixtus Pontifex maximus nobile admodum lupanar Romæ extruxit.—De vanit. scient. cap. lxiv.

⁷ Nunc vero sub Christi vicariis et Petri successoribus, ut alius quidam cecinit—urbs est jam tota lupanar.—*Espenceaus de Continent*. l. iii. c. iv.

⁸ Romana scorta in singulas hebdomadas *julium* Pontifici pendant.—*Agrippa. ibid.*

brands it as a wretched tribute, abominable to God, and shameful to the most barbarous people; as that which was a reproach to nature itself and the civil government; as that which did, as it were, by a law authorise this wickedness.¹ Nor do the popish writers deny that it is as bad as he represents it; and yet, since the pope hath made it a custom, they have the confidence to justify it. Hear one of their prime penitentiaries: The gain, says he, or tribute for whoredom, is by the common law a deadly crime; and Nicephorus says it is a filthy gain, detestable, absurd, hateful, and which the most savage barbarians may be ashamed of.² What then? Is he or the great bishop ashamed of it? You may know how by what he adds immediately. Yet, says he, because of the custom, which passes for a law, the pope consenting to it in the lands of the church, *non est peccatum*, it is no sin, it ought to be paid.³ So that the pope's will and interest, passing into custom, can make that to be no sin, which nature, law, history, and their own consciences condemn as a most horrid crime, and that well becomes his holiness, which the worst barbarians would detest. No wonder, then, if they conclude it lawful for any to let their houses to harlots, though they know they take them for the practice of whoredom; the trade is so good, they can pay higher rents than others. No wonder their casuists and divines determine so many things in favour of whores; what they receive for their detestable practice is not to be accounted a reward only, but a lawful debt;⁴ thus their divines conclude, while their conscience extorts this from them, *dolendum tamen est, debitum esse ob scelus putatum*. And so they may demand it, and recover it, and have patrons and officers for their assistance; that whoredom may be practised by rules of justice, and they may force the payment, though there was no price agreed on,⁵ nor is the whore bound to make restitution, though she take more than her due,⁶ nor is it necessary she should give any of it to the poor.⁷ And they are as punctual in resolving prostitutes and their customers about the price of this staple commodity, as about the lawfulest negotiations in the world.⁸ Who may sell themselves to serve the lusts of others, at what rate, what liberty they have to take a price, answerable to the just value, how the value may be computed, and how they may improve it, &c. Though filthiness in a woman be a fault, yet it is no fault filthily to set it to sale.⁹ A man may satisfy the

¹ Τίλος ἱλαυνόν τι καὶ διαμερίσις, καὶ βάρβαρον αὐτῶν ἀνάξιον, &c., l. ii. cap. xxxix. p. 567. Hist. Eccles.

² Lucrum vel tributum ex meretricum opera quærere, inspecto jure communi, peccatum mortale est, et a Nicephoro. l. xvi. c. xl. Hist. Eccl. dicitur vectigal impurum, detestabile, absurdum Deoque invisum, feris quibusque barbaris indignum et execrandum piaculum.

³ Ratione tamen consuetudinis, quæ pro lege habetur, et consentiente rege in terris suis, et Papa in terris ecclesiæ, non est peccatum, ideo est solvendum.—Græff. l. ii. c. cxxiii. n. v.

⁴ Meretricem promissam, ob turpem usum corporis, mercedem, tanquam debitam posse petere, negat Navar. Aiunt probabilius Lopez, Soto. Cajetan. Covarruvias—nam pretium illud debitum est jure naturæ: dolendum tamen est, debitum esse ob scelus putatum. Victorel. in Tol. l. v. c. xix. vid Soto. de Just. et Jur. l. iv. q. vii. art. i. p. 128.

⁵ Qui illis statum pretium non solveret, cogeretur in foro judiciali.—Idem. ibid. Græff. ibid. n. iii. n. viii. Potest illud meretrix petere in judicio. Illis solis lege decreta sunt pretia.—Soto. ibid.

⁶ Græff. ibid. n. ii.; Navar. c. xvii. n. xxxiv.

⁷ Græff. ibid. n. ii.

⁸ Ratio Cajetani, viz. quod usus meretricis est materia vendibilis et non rei sacræ: quam Soto et recentiores magni facere videntur.—In Navar. c. xvii. n. xxxv.

⁹ Licet turpiter faciat quod sit meretrix, non tamen turpiter accipit. Aquinas. in Nav. ibid., Soto. ibid., Græff. ibid.

lust of a female at a price;¹ and he is so far from being obliged to restitution, that it is more than equal it should be paid him; he parts with more for it² (there is not only justice, but equity, and conscience for him in the case); and there is invincible proof for it, since Alexander himself took hire upon this account, and the Amazons were wont of old to hire men to do this work.

Any whores whatever may retain the price of their filthiness;³ only a whore is bound in conscience to restore what is given her by their religious persons.⁴ This, it seems, is the peculiar privilege of their votaries, that harlots must serve their turn *gratis*; and they have so much encouragement more than others to practise whoredom, since in conscience it must cost them nothing. But if a secular person give a religious man money, or anything else for the religious man's whore, that is not to be restored. It would be too hard to part with his whore for nothing.⁵ Yet one encumbrance there is, but very gently laid on them: if the religious man have goods in his power to dispose of, he may (it is not said he must) satisfy a wench when he has deflowered her, &c.; for this is a pious use.⁶

A woman that commits lewdness secretly may take the price of fornication more justly than a common harlot (though she does it justly enough), because in her it is more valuable; the price may rise, being an honest whore.⁷ If a married woman fall into adultery once and again, she may take her price without charge of restitution (it is more lawful gain than to have any such burden annexed), and the adulterer is bound upon his soul to lay it down; for though adultery be illegal, yet to buy and sell it is no sin, if the price be not excessive, and much above the just value of the thing, the quality of the persons considered.⁸ And it must not be forgotten that the adulteress is not to be accountable to her husband for what she gains by this traffic, or a maid to her parents when she prostitutes herself for hire in her father's house, but may convert it to their own use, as that which they earn by hand labour, unless they grow very wealthy by the trade.⁹ And if these women do but take moderate sums for this filthy traffic of those who are not at their own disposing, they are not bound to restitution; because it is presumed that those who have the charge of those minors do allow such expenses.¹⁰

¹ Imo utraque ratione posset etiam masculus a fœmina pretium recipere: quin vero æquius, quia plus præbet: sicuti Alexander in jure naturæ potuit a duce illa Amazone quæ illum gratia recipiendæ prolis invisit, quod et prece et pretio, ut fertur, impetravit. Nam illi fœminarum generi in more erat, pretio accersere viros qui ad illas ingrederentur.—Soto. *ibid.* Graff. *ibid.* n. vii.

² Qui a fœmina propter opus libidinosum accipit pretium non tenetur illud restituere, quin vero æquius est ut illud accipiat, cum plus præbeat, sicut Alexander, &c. Item si causa salutis quispiam emissionem illa egeret, posset amplexum illum pretio coemere.—Soto. *ibid.*

³ Adrian. Sylvest. Covarruv. Soto. Medina. Corduba. Navar. Antoninus in Vasquez. Opusc. Moral. p. 124, dub. ii.

⁴ Idem. *ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Paludan. Palac. *ibid.*

⁷ Porro autem crediderim has multo justius posse recipere pretium: quippe quæ ob majorem honestatem pluris sunt æstimandæ. Idem. *ibid.* Graff. *ibid.* n. vi.

⁸ Quod si de aliis sciociteriis quæ sunt puellæ aut maritatæ quæ semel aut bis collabuntur—et illis quoque liceret pretium recipere: tenebiturque in foro conscientiæ, qui illis promisit solvere, nisi excessus justæ æstimationis pro ratione personarum immodicus esset. Et ratio est eadem S. Thomæ. Nam licet flagitia illa sint lege vetita, datio tamen non est prohibita. Et ideo juri naturali standum est: quo tunc jure concessio illa corporum æstimabilis est pecunia.—Soto. *ibid.* Potest nupta quæ semel aut bis collapsa est pretium recipere absque nexu restitutionis, et adulter tenetur judicio animæ illi solvere, &c. Graff. *ibid.* n. viii. et Covarruvias *ibi*.

⁹ Soto. *ibid.* Idem esse judicium atque de aliis, quæ operis manuum suarum adquisierint, &c. et Graff. *ibid.* n. ix.

¹⁰ Si res est modica pro qualitate personæ, etiamsi a filio-familias recipiat, retinere

This was necessary to be added, that harlots might not be discouraged from admitting boys under age among their customers. Lastly, a nun playing the whore may both do it for hire, and with a good conscience keep it when she hath done.¹ It had been hard measure for their votaries if some provision had not been made for them, that their trade might be gainful, when their own authors tell us it is so common. There was no reason to be partial, and make much difference betwixt them and other prostitutes, when their Clemangis could see no difference betwixt their nunneries and the common stews.² But to proceed with the latter, while they are giving rules for conscience, they tell us the law countenances fornication so very much, that it compels public whores to commit lewdness with any one whomsoever giving her her hire.³ And so indulgent is the church to whoredom, that harlots who live there many years (even as long as they can get custom), do incur no ecclesiastical censure.⁴ So that at Rome, made so purely Christian by its popes, whoredom is as lawful as when it was most heathenish, and is objected as the shame of it by St Augustine, that there the use of whoredom was a lawful practice.⁵ Hereby the people under popery are so well edified that they cannot easily know whether fornication committed with common prostitutes be a sin, as one of their doctors tells us;⁶ for many of the common people (says he) who know not how to distinguish betwixt sin permitted or not forbidden as to the punishment, and not as to the sinfulness; because that simple fornication is not punished, and whores have the privilege of impunity, they make account it is no sin to deal with them (at the pope's rate); and this is very common in cities otherwise well instructed in the faith and religion (of Rome) as those who hear confession well know.⁷ It seems confessors have something to do to persuade the people that that is a sin which the pope publicly allows; and they might have more to do if the people did not suspect that the pope is a man like themselves, and for all his infallibility may, in matter of whoredom, err as they usually do.

But if any man be not disposed to take this liberty, so freely offered, of haunting the common stews, he is encouraged by the law of their church to have a concubine at home, and that without any great hazard. It will not cost him so much as the loss of the communion, for the canon law provides,

potest. Nam præsumitur pater scire, ratasque subinde habere ejusmodi expensas. Soto. *ibid.* Graff. *ibid.* n. x.

¹ Quinimo, ut inquit Covarruvias, Nec monialis pecuniam recipiens ob mercedem sui coitus tenetur illam restituere in foro animæ.—*Idem. ibid.* n. x.

² Nihil distinguit inter sui temporis virginum monasteria, et meretricum lupanaria.—*Espenc. de Contin.* l. ii. c. xlii.

³ Et in tantum lex tolerat hujusmodi fornicationes, ut etiam cogat publicas meretrices ad fornicandum cum quocunque, juxta tamen mercedem.—*Graff.* l. ii. c. lxxiv. n. iv.

⁴ Though one continue a whore for twenty years, yet doth she not incur the censures of the church.—*Vid. Vivaldus Candelabr. aur. tit. de Confess.* n. lx.

⁵ Tu tu sancte pater Augustine. Quid vere terrenæ civitati velut exprobas, quod scortorum usum licitum fecerit, ut quem nulla ejus lex vindicet, cum eadem turpitudine in nostra, hoc est Dei civitate, neque minus permittatur, neque magis puniatur.—*Espencæus de Contin.* l. iii. c. iv. Ratio vero quam prædictus Segobiensis (*Soto*), secutus aliquot alios sentit, viz. quod lex permittit, et facit justam operam meretricis, non tamen alias prædictorum operas, &c.—*Navar. c. xvii. n. xxxv.*

⁶ Fill. tr. xxx. c. ii. n. li. p. 203.

⁷ It is not the common people only that have this good opinion of it. Nec hodie Anistippei quidam deunt, qui simplex hoc stuprum pro crimine non habeant.—*Espenc. de Contin.* lib. iii. cap. iv. Utinam non essent in orbe atque nomine Christiano, qui libellis publice editis, quasi quibusdam fornicandi leagogis, mulieres, et quidem omnes, nihil aliud in vita communi esse putarent, quam rem explendæ libidini natam.—*Idem. ibid.*

that he who has not a wife, but instead of a wife a concubine, shall not be kept from the communion, so that he be satisfied with one woman, either a wife or a concubine.¹ Now, since they tell us sometimes that none who are in mortal sin may partake of the communion, it should seem that with them to live in fornication is either no sin, or none that is mortal.

Their doctrine is as indulgent to those who will not put away their concubines as such persons need desire. Absolution is not to be denied him who, having lent his concubine whom he keeps in his house one hundred crowns, has no hope to recover it if he put her away. Or, on the contrary, if the woman be not like to recover the like sum owing her, if she leave the house of the whoremaster; for, as was said before, none are bound to avoid the next occasion of sin, to their great loss. Nor is he bound to put away his concubine if she be very useful for the gaining of temporal goods by way of traffic.² It is enough that he intends not to sin hereafter. Yea, if the concubine be very serviceable for the delight of the whoremaster, so that his life would scarce be pleasant without her, and other cates would be very distasteful to him, and another woman, so much for his purpose, would hardly be found, the whoremaster will not be obliged to put her away.³ Neither is absolution to be denied if he might lose his reputation by quitting his whore; yea, or if the concubine would be disgraced thereby. It is enough if he firmly promise not to sin more with her, since it is in his power not to sin, although there be present danger of it while she stays in his house.⁴

But what if he sin with her still, after such promises to the contrary? That will not hinder if he repent still; and he may truly repent (in their way), and be absolved, when there is no appearance of amendment. So he determines in a like case after others.⁵ Accordingly, Bonacina determines a confessor may absolve one who keeps a whore, and will not put her away, if he cannot do it without much disgrace, or scandal, or other great inconvenience.⁶ And him also who sins but seldom with his whore, three or four times in a year (or thereabouts), and hopes he may not relapse further.⁷ And so may a youth be absolved who keeps a whore in his father's house, with whom he sins customarily, though he put her not away, so that he have a firm purpose to desist.⁸ But what if after such a purpose he relapse still? He may be absolved still (as we heard before), even innumerable times, because so oft we are to forgive our brother.⁹

Or if a concubine at home will not satisfy an unclean person, but he commit fornication with others, yet if he make but himself drunk before, that fornication will be no sin, or but an inconsiderable fault, if he be but half drunk.

Nor will adultery be a sin in that or many other cases. Christ teaches that 'he who puts away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery,' Mat. v. 32; yet they teach that where the marriage is both firm and consummated by conjugal enjoyment, yet the parties may

¹ Decret. dist. xxxiv. c. iv. Is qui non habet uxorem, et pro uxore concubinam habet, a communione non repellatur. Rabanus. l. pœnit. c. x. alleges a Spanish Canon for this. And Gratian. dist. xxxiv. and Espencæus de contin. l. ii. c. vii. Jacobus Curio. l. ii. Chron. says of Gregory vii., Quasi calibatum perpetuum concubinatus temperamento mitigaret, sacerdotem unius concubinæ societate contentum ab officio non repellendum statuens.—*Vid. ibid.*

² Jo. Sancius. disp. x. n. xx.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ N. xxi.

⁵ Absolvendum fore toties quoties vere pœnituerit, non solum quando aliqua emendatio notatur; ut tenent. Suar. Graff. Navar. Coriolan. Lopez.—quod possit absolvi pœnitens, etiamsi nullus appareat profectus, tenet Vivaldus.—*Ibid.* n. xvi.

⁶ De Matrim. disp. iv. punct. xiv. n. xi.

⁷ *Ibid.* n. xii. juxta Graffium et alios.

⁸ *Ibid.* n. xiii. ita Graffius. Lopez. et. alii.

⁹ Jo. Sanc. *ibid.* n. xvi.

be separated as to cohabitation, and as much divorced as they can be for adultery (by their doctrine), either for outward danger, or when one tempts the other to mortal sin, or for that which they call heresy, or if either of them will enter into a monastery.¹ And if there had not been carnal knowledge after the marriage, though it be firm and valid, yet if either of them will make the monastic profession, the other is at liberty to marry another, and live together as man and wife, the parties whom they first married still living. So that if a wife will turn nun, she may put away her husband (doing it *eo ignorante vel invito*²), and he may marry another wife.

The Council of Trent confirms this to purpose, when it curses those who hold that lawful matrimony, not consummated, is not dissolved by a solemn religious vow.³ It is acknowledged by Boniface VIII.,⁴ and Gregory XIII.,⁵ that this of matrimony is a bond made firm and indissoluble by God himself, and the other, of a vow, but a church constitution; yet (as was observed long since) the Trent prelates will not only have a human bond to dissolve a divine, but will have those accursed who will not believe that an institution of man, born many hundred years since the apostles, should prevail against a divine institution, made at the creation of the world.⁶ Thus in behalf of their pretended chastity, they have opened a broad way for real adultery; and who could expect more reasonable decrees in such a case?

This for their laity; then for their clergy and monastics, their doctrine is, that adultery is not so much a sin as marriage,⁷ no, nor incest, or sodomy, or bestiality, so that they may better venture upon any of these abominations than upon that state which the Lord hath authorised and honoured. And he is more capable of orders amongst them who hath kept two whores, than one who hath been twice married, or but once married a widow.⁸ An incestuous person, says Erasmus, is admitted to be a bishop, a murderer, a robber, a sodomite, a sacrilegious wretch; a parricide, is admitted, and who not?⁹ *Solus digamus*, one that has been twice married, is only excluded from this honour, though he alone be blameless. The apostle commends marriage to prevent the heats of lust, which he calls burning; but burning lust is with them innocent. To burn, says Valentin, does not signify to burn with the flames of lust, for this in itself is not evil.¹⁰ The apostle determines it better to marry than to burn; but Bellarmine says, it is worse to marry, however our adversaries gainsay (where he puts the apostle with us amongst his adversaries), especially for her who is under solemn vow; and a little after he tells us, she that marries after a simple vow,¹¹ in a manner sins more than she that commits fornication; his reason is, because the one

¹ Vid. Sylvest. Sum. v. divort. n. x. et n. ii. Quantum ad vinculum, matrimonium ratum solvi potest per mortem civilem, i.e. professionem tacitam vel expressam religionis approbatam: ita quod remanens in sæculo potest libere cum alia contrahere.—*Ibid.* (vid. Maldonat. Summ. quæst. xiv. art. xiii.)

² Idem. *ibid.* n. vi.

³ Sess. viii. Can. vi.

⁴ 6 Decret. l. iiii. tit. xv.

⁵ In bulla Ascendente Domino.

⁶ Vid. Histor. of Counc. of Trent. l. viii. p. 790.

⁷ Marriage of them who have vowed chastity, is the worst sort of incontinency.—*Rhem. Annot.* in Cor. vii. ix.

⁸ Aquinas, Comment. in Tit. i.

⁹ Annot in 1 Tim. iii. admittitur incestus, admittitur homicida, admittitur pirata, admittitur sodomita, sacrilegus, parricida; denique quis non? solus digamus excluditur, qui solus nihil admisit.

¹⁰ Uri non idem significat quod flamma libidinis uri; hoc enim per se malum non est, imo materia potius victoria. l. de Cœlibat. Cap. vi.

¹¹ Non utrumque est malum, et nubere et uri; imo pejus est nubere, quicquid reclament adversarii, presertim ei, quæ habet votum solenne.—*De Monach.* l. ii. c. xxxvi. p. 1213.

makes herself incapable of keeping her vow, which she does not, who plays the whore.¹ Where we see what their vow of chastity is (the argument wherein they triumph to prove the holiness of their church), it is a chastity which consists well enough with whoredom, and is only violated by marriage. Accordingly, the clergy have liberty to haunt the public stews. It is in reference to those who are unmarried (to wit, the clergy) that the stews are held to be so very necessary;² that no consideration could move the pope or his council to think any thing more fit to be done against the common whores, but only some diminution of their pride and luxury, as one of their doctors intimates. And as if that would not serve, they have been heretofore allowed to keep whores at home, paying a yearly rent for that liberty;³ yea, those priests that would not keep whores (that they might not want temptation to it), were forced to pay the rent, because they might have had the liberty if they pleased. For a monk or friar to lay aside his habit is a crime, by which he incurs excommunication; and yet if he lay aside his habit that he may commit fornication the more expeditely, without the incumbrance which his monkish weeds would give him in the act, they declare him upon that account freed from censure. Excommunication is not incurred, says Navarre, for every leaving of his habits which is temerarious or deadly, because he incurs it not by laying it aside that he may the more readily indulge himself in fornication.⁴ Sylvester had made such a decision before him, so understanding Paludanus, that he is under excommunication who puts off his habit to disguise himself in reference to others, that he may not be known, but not he that lays it by with a respect to himself, viz., for the pleasure of fornication.⁵ So that the censured dismissing of habit is, as he distinguishes, that which is fraudulent, so as to put on another, but not that which is for an hour's pleasure while he is quite stripped.⁶ Panormitan concludes that an oath is never to be given to him of whom there is vehement suspicion that he will not observe it, and he that gives it in that case sins mortally.⁷ Hence Pope Alexander would not have priests bound by

¹ Quæ autem nubit post votum simplex, illa verum matrimonium contrahit, tamen aliquo modo magis peccat, quam quæ fornicatur, quia reddit se impotentem ad servandum votum, quod non facit quæ fornicatur.—*Ibid.* p. 1214.

² Mirum certe tales tantosque viros consuluisse, minuendum modo scortorum fastum et luxum, non etiam ea semel ejicienda, an vero propter tam multos ibi cælibes necessario retinenda? O rem horrendam!—*Espencæus de contin.* l. iii. c. iv. p. 784.

³ Turpissimum est quod (Officiales) permittant (Clericos) cum concubinis, meretricibus, et pellicibus habitare, liberosque procreare sinunt, accepto ab iis certo quotannis censu: atque adeo alibi a continentibus. Nam habeat (inquunt) si velit. Et quoties enim quisque talis, cum tales tam multi sint, hodie aliter puniuntur? Idem. in Tit. c. i. p. 479; Corn. Agrippa de Vanit. Scient. c. lxiv.

⁴ Non incurritur etiam ob quamlibet dimissionem temerariam mortiferam, quia non incurritur ob dimissionem ut expeditius fornicationi indulgeat.—*Navar.* c. xvii. n. cxxx.

⁵ Si quis habitum dimittat ut fornicetur secundum Pet. de Pal. sine dubio est excommunicatus, quod ego verum crederem quando habitum dimittit relative ad alios, puta ne cognoscatur: secus relative ad se, puta propter voluptatem. Sum v. Excom. ix. n. liii. Non affici excommunicatione qui se vestibus spoliatur—ut liberius et voluptuosius peccet. Bonacina Tom. iii. de Excom. disp. ii. q. viii. punct vi. n. iii. Sayrus et alii quos magno numero refert Sanctarell. *ibid.*

⁶ Unde dico illam dimissionem debere intelligi, quando habitus demittitur dolose cum assumptione alterius ad utendum eo, secus ubi dimitteretur ad horam voluptuose, nullo alio sumpto.—*Ibid.*

⁷ In c. Clericus. de coha. Cler. et mulier. Concludit quod nunquam est deferendum juramentum illi, contra quem est vehemens suspicio de transgressionem, et deferens peccat mortaliter et Alex. facit optime (textus dicti, c. Cleric.), ubi non vult clericos cogi jurare dimittere concubinas, Angel. Sum. v. juram. ii. n. xi. Navar. c. xii. n. xx. Ne in fornicationem reversus perjurii quoque reatum incurreret.—*Espenc. de Cont.* l. ii. c. vii.

oath to forsake their concubines, because it seems there was strong presumption they would venture on perjury rather than leave their whoredom. Hence Erasmus had so much cause to complain, that among so vast multitudes who were unmarried, and under the vow of chastity, so exceeding few did live chastely, so innumerable many did wallow in uncleanness.¹ And Cassander, another moderate papist, says that a man could not find scarce one in a hundred of them that abstained from women.²

Before these, the gloss on the Canon Maximianus, dist. lxxi., tells us, it is the common opinion that no priest should be deposed for simple fornication, because there are but few priests free from it.³ If all fornicators had been deprived, their church would have been made desolate, and left in a manner priestless. This was a great reason then, and is, it seems, of the same force still; for at this day, a priest is not to be deprived for simple incontinency. The congregation of cardinals (much concerned for the propagation of the holy church) declared it to be law, that the penalty of deprivation proceeds not for simple incontinency, as Garzias observes; only they must not keep whores in the capacity of concubines.⁴ It may be that came too near marriage to have so much favour as vagrant whoredom. Yet if a priest keep a whore at board and bed, and use her constantly as if she were his wife, he is not therefore irregular; indeed, if he marry her, or an honest woman, all the world cannot excuse him; for though such whoredom never disables a priest, yet chaste marriage utterly spoils him; yea, if he keep in that capacity more whores than one (I know not how many more, for they are not limited to numbers), yet still he is not irregular (as innocent bigamy would make any one though he were an apostle), but the bishop may dispense with him. So Pope Innocent III. determined, and it is now as good law as their church has any; and the more remarkable, because the doctor's gloss on it would have it noted as admirable, that whoredom has with them more privilege than chastity.⁵ Where we may suppose the gloss speaks the sense of such as are strangers to Rome; for that uncleanness should be preferred before chastity is in that church nothing wonderful nor strange at all, but ordinary and obvious. That pope (whom they magnify as the singular glory of their law) decrees that the bishop may dispense with priests who keep many concubines to exercise their office, as he doth also with those who are noted for simple fornication.⁶ And how the bishops were wont to dispense with them is known, their own writings declaring it the custom, as before, to let out those women to them at a yearly rent; and that they were so hard — lords, that if a priest had no mind to the bishop's tenement,

¹ Cum ubique tam ingens sit sacerdotum turba, quorum quotusquisque castam agit vitam? de conscrib. Epist.

Si quis perpendat horum temporum statum, quotam hominum portionem monachorum greges occupant, quotam sacerdotum et clericorum collegia: deinde perpendat quam pauci in tanto numero viri servant castimoniam, tum in quæ libidinum genera quam innumeri divergant, quanto cum probro complures palam incesti sint et impudici, &c.—*Annot.* in 1 Tim. iii.

² In concilio Neocæsar, magis punitur sacerdos qui fornicatur quam qui publice contrahit—jam eo res redit ut vix centesimum invenias, qui ab omni commercio fœminarum abtineat.—*Consult.* art. xxiii.

³ Communiter dicitur quod pro simplici fornicatione quis deponi non debet, cum pauci sine illo vitio inveniantur. Dist. lxxxi.

⁴ Quæ tamen pœna privationis beneficii non procedit in simplici incontinentia, absque qualitate concubinatû, ut constat ex declarat. adducta a Garcia.—*Jo. Sanc. disp.* l. n. x.

⁵ Si presbyteri plures concubinas habentes—poteris cum eis tanquam simplici fornicatione notatis, quæ ad executionem sacerdotalis officii, dispensare—*Extra. de Bigam.* tit. xxii. c. quia circa.

⁶ Notandum mirabile quod plus hic habet luxuria quam castitas.

and did not take it, yet he must pay for it no less than the forwardest farmer.

Sodomy abounds most in Italy (for it was requisite that Rome should be, as it is in the prophetic style, Sodom, and not incongruous that the vilest wickedness should thrive best under his holiness' wing); yet, as if they would have it as common everywhere, and more there than it is, their decisions are exceeding favourable to it, and treat it very indulgently. Married persons may practise sodomy together, the beginnings of it, all of it, bating the last complement of the act, without mortal guilt.¹ Unmarried persons, their clergy, may act it without restraint to the uttermost, and be neither suspended nor irregular. There is no danger of it if they do it but two or three times now and then, yea, they are safe unless they make a custom of it.² The strictest decree that we find any pope ever made against sodomy is that of Pius V., which was yet formed in such terms, on purpose that it should not reach any ecclesiastics, but such only as made a trade of it by continual practice. This Navarre had from the mouth of Gregory XIII.³

And if they do make a trade of it, yet still they are secure if it be not notorious and public; and it will not be counted notorious, though it may be proved, though it be commonly reported, though it be confessed; nor public, unless it be manifest to all.⁴ Thus, if any ecclesiastic will practise sodomy, provided he do it not continually, or if he will make a daily trade of it, yet so he do not keep an open warehouse, the pope has taken special care (even in the severest order that his zeal against this wickedness could ever be brought to make) that the sodomite shall have his liberty without any fear of losing office or benefice in holy church.

Further, they declare that mental heresy is a greater crime than sodomy.⁵ As, suppose a man should believe that the public worship of God ought to be in a known tongue (such a heresy as they cannot acquit the apostle Paul of), the secret belief of this, though never manifested by expression or practice, is in their account worse than sodomy. What conscience are they like to make of this while such is their judgment? Moreover, some of them say that the stealing of thirty rials (about fifteen shillings) is a greater sin than sodomy.⁶ Yet theft is wont to be counted one of the least crimes, and this is none of the greatest theft. Of what value the thing stolen must be to make theft a mortal sin, is, they say, to be determined by the judgment of a prudent man. Those who have the reputation of great prudence amongst them, declare that to steal one hundred crowns, in some case, is no mortal crime.⁷ If they should any of them determine that the stealing of twenty-nine rials, or thereabouts, is but venial, there will but be about sixpence difference betwixt sodomy and a venial fault. It is true they do not commonly deliver this conceit in the terms expressed, but it is clearly inferred from the doctrine of Aquinas, and Scotus too, generally embraced; for he concludes that justice is a more excellent virtue than chastity;⁸ and that the sin is more heinous which is opposite to the nobler virtue;⁹ upon

¹ Zerola, Graffius. et alii apud Dianam. li. p. tr. iii. res. xxxvii.—*Angelus*, v. debitum. n. xxv. vide Navar. c. xxvii. n. ccl.

² Bonacina de Matrim. q. iv. punct. xi. n. ii. ibi. Navar. Quaranta. Riccius. Mattha. Duardus Garzias, et alii.

³ Cap. xxvii. n. cxxlix. vid. Bonacin. ibid. n. iii. ibi. Navar. Rodriguez Lazarius.

⁴ Navar. ibid. n. cxxlviii. Publicum definitur esse, quod patet omnibus.—*Bartol.* ibid. n. cclv.

⁵ Navar. Manual. c. xxvii. n. cxxlix.

⁶ Vid. Vasq. i. 2, q. lxxi. art. ult. Montesinum i. 2, tom. i. q. lxxiii. art. iii. d. v.

⁷ Aragon et alii in Pet. Navar.—Vide Bonacin. de Restit. d. ii. q. iii. p. 2, n. vii.

⁸ Justitia major virtus quam castitas. i. 2, q. lxxvi. art. iv.

⁹ Quod majori virtuti opponitur, gravius peccatum, q. lxxiii. art. iv.

which ground not only sodomy, but copulation with a brute or a devil will be a less sin than petty theft. In short, if their divines (whether followers of Thomas or Scotus, betwixt whom they are all in a manner parted) will be true to these principles, since they cannot deny but there is injustice in stealing one rial, they must hold that sodomy is no more a sin, nor more conscience to be made of it, than of stealing sixpence, when their doctrine of theft has left no conscience of that. Thus far they have advanced to secure sodomy against the laws of God and by those of the church; as for any secular laws, they may laugh at them, for sodomy has ecclesiastical immunity. By the special care of Pope Gregory, sodomites were not mentioned amongst those who are excluded from that privilege.¹ The civil law (I suppose before the unmarried clergy were law-givers) ordains that sodomites should be burned, but the church has provided that no fire may touch them if they can escape that from heaven. Besides other sacred places, the palaces of cardinals and bishops, all monasteries, yea, the house of every parish priest and ecclesiastic, are all sanctuaries for sodomites. They could not well proceed further in favour of this crime, since the eyes of the world was open about them. It is not now so seasonable for the pope's legate (as he did before) to praise sodomy in print as a pious act. These rules and examples considered, who can think that they count uncleanness of any sort a sin much to be avoided? Or who can wonder if Rome became hereby, in a literal sense, 'the mother of harlots and abominations'? or yet think strange that they should be most taken with papal holiness who are most addicted to whoredom and uncleanness?

Sect. 9. Further, it is no sin for the Romanists to take from those whom they count heretics (from protestants particularly) all that they have. This will not be theft or robbery, but an act justified by the laws of their church, which oblige them to do it; for this is one of those many punishments which that law will have inflicted on us; the goods of heretics are by sentence of law immediately confiscated.² There is no question of this amongst them, only as to the execution there is some doubt, whether heretics are bound in conscience, as soon as they are such, to give up their possession themselves, and deliver all they have to Roman Catholics; or whether they may not, without mortal guilt, keep possession, till the papists see it fit to put them out, and seize on all they have. The famous Panormitan concludes that the heretics are bound, under the pain of deadly sin, to do this execution upon themselves, not expecting any other sentence or executioner.³ And there is a pretty army of doctors (*longa doctorum phalanx*) do maintain this with him, but Soto and some others determine that they need not be so hasty to give up all they have of their own accord, but may stay for a declaratory sentence, and seizure upon it; but then a general sentence will serve,⁴ without particular process or examination who are personally guilty, and a sentence by some ecclesiastical person may suffice.⁵

But all of them agree in this, that heretics lose all title and property in whatever they possess, and that for them and their heirs; and this before

¹ Bonacin. in i. præcept. d. q. vii. p. 5, n. xiv. Colligitur reos Sodomitici criminis immunitatis privilegio non privari, quia in bulla Gregorii non exprimuntur.

² Concil. Later. sub Innoc. III. bona ipsorum ipso facto applicantur fisco.—*Angel. Sum. v. hæret. n. v.* Sunt ipso jure, vel ipso facto confiscata.—*Sylvest. v. hæret. c. i. n. xii.*

³ Cujus regula est, quod ille cujus bona sunt ipso facto confiscata, non potest illa cum bona conscientia retinere, quia statim sunt acquisita fisco.—In Soto de Just. et jure l. iii. q. vi. art. vi. p. 21.

⁴ Sylvest. ibid. n. xii.

⁵ Idem ibid. et Angel. ibid. n. v.

any declaratory sentence,¹ even from the first day of their pretended heretical pravity, as the Directory for the Inquisitors determines.²

To lose all title to their estates may seem a small matter, considering that they lose all power and jurisdiction, all right to honour and fame (they and theirs being infamous), to liberty also, and life itself; but because loss of property is great in consequence, let us stay a little on it. All that these pretended heretics have, being confiscated, they are liable to a seizure presently, and though their convenience will not serve them to seize on all, a long time after, yet in the interim the poor heretics are responsible for all the mesne profits³ (it may be in our case for a hundred, or two hundred, years past); and all this while they have no power to alienate or dispose of their goods or estates by gift, sale, will, or otherwise; yea, not of any of it by way of charity, for they are not their own to dispose of. Hence all wills, sales, contracts, for this purpose (it may be for some ages together) are null and void.⁴ And if the heretic will venture to alienate anything he has, he that buys it does it at his peril; for though it pass from hand many years, yet it may be taken away from the purchaser, with whom it is found,⁵ without restoring the price that was paid for it,⁶ and he that sells it is a cheat, and sins mortally, if he gives not the purchaser notice of the hazard, and tell him, that when he sells his estate, or goods, he has no right to sell them.⁷ If the pretended heretic die, and leave what he has to his children, it is no better than if he left them another man's goods which he had no title to.⁸ Yea, though the children be catholics, they lose their portion.⁹ But who are

¹ Idem *ibid.* v. pœna. n. iii.—*Graff.* l. ii. c. xi. n. x. fine.

² Ut etiam tenet director. l. iii. tit. ix. qui etiam dicit, quod dicta bona damatorum propter hæresim, vel hujusmodi, ad fiscum pertinent a die commissi criminis.—*Sylvest. ibid.* n. xiii.

Condemnatio illa retro agitur usque ad articulum quo hæreticus omni ignorantia nudatus, hæresim studio asseruit. Assertio est Jo. Aud. Sed nulla opus est autorum citatione: nam lex est expressa. Et universalis usus et practica St. Senatus Inquisitionis sic habet, nempe secundum normam directori. l. iii. tit. ix. Soto, *ibid.* p. 23; vid. *Sylv. ibid.* n. xiv.; *Graff.* l. ii. c. xxi. n. xvii.

³ Talis clausula, *ipso jure vel facto*, operatur restitutionem fructuum medii temporis—nam a die commissi criminis, non facit fructus suos, sed statim debentur fisco. Fel. in cap.; Rodolphus de rescript.; *Graff. ibid.* n. xxi.

⁴ Donatio vel alienatio facta per hæreticum ante damnationem non tenet—sicut facta damnatione bona alienare non possunt, sic nec ante illam a die commissi criminis.—*Sylv. ibid.* n. xiv.

Habetque eoque vim talis sententia, ut omnes contractus, nempe donationes, venditiones, atque alii, etiam causa dotis, quos hæreticus ab illo articulo fecerit, habeantur pro infectis.—Soto, *ibid.*

⁵ Navar. c. xvii. n. cvi.

⁶ Si hæreticus alienavit, fiscus vel inquisitores non tenentur restituere pretium emptori, quia effectus damnationis retro trahitur.—*Sylvest. ibid.* Fiscus nullo emptoribus restituito pretio sibi adjudicat dicta bona.—Soto, *ibid.* Res quælibet per delinquentem alienata a fisco vindicari possit a die commissi criminis, pretio ipsi emptori minime soluto.—*Graff. ibid.* n. xvii. Non solum revocabit rem, pretio non restituito emptori, qui emit ab hæretico: verum etiam nec ei qui emit, quantumcunque per plures manus transierit, quia non habuit jus vendendi; hæc Jo. Manald. Archidiaconus, et Jo. Andrews, et idem Directorium in *Sylvest. ibid.*

⁷ Navar. c. xxiii. n. lxxxix.—*Sylv. ibid.*

⁸ Nihil habebunt de bonis parentum filii, nec etiam agnati.—*Angel. ibid.* Si aliquis sit declaratus hæreticus, statim potest fieri executio in bonis ejus, exclusis filiis, etiam de legitima.—*Graff. ibid.* n. x.

⁹ Si habuerint catholicos filios, nihilominus confiscantur, secundum Gloss. in *Sylv. ibid.*; *Angelus, ibid.*

Quinimo veniunt privandi ipsi filii Catholici etiam legitima; ita notatur per Genzelinum—quem sequitur Zabarella; et ratio est, quia legitima est quota bonorum, quæ pater habebat tempore mortis, sed pater eo in tempore nihil habet, quando bona sunt confiscata.—*Graff. ibid.* n. ix.

those that may take from protestants (or others whom they count heretics), what they possess? Why, any that will; authority is given to all whoever to rob, spoil, or bereave us. So Sylvester, and others, quoting the Rabbies of the pontifical law for it. It is their determination, that in point of law and conscience, all that will have authority to spoil us of what we have.¹ What he adds is matter of caution for more plausible proceedings in the spoil and robbery. It seems safe that this be not done but by special edict of the prince, or of the church; this is convenient, lest otherwise one might seem to do it rather out of covetousness or revenge, than out of justice and obedience.

By this we may understand in what condition protestants are by the laws of the Romish church, and how papists are obliged to look upon us, and demean themselves towards us. No protestant, from the prince to the meanest subject, has any title to lands, houses, money, or anything else which they possess, or can justly call it their own.² All rules of righteousness, which concern property, are void; papists owe them no observance. In reference to us, we are not capable of injury upon this account; whatever they do against us, in respect of our estates, they wrong us not, they sin not, for we have no title. If they take from us anything, or all we have, they steal not aught from us, they rob us not, because they take nothing from us that is our own. If they burn our houses over our heads, and fire towns and cities (as they have done, and their famous Simanca says they may do),³ they do us no injury, they sin not on this account, because the houses and goods consumed are none of ours. If they deprive a protestant prince of his throne and dominions, they sin not; he is by their law and doctrine but a usurper, and had no just title to his crown.⁴ If they draw any of his subjects into war against him, at home or abroad, they do him no wrong, for they are not his subjects, no more than the popish clergy, who are sworn to another sovereign.⁵ Or if he entrust them with the commands of forts or

¹ Si aliter fieri non potest, manu armata sunt eis omnia bona auferenda, ut 23. q. iii. c. i. Sicut tamen dicit Raynuc. et Gofredus; licet ecclesia videatur dare generalem auctoritatem omnibus expoliandi eos: tamen satis videtur tutum, quod non fiat nisi speciali edicto, vel principis vel ecclesiæ: ne aliter videatur quis potius ex cupiditate vel ultione, quam ex iustitia et obedientia pugnare.—*Sylvest. ibid.* n. xiii. Infidelitas hæreticorum est pessima. Utrum infideles qui non recognoscunt dominium ecclesiæ licite possint suis rebus spoliari? Resp. Hostiensis, quod sic per illud Mat. ult.; Data est mihi omnis potestas, &c., quam quidem transtulit in vicarium suum.—*Angel. Sum.* v. infidel. n. iii. et n. vii.

² A constitution of Pope Paul IV., subscribed by all the cardinals, declares that all prelates and princes, even kings and emperors fallen into heresy, should be, and should be understood to be, deprived of all their benefices, states, kingdoms, and empires, without farther declaration, and incapable to be restored to them, even by the apostolic see; and their goods, states, kingdoms, and empires shall be understood to be common, and to belong to those catholics who can get them.—*Hist. of Council. of Tr.* lib. v. p. 409.

³ Institut. Cathol. Tit. xlv. sect. xiii.

⁴ Tenens regnum contra formam juris et mentem papæ dicitur tyrannus.—*Mascon. de imper. Reg.* pars. i. c. ii.

Propter hæresin rex non solum regno privatur, sed et filii ejus a successione regni pelluntur.—*Simanc. ibid.* tit. ix. c. lxxix. Post latam sententiam declarativam de crimine hæresis, injuste princeps possidet regnum, et principatum, et exercet jurisdictionem in subditos: tenenturque subditi eximere se ab ejus obedientia, et bellum gerere contra illum, si vires illis suppetant.—*Bannes* in xxii. q. x. p. 614. Yea, Bannes says, it is the more common opinion with Aquinas and his followers, that before the sentence declaratory, subjects may lawfully, if they have strength, exempt themselves from the power of the prince, p. 590.

⁵ Vassalli hæreticorum ipso facto liberantur. *Angel. Sum.* v. hæret. ; *Sylvest. ibid.* n. xiv. Principibus apostantibus a fide non est obediendum. Aquinas, ii. 2. q. x.; *Council. Lateran.* cap. iii.

garrisons, they may betray them to the Romanists, and not wrong him, because they were not his.¹ If they take all places of trust, or profit, from nobles or commons, they do them no wrong, because they had no right to them, nor had the children after them any, for some generations.² If they pay no debts to protestants, though they were not only under the obligation of a promise, but of solemn oath, they may justify it, they owe them nothing.³ If trust be reposed in them, or anything be deposited in their hands, or they borrow anything of us, they may detain it; they need not restore it, for they have nothing of ours.⁴ In a word, there can be no parliaments, or convention of the three estates of a nation, because there are none in that capacity. As there are no persons of honour for peers, all being infamous, so can there be no freeholders to choose, or to be chosen, for commons, since there are no proprietors.⁵ And as no laws can be made, can be valid, there being none who have any power to make them, so there can be no aids or subsidies granted, or required, since they cannot be given or required of those who have nothing of their own to give.

Thus, by the popish principles, the foundations of the civil constitution in England, and other countries in like circumstances, are quite blown up, as if they had been at the mercy of a Faux. And those who will follow their conduct, must hold that we have no government, no king, no subjects, no parliaments, no laws, no liberties, no property, and, indeed, none of the rest, because not this last. And all that will be true to the doctrine and laws of popery must believe this, and may lawfully deal with us accordingly; they sin not if they do, there is no conscience in the case to hinder them, or secure us; nay, they are bound to do it, if that which they account most sacred can oblige them, and that as soon as they can. That which restrains them is not the fear of God, but of the penalties of our laws, which yet are of no more force by their determination, than the agreement of a company of robbers, or the constitutions of mere usurpers, which will stand in their way no longer than till they can master the power which bears them up, against that which the Roman decrees and edicts have made equity and justice, in despite of the laws of God and nations.

Sect. 10. Moreover, they may bear false witness, either privately or in open court, for their advantage; and if it do not much wrong another, it is but a small fault, so that if it do no wrong at all, it will be less than a small fault.⁶ On this account they may bear false witness against a protestant, or any other, whom they count heretics, even when estate or life is concerned; for by their laws and doctrine his life is forfeited, and his goods confiscated, and so though by false testimony he lose both, yet he has no wrong, because he had no right to either. They may use fraud and deceit in bargains, to

¹ *Absoluti sunt subditi a debito fidelitatis, etiam custodes arcium.* Simanca, *ibid.* tit. xlv. sect. lxxiii.; Concil. Lateran. *ibid.*

² *Angelus. Sum. v. hæret. n. viii.; Sylvest. ibid. n. xiv.; Concil. Lateran. infra.*

³ *Si quis promississet eis solvere certo die sub juramento, vel pœna, non tenetur; ut ibi notat gloss. Sylv. ibid.; Angel. ibid. n. xv.; Armilla, v. hæret. n. xi.; Ovandus. infra.*

⁴ *Simanca. ibid. tit. xlv. sect. xxvii.*

⁵ *Ipsa jure sunt infames, ut neque ad publica officia sen consilia seu ad eligendos ad hujusmodi aliquos, neque ad testimonium admittuntur. Sunt intestabiles etiam, nec ad successiones admittuntur.—Angel. Sum. n. xx. ibid.* For this there is a decree of one of their general Councils (that of Lateran under Innocent III.), involving not only heretics themselves, but expressly all the receivers, defenders, and favourers of such. *Ex tunc ipso jure sit factus infamis, nec ad publica officia seu consilia, nec ad eligendos aliquos ad hujusmodi, nec ad testimonium admittitur, sit etiam intestabilis, &c.* Cap. iii. in *Crab. Tom. ii. p. 948.*

⁶ *Soto e just. et jur. l. v. q. vii. art. iv. supra.*

get what a protestant sells, for little or nothing, yea, or to cheat him of all he has, for the deceit is not considerable in point of conscience, but for the wrong it does ; and here is no wrong in the case, for he cheats the heretic of nothing that was his own, and so does him no injury. They may use perfidiousness in breaking compacts, agreements, or promises ; for perfidiousness, when it is officious,¹ and does but a little injury to those concerned, is one of the least sorts of faults, by their doctrine ; therefore, when it does no injury at all, it is less than the least ; but by breaking promises, or any such bond of faithfulness which concerns the estate of a heretic, they do him no injury, because he has no estate of his own, by their account. So that if a papist should make a thousand promises, and confirm each of them with an oath to a heretic, that he will pay what he owes him, or restore to him what is his own, he sins not, though he never pay, nor restore a farthing of it, because nothing is due to a heretic, nor is there any thing he can call his own. And this is not my inference only, but they themselves declare it to be the consequence of their principles, and what they deliver in express terms, amounts to as much as this charge comes to.²

Sect. 11. Thus they leave little that can be sin in papists, one towards another, but less towards protestants. It is no sin not to keep peace or faith, not to observe either truth or honesty, towards heretics. It is no deceit, to equivocate with them in private dealing, or public transactions ; it is no dishonesty to cheat them of what they have ; it is no perjury to break oaths with them ; it is no theft to rob or spoil them ; it is no inhumanity to burn their houses over their heads ; it is no murder to kill them ; in a word, it is no sin for all relations to deny them what God hath made their respective duties.

Sect. 12. Finally, natural corruption, after baptism, has nothing in it that can be charged with sin, no, not in wicked men, who afterwards by mortal sin are quite destitute of grace. So that by their doctrine, a fixed averseness and contrariety to God and holiness, an habitual enmity against him, a propenseness to all ungodliness and unrighteousness, is no sin ;³ an inward temper and disposition, though it be most impious, atheistical, rebellious, filthy, treacherous, and bloody, has no sin in it ; an inclination to deny God, to speak all evil of him, to depose him, to advance lusts and the devil before him ; an inclination to adulteries and beastly uncleanness, to murder and barbarous cruelty, to the most prodigious wickedness against God or man, is no sin. Yea, though it be not transient, but constant and habitual, though it be strong and impetuous, though this corruption be reigning, not subdued or mortified ; though it be active and fruitful in all the powers of the soul, though it hurry the lower faculties into rebellious commotions, and follow the superior with frequent and strong impulses, and exert its power and malignancy both in thoughts and affections, yet if the inward motions have not consent, there is no more sin in their acts than in their principles.

In all these evils papists may live and die, and in many more, which I pur-

¹ Cajetan. Sum. v. perfidia.

² Si aliquis promississet eis hæreticis solvere sub pœna vel juramento certo die, non tenetur ; ut Gloss. Et hoc intellige, si est manifestum ipsum in hæreticam incidisse perfidiam, et dicit, Phil. idem etiam si est occultus ; dummodo probari possit. Panormitan. *ibid.* vult, quod a die commissi criminis sunt liberi. Angel. Sum. v. hæret. n. xv. ; Armilla. v. hæret. n. xi. ; Sylvest. v. hæret. n. xiv. He that fails, being bound by oath or otherwise, to make payment, sins not, because the creditor's heresy hath discharged him.—So *Orandus*, in iv. dist. xiii. prop. xxx.

³ Qui ita est habitualiter dispositus, ut adveniente occasione, committeret peccatum mortale, non peccat mortaliter—non sufficit habitualis effectus ad peccandum—ut peccatum reipsa contrahatur.—*Bonacin.* de peccat. d. ii. q. iii. p. 5. n. iii. *ibi.* alii communiter.

posely waive, lest I be too tedious, and many more too, than I have taken notice of, even in plain violations of every part of the divine law, the rule of righteousness and holiness; and yet wipe their mouths, and say they have no sin at all, but are as holy as their church requires them, and as sure of salvation as their doctrine and the power of delusion can make them. Though any protestant, who allows himself but in a very small part of these enormities, we will give them leave (or they may take it from Scripture) to count him an ungodly and unrighteous wretch, who can have no good conscience towards God or man, nor any hopes of heaven (continuing so) but such as will delude him.

Sect. 13. But if they have not legitimated wickedness enough already, they have expedients at hand to do it, for much more; they are furnished with devices to justify all the sin in the world, or at least in their church, when they please to use them. Let us instance in two or three.

That power which they challenge for the pope herein, is notorious. We heard Bellarmine tell us before, that if the pope should command vice, the church must practice vice, or else sin against her conscience. And he says expressly elsewhere, that in a good sense, Christ gave to Peter a power to make that which is sin to be no sin, and that which is no sin to be sin; and what he gave to Peter, they will have us believe he gave to popes.¹ So that it seems, Christ hath given Peter, and consequently his successors the popes, power to authorise any sin and wickedness; only we are to understand this in a good sense, which let any man do if he can. They declare, that he can dispense not only with positive but divine laws, and so make the transgressions thereof to be no sin. To omit the many testimonies for this, produced by others (and which some of themselves count extravagant), let us hear Sylvester, who seems modest in comparison: The pope has power in all things purely positive, and in some pertaining to divine law, because he has all laws in his own breast, as to interpretation and dispensation.² Where, what in his assertion seems restrained, in the reason of it (fetched from the canon law), is unlimited, he has all laws in his own breast; it seems to import that they are all in his power and at his pleasure, so as he may either interpret them, or dispense with them, as he thinks fit. Some of them, in reference to natural and divine laws, make show of denying this in general; but then they grant in particular instances, what is sufficient to make good the general charge. There is no command of the first or second table, wherein they do not hold the pope may dispense, unless it be the first, and to question his power of dispensing there, is no great disparagement to him, since they deny it to God himself. There is no doubt amongst them, but he can dispense with oaths,³ and make it no sin to break them, though they acknowledge the obligation of an oath to be by divine law.⁴ And no wonder it has been so ordinary a practice, since they hold that this condition is still presupposed in the oaths, *if it shall please the pope*.⁵ And though they conclude vows to be more obliging than oaths, yet they teach, the pope may

¹ In bono sensu Christus dedit Petro potestatem faciendi de peccato non peccatum; et de non peccato peccatum.—In *Barkla*. c. xiii.

² Sicut habet papa (potestatem) in omnibus pure positivis, et in quibusdam pertinentibus ad jus divinum, quomodo dicitur omnia jura habere in scrinio pectoris sui (de const. licet. l. vi.) quantum scilicet ad interpretationem et dispensationem.—*Sum*. v. dispens. n. vii.

³ In votis autem et juramentis dispensavit, ac poterat quidem, quod erat in ædificationem.—*Canus*. para. vi. relect. de pœnit. p. 371.

⁴ Reddere vota, juramenta servare, juris est divini et naturalis.—*Idem* ibid. p. 370.

⁵ Subintelligitur—si placuerit papæ, ut in D. C. Venientes. de jurejur. immo in omni juramento excipitur autoritas superioris.—*Sylv*. v. juram. iii. n. i.

dispense with the accomplishment of solemn promises made to God, and so can make both sacrilege and perfidiousness to God lawful enough.¹ The pope can dispense not only with rash oaths or vows, but those that are best, and their obligation most unquestionable. If any (says Rosella, after others) do vow or swear anything that may lawfully be observed, the pope should not alter it when there is no cause; yet if he do release such (though without cause) the release holds good, because he is above positive law, and also can dispense against the divine law, so that he dispense not against the gospel and articles of faith, *Sum. v. juram. i. ii. 4.* But if he do that too, he may stand to it, for many teach that the pope is not forbidden to dispense against the gospel, but only not to destroy the gospel (*v. papa. n. 3*), and we must conceive (if we can) that he may take away the obligation of the rules of the gospel without destroying it.

However, as to oaths and vows, he can totally (they say) dissolve the obligation, *quemadmodum potest ipse Deus*, even as God himself can, because it is likely that God, as he had cause, gave his own power to his vicar, otherwise he had not been a good father of his household, if he had left his flock without a shepherd, who could, as occasion serves, provide for them in all (even to license perjury and perfidiousness to God himself), as Pope Innocent argues; but whether with more reason or blasphemy, let others judge. Whereupon, Hostiensis saith, that seeing God and his vicar have the same consistory, the pope can do in a manner all that God can do, the key not erring, for Christ says generally to Peter, 'Whatever thou shalt bind;' and saying *whatever*, he excepts nothing, *Ibid. n. i.*

There is not any thing in the world which they count more inviolable than their vow of religion, yet he may dispense with this, and the reason is considerable; because religion derived its being from the authority of the Roman bishop, he therefore who gave it may take it away. So Pope Innocent and their canonists generally, *ibid. n. iv.* Hostiensis and others, seem to speak extravagantly when they say, the pope can do as much in a manner as God himself. But this may pass for a modest speech, if they will have him to do more, and more he can do if he can make contradictions to be consistent. One instance of it we have in the question, whether the pope can dispense with a monk to have secular property. Rich. de S. Victore says, it is essential to a monk to want it, and so a contradiction to be a monk, and have it; yet others say the pope can do it, and render those consistent enough, and so make one to be a monk while he is none, *Idem. ibid.*

So for sanctifying of the Lord's day, there can be no doubt of the papal power herein, since they count the command for it positive,² for that he can dispense in all positives,³ is with them unquestionable. Nothing is necessarily required by the precept for sanctifying of this day, but the hearing of mass, and abstaining from servile works. The pope, if he please, may turn these into working days, for he can abrogate them. And since the people, by their divinity, are not obliged to any other public worship but the mass, and that only on these days, he may discharge them from all conscience of public worship, and disengage them from tendering any unto God, for he can dis-

¹ Canus. *supra*.

² Dicimus omnia Christianorum festa, etiam dies dominicos, solo humano jure—id quod etiam sentit, Turrecremata, Archidiaconus, S. Thomas, Waldensis, Navar. c. xliii. n. i.

³ Quæ sunt de jure positivo, potest summus Pontifex, etiam sine causa, tollere et abrogare, et quamvis male faciat, factum tamen validum sit.—Canus. *ibid.* p. 972. Sylvest. juxta mentem S. Thom. v. papa. n. xv. vid. Angel. *Sum. v. papa. n. iii.* Universaliter potest dispensare—contra statum universalem Ecclesie.

pense with the mass.¹ They make it, indeed, sometimes a character of antichrist, to put down the mass; but it is not fit the pope should want power to be antichrist at pleasure; and why should they be angry with us for thinking him so already, since with them herein he may lawfully be antichrist when he list. And he may do as much for the clergy and monastics; all the solemn worship necessary and proper for them, is that of their canonical hours, but the pope can order that they shall not be obliged to say their service.² So Sylvester, after others, concludes; he adds, indeed, that though the pope can discharge them from this service, yet he cannot disoblige them from making some recompence to their benefactors for not praying for them; but for this (he says) they need not trouble themselves; for the least prayer that can be will suffice for that.³ So an *Ave Mary* may serve (that serves generally on all occasions) a prayer (if it may be so accounted) of one petition to the virgin, and not a word to God, not a syllable for their benefactors, they may be as well without it. And so others leave them, determining without any reserve, that the pope may dispense with their divine service, and may do so validly without any cause, too.⁴ So that the pope, when he list, may leave no public worship of God in the whole Roman world; and when he does this, it will be no sin wholly to neglect it. He can dispense against the universal state of the church; so the law of their church will have it. Only, says Panormitan, he should not deface it;⁵ but there is no danger of that, though he should destroy it (as he has done indeed; they ascribe no power to him in this, but what he has given the world proof of effectually), for he cannot deface it, unless he change the universal state of it without reason; and this he can never want, so long as his will is good reason, as they say it is.

He can as easily discharge them from all righteousness towards men; he can make it lawful for a son to calumniate his father; or covet all he has, or to wrest it from him by force, yea, to attempt his life, and when he hath reduced him to want and misery, to leave him perishing for want of relief. This office he did for the emperors heretofore, and is commended for it.⁶ He can take away any man's right, and dissolve all bonds, contracts, obligations, whereby one man is bound to another;⁷ and so can make it lawful to act against all faith, truth, justice, and common honesty.⁸ Further, those whom

¹ Sequitur posse pontificem in hoc præcepto (de missa audienda) dispensare, cum ecclesiasticum sit. He adds only, Dispensare cum aliquo ut nunquam in tota vita missam audiat, etiamsi possit, neque ulla rationabili causa impediatur, non potest esse expediens.—*Suarez*. tom. iii. disp. lxxxviii. sect. ii. p. 1140. Hinc patet summum Pontificem posse dispensare in præcepto audiendi missam. Tom. i. disp. iv. q. ult. punct. xi. n. vi.; Bonacina. Aiunt communiter Doctores posse consuetudine vel humana potestate abrogari.—*Idem* in iii. præcept. q. v. n. iv.

² Quarta causa (a recitando divinum officium excusans) est dispensatio papæ; juxta Cardinalem Turrecrematam, neque aliud sentit Cardinalis Florentinus.—*Navar.* c. xxv. n. cii.

Utrum papa facere possit quod prædicti non teneantur ad horas? Laud. et Jo. de Lig. senserunt quod papa hoc potest, &c.—*Sum.* v. hor. n. ix.

³ Sed circa istam suppletionem non oportet esse multum scrupulosum, quia consurgit ex naturali lege potius quam ecclesiæ præcepto; ut recompensetur benefactoribus: quod etiam per minimam orationem fieri potest.—*Ibid.* n. v.

⁴ Bonacin. Divin. Offic. disp. i. q. vi. p. iii. n. i.

⁵ Sum. Rosell. v. papa.

⁶ So the Emperor Henry IV. was used by his own son, excited by the pope; and Baronius will have it, past denial, an eminent work of piety.—*Annal.* tom. xii. an. 2156. n. xiv.

⁷ In omnibus et per omnia potest facere et dicere quicquid placet, auferendo etiam jus suum cui vult.—*Specul. Guliel. Durand.* l. i. par i. de legit. sect. vi. n. li.

⁸ Utrum possit aliquem absolvere ab obligatione, qua tenetur alteri homini? et dico

God hath joined together in lawful matrimony, the pope (they say) hath power to separate, and sometimes, so as to marry others, and so live in adultery without sin, as he did with the son of the Conde D'Olivares.

If there have been no carnal knowledge, they make no bones at all of the pope's dissolving marriages, how firmly soever contracted, or solemnly celebrated. No, nor if they have had that full consummation with reluctance. But there is one rarer feat that the pope can do, he has power to dispense with persons to marry and continue so, not during life, but for such time as they desire, a year or two, or till they can have a child, and then be unmarried again, and freed from all bonds of that state, without any divorce or occasion for it. Jo. Andreas (a principal rabbi of their church Talmud) says, He had disputed this question, whether the pope might not dispense with a king's only son, being a monk, to marry for a while, till he could get a boy, and after return to his monastery and unmarried condition? He answers, That the pope, whose power is disputed, may resolve it himself, yet he may be advised to forbear, but many maintain, that if he should dispense, the dispensation would stand good (according to whom, the pope is not forbidden to dispense against the gospel, when he sees cause, but only not to destroy it, as before), and this holds especially, if the party would be content to be married for a while, rather than for ever. So Andreas, and the same, it seems, is defended by Jo. Antonius, bishop of Alexandria (in Millain), by Baldus, by Fulgosius, and Baptista Toruamala. Our author will not grant that the pope cannot dispense with a religious person to be married a little, but makes it a question whether he can let him marry during life.¹

Moreover, he can not only legitimate adultery, but incest; for they teach that he can dispense with marriages in those degrees which God's law forbids, even such as are acknowledged to be against the dictate of nature.² They except no degree of consanguinity, but only the first in the direct line, viz. marriage betwixt parent and child; they say he can license it in the first degree in the collateral line, viz. betwixt brother and sister.

Some indeed stick at this, because they observe not that the pope has dispensed in this case. But the credit of their St Antoninus will not be questioned, who tells us that Pope Martin the Fifth dispensed with one who had married his own sister.³ Yea, he takes upon him to dispense with sodomy.⁴ Sixtus the Fourth gave license to the whole family of Cardinal St Lucy, that they should use sodomy in the three hotter months, June, July, and August.⁵ And Alexander the Sixth gave the cardinal De Valentia leave to bugar the Marquis De Zaneta, his own natural son.⁶

The most modest opinion at first blush (which yet ends little better than the worst) that I have observed amongst them, concerning the pope's power in reference to the laws of God, is that of Richard De Sancto Victore, as Angelus reports it, that the pope can dispense with the divine precepts when the reason of them ceaseth; otherwise, says he, God (if he had not so em-

secundum Innocentium quod hoc potest, de plenitudine potestatis.—*Sylvest. v. papa. n. xiii.*

¹ Sum. Rosell. v. papa. n. iii. et iv.

² So Aquinas (in Dian. v. matrim n. lvi.) Bonaventur, Scotus, Durand. Alensis, Richard. Augustinus Triumph. Cajetan, Roffensis (in Victorell. ad Tol. l. vii. c. ix.)

³ Fe re omnes gradus Mosaica lege prohibiti, sunt etiam prohibiti naturali.—*Sylv. v. papa. n. xvii.*

⁴ Reperitur tamen Martinus V. ut Archiepiscopus (viz. Antoninus), refert, dispensasse cum eo, qui cum sua germana contraxerat, et consummaverat, habito consilio cum peritis theologis et Canonistis. Idem. ibid. et Angelus. v. papa. n. i.

⁵ Vid Myst. iniquitatis, 1310.

⁶ Ibid. 1328.

powered him) would not seem to be a good master of his household¹ (not wise, say some; not diligent, say others; for this is a common argument for the papal prerogative). We must take heed how we question the pope's power herein, for if we do, they may question the government of God. And herein he is followed by Sylvester,² a Dominican, and Angelus,³ a Franciscan (though in other things they often clash) who tell us that besides divines, all the canonists agree in it, if well understood.⁴ And this the former extends to particular cases, whether in the natural or divine law,⁵ and the latter concludes it, not only as to the precepts of the second table, but as to all the commands, both in the Old and New Testament.⁶ All the question is, How one may know when the reason of God's law ceaseth in any case?⁷ To which he answers, That this we sometimes may learn by the examples of God himself, who many times dispensed with his own law. So that in such cases, it seems, the pope may do as much as God himself. But this may not prove enough to serve the pope's turn. So he adds, when we have not an example of that, or the like dispensation in Scripture, the declaration of it (that is, when the reason of the law fails) in any other case belongs to the pope alone.⁸ Accordingly Sylvester, He may, when there is any doubt, authoritatively explain whether or no in any certain case the reason of the divine or natural precept takes place.⁹ The pope, if he were God (as they too often call him) needs not herein desire more power than this; he may declare that the reason of the divine law ceases when he pleases, and so he may dispense with it when he list. Thus the pope might discern the reason of the law for marriage to cease, when Olivares had declared Julian Naleasor his heir, and so gave him leave to marry another wife, when he had one already, lawfully married (yet his holiness might be hastier herein than some doctors would have him, who though they hold the pope can dispense with one to have two, or more wives at once, yet think it not so very fit to be done, while catholics are so plentiful).¹⁰ And he would have seen something more in Harry VIII.'s case, than he let the world know, if the emperor Charles V. had not stood in his light. And so in that against perjury, Clement VII. saw the reason of it cease, when he saw it his interest that Francis I. should break his oath. And Sixtus IV. could well see that the reason of that law against sodomy ceased in the hotter months, and so dispensed with it then, though not in cooler seasons.

But what if the pope should mistake in his declaration about the law, and the reason of it, and so err in dispensing with it? This must not easily be supposed. I firmly believe, says Angelus, that if any one seeking a dispensation, in any case against the law of God, not interposing the importunity of gifts and solicitations, do put himself simply into the pope's hands,

¹ Si occurreret casus particularis in quo deficeret ratio legis—tunc papa posset dispensare; aliter, ut dicit Ricar. non videretur Deus fuisse bonus pater-familias. V. papa. n. i.

² V. papa n. xvi.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Et in prædicta opinione concurrunt omnes Canonistæ, si bene intelligantur.—*Idem. ibid.*

⁵ Potest ea interpretari in dubio authoritative, scil. utrum in aliquo determinato casu, habeat locum ratio divini, aut naturalis statuti, vel non.—*Sylvest. ibid.*

⁶ Et quod dico de præceptis secundæ tabulæ, idem dico de omnibus præceptis veteris et novi Testamenti.—*Angelus. ibid.*

⁷ Sed quis poterit scire quando ratio legis deficit in aliquo casu? Resp. quod istud aliquando habemus exemplo Dei, qui multoties dispensavit in sua lege.

⁸ Sed quum talis dispensationis vel similis non habemus exemplum in scriptura, tunc ad solum papam pertinet ipsius declaratio.—*Idem. ibid.*

⁹ Supra.

¹⁰ Vid. Sum. Rosell. v. papa. n. v.

with a declaration of his case, that God will not suffer his vicar to err in dispensing.¹ Yet if the worst should come to the worst, and the pope should err herein, that will make no alteration in the case before us; for though it may be a fault to dispense, yet the crime he dispenses with may be no sin to him who has his holiness's leave to commit it. I judge, says Navarre, that though the dispenser may be in fault, yet he that is dispensed with is excused, if, relying honestly upon the authority of his superior, he thinks it was granted upon just cause, till he be convinced that it was not justly granted.² For all this, Bellarmine has the confidence to affirm that no catholic ever held that the pope could dispense any way with the divine commands, and yet what is it less that himself ascribes to the pope, when he says by his indulgences we are disobliged from the command of bringing forth fruits worthy of repentance?³ These fruits are, by their own account, all good works; and so in time the pope can make it to be no sin to live without the worship of God, righteousness towards men, and good works, which respect either.

Sect. 14. But they need not make use of the pope's authority for this purpose; there are other expedients nearer hand will serve to make any sin lawful. One is *probable ignorance*, and that, when upon a *probable ground*, error is conceived to be truth, and that which is sin indeed is taken to be no sin. When upon such a ground one ventures upon a crime, it will not be criminal. Now, they give an account of several things, each of which will serve them herein for a probable ground.

First, a *probable reason*, when there are arguments *pro* and *con*, all probable in his judgment that views them, if he follows that which seems to him most probable, he sins not, though it lead him into sin.⁴ They lay great weight upon authority, and think it safe to follow the herd in a common opinion; yet one good reason, they say, is to be preferred before the common judgment of their writers, and one may venture against the stream, being backed with it.⁵ Nor is there need to be very scrupulous about the probability of a reason; it is enough if it seems but probable to him that weighs it, yea, though it seem but so, out of affection to him that offers it.⁶ And that may as well pass for more probable, which is more favourable to the inclination of the inquirer, and he may be his own judge in the case, and act against the scruples of his conscience when he has probable reason. But when there are more reasons against it, and but one probable for it, must not the more sway us, since that is safer, and that which is safer is to be chosen, according to the common rule? No, we are not obliged, for that rule even in matters of faith and practice is only a counsel;⁷ not a pre-

¹ Ibid. n. ii.

² Arbitror autem, quod licet dispensator peccet, tamen dispensatus, si bona fide nixus autoritate superioris, putat eam justa de causa esse datam, excusatur donec satis noverit eam non fuisse sic datam.—*Ibid. prælud.* ix. n. xiii. xiv.

³ Indulgentiæ—faciunt tamen, ut pro iis panis, quæ nobis per indulgentiam condonantur, non teneamur præcepto illo de faciendis dignis pœnitentiæ fructibus.—*De pœnit.* l. iv. c. xiii. p. 1068.

⁴ Quando homo occurrentibus rationibus in utramque. partem suo judicio probabilibus, eligit eos quæ sibi videntur probabiliores, quæ tamen revera sunt contra veritatem, cui ipse alias bene effectus est: tunc iste (licet contra veritatem erret, et sic laboret ignorantia contraria) nulla culpa errat: sic doctores Communiter.—*Sancta Clara*, Dens. nat. gr. problem. xv. p. 87.

⁵ Navar. cap. iii. n. viii.

⁶ Ignorantia excusat—etiam cum quis, in affectione ad suum doctorem, judicat probabiliter, ut sibi videtur, esse verum, quod est falsum.—*Sylvest. sum.* v. opinio. n. i.

⁷ Navar. c. xxvii. n. 281.

cept; we are only enjoined to do what is *safe*, not to what is *safer*, and a practice upon a probable reason is safe enough.¹

Sect. 15. Secondly, *custom* is another probable ground which (with them) will secure a person from sin in doing what is unlawful. It is ordinary with their casuists to conclude a practice innocent when there is custom for it, though otherwise they condemn it as a sin. So Navarre determines that if it were a custom to observe the Lord's-day only till noon, or till mass were ended in the morning, it would be no sin to spend the rest of it in servile works.² And that of Cajetan is observable: he takes notice that it is a practice in the church of Rome to sing to the organ profane and filthy songs when they are at church for worship. This the cardinal reflects upon severely, condemns it as a mortal sin, and a crime of sacrilegious superstition; yet in the conclusion, thinks something of it excusable upon the account of custom and probable ignorance.³ Those who in dancing use habit, gesture, or songs which are notoriously lascivious, as immodest women who wantonly lay open their breasts, and men who expose without due covering their shameful parts; they sin mortally.⁴ So De Graffis had concluded (as any person that is not past shame would do); but then he presently corrects himself: Yet of this, says he, we can pass no certain judgment, but must stand to the custom of the country.⁵ Though so much wantonness seem a mortal sin, yet if it be the custom he cannot certainly judge it any. In like manner Sylvester determines of a habit that will not suffice to hide their shame; if it be a custom, though not laudable, and without ill intention, no general rule can be formed against it.⁶ In positive precepts, where things are evil because prohibited, custom will excuse.⁷ And so fornication, which, in the judgment of Durandus and some others, is of this nature, needs nothing but custom to excuse it from being a sin.⁸ So much they ascribe to custom that they will have the Scripture not to direct and regulate it, but to follow it and be conformed to it even in its changes, so that the sense and obligation of the divine rule shall be changed, as the Romanists change fashions. This Cardinal Cusanus affirms. The Scripture (says he) is fitted to the time, and variably understood, so that at one time it is expounded according to the current fashion of the church, and when that fashion is changed, the sense of Scripture is also changed; and again, no wonder if the practice of the church do take the Scripture, one time one way and another time another, for the sense of it keeps pace with the practice.⁹

¹ Hoc potest facere (viz. crebro contra scrupulos) tuta conscientia ex consilio proprio, quando habet probabilem rationem.—*Sylvest. v. scrupul. n. iii. Regul. v.*

² Cap. xiii. n. v.

³ Excusandos tamen illos crediderim, qui simplici corde credentes licere non turpia, sed vana, quasi pro recreatione pulsare, pro eo quod ubique sic vident fieri, erraverunt—tales enim ex ignorantia probabili erraverunt.—*Sum. v. Organ.*

⁴ Qui habitu, gestu, cantu, notabiliter lascivo, in ludo chorearum utitur, sicut feminae inverecundas pectora lascive nudant, viri partes inverecundas indecenter cooperatas ostendunt, peccant mortaliter.

⁵ Verum de hoc pro certo judicare non possumus, sed standum est consuetudini patriæ l. ii. cap. cxx. n. xvi.

⁶ Sum. v. Ornat. n. vii.

⁷ In his quæ ideo sunt mala quia prohibita, ut communiter positiva præcepta, excusat consuetudo præscripta, quia tollit legem, et est legum interpres: Imo hac ratione dico, quod excusat etiam si non sit præscripta, modo sit rationalis et scienter tolerata, &c.—*Idem. ibid. v. scrupul. n. iv. reg. v.*

⁸ Supra.

⁹ Scripturasque esse ad tempus adaptatas, et varie intellectas, ita ut uno tempore secundum currentem universalem ritum exponerentur, mutato ritu iterum sententia mutaretur.—*Epist. ii. ad Bohem. de usu Com.*

Nec mirum si praxis ecclesiæ uno tempore interpretatur scripturam uno modo, et alio tempore alio modo: intellectus enim currit cum praxi.—*Idem. epist. vii.*

This was urged in the Council of Trent, and judged to be the meaning of the Lateran Council, when it decreed that the Scripture should be expounded according to the doctors of the church, or as custom has approved.¹ Thus it must come to pass, that what the word of God, in its true meaning, did once condemn as a sin, if it become the Roman practice, the divine precept will change its sense, and the act will be no sin. It was a sin once by the word of God to deprive the people of the cup in the eucharist, but since it was the custom of Rome, the Scripture has changed its meaning, and it is now no sin. To worship images was a crime condemned in Scripture, as that which God most abhorred, but being once the practice of the Romanists, the Scripture renounced the former sense, and it is now far from being criminal. It has not only made a change in the word of God, but in the nature of the thing, and the same thing which was idolatry is now no such matter. Of the law against idolatry (says Sylvester), nothing must be said, because now by the grace of Christ it is not in use.² It is not in use, because it is their custom; it is not the same thing that it was to all the world besides, because they use it. And what custom has done in these instances, it may as well do in any other; when all sin is once the practice of that church (as the worst is already), there will be no sin in it.

Sect. 16. Thirdly, Another probable ground is a *considerable authority*, or the opinion of one whom we may trust; hence this is their doctrine, that he who does what is sinful, following the judgment of an able doctor, is excused from sin. This principle is without ground appropriated to the Jesuits, with the pernicious consequences of it; it was current in the church of Rome before the fathers of that society were infants. Panormitan thus determines: He that follows the opinion of any doctor, not curiously examined, which afterward appears false, is excused from sin, so long as it appears not to be false.³ In Sylvester, this is confirmed, and he directs to several proofs out of their law for it; removes what, by mistake, is alleged out of Aquinas against it; and shews that both their great saint and their great abbot agree with others, that this is safe in points which concern either faith or manners, when they are not evident (not clearly and manifestly determined). To him, one doctor may be sufficient.⁴ In morals, we must be satisfied with probabilities; and, according to the rule amongst them, a man may probably follow one doctor.⁵ And by a multitude of authors we are not to judge what is better or more equal; the opinion of one, and he worse than the rest, may be preferred before many in some particular. So he,⁶ and Angelus⁷ before him, after others. They conclude, in reference to Joachim, who was not accounted a heretic (though

¹ History of Council of Trent. l. ii. 159.

² *Queritur quid juris de idololatria? Et dico supersedendum esse hic: quia jam per gratiam Christi, non est in usu.*—v. *Superstitio*, n. iii.

³ Panormitan. in C. Capellan. de feri. dicit quod sequens opinionem alicujus doctoris non subtiliter investigatam, quæ postmodum apparet falsa, excusatur a peccato quamdiu non apparuerit falsa. Sylv. opinio. n. i. et Angel. Sum. v. opin. n. ii. Ubi Glossa cum textu. Innocentius. Gofredus, et alii.

⁴ Ibid. secundum Antoninum.

⁵ *Opinio probabilis erit, si illam affirmant boni nominis doctores, imo et si unus doct. Angelus. Sylvester. Navar. &c., Jo. Sancius. disp. xlv. n. lxi. Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. ii. q. iv. punct. ix. n. i. et alii ibid.* For this 24 doctors are produced by Verricelli. Q. moral. tom. i. tr. ii. q. v.

⁶ Probabiliter quis sequitur opinionem sui doctoris: sed neque ex multitudine authorum quid melius et æquius est, judicato; cum possit unus, et forte deterioris sententia multos in aliqua parte superare.

⁷ Ibid. n. ii.

⁸ Ibid. n. i.

his opinions were against the faith), because not condemned by the church, that he is much more to be excused who follows the opinion of a doctor not rejected by the church ;¹ and if he thought it not true, would not adhere to it. Certainly (says Angelus) in him there can be no contempt, and so no sin of disobedience.² It is true, that which is maintained by more and better authors seems more probable ; but they will not have us always bound to follow that which is more probable ; for though this be more secure, yet the rule, that what is safest to be followed, holds not (they tell us) but in points that are properly dubious ; and where there is opinion, we are not properly in doubt.³ Thus Navarre also explains it,⁴ having told us that it is not always necessary to choose what is safer, because it is enough for the fulfilling of the precept to choose that which is safe, even in those things which concern faith and manners ;⁵ for in other things, it is not so much as under counsel to follow the safest. Accordingly, Metina (in Lopez) says : The opinion of expert divines may be held without sin, although the contrary be more clear and more safe.⁶ In short, that an opinion which is less probable may be followed, is asserted (we are told) both by the greater part and the graver sort of their divines ; above forty of their grave doctors are alleged for it, and amongst them, Martin Navarre, Medina, Peter Navarre, Arragon, Bannes, Du Vallius, with others, besides Jesuits.⁷ At present, take only the words of Navarre, who speaks fully : In the court of conscience (says he) it is enough, for the avoiding of sin, to take his opinion for true, whom we probably think to be a man of sufficient knowledge and conscience ; and quotes their Gloss and Panormitan for it.⁸ To whom let me add Sancta Clara, who not only tells us (as we have heard before) that at this day it seems to be the common opinion of their schools and doctors, that the people erring with their teacher or pastor are wholly excused from all

¹ Multo magis excusatur sequens opinionem doctoris non reprobata, cum voluntate non adhaerendi, si vera non apparet.—*Uterque, ibid.*

² Certe in isto non potest esse contemptus, et sic nec peccatum inobedientiae.—*Ibid.*

³ Nec obstat, quod in dubiis tutior pars est eligenda—ut videtur se exponere periculo, qui in diversitate opinionem non eligit tutiorem : quoniam hoc verum esset quum proprie dubium est, sed quum est opinio secus est, quia nec tunc sumus in dubio : nec consequenter exponit se quis periculo. Angelus. *ibid.* n. ii. et Sylvest. n. i.

⁴ Rectus intellectus illius vulgati *Tutior pars est eligenda in dubio*, nempe in eo quod est proprie dubium, quale non est, cum sufficienti autoritate aut ratione altera pars creditur, neque cum ex multis opinionibus una pro vera eligitur, cap. xxvii. n. 284.

⁵ Non semper esse necessarium, partem tutiorem eligere, quia satis est quoad præcepti implementam tutam eligere, ut late probavimus, etiam in his quæ ad fidem et mores pertinent : in aliis enim, nec de consilio quis tenetur eligere tutiorem, n. cclxxxi. Vid. Antoninum. Angel. Sylvest. Navar. Gutier in Jo. Sanc. disp. xlii. n. xii.

⁶ Dicit opinionem posse teneri sine peccato, quæ est peritorum virorum, licet contrarium sit planius et securius, cap. lii. p. 271.

⁷ Licetum esse sectari opinionem minus probabilem, relicta probabiliore, docent Mercado, Medina, Sairus (naming twenty besides, and adding, et alii plures).—*Jo. Sanc. disp. xlii. n. xii.*

Possumus absque peccato sequi opinionem probabilem, relicta probabiliore, et tutiore. Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. ii. q. iv. punct. ix. n. iv. ; Clavis Regia, et alii communiter. *ibid.* n. v. For this Barnabas Gallego, a Dominican, produces near fifty of their doctors, many of them of the same order, and says it is sententia communior inter Thomistas. tract. de conscient. dubi. de consc. probabili. So that if we may trust those whom we see no reason to think partial to the Society, this is not a singular conceit of the Jesuits, but the opinion of their other divines generally, and the more common doctrine of Aquinas his disciples, otherwise most opposite to the Society.

⁸ In foro tamen conscientiae ad effectum non peccandi sufficit eligere pro vera opinionem, quem merito censemus esse virum idonea et scientia et conscientia præditum. cap. xxvii. n. cclxxviii.

fault,¹ but also, when any has a probable ground for what he does ; as when a countryman believes anything to be lawful, induced thereto by the testimony of the parish priest, or of his parents, although he mistake, yet his mistake is void of sin ; according to the rule in law, just and probable ignorance ought to be excused.² So that, to make a sin to be no sin, not only the judgment of a grave doctor so determining, but of a parish priest (who are known to be sufficiently ignorant), yea, of parents also (more ignorant than they) will suffice ; and herein (says he) the doctors generally concur. In fine, if it be the common opinion that invincible (as divines) or probable ignorance (as the canonists call it) is excused from all sin, and that it is an instance hereof when one is misled by a sufficient author, then this is the common doctrine of the Romanists, and not the extravagancy of some particular sect or order amongst them.³

If, then, this principle be so destructive to religion, the souls of men, and human societies, as some of the French Romanists brand it in reference to the Jesuits, the charge falls upon the common doctrine of the Roman church ; for there it is generally taught and received, and was so before Ignatius had founded his order. And this prevents their ordinary exception against our alleging particular authors against them ; they cannot with reason or modesty make use of this shift longer ; for a single doctor is so far authorized by the common doctrine of their chief writers (and so of their church), that any, or all in their church, have warrant to rely on him ; and so, in producing a particular author, in esteem with them, we do, in effect, allege their common doctrine. And indeed, by the premises, the opinion of a grave doctor is the doctrine of their church so far, that any of their church are allowed to follow it, both as to belief and practice. Their church (if we know her sense by the declaration of the generality of her approved authors) does allow all Romanists to follow the opinions I have charged them with, though they be plainly destructive of worship, faith, and holiness, both of heart and life. For I have charged them with nothing without a considerable author ; and what is so grounded is with them probable, and what is probable is safe, and allowed both as to faith and manners. Or if there be any particular in the charge in which there is not a common concurrence, or which is contradicted, though by a multitude of their writers, yet since there is at least one grave doctor for it, it is in their account safe ; and any Romanist has liberty, by the doctrine now insisted on, to follow it (if he please), rather than that which, upon the account of more assertors, may be thought safer.

But as to the purpose for which I now take notice of it, this principle serves to rid their church of all sin, that is, of all conscience to avoid any ; for if that be safe which is probable, and that will be probable, which is countenanced by the opinion of particular doctors, then all the sins which they, or any of them, have already concluded to be no sins (and these are an infinite

¹ Deus. nat. gr. probl. xv. p. xcix. supra.

² Probabilis est quando quis habet fundamentum probabile ; ut dum rusticus credit aliquid esse licitum, ductus testimonio sui parochi vel parentum :—tunc iste (licet contra veritatem erret) nulla culpa errat : sic doctores communiter, secundum illud : Ignorantia justa et probabilis excusare debet.—*Ibid.* p. 78.

³ Durandus ; cum excuset probabilis ignorantia, puta, si habet aliquem doctorem authenticum et famosum, cujus opinioni nititur in *Sylvest.* v. confess. n. ii. Verrec. dubitans et consulens viros doctos falso consulentes, laborat ignorantia invincibili.—*Ibid.* v. Ignor. n. v. Justa ignorantia—qualis est, cum quis petit consilium a viris habitis pro præditiis scientia et conscientia in id sufficienti, qui falso ei consulunt, et hæc omnino excuset. Navar. c. xxiii. n. xlv. ; Graff. l. ii. c. cxxxi. n. xxi. et l. iv. c. ix. n. viii. ; Sancta Clara. *ibid.* p. 96 ; Herrera et Faber. *ibi* ; Bonacina. de peccat. d. ii. q. viii. p. ii. n. ix. et xvi.

number) may be safely committed ; and all that any of them hereafter may determine to be no crimes, may be practised with as little conscience, and as much security. So that a train is laid hereby to blow up the whole rule of Christianity, and all innocency and holiness, which consists in conformity thereto. It has done horrible execution already, and what has hitherto escaped is at the mercy of it, being wholly under the mine, and may be despatched whenever the casuists (their engineers), who are daily at work about it, shall think fit.

Sect. 17. Let me but add some of the rules they lay down for the direction and relief of scrupulous consciences. They must persuade themselves that they sin not, though they break the law in a strict sense, if they observe it according to some complaisant interpretation. A benign sense is rather to be put upon any precept, than that which is strict ; for the precepts of God and the church are not against that pleasantness which a scrupulous interpretation takes away :¹ and that a person may the better be pleased, he may make the interpretation himself, and so make it as benign as he desires, and as favourable as his inclination and interest would have it ; for though, in other courts, the interpretation belongs to him who makes the law, yet, according to their St Antoninus, in the court of conscience, it belongs to every one to do it for his own practice.² Or if he will be so over cautious, as not to rest in his own sense, but inquire the opinion of others (and he may easily meet with those amongst them, who will either make that which he has a mind to, no sin ; or will mince it for him so small, that it may go down without hurt), yet he may choose that opinion which is most for his purpose (that which is most complaisant, and so will best serve his turn) ;³ and if he thinks it probable, though he fear the contrary, and it be false indeed, yet he may act according to it, and sin without fault.⁴ Nor is he concerned whether the doctor's opinion be true or no ; for though it be false, he may notwithstanding thereupon cast off all scruple, and break the law without sin.⁵ Thus if either himself, or any other will give him liberty to sin, when the law gives it not, yet he may take it, and his sin will be no sin.

Secondly, he must persuade himself he sins not when he breaks the law, not only if it be impossible, but if it be very difficult to keep it.⁶ Now it may be very difficult to avoid sin, when his employment leads, or when his complexion inclines him to it, or when he has got a habit of sinning, or otherwise when he is under temptation ; and if it will be no sin to break the law in these and the like cases, he may make wickedness his daily practice with-

¹ *Sexta (medicina) usus æquitatis circa leges ; de qua S. Thom. persuadendo sibi non peccare—qui (legem) in sensu benigniori servet, quamvis in duriori violet.—Navar. c. xxvii. n. cclxxxiii.* Cæteris paribus inter sententiam benignam et duram circa præcepta potius benigna interpretatio facienda est, secundum. Jo. de Amb. Vervec. et Archi. et ratio est, quia præcepta Dei et ecclesiæ non sunt ad tollendam dulcedinem, quam aufert interpretatio scrupulosa.—*Sylvest. v. Scrupul. n. iv.*

² Interpretando discrete præcepta non solum humana, sed et divina, maxime affirmativa : quæ interpretato licet in foro contentioso ad eum spectet ad quem est editio legis : tamen secundum Archi. in foro conscientie, pertinet ad quemlibet pro facto suo.—*Idem, ibid. n. iii.*

³ Septimum est eligere opinionem magis facientem ad propositum proprium.—*Ibid.*

⁴ Si credat probabiliter sic esse faciendum, etiamsi sit cum formidine alterius partis, non peccat illud agendo, etiamsi falsa esset ejus opinio. *Sylvest. Antoninus. in Fill. tr. xi. n. clxxxii. ; Sylv. ibid. n. iii. ad. ob. ii.*

⁵ Excusatur, etiamsi sequatur consilium falsum, quia fecit quod potuit.—*Sylv. ibid. n. v.*

⁶ Non peccare—qui eam non servat, ubi et quando est impossibile aut valde difficile.—*Navar. ibid.* Nec Deus nec ecclesia intendit obligare ad vix possibile alicui, secundum Jo. de Amb. Illud esse impossibile dicitur quod vix est possibile : utputa nimiam habens difficultatem. Vide supra. v. potent ; *Sylv. ibid.*

out danger of sinning. But they seem to take *difficult* or *impossible* in a great latitude, as though it might be no more than *incommodious*; and so Sylvester explains it in the place to which he here refers us.¹ Now it may be judged *incommodious* to observe the commands of God, when they suit not his fancy, or humour, or inclination, or interest, that of his ease or advantage; and if then, it will be no sin not to obey the divine commands, a man may go near to be excused from sinning all his life, though he do little or nothing else but sin. The obligation of the whole law, and gospel too, will be superseded by our conveniences; he may omit what is enjoined, or practise what is forbidden, and it will be no sin, if he judge the observance of the rule too difficult or *incommodious*.

Thirdly, He must make account that he sins not by breaking the law, when he may be thought a fool for keeping it, or when the observance of it may be ridiculous.² Now, when sin is general, and the common usage of the times and places where he is, it may be as ridiculous to avoid it, as to be out of the fashion, or to appear in an antique garb. And those who reap pleasure and advantage by sin, will be ready to account them fools who abstain from it; as Nic. de Clemangis says they did in his time. A blessed time when there could be no sin, because piety and virtue were grown ridiculous!³ He must not think he sins who observes the law according to the common usage of good catholics,⁴ and makes that his example and rule, and what conscience he is like to make of sin by this rule, we may understand by the character which the count of Mirandula gave of the good catholics (the chief of them) to Pope Leo. Amongst the most (says he) of the most eminent in our religion, to whose example the silly multitude should be conformed, there is either no worship of God, or certainly very little; no regard at all of good life, no shame, no modesty; righteousness is declined into hatred or favour, and godliness even sunk into superstition.⁵

And if there be danger, it will be accounted folly indeed to expose himself; and whether it be accounted so or not, the apprehension of danger may excuse a man from sin in any case, so Sylvester after others.⁶

There is no need to insist upon their other rules, as that the scrupulous ought to exercise himself in choosing what is less safe (more dangerous) amongst probable opinions, and not to regard (though he cannot answer) the arguments against it; it is enough that he believe what another says. Or this, The confessor may tell him that he should count no sin mortal, but

¹ Aliquid dicitur alicui possibile, quia potest illud commode—eodem modo dicitur impotentia, scil. quia non est aliquid possibile de jure, vel commode, vel honeste.—*Idem v. potentia.*

² Neque cum non servat, ut pro stulto non habeatur.—*Navar. ibid.* Nec Deus nec ecclesia intendit obligare ad hoc, ut quis appareat fatuus, et ridiculo sit. *Sylv. ibid. secundum; Jo. de Amb. Gloss. Innocent. Antoninum. v. Scrupul. n. iv.*

³ De corrupt stat. eccles. Cap. xxv.

⁴ *Navar. ibid.; Sylvest. ibid.*

⁵ Franciscus Picus Mirandula de reformand. moribus. Apud plerosque religionis nostræ primores, ad quorum exemplum componi atque formari plebs ignara debuisset, aut nullus aut certe exiguus Dei cultus, nulla bene vivendi ratio, atque insitutio, nullus pudor, nulla modestia: Justitia vel in odium vel in gratiam declinavit: pietas in superstitionem pene procubuit.

Quamobrem dico et exclamo (neque enim metuo homines, Deo fretus), neminem mea ætate fuisse fidelem dispensatorem, imo papa ipse pacatis populis bella infert, opes alienas sinit, et suas exorbet, nulla sanctitas, nulla religio, nullus Dei timor, et quod horresco referens, omnium scelerum, impii homines a papa sumunt excusationem.—*Valla de donat. Constant.*

⁶ In quolibet casu pretermittens facere quod lex imponit. Excusari potest a peccato, si hoc facit per virtutem *Epikeiæ*, sine contemptu, ratione alicujus periculi considerati.—*Joh. de Amb. Antoninus. in Sylvest. ibid.*

what is manifest to be such, and so manifest sometimes, that he cannot swear it is not;¹ or any else, though they have store of like nature; the former are sufficient to leave no conscience of sin amongst them in ordinary practice, and to encourage sinners commonly to venture upon any violation of the divine rule, with warrant from their doctrine, that it will be no sin to them. Thus they take a course to ease men's consciences, by leaving them none. And what clearer way can there be to remove scruples, than to persuade them (who would retain some conscience, if they would suffer them) that there is little or no sin to be scrupled at.

Sect. 18. This is abundantly sufficient to make it apparent that the popish doctrine is destructive to holiness of life, since they have warranty thereby, not only to neglect the proper acts and exercises of holiness, but to give up themselves to practices of all sorts, which are directly opposite thereto. It is true, they do not acknowledge those practices to be sins or dangerous; but they may with as good reason justify such acts, which they cannot but condemn for crimes, as they go about to excuse these from being criminal. A son of Belial, that has lived in the neglect of holiness, and in the practice of ungodliness and unrighteousness all his time, will scarce pass at the day of judgment for one that is holy or innocent, because he has had the confidence to think so, or has found out some shift to support his presumption; or because others like himself were of the same mind; nor is he like to escape because he had wit enough to cozen his conscience, or boldness to stifle it, or wariness to keep out the light which would have informed it, or self-love to believe those who flattered him, in what his corrupt inclination led him to, or facileness to follow those blindfold who had no mind to see. Those devices which they have found out to justify innumerable transgressions of the divine law (and may serve as well to justify them all), have no countenance from Scripture, nor from antiquity, faithfully following it. This is not only acknowledged, but charged home by some of the French Romanists, upon a supposition, that these pernicious artifices are peculiarly the Jesuits'; but since it is apparent that the divines and casuists of all orders, and those of universal repute, are no more excusable, the charge is justly fixed upon their church and practical doctrine in general. Nor is their acknowledgment needful, it is plain in the writings of those who have the conduct of their consciences, that they consult not with Scripture in these determinations, no more than with ancient writers; you shall find them very rarely meddle with either. An allegation out of their canon law is an authentic authority that passes for the text. A schoolman or casuist of note, that went before them, is a sufficient conduct; if there be a concurrence of five or six, it is then the common opinion, and they are as secure in it as if they marched with a caravan; but if they have a mind to be singular, and have but something like a reason for it, they supererogate, though the reason be such, that the next who examines it puffs it away as a trifle. Such are the foundations of their practical divinity. The masters of it (the casuists) are followed by the priests and confessors, and the priests are followed by the people; and so the blind follow the blind, and those that see not, those that will not see.

But it may be, there was less need to be so long and particular, in shewing how unnecessary it is with them to forsake sin. It is manifest enough by their doctrine of repentance, before insisted on, that there is no necessity they should break off their sins till they be obliged to be contrite; and their doctors cannot agree upon any time for this (though some of them specify the point of death, though then indeed they do not account it indispensably necessary): the people may think themselves excused if they do

¹ Bonacin de peccat. disp. ii. q. iv. punct. viii. n. iii. ubi Sayrus. et alii et n. iv.

not resolve to leave their sins till their teachers agree that they must do so, and so live in them, till they can live no longer. If any particular doctor fix a more early period, and bring some reason for it, though they may if they please, yet they are not obliged to believe him, for no reason is brought by any of them for a more timely turning from sin, but is confuted and rejected by some or other among them as slight and insufficient. And it is no sin not to believe him who proposes to them upon frivolous reasons; yea, it would be an act of imprudence to do it, as Sancta Clara¹ assures us, out of Aquinas and Victoria; so they may hereupon go on in their sins till the approach of death; and he, whom they worship as a saint, and reverence as the angel of their schools, may encourage them herein, since he declares that continuance in sin unto death is not a special sin, but only a circumstance of sin.² Nor need they be afraid of this circumstance, as though it would make their case worse; for by their doctrine, to sin (and so to continue in sin) upon confidence that they shall have pardon by confession, is so far from aggravating sin that it extenuates it. So Cajetan and Navarre after him.³ And that nothing may discourage them from continuing in wickedness, the council of Trent declare (without excepting the sinner's perseverance in sin unto death) that if he be attrite, the sacrament of confession will secure him, though attrition is confessed not to import so much as any pious or ingenious purpose to forsake sin.

CHAPTER X.

The Roman doctrine makes good works to be unnecessary.

Sect. 1. But their good works possibly may satisfy for their other defects and extravagancies, and in these they glory above all, and have the confidence to condemn us, upon a pretence (though utterly false and groundless) that we deny the necessity of good works. Is it imaginable that after this they themselves should hold them to be unnecessary, and so run into the heresy which they charge upon others? I will not desire any to believe this unless I let him see it; but their writings make it visible to any who have a mind to see. They reduce all good works to fasting, prayer, and acts of mercy, or alms-deeds. For their fasting I shall only say this, it is no fast, it is no good work, nor is it in their account necessary. To the making of a fast there must (as they tell us) be the concurrence of these severals. First, there must be no more than once eating. Gregory lies (though both a pope and a saint with them) if this be not true, says Cajetan.⁴ Secondly, this eating must not be a dinner. Bellarmine makes this good by scripture, a troop of fathers, and the perpetual custom of the faithful; concluding that it was never heard in the ancient church, that they did eat either till night, or be-

¹ Quando articuli fidei non modo debito proponuntur, ut rationibus frivolis—tunc enim credere esset actus imprudentiæ, secundum D. Tho. ii. 2. q. i. art. iv. Deus. Nat. Gr. Probl. xv. p. 87.

² Permanentiam in peccato usque ad mortem, non esse speciale peccatum, sed quandam peccati circumstantiam.—*Aquinas*. ii. 2. q. xiv. a. ii.

³ Peccans ob fiduciam, quod postea per confessionem veniam obtinebit, non tenetur de necessitate id confiteri: quia non est circumstantia adeo peccatum aggravans; imo potius minuit, ut inquit Cajetanus in ii. 2. q. xxi. art. ii.; *Nav.* cap. vi. n. iii. p. 98.

⁴ Unica demum comestio, nisi ad jejuniū necessaria sit, mentitur Gregorius.—*Sum.* v. jejuniū. p. 344. Unica comestio est de essentia jejunii.—*Navar.* cap. xxi. n. xiv. Sane si in jejuniū bis cibum capere fas esset, equae hic abstinentiæ forma, vel species quidem foret? Parvi enim refert, quo vescaris cibo, si modo te ad summum satiaveris.—*Polyd. Vergil. de invent. rer.* lib. vi. cap. xvi. p. ccclxxii.

fore three at afternoon.¹ Thirdly, what they take must be less nourishing and delicious than their ordinary fare. And so the church forbids that which in its nature, and for the most part, is more nourishing and more pleasing, the end of fasting requires it, which is (says he out of St Austin) to tame and subject the concupiscence of the body.² All these are necessary to the being of a fast, as they affirm, and yet not one of these is observed in their fasting. For first they eat a dinner, a full meal, at noon, or an hour or two sooner if they please, at the same time, and in as great quantity, as they do any other day; yea, if they eat to great excess at a fasting dinner, yet they keep the fast. As to the quantity (says another of their cardinals, who can best tell what belongs to fasting) of a dinner at a fast, there is no certain measure; but though one be very excessive, and transgress the law of sobriety, yet he fasts well enough; and adds, it is lawful to eat more than ordinary at dinner upon a fast day.³ Others, not of the Society, may hit the sense of the church herein more unquestionably, when they teach, that one who, observing the quality of the meat, stuffs his belly so full as to be so far from any sense of the hardship of fasting, or from repressing the sins of the flesh, that he rather excites and cherishes lust thereby, yet fulfils the precept for fasting. So Covarruvius, Abulensis, Medina, Cajetan, and others, in Bonacina, and he after them,⁴ where, by the help of a distinction or two, intemperance both in quality and quantity, is made perfectly consistent with the fast and temperance of holy church. So that they fast, though they dine, and that lustily, whatever the Scripture, or the fathers, or all the faithful (in Bellarmine) say of the inconsistency of a dinner with a fast. But this is too little for a Roman fast (though many that never dream they fast eat constantly less); they may eat a breakfast too, and yet keep a fast after they have broke it. They may drink ale or wine, and eat bread after it, that the strong drink may not hurt them; or if bread will not serve them (though these together may make a breakfast for a festival) they may eat other things also after their morning's draught, if it be not beyond measure; and these both at their first and second breakfast.⁵ Oh! but thus they eat twice, that the cardinal was aware of, where is then their fast, when it is, as they affirm, essential thereto not to eat twice? Why, says he, a pious construction must be put upon it, it is that the drink may not hurt them; and so taken it seems either they eat not twice, when they eat once and again, or they fast by a pious interpretation, when in the sense of the universal church, and the world too, they fast not.⁶ Thus, that they may be sure to afflict the

¹ Unicum igitur refectioem, eamque cœnam esse debere, nec prandium, cum jejuni datur opera, facile probari potest, extant enim exempla scripturarum, testimonia patrum, et perpetua consuetudo fidelium.—*De Jejun.* l. ii. c. ii. p. 1034. Apud veteres inauditum est prorsus, ut ante horam nonam, quæ est tertia post meridiem, jejunium quodcunque solvatur. Quemadmodum etiam nulla est apud veteres mentio binæ refectioem, cum de jejunio agitur.—*Ibid.* p. 1035, vid. Victorel. ad Tol. l. vi. c. ii. p. 972.

² Certum genus cibi prohibuit jejunaturis, illud videlicet quod ex genere suo, et ut plurimum magis nutrit et magis delectat.—*Idem. ibid.* cap. v. Nam finis jejunii est corporis concupiscentias edomare, et in servitatem redigere.—*Ibid.* p. 1043.

³ In continua autem quantitate prandii, non est certa mensura ratione jejunii: sed quamvis aliquis multum excedat, non ob id solvit jejunium, peccat tamen contra sobrietatem—licet tamen tempore jejunii, aliquid plus accipere in prandio.—*Instruct.* . vi. c. ii. p. 990. Qui intemperanter comedit, dum prandet die jejunii—satisfit præcepto.—*Bonacin.* tom. ii. disp. i. q. i. punct. ix. n. i.

⁴ De præcept eccles. ult. disp. q. i. punct. ii. n. vi.

⁵ Licitus est mane potus etiam vini sine fraude; etiam licitum aliquid sumere pro stramento, potus ne obsit, Sylv. v. jejun. n. ix. et hoc expresse tenet.—*S. Thomas.*

Nec sumere in serotino jentaculo parum panis, frangit jejunium: quia ad hoc videtur serotinum jentaculum reductum ut non referat quid quisqueumat, si modum non excedat. Cajetan. Sum. jejun. it holds as well of a breakfast early as later.

⁶ Sumere vero jentaculum serotinum ad sustentationem naturæ, est proculdubio

flesh with a severe abstinence, they may eat a supper too. And no wonder, for if they can excuse the second eating, it will be, as they conclude, no fault to eat a third, or a fourth, or a fifth time, or as often as they please; but three meals may serve them for a fast, and so one supper may suffice.¹ Indeed, they call it by *canula*, and will have it pass under a little name, though the quantity allowed be great, even full as big as custom will make it, for that is their rule for fasting suppers, not to eat by any certain measure, but so much as others are wont to do; if it be excessive great, that which custom introduces will justify it.² And those that tell us custom is their rule acquaint us also, that it is the custom in divers countries to sup with notorious excess.³ And so they may eat at supper not only for hunger, but out of sensuality, as Panormitan, and others after him.⁴ And thus sensuality and the severity of a popish fast, are perfectly reconciled.

Such a supper these fathers may eat in the morning, if they please. This will be but a small fault, though they do it when there is no occasion for it;⁵ and they may the better fast after, upon a full stomach, till noon at least; but they need not stay so long, for they may drink every hour, or oftener if they will, and whenever they drink they may eat something too, that the drink may not hurt them; and thus they may break their fast every hour of the day, or more, and yet keep it the whole day well enough.

For the quality of their fasting-meat (to say nothing that some flesh is allowed) they may use the most delicious that they can compass, the most curious sweetmeats, the choicest wines, the rarest fish, and that dressed after the most delicate mode, and this at dinner, the meal most repugnant of all to fasting. Oh, how gladly would thousands of our people be condemned to such a maceration of the flesh, for more days in a year than the Romanists are thus pitifully mortified, and never trouble pope or prelate for a dispensation! Nay, they would purchase a license to fast, if any would accommodate them with expedients to do it at such a rate. Besides their meats, they may drink freely, not only at meals, but before or after, though they need it not, and be not thirsty;⁶ the drinking of wine out of sensuality breaks not the fast, says Sylvester.⁷ And thus they may drink before the meat they fast on be digested, for though that be intemperance in other cases, as Navarre tells us, it breaks not the fast.⁸ Sylvester thinks it possible that intemper-

iterum comedere.—*Ibid.* Pie interpretandum est: ut scilicet fiat ne potus noceat.—*Ibid.*

¹ Sola autem secunda comestio peccatum est: non autem tertia neque quarta, vel ulterior: quia illa sola jejunium frangit, secundum Durandum, quam sequuntur recte Angelus, et Sylvester. Navar. c. xxi. n. xiv.; vid. Cajetan. Sum. v. jejunium, p. 392.

² Quanta tamen debet esse, considerata est consuetudo communis patriæ—non enim est peccatum mortale talem consuetudinem servare, licet quantitas sit aliquantulum grandis. Unde Armilla probat collationes, quæ fiunt Romæ secundum consuetudinem tenelli ob consuetudinem, et quia Pontifex tolerat, cum sciat: nec ego auderem damnare, quamvis isti sunt abusus hominum parum timeratorum.—*Toll. ibid.*

³ Navar. c. xxi. n. xiv. Collatio notabiliter immoderata frequenter, præsertim in Lusitania.

⁴ Immo etsi ex sensualitate, secundum mentem Panormitani, quia sufficit non exire terminos consuetudinis.—*Sylv. ibid.* n. x.

⁵ Bonacin. de præcept. Eccles. q. i. p. 3. n. vi. ibi Angles. Naldus, et alii, vide p. l. n. viii.

⁶ Utrum pluries bibere vinum vel aquam frangit jejunium Resp. Innocentius et Ricar. quod non, sive ante pastum sive post.—*Angel. sum. v. jejun. n. iv.* They may drink it, and that often, for hunger as well as thirst.—*Navar. cap. xxi. n. xiii.*

⁷ Potus etiam vini et electuaria, &c. De quibus intelligitur, quod ex sensualitate sumpta, non frangunt jejunium.—*Ibid. Sylvest.*

⁸ Esto, quod venialiter peccaret, qui cæpta et nondum finita digestionem biberet, non quidem quod jejunium frangat, sed quia actum inordinatum agit.—*Navar. ibid.*

ance in drinking may be a sin ; however, it is lawful for those that fast to drink often, on the same day, for drinking breaks not the fast, either before or after dinner ; so he after others.¹ A man may wonder what can break this fast, since neither drinking nor eating so often, and so much, even to excess, and the gratifying of sensuality, in so high a degree can do it. It is wine that they may drink so often when they fast, and yet they acknowledge that wine is more contrary to the nature and end of a fast than flesh. Though wine, says De Graffis, be more nutritive, and the drinking of wine do more provoke to concupiscence than the eating of flesh, according to that : Prov. x. Wine is a luxurious thing, and Eph. v. Be not drunk with wine in which is luxury ; yet, says he, he that on a fast day often drinks wine or water, either sooner or later, does not break the fast.²

Thus, as they may eat like gluttons, so (by the doctrine of their chief authors) they may drink till they be drunk, and yet not break their fast, for no drinking (how excessive soever) can break it. The church-fast (they tell us) consists not in abstinence from drink ; consequently, he that drinks wine, or other liquor, before or after dinner, breaks not the precept for fasting, though he sin against temperance, and drink excessively. So Bonacina, after Aquinas, Abulensis, Navarre, and others, telling us it is their common doctrine).³

I suppose this fast can never be broke ; it will be a fast for ever, do what they can, if all they are allowed to do against it cannot make it to be no fast ; for so far as I can perceive, they may break their bellies, and yet not break their fast. If one in the ancient church had spoke of his fasting after three such meals, and so much drinking, yea, or but eating a dinner, he would have been thought out of his wits ; yet they must not be accounted ridiculous, who tell us gravely that this is fasting, and that they break not a fast unless they dine twice on a fasting day ;⁴ and indeed some of their writers seem ashamed of this good work, as they do it in their church.⁵ But suppose this were a fast (when indeed it is no such thing), and observed by them, *iv ἡγεοφωγία* (as Epiphanius explains it), and so that they tasted nothing till three o'clock, or till evening as of old, yet by the Roman order it could be no good work.⁶ That it may be such, there must be something religious

¹ Licitum est jejunantibus pluries intra diem unam potare, licet immoderantia circa hoc posset esse peccatum. Sylv. *ibid.* n. ix. secundum S. Thom. ; idem dicit Albertus. Paludan. Richardus. Quod potus non solvit jejunium sive post, sive ante prandium.—*Ibid.*

² Etsi vinum sit nutritivum, et ad concupiscentiam magis provocet potus vini quam esus carniū illud Prov. xx. Luxuriosa res est vinum ; et ad Eph. v. Nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria, tamen qui die jejunii sæpius biberent vinum, aut aquam, et mane et vespere, jejunium non frangunt, quamvis hoc facerent ad sustentandum se, et famem sedandam. ita D. Th. ii. 2, q. cxlvii. art. vi. ad. ii. qui inquit, quod bene possunt peccare et meritum jejunii perdere sicut si immoderate cibum sumerent ; sed non ut jejunium frangatur ; et ratio est quia jejunium est abstinencia a cibo tantum.—*Graff.* l. ii. c. xxxvi. n. xxi. p. 215.

³ Non violat præceptum jejunii—quamvis peccet contra temperantiam, bibendo intemperanter.—*Tom.* ii. p. 337, n. vii. et alii communiter.

⁴ Innocent. et Richard. (dicunt) quod prandere pluries in die jejunii est contra consuetudinem probatam ecclesiæ.—*Angel. Sum. ibid.* n. iii. Semel esse in die prandendum seu manducandum : qui vero pluries, solvit jejunium.—*Tol.* l. vi. c. ii. p. 989.

⁵ Jejunia nostra, quæ in vini copia natant, et piscium varietate carnis delicias superant—veteribus omnibus non modo fuisse incognita, sed et intolerabilia adeoque abhominanda, constat.—*Lindan. Panopl.* l. iii. c. xi. Inanem tantum veri jejunii retinet umbram.—*Cassand. defens. lib. de Offic. viri.* p. 119.

⁶ *iv ἡγεοφωγία διατελοῦσι πάντες δι' λαοί, φημι δι' ἄρτου καὶ ἁλὸς καὶ ὕδατος τίτι χρεῖμαι πρὸς ἰσχύειν.*—*Compend. Doctrin Cathol.*

If they sleep the whole day, yet they accomplish the precept.—*Jo. Sanc. disp.* li. n. ii.

(for mere abstinence has no more goodness in it than eating); it cannot be religious unless it be subservient to some religious design or employment; but they disjoin it from all things of that nature; we hear not a word from them, of their taking notice of their sins, or confessing them, or afflicting their souls for them; they need not so much as pray when they fast, either in public or private; yea, they are not obliged to hear mass, though that be the employment of every day for worship, so that their fasts are no days for worship, or any religious exercise.¹ They are discharged also from religious ends; two are commonly assigned, the taming of the flesh, and the elevating of the mind to God; but though the flesh be more unruly, and the mind move not in the least towards God on a fasting-day; though they never mind these ends in their abstinence, yet they entirely fulfil the precepts of their church for fasting, as they commonly conclude, upon this ground, because the end of the precept is not commanded.² So that this practice which they call fasting, is a mere bodily exercise amongst them, and thus it is represented by Cajetan, applying that of the apostle to it,³ 1 Tim. iv. 8, 'Bodily exercise profiteth but little,' &c. Where he denies it the character of a good work. And since it is neither a true fast nor a good work, if they made it never so necessary, it would be no proof, that by their doctrine there is any necessity either of real fasting or any good work. But, indeed, they declare their pretended fasts needless; for their best writers conclude it to be but a venial fault not to observe them; so that there is no more necessity with them to fast after their mode, than there is to avoid a venial sin, which is none at all.⁴ They have so many ways to excuse men from fasting, as leave no necessity of it. This one may serve any that have no mind to fast. If a man have tired himself with any employment (lawful or damnable) not only with honest labour, but with too much gaming, yea, or with excessive whoring, he is thereby exempted from the obligation to fast, though he so wearied himself on purpose that he might be excused. But one thing herein is more intolerable, that this ridiculous piece of mockery which they call fasting, has the glory given it which is peculiar to Christ alone, and is thought sufficient both to satisfy the justice of God, and to merit, by way of condignity, not only grace but eternal glory; an opinion of such malignancy as is enough to poison the best work in the world into deadly guilt. To hold that a person, because he eats not two dinners, or abstains for a day

¹ Dixi festo: quia nemo ullo alio die hoc præcepto (de audienda missa) tenetur, etiam clericus vel monachus, imo neque episcopus—Nullo inquam, alio die etiam jejunii et quadragesimæ, &c.—Navar. cap. xxi. n. ii.; Rosel. v. miss. n. xiii.; Sylvest. v. miss. ii. n. i.

² Lex quæ præcipit aliquid, non obligat ad finem, sed ad media tendentia ad finem.—*D. Tho.* i. ii. q. c. art. ix. et x. Unde lex non obligat ad carnis petulantiam compescendam, sed ad media quibus comprimi possit, sicuti est jejunium.—*Graff.* l. ii. c. xxxvi. n. xx. Licet ecclesia nos quadragesimali observatione extenuare in carne intendat, ut liberior mens spiritualibus accomodetur, tamen finis ille non est in præcepto, sed tantum ciborum abinentia.—*Soto*, de nat. et gr. l. i. c. xxii. p. 57. Finis præcepti jejunii est elevatio mentis: si tamen quis jejunat et non elevatur mente, non est transgressor præcepti.—*Cajetan.* Sum. v. matrim. p. 430. Nec, si lex jubet quadragesimæ jejunium ut mens elevetur in Deum, astringimur proinde ex hujus præcepti vigore mentem in Deum elevare.—*Canus.* Relect. de pœnit. pars. iv. p. 871; vide *Tol. instr.* l. iv. c. xii. p. 623.

³ Sum. v. jejunium. p. 348. Opera utriusque misericordiæ meliora sunt quam jejunii: juxta illud apostoli, Corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis est: pietas autem ad omnia valet.

⁴ Quantum est ex jure scripto nullum cognosco intervenire mortale peccatum in fractione jejunii ecclesiæ, si contemptus desit. *Cajetan.* ibid. p. 362; vid. *Aquin. Antoninum.* Archidiaconus. Paludan. Angelum. et alios in Sylvest. v. Jejun. n. xxi. Communis opinio.

from flesh, though he stuff himself with other delicacies, even to excess, should be worthy of the glorious prerogative of Christ, is a conceit to be entertained with scorn and laughter, if the horror of it did not call for another passion. Yet such are points of faith in that church; and this surely is enough to cloy any man with their fasting.¹

Sect. 2. Come we to the next of their good works, that is, prayer. This unquestionably is a good work, but then sure it must be good praying; but they are so far from judging it necessary to pray well, that they conclude it sufficient to employ themselves about this work in such a manner as cannot, upon a just account, be called praying at all. The only public prayers necessary for the people, by the Roman orders, are those of the mass, but how they pray therein, I cannot apprehend. They use not the words, they need not hear them, they cannot understand them. Now, can it be imagined that he prays, who neither expresses nor conceives any petitions? They do it not themselves, they join not with the priest, for no man can possibly concur with the words or the sense of him whom he neither hears nor understands. They cannot concur with the priest as men, with rational acts, much less as Christians. The church of Rome has made it not only needless, but impossible, for the people to pray in their public service; they must think something sufficient for them, which is not praying. Let us see what account their authors give of this. Sylvester, proving that it is not needful to pray on the Lord's day, or any of their days for public worship, tells us what will serve the people instead thereof. It suffices that they stand by the priest praying in the mass, and that is all that is requisite, by virtue of this precept.² So that the church requires no more than the presence and posture of the body. And they that can make a prayer of this, may make an image in the church to pray; and if this would be a miracle, it would be as wonderful that the other should be praying; but thus it becomes those who will worship images, as if they were God, to worship God, as if themselves were images. Oh, but they must concur with the priest so far, as either actually or virtually to wish that his prayers may be heard.³ And if this be praying, a man may pray in the church while he is in his bed at home, for actually he may do this if he be awake, and virtually, though he be asleep. There is no prayer, but what is either vocal or mental; what the people do in the mass, is neither; they say nothing, nor do they understand anything, nor need they mind anything, of what is said; and it is much, if a man's mind can be employed about that which he not only understands not, but minds not at all. The mind must necessarily attend actually in mental prayer,⁴ but actual attention is not necessary to what they call praying. So it is neither vocal nor mental, not any at all, unless they can devise a mode of prayer without either voice or mind. They know not what to mind, nor whom, person or thing; they understand not whether the

¹ So Jo. Saneius after others; *Liberos a jejuniis existimo, qui culpa sua ita defatigati redduntur—quod jejunare non valeant; ut qui defatigatus esset ludo pilæ, aut nimis esset deditus fœminarum commistioni—docent Medina. Diana. Ledesma, Montesin, &c. disp. liv. n. xx. Nonnulli doctores extendunt ad eos qui defatigantur in ludis, aut in quærenda meretrice, &c.—Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. ii. q. viii. punct. i. n. xvi.*

² Unde sufficit astare oranti sacerdoti in missa, quantum est ex vi hujus præcepti.—*Sum. v. Dominic. n. viii.*

³ Cum nemo teneatur ex præcepto audire, et minus intelligere verba sacerdotis, quia satis est, vel ex longinquo missanti adesse, et surgendo, genua flectendo, vel alias actualiter vel virtualiter exoptare, ut sacerdos, qui pro omnibus orat et sacrificat, a Deo exaudiat.—*Navar. cap. xxi. n. viii.*

⁴ Cum ipsa eadem attentio sit ipsissima oratio.—*Soto de Just. et Jur. l. x. q. v. art. v. p. 340.*

priest be in confession, or at prayer, or in his lauds; no, nor whether he be praying or reading, unless the dumb signification of a posture tell them; nor that way neither, for they need not see, no more than hear, the priest. They know not whether he be addressing himself to God, or to a creature, whether to another divine person than the Father (for they have prayers in the mass to Christ and the Holy Ghost, though an ancient council forbids it); they know not whether he be praying to an angel or to a saint, to a man or to a woman, to an image or to a crucifix, for they have addresses to all. They can in no wise be thought to pray, who do not, who cannot so much as say *Amen* to a prayer; and this they cannot say, who understand not what is prayed for, as Aquinas himself assures us from the words of the apostle.¹

But the priest who celebrates seems to pray, though the people at mass do not. He seems so, but the church of Rome obliges not him to pray, unless he can be said to pray who only reads the words of a form, without minding anything else which they must necessarily be concerned in who pray indeed. Of the several sorts of attention requisite in prayer, none, with them, is necessary but that which respects the pronouncing of the words right. If the priest mind but this only, so as to read the words right, it is sufficient, he does all the church requires, and fully satisfies the precept of saying mass; this is their common doctrine. So that unless he can be said to pray who neither minds the God he should pray to, nor the things to be prayed for, no, nor the sense of the words he uses, their church requires not the priests to pray, even when they are saying their mass-prayers. Nor is it more needful, on the same account, in the canonical hours, as we have seen before. So that praying indeed is not necessary for priest or people in all the public service of the Romish church; much less is it needful in their private devotions, which are not enjoined;² for there they declare it lawful to be more neglectful of all the necessary concerns of prayer than in public. Now that they who mind nothing but the bare saying the words of a prayer do not pray indeed, they themselves will acknowledge in their lucid intervals. Cajetan tells us that if one be corporally present at mass, but lets his mind considerably wander after other things, he satisfies not the precept, because he is but so there as if he voluntarily slept at it; for to be far from the mass by voluntary sleeping and by voluntary wandering are both alike.³ Hence it is clear that priest or people whose minds voluntarily wander at mass, do no more pray there than if they were voluntarily asleep; and consequently, if they wander carelessly, without observing it, they pray no more than if they were carelessly asleep. Yet many of them think the church forbids not voluntary wanderings. He himself thinks she forbids not careless wanderings; therefore all of them must believe that she thinks it sufficient to pray as they may do who are fast asleep, one way or other. And yet none that are awake can well count sleeping to be praying. Bellarmine reckoning the several sorts of prayer, one (says he) is mental,

¹ Quomodo enim dicit Amen cum quid orat nescit? Quia non potest intelligere quid boni dicas.—*Comment.* in 1 Cor. xiv. Manifesta sunt verba apostoli, cum qui ob imperitiam quod dicitur non intelligit, fieri non posse, ut ad alterius gratiarum actionem Amen respondeant.—*Cassand. Defens. lib. offic. pii viri.*

² Ubi autem libere et citra obligationem oratur; sola est culpa venialis indecenter orare: quare distractio, etiam meditata, nisi contemptio adsit, nunquam erit mortalis. Soto de Just. et Jur. l. x. q. v. art. v. p. 341; fine. vid. Angel. Sum. v. horæ. n. xxvii.; Gabriel de Can. Miss. Lect. xxii.; Græff. l. ii. cap. li. n. xi.

³ Si quis corporaliter præsens sit missæ, sed mentem advertenter a missa divertat ad alia, non satisfacit præcepto missæ: quoniam ita ibi est, ac si voluntarie ibi dormiret: paria namque sunt, longe a missa fieri per voluntarium somnum, et per voluntariam diversionem mentis ad alia.—*Sum. v. fest. p. 305.*

another is both mental and vocal.¹ But when he would add that which is vocal only, he will not have that accounted prayer. A third member of the division ought not to be added, to wit, that which is vocal only; and gives good reason, for that, says he, is of no use to please God, but rather to provoke him to anger, according to that Isa. xxix., 'This people honour me with their lips,' &c. Yet such is the praying in the Roman church, and no other needful in their divine service, as the cardinal himself declares sufficiently in the same book. And if no other praying be needful, no prayer that is a good work is necessary by their doctrine.

Sect. 3. Proceed we to the last sort of their good works, to wit, acts of mercy or charity, comprised in alms-deeds for the relief of the indigent; and we can scarce discover that these will ever be necessary by their doctrine. Cardinal Cajetan (one represented as more favourable to these acts of charity than divers others) tells us that to omit them is no mortal sin (and therefore to do them will not be necessary by any command), but only in two cases; first, when one hath superfluities, both of nature and state, that is, more than either nature or the quality of the person requires; secondly, when the poor are in extreme necessity (not in common want only, but such as is extraordinary).² And these two are so described to us that themselves confess they very seldom fall out, and we may think hardly ever, so that rarely or never will this good work be necessary. For the former, that a person may be judged to have anything superfluous (without which he is not bound to relieve others), it must be considered what is requisite for the honourable expenses of himself, his children and family, and what for the munificence of his state and magnificence too, what for common events and casualties, to provide against them, and other things of this nature.³ Upon which he concludes, it will rarely fall out that a man living splendidly, according to his quality, will have anything superfluous. And so very rarely (if he had said *never* the premises would have borne it) will it be the duty of such as have enough to live gloriously to spare anything for the poor. Less pride and vain-glory, or prodigality, than they allow them to have without any mortal guilt, will leave nothing superfluous, and so quite excuse them from these good works. Navarre is of the same mind, and tells us there are few rich men who have anything superfluous, since neither kings nor great princes can be thought to have superfluities;⁴ having said a little before, that it cannot easily be judged that any secular person hath more than is needful for his

¹ Alia est oratio tantum mentalis, alia mentalis simul et vocalis; neque debet addi tertium membrum (id est) vocalis tantum. Ea siquidem non est utilis ad placandum Deum, sed magis ad provocandum ad iram, juxta illud, Populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me, Isa. xxix.—*De bonis oper.* l. i. cap. ii. p. 974.

² Eleemosynam non facere est peccatum mortale in duobus solummodo casibus; primus est, si quis habet de superfluo naturæ et personæ—secundus est quem apparet pauper in extrema necessitate constitutus; juxta illud, pascite fame morientem.—*Sum. v. Elemos.* p. 134.

³ Superfluum in tali latitudine consistens, judicandum est consideratis sumptibus honorabilibus etiam filiorum, familiæ, status munificentia, magnificencia, communibus eventibus, hæredibus, et aliis ejusmodi: ita ne raro videatur contingere, ut homo secundum statum gloriose vivens, superfluum habeat.—*Idem, ibid.*

⁴ Sequitur item Rosellam sine justa ratione dixisse, paucos divitum confessarios salvatum iri, si eleemosyna in prædictis duobus casibus de præcepto foret; non enim tot sunt, quot putat, hujusmodi divites, quibus sit superfluum status, cum nec reges et magni principes superflua habere censeantur.—*Cap. xxii. n. vi.* Facile judicandum non esse, aliquem sæcularem plura, quam quæ suo statui necessaria sunt, habere. Cum etiam ille qui ad aliquod dominium emendum, et mutandum suum statum in alium majorem, ad quem idoneus est, pecunias congerit, non habet plus quam suum statum deceat.—*Ibid.*

condition, for he may heap up moneys to purchase more, or to advance his condition higher, and so still have no more than is requisite for his state, and nothing at all will be due for charitable acts. He expresses it more fully elsewhere, and concludes, For all this he cannot be said to have any such superfluities that he should be obliged by any command to give to the poor.¹ So that unless a man have so much as he neither has at present, nor may have for the future, occasion to use—that is, unless he has so much as no man will or can believe he hath,—an act of charity will not be his duty. If he do but desire to have more than he now has, or do but design to rise any higher than he now is, though but in such a degree as is found in all, and may innocently be in any; at least, if he have but anything of covetousness or ambition, though far less than they determine he may have without any deadly guilt (and so without any considerable danger), he is discharged from all obligation to this good work.

The other case will make charity no more necessary; it is when the poor are in extreme necessity, and this is only when it is apparent they will die for want of necessaries if we relieve them not.² Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necessity is so great; he need not take the party's word for it, no, not though in public places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no, not the judgment of his parish priest or confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness), unless they can assure him thereof as eye-witnesses, or if he be morally certain of the extremity;³ yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing anything himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation which they add in the case).⁴ For example, if he thought it likely that a protestant would relieve the perishing party, a papist (by their doctrine of good works) might reserve his money and charity for another world, nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to steal, either secretly or openly, from those that have enough;⁵ so that acts of charity will not be necessary among them but when theft is lawful, and no man need relieve the indigent with anything he hath, till they

¹ Cap. xxiii. n. lxxiv. Nec ob id dicitur habere tale superfluum, quod de præcepto pauperibus teneatur erogare.

² In sententiam Cajetan. et Navar. inclinant Sotus et Sarmientus. Vasques. Opusc. Moral. de Eleemosyn. dub. iii. n. xx. Asserunt non esse præcepti obligationem ullam, extra tempus extremæ necessitatis proximi, quantumvis divitiæ superfluum non tantum naturæ, sed statui, etiam congruæ sustentationi, Gabriel, Alexander, Major, Gerson—repuntat probabilem Antoninus, Contadus, Durandus.

Durandus assersit se non audere dicere esse aliquid tempus præcepti extra extremam necessitatem, ne tot divites condemnet.—*Idem*, *ibid.* n. xi. et Jo. Medina. in Sa. v. Eleemosyn.

³ Bonacin. i. præcept d. iii. q. iv. p. 6, n. iii.

⁴ Extreme egere dicitur, non solum qui jam animam agit vel spirat: sed etiam cum indicia probabilia apparent eo deventurum, nisi ei subveniatur, et non se offert nec expectatur probabiliter alius, qui ei subveniat, juxta S. Thom. et declarat Cajetan.—*Idem*, cap. xxiv. n. v.

⁵ Soto de Just. et Jur. l. iv. q. vii. art. i. Licet alienum arripere sine peccato in extrema necessitate.—Sotus, Cajetan. Navar. Adrian. Armilla. Covarruvius. Et in urgenti.—Sylvest. Angelus. in Vasq. *ibid.* dub. vii. n. xxviii. in gravi licitum esse. Sylvest. Medina. Angel. Navar. Pet. Navarra, Malderus et plures alii apud Dian. p. 2, tr. iii. Res. xxix.; Bannes in 2, ii. q. lxvii. art. vii.

may justly take it from him. But if it were possible in these cases whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty, yet one thing more, added by their prime doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not required to relieve the necessitous by giving them anything, but it is sufficient to let, or sell, or lend to them.¹ Navarre concludes it lawful to buy persons in extreme necessity, and lawful for them to consent to it.² His reasons, among others, are because a father in time of extreme hunger may sell his son; also, because no man is bound to relieve one, though in extreme necessity, *gratis*, if he can do it sufficiently by loan, exchange, &c. So that if a man were in such extremity for want of food, that he might sell his son to get it for the saving of his life, yet no Christian, in that case, were bound to give him relief freely; by their doctrine it would suffice to let him have money or meat by the sale of his child. We cannot expect they will ever find it a duty to give to the indigent if not in such circumstances; and it is a plain case, where there is no obligation to give, there is no necessity to give alms.

But if they did make it necessary to give alms, yet it is not needful by their doctrine to do it so as it will be a good work (or so to fast, or pray, or do any other act which have any goodness in them, or pretend to it; so good works will, by their principles, be still unnecessary. For that any work may be good, it must be from a right principle and for a good end; but both these they make needless. As to the former, there is no necessity, as they teach, to act out of love to God;³ for though this be the intention of God, and the design of the law in all good acts, as they acknowledge from that 1 Tim. v., Rom. xiii., yet they have a maxim generally received, The intention of the command is not commanded.⁴ Herein they follow Aquinas, and hence they conclude that such a mode of acting out of love to God is not required in any command of the divine law;⁵ but the whole, and every part of it, may be fulfilled, and sin avoided, if that which is required be done, though not out of love to God at all.⁶ And particularly Soto takes much pains to argue us out of the love of God in all our actings, and to prove that it is not necessary. And all generally conclude that it is not needful in any acts of piety, mercy, or charity required on their days of worship; since there they determine that there is no need of any act of love, as was shewed before.

It is no wonder therefore (as to the second) if they conclude it needless to act for God in what we do, and make him alone our chief end. In the theory indeed they determine that an act is not good unless there be a concurrence of all conditions requisite thereto, and that the end is the principal

¹ Adrian. iv. de restit.; Navar. cap. xvii. n. lxi. et cap. xxiv. n. vi. In quibus tamen duobus non est de præcepto subvenire donando, sed satis est subvenire commodando vel mutuando.—Vid. Bellarm. de bon. operibus, l. iii. c. viii. Hæc doctrina vera et non solum a S. Thom., sed etiam ab aliis Theologis communiter tradi solet.—Vid. *plures in Vasq. ibid. dub. vi. n. l.*

² Licet eos emere et illis emptioni suæ consentire, c. xxii. n. lxxv. Quia pater tempore famis extremæ filium vendere potest—tunc quia nemo tenetur ad gratis subveniendum, egenti etiam extreme, modo commodando, vel mutuando satis ei succurrat.—*Ibid.*

³ Alexander Alensis, Petr. Lombard, Aquinas, Angelus, Sylvester, Canus, Soto, Jac. de Graffius, &c. *supra*.

⁴ Ex D. Thom. et graviorum autorum sententia, ad finem legislatoris minime teneamur, sed ad media, &c.—Canus, *Relect. de pœnit.* part. iv.; Soto de Nat. et Gr. *supra*.

⁵ Modus talis charitatis non cadit sub præcepto, &c.—Soto de Just. et Jur. lib. ii. q. iii. art. x.

⁶ Hinc ergo patet adimplementem præceptum per actum ex aliqua circumstantia malum satisfacere præcepto, etiamsi non adimpleat modum, aut etiam finem a legislatore intentum.—Bonacin. tom. ii. disp. i. q. i. punct. ix.

(as much in morals as the form is in naturals). So that without a good end that act must be naught, and no good end where God is not chief;¹ yet for practice they discharge them from any necessity to make God their principal end. They conclude it lawful for a man to act principally for his own advantage;² yea, they count it but a venial fault to do the best act principally for a sinful end.³ Now, to avoid a venial sin, they hold it not necessary by any command of God, and therefore it will not be needful to do anything but principally for an end so far sinful; and, consequently, unless the work can be good, whose principal end is sin, no good work at all will be necessary. But it is a more wicked end, which they openly avow, when they design by what they do to merit grace and glory, and make satisfaction to divine justice. This is to make Christ a leg, while they attempt his crown; to offer him a rush, with an intent thereby to invest themselves in his pre-rogative. They should shew us how it is possible such acts can be good, before they pretend to account good works necessary.

Sect. 4. But though they find no necessity of good works by virtue of any divine precept ordinarily, yet they seem to make some when they will have the priest to enjoin them for penance (and it is like in this as in other cases, they leave so little or nothing needful that God has commanded, to render their own devices more necessary). But good works, being enjoined as penance, become punishments, and it signifies the church of Rome is no good friend to good works when she counts or makes them punishments; for punishment is properly evil to us, and not to be done, but suffered, and thus she will have good works neither to be good nor to be done. To be sure thus they cannot be done so as to be good, or as becomes Christians to do them; for he that must think it a suffering to do them, does them with the spirit of a slave, not of a Christian. But let us suppose they may be good works, and well done too by way of penance, yet they are not necessary at all in their church upon this account, and so no way. For, first, the priest needs not enjoin good works as penance;⁴ he may enjoin nothing at all if he pleases;⁵ or some slight thing, that which is good for nothing, or that which is worse;⁶ or what the confitent must have done if he had not sinned;⁷ or he may dismiss him with this general, All the good thou doest, or evil thou sufferest, let it serve for satisfaction;⁸ or he may commend something by way of counsel, without obliging him by any injunction;⁹ or he may require him only to avoid the sin he confesses for a while¹⁰ (and when he shrives the woman that he has sinned with, it is like he may not prove very rigorous this way¹¹). Or, secondly, if he should enjoin this, or any good work, the confitent need not accept of, or submit to it, as many of their chief doctors determine.¹² Or, thirdly, if he do accept it, yet he needs not perform it for all that; he may be released by himself; to omit it will be but a small fault (such as he needs not regard, be the good work little or

¹ Omne opus cuius finis est malus, ipsum quoque malum est.—*Navar. cap. xii. n. xxx*
² Sylvest. Sum. v. Caritas. n. v.; *Navar. supra.*

³ Cajetan. Sylvest. *Navar. supra.* The precept may be fully accomplished where the manner and end is naught.—*Bonacin. ibid. et apud eum, Aquinas, Sotus, Navar, Medina, et alii.*

⁴ Vid. Sylv. v. Confess. iv. n. ii.; Suarez, iii. tom. iv. disp. xxxviii. sect. vi. n. iv.

⁵ Cajetan. *Navar. ibid. sect. iii. n. iv.*

⁶ D. Thomas, Soto, et alii communiter; *ibid. sect. iv. n. iv.*

⁷ *Ibid. sect. vi. n. v.*

⁸ S. Thom. Paludanus, Petr. Soto, *Navar. ibid. sect. vi. n. vi.*

⁹ D. Thom. Paludanus, Petr. Soto, Victoria, Ledesma, *ibid. sect. iii. n. ii.*

¹⁰ *Ibid. sect. vi. n. ii.*

¹¹ Vid. Angel. sum. v. confess. v. n. viii.

¹² Scotus, Gabriel, Hostiensis, Panormitan, Medina, Sylvester, Armilla, *Navar, in Suar. ibid. sect. vii. n. i.*

great), if he not out of contempt.¹ Or another may undertake it, and satisfy by suffering it for him;² or a priest may release him, either he that enjoined it or another.³ However, indulgences will do it effectually, these serve to sweep away all good works (all necessity of them) on this account for ever. This is their special use, to relieve the pope's subjects from the sad penalty of good works; for though they have dealt hardly with good works, to make them a punishment, yet they will not deal so hardly with catholics as to have it necessary that they should be thus punished. And therefore to ease them of this grievous suffering of doing good, the church in great tenderness has provided indulgences, which they may have at easy rates; and thereby an acquittance, discharging them from the good works they were to *suffer*! And if the priest should be so rigorous as to enjoin a sinner to be doing good all his life, or so impertinent as to require it for an hundred years, he may meet with indulgences will quit him of it, every moment of his life; and if he will, many thousand years over and above. And if this cannot be had unless he pay for it, yet for his encouragement they teach that it is better to lay out his money for an indulgence than in deeds of charity.⁴ So that there is no such goodness or necessity in the best work a priest can enjoin, but it may be better, and more necessary, to give the pope money; and this done, through his indulgence, there may be no need to do any more.

THE CONCLUSION.

By the premises, it is manifest that popery, by its practical principles, is destructive to Christianity and the souls of men. As to Christianity, whether we consider it in general as religion, or in its specialties as the best religion, it is both ways by the popish doctrine ruined. This plucks up the fundamentals of it, and dissolves the whole structure, and buries and confounds both the necessary materials, and the peculiar excellences thereof, in its rubbish. There can be no religion in reality without real worship, this being essential to it; yet their doctrine declares it needless, either for clergy or people to be real worshippers of God, being so far from engaging them to be reverent or devout, or sincere, or affectionate towards God in religious addresses, that it will not have them obliged so much as actually to mind God when they pretend to worship him. There needs not so much as one act of true and real worship, to make them as religious, and as much Christians, as is necessary by their divinity; so that Christianity, as they form it, is a religion regardless of God, even when, if ever, he should be most observed and honoured, and thereby sunk lower than heathenism, and the notions of natural religion retained by infidels. Further, it discharges those acts and duties of Christianity which are necessary and essential to it; and allows and encourages all that it forbids, and condemns even what is most repugnant to, and inconsistent with it. It makes all Christian acts and duties needless, and all wickedness opposite thereto, safe and practicable, without

¹ Omittere satisfactionem est peccatum; sed non mortale, si desit contemptus: quia non omittitur aliquid necessarium ad salutem.—*Cajetan. Sum. v. satisfact. p. 520.*

² Communis sententia theologorum est, posse penitentem implere per alium satisfactionem sibi impositam. Ita D. Thom. Paludanus, Sylvester, Alensis in Suar. *ibid.* sect. ix. n. i.

³ Opinio communis est quam tenet Sylvest. Angelus, Navar, Rosella, Victoria, Ledesma, Medina. *ibid.* sect. x. n. iv.

⁴ An sit melius dare argentum in Elqemosynam, quam dare in subsidium ad consequendam indulgentiam?—loquendo ex genere censeo esse melius, subsidium facere ad consequendam indulgentiam.—*Idem, ibid.* disp. xlix. sect. v. n. vii. p. 633.

fear of condemnation ; and there needs no more to ruin the religion of Christ. A great part of those duties are by this doctrine mere matter of counsel, and thereby they are made no duties, all obligation to perform them being, in that notion, quite dissolved. The remnant (all conscience of which is not swallowed up in counsels) which they cannot but acknowledge to be duties, yet they will have them to be so but sometimes, and that very rarely, and when that is they cannot tell ; it is not certainly known when, and the observance thereof must be correspondent : nobody knows certainly when. Or if they guess at the time, and point some out as probable, yet when the time comes, the acts (though the life of Christianity consists therein, and the salvation of the persons depends thereon) need not to be done, something else will serve instead thereof, some natural act, or faint wish, or false conceit, something or other, though neither truly Christian nor virtuous (with the sacrament at least), will excuse them from all other Christian acts. It is not the accessories of religion only that they make thus bold with ; but thus they handle the very vitals of Christianity, and make them unnecessary for Christians. The very acts of faith, and hope, and love, yea, repentance itself, and all the rest with these, are thus made needless, and they may be true Christians (at their rate), and saved (in their conceit) without ever exerting, in a whole life, so little as one act of grace or Christian virtue. The world never saw Christianity, into what hands soever it fell, more clearly stripped, not only of its lustre and ornament, but of its life and being. If this suffice not to make an end of all religion truly Christian, they not only dismiss, as more than needs, what the doctrine of the gospel makes most necessary, but advance and encourage what is most opposite to it, not only ignorance, unbelief, disaffection to Christ, impenitency, but therewith all disobedience unto the gospel. Instead of the holy rules thereof, they have formed a doctrine of licentious maxims, which give security to the practice of any wickedness, and take away (when they had left no other restraint) the fears of hell from those who live and die in damning sins. Whatever it is that Christ forbids, it is with them either no sin, or not dangerous, or the worst of all, by virtue of some devices of their own, not damning ; so that they may venture upon any wickedness freely, and persist therein securely till death ; and yet, by some evasions which they tell them of, escape the wrath to come (whatever Christ say to the contrary) without either the fruits or acts of repentance. There are many sins, and amongst them horrid and enormous crimes, condemned by the law of God and natural light, and such as the practice of them is reproachful to the Christian name, which yet, with them, pass for no sins ; and they are furnished with expedients to make any other so too, when they see occasion, and in these they will discern no shadow of danger. There is a world of wickedness, which by their doctrine is venial, abundance more than enough, utterly to deface Christianity, and to make any who takes but part of the liberty given by their divines, to look more like an atheist, or a brute, a person of no religion, conscience or honesty, than a true Christian. They can gratify any vicious disposition, which way soever it leads, with impiety and debauches enough to fill up a whole life ; and yet, if he will be satisfied with anything but the highest degree of wickedness, promise him security.

If he could swallow ten millions of their venials every minute at a gulp, they would not (by their divinity) endanger him, though one that will follow the rules of Christ must choose death rather than venture upon some one of them. There is with them no danger in thus sinning, though the Christian doctrine never discovered anything else in sin ; or, if their catholics will be outrageously wicked, and cannot be satisfied with less than the practice of

the most mortal crimes, they will not disoblige them (the party must be kept up though their souls sink), they shall have their liberty upon easy terms; deadly sins shall be as free for them, and in a manner as safe as their harmless venials. That which makes venial faults seem less dangerous than mortal, is because they will not damn a man, though he never repent of them; but even herein they have made venial and mortal alike safe; for, by their doctrine he may live in all sorts of deadly wickedness, and die therein without any act of true repentance, and yet escape damnation. They commend to them several evasions to secure impenitent sinners, how damnable soever their neglects or practices have been to the last. But that of the Trent Council must not be doubted of; attrition (which they confess alone to be no sufficient, no saving repentance), with the sacrament of confession, will pass any sinner into a saving state. This one device of their own will serve instead of all that Christ hath prescribed; if this be observed, though they live and die in the neglect of all Christian virtues, and in the practice of all wickedness which Christ condemns, they need not fear; this alone will secure them. The least natural or slavish remorse, and a priest, is all the Christianity that a papist need trouble himself for: if he can but make sure of these at last gasp, he is safe, though all his life he be more like a devil incarnate than a Christian. By this alone Christianity is utterly subverted, all the laws of Christ in effect repealed, and their observance rendered needless, the whole gospel made a cipher, and a way to salvation opened by bold impostors, not only without, but against the gospel, and quite cross to the way, the truth, and the life.

Sect. 2. No more is needful to manifest that the practical part of popery (however it hath passed for more harmless than the other more insisted on) is destructive to the souls of men. It leads them out of the way of salvation, if real Christianity be the way. It obliges them to neglect as needless not only the lesser, but the principal, parts of that way, without which heaven is altogether inaccessible. They that have discovered another hell, may as well fancy another heaven; but the way to that heaven which Christ hath prepared for his people, lies through the knowledge of Christ, love to him, faith in him, that repentance from dead works, and exercise of Christian virtues, that mortification of sin, holiness of life, and real worshipping of God, which, by this doctrine, is abandoned as unnecessary. It tempts them into the way of destruction, encourages them in such practice of wickedness as Christ hath declared to be the broad way. It promises safety therein, and hides the danger from their eyes, it covers the pits (whose descent is into that which is bottomless) with spiders' webs, and persuades them it is firm ground. It leaves them no sense, nor notice of many sins; no conscience of far the most; no fear of any, no not of the worst, such as themselves call deadly crimes. It gives as much security to such wickedness as a heart that has sold itself to it need wish. For what need he desire more than assurance, that after a whole life spent therein, there is a very easy way for him to be saved, so easy that he need not trouble himself so much as truly to repent? Such grace as any priest can help a sinner to (an impenitent sinner) at last gasp, will bring him to heaven, though he never once thought of the way to it all his life.

Such being the rules which Roman Catholics have for the conduct of their hearts and lives, and the worst sort of them being as much approved by their church, as any practical doctrine current amongst them, let it be considered what regard that church hath of religion or salvation, which leaves them to such doctrine as is so inconsistent with both, and what regard they have of their souls, who, after notice hereof, will trust them to such a conduct. It

gratifies the lusts and corrupt inclinations of the seduced, and serves the interest of the contrivers, drawing the world into the bosom of the pope's church, and entangling it there by all the charms of such a religion as dissolute persons would make for themselves ; but if the God of infinite goodness and truth have given us any certain notice of the ways of eternal life and death, those that believe and practise it will certainly destroy their own souls.

CONTENTS

OF THE PRECEDING TREATISE.

CHAPTER I.

By the doctrine of the Romanists it is not needful to worship God really in public or private. True religion will have God to be worshipped really. Real worship requires the concurrence of mind and heart. In their divine service they require no act of the will, but an intention beforehand to attend their service is enough, though they be not attentive when they are at it. An intention to worship God there is scarce needful. Their intention may be effectual, though they act contrary to it. They may employ both soul and body about other things when they are at their prayers. The act of the mind which they seem to require is attention, but this need not be either spiritual or rational ; so that they need not mind God in their prayers, nor the things to be prayed for, nor the sense of the words they use, but only the pronouncing of them, nor need they actually mind that. The church's holiness supplies their defects, and makes those pass as such that pray devoutly who pray not at all. All due attention in worship is not only unnecessary, but impossible in their way. As attention, so inward reverence and devotion likewise, is not necessary in their service. Hereby their worship is no better than a profane irreligious exercise. They seem satisfied with less worship for God than for their images.

Sect. 1, to p. 24.

In the mass, by their doctrine, God may be less minded than in their canonical hours, where they tell us he need not be minded at all. No inward worship requisite in the mass. It is enough if their attendance there be but an human act ; nay, the use either of sense or reason is not there required. They may busy themselves in other employments while they are at mass. They may sleep a while, or laugh, if they be not too loud. Or talk of their worldly affairs all the while, say some ; others would not have their discourse so serious ; yea, it may be immodest, without transgressing the precept. And lascivious or very profane tunes to the organ at mass may be a small fault. The precept for mass (the chief part of their religion) may be fulfilled by mortal wickedness.

Sect. 2, to p. 31.

Of their ends in worship. They may lawfully worship God for their own ends. Sin may be their end in worshipping, and that without sin, if not principally intended. It is but a small fault to worship God principally

for vain glory. He that comes to mass or prayer with a design to satisfy his lust, or other mortal wickedness, satisfies the command of the church. . . . Sect. 8, to p. 34.

How unnecessary preaching is counted in their church, and hearing the word, in such circumstances where it would be accounted needful, if ever. . . . Sect. 4, to p. 35.

In their sacraments no good motions or actual dispositions (such as are necessary in real worshippers) are required by that church in any that administer or partake thereof. This shewed as to baptism and penance, the sacraments for the dead ; also in the other five for the living. In all, the precepts of the church may be fully accomplished by impious and wicked acts. . . . Sects. 5 and 6, to p. 38.

Even as to the eucharist (for which they profess they have the highest veneration) they may partake worthily who are without any the least good act of mind or heart. And to shut out good motions from their souls, on set purpose, when they are communicating, is but a venial fault, such as will not hinder the effects of the sacrament. Those vagaries which are inconsistent with attention and reverence, if they be not taken notice of, will be no fault at all ; if they be deliberate, will be but slight ones. Not only reverence and devotion are accounted needless at this sacrament, but sobriety and the use of reason. To communicate out of ostentation and vainglory is but a peccadillo. And all holy fervour being excluded by voluntary distraction, to employ their souls vainly or wickedly during the celebration is no fault at all, in reference to the sacrament. Those that communicate unworthily to such a degree as is counted most horribly impious, do fully satisfy the precept of their church for the communion. . . . Sect. 7, to p. 40.

Their doctrine doth not more oblige them to worship God in private. Meditation not necessary, no, not on the holiest seasons or occasions. Reading the word of God scarce tolerated in the people, and that not so freely as the stewes. . . . Sects. 8 and 9, to p. 40.

Private prayer rarely a duty with some, never a duty with others. Not at all by their common doctrine, but by accident, in the article of necessity, which many never meet with ; so that many may never pray while they live, and yet be innocent. Some say there is no divine precept for prayer ; others, who acknowledge a precept, will not have it oblige them at such times and occasions when, if ever, it would oblige. Even in their article of necessity, when it comes, they have ways to excuse them easily from the obligation, and to make it no special sin to neglect this duty all their life. . . . Sect. 10, to p. 44.

Their church obliges not any to private prayers, not to the least or those of most account among them. Whenever they use private prayer upon any account, as required by precept, or enjoined for penance (for prayer passes commonly with them as a punishment), or voluntary as a work of supererogation, there is no need by their principles to worship God therein. Seeing they are to worship him no more anywhere, the world may judge what religion they have, since that worship is as essential to religion as a soul to a man.

Sects. 11 and 12, to p. 47.

CHAPTER II.

Christian knowledge is not necessary for Romanists by their doctrine. They

- need not know what they are to pray for. Many of their priests, yea, of their popes, understand not their common prayers. Sect. 1, to p. 48.
- They need not know what they are to believe. The knowledge of all the articles of the small creed, nor of the Trinity, and incarnation of Christ, scarce necessary for all Christians. Ignorance and error in points of faith may not only be innocent but meritorious. Sect. 2, to p. 53.
- They need not know what they are to do. They may merit heaven by following their leaders out of the way. That is the most complete and perfect obedience which is next to brutish, without knowledge and judgment, when they obey their leaders as a beast doth his owner. Sect. 3, to p. 55.
- The knowledge of the Scriptures (to which their doctrine and worship is confessed to be repugnant) unnecessary in a manner for all sorts; not only for the people and monastics, but their confessors and preachers. Their bishops afraid to look into the Bible lest it should make them heretics. Therefore very few of their bishops in the council of Trent (who decreed so many new articles of faith) had knowledge in theology. Their popes commonly no divines, many of them understood not Latin, though not only their church-service and laws, but their authentic edition of the Scripture be confined to that language. The people, the further they are from knowledge, the more excusable, if they take no care nor pains to get it. Sect. 4, to p. 62.

CHAPTER III.

- Their doctrine makes it needless to love God. There is no command for habitual love to God. The acts of this love are as unnecessary. The imperative acts thereof not enjoined; neither God nor the church requires any to observe the commands of God out of love to him. Sects. 1 and 2, to p. 64.
- How needless the elicit acts of this love are. Some hold there is no command for this actual love (any inward act of it) that binds them, or no special command. Others, who acknowledge a precept, will not have it to bind them upon any occasion when, if ever, it would oblige. Not when they have sinned against him. Not when he expresses his love. Not when he discovers his infinite excellencies to them. Not when they are to worship him. Not at any sacrament, no, not the eucharist. It is too much to love God once a week, or once a year, or once in four or five years. One act of love once in a life may be enough; yea, and more than needs too, for when that time comes (if ever it come) when they will have any obliged to an act of love, yet they then assign something else which will serve instead of it, and so render it needless still. A love which is the issue of nature unsanctified may suffice. Or to love God less than other things, only more than mortal crimes, may be enough. Or to do nothing against this love, though there be no acts of it or from it, may be sufficient. Or external acts may satisfy. Or if a man believes that he loves God above all, though indeed he does not, it may serve the turn. Or attrition (which includes something repugnant to this love) with their sacrament of confession, may excuse him from loving God at the point of death, though he never once loved him in his life before. How extremely pernicious and ridiculous this their doctrine is. Sect. 3 and 4, to p. 75.

CHAPTER IV.

- By their doctrine no faith is necessary, but that which is neither justifying nor saving. That which they will have necessary for the ignorant is what they call implicit. A faith which they may have without actually believing any one article of the Christian faith. And is consistent with the belief of what is quite opposite to the Christian belief. And is but such a faith as Jews, Turks, and Pagans have. This was not thought sufficient for Christians till they were thought something like asses, and so expressed by some of their great saints and doctors. How many ways they have to exempt the people from the obligation of all precepts for any other than this brutish faith. . . . Sect. 1, to p. 79.
- The faith requisite in the more intelligent to justify them they call explicit. This, as described by them in its object, includes things uncertain, impertinent, false, impossible, and ridiculous, as points that must be certainly believed unto justification. This of itself (as themselves say) deserves not the name of a virtue, is an idle, dead thing, may be found in the worst of men, and in the devils too. Yet it is with them the Christian, the Catholic faith. . . . Sect. 2, to p. 80.
- They see no great necessity of faith. The pope (the head of their church) needs it not. And the body may make a shift without it, if any one among all the members have it but. And one act of it in a whole life may serve. The ruder sort may be helped to this act (which will serve once for all) by making the sign of the cross, as their grave divines direct them. . . . Sect. 3, to p. 82.

CHAPTER V.

- No necessity of true repentance for any sort of sins, by their doctrine. Of original sin, or the corruption of our natures, no man can be obliged to repent. . . . Sect. 1, to p. 88.
- It is as needless for those many (and divers of them horrid sins), which they count venial. What pretty expedients they have to expiate these without repentance. . . . Sect. 2, to p. 84.
- For mortal sins some teach there is no divine command to repent. And so to live and die impenitently will be no transgression. No need of it any way, either as a duty enjoined, or as a medium. Sect. 3, to p. 85.
- Others who confess there is a command for it, will not have it oblige any sinner presently. No sin nor danger to defer repentance. Nor will they have it needful at such times and occasions which, if any, would be the necessary seasons for it. Not at solemn times of worship. Not on days of fasting. Not when visited with great calamities. Not when sins are brought to their remembrance. Not when they address themselves to their sacraments, no, not that of penance. Sects. 4 & 5, to p. 89.
- No need to repent till one be at the point of death. Nor is it so needful then, or any time before, but something else may serve without it. A repentance without any sensible sorrow for, or actual resolution against, sin, is sufficient. Or a penance merely natural may suffice. Or a slight remorse in the lowest degree possible, one act of it, despatched in an instant, and never repeated, will be enough. Or if a man conceive that he truly repents, though really he does not, this may serve the turn. Or if he know that he does not repent sufficiently, yet if he signify that

he would grieve more, and is sorry that he does not, this will be effectual. Or attrition with the sacrament will unquestionably justify him. Attrition with them is far distant from true repentance. Several sorts of it. Any of them seem sufficient by the Council of Trent. The general concurrence of their divines for the sufficiency of attrition, yet the best sort of it confessed to be morally evil. . . Sects. 6 & 7, to p. 98.

When they have excluded true repentance by attrition, they reduce attrition to nothing; yet will have it still sufficient. The least servile dislike of sin, in the lowest degree, though it be gone in a moment, though it be merely natural, is enough. Or if there be but a dislike that this dislike is wanting, Or a willingness to have it in those who have it not. Or a man's thinking probably that he hath it when he hath it not. Or a willingness without it to receive the sacrament will serve the turn. Yea, even without their sacrament of penance, attrition with the eucharist, or extreme unction, or the mass, or without any sacrament at all, may procure pardon. What ways attrition may secure them when they cannot have a priest, or the rites proper to priests, while they live, or after they are dead without them. . . Sect. 8, to p. 148.

This doctrine, which makes saving faith, love to God, and true repentance needless, is established by the council of Trent. Their sacrament of penance hath no ground in the word of God. And being taught to depend on it for pardon, and to neglect the things of most necessary importance to salvation, it proves a most damning imposture. Their doctrine thus making repentance needless, plainly destroys Christianity, debauches the lives, and ruins the souls of sinners. And is one of the most pernicious heresies that ever was broached.

Sects. 9, 10, & 11, to p. 103.

CHAPTER VI.

Their doctrine leaves no necessity of holiness of life. It is enough to denominate their universal church holy, if there be but one holy man in it. One act of charity, the least of all, may make one a holy man. Other maxims of this tendency. How they destroy the necessity of holy life, by making it needless to exercise virtue and avoid sin.

Sect. 1, to p. 104.

How they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary in general, more particularly hope (one of the three divine virtues) fares no better than faith and love. They leave themselves no good ground of hope. Their hope a conjecture, founded upon a delusion. The precept for hope obliges not but in the more grievous assaults of despair. So that not one of a thousand in popery need have any hope in God. No, not any, since the command for it may be satisfied by other acts.

Sects. 2 & 3, to p. 105.

Their doctrine leaves no room for, no ground of, humility, no sense of sinfulness, weakness, unworthiness. It is pregnant with pride and arrogance.

Sect. 4, to p. 107.

Brotherly love unnecessary by their doctrine. No need of love to any, unless in necessity. Nor then, though the necessity be extreme, if we help them, though not out of Christian love. This extended not only to external, but spiritual necessities. If the acts whereby we should relieve their souls be neglected, it may pass for a small fault. Those who have no Christian love, if they believe they have it, may be ex-

cused from sin. No precept requires any special act of love to our brethren. No affirmative command for such love. It is enough that we do nothing against them. . . . Sect. 5, to p. 108.

In destroying the necessity of those radical graces instanced in before, they root out the rest. Particularly those that depend upon love to God, viz., delight in God, desires to enjoy him, hatred of sin, sorrow for it as an offence to God, and filial fear. By their common doctrine, there is no special command for any fear of God. So that the want of all fear of God, filial or servile, is no special sin. Since they need not act out of love, they exempt themselves from all acts truly Christian, and any other Christianity than honest heathenism. All exercise of virtues opposite to acts accounted but venially evil, is with them needless. The monstrous consequences of this. . . . Sects. 6, 7, & 8, to p. 111.

A special expedient, whereby they make the exercise of Christian virtues unnecessary, is their turning the commands of God into counsels, such as need not be observed. Such they count many of those excellent rules in Christ's sermon on the mount. These and many others specified. More instances in virtues which concern ourselves, God, and others, in acts of temperance and contentment, in acts of religion, and in acts of righteousness and mercy. Also mortification, crucifying the world, self-denial, taking up the cross, and all growth in grace, is but matter of counsel. So is every degree of grace above the lowest of all. Yea, all commands for good acts are no more than counsels, but only in the article of necessity. And all acts that have more than moral goodness. And all actings in a virtuous manner, and from a good principle. Exercise of virtue not necessary either in worship or common conversation. Not in those cases where, if in any at all, it would be needful. A way they have for any man to turn whatever precept pinches him into a counsel. There is no danger, nor any sin at all, in rejecting the counsel of God. No, not when conscience dictates that it is good to follow them. No, nor when God further calls thereto by inspirations or motions of his Spirit. They may be neglected out of contempt. And with some abhorrence of them. They may boast and glory in such neglects. They may bind themselves by oaths not to observe God's counsels. . . . Sect. 9, to p. 121.

No exercise of virtue necessary but only during the pope's pleasure, for if he should forbid virtue (as he hath done already in divers instances) the church would be bound to believe those virtues to be evils, and so to avoid them. Further, their doctrine encourages the continual practice of such wickedness, as is inconsistent with all holiness of life, reduced to three heads. . . . Sect. 10, to p. 122.

CHAPTER VII.

Many heinous crimes are virtues, or necessary duties with them. Their blasphemies waived, because insisted on by others. Also a great part of their idolatry. Their plea in excuse of this crime, from the distinction of terminative and transient worship, removed by their own doctrine formerly opened. . . . Sect. 1, to p. 123.

Their idolatry as to relics. These are to be religiously worshipped, though many of them be ridiculous and loathsome, though many thousands be confessed to be counterfeit, and great and detestable impostures be therein acknowledged. To worship false relics, or the devil upon a

- mistaken belief, is meritorious. What worshipful things miscarriages in the mass furnish them with. . . . Sect. 2, to p. 125.
- They give divine worship to relics, though they give it not the name. They give both name and thing expressly to vast multitudes. All which they count relics of Christ are to have Christ's honour. Among these they reckon all things that were near him, or touched him on earth, even the earth, water, stones, &c. Not only the things, but persons that touched him, thereby become his relics, and are to have his worship. The Virgin Mary expressly, and thousands more may have it; by the same reason, they will not absolutely except the ass on which he rode. Yea, all the relics of such persons may have it. For they commonly teach that the relics may have the same worship with the person whose they are. The best of their relics impostures, that which passes for the foreskin of Christ, his shirt, coat, blood, the crown of thorns, lance, nails, cross, and its liquor. Their relics numerous beyond account. How they came to be so, their own authors tell us. The devil furnished their church with some of them, and crafty knaves with others. Yet their whole religion in a manner consists in worshipping such things as these, as some of themselves tell us. . . . Sect. 8, to p. 134.
- Perjury necessary by their doctrine. If a prince swear solemnly not to prosecute his supposed heretical subjects, unless he break his oath, he is in danger to be damned. No faith to be kept with heretics. Their doctrine ruins all securities that popish princes or subjects can give to protestants. These can with prudence trust to nothing but what will keep them out of the papal reach. . . . Sect. 4, to p. 135.
- Robbery and murder as necessary a duty. To deprive heretics of estate or life, a meritorious act. All papists, princes, or others, are bound in conscience by that which is most obliging in their religion, utterly to root out all they account heretics, and to seize on all they have. A decree of a general council for it, which encourages the execution with promises of the greatest rewards, and enforces it with threatenings of most dreadful import. They must not be counted catholics unless they do it. It hath been effected or attempted in all countries where the papists had power to do it, or but thought that they had it. The reason why they do it not in England and some other places is, as themselves declare, because they have not yet power enough. . . . Sect. 5, to p. 137.
- Sorcery and conjuration part of their religion. This manifested in their sacramentals, where by their own rules there is a tacit invocation of the devil. Their excuses here insufficient. Even their mode of praying too like conjuring. . . . Sect. 6, to p. 140.
- The chief act of their religion is to destroy Christ, by sacrificing him daily in the mass, which they maintain they do truly and really. . . . Sect. 7, to p. 143.

CHAPTER VIII.

- Their doctrine tends to destroy holiness of life, by encouraging the continual practice of all sort of wickedness under the notion of venials. What hatred of God. What acts of infidelity and idolatry. What distrustful cares. What irreligiousness in all religious exercises. What use of witches. Or dealing with the devil. What irreverence towards God in adoration. . . . Sect. 1, to p. 144.

- What impious swearing almost at every word. In horrid terms. Without offering to break off this ungodly custom. Binding themselves by oaths, and threatening God that they will sin against him. And never comply with his will in things which he commends to them as most excellent. What fraudulent oaths. What perjuries of all sorts, both as to assertory and promissory oaths, not worse for being most frequent and customary. . . . Sect. 2, to p. 149.
- What blasphemies. Out of levity, passion, or inconsiderateness. Or from wicked custom and contempt of a man's own salvation. The more habitual and customary blaspheming is the better. Sect. 3, to p. 150.
- What profaning of holy time. Where it is manifest, that little or nothing at all of religion need be made conscience of amongst them; even at the only time set apart for the acts and exercises of it. Sect. 4, to p. 153.
- What irreverence in children to parents. They may be ashamed of them. And curse them; as parents may curse them again. What unaffectionateness. They may desire the death of their parents for some outward advantage. Or by accusations procure their death. What disobedience in all things, out of negligence or sensuality. And in matters of greatest importance as to this life. Or in matters which concern their salvation. Parents have no right to oblige their daughters not to be whores. . . . Sect. 5, to p. 155.
- What murder of soul or body. As to acts inward and outward. What hatred. What outrageous anger. What revenge. Desires of the death, not only of enemies, but nearest relations, because they are poor, or not handsome, may be innocent. Actual killing them without deliberation is no fault, when not fully deliberate (when ordinarily many things may hinder it from being so) is but little worse. . . . Sect. 6, to p. 156.
- What uncleanness. Fornication in its own nature not evil with some. Adultery one of the lesser sins. To seek or receive hire for whoredom scarce a fault, even in a nun. The conjugal act before marriage venial. And also to lie with one contracted privately, after a public contract with another. A woman whose chastity is attempted with some force need not cry out, nor make any resistance, but may take natural pleasure in the act. How excused when drawn to it by courtship. Those who are disposed to fornication may innocently be invited to it. Self-pollution may be desired or delighted in as past or future for a good end. To venture upon the occasions. To use hot provoking means, carnal touches. To expose themselves to place, company, sights, persuasions, opportunities that are ensnaring. To use filthy discourse, or a tempting garb, all venial. . . . Sect. 7, to p. 159.
- What stealing in all sorts, children, servants, wives. Mortal theft is so stated that they may make it venial when they please. They may steal little or much. Of these many instances. What cheating in false measures. Or the quality or substance of what they sell. They may promote the cheat with lies or worse. And defraud those who entrust them. Their church laws allow cozening, so it be but as to half of the worth of the commodity. . . . Sect. 8, to p. 164.
- What lying. They may lie merrily, and do it customarily, out of mere pleasure in telling lies, yea out of malice. They may lie whenever it will be for their advantage, if it do no great mischief, or they do but think so. To tell lies for their religion is piety. No sort of lies mortal but by accident, when they do great mischief, as speaking the truth may do. Nor in many cases when they do such mischief. They may

use lies in commerce, and confirm them with oaths, both together may be but venial. Also in courts of judicature. How both judge and witnesses may lie there. They may bear false witness in favour of one another. They may delude the court by equivocation or mental reserves. Even a priest may swear he knows nothing of what he has heard in confession, with this reserve, he knows it not as man, but as God. They have lies in their divine office. Abundance of such stuff, or worse, is confessed to be there. Nor would they have all purged out, lest none of their old service should be left. They may tell lies in the pulpit. But some of them would have such rank ones avoided as the hearers may smell out. They may do it even in confession, and delude the priest with lies in much variety. And he may delude them likewise, pretending that he absolves them, when he neither doth it nor intends it. Since they have such liberty to lie everywhere, when can they be trusted? Sect. 9, to p. 172.

What perfidiousness venial. How they may be perfidious for delight, or advantage. They may make promises outwardly, without intention to be obliged. Yea, they may deny, with oaths too, that they promised. Internal promises, though made in the form of a vow, or with an oath added, oblige them not. How easily they may excuse the worst perfidiousness. The firmest promises bind not but under venial guilt, unless they be in writing or with an oath. Nor then, if they intended not thereby to be obliged. Sect. 10, to p. 175.

What hypocrisy. To make false shows of sanctity for a good end is no sin. Bare hypocrisy venial, though one delight to play the hypocrite. Yea, when it is for a bad end, though the fault be doubled it is venial still. They reverence hypocrisy as a holy art. It is amongst the commendations of their great saints, and recommended by them to their religious. If they feign more holiness than they have, to edify others, it is rather meritorious than faulty. Their church much concerned for the honour of hypocrisy. Sect. 11, to p. 176.

What calumny. How many ways they have to ruin the reputation of others without mortal guilt. Amongst others, if one speak ill of them or their church, though truly, they may charge him with false crimes. A small fault for one to defame himself. Sect. 12, to p. 179.

What flatteries venial. To praise one for the virtues he never had, or the good he never did. Yea to applaud him for his sins, to gain something by such flatteries. Cursing may be their usual practice. It is scarce any fault when used for honest recreation. Sect. 13, to p. 180.

What capital sins are with them venial. All covetousness, unless injustice be added. Yea, and with injustice too. They allow them to gain unrighteously. They may gain out of excessive desire of lucre, and make it their principal end, and turn it into a trade. They need not restore what they win by unlawful, or what they call diabolical games. But the loser may steal it from him that wins. Or refuse to pay, though he have sworn to do it, his oath may be easily dispensed with. They may take hire for acting the most abominable wickedness, or unjust judgment, or false depositions, or murder, or consulting with the devil. But then they must be sure to do the fact. No restitution to the poor a duty. Hard-heartedness and unmercifulness to the poor venial. Pure prodigality a less fault than covetousness, though this be next to none. Sect. 14, to p. 184.

All pride venial, but such as is scarce to be found in the Christian world. The numerous issue of this queen of mortal sins, as they style it, to

which they are so favourable. To ascribe what they receive from God to their own merits, is confessed to be mortal pride, yet they make it part of their creed. Arrogance, commonly a venial fault.

Sect. 15, to p. 186.

Ambition venial, unless one would be honoured for a crime, or counted a god.

Sect. 16, to p. 186.

Vain-glory regularly a venial, it imports nothing contrary to the love of God or man. It may be their principal end in all things ordained for the honour of God, otherwise their whole clergy, they say, would be in a dangerous condition. They may take livings and spiritual promotions principally for honour or temporal profit. So we have an account why they may make religion all along subservient to a worldly interest.

Sect. 17, to p. 188.

Loathing of spiritual and divine things venial, unless it be on such an account as rarely happens. All in a manner that is requisite for a true Christian may be abhorred without mortal guilt. Rancour and indignation against any who would draw them to spiritual and divine things, a venial.

Sect. 18, to p. 189.

Anger, though extravagant and revengeful, may be venial. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do and be innocent. Disdain of others. Audaciousness, immoderate fear, or wrath. Fool-hardiness. Incontinent desires and lust. Love of the flesh or the world, venial. Envy scarce any worse.

Sect. 19, to p. 191.

Intemperance, comprising gluttony and drunkenness, in its own nature a venial. When they play the epicures like Dives, and resolve to give up their whole life to gluttonous pleasures, it is but near to a mortal sin. When it proceeds to beastliness, and the glutton so burdens nature that it is forced to ease itself by vomiting, or other nasty, loathsome ways, it is still venial. When he eats till he vomit, on purpose that he may be ready to eat again, it is no worse. Drinking till the house in the drunkard's fancy run round, is venial. Nor will it be worse till reason be totally drowned. The rare virtues of drunkenness; complete drunkenness will make any wickedness then acted to be no sin at all. And half drunkenness will make it to be but a venial.

Sect. 20, to p. 194.

The multitude of particular crimes which issue from these seven capitals need not be taken notice of as mortal. They have no warrant from Scripture to count any sin venial. Yet they venture to reduce to this account what the law of God forbids, not only when it is of less but greatest importance. To make a sin mortal requires so very much, that the sinner may easily miss some of it, and so venture upon it without fear that it is deadly. This declared particularly. They shew them a way to pass any mortal crime as venial. How they represent venials as so very harmless, that all have encouragement enough to practise them continually all their life, and even when they are dying. Though some few of them may make any look like monsters in the judgment of a sober pagan.

Sect. 21, to p. 199.

CHAPTER IX.

They conclude many crimes, inconsistent with holiness of life, to be no sins at all, and so warrant all to live in the practice of them. Some particulars of this nature before insisted on, here only pointed at. It is

- no sin to quench the motions of God's Spirit, drawing them to the observance of his will any way. Yet may they invite others to wickedness when they are ready for it. They may lawfully deal with the devil divers ways. . . . Sect. 1, to p. 200.
- It is sufficient to pray with the mouth, without the heart. Sect. 2, to p. 201.
- How it is no sin to worship the untensils of worship. Or the word *Jesus* pronounced or written. Or the accidents of bread and wine in the eucharist. Or the picture of the manger, thorns, or spear which touched Christ. Or the ass he rode on, or the lips of Judas for kissing Christ, though to betray him. Or the imaginary blood of a crucifix. Or to worship any person whatever as the image of God, or any other creature in the world, toad, serpent, or a wisp of straw. Or the apparition of the devil himself in a beam of light, or the form of a crucifix. . . . Sect. 3, to p. 204.
- Perjury no sin. When one takes an oath and intends not to swear. Or swears and intends not to be obliged. Or swears in another sense than he knows is intended in the oath. So they may use equivocation or mental restrictions in swearing. And think this lawful either to gain some advantage, or to avoid any damage. Many instances of such artifice of words or inward reserves which they may use to elude oaths. They may swear with such ambiguities or reserves, when they are swearing not to use them. No oath can be contrived which they may not thus elude. . . . Sect. 4, to p. 209.
- The irreligion of the Roman church palpable in the observance required of the Lord's day, and others set apart for holy employments. When the people are discharged from religious duties at other times, nothing is enjoined them on these days but presence at mass. At mass they need neither mind God nor divine things. It would be no sin to employ themselves in servile works on these days if it were but the custom. Nor to give them no observance at all after mass. This may be despatched before sunrise. These days are not profaned by any acts of wickedness. So that all the religiousness which that church requires of their catholics, when they make the best show of it, is consistent with the lewdest acts of ungodliness and debauchery. . . . Sect. 5, to p. 218.
- In reference to those whom they count heretics, all relatives are discharged from their respective duties, subjects, wives, children, servants, yea, debtors too. It is no murder to kill a heretic, or those that are excommunicated. . . . Sect. 6, to p. 214.
- Upon what occasion they may kill one another. A man may with impunity kill his wife taken in adultery, or his daughter, or sister, or his own mother, and this though they be big with child. A woman married or unmarried, being unlawfully got with child, may procure abortion, not only to secure her life, but her state and credit. It is lawful to cut up an honest mother quick, and she bound to procure it, that the child in her womb do not want baptism. They may without sin kill any one assaulting them unjustly, not only to secure their life, but to avoid a wound or a blow (a priest may do it while he is celebrating) though the aggressor be frantic, or in drink, or asleep; or though he have had intolerable provocation and be the sufferer. They may kill an innocent to escape themselves. They may kill one before he actually assaults them, though his soul be like to perish with his life, if they know he is prepared for it, or does but design it. So the adulteress may prevent her husband, and kill him first, with the poison or weapon

prepared for her. They may kill one to secure their goods, or recover them, when they may be recovered in a legal way. Yea, though they be of small value, worth but three or four ducats, yea, but one crown or less. They may kill men for their reputation. If he sees one approach to assault him, he may kill him rather than retire. A blow with a cudgel or a light switch, yea, or a box on the ear, is a just ground to kill him that gives it, yea, or does but offer at it. They may kill men for ill language, though they allow it to be as common as any they speak. Yea, for an affront by mere signs, though he that gives such an affront runs for it. They speak favourably of duels. But allow them to kill men more privily, and by surprise, when they impeach their reputation publicly or privately, yea, or do but threaten to do it. Jesuits scarce so extravagant here as some of other orders. If the civil laws did but give so much liberty to murder, as their rules for conscience, no man near them could have security for his life. Sect. 7, to p. 218.

How indulgent their doctrine is to uncleanness. They oblige them not to avoid such occasions of this sin by which they very frequently fall, unless they fall thereby in a manner always. Divers instances. What liberty they give to unclean thoughts. Obscene words. Lascivious writings. Filthy songs. Such ditties sung to the organ at mass. Offered to God in the person of the church for divine praises. This was the custom everywhere in Cajetan's time, and since. As intolerable obscenity in their penitential confessions. What licence they give to use such things as provoke lust. Also to immodest touches and shameful sights. No need to be resolute in resisting temptations. How servants may minister to the lust of their superiors. Actual whoredom hath excessive encouragement. The pope builds stews for prostitutes. They pay him a weekly tribute for liberty and accommodation to drive their trade. This condemned as most abominable to God and man, even by barbarians; but the pope consenting to it, it is no sin, not indecency for his holiness to be maintained by the hire of whores. Many things concluded by their divines in favour of them. How punctual in deciding at what rates all sorts of women may set themselves to sale. They oblige them not to restitution, but when their religious make use of them, who are to have it gratis. Public prostitutes compelled by law to commit lewdness with any that will hire them. Hence the people (instructed in their religion) know not that such fornication is a sin. He that keeps a concubine at home is not to be denied the communion. Nor will they oblige him to put her away, if that would impair his estate, or delight, or his reputation, yea, or her's either. It is enough if he promise not to sin with her, though he keep not promise. Adultery no sin in divers cases. For the clergy, adultery, nor unnatural uncleanness, not so much a sin as marriage. Burning lust, innocent. Better to burn than to marry, whatever the apostle with their adversaries say. The admired chastity of their votaries consists well enough with whoredom, and is only violated by marriage. Their priests have been allowed to keep whores at home, paying a yearly rent for it. And those were to pay it who took not the liberty, because they might. Votaries incur excommunication for laying aside their habit, but not if they lay it aside to commit fornication more readily. Priests in no wise to be obliged by oath to forsake their concubines. Extremely few chaste, by their own confession, of those innumerable many that profess it. A priest not to be deposed for fornication, because there are very few not guilty. Priests who keep

many concubines not irregular. How they favour sodomy. Married persons may practise much of it together. Their clergy may act it to the uttermost, and be neither suspended, nor irregular, unless they make a trade of it, and do that so publicly and notoriously, as they can scarce do (by their description hereof), if they had a mind to it. Mere mental heresy a greater crime than sodomy with them. Yea, petty thievery a more heinous sin, with some of them expressly, and in consequence with most. Sodomy hath ecclesiastical immunity. All sorts of religious places amongst them are sanctuaries for sodomites, all sorts of uncleanness having such free and favourable entertainment in their church, no wonder if it be the sink of the Christian world.

Sect. 8, to p. 232.

It is no sin to take from protestants, or any counted heretics, all they have. All their estates are confiscated immediately, before any declarative sentence, from the first day of their pretended heresy. Though the papists make not seizure presently, yet those heretics are in the interim responsible for the mean profits. And they cannot any way alienate or dispose of their estates. All wills, sales, contracts for this purpose, are null and void. All may be taken from the purchaser, without restoring the price he paid. Children, though Roman catholics, lose their portions. Liberty given to all to spoil and bereave them. All rules of righteousness which concern propriety are void here, papists owe them no observance. It is no sin to burn their houses. To deprive a protestant prince of his throne. To draw his subjects into war against him. To betray garrisons to the Romanists. To pay us no debts. To detain what is deposited with them in trust. There can be no lawful parliament among protestants. No king. No peers. No freeholders. No laws that are valid can be enacted. No aids or subsidies can be granted. The fundamentals of the government in England, and other such like countries, quite blown up by their principles.

Sect. 9, to p. 235.

It is no sin with them to bear false witness against protestants, when their life or estate is concerned. Or to use fraud and deceit in bargains, to cheat them of all they have. Or perfidiousness in promises, compacts, &c. They leave little that can be sin in papists towards themselves; less towards protestants, .

Sects. 10 and 11, to p. 236.

An aversation and contrariety to God and holiness, a propenseness and inclination to all ungodliness and unrighteousness in the horridest instances, when it is habitual, reigning, impetuous, active, is no sin at all in the temper and habit; no, nor in the acts and motions, without consent.

Sect. 12, to p. 237.

What expedients they have to justify all sin in the world, or make it no sin. The pope's power herein. If he command vice, their church is bound to practise it. He can make sin to be no sin. He may dispense in all positive laws, and in the divine law (and against the gospel) at least where God can dispense, particularly with oaths and vows, such as are best, and most inviolable. With the observance of the Lord's day, so as to turn it into a working day. With all public worship amongst them, both mass and divine service. And against the universal state of the church. He can discharge them from righteousness towards men. Take from any man his right. Dissolve marriages. Legitimate adultery. License persons to be married for a while, and not during life. Authorise incest (dispensing with marriage betwixt any but parents and children) and sodomy. He can dispense with any divine

law when the reason thereof ceaseth, and can declare it to cease when he pleaseth. If he should err in dispensing, yet he that makes use of his licence to sin, sins not. He can free any from the obligation to fruits meet for repentance. Thus can he discharge all from acts of religion, righteousness, and good works. . . . Sect. 13, to p. 242.

He is excused from sin, who ventures on it upon some probable reason, though it seem but probable to him, out of affection to the person that offers it, and there be more reason against it. . . . Sect. 14, to p. 243.

Custom will excuse from sin, and make it no sin. Divers instances. The sense of Scripture must be conformed to the custom of their church, and vary from what it was, as they change fashions. . . . Sect. 15, to p. 244.

He sins not who does what is sinful, following the judgment of a grave doctor. One such doctor may suffice (as multitudes of their divines conclude). And will secure him in following his opinion, though both less safe and less probable. This granted to be the common doctrine of their church. So it is unreasonable to except against our alleging the opinion of particular doctors against them, since their common doctrine allows any to follow the opinion of particular doctors, as to belief or practice. Hereby a way is opened to leave no conscience of sin amongst them. . . . Sect. 16, to p. 247.

Their directions for the scrupulous of like tendency. He sins not who breaks the law in a strict sense, if he observe it in some benign sense. He may make the interpretation himself, and so such as will please him, or choose that of others which is best for his purpose, though he fear it is not probable, and it be false indeed. Or when the observance of the law is very difficult or incommodious. And ordinarily he is like to judge it so. Or when the observance of it is ridiculous, as the observing of the divine rule has been (by their acknowledgment) long since in their church. Or when there is apprehension of danger in complying with it. Or when he observes it but according to the common usage of good catholics, when amongst the most eminent of their catholics it is confessed, there is little or no worship of God, no regard of good life, righteousness, or godliness. Their devices for justifying of much wickedness (to the excluding all holiness of life), where founded. . . . Sects. 17, 18, to p. 250.

CHAPTER X.

Good works not necessary by the Roman doctrine. This shewed in fasting, prayer, alms-deeds, to which they reduce all good works. They do not, they need not, fast on their fasting days. Their church requires the observance of none of those things, which they say are necessary to the being of a fast. They may eat a dinner, a full meal at noon, may be excessive therein, so as to transgress the laws of sobriety, and to excite and cherish lust, instead of repressing the flesh, and yet fulfil the precept. They may break their fast in the morning (and yet keep it), with ale, wine, bread, or other things. They may eat a supper, too, and that excessive great, as big as custom will have it, when they tell us, it is their custom to sup with notorious excess. They may sup out of sensuality. And may take their supper in the morning. And drink and eat every hour. The quality of their fasting meat most delicious. They may drink at any time, and wine, too (though that is confessed to be more contrary to a fast than flesh). They may drink it till they

- be drunk, and yet not break their fast. Nothing religious in their fast. Neither religious ends nor employments. And so it can be no good work, nor necessary in their account. Those that have tired themselves with gaming or whoring are excused. Yet this piece of mockery passes with them as satisfactory and meritorious. Sect. 1, to p. 255.
- Their praying no good work. The people pray not in the mass. They neither express nor conceive any petitions. Nor concur with the priest, but by presence and posture of the body, as an image may do, or by virtually wishing the priest's prayers may succeed, which they may do when they are asleep. Nor do their priests pray better in their public service, unless the bare pronouncing of the words (which is all they count necessary) be praying. How far they acknowledge this. Sect. 2, to p. 257.
- Acts of mercy or charity not necessary with them, but in two cases, which seldom or rather never occur, at least together. One is, when they have superfluities both in respect of nature and state; but, they say, it cannot easily be judged that any secular person (no, nor kings and princes), have such superfluities. The other is when the necessity is extreme; except it be such, if any had superfluities, they would not be obliged to part with any thing. When it is extreme, they allow the poor to steal. So charity is not needful but when stealing is lawful. Or then he may be excused so many ways, that he need never find himself obliged to relieve any gratis. Good works not necessary with them, because to act from a good principle, and for a good end, is needless. Their design to satisfy justice, and merit grace and glory by what they do, makes their pretended good works deadly evils. No necessity of good works upon the account of their being enjoined for penance. So they are not done as good, but suffered as evils. Besides, the priest need not enjoin such. Or the sinner need not submit thereto, or need not perform it. But may be released many ways. Especially by indulgencies. It is counted better to give money for these, than in ways of charity. Sects. 3 and 4, to p. 261.
- The conclusion; where from the premises in brief is inferred, that the practical doctrine of the Romanists tends to ruin Christianity, and the souls of all that follow it. To p. 264.