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PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
OF THE IMMORTALITY OF 
Mans Soul, 
And the Nature of it, and other Spirits.
Two Discourses: 
One in a Letter to an unknown Doubter; The other in a Reply to Dr. Henry Moore's Animadversions on a private Letter to him; which he published in his Second Edition of Mr. Joseph Glanvill's Sadducismus Triumphatus, or History of Apparitions.

By RICHARD BAXTER.

LONDON:
Printed for B. Simons, at the Three Golden Cocks at the West End of St Paul's. 1682.
The PREFACE.

§. 1. THE Author of the Letter which I answer, being wholly unknown to me, and making me no return of his sense of my Answer, I suppose it can be no wrong to him that I publish it. I have formerly thought, that it is safer to keep such Objections, and false reasonings, from men's notice, than publickly to confute them. But now in London they are so commonly known, and published in open Discourse and Writing, that whether silencing them be desirable or not, it is become impossible. And tho' I have said so much more, especially in two Books (The Reasons of the Christian Religion, and the Unreasonable-ness of Infidelity) as may make this needless to them that read those; yet most Infidels and Sadduces being so self-conceited, and fastidious, as to disdain, or cast by all that will cost them long reading and consideration, it may be this short Letter may so far prevail against their sloth, as to invite them to read more. I would true Christianity were as common as the profession of it: There would then be fewer that need such Discourses. But alas! how numerous are those Christians that are no Christians, no more than a Carcass or a Picture is a man; yea, worse Christians, who hate Christianity, whose Godfathers and Godmothers
(not Parents, but Neighbours) did promise and vow three things in their Names. 1. That they should renounce the Devil, and all his Works; the Pomp and Vanities of this wicked World, and all the sinful lusts of the flesh. 2. That they should believe all the Articles of the Christian Faith. 3. That they should keep God's holy Will and Commandments, and walk in the same all the days of their lives. Yea, before they could speak, the mouth of these Godfathers speaking for them, did not only promise, that they should believe, but profess in the Infants name, That even then they did steadfastly believe the Articles of the Christian Faith. The Infant is said to make both the Promise and Profession by these Godfathers; who also undertake to provide, that they shall [learn all things which a Christian ought to know and believe to his Souls health, and shall be virtuously brought up, to lead a godly and a Christian life]. Whether these Godfathers ever intend to perform this, or the Parents use to expect it of them, I need not tell you; But how little most of the baptized perform of it, is too notorious. And what wonder is it, if we have Christians that in Satan's Image fight against Christ, even PERJURED, MALIGNANT, PERSECUTING Christians, haters of those that seriously practice the baptismal Vow, when they are PERJURED and Per-
Perfidious Violaters of it themselves, as to the prevalent bent of heart and life.

These Hypocrite nominal Ceremony Christians, become the great hinderance of the cure of Infidelity in the world. It is the SPIRIT by its supernatural Works, which is the great Witness of Christ, and the infallible proof of supernatural Revelation. These witnessing works of the Spirit, are these five: 1. His Antecedent Prophecies. 2. His inherent Divine impress on the Person, Works, and Gospel of Christ. 3. His concomitant Testimony in Christ's uncontrolled numerous Miracles, Resurrection and Ascension. 4. His subsequent Testimony in the numerous uncontrolled Miracles of the Apostles, and supernatural gifts to the Christians of that Age. But tho the History of these be as infallibly delivered to us, as any in the world; yet the distance hindereth the belief of some, who have not this history well opened to them. 5. Therefore God hath continued to the end of the world a more excellent Testimony than miracles (thought not so apt to work on sense) even the special regeneration of sanctifying work of the Spirit of Christ, on the souls of all sincere Believers: The raising of Souls to a Divine and heavenly Disposition, and Conversation, to live to God and the common good, in the comfortable hopes of an everlasting heavenly glory, as purchased and given by our Redeemer, conquering the allurements of the world and flesh, the temptation...
ons of Satan, and all the flatteries and frowns of the ungodly; This is a work that none but God can do and will do, which beareth his Image and superscription.

But now these Hypocrites, obscure it to themselves and other unbeliever, and tempt men to say, Are not Christians as bad as Heathens? and Mahometans. Are they not as fleshly, and worldly, and false, and perjured, and malicious, and hurtful, and pernicious to others and themselves? But I answer, No, They are not: These are no more Christians, than Images are men: They are the Enemies of Christians, that under Christ's banner, and in his liveliness and name, do the most perfidiously hate him and fight against him: Who will tell them, Inasmuch as you did it to the least of these, you did it to me. They betray him for money, as Judas, by Hail-master and a Kiss. I challenge any Infidel to find me One that seriously believeth the Gospel of Christ, as perceiving the certain Evidence of its truth, who is not a person of a holy and obedient heavenly life: How can a man sincerely believe that God sent his Son from Heaven in flesh, to Redeem man, and to bring us to Glory, and that he sealed his Doctrine by all his miracles, resurrection and ascension, and the Holy Ghost, and that he is our Head in Heaven, with whom we shall live in joy for ever; and is the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him, I say: How can a man be-
believe this seriously, and not esteem, and choose and seek it, before all the shadows and vanities to this world. It is not Christians, but false hypocrites, whose lives represent Christianity, blasphemously as no better than Heathenism or Mahometanism; It is but for worldly Interest, and Reputation, or because it is the Religion of the King, Country, or Ancestors, that they take up so much as the name and badge of Christianity. And will you judge of our Religion by its enemies? Do you not see in their drunkenness, sensuality, covetousness, ungodliness, how unlike their lives are to the baptismal Vow, and that they hate, and seek to destroy them that are serious in keeping that Vow, and living as Christians?

§ 2. And as I publish this for the use of unbelievers, so I must let the Reader know, that it is become one of the usual tricks of the Popish deceivers, to put on the Vizor of an Infidel, and to dispute about the immortality of the Soul, and the greatest difficulties of Religion: And it is to puzzle men, and convince them, that by Reasoning they can never attain to satisfaction in these matters; And then to infer, [‘You have no way left, but to believe the Church, &c. we are that Church. If you leave that easy quiet way, you will never come to any certainty]. Why do they not try the same trick about all the difficulties in Philosophy, Astronomy, Physick, History, &c? For every Science, and Art, hath its difficulties. But are not all these as great difficulties to the Pope and his Pre-
lates, as they are to us? But God hath given us a more clear and satisfactory way of the solution of such Doubts.

§. 3. I must further give notice to the Reader, that it was the publishing of Dr. H. More's answer to a Letter of mine, which occasioned the publishing of this. When I was put on the one, I thought it not unprofitable to premise the other, as being of much greater use. It seemed good to the worthy Dr. to desire my thoughts of his Description of a Spirit, which he laid down in the first Edition of Mr. Glanvile of Apparitions; which I gave him in a haft Letter, which he thought meet, without my knowledge, to publish an answer to, in his second Edition of Mr. Glanvile. Our difference is scarce worth the Reader's notice. And our contention is only friendly, and Philosophical. But yet it may possibly be useful to some, at least to excite them to a more profitable search than I have made. And it explaineth some passages in my Methodus Theologicae.

But I much more commend to the reading of the Sadduces and Infidels, the Histories themselves of Apparitions, and Witchcrafts, which Mr. Glanvile and Dr. More have there delivered, many of them, at least, with undeniable evidence and proof. To which, if he will but add the Devil of Mascon and Bodin, and Remigius of Witches, he will scarce be able to deny belief to the existence and Individuation of Spirits, and the future life of separated Souls.

SIR,
THE NATURE AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL PROVED.
In Answer to one who professed perplexing Doubtfulness.

By RICHARD BAXTER.

LONDON:
Printed for B. Simons, at the Three Golden Cocks, at the West End of St. Paul's. 1682.
I have Reason to judge you no Stranger to such Addresses as these: and therefore have ventured more boldly to apply my self to you. Others would, it may be, rigedly censure this Attempt; but your more Christian Temper will induce you, I hope, to judge more charitably, did you but understand with what reluctance I undertook this task.

I have had many Disputes with my self, whether or no I should stifle these Doubts, or seek Satisfaction. Shame to own such Principles bid me do the first; but the weight of the Concern obliged me to the last. For I could not with any cheerfulness, or with that vigor I thought did become me, pursue those unseen Substances, those Objects of Faith Religion holds forth, except I did really believe their existence, and my own capacity of enjoying them.
I thought at first to satisfy my self in the certainty of the things I did believe, to confirm and establish my Faith by these Studies, that I might be able to render a Reason of the hope that is in me: but instead of building up, I am shaken; and instead of a clearer evidence, I am environed with uncertainties.

Unhappy that I am! I had better have taken all upon Trust, could I so have satisfied my Reason, than thus to have involved my self in an endless Study. For such I am afraid it will prove without help; for that I may not in this Concern rest without satisfaction; and yet the more I consider, and weigh things, the more are my doubts multiplied. I call them only doubts, not to palliate any opinions; for I have not yet espoused any; but because they have not yet attained so much maturity or strength, as to take me off those things, my doubts being satisfied, I should conclude of indispensible necessity; they are but yet in the Womb: assist to make them Abortives.

I have not been wanting to my self, but in the use of all means to me known, have sought satisfaction, both by Prayer, Reading, and Meditation. I have weighed and consulted things according to my 

Ca-
Capacity. I have been as faithful to my self in all my reasonings, as I could, and void of prejudice, have passed impartial Censures on the things in debate, so far as that light I have would enable me; and what to do more, I know not, except this course I now take, prove effectual, you inclining to assist me, that I know have studied these things.

My request to you therefore is, If your more publick Studies will permit you, That you would condescend to satisfy me in the Particulars I shall mention. I assure you, I have no other design, but to know the Truth: which in things of such moment, certainly cannot be difficult, tho' to my unfurnished Head they have proved so: I hope my asking may prove my establishment.

That I may therefore put you to as little trouble as I can, I will first tell you what I do believe, and then what I stick at.

First, therefore, I do really believe, and am very well satisfied, That there is a God, or a first Cause that hath created all things, and given to every thing its Being. For I am not acquainted with any independent Being. I know not any thing that is able to subsist without the Contribution of its
Fellow-Creatures. I am conscious to my self, when sickness invades me, and death summons my Compound to a dissolution, I can do nothing to the preservation of the Being I enjoy. And if I cannot preserve my self as I am, much less could I make my self what I am: For when I was nothing, I could do nothing. And Experience and Sense tells me, As it is with me, so it is with others; as there is none can preserve their Beings, so there is none could acquire to themselves the Being they have; and if none, then not the first man. And indeed that was it I enquired after, from whence every species had at first their Beings; the way, how, and means by which they are continued. I know not any Cause of the Being of any thing, of which again I may not enquire the Cause: and so from Cause to Cause, till through a multitude of Causes, I necessarily arrive at the first Cause of all Causes, a Being wholly uncaused, and without Cause, except what it was unto it self.

My next Enquiry was into my self; and my next business, to find what Concern I have with my Creator: which I knew no better way to attain, than by searching the bounds of humane Capacity. For I con-
concluded it reasonable to judge those attainments I was capable of in my Creation, I was designed for. Now if man is nothing more than what is visible, or may be made so by Anatomy or Pharmacy, he is no Subject capable of enjoying, or loving God, nor consequently of a life of Retribution.

In this Enquiry I found Man consisted of something visible and invisible; the Body which is visible, and something else that invisibly actuates the same. For I have seen the Body, the visible part of man; when the invisible, either through indisposition of its Organs, or its self, or being expelled its Mansion, hath ceased to act (I speak as one in doubt): the Body hath been left to outward appearance the same; it was yet really void of Sense, and wholly debilitated of all power to act: But then what this invisible is, what to conclude of it, I know not: Here I am at a stand, and in a Labyrinth, without a Clue: For I find no help anywhere. Many have, I acknowledge, defended the Souls Immortality; but none have proved the existence of such a Being, and a life of Retribution, and that copiously enough; but none have proved a Subject capable of it. I know all our Superior...
Faculties and Actions, are usually attributed to the Soul; but what it is in man they call so, they tell us not. To say it is that by which I reason, or that now dictates to me what I write, is not satisfactory: For I look for a definition, and such an one, as may not to ought else be appropriated. Is it therefore a real Being, really different from the Body, and able to be without it? or is it not? If not, whatever it be, I matter not. If it be, is it a pure Spirit, or meerly material? If meerly material, and different only from the Body gradually, and in some few degrees of subtilty, it is then a question, whether or not that we call Death, and suppose a separation of the Compound, be not rather a Concentration of this active Principle in its own Body, which through some indisposition of the whole, or stoppage in its Orgains, through gross Corporeity, hath suffocated its actings. If it be a pure Spirit, I would then know, what is meant by Spirit? and whether or no all things invisible, and imperceptable to Sense, are accounted such? If so, it is then only a term to distinguish between things evident to Sense, and things not. If otherwise, how shall I distinguish between the highest degree of material, and the
the lowest degree of spiritual Beings, or know how they are diversified, or be certain the Being of the Soul is rightly appropriated. For to me, an immaterial and spiritual Being, seems but a kind of Hocus, and a Substance script of all materiality, a substantial nothing. For all things at first had their Origine from the deep dark Waters: witness Moses Philosophy, in the 1st of Genesis, on which the Spirit of God is said to move. I am far from believing those Waters such as that Element we daily make use of; but that they were material, appears by those multitudes of material Productions they brought forth. And if those Waters were material, such were all things they did produce, among which was Man, of whom the Text affirrs nothing more plain; for it saith, God created man of the dust of the earth; the most gross part and sedement of those Waters, after all things else were created. Now the Body only is not Man; for Man is a living Creature: it is that therefore by which the Body lives and acts, that constitutes the Man. Now the Apostle mentioneth Man to consist of Body, Soul and Spirit. My Argument then is this, God created man of the dust of the earth.

But
But Man consists of a Body, Soul and Spirit:

Therefore Body, Soul and Spirit are made of the dust, &c. and are material.

The major and minor are undeniable; and therefore the conclusion. Yet do I not therefore conclude its annihilation: for I know all matter is eternal; but am rather persuaded of its concentration (as afore) in its own body.

But of its real Being, purely spiritual, and stripped of all materiaility, really distinct from its body, I doubt.

Because that by several accidents happening to the body, the man is incapacitated from acting rationally, as before; as in those we call Idiots, there is not in some of them so much a sign of a reasonable Soul, as to distinguish them from Bruits: Whereas were the Soul such as represented, it would rather cease to act, than act at a rate below itself. Did it know its Excellencies, such as we make them, it would as soon desert its being, as degrade itself by such brutish acts: It is not any defect in its Organs could rob the Soul of its Reason, its Essential Faculty. Tho the Workman breaks his Tools, his hands do not lose their skill, but ceaseth to act, rather
ther than to do ought irregularly: so likewise would the Soul then act contrary to its own nature.

Secondly, Because all the species both of the Mineral, Vegetable, and Animal Kingdoms, appear to me, but as the more eminent Works of a most excellent Operator, as Engines of the most accurate Engineer; they all live, and have a Principle of Life manifest in their growth and augmentation, and so far as they are living weights, as I can perceive from the same source. But then comes in those Natures and Faculties whereby each is distinguished from other, even like several pieces of Clock, or Watch-Mork: the one shews the hour of the day, and no more; the next shews the hour and minutes, another shews both the former, and likewise the Age of the Moon; another hath not only the three former motions, but an addition of the rise and fall of Tides; yet all this, and many more that in that way are performed, are several distinct motions, arising all from the same Cause, the Spring or Weight, the Principle of motion in them. So among living Weights, the first do only grow and augment their bulk, and have no possibility in nature to augment their kind; the next, to wit, Vegetables, do not only
only grow and increase their bulk, but likewise have a power of propagating their like: the third Family, I mean the Animal Kingdom, do not only live and increase their kind, but likewise are made sensitive. And lastly, we our selves that are not only possess of all the former, but of something, I know not what, we think more excellent, and call Reason, and all this from the same source; namely, that we live; which if we did not, we could not perform any of these acts. For life in us is the same as the Spring or Weight in the Watch or Clock, which ceasing, all other motion ceaseth, as in a Watch or Clock, the Spring or Weight being down.

As Life therefore is the Cause of all Motion, and all natural Operation and Faculties; yet those multifarious Operations and Faculties, manifest in, and proper to the particular species of the Three Kingdoms, requires not divers Principles of Life, no more than divers motions specified in a Watch or Clock, requires diversWeights or Springs. And as the diversity of motion in Watch or Clock, ariseth not from diversity of Weights or Springs, but rather from other means: so those diversities of Natures and Faculties,
manifest throughout the Three Kingdoms, arise not from divers Principles of Life, but from one Principle of Life, manifesting its power in Bodies diversly organized. So that a Tree or Herb that only vegetates and propagates its kind, hath no other Principle of Life than an Animal that hath Sense, and more eminent Faculties. The difference only, as I conceive, is, this Principle of Life in the vegetable, is bound up in a Body organized to no other end, by which Life is hindred exerting any other power; but in the Animal it's kindled in a purer matter, by which it's capacitated to frame more excellent Organs, in order to the exerting more eminent Acts. For the Principle of Life can no more act rationally in matter capable of naught but vegetation (for it acts in matter according to the nature thereof, advancing it to its utmost excellence), than a man can saw with a Coulter-Staff, or file with an Hatchet, or make a Watch with a Bedle and Wedges.

I am apt to believe those rare Endowments, and eminent Faculties, wherewith men seem to excel mere Sensatives, are only the improvement of Speech, wherein we have the advantage of them, and the result of reiterated Acts, until they le-
become habits. For by the first we are able to communicate our Conceptions and Experiments each to other; and by the other we do gradually ascend to the knowledge of things. For is all the knowledge either in the acts, Liberal or Mechanical, any more than this acts reiterated, until they become habits; which when they are, we are said to know them? And what is all our reasoning, but an Argument in Discourse tossed from one to another, till the Truth be found, like a Ball between two Rackets, till at last a lucky blow puts an end to the sport? We come into the World hardly men; and many whose natures want cultivation, live, having nothing to distinguish them from Brutes, but the outward form, speech, and some little dexterity, such as in Apes or Monkeys, in the things they have been taught, and the Affairs they have been bred to. And could we imagine any man to have lived Twenty or Thirty years in the World, without the benefit of Humane Converse, What would appear then, think you, of a rational Soul? which the wise man well saw when he asserted the Condition of Men and Beasts to be the same what a meer Ignorant hath, *Moses* himself made of *Adam*, that in his sup-


posed best state, knew not that he was naked; but I believe the Nine Hundred and Thirty years Experience of his own, and the continual Experiments of Poste-
ritv, in that time communicated to him, might quicken his Intellect. So that he died with more Reason than he was crea-
ted, and humane nature in his posterity. The next Generation was embellished with his attainments, to which their own Experiences still made a new addition. The next Generation built on their Foun-
dation, and the next on their; and so on: and we are got on the shoulders of them all. So that it's rather a wonder, that we know no more, than that we know so much. So that what we have, seems rather times product, through the means aforefai'd, than what our Natures were at first enrich with.

The which appears likewise in those whose memory fails, and in whom the vestigia of things is wore out; the habits they had contracted, and manner of working in their several acts being forgotten, what silly Animals are they? Where-as were the Soul such as repreftented, who could rob it of its Endowments? It's true the debilitating of a hand, may impede manual labour; but rafe what hath for-
merly
merly been done out of the Memory, and you render Man a perfect Bruit, or worse: for he knows not how to give a sig-
nification of his own mind.

And indeed, I know not any thing wherein Man excels the Beasts, but may be referred to the benefit of Speech and Hands, capable of effecting its Concep-
tions; nor find any better way to attain a right knowledg of our selves, but, by be-
holding our selves in Adam, and enqui-
ring, what Nature had endued him with, which will fall far short of what we now
admire in our selves.

But now supposing all this answer'd, what will it avail us to a Life of Retri-
bution, if all return to one Element, and be there immersed as Brooks and Rivers
in the Sea? If we lose our Individuation; and all the Souls that have existed, be swal-
lowed up of one, where are the Rewards
and Punishments of each individual. And
we have reason to judg it will be thus, ra-
ther than otherwise, because we see every
thing tends to its own Centre, the Water
to the Sea, and all that was of the Earth
to the Earth, from whence they were ta-
ken. And Solomon faith, The spirit returns
to God that gave it. Every thing then re-
turning to its own Element, lóseth its In-
dividuation.
dividuation. For we see all bodies returning to the earth, are no more individual bodies, but earth: Have we not reason then to judge the same of Spirits returning to their own Element? And what happiness then can we hope for, more than a deliverance from the present calamity? or what misery are we capable of, more than what is common to all?

The same is more evident in the body with which we converse, and are more sensibly acquainted with, seems wholly incapable of either, &c. For all bodies are material, and matter itself is not capable of multiplication, but of being changed. Therefore Nature cannot multiply bodies, but changeth them; as some bodies arise, others perish. Natures expense in continual Productions being constantly supplied by the dissolution of other Compounds: were it otherwise, her Storehouse would be exhausted; for its by continual Circulations, Heaven and Earth is maintain'd; and by her even Circular motion, she keeps herself employed on the same stock of matter, and maintains every species. There is no body the same to day it was yesterday, matter being in a continual flux; neither immediately on the dissolution of a Compound, and Corruption of
of the body, doth the earth thereof retain any specific difference of that body it once was, but is immediately bestowed by Nature, and ordered to the new production of other things. That part of matter therefore which constitutes a humane body, in a short time is putrified, and made earth, which again produceth either other inferior Animals, or Grass, or Corn, for the nourishment of Beasts and Fowl, which again are the nourishment of men. Thus circularly innumerable times round, Nature continually impressing new forms of the same matter. So that that matter that now constitute my body, it may be a thousand years ago was the matter of some other man, or it may be of divers mens, then putrified; which in this time hath suffered infinite changes, as it may be sometime Grass, or Corn, or an Herb, or Bird, or Beast, or divers of them, or all, and that divers times over, before my body was framed; who then can say, why this matter so changeable, should at last be restored, my body rather than his, whose formerly it was, or the body of a Bird, or other Animal? For by the same Reasons that the body of man is proved to arise again, may, I think, be proved the Restoration of all other bodies, which is equally incredible to me (if understood at one time). For Natures
eires stock of matter being all at first exhausted, she could not employ her self in new Productions, without destroying some of the old; much less can she at once fabricate out of the same quantity of matter, all the bodies that ever were, are, or shall be; which yet, notwithstanding could she, they could not be said to be the same bodies, because all bodies suffer such alteration daily, that they cannot be said to be the same today they were yesterday; how then can they be capable of Reward or Punishment?

These are now my doubts; but are they the fruits of Diligence? and am I thus rewarded for not believing at a common rate? A great deal cheaper could I have fate down, and believed as the Church believes; without a why, or a wherefore, have been ignorant of these Disputes, and never have emerged my self in this gulf, than thus by Reflection to create my own disturbance. Had I been made a mere Animal, I had had none of these Doubts nor Fears that thus torment my mind; for doubting, happy Bruits happy, far more happy than my self! With you is none of this; with you only is serenity of mind, and you only void of Anxieties; you only enjoy what this world is able to accommodate with, and it may be too
have those Careless we know not of, while we, your poor purveyors, go drooping and dis-pending, doubting, fearing, and caring a-bout, and our whole lives only a preying on one another, and tormenting our selves. You have the carnal content and satisfac-tion; we nothing but the shell, a vain glo-rious boast of our Lordship over you, with which we seek to satisfie our selves, as Pro-digals, with husks, while the truth is, we are afraid to confront our Vassals, except we first by craft and treachery beguile them from whom likewise we flee, if once enra-ged: and what a poor comfort is this? Is this a Priviledg to boast of? Is this all Rea-son advanceth to, only a Purveyor to Beasts, and to make my life more miserable, by how much more sensible of mis-e-ry! Well might Solomon prefer the dead before the living; and those that had not been, before both; intimating thereby, that being best, least capable of misery; that is, of Trees, of Herbs, of Stones, and all in-animates, which wanting sense, are insen-sible of misery. Better any thing than man therefore, since that every brute and inani-mate stock or stone, are more happy in that measure: they are less capable of misery. What the advantage then, what the bene-fit that occurs to us from them, or what pre-
preheminence have we above them, seeing as dieth the one, so dieth the other, and that they have all one breath?

Pardon this Degression; the real sense and apprehension I have of things, extort it from me. For I, as Job, cannot refrain my mouth, but speak in the bitterness of my Spirit, and complain in the anguish of my Soul, Why died I not from the womb? why did I not give up the ghost when I came out of the belly? Why did the knees prevent me? or why the breasts, that I should suck? I had then been among Solomon’s happy ones: I should now have lain still and been quiet; I should have slept, and been at rest: whereas now I am weary of life. For tho I speak, my grief is not assuaged; and tho I forbear, I am not eased; but now he hath made me weary, and made desolate all my company: he hath filled me with wrinkles, which is a witness against me; and my lean-ness rising up in me, beareth witness to my face, God hath delivered me to the ungodly, and turned me over into the hand of the wicked, and my familiar friends have forgotten me. I said, I shall die in my nest, and shall multiply my days as the sand, when my root was spread out by the waters, and the dew lay all night on my branch; when my glory was fresh, and my bow was renewed in my hand: but
but I find while my flesh is upon me, I shall have pain; and while my soul is in me, it shall mourn. Have pity upon me, O my friend! for the hand of God hath touched me. The wicked live, and become old; yea, they are mighty in power, their seed is established in their sight with them, and their off-spring before their eyes; their houses are safe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them, &c. they are planted, and take root, they grow; yea, they bring forth fruit, yet God is never in their mouth, and far from their reins. In vain then do I wash my hands in innocency, seeing all things come alike to all. There is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, to the good, to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as be that feareth an oath.

I have now done (tho I hardly know how), left I too far trouble you; and only beg your perusal of these lines, and two or three in answer of them by this Bearer, who shall at your appointment wait on you for the same. Let me farther beg these two things of you: first, That you would consider you have not to do with a Sophistic Wrangler, or with one that would willingly err, but with one that desires to know
know the Truth. Let therefore your Answer be, as much as you can, void of Scholastick Terms, or Notions that may lead me more into the dark. And then, as Feb did beg, That God would withdraw his hand far from him, and that his dread might not make him afraid; so I. And further, That you would not awe me with his greatness, nor suppress my Arguments with his Omnipotence. Then call thou, and I will answer; or let me speak, and answer thou me. Thus begging the Divine Influence to direct you, and enlighten me, I subscribe myself,
SIR,
§. 1. It is your wisdom in Cases of so great moment, to use all just endeavours for satisfaction; and I think you did but your duty, to study this as hard as you say you have done. But I wish you had studied it better; for then you would not have been a stranger to many Books which afford a just solution of your Doubts, as I must suppose you are, by your taking no notice of what they have said. 2. And I wish you had known, that between the solving of all your Objections, and taking all on Trust from men, or believing as the Church believeth, there are Two other ways to satisfaction (which must be conjunct): 1. Discerning the unanswerable evidences in Nature and Providence, of the Souls future Life. 2. And taking it on trust from Divine Revelation; which is otherwise to be proved, than by believing as the Church by Authority requireth you.

I have
I have written on this Subject so much already, that I had rather you had told me why you think it unsatisfactory, than desire me to transcribe it, while Print is as legible as Manuscript. If you have not read it, I humbly offer it to your consideration. It is most in two Books: The first which I intend you to read, is called, The Reasons of the Christian Religion: the other is called, The Unreasonableness of Infidelity. If you think this too much labour, you are not so hard or faithful a Student of this weighty Case, as it deserveth, and you pretend to be. If you will read them (or the first at least), and after come to me, that we may fairly debate your remaining Doubts, it will be a likelier way for us to be useful to each other, than my going over all the mistakes of your Paper will be. And I suppose you know, that we have full assurance of a multitude of Verities, against which many Objections may be raised, which no mortal man can fully solve, especially from Modes and Accidents. Nay, perhaps there is nothing in the World which is not liable to some such Objections. And yet I will not neglect your writing.
§. 2. When you were convinced, That there is a first Cause, it would have been an orderly progress to think what that Cause is; and whether his Works do not prove his Infinite Perfection, having all that eminently which he giveth formally to the whole World, as far as it belongeth to perfection to have it. For none can give more than he hath. And then you should have thought what this God is to man, as manifest in his Works: and you should have considered what of man is past doubt, and thence in what relation he stands to God, and to his fellow-creatures: And this would have led you to know mans certain duty: and that would have assured you of a future life of Retribution. Is not this a just progress?

§. 3. But you would know a Definition of the Soul. But do you know nothing but by Definitions? Are all men that cannot define, therefore void of all knowledge? You know not at all what seeing is, or what light is, or what feeling, smelling, tasting, hearing is, what sound or odor is, what sweet or bitter, nor what, thinking, or knowing, or willing, or loving is, if you know it not before defining tell you, and better than bare defining can ever tell you. Every vital faculty
Culty hath a self-perception in its acting; which is an eminent sense: Intuition also of outward sensible Objects, or immediate perception of them, as sensata & imaginata, is before all Argument and Definition, or reasoning action. By seeing, we perceive that we see; and by understanding, we perceive that we understand. I dare say, That you know the Acts of your own Soul by acting, tho when you come to reasoning or defining, you say you know not what they are. You can give no definition what substance is, or Ens at least, much less what God is. And yet what is more certain than that there is Substance, Entity, and God?

§ 4. But I'll tell you what the Soul of man is: It is a Vital, Intellectual, Volitive Spirit, animating a humane organized Body. When it is separated, it is not formally a Soul, but a Spirit still.

§ 5. Qu. But what is such a mental Spirit? It is a most pure Substance, whose form is a Power or Virtue of Vital Action, Intellecction, and Volition (three in one).

§ 6. I. Are you not certain of all these Acts, viz. That you Act vitally, understand and will? If not, you are not sure that you
you see, that you doubt, that you wrote to me, or that you are any thing.

II. If you act these, it is certain that you have the power of so acting. For nothing doth that which it cannot do.

III. It is certain, that it is a Substance which hath this power: For nothing can do nothing.

IV. It is evident, that it is not the visible Body, as composed of Earth, Water and Air, which is this mental Substance. Neither any one of them, nor all together have Life, Understanding, or Will. They are passive Beings, and act not at all of themselves, but as act by invisible Powers. They have an aggregative inclination to Union, and no other. Were it not for the Igneous Nature which is active, or for Spirits, they would be cessant. Therefore you are thus far past the dark, That there is in man an Invisible Substance, which hath, yea, which is a Power or Virtue of Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition.

V. And that this Active Power is a distinct thing from meer Passive Power, or mobilitie per alud, Experience puts past doubt. There is in every living thing a Power, or Virtue of self-moving, else Life were not Life.

VI. And
VI. And that this is not a mere accident of the Soul, but its essential form, I have proved so fully in my Methodus Theologiae, in a peculiar Disputation, that I will not here repeat it. It's evident, That even in the igneous Substance, the Vis Motiva, Illuminativa, Calefactiva, is more than an accident, even its essential form: But were it otherwise, it would but follow, That if the very accidental Acts or qualities of a Soul be so noble, its essential must be greater.

VII. But it is certain, That neither Souls, nor any thing, have either Being, Power, or Action, but in constant receptive dependence on the continued emanation of the prime Cause; and so no Inviduation is a total separation from him, or an Independence, or a self-sufficiency. Thus far natural light tells you what Souls are.

§. 7. You add your self, That those attainments which you were made capable of, you were designed to. Very right: God maketh not such noble Faculties or Capacities in vain; much less to engage all men to a life of duty, which shall prove deceit and misery. But you have Faculties capable of thinking of God, as your Beginning, Guide, and End, as your Maker, Ruler, and Benefactor;
nefa&; of studying your duty to
him, in hope of Reward, and of thinking
what will become of you after Death, and
of hoping for future Blessedness, and fear-
ing future Misery: all which no Bruit was
ever capable of. Therefore God designed
you to such ends which you are thus capa-
ble of.

§. 8. You say (p. 3.) Many have defen-
ded the Souls Immortality; but none have pro-
ved a Subject capable of a life of Retribution.
It's a Contradiction to be immortal, or re-
warded, and not to be a Subject capable.
For nothing hath no accidents. Nothing
hath that which it is not capable of ha-
ing.

§. 9. You say, None tell us what it is;
How many Score Volumes have told it us?
I have now briefly told you what it is. You
say, [To say it is that by which I reason, is
not satisfactory. I look for a Definition].
But on Condition you look not to see or feel
it, as you do Trees or Stones, you may be
satisfied. I have given you a Definition.
The Genus is Substantia purissima; the Diffe-
rentia is Virtus Vitalis, Activa, Intellec-tiva,
Volitiva (trinum a Imago Creatoris). What's
here wanting to a Definition?

I have
have told you, That there is an antecedent more certain Perception, than by Definition; by which I know that I see, bear, taste, am, and by which the Soul, in act, is conscious of itself.

§. 10. You ask, 1. Is it a real Being? 
  
  Answ. I told you, Nothing can do nothing.

  2. Is it really different from the Body? 
  Answ. A Substance which hath in it self, an Essential Principle of Life, Intellection, and Volition, and that which hath not, are really different. Try whether you can make a Body feel, or understand without a Soul.

  2. Those that are seperable, are really different.

  3. You ask, Is it able to be without it? 
  Answ. What should hinder it? The Body made not the Soul: A viler Substance giveth not being to a nobler. 2. Nothing at all can be without continued Divine sustentation. But we see, 'fuxta naturam, God annihilateth no Substance: Changes are but by composition, and separation, and action, but not by annihilation. An Atome of Earth or Water, is not annihilated; and why should we suspect, that a Spiritual Substance is? Yea, the contrary is fully evident, tho God is able to annihilate all things.

§. 11. You
§. 11. You say, If it be meerly material, and differ from the Body but gradually, Death may be but its concentration of this active Principle in its own Body.

Answ. If you understand your own words, it's well. 1. Do you know what material signifieth? See Crakenthorp's Metaphysicks, and he will tell you in part, it's an ambiguous word. Sometime it signifieth the same as substantia; and so Souls are material. Sometime it signifieth only that sort of Substance which is called corporeal. Dr. More tells you, That Penetrability, and Indivisibility, difference them.

But what if fire should differ from air materially, but in degree of subtility and purity, or sensitive Souls from igneous, and mental from sensitive, but in higher degrees of purity of matter; Is it not the form that maketh the specific difference? Air hath not the igneous Virtue of Motion, Illumination, and Calorification; nor ignis, the Sensitive Virtues, nor meer sensitives the rational Virtues aforesaid. Forma dat esse & nomen. This maketh not a meer gradual difference, but a specific.

There
There is in Compounds matter, and materiae dispositio receptiva, & forma. There is somewhat answerable in spiritual uncompound Beings. There is substantia, and substantiae dispositio, & forma. These are but intellectually distinct, and not divisible, and are but inadequate conceptions of one thing. That substantia is conceptus fundamentalis, is confess. Some make penetrability and indivisibility, substantiae conceptus dispositicus. But the Virtus vitalis activa, intellectiva, volitiva, in one, is the conceptus formalis.

2. But what mean you by [the active Principles concentration in its own body]? It is a strange Expression. 1. If you mean, that it's annihilated, then it remaineth not. 2. If you mean, that it remaineth an active Principle, you mean a substance, or accident. If a substance, it seems you acknowledge it a self-sustaining being, only not separate from its carcass. And if they be two, why are they not separable? If separable, why not separated? When the dust of the Carcass is scattered, is the Soul concentrated in every atome, or but in one? And is it many, or one concentrated Soul? If you mean, That it's but an accident, that's disprov'd before; what accident is it? If concentrated in the body, the body, and every dust of it,
is vital and intellectual. And if so, every clod and stone is so; which I will not so much wrong you, as to imagine that you think.

§. 12. But you would know what's meant by a spirit, whether all that is not evident to sense? Ans. It is a pure substance (faith Dr. More, penetrable and indivisible) essentially vital, perceptive and appetitive.

§. 13. You add, [How shall I know the difference between the highest degree of materials, and lowest of immaterials? To me an immaterial, and spiritual being, seems a kind of Hocus, a substantial nothing.

Ans. If you take matter for the same with substance, it is material. But not if you take matter, as it's usually taken, for corporeal; or gross, and impenetrable, and divisible substance, incapable of essential, vital, self-moving perception and appetite. If this seems nothing to you, God seems nothing to you, and true Nature, which is Principium motus, seems nothing to you: And all that performeth all the action which you see in the world, seems nothing to you. It's pity that you have convers'd so little with God and your self, as to think both to be nothing.

§. 14. What
§. 14. What you say out of Gen. 1. is little else but mistake, when you say [all was made out of the deep waters by the spirit of God]. The Text nameth what was made of them. It faith nothing of the Creation of Angels, or Spirits, out of them (no, nor of the Light, or Earth, or Firmament).

And whereas you say, [God made man of the dust of the ground; but the body only is not man, ergo. Ans. You use your self too unkindly, to leave out half the words, Gen. 2. 7. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul; when the Text tells us the two works by which God made man, will you leave out one, and then argue exclusively against it? What if I said, [The Chandler made a Candle of Tallow, and then by another kindled it]? or [a man made an House of Bricks, and cemented them with Mortar, &c.]? will you thence prove, That he made a Candle burning without fire, or the House without Mortar? Words are useless to such Expositors.

§. 15. Page 4. you say; You know all matter is eternal.
But you know no such thing. If it be Eternal, it hath one Divine perfection: and if so, it must have the rest, and so should be God. But what's your proof?

You again (believe the Souls concentration in its body). Ans. Words insignificant. It's Idem or Aliud. If Idem, then dust is Essentially Vital and Intellectual. Deny not spiritual forms, if every clod or stone have them. If Aliud, how prove you it to be there, rather than elsewhere? And if you considered well, you would not believe essential, substantial life and mind, to lie dead and inactive, so long as the dust is so.

§. 16. You come to the hardest Objecti-

The Souls defective acting in infants, idiots, the sick, &c. and say, [It would rather not act, if it were as represented.]

Ans. 1. It cannot be denied, but the Operations of the Soul here, are much of them upon the organized body; and tho not organical, as if they acted by an Organ, yet organical, as acting on an Organ; which is the material Spirits primarily. And so there go various Causes to some Effects, called Acts.
2. And the Soul doth nothing independently, but as dependent on God, in Being and Operation: and therefore doth what God knoweth, and useth it too, as his Instrument, in the forming of the body; and in what it knoweth not it self. And as God, as *fons naturæ necessitâteth* the natural agency of the Soul, as he doth the Soul of Bruits. But as the wise and free Governor of the world, he hath to moral acts, given man's Soul free-will, and therefore conducting Reason; which it needs not to necessitated acts, as digestion, motion of the blood, formation of the body, &c.

And as it is not made to do all its acts freely and rationally, so neither at all times, as in Apoplexies, Infancy, Sleep, &c. It is essential to the Soul, to have the active power or virtue of Intellecction and Free-will, but not always to use it. As it is essential to the substance of fire, the latent in a flint, to have the power of motion, light and heat.

And its considerable, that as a traveller in his journey, thinking and talking only of other things, retaineth still a secret act of intending his end, (else he would not go on) when he perceiveth and observeth it not at all. He that playeth on the Lute or Harpsichord, ceaseth when his Instrument is out of tune,
tune; because he acteth by free-will.

But the Soul of an Idiot or mad-man acteth only per modum naturae, not by free acts, but necessitated by God by the order of nature. Only moral acts are free; and that some other are but brutish, and some but vegetative, is no more a wonder, than that it should understand in the head, and be sensible only in the most of the body, and vegetative only in the hairs and nails. It operateth in all the body by the Spirits, as valid; but about the eyes, and open sensoria, by Spirits also as lucid, for that use.

§ 14. But never forget this, That nothing at any time doth what it cannot do; but many can do that which they do not. Tho' the Soul in the Womb, or Sleep, remember not, or reason not; if ever it do it, that proveth it had the power of doing it. And that power is not a novel accident, tho' the act may be so.

§ 18. To your Explications p. 4. I say, 1. None doubts, but all the world is the work of one prime operating Cause; Whom I hope you see in them, is of perfect power, wisdom and goodness, the chief efficient dirigent and final cause of all.
2. I doubt not, but the created universe is all one thing or frame; and no one atome or part totally separated from, and independent on the rest.

3. But yet the parts are multitudes, and heterogeneous, and have their Individuality, and are at once many and one in several respects. And the unity of the Universe, or of inferior universal Causes (as the Sun, or an anima telluris, &c.) are certainly consistent with the specific and individual differences of the parts.

E.g. Many individual Apples grow on the same Tree; yea, Crabs and Apples by divers grafts, nourished on the same flock: One may rot, or be fower, and not another. Millions of Trees, as also of Herbs and Flowers, good and poysonous, all grow in the same earth. Here is Unity, and great Diversity. And tho self-moving Animals be not fixed on the earth, no doubt they have a contiguity, or continuity, as parts with the Universe. But for all that, a Toad is not a Man, nor a man in torment, undif- ferenced from another at ease, nor a bad man all one with a good.

§. 19. And if any should have a conceit, That there is nothing but God and matter. I have fully confuted it in the Appendix to C 4 Rea-
Reaf. of Christian Religion. Matter is no such omnipotent sapiential thing in itself, as to need no cause or maker, any more than compounds. And to think, that the infinite God would make no nobler Creature than dead matter, no liker himself, to glorifie him, is antecedently absurd, but consequently notoriously false. For tho nothing be acted without him, it's evident that he hath made active Natures with a principle of self-moving in themselves. The Sun differs from a clod, by more than being matter variously moved by God, even by a self-moving power also. Else there were no living creature, but bodies in themselves dead, animated by God. But it would be too tedious to say all against this that's to be said.

§. 20. When you tell us of [One life in all, differenc'd only by diversity of Organs], you mean God, or a common created Soul. If God, I tell you where I have confuted it. It's pity to torment or punish God in a murderer, or call him wicked in a wicked man: or that one man should be hang'd, and another prais'd, because the Engines of their bodies are diverse. But the best Anatomists say, That nothing is to be seen in the brain of other Animals, why they might not be
as rational as Men. And if it be an *Animal creatura communis* that you mean, either you think it is a *universal Soul* to the universal world, or only to this Earth or Vortex. If to all the World, you feign it to have Gods Prerogative. If to part of the world, if each Vortex, Sun, Star, &c. have a distinct individuate superior Soul, why not men also inferiors? And why may not millions of individual Spirits consist with *mores communes* or universal Spirits, as well as the life of Worms in your belly with yours. That which hath no *Soul* or *Spirit* of its own, is not fit for such reception and communion with superior Spirits, as that which hath. Communion requireth some similitude. We see God useth not all things alike, because he makes them not like.

§. 21. But if the difference between Beasts, Trees, Stones, and *Man*, be only the *organical contexture* of the body; then 1. Either all these have but *one Soul*, and so are but one, save corporeally. 2. Or else every Stone, Tree and Beast hath an *Intellecual Soul*; for it is evident that *man* hath, by its Operations.

I: Had you made but *Virtue* and *Vice* to be only the effects of the bodies contexture, sure you would only blame the maker of your
your body, and not your self, for any of your Crimes: For you did not make your own body, if you were nothing.

Is the common light and sense of Nature no Evidence? Doth not all the world difference Virtue and Vice, moral good and evil? Is it only the difference of an Instrument in Tune, and out of Tune? Either then all called sin is good; or God, or the universal Soul, only is to be blamed. Then to call you a Knave, or a Lyar, or Perjured; &c. is no more disgrace, than to say, that you are sick, or blind. Then all Laws are made only to bind God, or the Amima mundi; and all punishment is threatened to God, or this common Soul. And it is God, or the common Soul only in a body, which sorroweth, fear-eth, feeleth pain or pleasure.

II. And if you equal the Souls of Beasts, Trees, Stones and Men, you must make them all to have an Intellectual Soul. If man had not, he could never understand. And if they have so also, frustra fit potentia qua nunquam producitur in actum. It is certain that it is not the body (Earth, Air or Water) that feeleth, much less that understandeth or willeth. If therefore all men have but one Soul, why is it not you that are in pain or joy, when any, or all others are so? Your suffering and joys are as much theirs. You hurt
hurt your self when you hurt a Malefactor. Why are you not answerable for the Crimes of every Thief, if all be one?

§ 22. You vainly liken several Natures and Faculties to several pieces of Clock-work. For Natures and Faculties are self-acting Principles under the prime Agent: but a Clock is only passive, moved by another: Whether the mutus gravitatiunis in the poise, be by an intrinlick Principle, or by another unseen active Nature, is all that's controvertible there. All that your similitude will infer, is th's, That as the gravitation of one poise, moves every wheel according to its receptive aptitude; so God, the universal Spirit, moveth all that is moved, according to their several aptitudes, passives as passive, actives as active, vitals as self-movers, intellectuals as intellectual-free-self-movers under him. No Art can make a Clock feel, see or understand.

But if the world have but one soul, what mean you by its concentrating in the Carcafs? Is the universal Soul there fallen asleep, or imprisoned in a Grave, or what is it?

§ 23. Add
§. 23. Add page 5. You well say, That Life is the cause of all motion: Yea, infinite Life, Wisdom and Love, is the cause of all: but there be second Causes under it: Plurima ex uno. And it maketh things various, which it moveth variously; and maketh them vital, sensitive or mental, which he will move to vital, sensitive and mental acts. Operari sequitur esse.

§. 24. You are apt to believe, That those eminent Faculties wherewith men seem meer Sensitives, are only the improvement of Speech, and reiterated Acts, till they become Habits.

Ans. 1. I had a Parrot that spoke so very plainly, that no Man could discern but he could have spoke as well as a Man, if he had but had the Intellect of a Man; and quickly would learn new words, but shewed no understanding of them.

2. Many men born deaf and dumb, are of a strong understanding (enquire of a Brother of Sir Richard Dyett's, a Son of Mr. Peter Whalley of Northampton, a Son in Law of the Lord Wharton's, &c.

3. The Faculty and the Habit are Two things. The Faculty is the Essential form of the Substance. The Habit, or Act, is but an Accident. The Faculty is nothing but
but the \textit{active Power}. And the \textit{Power} goeth before the \textit{Act}. Doth \textit{acting}, without \textit{Power} to \textit{act}, cause the \textit{Power}? What need you the \textit{Power}, if you can \textit{act} without it? And what's a \textit{Contradiction}, if this be not, to say, \textit{I do that which I cannot do}, or \textit{I can do that which I have no power to do}? You are not a man without the Faculty, but you are without the \textit{Act}; or else you are no man in your sleep. The \textit{act} then is but the \textit{Faculties \textit{act}}; and \textit{Habits} are nothing but the Faculties \textit{promptitude} to \textit{act}. And this indeed is caused sometime by \textit{very strong acts}, and sometime, and usually, by \textit{frequent acts}; and sometime suddenly, by \textit{a special Divine Operation}. No doubt, but Oratory, and all Arts and Sciences, are caused by frequent acts, and their Objects: But those \textit{acts} are caused by \textit{humane Faculties}, under God, the first Cause. You can never cause a Carcass, or a Parrot, or any Bruit, to \textit{think} of God, and the \textit{glory to come}, nor to do any proper humane \textit{act}.

Credible History assureth us, That Devils, or separate Souls, have acted Carcasses, and discoursed in them, and seemed to commit Forfication in them, and left them dead behind them; and they were known to be the same that were lately executed, or
or dead, and were re-buried. Here the dead Organ was capable, when a Spirit did but use it.

You too much confound *Intelligence* and *Ratiocination*. The prime acts of intellectual Perception, are before Ratiocination. And there are a multitude of Complex Verities, which all found men know without Syllogisms. The disposition to know them, is so strong, that some call it Actual Knowledge.

§. 25. Add page 6. It's well known, That the Natives in *New England*, the most barbarous *Abassines, Gallanes, &c.* in *Ethiopia* have as good natural Capacities as the Europeans. So far are they from being but like *Apes* and *Monkeys*; if they be not Ideots, or mad, they sometime shame learned men in their words and deeds. I have known those that have been so courtly clad, and so clownishly bred, even as to Speech, Looks and Carriages, that Gentlemen and Scholars, at the first congress, have esteemed them much according to your description, when in Discourse they have proved more ingenious than they. And if improvement can bring them to Arts, the Faculty was there before. When will you shew us an Ape or a Monkey, that was ever brought
to the Acts or Habits before mentioned of Men? Yea, of those that were born deaf and dumb?

§. 26. Your mistake of Adam's case, and Solomon's words, is so gross, that I will not confute it, lest the description of it offend you.

§. 17. The case of failing memories is answered before, in the case of Infancy and Apoplexies, &c. Our memory faileth in our sleep: and yet when we awake, we find that there remains the same knowledge of Arts and Sciences. They did not end at night, and were not all new made the next morning. The Acts ceased, because the receptivity of the passive Organ ceased: but the Habit, and Faculty continued. And when memory in old men faileth about names, and words, and little matters, their judgments about great things are usually stronger (by better Habits) than young men.

§. 28. You say, You know nothing wherein Man excels Beasts, but may be referred to the benefit of speech and hands, capable of effecting its Conceptions.
This is answered before. Those Conceptions are the cause of words and actions: and is there no cause of those Conceptions? And if man's Conceptions differ from the beasts, the causes differed. And if the first Conceptions did not differ, the Subsequent would not differ neither, without a difference in the causal Faculties. Why do not Beasts speak as well as Men? Parrots shew, That it is not in all for want of a speaking Organ. If one be born dumb, and not deaf, he will know but little the less for his dumbness. If he be born deaf and dumb, and not blind, he will still be rational, as Dr. Wallis can tell you, who hath taught such to talk and converse intelligibly by their fingers, and other signs, without words. I confess, if all the outward Senses were stop'd from the Birth, I see not how the Soul could know outward sensible things, as being no Objects to it. And how it would work on it self alone, we know not; but understand, and will, we are sure it doth: and therefore can do it. And it's one thing to prove Beasts to be men, or rational, and another thing to prove Men to be Beasts, or irrational. If you could prove the former, viz. That Beasts have Souls that can think of God, and the Life to come, if they could but speak, this would rather prove them.
them immortal, than prove man unreasonable, or of a mortal Soul. Your whole speech makes more to advance bruits, than to deny the reason of man.

§. 29. You say, You know no better way to attain a right knowledge of our selves, than by beholding our selves in Adam, and enquiring what Nature had endued him with, which will fall far short of what we now admire in our selves.

Answ. 1. As a multitude of Objects, and Experiences, more tend to Wisdom than one alone; so to know both what Adam was, and what all men are, and do, doth evidence more to our information, than to know Adam's first Case alone.

2. Adam's first Powers are to be known by his acts; and his acts were not to be done at once, in a minute, or a day: And we have not the History of his Life much after his Fall. But we may be sure, that Adam's Nature in Innocency, was no baser than ours corrupted: And therefore Adam had the Powers of doing whatever other men since have done.

3. But let us come to your Test: 1. Adam was made a living Soul by the breath of God, after the making of his body of the earth.
2. Adam and Eve were blessed with a generative multiplying Faculty: but they did not generate God; nor did every bruit that had also that Faculty. Therefore there is a Soul which is not God, in every Animal, (nor yet an Universal Soul).

3. Adam, no doubt, could not know external sensible Objects, till they were brought within the reach of his sense: no more can we.

4. Adam knew the Creatures as soon as he saw them; and gave them Names suitable. This is more than we could so soon do.

5. Adam had a Law given him; and therefore knew that God was his Ruler. He knew that God was to be obeyed; he knew what was his Law: else it had been no sin to break it. He knew that he ought to love, and believe, and trust God, and cleave to him: else it had been no sin to forsake him, and to believe the Tempter, and to love the forbidden Fruit better than God. He knew that Death was the threatened Wages of Sin. In a word, He was made in the Image of God: And Paul tells us, it is that Image into which we are renewed by Christ: And he describeth it to consist in wisdom, righteousness, and true holiness.

6. And
6. And we have great reason to think, that it was Adam that taught Abel to offer Sacrifice in Faith, and delivered to his Posterity the Traditions which he had from God. Tho Adam did not do all this at once, he did not receive a new Soul or Faculty for every new act. Can Apes and Monkeys do all this? Doth God give them Laws to know and keep as moral free-agents?

But you say, Adam knew not that he was naked. Ans. What! and yet knew God and his Law, and how to name the Creatures, and how to dress and keep the Garden? He knew not that nakedness was shameful; for he had newly made it shameful.

Perhaps you think of Adam's forbidden desire of knowledge, and his miserable attainment of it. But that did not make him a new Soul, that had no such Faculty before. Adam was the Son of God by Creation, Luk.3. and it was his duty and interest to live as a Son, in absolute trust on his Fathers care and love: and instead of this, he was tempted to self-dependance, and must needs know more than his duty, & his fathers love and reward: He must know good and evil for himself: like a Child that must know what Food, and Rayment, and Work is fittest for him; which he
he should know only by trusting his Fathers choice; or as a Patient that must needs know every Ingredient in his Physick, and the Nature and Reason of it, before he will take it, when he should implicitly trust his Physician. Man should have waited on God for all his Notices, and sought to know no more than he revealed. But a distrustful, and a selfish knowledge, and busy enquiring into unrevealed things, is become our sin and misery.

§ 36. You say, Suppose all this answered: what will it avail, as to a life of Retribution, if all return to one element, and be there immersed as Brooks and Rivers in the Sea, and we lose our individuation.

Ans. I answer'd this in the Appendix to the Reas. of the Christian Religion. I add 1. Do you believe, that each one hath now one individual Soul, or not? If not, how can we lose that which we never had? If we have but all one universal mover, which moveth us as Engines, as the Wind and Water move Mills, how come some motions to be so swift (as a Swallow), and others so slow, or none at all, in as mobile a body? Yea, how cometh motion to be so much in our Power, that we can sit still when we will, and rise, and go, and run, and speak when
we will, and cease, or change it when we will? A stone that falls, or an arrow that is shot, cannot do so. Sure it is some inward formal Principle; and not a material Mechanical mobility of the matter, which can cause this difference.

Indeed if we have all but one Soul, it's easie to love our Neighbours as our selves, because our Neighbours are our selves. But it's as easie to hate our selves as our Enemies, and the good as the bad, if all be one (for forma dat nomen & esse). But it's strange, that either God, or the Soul of the World, shall hate it self, and put it self to pain, and fight against it self, as in Wars, &c.

But if you think still, That there is nothing but God and dead matter actuated by him, I would beg your Answer to these few Questions.

1. Do you really believe, that there is a God? that is, an eternal infinite self-being, who hath all that power, knowledge, and goodness of will, in transcendent Eminency, which any Creature hath formally, and is the efficient Governor of all else that is. If not, all the world condemneth you: for it is not an uncaused Being, and can have nothing but from its Caufe, who can give nothing greater than it self.
2. Do you think this God can make a Creature that hath a subordinate Soul, or Spirit, to be the Principle of its own Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition, or not? Cannot God make a Spirit? If not, it is either because it is a Contradiction (which none can pretend), or because God is not Omnipotent; that is, is not God; and so there is no God; and so you deny what you granted. But if God can make a Spirit,

3. Why should you think he would not? Some of your mind say, That he doth all the good that he can; or else he were not perfectly good. Certainly his goodness is equal to his greatness, and is communicative.

4. Hath he not imprinted his Perfections in some measure, in his Works? Do they not shew his glory? Judg of his Greatness by the Sun, Stars, and Heavens; and of his Wisdom, by the wonderful Order, Contexture, and Government of all things. Even the Fabrick of a Fly, or any Animal, poseth us. And do you think, that his love and goodness hath no answerable effect?

5. Do you think, that passive matter doth as much manifest Gods Perfection, and honour the Efficient, as vital and Intellectual
al Spirits? If it be a far nobler Work for God to make a free, vital, mental Spirit, to act under him freely, mentally, and vitally, than to make mere atomes, why should you think that God will not do it?

6. And do you not dishonour, or blaspheme the prime Cause, by such dishonouring of his Work, as to say, he never made any thing more noble than Atomes, and Compositions of them.

7. Is there not in the Creature a communicative disposition to cause their like? Animals generate their like: Fire kindleth fire: Wise men would make others wise: God is essential infinite Life, Wisdom and Love: and can he, or would he make nothing liker to himself than dead Atomes? Yea, you feign him to make nothing but by Composition, while you say, That matter it self is eternal.

8. But when the matter of Fact is evident, and we see by the actions, that there is a difference between things moved by God, some having a created Life and mind, and some none, what needs then any further proof?

9. 31. But if you hold, That we have now distinct Spirits, which are individual
Substances, why should you fear the loss of our individuation, any more than our annihilation, or specific alteration? If God made as many substantial individual Souls, as men, is there any thing in Nature or Scripture, which thteatneth the loss of Individuation? I have shewed you, and shall further shew you enough against it.

§. 32. You say, page 7. Every thing returneth to its element, and loseth its individuation: Earth to Earth, Water to the Sea, the Spirit to God that gave it. What happiness then can we hope for more than deliverance from the present calamity; or what misery are we capable of, more than is common to all?

Anf. 1. Bodies lose but their Composition, and Spiritual forms. Do you think, that any Atome loseth its individuation? If it be still divisible in partes infinitas, it is infinite. And if every Atome be infinite, it is as much, or more than all the world; and so is no part of the world; and so there would be as many Worlds, or Infinities, as Atomes. It is but an aggregative motion which you mention. Birds of a Feather will flock together, and yet are Individuals still. Do you think any dust, or drop, any Atome of Earth or Water, lo-
feth any thing of it felf, by its union with the rest? Is any Substance lost? Is the simple Nature changed? Is it not Earth and Water still? Is not the Hæccepty, as they call it, continued? Doh not God know every dust, and every drop from the rest? Can he not separate them when he will? And if Nature in all things tend to aggregation, or union, it is then the Perfection of every thing. And why should we fear Perfection?

2. But Earth, and Water, and Air, are partible matter. Earth is easily separable: The parts of Water more hardly, by the means of some terrene Separaror: The parts of Air yet more hardly: and the Sun-beams, or substance of fire, yet harder than that (tho it's contraction and effects are very different): And Spirits either yet harder, or not at all. Some make it essential to them to be indiscerptible; and all must fay, That there is nothing in the Nature of them, tending to division, or separation. And therefore tho God, who can annihilate them, can divide them into parts, if it be no Contradiction; yet it will never be, because he usefeth every thing according to its nature, till he cometh to miracles. Therefore their dissolution of parts is no more to be feared, than their annihilation.

3. But
3. But if you take Souls to be partible and unible, then you must suppose every part to have still its own existence in the whole. And do you think, that this doth not more advance Souls than abase them? Yea, you seem to Deifie them, while you make them all to return into God, as drops into the Sea. And if you feign God to be partible, is it not more honour and joy to be a part of God, who is joy itself, than to be a created Soul? If a thousand Candles were put out, and their light turned into one Luminary, as great as they all, every part would have its share in the enlightning of the place about it. Is it any loss to a single Soldier, to become part of a victorious Army.

4. But indeed this is too high a Glory for the Soul of man to desire, or hope for. It is enough to have a blessed union with Christ, and the holy Society, consistent with our Individuation. Like will to like, and yet be it self. Rivers go to the Sea, and not to the Earth. Earth turns to Earth, and not to the Sun, or Fire. And the holy and blessed, go to the holy and blessed: And I believe, that their union will be nearer than we can now well conceive, or than this selfish state of man desireth. But as every drop in the Sea, is the
fame Water it was, so every Soul will be
the fame Soul.

2. And as to the incapacity of misery
which you talk of, why should you think
it more hereafter than here? If you think
all Souls now to be but one, doth not an a-
king Tooth, or a gouty Foot, or a calcul-
lous Bladder, suffer pain, tho it be not the
body that feeleth; but the fame sensitive
Soul is pain'd in one part, and pleas'd in
another. And if all Souls be now but God
in divers Bodies, or the Anima mundi, try
if you can comfort a man under the tor-
ment of the Stone, or other Malady, or on
the Rack, or in terror of Conscience, by
telling him, That his Soul is a part of God.
Will this make a Captive bear his Captivi-
ty, or a Malefactor his Death? If not here,
why should you think that their misery
hereafter will be ever the less, or more
tolerable for your conceit, that they are
parts of God? They will be no more parts
of him then, than they were here. But
it's like, that they also will have an unit-
ting inclination, even to such as themselves;
or that God, will separate them from all
true unity, and say, Go you cursed into ever-
lasting fire, prepared for the Devil and his An-
gels, &c.
§ 33. No doubt it's true, that you say, page 7, and 8. That matter is still the same, and liable to all the changes which you mention. But it's an unchanged God, who doth all this by Spirits, as second Causes, who are not of such a changeable, dissoluble, partible nature, as Bodies are: It is Spirits that do all that's done in the world. And I conjecture, as well as you, That universal Spirits are universal Causes. I suppose, That this Earth hath a vegetative form, which maketh it as a matrix to receive the Seeds, and the more active influx of the Sun. But Earth and Sun are but general Causes. Only God, and the seminal Virtue, cause the species, as such. The Sun causeth every Plant to grow; but it causeth not the difference between the Rose, and the Nettle, and the Oak. The wonderful unspeakable Virtue of the Seed causeth that. And if you would know that Virtue, you must know it by the effects. You cannot tell by the Seed only of a Rose, a Vine, an Oak, what is in it. But when you see the Plants in ripeness, you may see that the Seeds had a specifying Virtue, by the influx of the general Cause, to bring forth those Plants, Flowers, &c. Neither can you know what is in the Egg, but by the ripe Bird; nor what
what the Soul of an Infant is, but by Manhood and its Acts.

§ 34. You here pag. 7, divert from the point of the Immortality or Nature of the Soul, to that of the Resurrection of the Body, of which I will now say but this; Christ rose, and hath promised us a Resurrection, and nothing is difficult to God. 

Our living another life after this. The Body hath more parts than Earth and Water. The Spirits as we call them, which are the igneous parts, lodged in the purest aereal in the blood, &c. are that body in and by which the Soul doth operate on the rest.

How much of these material Spirits the Soul may retain with it after Death, we know not: and if it have such a body, it hath partly the same; and God can make what Addition he please, which shall not contradict identity: Paul faith of Corn, God giveth it a body as pleaseth him, in some respect the same, &c. in some not the same that was sown. We do not hold, That all the flesh that ever a man had, shall be raised as that mans. If one man that was fat, grow lean in his sickness, we do not say, that all the flesh that sickness wasted, shall rise: It shall rise a spiritual body. God knoweth that which you and I know not.
§. 35. You add, how easie it would have been to you to believe as the Church believeth, and not to have immerged your self in these difficulties?

Ans. I. The Church is nothing but all individual Christians; and it is their Belief which makes them capable of being of the Church: As we must be men in order of Nature, before we are a Kingdom of men; so we are Believers before we are a Church of Believers. A Kingdom or Policy maketh us not men, but is made of men; and Church-society or Policy maketh us not Believers, but is made up of Believers. Therefore Belief is first, and is not caused by that which followeth it? And why doth the Church believe? Is it because they believe?

And whom do they believe? Is it themselves? I doubt you have fallen into acquaintance with those whose Interest hath made it their Trade to puzzle and confound men about things as hard to themselves as others, that they may bring them to trust the Church, and then tell them that it's they that are that Church, as a necessary means to the quieting their minds. And they tell them, You are never able by reason to comprehend the mysteries of Faith; the more you search, the more you are confounded. But if you
you believe as the Church believeth, you shall speed as the Church speedeth, But it's one thing to believe the same thing which the Church believeth; and another to believe it with the same faith, and upon the same Authority. If a man believe all the Articles of the Creed only because men tell him that they are true, it is but a human Faith, as resting only on man's Authority; but the true Members of the Church believe all the same things, because God revealeth and attesteth them; and this is a Divine Faith: And so must you.

If you love light more than darkness and deceit, distinguish, 1. Believing men for Authority. 2. Believing men for their Honesty, 3. Believing men for the natural impossibility of their deceiving.

And the foundation of this difference is here: Mans Soul hath two sorts of acts, Necessary and Contingent, or mutably free.

To love our selves, to be unwilling to be miserable, and willing to be happy; to love God as good, if known, &c. are acts of the Soul as necessary, as for fire to burn combustible contiguous matter; or for a Fruit to eat; so that all the Testimonies which is produced by these necessary acts by knowing men, hath a Physical certainty, the contrary being impossible. And this is infallible his-
storical knowledge of matter of fact. Thus, we know there is such a City as Rome, Paris, Venice, &c. and that there was such a man as K. James, Ed. 6. Hen. 8. William the Conqueror, &c. And that the Statutes now ascribed to Ed. 3. and other Kings and their Parliaments are genuine. For Judges judge by them, Lawyers plead them, Kings own them, all men hold their Estates and Lives by them. Contrary mens Interest by Lawyers are daily pleaded by them against each other; and if any one would deny, forge or corrupt a Statute, Interest would engage the rest against him to detect his fraud.

1. The certain effect of natural necessary Causes hath natural necessary evidence of Truth.

But when all knowing men of contrary Dispositions and Interests. acknowledg a thing true, this is the effect of natural necessary Causes.

Ergo it hath natural necessary evidence of Truth.

2. It is impossible there should be an Effect without a sufficient Cause.

But that a thing should be false which all knowing men of contrary Dispositions and Interests acknowledge to be true, would be an Effect without a Cause; for there is no Cause
in nature to effect it. It is impossible in nature that all men in England should agree to say, There was a King James, K. Edward, Q. Mary, or that these Statutes were made by them, if it were false. This is infallible Historical Testimony. It were not so strong if it were only by one Party, and not by Enemies also, or men of contrary Minds and Interests. And thus we know the History of the Gospel; and this Tradition is naturally infallible.

II. But all the Testimony which dependeth on humane Acts, not necessary, but free, have but an uncertain moral humane Credibility. For so all men are Lyars; i.e. fallible, and not fully to be trusted.

And I. Those Testimonies which depend on mens Honesty, are no farther credible, than we know the Honesty of the men: which in some is great, in some is none, in most is mixt, and lubricous, and doubtful. Alas! what abundance of false History is in the world! Who can trust the Honesty of such men, as multitudes of Popes, Prelates, and Priests have been? Will they stick at a Lye, that stick not at Blood, or any wickedness? Besides, the ignorance which invalidates their Testimony.

II. And to pretend Authority to rule our Faith, is the most unsatisfactory way of all.
For before you can believe that Jesus is the Christ, and his Word true, how many impossibilities have you to believe? 1. You must believe that Christ hath a Church. 2. And hath authorized them to determine what is to be believed, before you believe that he is Christ. 3. You must know who they be whom you must believe; whether all, or some, or a major vote. Whether out of all the world, or a party. 4. And how far their Authority extendeth? Whether to judg whether there be a God, or no God; a Christ, or no Christ; a Heaven, or none; a Gospel, or none: or what. 5. And how their determinations out of all the world may come with certainty to us: and where to find them. 6. And when Countreys and Councils contradict and condemn each other, which is to be believed. Many such impossibilities in the Roman way, must be believed, before a man can believe that Jesus is the Christ. In a word, you must not puzzle your head to know what a man is, or whether he have an immortal soul; but you must, 1. believe the Church of Believers, before you are a Believer in Christ. 2. And you must believe, that Christ was God and Man, and came to save man, before you believe that there is such a creature as man, or what he is, and whether he have a soul capable of salvation. But I have elsewhere opened these Absurdities and Contradictions;
traditions; where you may see them confuted, if you are willing.

§. 36. Your question about the soul's nature, existence, and Individuation, may be resolved by a surer and easier way: as followeth:

I. By your own certain experience.

1. You perceive that you see, feel, understand, will and execute. 2. You may know, as is oft said, that therefore you have an active power to do these. 3. You may thence know, that it is a substance which hath that power. Nothing can do nothing. 4. You may perceive, that it is not the terrene substance, but an invisible substance, actuating the body. 5. You may know, that there is no probability, that so noble a substance should be annihilated. 6. Or that a pure and simple substance should be dissolved by the separation of parts (or if that were, every part would be a spirit still). 7. You have no cause to suspect, that this substance should lose those powers or faculties which are its essential form, and be turned into some other species, or thing. 8. And you have as little cause to suspect, that an essential vital intellectual power, will not be active, when active inclination is its Essence. 9. You have no cause to suspect, that it will want Objects to action in a World of such variety of Objects. 10. And you have as little cause to
suspect, that it will be unactive, for want of Organs, when God hath made its Essence acti-
ve; and either can make new Organs; or that which can act on matter, can act without, or on other matter. He that can play on a Lute, can do somewhat as good, if that be bro-
ken. 1 1. And experience might satisfie you, that sever a l men have several souls, by the se-
veral and contrary Operations. 1 2. And you have no reason to suspect, that God will turn many, from being many, into one; or that unity should be any of their los s. All this, Reason tells you, beginning at your own experience, as I have (and elsewhere more fully) opened.

§. 37. I I. And you have at hand sensible proof of the individuation of spirits, by Witches, Contracts, and Apparitions: of which the world has unquestionable proof, tho there be very many Cheats. Read Mr. Glanvill's new Book, published by Dr. Moore, Lavater de Spectris, Zauchy de Angili, Manlii Collet. Bodin's Daemonolog. Remigius of Witches, besides all the Mallei Malificorum, and doubt if you can. If you do, I can give you yet more, with full proof.

§. 38. III. But all that I have said to you, but the least part, in comparison of the af-
rance which you may have by the full
revelation of Jesus Christ, who hath brought life and immortality to light in the Gospel, where the state, the doom, the rewards and punishment of souls is asserted.

And without dark and long Ambages, or Roman Juggles, we prove the truth of this Gospel, briefly and infallibly thus:

I. The History of Christ's Life, Miracles, Doctrine, Death, Resurrection, Ascension, the Apostles Miracles, &c. is proved by such forementioned evidence, as hath physical certainty: Not such as dependeth only on mens honesty, or moral argument, much less on a pretended determining authority; but such as dependeth on necessary acts of man, even the consent of all sorts of contrary minds and interests, as we know the Statutes of the Land, or other certain History. But we are so far from needing to ask, which part of Christians it is that is this Church, that is to be believed, that it tendeth to the ascertaining of us, that all the Christian World, Papists, Protestants, Greeks, Moscovites, Armenians, Jacobites, Nestorians, &c. herein agree, even while they oppose each other. To know whether there was a Julius, or Augustus Caesar, a Virgil, Ovid Cicero, and which are their Works; yea, which are the Acts of Councils, no man goeth to an authorized determining
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Judge for the matter of Fact, but to historical proof. And this we have most full.

I. And if the History be true, the Doctrine must needs be true, seeing it is fully proved by the matters of Fact. Christ being proved to be Christ, all his words must needs be true.

§. 39. The Gospel of Christ, hath these four parts of its infallible evidence.

I. The antecedent and inherent Prophecies fulfilled.

II. The inherent impress of Divinity on the Gospel itself, unimitable by man. It hath God's Image and Superscription; and its Excellency, propria luce, is discernible.

III. All the Miracles, and Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ, the Gift of his Spirit, and extraordinary Miracles of the Apostles, and first Churches.

IV. The sanctifying work of the Spirit by this Gospel, on all Believers in all Ages of the World, by which they have the Witness in themselves. A full constant unimitable Testimony.

§. 40. And now how highly soever you think of Bruits, think not too basely of Men, for whom Christ became a Saviour.
And yet think not so highly of Men, Bruits and Stones, as to think that they are God. And think not that your true diligence hath confounded you, but either your negligence, or seducers, or the unhappy stifling of obvious truth, by the ill ordering of your thoughts. And I beseech you remember, that God's Revelations are suited to mans use, and our true knowledge to his Revelations. He hath not told us all that man would know, but what we must know. Nothing is more known to us than that of God which is necessary for us: Yet nothing so incomprehensible as God. There is much of the Nature of Spirits, and the world to come, unsearchable to us, which will pose all our Wits: yet we have sufficient certainty of so much as tells us our duty and our hopes. God hath given us Souls to use, and to know only so far as is useful. He that made your Watch, taught not you how it's made, but how to use it. Instead therefore of your concluding-complaints of your condition, thank God, who hath made man capable to seek him, serve him, love him, praise him, and rejoice in hope of promised Perfection. Live not as a willful stranger to your Soul and God. Use faithfully the Faculties which he hath given you: sin not willfully against the truth revealed, and leave things secret to God, till you come into the clearer light: and you shall
shall have no cause to complain, that God, whose goodness is equal to his greatness, hath dealt hardly with mankind. Instead of trusting fallible man, trust Christ, who hath fully proved his trustiness; and his Spirit will advance you to higher things than bruits are capable of. God be merciful to us dark unthankful sinners.


Ri. Baxter.

E R R A T A.

IN the Second Part, p. 12. 1. 9. for primus \( \times \) Prima.

p. 16. 1. 21. for is \( \times \) are.

I have not leisure to gather the rest, if there be any.
OF THE
NATURE
OF
SPIRITS;
ESPECIALLY
MANS SOUL.

In a placid Collation with the Learned

Dr. Henry More,

In a Reply to his Answer to a private Letter, Printed in his second Edition of Mr. Glanviles Sadduceismus Triumphatus.

By Richard Baxter.

LONDON, Printed for B. Simmons, at the Three Golden Cocks at the West End of St. Pauls. 1682.
A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Henry More at Christ's Colledge in Cambridge.

Reverend Sir,

I had answered your desire sooner, but having lent out the Sadducee Triumph. I said till now to have had it returned (being loth to buy another; it costing me 6 s.) But I was fain to get another at last; and on the review I find that I have expressly given you my thoughts already of your notion of a Spirit in my Methodus, having noted it in your Book of Atheism, and your Ench. Metaphys. In short, I think you...
and I are agreed that we cannot conceive of a Spirit unico conceptu, but must have two inadequate conceptions of it: of which one is that which Dr. Glisson De Vita naturae, calls conceptus fundamentalis, and is that which we call Substantia: for we can scarce think of a Virtus formalis, which is not Substantiae alicujus virtus, but qua virtus simpliciter existeth of itself, (unless we must so think with some of God.) And though this maketh not an actual composition, as Matter and Form in mixtis, yet intellectually we must take it as a distinct inadequate conceptus.

The other inadequate conceptus is Formal; and I think you and I are agreed that this is Virtus Una-trina, as described by me, viz. Virtus Vitalis, vitaliter activa, perceptiva, appetitiva, as Dr. Glisson speaks: (of which I make three species as described.) And I am myself far better acquainted with the nature of
a Spirit by the essential Virtus formalis, known to us by its acts; (for nothing doth that which it cannot do) than from the notion of substantiality. And yet I dare not say that a self-moving principle is proper to a Spirit. Nor do I consent to Campanella de sensu rerum, and Dr Glisson that would make all things alive by an essentializing form in the very Elements.

I distinguish Natures into Active and Passive; and Passivity is a word that serveth me as well as materiality: But whence the Descensus gravium is, I despair of knowing; and if it be of an innate principle, I call it not therefore a Spirit, because it is but passivorum motus aggregatius ad unionem in quiete, when Spirits motion is vital and so essential to them, that they tend not to union in quiescence, but in everlasting activity; quiescence in inactivity, being as much against their nature as motion against a Stone. So that
that I think we are agreed of the formal notice of a Spirit in general, and of an intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative in specie.

But truly I am at a loss about the conceptus fundamentalis, wherein the true difference lieth between Substantia and Materia. Do we by ---Substantia mean a conceptus realis, or only Relative. To say it doth subsist accidentibus, speaks but a Relation directly, and leaves the question unanswered, Quid est quod substat accidentibus. To say it is not an Accident, tells us not what it is, but what it is not. To say it doth subsist per se, either saith no more than that it is Ens reale, or else tells us not what it is that doth subsist. Quoad notationem nominis distinct from use, doth not materia and substantia signify the same fundamental conceptus? And is not the form the notifying difference? You difference Substance and Matter antecedently to the formal difference by Penetrabili-
trability & Impenetrability, Indivisibility & Divisibility. But I despair knowing in this life, how far Spiritual Substances are penetrable and indivisible. I grant you such an extension as shall free them from being nothing substantial, and from being Infinite as God is.

2. We grant Spirits a quantitas discreta; they are numerous, individuate; and formæ se multipli-
cant. Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter? But if be should, that would be no destruction of their Species, as the mixtorum dissolutio is; but as every drop of divided Water is Water, & one Candle lighting many, and many joined in one, are all the same fire; so much more would it be with Spirits, were they united or divided; and their locality

A 4
and penetrability are past our conceit. 3. But were we sure of what we say therein; these two (Penetrability and Indivisibility) speak but Accidents, though proper; and therefore are no satisfying notice of the notion of Substance Spiritual as distinct from Matter. I am hitherto therefore constrained to contain many thoughts in the following compass.

1. I know Spirits best by the Virtus vitalis formalis unam trina.

2. I hold that of Created Spirits substantia as notifying a Basis realis, must be the Conceptus Fundamentalis.

3. The word Immaterial signifying nothing (but a negation) and Materia being by many Antients used in the same sense as we do Substantia, I usually lay by the words.

4. I hold to the distinction of Natures, or Substances Passive and Active.
5. I distinguish Spiritual Substances as such by the Purity of the Substance, besides the Formal Difference.

6. Yet I doubt not but all Created Spirits are somewhat Passive, quia influxum causae primae recipient: And you grant them a Spissitude and Extension, which signify as much as many mean that call them Material. But Custom having made Materiar, but specially Corpus, to signify onely such großer Substance as the three Passive Elements have, I yield so to say, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material.

7. Though I ran not into the excess of Ludov. Le Grand de Igne (nor of Telecium or Patricius) I would Ignis were better studied: But this Room will not serve me to say what I think of it. But in brief, He that knoweth that Ignis is a Substance, whose Form is the Potentia Activa movendi, illu-
illuminandi, calore, et igni, these are received in a gross Passive Body, being but their Accidents oft, but the Igneous Substance in act operating on them, and conceiveth of Spirits, but as Ignis eminenter, that is, of a purer Substance than Ignis is, which we best conceive of (next the Formal Virtue) by its similitude, I think knows as much as I can reach of the Substance of Created Spirits. And the Greek Fathers that called Spirits Fire, and distinguished Ignem per formas into Intellecutive, Sensitiv, and Vegetative or Visible Fire, (as it is in Aere Ignito,) allowing an Incomprehensible Purity of Substance in the higher above the lower (as in Passives Air hath above Water, &c.) I think did speak tolerably, and as informingly as are the notions of Penetrability and Indivisibility; though perhaps these also may be useful.

Sir, I crave your pardon of these curt
curt expressions of the thoughts which you desired concerning the description of a Spirit. If God make us truly holy, we shall quickly know more to our satisfaction. I rest

Your obliged Servant,

Nov. 17.

1681.


You make [a Spirit to be Ens, ideoque, Unum, Verum, and that True denotes the answerableness of the thing to its proper Idea, and implies right matter and form duly conjoined. ] Q. Do you not here make Spirits material? But no doubt whether
to be called Material or Substantial, the form is not an Adjourned thing, but the form of a simple essence is but an inadequate conceptus, making no composition.
OF THE
NATURE
OF
SPIRITS:
A Placid Collation with the Learned Dr. Henry More; upon his Answer to a private Letter, published in the second Edition of Mr. Glanviles Sadduceismus Triumphatus.

Reverend Sir,

§ 1. That my hasty Letter should occasion you to benefit the World with more of your Information, in so considerable a point, as is the nature of a Spirit, was more than I thought of, or could hope for: Had I imagined that you would have so far honoured it, I should have so written it, as might have drawn out more of your Instruction, and made your Animadversions yet more edifying.

§ 2. I
§ 2. I desired you to have forborn the title of Psychopyrift, for these Reasons: 1. Because it tendeth plainly to misinform the Reader, as if I held that Souls (or Spirits) are Fire; whereas in my Books and Letters, I still say otherwise. And that they may be so called not formally, or univoce, but only eminenter and analogice. And when a name on the Title page, & through the whole, and a supposition in much of your arguing, implyeth that I hold what I renounce, it may wrong your Reader's understanding, though I am below the capacity of being wronged.

2. And the fastening of Nicknames on one another in Controversies of Religion, hath so much caused Schisms, and other mischiefs, that I confess I the less like it about Philosophy. But I must submit.

§ 3. My understanding is grown so suspicious of ambiguity in almost all words, that I must confess that what you say also against those whom you
you call Holenmerians and Nullibists satisfieth me not, unless many terms used in the controversies, were farther explained than I find them here, or in your Metaphysicks (your Books against Judge Hale I have not seen.) But I may take it for granted that you know that they who use the saying of [ Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte ] ordinarily tell us; 1. That they use the word Tota relatively, and improperly; seeing that which hath no parts is improperly called Tota. 2. That they mean it but negatively, viz. That the Soul is not in the parts of the body, per partes, part in one part, and part in another, but indivisibly. And one would think this should suit with your own hypothesis.

And when I better know in what sense Locus is used, I shall be fitter to enquire whether Spirits be in loco. When some take it for a circumscribing body, and some for a subjective body (on which it operateth) and some for a meer room possest in vacuo, and
and some for God himself in whom are all things, the name of a Nullifist is as ambiguous to me.

§ 4. You tell your Reader that [All created Spirits are Souls in all probability, and actuate some Matter or other.]

Sir, Philosophers freedom is usually taken easier than Divines; I will therefore presume that our mutual freedom shall not be in the least distasteful to either of us: And so I must tell you that I have long taken it for a matter of very great use to distinguish unknown things from known, and to bridle my understanding from presuming to enquire into unrevealed things: And I take that boldness of Philosophers to have had a great hand in corrupting Divinity. Secret things are for God, and things revealed for us and our Children, saith Moses. And when I presume most, I do but most lose my self, and misuse my understanding: nothing is good for that which it was not made for:
for: Our understandings as our Eyes are made only for things revealed. In many of your Books I take this to be an excess; And I have oft wondered at your Friend, and (sometime) mine, Mr. Glanvile, that after his Scepsis scientifica, he could talk and write of doubtful things with that strange degree of confidence, and censuring of Dissenters as he did. I am accused of overdoing, and curiosity my self: But I endeavour to confine my enquiries to things revealed.

This premised I say, undoubtedly it is utterly unrevealed, either as to any certainty or probability, that all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter. Aliss how should we come to know it. Neither Nature nor Scripture tells it us.

But 1. If this be so, the difference between you and the Psychopyrists must be opened as it is (much like that of Mammertus and Faustus,) whether the Soul (or a Spirit) have Matter by composition, or sim-ple
ply uncompounded: for a body you suppose it still to have. Is it separable from a Body or not? If it be, why should you think that it is never separated? If it can subsist without a Body, who can say that it doth not? If it cannot but be inseparable, it is a strange composition that God cannot dissolve. And if it perish upon the dissolution, then it was but an Accident of the body, and not a compounding Substance. Dr. Gliftons and Campanella's way is as probable as this; And I marvel that when you have dealt with so many sorts of Dissenters you meddle not with so subtile a piece as that old Doctor's de Vita Natura: I have talkt with divers high pretenders to Philosophy here of the new strain, and asked them their judgment of Dr. Gliftons Book, and I found that none of them understood it, but neglected it as too hard for them, and yet contemned it. He supposeth all Matter to be animated without composition, the Matter and Form being but conceprus inade-qua-
quati, of an uncompounded being; however that Matter as such be divisible into atomes, every atom still being uncompounded living Matter. You suppose all Spirit to be in Matter, but by way of composition as distinct substances. I go the middle way, and suppose that substance (simple) is Active or Passive: that the three Passive Elements, Earth, Water and Air are animated only by composition, or operation of the active; But that the active substances have no composition, (but intellectual) but Substance and form are conceptus e-jusdem inadequati. So that what Dr. Glisson saith of every clod and stone, I say only of Spirits, (of fire I shall speak after.)

2. And do you think that the Soul carrieth a body out of the body inseparable with it, or only that it receiveth a new body when it passeth out of the old. If the latter, is there any instant of time between the dispossession of the old, and the possession of the new. If any, then the Souls.
sometimes without a body: And how can you tell how long. If not what body is it that you can imagine so ready to receive it without any interposition? I have not been without temptations to over inquisitive thoughts about these matters: And I never had so much ado to overcome any such temptation, as that to the opinion of Averrhoes, that as extinguished Candles go all into one illuminated air, so separated Souls go all into one common Anima Mundi, and lose their individuation, and that Materia receptiva individuat. And then indeed your notion would be probable; for the Anima mundi mundum semper animat, and so my separated Soul should be still imbodyed in the world, and should have its part in the worlds animation; But both Scripture and Apparitions assure us of the individuation of Spirits, and separate Souls.

And I confess to you that I have oft told the Sadduces and Infidels, that urge seeming impossibilities a-
against the Resurrection, and the activity of separate Souls for want of Organs, that they are not sure that the Soul taketh not with it, at its departure hence, some seminal material Spirits (ethereal and airy;) and so that this spirituous or igneous body, which it carrieth hence, is a semen to the body, which it shall have at the Resurrection, no man knoweth the contrary, and no man knoweth that it is so.

The Soul is many months here in organizing its own body in generation, and more in nourishing it to a useful state: That particular organical bodies are made ready to receive them just at death, is hard to be believed: That the matter of the Universe is still ready is past doubt. But how organized, or how the Soul worketh without Organs, we shall better know hereafter. Your opinion much favoureth the Pythagoreans; If the Soul be never out of a body, is it not as like to come into one new forming in the womb, as into we know not what or where? B. 3 9 5
§ 5. I could wish you had printed my Letter wholly by itself before you had annexed your answer, that the Reader might have understood it; which I can hardly do myself as you have parcelled it. But we must not have what we would have from wiser men.

I take it for an odd method, when I never asserted Spirits to be fire, but denied it, first to be in your Epistle feigned to have said it, and yet in the end of it for you to say that [I mean not ordinary fire, but that my meaning is more sublime and refined] and never tell the Reader what it is before you dispute it, and then through the whole answer to dispute on a wrong supposition, and in the end of the Book to confess again that I say not that Spirits are fire or material.

§ 6. Had I been to choose an edifying method, we would first have stated our question, and agreed on the meaning of our terms; But I must follow your steps; though I had rather have done otherwise.

Ad.
Ad Sect. I.

§ 1. That my Notions are like those of Judge Hale, is no wonder; we were no strangers to each others thoughts about these matters; and though he and you have had some peaceable Vellitations, I take it for no dishonour to be of his mind.

1. De Nomine: There is no such agreement among Philosophers of the name Matter as you suppose. I refer you for brevity, but to a very small Book of a very Learned Author (advanced by the Preface of one eminent for subtilty) the Metaphysicks of Dr. Rich. Crakenhorpe, who tells you at large, that Matter is taken either properly (as you and I do Substance) and so Spirits are material, or improperly and narrowly for that only which hath the three dimensions; and so Spirits are not material. It's unprofitable to cite many more so to the same purpose: And I suppose
It suppose you know, that not only Tertullian, but many other of the Fathers (many of whom you may find cited by Faustus Reg. whom Mammertius answereth) so used both Matter and Corpus also.

§ 2. The word [Form] is as ambiguous; You and I are not the only persons that use it not in the same sense. Matter in its first Conceptus called Primus, hath no Form; that is, is conceived of abstractive from all Form. Matter in its next Conceptus is conceived of as diversifyed by accidents, as quantity, figure, &c. And so the 3 passive Elements, Earth, Air & Water, are diversifyed by many accidents, making up that Consistence, which is called their several forms, known only by sense, and capable of no perfect definition. Many such passive Materials conjunct have their Relative Form, which is that Contexture in which consisteth their aptitude for their use: as a House, a Ship, a Gun, a Watch. In Compositions where the Active natures are added, and operate unitedly on the passive, there the Active is the Form of the Compound, quite in another sense than any of the former, viz. as it is principium motus.

You and I are enquiring of the different Forms of Matter and Spirit: You say that Impenetrability, and Divisibility are the Form
Form of Matter, and the contrary of Spirit: I say, that 1. Substance as Substance, (and Matter taken for Substance, which Dr. Crakenthorpe thinketh is the properest sense) as such hath no Form, that is, in conceptu primo. 2. That substance distinguished by subtilty & crassitude, visibility and invisibility, quantity, shape, motion, &c. doth herein differ Modally: And this Modo may well enough be called the Form, before it have another Form: And as the divers foresaid Elements thus differ, so the substance of Spirits no doubt hath some Modal Excellency above all Bodies or Matter strictly or narrowly so called: And if you will call this a Form, I contend not about the word, but it is but equivocally so called, Spirits having another nobler sort of Form. 3. Nothing hath two Forms univocally so called: But Spirits have all that Virtus formalis, which I oft described, which is their very form: There is no Spirit without it: It’s not a Compounding part, but the form of a simple substance. Vital Virtue, Vis, Potentia activa, signifieth not the same thing with Penetrability, and Indiscerptibility; Therefore both cannot be the Form univocally so called: And how you could put both these your self into one definition, as
as a kind of compounded Form I wonder. Yea, your two words themselves signify not the same thing: Penetrable and Indiscernible are not words of one signification. And surely you will grant that these two, Penetrable and Indiscernible can be no otherwise a Form to Spirits, than Impenetrable and Discernible are a Form to Matter. And it's apparent that the first is but a modal conceptus, and the latter a relative notion of Matter, and neither one nor both are contrary to Virtus Vitalis in a Spirit (or Virtus activa:) Meer passive potentiality is rather the contrary difference here.

And I know not why you might not as well have named divers other Accidents or Modes, especially Quantity, and the trina dimensio, and called them all the Form of Matter, as well as your two.

Indeed when we have from sense a true notion of Matter, we must know that it hath Quantity, and is somewhere, and therefore that one part of it, and another part cannot possess just the same place, and so we grant you the Impenetrability: And how far you prove Spirits to be such substances as are extended, and have Amplitudo (as you say pag. 105.) and spirituality, and be in loco, and in more or less space
space variously, and yet that they have no dimensions which the Divine Intellect or Power itself can measure; and whether all the Spirits in the universe can be in eodem puncto, and all that are finite, contracted into that one point, I leave this to Wits more subtle than mine to judge of.

For to tell you the truth, I know nothing at all without the mediation of sense, except the immediate sensation itself, & the acts of Intelect & Volition or Nolition, & what the Intellect inferreth of the like, by the perception of these. I have seen & felt how Water differeth from Earth, and from that sensation my Intellect hath that Idea of the difference which it hath: But without that seeing and feeling it, all the definitions in the world, and all the names of hard and soft, and dry and moist, would have given me no true notice of the formal difference. Now hence I infer, that I have no sense at all of the difference of a Spirits Substantiality in such modes and accidents from that of Matter; and therefore how can I know it? I know by knowing what knowing is, and by willing what willing is: And I know that these Acts prove a power (for nothing doth that which it cannot do,) and that Act and Power prove a Substance.
nothing hath nothing, and can do nothing:) ab est tertii adjeciti ad est secundi valet argumentum: And I know, that unless Light might be called Spirit, Spirits are to me invisible: And so I can knowingly say, 1. What they do, 2. What they can do, 3. What they are in the genus of Substantiality, 4. And what they are not as to many Attributes proper to Visible Substances or Bodies; 5. And I have elsewhere fully proved in a special Dispute (in Methodo Theol.) that the Power of Vital Action, Intellection and Volition, is not a meer Accident of them, but their very essential form. But as to that Modification of their Substance which is contrary to Impenetrability and Divisibility, I may grope, but I cannot know it positively, for want of sensation.

§ 2. Is an Atom Matter? or is it not? If one Atom be no matter, then two is none, and then there is none. If an Atom be matter, is it Discoverible or not? If not, how is this the Form of Matter? If it be divisible, it is not an Atom; that's a contradiction. And if every Atom be divisible in infinitum, it is as great, or greater than the world, and then there are as many Infinites as Atoms. That three Atoms united cannot be divided just in the
the middle, etiam per Divinam Potentiam, is because it implieth a contradiction, viz. that an Atom is divisible; so that by you an Atom is a Spirit.

Do you take the word [Penetrable] actively, or passively, or both? If actively according to you Matter is penetrable, for it can penetrate a Spirit, that is, possess the same place. But I perceive you mean that Spirits can penetrate Bodies, & also that they can penetrate one another.

And I suppose that by Penetration you mean not that which separateth parts, of the Matter, & cometh in between these parts, but you mean possessing the same place, as is said: And if so, do you put no limitation or what? I ask before, can all the Created Spirits in Heaven and Earth be in the same Atom of matter? If so, are they then absent from all other place? or is every Spirit ubiquitous? You confute the Nullibists by the operation of the Soul on the Body: Ibi operatur, ergo ibi est: And do you think that all the Angels in Heaven, and all Created Souls may be in one Body by Penetration? If so, Are they one Soul there, or innumerable in one man? And if they may be all in one point, and so be all one, may they not be divided again? I confess my ignorance of the Consistence of Spiritual Substance
Substance is so great, that I am not able to say, that God who hath given Souls quantitatem discretam, and made them innumerable, is not able to make one of two, or many, and to turn that one into two, or many again: I am not sure that it is a contradiction; especially if it be true that Sennertus, and many more say of the multiplication of Forms by Generation.

But if you take Penetrability passively, then you mean that Spirits may be penetrated by Bodies, or by one another, or both. No doubt you mean both, and so, as I said, Bodies also are penetrable, both actively and passively; that is, Bodies can penetrate Spirits, and be penetrated by Spirits. Whether any Bodies penetrate each other, viz. whether Light or its vehicle at least be a Body, and whether it penetrate the body of Glass or Crystal, with more about these matters, I have heretofore spoken in my Reasons of the Christian Religion Append. Obj. 2. p. 525. and forward.

§ 3. To conclude this; as in natural mixt Bodies, there are three principles, Materia, Materia Dispositio (for that I think is a fitter expression than Privatio) & Forma; so in simple Beings there are three (not parts, but) conceptus inadequate, and answerable here to; viz.
I. In the three passive Elements, Earth, Water and Air, there is in each, 1. The Matter, 2. The Disposition of that matter by contexture, and various modes, of which Impenetrability and Divisibility are parts; 3. The passive Form resulting from all these, which consisteth in their various aptitude to their uses; especially their Receptivity of the Influx of the Active Natures. Here you put two Attributes together, which are both but parts of the Materiæ Dispositio, and call them two the Form.

II. In the Active Natures, there is, 1. The Substantiality, 2. The Substantiae Dispositio, 3. The Form.

Of the first (not part, but) inadequate Conceptus, Substantiality, we agree, of the second Conceptus we differ: That such Substances have an incomprehensible Purity, of which we can have no distinct Idea for want of Sensation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the Form of Spirits, but the Substantiae Dispositio, is that which I say: And you say that Penetrability and Indivisibility are the Form, which (at most) are but the Dispositio Substantiae; and yet you joyn the Vital Virtue as part of the formal Conception too; which
which is quite of another conception. And so we differ of the third Conceptus, viz. the Formalso; which I affirm of all simple active natures to be the Virtus Activa: And if they are Vital, the Virtus Vitalis.

Of the name Vita, there is a Controversie, which must be distinguished from that de re. If it be true that Dr. Giffon faith, that every Atom of matter hath in it a Motive Principle without Composition, then the Motive Virtue is the Form of all Matter, as well as of Spirit. If all be to be called Living or Spirit, which hath a Virtus Motiva for its Essential Form, then Ignis (or Æther) is Vital and Spirit; for it hath an Essential Motive Principle as its Form. Therefore the Question whether Ignis or Æther) be Life or Spirit, is but a question de nomine (such as too many usually in Disputes manage, as if it were de re.) It is no Life or Spirit, if by those names you mean only Sensitive and Intellectual Natures: But it is Life and Spirit, if by that name you mean only an Essential Formal Motive Principle.

I have oft professed that I am ignorant whether Ignis and Vegetative Spirit be all one (to which I most incline) or whe-
ther Ignis be an Active Nature, made to be the Instrument by which the three Spiritual Natures, Vegetative, Sensitive and Mental work on the three Passive Natures: And though I was wont to think, that what I knew not myself, all men of great Learning knew, specially such as you, in the points which you have with singular industry studied; yet now experience hath banished that modest Error, and convinced me that other men must be content with an humble Ignoramus as well as I.

§ 4. And here I must note, that § 18. p. 127. where you purposely define a Spirit, you agree with me: Your definition is [A Spirit is an Immaterial Sub stance intrinsically endued with Life, and the Faculty of Motion.] Forgive me for thinking that you are not strict enough in your terms for a definition; but plainly you seem to mean the same as I do. You should, I think, have mentioned a Spirit as a simple Substance differing from a mixt; and have said, not only [intrinsically] endued, for so is every Animal who is Body as well as Spirit, but also endued with it as its simple Formal Essence: And whether all Faculty of Motion (e.g. Gravitation) be Life, I am in doubt. But here C 1. You
1. You agree with me in the first Conceptus [Substance:] And 2. As to that mode of Substance which I call the Dispositio Substantiæ ad Formam, you call it but [Immaterial] which is a negative, and speaketh nothing positively; which is such an honest Confession as we poor Ignorants aperally make, that what the excellent Purity or modal Consistence of Spiritual Substance is as compared to Material (or Corporeal) because we never saw or felt it as we do Corporeal; we do not formally know, and therefore only tell men de genere, that it is most pure and excellent; but in special, that we have no true Idea of it, and therefore only tell men what it is not [not material] and not what it is. 3. But you name no Formal Difference but Life: When you add [the Faculty of Motion] it is a defective Explication of the Virtus Vitalis, which is ever Unica-triplex, viz. Aëritis-Perception-Appetitiva, when it operates to generation or augmentation. And do you think that Life and Immateriality are Synonyma's? Or that Life and Penetrable and Indiscernible, are Synonyma's? Or that the Form of a Spirit is a Compound of such and so many Heterogeneals? Had you held to this definition, I think you had done best.
§ 5. Pag. 129. You seem to explain Intematerial so as to make Indiscernibility an immediate Attribute, and expound it, It is indiscernible into real Physical parts: (so is an Atom.) But as Physical signifies corporeal, some will say, it may yet be per potentiam divinam divided into Spiritual parts. And you expound Penetrability actively, that it can penetrate the matter and things of its own kind, that is, pass through Spiritual Substances: And such any gross Body can pass through.

§ 6. When Answ. p. 3. you say of a Spirit, that it is [so subtil as to be in such sort penetrable.] And in Sect. 31. to which you refer us, you make the difference of Spirit penetrating, and Body impenetrable to be subtilty and crassitude.] Could any of us have said more whom you contradict? Is Subtilty and Crassitude the difference between Spiritual Substance and Material in their Consistency? I have not said so much as this.

§ 7. As to your oft-mentioned per se & non per alium, as proper to Spirits, I am past doubt, that Spirits more depend on God for Being and Motion, than Matter doth on Spirits (Created.) But it's difference enough that God giveth them an Essential Formal Virtue self-moving receptive
receptive of his moving Influx, when Passives move only as moved by self-movers: (unless the aggregative Motion must be excepted, of which afterward.)

Ad SECT. II.

§ 1. Three Faults, of which one is a Mischief, you find with my Conceptus formalis. 1. That it leaveth out what is contained in the Conceptus formalis of a Spirit in General, Penetrability and Indiscernibility.

Ans. 1. It is but the dispositio Substantia at most, and not a proper Conceptus formalis. 2. You leave out other modifications as essential. 3. It leaveth none out that is known, while I say that it is Substantia purissima, which containeth your Modes and Attributes with more if they be true, if not, it avoideth the errors.

§ 2. 2. You say, [It puts in Perception, and we have no assurance that a plas-tick Spirit hath Perception, but as such hath
hath none: Else the Soul would perceive the Organization of its own Body.

Ans. Dr. Glisson, de Vita Nature and Campanella, have said so much against you of this, that supposing the Reader to have perused them, I will not repeat it.

Did you think that there is no Perception but sensitive or Intellectual? Such indeed the vegetative Spirit hath not; but it hath a vegetative Perception. A Plant growtheth in a Soil of various qualities: It attracteth to itself that part of Nutrition which is congruous to it, and digesteth that so Attracted: And therefore it hath an answerable Perception, which sort is congruous to it, and which not, when it neglecteth one sort, and draweth another. It doth not see or feel it, nor understand it, but insensibly perceiveth it.

3. You say, you [do not easily assent to that conceit of a Trinity in this Conceptus formalis which I make to consist in Virtute una-trina, vitali, perceptiva, appetitiva.]

Ans. Nor did I easily assent to it; nor did Dr. Glisson after 80 Years of age, easily procure men to assent to it, nor Campanella take so marvellously with others as he did with our Commentarius and some such. And far be it from me to expect you should easily assent to it, when I come

C 3
not to you as a Teacher. But whereas you say, that these make three no more than Animal, Homo, and Brutum, or Cupiditas, Desiderium, and Fuga, you silence me; for it beseemeth me not to speak to you in a Teaching Language, and there is no other to convince you. And if all that I have said in Method, Theol. will not do it, I confess it will not easily be done, Animal, Homo, and Brutum, are three words containing only a General, and specific nature, in two distinct species of Subjects: If you think that in the Sun Virtus-motiva, illuminativa, & calefattiva, or in man's Soul a vegetative, sensitive, and Intellectual power, or in the latter, mentally-active, Intellectual, and Volitive Virtue, are no other, I will not persuade you to change your mind, much less give you any Answer to your simile of cupiditas, desiderium, fuga, save that you might almost as well have named any three Words.

§ 3. But you say [The Omission of Immaterial in your Conceptus formalis, or which is all one of Penetrability and Indiscernibility is not only a mistake but a mischief; it implying that the Virtus Appetitiva & perceptiva may be in a Substance though material, which betrays much of the sus-
succeours which Philosophy affords to Religion, &c.

Ans. Melancholy may cause fears by seeming Apparitions. I hope no body will be damned for using or not using the Word Material or Immaterial: It's easier to use either to prevent such danger. And I am not willing again to examine the sense of these words every time you use them. You know I said not that Spirits are Material: And you say they are Substances of Extension, Amplitude, Spissitude, Locality, and Subtilty, as opposite to Crassitude. And what if another think just so of them, (or not so grossly) and yet call them Matter, will the word undo him? But you say I omit Immaterial. Ans. See my Append. to Reas. of Christ. Rel. whether I omit it: But is a bare Negative Essential to a just definition here? Why then not many Negatives more, (as invisible, insensible, &c.) To say that Air is not Water, or Water is not Earth, was never taken for defining, nor any mischief to omit it.

But that the positive term Purissima doth not include Immaterial, and is not as good, you have not as yet proved. Is Substantia purissima material? Do not you by that intimation do more to assert
the Materiality of Spirits than ever I did? Have you read what I have answered to 20 Objections of the Somatists in the aforesaid Append.

But you say, *It implyeth that Virtus perceptiva, &c. may be in a substance material.* Ans. Negatur. If I leave out 20 Negatives in my Definition, it followeth not that the form may be with their positives. But can you excuse yourself from what you call a Mischief, when you intimate that Substantia purissima may be material? Because I only called it purissima, you say I imply it may be material.

But I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue matter itself with the formal Virtue of Perception: That you say the Cartesians hold the contrary, and that your Writings prove it, certifieth me nor. O the marvellous difference of mens Conceptions! Such great Wits as Campanella, Dr. Glisson, &c. were confident that no Matter in the world was without the una-trina Virtus, viz. Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive; I agree not with them: But you on the contrary say, that Materia qualitercusque modificata is incapable of Perception: I doubt not, materia qua materia, or yet qua mere modificata hath no Life: But that it is
uncapable of it; and that Almighty God cannot make perceptive living Matter, and that by informing it without mixture, I cannot prove, nor I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impossible? Nor do I believe that it giveth a man any more cause to doubt (as you add) of the Existence of God, or the Immortality of the Soul, than your Opinion that faith, God cannot do this.

To pass by many other I will but recite the words of Michaelis Ethnophron, li. i. c. 13. p. 23, 24. instancing in many that held the Soul to be Pure Matter.

Eam Sententiam inter veteres: probavit apud Macrobiunm, Heraclitus Physicus, cui anima est Essentia Stellaris scintilla; Et Hipparchus apud Plinium, cui est causa pars: Et Africanus apud Ciceronem qui detrabit animam ex illis sempiternis ignibus quae Sidera vocamus; queq; globosi & rotundae divinis animatae mentibus circulos suos orbesq; conficiunt celeritate mirabili: Et Seneca qui descendisse eam ex illo celesti Spiritu ait; Et Plato ipse qui alicubi animam vocat aut deinde odynis, radians & splendidum vehiculum: Et Epicurus qui Astra vocat nobis cilia xj suntque numine, amicae & cognate clementa: Ipse que cum Peripateticis Aristoteles qui eam quinta
§ 4. But you magnifie our difference, saying [In this you and I fundamentally differ, in that you omit, but I include, Pene-
trability and Indiscerpibibility in the Conceptus formalis of a Spirit. Ans. I think you mean better than you speak, and err not fundamentally. 1. I do not think that your two hard words are fundamentals, nor that one or both are Synonyma to Im-
material. 2. I do not think but Purissima includeth all that is true in them, and so leaveth them not out. 3. I do not leave them out of the Dispositio vel modus Sub-
stantiae, though I leave them out of the Conceptus formalis. 4. Your self affirm the vital Virtue to be the Conceptus formalis. 4. And
And hath a Spirit more forms than one? You know of no existent Spirit in the World that hath not its proper specification form: And if your two words had been a General Form, that's no form to the species, but a Substantia dispositio. Doth he fundamentally err that faith Corpus humanum organicum is not forma hominis? Or that the puritas vel subtilitas materia is not forma ignis vel solis, but only the materia dispositio? If our little self-made words were so dangerous on either side, I should fear more hurt by making the form of a Spirit. 1. To be but the Consistence or mode of the Substance; 2. And that to consist in divers accidents conjunct, 3. And those uncertain in part, or unintelligible; 4. And Spirits to have two Forms, or one made up of divers things, 5. And to place the form in a Negation of Matter. What a jumble is here, when the true definition of a Spirit is obvious?

§ 5. You say, [Penetrability maketh it pliant and subtil, and to a Substance of such Oneness and Subtility is rationally attributed, whatever Activity, Sympathy, Synenergy, Appetite and Perception is found in the world.

Ans. There is Oneness in Matter (in Atoms at least) and doth Penetrability make
make Subtilty? And is Subtilty the difference? Sure, if you make any sense of this, it must favour the conceit of Materiality more than my term Purissima.

But do you verily believe that Penetrability or Subtilty is a sufficient, efficient, or Formal Cause of Vitality, Perception, Appetite? and so of Intellection and Volition? I hope you do not: It is the Essential Virtus Formalis (including Potentiam activam, Vim & Inclinationem) which must immediately cause the Acts; Subtilty and Penetrability else will not do it: No man will grant you that the Proposition is good, ex vi Causalitatis, [Quodcunque penetrabile vel subtile est, ideo necessario vivit, percipit, appetit] unless it proceed à necessitate concomitantiae & existentiae. Yet where you are most out of the way, you are at it again, that This Mistake is a mischief.

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Ad SECT. III. & IV.

§ 1. Your Third Section I am not concerned in: I tell you still I deny not your Penetrability and Indiscernibility, though I lay not the stress on them as to...
Certainty or Importance, as you do, and am past doubt that they do but defectively speak the Substantiality sub conceptu modali & dispositivo, and are unskilfully called the Forma Spiritus.

§ 2. Your 4th Section I had rather not have seen. 1. You dislike that I say, that [a self-moving Principle I dare not say is proper to a Spirit.] I hope Ignorance is never the worse for being confess’d: All are not so wise as you. I deny it not; but I am not certain that Stones, Earth, and other heavy things, move not to the Earth by a self-moving Principle. I am not sure that if a Stone in the Air fall down, it is by a Spirits motion, and that God hath not made Gravitation, and other aggravative motion of Passives, to be an Essential self-moving Principle. Few men I think have thought otherwise. And yet I am not sure that all Stones and Clods are alive. If you are, bear with our Ignorance; for that is no Error.

§ 3. When I say [I consent not to Campanella de sensu rerum, or Dr. Glisson, that would make all things alive by an Essentiating Form in the very Elements.] Here you talk of soul play, to make one part fish, and the other flesh; one part of Matter self-moved, and other not.]
Anf. But, worthy Sir, the foul play is yours, that seem to tell your Reader that I do so, which I never do: That is scant fair play. I said not that Spirits are Matter, and I do but say I am ignorant whether Gravitation be from the Motion of a Spirit thrusting down the Stone, &c. or from an Essential Principle in the Matter. May not one be ignorant where he cannot chuse? I cannot but much difference the motus aggregativus, such as Gravitation causeth, which is only the tendency of the parts to the whole, that they may there rest from motion, from the natural motion of known Life, which abhorreth cessation. I take Motus to be no Entity, but a mode of Substance; to be in motion or quiescence, are several modes of it; and that mode which is most stated, most sheweth nature. I see no contradiction in it, that a Stone should fall without Life: I dare not say, that God cannot make a Rock or Clod to fall by an intrinsic Principle of Gravitation, without vital motion. And yet I am most inclined to your Opinion: But the stream of Dissenters obligeth such a one as I am to more modesty than must be expected from one of your degree.

§ 4. Next you complain of [*horrible Confusion.*] What’s the matter? why, to include
include Life in the Conceptus Formalis of
a Spirit (of which, Self-motion is certainly
an Effect) and yet say It is not proper to a
Spirit. Ans. It\'s worse than confusion to
intimate that I said what I did not. Your
saying [It\'s certain] is no conviction of
me, that there is no Self-motion but by
Life. You think not that Fire liveth; and
I am not sure that a Stone is a self-mover:
I only say, I know not. I never yet
saw your proof, that God is able to make
no self-mover but vital! And if he can,
how know I that he doth not? The World
suffers so much by mens taking on them
to know more than they do, that I fear
it in myself, as one of the worst Diseases
of Mankind.

§ 5. You conclude [We are to deny
Self-motion in the matter itself everywhere
as not belonging thereto, but to Spirit]
Ans. No doubt but Materia quanta est
mera passiva: But that God can put no
motive inclination in it, or that he cannot
give a Spiritual Vitality to any matter, are
conclusions fitter for you than for me.

§ 6. To shew why I oft neglect the
name [Material] (some taking it for the
same with Substance, and some only for
Corpority) I said, that the distinction of
Natures into Active and Passive, serveth
as well.] To this you say [Materiality is a Notion more strict, distinct and steady.]

Ans. The contrary is commonly known, and before and elsewhere proved; when Materialia is not only a very hard ambiguous word (and you have not yet enabled me by all your words, to know what you mean by it) but even such great men as before named make the more general sense (equal to Substance) to be the more proper: Had all used it, as you do, and you made us understand what you mean by it, I would hold to it accordingly.

You say, Passivity belongs to things Immaterial. Ans. 1. Passivity as exclusive of Activity, or as predominant, doth not.

2. No Passivity belongeth to that which is not Matter in the foresaid large sense of Matter, of which more anon.

Ad SECT. V, VI.

§ 1. Confess my Ignorance of the Cause of the descensus gravium; whether it be from a Principle made by God essential to the matter that descendeth
eth, or from an intrinsick compounding Active nature, or only from an extrinsick Mover. You here bid me not despair, for it is demonstrable that the descentus gravium is not from any principle springing from their own Matter, but from an Immaterial principle distinct therefrom.

Ans. 1. All doth not demonstrate to me, which some call demonstration; I perceive you note not at all what is my doubt, and how can you then solve it? I do not think that the Gravitation is from a principle springing from the Matter. How can a Principle of Motion spring from Matter? But the doubt is of the several ways forenamed: 1. Whether it be from a principle in the Matter, as Dr. Gllison thought, as a Conceptus inadæquatus of its Essence, or at least an inseparable Quality or Accident. 2. Or whether it be by an Essential Compounding Principle, as Anima in homine: 3. Or by an extrinsick Agent only; Did you think that you had answered these?

You say, [which Principle to be the Mover of the Matter of the Universe, I have over and over again demonstrated in Ench. Metaph.]

Ans. I would have had it plainer, but must take it as it is. It seems then that you think that it is only the Anima D Mundi,
Mundi, without any subordinate moving Principle: But you should have spoken out. I will not wrong you so much as to suppose that you think any Indiscernible Spirit proper to a Stone, or a Fox, or an Ass, moveth all the World: Therefore I must judge that to the Motion of all the Stones, Clods, &c. in the world, there is none but an Universal Mover. I confess I think (as Dr. Gilbert de Magn.) and many others, that the whole Tellus hath one Active Principle (which I plainly think is Fire;) and if he call it Anima Telluris, I leave him to his liberty. But I think there are subordinate particular Moving Principles besides the Universal?

Do you think that only the Anima Mundi animateth all Animals? I think you do not; else all Apparitions should be but by one Soul. Besides an Anima Universalis, there must be a particular (or singular) Soul in every Man, Beast, Bird, &c. There must be more than the Universal Soul, to make you write, speak, do better than others: And if so, how am I sure that nothing under the Universal Spirit moveth descendencia gravia? In motu projectorum (another instance of my Ignorance) there is sure some causality in Anima singulares projicientis. The Universal
versal Cause is ever one, but excludeth not subordinate Moving Causes. My old Friend Mr. Sam. Got (on Mosis Philos.) supposeth each Element to have its special Spirit: I am not so well skilled in such things, as to come to that certainty which others pretend to: I think to an equal common Motion an Universal Cause may suffice; but when Motions differ, I know not the different Causes so well as some think they do. How you answered Judge Hale of the Rundle in the Water, I know not: But you that think Fire in the Sun to be no Spirit but Matter, I am confident will never make me believe, that Fire and Sun are moved only by the Universal Mover, without any motive principle in themselves. Your Metaphys. c. 13. I have perused, and am past doubt of a Spiritual Moving Power: But two things I see not proved; 1. That there are not particular Moving Principles subordinate to the more Universal. 2. That the God of Nature hath not put into the passive Elements, a strong inclination of the parts to union with the whole, and to aggregative Motion when forcibly separated; which Inclination Dr. Glisson calleth their Essential Life; but I think is somewhat that deserveth not that name. I have not read

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your
your Vol. Philos. nor Adnotam. nor Answer to Judge Hale.

§ 2. Sect. 6. You say, This is to join the property of a Spirit to Matter. Ans. That's it that I doubt of, whether all Self-motion (under the Universal Mover) be proper to a Spirit, or only Vital Self-motion.

§ 3. Your Assurance of the Earth's Motion, assureth not me: I have seen a M. S. of your Antagonist's Judge Hale, that inclineth me to deny it; and nothing more than the Igneous nature of the Sun, to which Motion is natural, and the torpid nature of Earth; God making every thing fit for its use. But of this, as my judgment is of little value, so I profess Ignorance.

§ 4. That there is Activity in fixed Thoughts, I grant; for Thinking is Acting. But that there is as much Activity in the not-acting of a Rock, e.g. I deny.

§ 5. Again, you are at the Mischief of Leaving out your Penetrability, and Indiscernibility, and Immateriality; to which I have oft answered. And I now add, you make it an absurdity to name that as a Form, which is not proper to the thing: But Immateriality, Penetrability, or Indiscernibility in your own Judgment (I think) are none of them proper to Spirit. For
For they are common to divers Accidents in your account, viz. Light, Heat, Cold, &c. are all these.

Ad SECT. VII, VIII.

§ 1. You come to the main thing which I importuned you to bless the world with your explication of, viz. The true difference of Substance and Matter. And you say, It's obvious to any observing Eye. They differ as Genus and Species. Ans. I would I had an observing Eye. If by Matter you mean sensible Matter, such as Man can see, feel, or measure, &c. the difference indeed is obvious: My doubt is here; seeing you confess that *substantia accidentibus* is but a relative notion; (and it's commonly said that God hath no Accidents, and yet is a Substance: How true I say not,) and all your notice of it, besides Negatives is, that *Substantia est a Being subsisting by itself* and call this *a compleat Definition;* 1. How you can call that a compleat Definition of that which indeed is not definable, for want of a Genus: For you say Metaph. c. 2. that *Ens quatenus Ens non posse esse objectum Metaphysica cum tam gene-

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rall sit ut & Ordine & Natura & Doctrina res Physicas antecedat, &c. But this I think not at: Things not definable may be partly known. But 2. whereas it's grant-ed by you, that Substantia and Vita (or Virtus Activa) are two inadequate Conceptus of a Spirit, do you hold that the Conceptus of Substantiality hath any more in it of Real Entity, than the bare Conceptus of Virtus Activa (or Vitalis) alone? Or whether the meaning be, that as it is Res the Virtus Activa is its total Conceptus, and Substantia is but added to signifie that Res illa qua dicitur Vita vel Virtus Vitalis subsistit per se, & non in alio, id est, non est Accidens. If this be the meaning that the word Vís, or Virtus, speak all that is Res, and Substan- tia speak only its state, as being no Accident, but a Self-Being; this is intelligible, and it agreeeth with some mens thoughts of God himself. But this seemeth neither to be true (at least of Creatures) nor to be your sense. Not true; for a Created Virtus (vel Vita) qua non est alicujus Substantiae Virtus, vel ut Forma vel ut Accidens, seemeth above our reach to conceive. Though I know many call God Purus Actus, & the Schools mostly agree that Substantia is not univocally spoken of God and us, and deny it
to be properly said of God; and I can easily grant that God is utterly above all formal knowledge of ours; yet that Created Spirits should be a meer Virtus (or Potentia Activa, or Actus) seemeth hard to believe.

And many words intimate that it is not your Judgment, but that Substantiality signifieth not only the Modus of the Existence of the Actus Entitatius, or Virtus, but is the first half and fundamental Conceptus of a Spirit as Res, speaking halfly its Entity. In this I think we agree.

And now if this be so, this very Conceptus of Fundamental Reality, is but that same which Schibler, and abundance others call Materia Metaphysica, as different from Materia Physica; and which Dr. Crakenthorpe, & many others, take the general and most proper sense of Materia to contain. & therefore I say but, that you should not take an equivocal word for univocal, and lay so great a stress on an ambiguous name. And I confess still all your names of Indiscerptibility, Penetrability and Immateriality, give me no scientifical notion of the true difference between the lowest Substantiality of a Spirit, and the highest of Fire or Ether, or Aristotelis quinta Essentia (which you call Matter.) But I am fully
fully satisfied of an Incomprehensible Parity of Substance; 2. And of the true Form of a Soul; and I find myself to need no more.

§ 2. The Thomists take the Faculties of the Soul to be but Accidents (as Mr. Pemble de Orig. Formar. doth both the Souls of Brutes to be but Qualities of Matter) which I have elsewhere confuted: And these must needs think that the Notion of Substantiality is almost all of the Soul.

§ 3. You add out of your Ethicks, nullius rei intimam nudamq; essentiam cognosci posse, sed Attributa tantum essentialia, essentialisq; habitudines. We are not any way able to discover the very bare Essence or Substance of any thing.] Anf. Yet you say before, [What can be more plain? ] and [It's obvious to every observing Eye.] I confess I understand you not: I know no essence that is not intima: And if by nudam you mean accidentibus nudatam, we know no Substance so, because there is none such created: but we can abstract the Essence from the Accidents. And if we know not the nudam essentiam of any accident we know nothing. Essential Attributes, and Habitudes are hard words: If by the Attributes you mean the names or second signal notions, we know the Essence
of Letters, Names, Sentences; but by them ut per signa we know the things themselves, but scientia abstractiva non intuitiva. But this is true knowledge of the Essence signified. If by the Attributes you mean any Accidents signified by those Names, those are not essential Attributes. But if you mean the Essence signified you say and unsay. I am past doubt that we know the Essences of the immediate Objects of Sense, and also of our own Intellectual Acts. But how? There is scientia adequa and inadequa: I am past doubt that nil scitur scientia adequa, (but only inadequa): And so stricte, Res ipsa non scitur quia tota ejus Essentia non scitur; but aliquid rerum scitur; and this is true of the Essence itself. All our knowledge is partial and imperfect, a half Science, but it reacheth Essences.

Ad Sect. VIII.

§ 1. Whereas I think that only Usage must expound the difference between the sense of Substance and Matter, you deny it not, but still mis-suppose that use taketh Matter but in one sense,
sense, and never applieth it to spiritual Substance. All this de nomine is to little purpose, but I will recite some words of your own: Ench. Metaph. c.2. p.8,9,10. Essentia qua nihil alius est quam materia & forma simul sumpta--- Duo principia illa Entis interna & incomplexa quatenus ens est, esse Materiam & formam Logicam--- Et uniuscujusque rei quatenus ens est Essentia consistit ex Amplitudine & Differentia qua amplitudinem ab amplitudine discriminat. Nam quod res qualibet aliquatenus Ampla sit, ex eo patet, tum quod id voci materia valde consonum sit qua tanquam principium Entis quatenus Ens est consideratur; tum etiam quod nullam aliam ideam menti nostræ ea afferre potest prater hanc amplitudinem; Nec revera quicquam ab animis nostris con-
cipi omni amplitudine desitutum--- p. 10. Ex quibus omnibus tandem profinit pracla-
rum hoc consecutarium quod omne Ens qua-
tenus Ens est---Quantum, Quale--- Ens di-
citut respectu forma, legitimaq; conditionis 
materiæ.---Quod omne Ens sit Quantum, ex 
ilius Materiæ intelligitur--- Then you blame them qui imaginantur quadem Entia omni Materia carentia, etiam hæc Logica, omniq; ad materiam relatione.---p.12. Omnis substantia ex eo quod Ens sit, Materiæ quandam vel Amplitudinem in se includat. 

You
You see here how much more now you write against your self than me: I never said that Spirits are material, nor that every Substance hath some matter, as you do.

§ 2. But this is but Materia Logica. Ans. And those that I excuse do but call it Materia metaphysica: And what's the meaning of Materia Logica? If Logick or Grammar use second Notions, Names, and Signs, if they be not rebus aptata they are false. What is it now but the aptitude of the Name that we speak of?

Yea, you that make Spatium to be God, calling it Locus internus, really distinct from Bodies, yet say that you prove by Apodeictical Arguments, that it is tribus dimensionibus praditum: And no doubt God is a Spirit, so that you your self make a Spirit, even the Father of Spirits, to be Matter that hath Amplitude, Quantity, and the three dimensions; And yet write a Book against one as asserting Spirits to be matter, who never asserted it, unless the word Matter signifie but Substance: For I ascribe no more to it than your Amplitude, if so much. And yet I take the word Amplitude to signifie no form at all, no more than Quantity or Dimensions, or Indivisibility, or Penetrability, but to be
the Consistent Dispositio Substantiae.

And you once hit on that true notion of the Conditio materiae as a necessary Concep
tus Entis prater ipsam materiam & for
mam], Metaphyl. c. 2. p. 10. [Verum Ens
dicitur respectu forma, Legitimeq; Conditio
onis materiae: Neq; enim Galea ex tenui
Papyro fabricata & concinnata vera galea
est, sed potius ludicrum illius imitamentum.
And so elsewhere. Yet now you make the
Conditio Substantiae to be the Form.

§ 3. And when you make all Spirits to
be Souls, and to animate some matter, You
seem to make God to be but Anima Mun
di: And if so, he animateth it either as a
distinct compounding Substance, as we
say the Soul doth the Body, or else as the
forma rei simplicis which is but Conceptus
inadequatus, as Vitality is forma animae. If
in the first sense, you that say that ope
ration of the Soul proveth locality, and
ascribe Amplitude and Quantity to God,
and the three dimensions, do seem to
make him Intellectually though not actu
ally Divisible: That is, the Intellect may
conceive of God as partly in the Sun, and
partly on Earth, &c. or else you must ask
pardon of your opposed Holenmerians as
you name them, and say as they, that God
is totus in toto & totus in qualibet parte.
If in the 2d sense, then you make the matter only to be Substance, and God to be but the Form of that Substance (or as some dreams a Quality.) And then I confess your Notions of Indiscernible and Penetrable are very easily intelligible, as agreeing to the meer Form, (Vitality, Active-power, Wisdom, and Love.)

But how either of these notions will stand, either with God's Existence ut spatium infinitum, beyond all Matter, (which you sometime hint) or the Infiniteness of Matter, but with intermixt Vacuities, which (pag. 44. Metaph.) you seem to suppose to be communi natura voce confirmatum) I know not: For then the vacuum is Deus extra materiam, and so all Spirit is not in matter. I think that all matter and Spirit is in God; and that he is much more than Anima Mundi & omnium animarum.

Ad SECT. IX.

§ 1. To your Indiscernibility I further say, I distinguish, 1. Between Actual and Intellectual dividing; 2. Between what God can do, and what a Creature can
can do, and 3. Between the Father of Spirits and created Spirits: And so I say, 1. That if you had spoken of the meer *Vir-

tus Vitalis* of a Spirit, I think it is a con- tradiction to say that it is Discernible or impenetrable; But seeing you ascribe Am-
plitude, Quantity, and Dimensions, and Logical Materiality to the Substantiality of Spirits, I see not but that you make them Intellectually divisible; that is, that one may think of one part as here and anoth-er there. 2. And if so, though man can-not separate or divide them, if it be no contradiction God can. Various Elements vary in divisibility: Earth is most divisi-
ble: Water more hardly, the parts more inclining to the closest contact: Air yet more hardly: And if as you think the Sub-
stance of Fire be material, no doubt the Discernibility is yet harder. And if God have made a Creature so strongly inclin’d to the Unity of all the parts, that no other Cre-
ture can separate them but God only, as if a Soul were such; it’s plain that such a Being need not fear a Dissolution by separation of parts: For its own Nature hath no ten-
dency to it, but to the contrary, and no fellow Creature hath power to do it, and God will not do it. God maketh all things apt for their use, and useth things as he hath
hath made them, He made not Marble and Sand alike, nor useth them alike. And if he should make a Spirit (e. g. an *Animal* Vorticus, Solis, Stella, &c.) Such as he only can divide, but hath no natural tendency to division, but so much indiscernibility as no Creature can overcome, this (besides Scripture) intimateth God's purpose about it.

3. But doubtless God and Creatures are both called Spirits equivocally or analogically and not univocally: And it is the vilest Contradiction to say that God is capable of Division: But whether it be so with created Spirits I know not: They have passivity and God hath none. It's no great Wisdom to confess one's Ignorance; But not to confess it is very great folly.

I am scarce of your mind, that a man may be in the like puzzle in another World as he was in this, if he methodize not his Thoughts aright. But if it be so, you are best think again.

§ 2. For Penetrability you say, that one Spirit may have a greater Amplitude than another, and that the parts, as I may so call them, of the same Spirit, may in the Contraction of itself penetrate one another, so that there may be a Reduplication of Essence through the whole Spirit. Ans. You temper
tempt me to doubt lest you talk so much against materiality of Spirits to hide the name of your own Opinion, for that which others call materiality. If Spirits have parts which may be extended and contracted, you'll hardly so easily prove as say, that God cannot divide them. And when in your Writings shall I find satisfaction, into how much space one Spirit may be extended, and into how little it may be contracted? And whether the whole Spirit of the World may be contracted into a Nut-shell, or a Box, and the Spirit of a Flea may be extended to the Convexe of all the World.

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Ad SECT. X.

§ 1. I said, [We grant that Spirits have a Quantitas discreta; they are numerous, individuate, and Formæ se multiplicant: Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell, that that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter.] You say, [This passage is worth our attentive consideration. And 1. You hence infer Amplitude]
atitude and Dimension of Spirits. Ans. I meddle not for you, not against you: What's this to me?

§ 2. You ask what are the *Forme que se multiplicat*? Ans. Sensitive and Rational as well as Vegetative Spirits: You say, That must be *Creation*, or *Self-division*. Ans. No; it is but *Generation*. And in Append. to the Real. of Christian Religion, I have partly shewed that Generation is from God as the Prime Cause, and yet the Parents Souls as a Second Cause, so that somewhat of a sort of Creation and Traduction concur: which having further opened in *Method. Theol.* I here pretermit.

§ 3. But to my Question, Why God cannot make two of one, or one of two, you put me off with this lean Answer, that we be not bound to puzzle our selves about it. Ans. I think that Answer might serve to much of your Philosophical Disputes. But if you will puzzle us with a naked Assertion of Indiscernibility, we must ask your proof of it; why God cannot divide and unite extended ample Quantitative Spirits? and if he can, how you know that he doth not? or that Indivisibility is the Form of a Spirit; when as if Water be divided into drops, every drop is Water still.

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§ 1. In your further thoughts of this Sect. ii. you do first mis-suppose that my Question intimatest such a Divisibility of Souls, as of terrene Bodies into Atoms, or a contrary Union. Terrene Atoms have the most imperfect Union. All the Sands on the shoar are not only divisible, but partly divided: I cannot say, that all the parts of the Air are so; much less of the Fire. There is a far closer Union of all the Substance of that Lucid Cal'esactive Element, than of Earth, Water, or Air.

§ 2. And here I must insert, that after long thoughts, I doubt not but all things Created are truly one, and truly many: No one particle of the Universe is independent on the rest: Parts they are; as every part of a Clock or Watch: Every Leaf, and Grape, and Apple on the Tree hath a certain individuate or numerical Being, and yet every one is a part of the Tree: And every Herb and Tree is a part of the Garden or Orchard, and that a part of England, &c. and all a part of the Earth in which they grow; and no doubt the Earth
Earth is as dependant on other parts of the Universe; and all on God. We dream of no total separation of any Creature from the rest, much less Spirits.

But all the Illuminated Air, is more one lamma teruis (though compound of Air and Fire, and called by us Light) than the Sands are one Earth: And I doubt not but that Fire, which is the Motive, Illuminative, and Calefsive Substance, in all the Air, and elsewhere, is yet much less divisible than the Air, and Souls than it: So that should God make many into one, they would be many Individuals no more, but one again Divisible by God himself.

§ 3. And you mis-suppose me to suppose that the whole Substance of all Humane Souls, are but the same which once in Adam was but one, and from him divided. Writing is a tedious work, because it hardly causeth men to understand us. I suppose that a continued Creative Emanation from the Father of Spirits, giveth out all that Spiritual Substantiality which becometh new Souls; but that God hath ordained that the Generating Souls shall first receive this Divine Emanation, and be organical in communicating it to the Semen, and so to new organical Bodies; not that the Parents Souls only dispose
the seminal recipient Matter, but are themselves partly receptive, and then active in the communication: It will be a defective similitude if I say, as a Burning-glass by a receptive contraction of the Sun Beams, is instrumental in kindling combustible matter: Rather as one Candle kindleth a thousand, and yet the substance of the Lucid and Calid Being, is communicated from the Ignite Air by the means o that one Candle. (For that it is only Motus a Motu, I believe not.)

That you have drawn me thus effutir quae circa generationem, opinor, must help you to be patient with my tediousness. And the rather, because to avoid offending you, I will now pass by any further Answer to your Queries, Wheth: Adam's Soul was a Legion? which else was Adam's Soul? How come they to be Male and Female? was that number of Souls expanded or contracted? what a change by Venery? what becomes of the many Souls in the Chaf? and the rest. I would not by a particular Answer disgrace your Questions, or the jocular urgent amplifications. No doubt Lights are too low Illustrations; but the highest within the reach of sense. There was not a Legion o Candles in that which lighted a Legion no
or need I tell you which of the lighted candles was that which lighted it; nor why lighting more consumed not the first; nor why it kindled a Wax-Candle, and a Tallow-Candle, &c. I knew not till now that you thought souls differed in sex, because the persons do. But I will not strive against your conceit. The soul of a male and female I better understand, than a male and female soul.

§ 4. But you tell me; I must consider the nature of light thoroughly, and I shall find it nothing, but a certain motion of a medium, whose particles are so or so qualified, some such way as cartesianism drives at: But here's not substances but motion communicated, &c.

Ans. I had as willingly have heard cartesius tell me any dream else that ever came into his brain: For this I greatly despise: And wonder not that any man is ignorant of the nature of spirits, who is so grossly ignorant of the igneous analogical nature as he was. I have said so much in divers books against it, that I will not here in transtu any further touch so noble a subject, than to tell you that if you have studied the old stoicks, platonists, &c. and patricius, telefius, campanella, lud, le grand, &c. as much as cartesius,

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I pity you for believing him. I doubt not the Substance of Fire hath a *Virtus motiva*, as well as *illuminativa* & *cale-suddita*: And consequently that *Light* and *Heat* are neither of them without *Motion*: But that they are a triple operation of the *Una-trina forma ignea*, I am past doubt: (after as hard study as you can advise me to.) But your terms [certain motion] and an (unnamed) *Medium*, and *particles so and so qualified*, and some way, &c. are not notifying terms to me.

That *Lumen* is *ipse motus* methinks a man of half *Cartesius's Age* should never dream: That it's an *effect of Motion* many say, and think it so, as much as *Intellecation* is an *effect of mental-Vitality*, and *Volition* of *Intellecation*. But (to lay no stress on Sir *Ken. Digby's Arguments*) I make no doubt *Ignis lucens* is as truly a *Substance* as a Spirit is. If Light be an *Act* or *Quality* it hath some immediate *Agent or Subject*: It doth not exist separated from them. It is in *the Air* but as the *Recipient*, as it is in the *Oil* of the *Candle*. The *Air* shineth not of itself (as the *Night* informeth us.) It is therefore a *Substance* that moveth and *illuminateth* the *Air*: And if *Cartes* will call that *Substance Globuli atheorci*, or *materialis subtilis*, I need not a game
a game at such toyish words: As Motus causeth Sensation, and Intellec
tion, which yet by mere motion would never have been caused, without the conjunct Acts of the Sensitive and Intellective Faculties as such, so is it of Light. Really when I read how far you have escaped the delu-
sions of Cartesianism, I am sorry that you yet stick in so gross a part of it as this is; when he that knoweth no more than mo-
tion in the Nature of Fire, which is the active Principle by which mental and sen-
sitive Nature operateth on Man, and Bruits, and Vegetables, and all the pas-
sive Elements, (if it be not ipsa formatae
danis) and all the visible actions in this lower World are performed, what can that mans Philosophy be worth? I there-
fore return your Counsel, study more throughly the Nature of Æthereal Fire.

I find cause to imagine (by your Writ-
tings) that you are (as Mr. Glanville) for the pre-existence of Souls before Gen-
eration. And when do you think they were all made? And what Bodies did all the Souls that have ever since been in the Worldanimate, when there was no human Body but Adam's and Eve's? Can you conje-
cture what Animal's they were before they were men's? If you on the one ex-

tream
stream (thinking that God made as many Souls, yea Animals the first week, as ever are in Being to the end of the World) and the Averrhoists on the other extream (who think all Souls are but one individualized by receptive Matter, as one Sun lighteth many Candles by a Burning-Glass, and all return as Candles put out, into one again) were to dispute it out by mere Philosophy (without the Experience of apparitions,) I know not which would get the better.

Ad Sect. XII, XIII.

The 12. Section being all mere fiction needs no further Answer.

§ 1. It seems you call that the [excited Spirit of Nature,] lighting every Candle which other men call Fire: And so you will number Fire with Spirits.

§ 2. Your 13. Section is strange. You say Penetrability and indivisibility are not accidents at all, no more than Rationale of a man. Ans. Animarationalis is forma hominis in the strict proper sense of Forma as an Active Principle. Indivisible is a Negative, and it and Penetrable are the consistency or mode of the Substance
France (or, as you call it, Matter:) As Amplitude, Quantity, Spiplitude, Dimensions, Locality are by you said to be, which are called Forms in another sense, as the passive Elements differ from each other. But the Principium Activum being the true and only Form of a Spirit, these modalities and Consistencies are but conditio materiae, as you call it, or Substantiae as I call it, as to the Form. Yet that Dispositio materiae is Essential I have asserted.

§ 3. And yet though all along I deny not your two words to be the conditio omnium Substantiae spiritualis (joined with more) I still tell you that difficulties make me not lay so much on them as you do. To add one more, As I told you Quality is penetrable; as well as Spirit, e. g. heat, so yet though we commonly say, it is indivisible, I wish you would solve this Objection: You prove the locality of Spirits by their operation on this or that Body, (And doubtless you may well prove that the Recipient body is in loco, and consequently the Agent relatively.) But how shall we avoid the division of Qualities or Spirits ex divisione materiae subjective. E.g. If a red hot Iron be penetrated by the heat, yet if this Iron be cut in two, while hot, and each part set (per potentiam supéri-
periorem) at 20 Miles distance. is not the heat divided with the Iron? So if a mans Head be struck off, and (by such a quick mover as you think moveth the Earth) the Head in a moment were carried far off, while both parts of the Body are yet alive, is not the Soul in each part? And if the Parts were 20 or 100 Miles a sunder, is it still one undivided Soul?

- I can say somwhat to satisfie my self of this; but hardly without crossing somwhat that you say.

§ 4. Again when my chief dissent from you is more against your Confidence than your Verity, yet you again tell us, that we know not bare Essences, but Essential Attributes. I tell you I take not these to be notifying Expressions: We know some Essences either intuitively (as Ockam faith) or without signs, immediately, e.g. what it is to see, taste, hear, smell, &c. and what to understand and will. And we know other Essences Scientia abstraction per signa. And what good would the knowledge of Attributes else do us. Attributes in notionem prima are the thing itself: And to know an Essentia Attribute, and to know ipsam Essentiam Scientia inadeguata is all one. But an Essentia Attribute as notionem secunda, is but signum per quod res significata.
ficata cognoscenda est; And this is knowing the Essence too, but scientia abstracti-
vâ: And all is scientia valde imperfecta.

§ 5. You say, that Neither the faculty nor Operation of Reasoning is the Essence, and consequently not rationale.

Ans. Things of so great Moment should not not be obtruded on the World with a bare ipse dico. The Act of Intellection or Reasoning is but the Essence in hoc modo: but the Faculty is the Essential Form of the Soul. When you have confuted the Scotists, and my peculiar Disput. in Meth. Theol. where I think I fully disprove what you say, I may hear you further.

Ad SECT. XIV, XV, XVI.

Here you would first know, How I know that the Vitalitas formalis belongs not to Matter, unless I have an Antecedent notion of Spirit distinct from Matter. Ans. 1. I consent not to Dr. Glisson, who thought all Matter had a Vital Form. But I undertake not to prove that God cannot endow any Matter with a Vital Form. And forma denominat; where I find the Form of a Spirit I'lle call it Spirit.

2. Dr.
2. Dr. Henry Moore in his *Metaph.* would ask me, how I know that a Helmet may not be made of Paper; and he and I would agree that Paper is not *materia disposita,* and yet we would not call it *Galea formam.*

§ 2. Your denial of Substantiality to be *ex traduce,* I answered before; telling you that I think it is both *ex emanatione creativa,* & *ex traduce,* but not by either alone; nor all Souls that ever will be, created in Indiscernible Individuality at once, and transmuted from Body to Body.

§ 3. When I say, the *Negative Immaterial* notifieth not the form, you say that *Immaterial implieth Positiveness.* And therefore give us the positive notion, or you give us no definition, nor any notifying word.

§ 4. When you say, *You believe it is not easie to give an Example that materia is put in lieu of substantia in that adequate sense.*] What abundance of Authors could I name you, yea, have I oft named, besides Dr. Crakenthorp?

§ 5. When you say, *All created Substance is both Active and Passive in some sense or other.*] It's but to say, all words are ambiguous. So all created Substance is matter in some sense or other. But one would have thought by your oft repeated
ed denial of the self-moving Power of Matter, that you had thought only Spirits have a self moving power. And if so, will you yet say, that [this is a distinction which distinguishes nothing?] I think thus, Natura activa as meet a name as Spiritus. And that yet it hath some Passivity, Damascene, yea, and Augustine, de Spir. & Anim. c. 8. say that is because the Soul [respectu incorporei Dei corpora est.] though in respect to our Bodies it is Incorporeal: Other Fathers say much more, but I justify not their words.

§ 6. Ad 15. Se&. I pretend not to have such an Idea of Spiritual Substance, as to denominate its consistence more fitly than by Purity, a word which you also use, yet not denying your several Attributes.

§ 7. As to your Doctrine of Atomes, I think no wise man dare say that God made matter first in divided Atomes, and after set them together. But that God is able to divide all matter into Atomes or indivisible parts I doubt not. The Virtus Formalis of Spirits (and so some qualities) consist not of Atomes: But how far God can divide the ample Substance of them, I only tell you, that I know not; and to pretend to know it would be none of my Wisdom. Your Attributes of amplitude, quantity,
dimensions, imply that God made some Spirits bigger in amplitude than others, as well as Virtutis fortioris. You think I suppose that which you call the Spirit of the World, or Nature, bigger in amplitude than the Spirit of a Wren:

§ 8. *Ad Sett.* 16. You that say, Spirits have Extension and Spissitude, say that spissitude signifieth more substance in less compass. And these Phrases sound liker to Corporeity than any that I have used: More substance and less substance, spissitude by Contraction signifie much change, and signifie that which the Intellect may distinguish into partes extra partes, though undivided which would increase a man's doubt, whether God be not able to make a bigger Spirit less, and a less bigger, and to separate the parts that are so distinguishable in amplitude, and to make one into two, or two into one.

§ 9. Whether *Æther* or Fire be material, methinks you should be as uncertain at least as I. For you say Light is but motus, of somewhat exciting the Spirit of the World. If it be the Spirit of the world that is the nearest cause of Illumination by way of Natural activity, than that which you call the Spirit of the World, I call Fire; and so we differ but de nomine. But I have
I have oft profeft my Ignorance whether Fire, and the Vegetative Nature be all one, (which I encline to think) or whether Fire be a middle active Nature between the Spiritual and the meer passive, by which Spirits work on Bodies. I think I shall quickly know all this better than you do.

Ad Sect. XVII, XVIII, XIX.

§ 1. Of your Doctrine of Atomes I spake before: I have no mind to examine the weight of your Reasons publickly.

§ 2. I thought you that so extol the Atomists Doctrine, would have deigned to read at least some of the Leaders of the various Sects: And my undervaluing them is no excuse to you: for as you knew not my judgment, so I suppose you do not much esteem it. That which I blame them for, is, that Lud. le Grand over-magnifieth Fire, Telesius and Campanella over-magnifie Heat, Patricius over-magnifieth Light, as Cartesius doth Motion: But if the one Principle of Motion, Light, and Heat, had been better handled as one, (as it is) it had been founder.

§ 3. I
§ 3. I need not your hydrostatical experiment of the rising Rundle to convince me of the Motion of the matter of the World by a spiritual power: I doubt as little of Spirits as of Bodies: But I understand not what greater wonder there is in the rising of your Rundle, than in the rising of a piece of Timber from the bottom of the Sea; or that the heaviest body should sink lowest if it have way. Whether Water consist of oblong flexible Bodies, I am not much regardful to know: Each of those oblong ones are divisible into Atomes.

§ 4. But as to what hence you infer of Fire, I make no doubt but the Flames and the red hot Iron are compound things; and that the oily or sulphureous matter moved and heated, is the Substance which we see. But I believe not that bare motion as motion, were it never so swift, would cause this: But that these effects are caused in the capable matter by the special action of a permeant Substance in itself invisible as Substance, whose form is the Active Virtue of moving, illuminating, and heating, and so is sensible only in this triple Effect. And if you call this a Spirit I leave you to your Liberty.
Ad Sect. XX. XXI.

S 1. The seven Propositions which you find in my words I own, save that the fourth should be thus formed [That the Substantia disposicio in fire distinct from the form beareth some such Analogy to a Spirit (if it be not one, viz. Vegetative) that may somewhat serve us to conceive of it thereby, and they that from this Analogy, call it Ignis non formaliter sed eminenter, are excusable; though it can be no strict proper name that cometh not a forma.

§ 2. Ad sect. 21. But you ask [Whether by Active power I mean a power alwaies exerting itself into act, so that this fire is alwaies moving, enlightning, and hot formaliter, else why should it be called Ignis?]

Ans. Answer your self, when you speak of a power of Sensation, and Intellecction and Volition in a Soul, do you mean a power alwaies exerting itself into sensa-tion, Intellecction and Volition, else why is it called a Soul. ] Ans. 2. I mean a power which hath alwaies an inclination to Act; & hath its own secret immanent act, & al-waies acts ad extra, when it hath fit re-
cipient objects. As to your oft mentioned Confutation of Judge Hale, having not read it, I am no Judge of your performance.

You Question what is this new igneous substance never heard of before] while in all Ages it hath been so famous a controversy; when not only the Stoicks but most old Philosophers gave to it so much more than meet; when Lud. Le Grand, would make us believe that it was almost the only God of all the Heathen World, under various names, and while so many new Sects have written so many volumes of it, who would have believed that even Dr. Henry More had never heard of it before?

To your question, Is it material or immaterial?] I still answer, material is a word of larger or narrower sense, ambiguous: I know that it hath the aforesaid Actions: And by them I know that it hath the Power so to act: and by both I know it is a substance capable of such power & Acts: And I know that the substance is invisible in se, but seen in its Effects. And my brain is too dark to be confident of more: Let him that knoweth more boast of it.

§ 3. You say [A material Fire distinct from the flame of a Candle, or Fire-stick, or red hot Iron, there is no more ground for, than
than material Water distinct from Wells, Rivers, Seas, &c.

Ans. Do you not take Cartesius materia subtilis, if not globuli ætherei, to be invisible, & not always appearing in Candles or Fire-sticks? If a Soul may be a sensitive and intellectual Substance, and yet not be always feeling or understanding, why may there not be Fire where it thineth not. It seemeth you take not the illuminated Air to be Ignite, because it is not a Candle or Fire-stick: I doubt not but Fire is a Substance permeant and existent in all mixt Bodies on Earth; & in ipsa telure; in Minerals; in your Blood it is the prime part of that called the Spirits, which are nothing but the Igneous Principle in a pure aerial Vehicle, and is the Organ of the Sensitive Faculties of the Soul: And if the Soul carry away any Vehicle with it, it's like to be some of this. I doubt you take the same thing to be the Spirit of the world, while you seem to vilifie it.

§ 4. It's strange when I tell you that I conceive of a Spirit but as Ignis eminenter, and not formaliter, that you should still ask whether I take it not for Ignis formaliter? I have often said, that I think Substances differ so gradually, that the lower hath still some Analogy to the higher.
And I still say that Natura Mentalis, & Sensitiva are not Ignis formaliter; But whether the Natura Vegetativa be any other than ipse ignis I know not; but think it is no other. Do you that better know its consistence call it Spirit or not as you please.

Ad Sect. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

§ 1. You puzzle me more and more: Before you said, Fire is nothing but motion of sulphureous particles, and only in Candles, Fire-sticks, hot Irons, &c. And yet now [The vehicles of Angels are Ignous or aethereal.] Is an Angel only in a Candle or hot Iron, &c. Is motion, yea motion of sulphureous particles their vehicle? If they are Animals, and have bodies, as you think, they are such as deserve a nobler Character.

§ 2. I tell you still, the Greek Fathers, I think, as well as I, call'd mental and sensitive Spirits, Ignis, but Analogically, which you call Symbolically: If that satisfy you, what have you all this while disputed against? And if Fire be the vehicle of Angels it is a substance. And when you see the Motion, Light, and feel the heat, do  — you
you think, what ever is the Recipient moved Matter, that the invisible Mover is not present and contiguous? It is that immediate mover which I call Fire, and am fully satisfied doth it not by Motion only, but the exerting of its triple Virtue.

§ 3. You confess, Sect. 24. the common use of the name of Fire applied to Souls by the old Philosophers: and still you say it was but Symbolically: and did they find no Reason to make Fire a Symbol rather than Earth or Water. When I still tell you that it is only analogically that Souls may be called Fire, did you fairly to pretend the contrary?

§ 4. Yea Sect. 25. You are at it again, saying that [I seem to conceive the Fathers to speak not Symbolically, but properly.]

Ans. where and when did I say any such thing? will you tell the world that a Man holds that which he never said, and hath oft written against, and write a Book against him on such a supposition, and at last have nothing to say but Prota-rem? I use not the words Symbolical and Proper; they are not precise enough for this subject: I said more when I said that Souls and Angels are called fire, only eminenter & analogice, but not formaliter: and forma dat nomen.

But
But you are offended that I say those Greek Fathers spake tolerably and informingly, and you say, It was mischievously, inducing men to believe the Soul mortal. For Light may be blown out, and hot Iron cooled. Ans. Alas! What dry Philosophy is this of Fire? Is any thing annihilated when the Candle goeth out? Was there not an invisible active principle moving your supposed sulphureous particles, which was as immediate an Agent as your Soul is of Sensation or Intellection: which remaineth the same? But indeed it is Air and not Sulphur which is the first and nearest Recipient of the illuminating Act, and is Conjunx Ignis, I suppose you'll say, The Spirit of the World doth this. Ans. Call it by what name you will, it is a pure active Substance, whose form is the Virtus motiva, illuminativa & calefactiva; I think the same which when it operateth on due seminal matter is Vegetative. But the World hath Spiritual Natures more noble than this; viz. sensitive and intellectual.

§ 5. Ad Sept. 26. You say against the Fathers, [When we enquire into the distinct Nature of things we must bid adieu to Metaphors.] Ans. When I am ignorant of my own Ignorance, I will hear you, I am far from dreaming that I have one formal Conception
Conception of God, but only Analogical: Only that of *Ens* is disputed between the Thomists and Scotists, whether it be Univocal *de Deo & Creaturis*. And here *Analogical* is but *Metaphorical*: And yet it is not *nothing* to see as in a Glass & enigmatically. And when I can perceive that your two hard words do not only signify more than negatively and modally, or qualitatively, but also give us an *idea* of a Spirit which hath *nothing* *Metaphorical*, but all *formal*, I shall magnifie them more than I do.

§ 6. You say we must search out the *adequate definition*.] *Ans.* That [*adequate*] is a word too big for me: I dare say that you have not an adequate knowledge of any thing in the World; not of one Fly or Flea or Pile of Grass: And can you make adequate Definitions of Angels and all Spirits? Even who before twice told us that we know not the intimate essence of things, but the Attributes? Indeed I perceive your Attributes are such as will not notify Essences. I ask my own experience whether *Indiscernible* is a word that giveth any *idea* of the Essence, save negative (that it cannot be torn into pieces) and modal? and I find no other that it maketh on my Mind.
The common note of Matter is, that it hath *partes extra partes*: and I think you thus make Spirits material. You make them parts of the compound Animal: and you deny them to be *toti in toto*; and you give them locality, & amplitude, & quantity. And if so, though they be indiscernible, they have continued parts intelligible; and that part of the Soul is not in one hand which is in the other: and as *partes Animalis* they are actually separable from the matter. The *Spiritus Mundi* you suppose to be a great continued amplitude or extended Substance. And Atomes are in some Elements a closely continued Substance. You seem to make all Substance to be Atomes, spiritual atomes and material atomes. And I am not sure that God cannot make material atomes so continued a matter as that no Creature can discern them: is it any contradiction? and I doubt not but Souls and Angels are so indivisible, as that their Nature tendeth to continued, undivided Unity, and no Creature can divide them. But that God cannot do it I cannot say.

Even of the Souls Mortality not only *Arnobius*, but many other Christian Writers maintain, that it is mortal natura, but immortal *ex dono*; which is unfairly spoken
spoken but well meant: that is, God hath made their Natures such as have no tendency in themselves to a Dissolution or Destruction, but not such as he cannot dissolve or destroy; Yea I doubt not but without a continued Divine Sustentation, all the World would in a moment be annihilated; Preservation being a continued sort of Creation. Your owning nothing in Fire but what's visible, I have spoke to:

Ad Sect. XXVIII.

§ 1. That Spirits are each Ens unum per se, so as to have no divided parts, or such as tend to dissolution I doubt not: that they are each one by the continued uniting Influx of that God who continueth their Being, and so far per alium, is past doubt. You here make Metaphysical Monades absurd and ridiculous. But is not that a Monad and Atome which is one and indivisible? though it be not minimum: and if your Penetrability imply not that all the singular Spirits can contract themselves into a punctum; yea, that all the Spirit of the World may be so contracted, I find it not yet sufficiently explained: For you never
tell us into how little parts only it may be contracted: And if you put any limits I will suppose that one Spirit hath contracted itself into the least compass possible; and then I ask, cannot another and another Spirit be in the same compass by their Penetration; If not, Spirits may have a contracted Spirititude which is not penetrable, and Spirits cannot penetrate contracted Spirits, but only dilated ones. If yea, then quo vadis whether all created Spirits may not be so contracted.

And I should hope that your Definition of Spirit excludeth not God; and yet that you do not think that his Essence may be contracted and dilated. O that we knew how little we know!

And as to your rejection of Metaphors I say, the very name Spiritus which you use is a Metaphor: the first sense being our Breath à spirando, or the Air or Wind: Martinus nameth no fewer than Fifteen senses of it, and Wisdom itself said, 1 Cor. 15. There is a natural Body, and there is a spiritual Body.

§ 2. You add, [If you will say, that if he should create such a Spirit with metaphysical Amplitude, which though so large himself cannot divide, and sever into parts, he would thereby puzzle his own Omnipoten-
cy, at this rate he shall be allowed to create nothing, no not so much as matter, nor himself indeed to be.

Ans. I had rather tremble at this than boldly answer it. Whatever is a contradiction cannot be; and it is not for want of power that God cannot do it: It is no work of power: Had you proved it a Contradiction for God, to make two Spirits of one, or one of two, you had done that part in an easier way, which I should not gainsay. But this Speech of yours is as if you said, [He denieth God to be the Creator, or to be God, who saith that God is able to divide an Ample Spiritual Substance; that is, who saith, that this is no contradiction, and that God is Almighty: when our Creed saith, that God is the Father Almighty, maker of Heaven and Earth. Cannot he alter or annihilate his own works: Before he made the World, he could have made the ample Substance of the Spirit of the World into many Spirits: And is he less able so to change it? If Spirits be unified as the Bodies which they animate, cannot God make many Bodies into one? Cannot he make many Stars into one? And then would that one have many unifying Spirits, or but one? It's a thing so high as required some shew of proof, to intimate that
that God cannot be God, if he be Almighty, and cannot conquer his own Omnipotency.

§ 3. Your words like an intended Reason are [For that cannot be God, from whom all other things are not produced & created.]

Ans. 1. Relatively (as a God to us) it's true; though quoad existentiam Essentiae he was God before the Creation. 2. But did you take this for any shew of a proof? The sense implied is this, [All things are not produced and created by God, if a spiritual ample Substance be divisible by his Omnipotency that made it: Yea, then he is not God. Negatur Consequentia.

Ad SECT. XXIX, XXX, XXXI.

§ 1. You say your definition is more informing than defining a Spirit by Fire, viz. [a Spirit is an immaterial substance induced with Life, and the faculty of Motion] and virtually containing in it Penetrability, and Indiscernibility] Ans. I. Your definition is common, good and true, allowing for its little imperfections, and the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits. The same things need not be so very oft repeated in answer to you:
you: but briefly I say; if by *Immaterial* you mean not [*without substance*] it signifieth truth: but a negation speaketh not a formal essence. 2. *Spirit* is itself but a Metaphor. 3. *Intrinsic*, *indued with Life, tells us not that it is the form: Qualities and proper accidents are intrinsic*. 4. The [*faculty of motion*] is either a tautology included in *life*, or else if explication of *life*, it is defective; or if it distribute Spirits into two sorts, *vital* and *motive*, it should not be in the common definition. 5. No Man can understand that the negative [*Immaterial*] by the terms, includeth Penetrability and Indiscerpibility. 6. You do not say here that they are the form, but elsewhere you do: and the form should be express'd, and not only *virtually contained* as you speak. 7. They are not the form, but the *Dispositio vel conditionem* formam. 8. If such modalities or *constitence* were the *form*, more such should be added which are left out. 9. Penetrability and Indiscerpibility are two notions, and you should not give us a compound form. 10. Yea you compound them with a quite different notion, [*Life and the faculty of motion:*] which is truly the form, and is one thing, and not compounded of notions so different, as *constitence* and *Vir-
You say Life intrinsically issues from this immaterial substance: But the form is concreated with it, and issues not from it.

You mean well: It is informing truth which you intend, and offer to the world. And we are all greatly beholden to you for so industrious calling foolish sensualists to the study and notion of invisible beings, without which what a Carkass or nothing were the world. But all our conceptions here must have their allowances, and we must confess their weakness.

And you might have informed us of all that you know, without fathering opinions on others, which they never owned, and then nicknaming them from your own fiction: As if we said that Souls are fire, and also took fire as you do for Candles, and hot Irons, &c. only.

§ 2. Now I that pretend not to a perfect definition repeat that which is the nearest to it that I understand.

And first I am for agreeing on the sense of words before we use them in definitions.

1. I take not the word [Spirit] to be of univocal signification here, but so analogical as to be equivocal. God and Creatures are not univocally called [Spirits.]
2. I know not (and I think no other) that all Created Spirits in the universe are so far of one substantial consistence as that the word [Spirit] univocally fits them all, as a Genus among the 15 senses of the word before-said mentioned by Martininus; when we confine it to one, men are apt to boggle at the ambiguity: yet when we have defined it, the name is to be used.

3. Materia is as ambiguous as Spiritus; and is oft used for Res or Substantia, which is fundamental to modes and qualities and active forms: and oft for substance of such a consistence as is sensible (to the highest senses) and as a mind in the flesh can have an idea of in its consistence; and if you will, such as you call Impenetrable and Discernible.

4. The word [substance] itself, if used only to signify, either Quoddity and not Quiddity; (as Ens for Quod est, and not Quid est, and subsistit for aliquid subsistit, not telling what) or relatively only for Quod substant accidetibus; or negatively for Quod non est accidens; sed aliquid subsistens in se, and include not the notion of Res fundamentalis, is not fit here to be used as a Genus; but in this sense it is.

5. Forma being oft taken for substantiae figura, and oft for the contexture of cor-
corporeal parts making it receptive of Motion, and oft for the union of the moving and the moved parts, and oft for the moving principle in a compound, and oft for the Motive or Active Virtue in a simple substance, but ever strictly for the specific constitutive cause, *per quam res est id quod est*; I take it to be but improperly and equivocally applied to the mere Receptive consistence presupposed to the form.

These things supposed, I presume not to give a definition of God, but such a description as we can reach.

Supposing the word [*Nature*] to signify in general [*Quoddity and Quiddity*] I first distinguish [*Nature*] into Active and Passive: By Active I mean that Nature which hath a formal Power, Virtue, and Inclination to Activity. By Passive I mean that Nature which having no such Active form, is formed to receive the Influx of the Active.

I refuse not to call the first Spirit: but because they so greatly differ, I choose rather the common name of *Active Nature*; being not metaphorical.

2. I suppose there is no such thing as *Spirit* (or *Active Nature*) which is not some species of *Spirit*: Therefore I give no definition of [*Spirit*] or *Active Nature*
Nature in general, for where there is no form and no species there is no proper definition. And all Spirit being actually Mental, Sensitive or Vegetative, and everything having but one univocal form, I name no form but of each species, but as in compounds, so in simples we mentally distinguish the materia (vel substantia) Dispositio & forma.

Therefore defining only the species, I define Naturam Mentalem to be [substantia Purissima Virtuosisima, Virtute scilicet. Formali Vitaliter-Aetiva, Intellectiva, Volitiva (una-trina:) I define Naturam Ani- malem seu sensitivam, to be [substantia Prior Virtuosiior, scilicet, virtute Vitali-Aetiva sensitiva, Perceptiva-sensitiva, Appeti- tiva-sensitiva.

I have told you oft enough why I say Purissima, including as much of your [Immaterial, Penetrable, Indiscernible] and more, as is really the substantia dispositio; and if you will call it as some do forma dispositiva, I quarrel not: But I use [Purissima] 1. to avoid many words, and 2. To avoid pretending to more distinct conceptions of spiritual consistencies than I find any idea of in my mind.

I use but the Comparative degree of
[Purior and Virtuosior] to sensitives, not being sure that there is not a gradual difference in both consistency and virtue in these species of Spirits.

I define the Vegetative Nature, supposing it to be ipse Ignis, to be [substantia Pura, Virtuosa, scilicet Virtute formalis Activa, Illuminativa, Caloractiva; by which prime operations it causeth Vegetation, & thereby in plants, Discretionem, Attractionem, Digestionem, &c. by an Analogous perception, appetite and motion. But these actions belong to compounds; And I still profess myself in this also uncertain, whether Natura Vegetativa and Ignea be all one: or whether Ignis be Natura organica by which the three superior operate on the Passive. But I incline most to think that they are all one; when I see what a Glorious Fire the Sun is, and what operation it hath on Earth, and how unlikely it is that so glorious a substance, should not have as noble a formal Nature as a plant. And I take all the superior Virtues to be the inferior, eminenter, and the inferior to have analogy to the superior.

Your frequent repetitions draw me to this repetition. If we agree in the definitions, I will not contend about any name.

And I confess if you could prove that Indi-
Indivisibility is proper to any species, then it would be a contradiction for it to be that species, and yet to be divisible, and so it would be no act of Omnipotency to do it. But as in Materials, so as far as I can conceive in Spirituals, to make two into one is no change of the Nature of the things, nor to make one into two. This belongs to Individuation, and not to specification.

Who can doubt but God being all in all things, he is as intimate to us as our Souls to our bodies, and more: And tho the Schools commonly say, that God hath no Accidents, pardon my dissent who doubt not he hath the accidents of Relations, and dare not say that all the world is not Dei Accidens, while in him we live, and move, and have our being: for I will not, and I do not think that it is Pars Dei, as if he were but Anima mundi, and yet I will not say that the world hath no entity or substance; nor yet that the entity of God and the world, is more than the entity (or substance) of God alone; for to be Minor or Pars is below God. But Accidents though no parts are substantia accidentia. And though I think the Fryar (Benedictus de Benedictis) in Regula Perfectionis speaketh fanatically when he ta-
keth it to be perfection to suppose we see and know no being but God; yet we must know nothing quite separate from God, and that hath not some dependent union with him. And yet while all things are in God, and so inseparable from him that nothing but annihilation can totally separate them, yet they are multitudes in themselves, and wicked Men and Devils are separated from the influx of his Grace and Glory. And the human nature of Christ hath some nearer union with God than other Creatures have. And so I doubt not but every Creature is so united to the universe, that nothing but annihilation can totally separate it from the rest; and yet this is consistent with individuation. I remember when I told him, whom you so oft mention of Augustines words de Anima, in which he seemeth to favour the saying that [All Souls are one, and yet many] rather than that [All Souls are one and not many] or [many and not one] he seemed much taken with it: all which I mention to infer that there is a separabili-
ty (from God and the universe) which is no way possible but by annihilation; and in compounds some separation of parts will change the species; and if it were proveable which Aquinas holds, that no two
two Angels are not of distinct Species, then every alteration of the individual might alter the Species; but yet it wo'd be a Spirit.

And I have long thought that so much selfishness as is our sin or imperfection, is a potent cause of making all men more regardful of Individuation and fearful of losing it by Union of Spirits than they ought; and that holy Souls will be nearer one with Christ and one another than we can here desire or conceive; and yet Individuation secundum quid at least, shall be continued. But yet I say, while there is numerus animarum, and it is uncertain whether also each Orb hath not one, and you plead for Amplitude, and Minority, (Quantity) and the Bodies animated may as vastly differ as a Flea, or a Wren, or a Pigmy, and the Sun, it is quite above my reach to know that a change of Individuals, by making one many, or many one, is a contradiction, and so impossible.

And as to Penetrability I repeat, that seeing by Penetration I suppose you mean not piercing inter partes, but possessing the same place with other things, and contraction of itself, into less amplitude, as I know not how a thing that hath no parts (and that extra partes) can contract itself into less space, (which is to contract parts that
that are no parts) so I cannot see but such Contraction and Colocality must needs be limited, so as that all the World cannot be deserted and mortified by all Spirits Contraction to one narrow space; nor yet that at once every Spirit is everywhere; and when the Contraction and Colocality is come to the narrowest possible, in that state Spirits must needs be further in penetrable, that is, no more can be in that space.

So that while I am past doubt, that God hath made Spirits of no kind of parts but what do naturally abhor separation, and so are inseparable, unless God will separate them, and so there is no fear of altering the Individuation much less the species of Souls; I there stop and will put no more into my definitions of Souls or Spirits than I know, at least as strongly probable, much less by laying the formal Essence on a Composition of hard & doubtful words, tempt all to believe that the very Being of Spirits is as doubtful as those words are.

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Ad Sect. XXIII.

§1. You said, [That a Spirit is Ens, ideoque verum, and that True im-
plieth a right matter and forms duly conjoin-
ed.] To which I said, [Do you not here make Spirits material?] You answered, [I do not make Spirits material in any sense derogatory to their Nature and Perfections.] Reply. Nor do those that I excused; so then after all these Sections, you make Spirits consist of Matter and form, in a sense agreeable to their nature and perfection: And so de nomine, you come nearer those that you accuse than I do.

§ 2. But you say, [That Matter and Form I there speak of, is a Matter and Form that belongs to Ens quatenus Ens---in a most general notion prescinded from all kinds of Being whatever, and therefore belongs to Beings Immaterial.]

Ans. If you may say Quidvis de quovis, lay not too great stress on words. Ens quatenus Ens hath no Form, nor proper Matter. Ens is that terminus incomplexus, to whose Conception all other are resolved. Therefore every other conception incomplex or complex, must add somewhat to it. It can be no Genu, or Species: If it have any kind of Matter and Form it is more than Ens quatenus Ens: And sure that which is [prescinded from all particular kinds of Being, is prescinded from Material and Immaterial, unless the word [parti-

G 4 cular]
cular] be a Cothurnus. To say that Ens hath Matter and Form, is to say more than Ens, a most general notion, as you call it.

But if Ens as the most general notion, have Matter and Form, then so hath Spirits, and every subordinate; for the general is in them all.

§ 3. But you say, [It's only materia & forma logica.] To which I answered before. That's but to say, It is notio secunda, which if it be not fitted ad primam, or ut signum ad rem significandam, it is false. And we suppose you to mean to speak truly and aptly. If you should mean neither materia ex qua, nor in qua, but circa quam, so Form may be Matter.

§ 4. You say, [Nor is the Form adjointed in a Physical Sense to the Matter, unless where the Form and Matter are Substances really distinct.

Ans. 1. I believe not this to be true: If it be, then only Compounds have Form and Matter; but I think Simples have Matter and Form, that are not two Substances but one. As I have oft said, Dr. Glisson after others most subtilly laboureth to prove it of every simple Substance, that its Matter and Form are not compounding parts, but Conceptus inadeguati: If the Intellect compound and divide its own
own Conceptions that maketh not a real Composition of two Substances in the objects, but as the Scotists call it, of two Formalities, or Conceptus objectivi: which if you will call a Logical Composition or Intellectual, if you explain it, the matter is small. But besides that Earth, Water and Air have their Matter and differing Forms, which are not two Substances, so hath Fire in a more noble sense if it be material: And by your Application of the word [Physical] you seem to extend it to Spirits: And if so, I am past doubt that the Substance and Form of Spirits are not two distinct conjoined Substances.

Too many Logicians have hitherto taken the Potentia naturalis, or Faculties of the Soul to be accidents in the Predicament of Quality: Let them call them Qualities if they please, but the Scotists have fully prov'd them to be no Accidents, but the formal Essence of the Soul, (and I have answered all Zabarell's Arguments ubi sup.) And this Virtus formalis, (vel facultas, vel potentia activa) is not a Substance joined to a Substance, but the form of a simple Substance. But I perceive by your next words that you approve all this, and speak only of mental Composition as to Spirits. And I say that the Mind should
should conceive, and the Tongue speak of things as they are, and not at once deny Materiality to Spirits, and call them Logically material; or at least bear with others that say but the same. If Logical Matter speak not Substantiality at least, it is delusive.

Your Interminata amplitudo sounds so like Infinita, that I am not willing to say that no Spirit hath any Terminos Substantia.

Ad Sect. XXXIII, XXXIV.

The Conclusion.

§ 1. You say that I wrote not so curtly, but that I have sufficiently conveyed my mind to you. I ans. I would have done so, had I dream'd of your Printing it. But that I did not, appeareth by your grand Mistake, as if I had asserted that materiality of Spirits which is proper to Bodies.

§ 2. As in all, our difference lieth in a much smaller matter than you thought. So in your great design of convincing the blinded Sadduces of this Age, and in the truly pious Conclusion in your 34. Sect. I not only agree with you, but in my own name, and many others, humbly render you unfeigned Thanks.

§ 3. And because I would not seem more distant from you than I am, I shall first tell you, that on these Subjects your thoughts and mine have been so long working to the same ends & much in the same way, that, 1655. your Book against
against Atheism and my popular discourses of the unreasonableleness of Infidelity coming out together, we both used many of the same Histories of Apparitions, Witches, &c. for Confirmation; and in that Book of yours, you have these following words, which if they are not (as I think they are not) mischievous, it's like mine of the same importance are not so, nor are more so proved by you than your own.

Antid. Li. p. 17. [The parts of a Spirit can be no more separated though they be dilated, than you can cut off the Rays of the Sun by a pair of Scissars made of pellucide Crystal.]

Appen. p. 304. [Suppose a point of Light, from which rays out a luminous Orb according to the known Principles of Optiques: This Orb of Light doth very much resemble the Nature of a Spirit, which is diffused and extended, and yet indivisible: For we'll suppose in this Spirit the Center of Life to be indivisible, and yet to diffuse itself by a kind of circumscribed Omnipotency, as the point of Light is discernible in every point of the luminous Sphere. And yet supposing that central lucid point indivisible, there is nothing divisible in all that Sphere of Light. For it is ridiculous to think of any Engine or Art whatsoever to separate the luminous Rays from the shining Center, and keep them apart by themselves, as any man will acknowledge that does but consider the thing we speak of. Now there is no difficulty to imagine such an Orb as this, as Substance as well as a Quality. And indeed this Sphere of Light itself, is not inhering in any Subject in the place it occupieth, looks far more like a Substance than any Accident. And what we fancied unadvisedly to befall Light and Colours, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in Spiritual Substances, whose central Essence spreads out into a secondary Substance, as the
luminous Rays are conceived to shoot out from a lucid point. From whence we are enabled to return an Answer to the greatest difficulty in the foregoing Objection, viz. That the conceived parts in a Spirit have an inseparable dependance on the central Essence, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an extension of this whole substantial power, yet one part is not separable or discernible from another, but the entire Substance, as well secondary as primary, or central, is indivisible. But let us again cast our Eyes on this lucid point and radiant Orb we have made use of: It is manifest that those Rays that are hindered from shooting out so far as they would, need not lose their Virtue or Being, but only be reflected back toward their shining Center: and the Obstacle being removed they may shoot out to their full length again: so that there is no Generation of a new Ray. ——

And p. 357. [When I speak of Indivisibility that imagination create not new troubles to herself, I mean not such an Indivisibility as is fancied in a Mathematical point, but as we conceive in a Sphere of Light made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that Sphere or Orb of Light, though it be in some sense extended, yet it is truly indivisible, supposing the Center such. For there is no means imaginable to discern or separate any one Ray of this Orb, and keep it apart by itself disjoined from the Center.

Now a little to invert the Property of this luminous Orb, when we would apply it to a Soul or Spirit: As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is necessarily in every part of the Orb, so there is also that Unity and Indivisibility of the exterior parts, if I may so call them, of a Spirit or Soul, with their inmost Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of Life is
is thereby also necessarily affected, and these exterior parts of the Soul being affected by the parts of the Object with such Circumstances as they are in; the inward Center receives all so circumstances, that it hath necessarily the entire and unconfused Images of things without, though they be contrived into so small a compass, and are in the very Center of this Spiritual Substance: This Symbolical Representation I used before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better set off the nature of a Spirit, &c.]

Here is the same and more than I have said, unless you think Light here to be no Fire; but take Light for a Substance, and Fire but for Motion: which if you say, I am willing to believe you will recall.

And that a Spirit is in its Contraction impenetrable, let your words testify, p. 312,

"Γνωστε ἴσος: I define thus: A Power in a Spirit of offering so near to a corporeal Emanation from the Center of Life, that it will so perfectly fill the Receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impossible for any other Spirit to possess the same, and of hereby becoming so firmly and closely united to a Body, as both to actuate and be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.

So here is a Spirit when it hath filled a Body, that can no more be penetrated by another Spirit or Body; and so in this contracted state is impenetrable. So that this is but bringing diffused parts closer together, and then no other can be in the same place. And is this the necessary Form of a Spirit?

But may not this extension and Indivisibility also be omitted as too hard, without all the mischief mentioned by you, and a truer notifying Form found out?

Let
Let us hear your self, p. 359. [To prevent all such Cavils we shall omit the Spinosities of the Extension or Indivisibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus: That the manifold Contradictions and Repugnancies we find in the nature of matter, to be able to either think or spontaneously to move itself, do well assure us that these operations belong not to it, but to some other substance: Wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an immaterial Being really distinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul: The speculation of whose bare Essence, though it may well puzzle us, yet those properties that we find incompatibile to a Body, do sufficiently inform us of the different Nature thereof: for it is plain she is a Substance induced with the power of Cognition, that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects, as also of penetrating and spontaneously moving of a Body; which properties are as immediate to her as impermeability and separability of parts to the matter, and we are not to demand the cause of the one any more than of the other.]

So here we have the true Form as sufficient notice.

And if voluntary Motion be proper to a Spirit, I think meer Fire (Solar or Aethereal) is no Spirit; But if all self-moving Power be proper to a Spirit, Fire is a Spirit. And from the Form will I denominate, while you oft tell us, that the Essence of Substance is unknown. (By Essence meaning somewhat else than that which I can fully prove to be the Form.

To conclude, there are these different Opinions before us.

I. That the whole Entity or Conceptus realis of a Spirit is Virtus vitalis, and is mera forma, or
or rather simplex actus Entitatus; and that Substantia is added not as a partial real Conceptus, but as respective, to notice that this Virtus vitalis is no Accident, but a thing that may subsist of itself. Some hold this true only of God, and some of all Spirits: If this be true, your notions of Penetrability and Indivisibility are most easily defended.

II. That Spirits have two inadequate, real Conceptus, and that Substantia is the fundamental as truly as materia is in mere Bodies, and an incomprehensible purity of Substance (or that it is Immaterial, not having partes extra partes with the trine dimension) is Substantiae dispositio; (yet that this hath degrees as the Forms have, all Spirits not being of equal Purity;) And that Virtus vitalis is the partial Conceptus, viz. Formalis. And this I encline to, as to created Spirits.

III. That the Conceptus formalis of Spirit is this Virtus vitalis, vel motiva, perceptiva, appetitiva, but that all Matter is essentially informed by that Vitality, and so Matter and Vitality are the inadequate Conceptus of every Substance, and that not by Composition, but as of one simple thing. And this is Dr. Glisson's and some others.

IV. That a Spirit is both a real Substance, (as the fundamental Conceptus) and informed both by Immateriality, Penetrability, and Indiscernibility, and also by a vital and moving Power: But that it existeth only in Bodies or Matter, and so always makes up a Compound of two Substances, (saving that God is infinite, beyond all Matter.) And that all such Spirits
Spirits were at first made together indivisible Individuals, both that of the least Creature and of the greatest, but changed from Body to Body, and so are parts of Animals. This I suppose is your Opinion.

Our chief difference is, that I profess to be ignorant of the Consistency and Incorporation which you talk of, and must be so: Though I am assured of the Substantiality and Form, which satisfieth me; for Christ knoweth all the rest for me.

FINIS.